SRID Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

• 1538

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)): I'll call to order this meeting of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. As the witnesses know, we've had a pretty hectic time here the last couple of weeks, and I think other members will be wandering in. It will be nice to hear your presentation and have this conducted in a timely fashion, since I believe we'll be having votes at 5.30 p.m.

As the witnesses will know, the subcommittee has been very interested in the challenges facing Africa, and it has decided to identify an issue related to human security in Africa that the committee can pursue and can make recommendations to government on.

One suggestion that has emerged from our hearings is exploring the role of civil society in Africa, particularly in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where, as a result of conflict, people cannot always rely on government assistance. Given the complexity of the conflict in the Congo, however, one member has wondered whether such a study would be possible or useful—I believe that was Madame Debien—and is having a few doubts.

The UN Security Council spent the month of January discussing African issues, including the situation in the Congo, and Canada announced a contribution of some $2.5 million to assist the peace process there. Several weeks ago, we heard from a number of representatives of Congolese groups in Canada in order to get an understanding of the range of views on the challenges facing the Congo. I must admit the views were diversified. I think we had four witnesses and four different views.

• 1540

Today we have representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and from CIDA. They're here to give us an overview of the situation in the Congo, Canadian policy towards that country, and a sense of the possible role that Canada can play in improving the lives of people there even as the peace process becomes entrenched.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses today. We have with us Joseph Caron, the assistant deputy minister for Asia-Pacific and Africa; Sandelle Scrimshaw, who, other than being my seatmate on a plane that we met on at one time, is the director general of the African bureau; Philippe Beaulne, deputy director of the West and Central Africa division; and Rolando Bahamondes, from CIDA, where he is regional analyst for Central Africa and the Great Lakes in the Africa and Middle East branch.

Mr. Caron, I believe you were going to begin the presentation.

Mr. Joseph Caron (Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia-Pacific and Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Yes, thank you, Madam Chairman.

Let me confine my remarks to the genesis, if you like, of the current situation that exists in the greater area of Central Africa, touch a bit on our interests, and then make a few comments on the civil society side. We'll then turn to CIDA for a more detailed discussion of what we're doing for civil society, because the funding is largely from CIDA, of course.

If you ask Canadians what the most important countries in the world are, or what the most important continents are for Canadian interests, they will generally point first to the United States and then maybe to Western Europe or Japan, China and Asia. But if you ask Canadians what Canada should be doing and where we should be active in terms of our diplomacy, and on what kinds of issues Canada should focus its attention, they will point to development, human rights, good governance, and a projection of Canadian values and indeed achievement of Canadian values and benefits around the world. So while Africa may not be the first region or continent that they think of when you pose the first question, it is of course the scene, the stage for many of the types of concerns that Canadians feel we should be most active on as a country in our international relations.

[Translation]

To really understand the situation in the heart of Africa, including the crisis situation that's mainly concentrated in the Congo, you have to do a bit of history. The major part of Africa was explored by the Westerners. Perhaps you know the English expression "the scramble for Africa", that exactly describes what happened in the XIXth century. The territory we are mainly concentrating on today is the Congo and the neighbouring region which are at the centre of that famous scramble, this quest for colonies.

As you know, the Congo was a Belgian colony. Congo- Brazzaville, that was up north, was a French colony. Cameroon was in turn a French and British colony. The Central African Republic was a French colony. East of the centre, Uganda was a British colony while Rwanda-Burundi at different times was under the influence of the Germans, Belgians and the French. When you go down south, you can see British influence. West, we have Angola which was under the Portuguese. This whole region inherited all kinds of different interests that can be either a source of co-operation or conflict.

• 1545

The Congo is a huge country in the centre of Africa. It is the third largest after Sudan and South Africa.

[English]

It has about 60 million people, which means it has about twice the population of Canada in an area comparable to that of Quebec and Ontario in Canada. It is an area of immense natural resources and natural wealth, but in the modern world lots of natural wealth and 25¢ will get you a cup of coffee, because natural resources alone are not enough. They have to be supplemented by working states, working institutions, transportation systems, communications systems, reliable tax systems, etc. To convert that potential wealth requires development, and to have development you can't have conflict.

The region is absolutely at the centre of a band of conflict extending from the Horn of Africa, where you have currently a conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Somalia has been in a state of considerable disorder for the last fifteen to twenty years. Uganda itself is relatively stable, but it is subject to the actions of guerrilla groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces, which contest the Museveni government, with some of that contention being ethnically based. Rwanda and Burundi have been subject to tremendous internal turmoil, of course, the most dramatic, unfortunate, and indeed catastrophic being the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Burundi is still in the grips of a civil war. When we go west to Angola, Angola itself remains in the grip of its own civil war. And each of these conflicts has as its back door, if you like, the Congo region itself.

As I said, Congo was a Belgian colony

[Translation]

from 1965 to 1996 and was governed by President Sese Seho Mobutu, infamous for his corruption, and who did not contribute—that's the least one can say—to the development of his own country. The region was affected by instability as well as the impact of the ethnic crisis in Rwanda.

[English]

I don't know if everyone recognizes where Rwanda is on the map. It's sort of in the middle, towards the east. The ethnic conflict that took place there in 1994 spilled over very dramatically into the eastern part of the Congo. The forces that were responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, which were politically motivated, the most famous group being referred to as Interamwe or the Rwandan military,

[Translation]

the Rwandan Armed Forces,

[English]

were forced out of the country. They were overwhelmingly Hutu groups, and they were forced out by overwhelmingly Tutsi forces that now largely constitute the government under President Bizimungu and Vice-President Paul Kagame. By pushing those forces into eastern Zaire at the time, they precipitated a chain reaction of events in that they carried their conflict into the eastern part of the then Zaire. At the same time, Burundi, which is the small state just south of Rwanda, was going through its own Tutsi-Hutu conflicts, and substantial numbers of Hutus moved into eastern Zaire to escape the Tutsi forces in Burundi and to regroup and prepare themselves for attacking anew.

• 1550

All of this movement of populations ultimately led to the creation of a large group in the Congo—a large reaction, if you like, and the creation of a group entitled Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, or the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire.

While the initial objective was to deal with the instability in eastern Congo, it evolved into an effort by Congolese, but also by Rwandans and Ugandans, to destabilize and ultimately replace the Mobutu administration, because the Mobutu group was seen to be favouring the Hutu forces that had moved into eastern Zaire. If Rwanda and Uganda were to deal with this, they felt they ultimately had to control the forces of government in Zaire.

They chose a fellow by the name of Laurent Kabila to head this group. Kabila himself is from the southeast, from the Katanga area, and he led forces ultimately toward Kinshasa, capturing Kinshasa and overthrowing the Mobutu government. This gets more complicated; I'm trying to keep it simple.

All of this took place with the expectation of the countries in the east that they would ultimately be able to control the government of Kinshasa in the west. But Kabila was very distrustful of his allies. He turned against them and allied himself with—I'm oversimplifying here—among others, Hutu forces that had been chased out of Rwanda. He essentially went against those who had helped him get into Kinshasa.

In Kabila's efforts to win control of all of Zaire, which was again renamed the Congo, he obtained the support of Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe. They all sent forces into Zaire, into the Congo, to help him combat the Ugandans, the Rwandans, and the Hutu forces.

The Zimbabweans went into that combat for a variety of reasons. President Mugabe himself wished to exercise regional leadership, and he felt this would be some way of doing it. There is a tremendous wealth in the southeast of the Congo, so to have access to that wealth was very much to his benefit. Angola went in because their civil war was continuing and they wished to control the rebels, who could use the Congo as their rear area. So by supporting Kabila, he had a better chance of opposing the UNITA rebels out of Angola. Namibia essentially went in because they wished to exercise solidarity against the state that was threatened.

All of these countries are now fighting their own wars or are fighting the internal war in the Congo. The internal war has been precipitated by the fact that some Congolese forces, allying themselves to the Rwandans and the Ugandans, have formed three different groups that control different parts of the country. So there's this internal battle and then there are all of these external battles, if you like, all using, rather conveniently, the Congo for their wars.

It gets much more complicated, but I'm not sure we'd be further ahead by getting into a lot of detail.

[Translation]

The reaction of the international community to this situation was first mainly expressed by the Organization of African Unity which took the major initiative to try to develop a context of negotiations for the six warring countries, including Congo, and the internal forces in Congo that were fighting among themselves.

• 1555

Supported by the United Nations, last July 10 they signed an accord in the city of Lusaka, in Zambia, that has been called the Lusaka Accord since then. According to the terms of this agreement arrived at under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity with the support of the United Nations, signing parties agreed to respect a cease-fire, withdraw their troops, end their fighting, free the soldiers of the armed forces they were holding as hostages and eventually withdraw into their own countries and at the same time support inter-Congolese dialogue in order that the Congolese recover their territorial sovereignty and be able to live in peace and safety in their own country.

The Lusaka Accord, to date, has not been a huge success although it is still the one and only framework for any possible accord in the Congo. The inter-Congolese dialogue has no centralized dynamics. Many dialogues are going on at the same time and the Kabila government has not yet found the way to ensure its own security, on the one hand, and, on the other, to get the dialogue to progress so that the three groups of combatants can come to an agreement.

Rwanda is still looking for border safety which, in its opinion, is not being afforded. So it is refusing to withdraw its troops as are doing Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia whose troops are still in position.

In January, the United Nations, at the initiative of the Americans, attempted to bring in all the actors together in New York to try to get them to conclude a new accord or implement the accord that already exists. Seven heads of State came to participate in these discussions. Many friendly interested countries, Canada amongst them, represented by Mr. Axworthy, participated in these talks. To date, these efforts have not borne fruit and it has not been possible to set up dynamics that would sooner or later lead to the withdrawal of troops and a national dialogue.

In any case, the military situation is worsening. There are still armed forces in both countries that think they can win the war using military force to attain their respective objectives. Unfortunately, the situation is unchanged.

The United Nations made a commitment when they adopted their most recent resolution, Resolution 1291, to which you alluded, Madam Chair. When the situation is sufficiently stable and the Secretary General of the United Nations confirms that this stability actually does exist, up to 5,537 observers, support troops, transport and communications troops will be committed to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. Mr. Kofi Annan has still not indicated that this is the case. In effect, for some days now, everything seems to indicate that we are far from reaching a sufficiently stable situation on the ground for the troops, including a modest Canadian participation, to be deployed.

[English]

Let me just conclude that very ultra-simplified presentation. It helps to have a map in one's head, I guess.

With respect to the issue of civil society, there's one thing that works, or appears to work, reasonably well in the Congo. Let's say there are two important foundations. The first one is that the Congolese, by and large, are committed to national unity and their borders. There are no strong forces within the country that are calling for the dismantlement of the Congo. National unity, peace, sovereignty, safe and secure borders—everyone agrees on that. That's a start.

• 1600

The tools of the state—what we take for granted, in terms of roads getting fixed and taxes getting paid and spent—simply don't apply in the Congo. There are rural and regional administrations that work to some limited extent, but what does work is the emerging actors represented by civil society organizations. The churches are extremely important. Indeed, I will pass la parole in a couple of seconds, because it's important to identify some of the really important groups that are representing social, civil, religious, and with time, political interests, all of whom have to be engaged more or less in this national dialogue, which is the only ultimate source of stability for the Congo.

My final comment is that if there is an important role for Canada to play in the Congo, given our resources, our interest, our history, the presence of a Congolese diaspora in Canada, the interests of government, and the interests of development, it is very much with respect to civil society.

The Chair: Thank you.

Sandelle, are you making—

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes (Regional Analyst for Central Africa and the Great Lakes, Africa and Middle East Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I think the Congo is one of those countries where it is very difficult to separate the solution to the conflict and development. I think it's one of the reasons External Affairs and CIDA work so closely together on this particular file.

I'm not going to expand any more on the good presentation of Mr. Caron, but I will talk a little bit about CIDA's activities and the progression of those activities in the Congo...[Technical Difficulty—Editor]...in the 1980s particularly. We had a very traditional type of involvement with the Congo at the time. [Technical Difficulty—Editor]...and commitment to givern the country went on until the early 1990s, until President Mobutu...[Technical Difficulty—Editor]

Between 1992 and 1993, we basically we didn't have any programs in the Congo. We had a small Canada fund, but it just didn't work very well. After the arrival of President Kabila in 1997, Canada reconsidered its programming and its assistance to the Congo.

The Chair: Excuse me, may I just confer with Madame Debien?

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): The sound just keeps coming and going.

[English]

The Chair: The system seems to be coming and going, and they're having difficulty hearing Mr. Bahamondes.

Please continue.

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: As I was saying, in 1998 Canada, with most of the international community, decided to begin its development activities in the Congo once again. During the first year of President Kabila's government, he introduced a number of very forthcoming economic and social policies which, in a way, attracted the attention and support of the international community to the country.

Since the start of the war that Mr. Caron was referring to, I think activities have slowed down a little bit. In the case of Canada, we have maintained our programming since 1998. The government, for all purposes, is a symbol more than a government as we know it. I think the ministries and the institutions behind the government are nonfunctional. The country was devastated after 30 years of dictatorship under Mr. Mobutu. Not only the government, but the country's infrastructure, has been totally destroyed. The Congo, once peace comes back, will have to start from scratch, particularly in the development process.

• 1605

But as Mr. Caron was saying, one of the positive forces that has emerged from the process has been civil society. Indeed, all of our programming with the Congo, with the exception of some assistance we're giving to the Central Bank of the Congo, is delivered through civil society.

Our objective in the program is how to restore peace to the country. We have two major objectives in the way of interventions: one is the issue of human rights, democracy, and good governance. That's the major objective for us. The second one is to try to satisfy basic human needs. The needs of the country and of the population are enormous, and through both bilateral programs and multilateral contributions through international organizations we are trying to somehow respond to humanitarian assistance and also to try to build up the peace process.

I just wanted to illustrate a little bit the type of projects we have right now in the Congo. First of all, I would like to tell you that for the last three years, bilaterally speaking, we have disbursed or committed around $17 million, and another $10 million-plus has come from contributions through multilateral initiatives, largely of a humanitarian nature. But we have also some initiatives from the partnership branch. We are dealing with education and things of that nature.

Bilaterally speaking, as I mentioned to you, our focus is the issue of how we can support a process that will be conducive to a durable peace in the Congo. We have one particular fund, which we have developed with civil society, that supports the national dialogue in terms of moving toward the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which is one of the provisions in the Lusaka accord. Basically, the dialogue is to try to find a political solution to the conflict in the Congo.

Civil society, or

[Translation]

civil society,

[English]

as it's called in the Congo, is an equal partner, I would say, in the dialogue, along with the government and other political parties. I think it is essential that civil society be strengthened and supported in the process moving toward the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

We have another project called Support to Democracy. The project itself is a way to strengthen the institutional capacity of civil society to play a role at both the political level and the economic level.

Finally, another project along those lines is called the Democratic Development Support Project, in which we're trying to promote and protect human rights and strengthen popular participation in decision-making.

Again, the projects are short term in nature, but they have a longer vision, which is trying to support a role for civil society once peace is restored to the country.

As you may know, Minister Axworthy, at the general meeting of the Security Council in New York, announced a number of initiatives to support the peace process in the Congo. Among those there are two that CIDA is financing: one is support for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and the second is support for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.

In the case of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, our role is to support the role of the facilitator of the dialogue, Mr. Masire, an ex-president of Botswana, who is trying to facilitate the process leading toward the holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. He would also chair the proceedings of the dialogue. But I think the critical part is to see how you can get the parties talking together and how you can ensure that the participants do attend the dialogue when it's held. Again, I want to stress the fact that according to the Lusaka accord, the

[Translation]

Collectif des forces vives

[English]

or civil society, is an equal member in the process.

We are working right now on putting our support together. A number of other countries are also indirectly providing the support, and we are working together in that effort.

The second issue is child soldiers. This is a major problem in the Congo. An estimated 10,000 children had been enlisted in the army, and now there is an initiative, which is being led by UNICEF, to try to reintegrate these children into society. It's a major challenge, but it's an essential challenge. These are the youths, the future of the country. I think UNICEF has already significant experience in the region in terms of moving along this particular case.

• 1610

All in all, Madam Chair, what I wanted to say is that we have a small program in the Congo. The program is flexible. We have to adapt to the situation. Our main partner is civil society, and it will continue to be so, because it is the structure that functions, and it is the group that really has a vision as to how to bring peace back to the Congo.

Finally, we are in the process right now of reviewing our assistance to the Congo and to try to get prepared for when peace comes back and to develop now a base for future development.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are there any other presentations?

[Translation]

The Chair: Madam Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Lady and gentlemen, welcome to our committee. Last week, we heard people from the Congolese diaspora here, in Canada and more particularly from the members of the community living in Montreal. They spoke at length about the Montreal conference and its follow-up, in other words about the inter- Congolese dialogue, that I followed and that seemed an excellent initiative in my books.

I put a question to the witness concerning the issues involved. I asked him if we could talk about ethnic struggles in the case of these countries that are in conflict. He answered that the problem wasn't to be found at that level. He told me that those people had always lived as close neighbours. After that, I met other people in private who often go over there and work over there. [Editor's note: Technical problems]... the main cause of that conflict is poverty. Poverty is at the root of it. It's a bit contradictory because there are major natural resources in the region. The dictators took the wealth for themselves and endemic corruption thrived while the populations were left to themselves and have been living for years in a state of extreme poverty. Their lands are less and less fertile because there are no infrastructures or tools to maintain them. Another important factor is the major population explosion. As land and food are needed, a certain number of borders are being crossed. Of course, when people cross borders, conflicts arise and the whole matter of appropriation of natural resources wells up.

These are the factors I was given as being at the basic root of that conflict. No one can deny that there were ethnic struggles between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Rwanda. However, it would seem that those ethnic struggles did not degenerate to become the cause of the conflict but rather, more fundamentally, the issues are poverty, population increase and the need for land. When you look at what is presently going on between the Lendus and the Hemas, that is way up north, it is clear that there is a struggle between two peoples, two ethnic groups, but it is not an ethnic struggle as such. It is essentially a struggle to take over land because of extreme poverty.

• 1615

I would like to hear what you have to say about that. Those explanations sound valid to me, but are they baseless or not?

I was given a document listing all the Canadian mining investments in the zone of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Five major Canadian companies are on that list and work there either as mining exploration companies or security companies, a bit like what we've seen with Talisman in Sudan. Mr. Axworthy told us that Talisman got its wrist slapped and that it should have taken the precaution of writing up a code of ethics to intervene. In the last issue of the Export Development Corporation's magazine, they say exactly the same thing. We have a superb example of what should not be done in Africa.

I would like CIDA, particularly the section that deals with industrial co-operation, to tell me how carefully they monitor these companies. In speaking to CIDA, which reports to the Minister, I am obviously also addressing myself to the Minister.

Mr. Joseph Caron: Your first question is so broad and so complex that each of us probably has a different and perhaps even contradictory opinion. I would, therefore, invite my colleagues to give their personal point of view.

As far as I'm concerned, I believe that conflicts of this magnitude rarely stem from one simple reason. I don't think that poverty in itself leads to such conflicts. The people are poor, they suffer from malnutrition and they don't have either the energy or the weapons to wage war. There are many other places in the world where there is just as much poverty, such as in Asia, in Bangladesh and in India. I don't think that poverty has necessarily caused the war. You have to look to reasons other than the dissatisfaction of the people, their deep-rooted malaise and the fact that their children are dying of starvation, although these reasons certainly can be exploited.

In the Congo, particularly in the eastern region of the country, where most of the conflicts are currently concentrated, a whole range of interests are colliding with each other. When you try to determine whether or not the conflict is primarily ethnic, you wind up in an old never-ending debate. We clearly know that some people, ambitious people and crooks, cite ethnic reasons to explain why groups are against each other.

Take, for instance, the situation of the Tutsi in Eastern Zaire over the past hundred years. When Mobutu was in power, there was discrimination against the Tutsis and they were not given citizenship. Eventually, they were given citizenship only to have it taken away later on. Today, this issue still remains uncertain. Such situations are certainly exploited by certain actors when it serves their purpose.

When you examine the conflicts that are occurring today, it is difficult to deny that some people are citing ethnic causes, but we must not forget that there are other reasons prompting them to say this, including purely business considerations and personal gain. There are also reasons related to national defence.

• 1620

The Government of Uganda will tell you that it is on the scene because it must protect itself against three gorilla groups which, whenever they can, attack the northwestern part of the country. The conflicts can be explained by many reasons. Underdevelopment and poverty are grounds that are readily cited by those people who want to promote their own interests. That is the way I see it.

Sandelle, I would invite you to give your opinion.

Ms. Sandelle Scrimshaw (Director General, Africa Bureau, Department of External Affairs and International Trade): I could add that we had a very interesting discussion about the cause of these problems with the new ambassadors of Rwanda and Burundi when they presented their credential letters recently. They both denied that the problem was related to ethnic reasons. They said that the Hutu and Tutsi had lived together for long periods of time and that their history had been marked by cycles of violence. According to them, it is a problem of governance. They believe that the governments are using the ethnic element as a political instrument enabling them to control the people. I believe that this is an important element.

When you couple these factors with the poverty that exists in Rwanda, the overpopulation with respect to the capacity of the land, as well as the people's dissatisfaction with government support in terms of infrastructures and social services, the climate is ripe for conflict.

Ms. Maud Debien: The government is fragmented, with a result that everyone is going his own way and everyone is king. Is that what you mean?

Ms. Sandelle Scrimshaw: As long as there is a government that does not reflect the will of the people, all of the people, and that is not accountable, the prevailing climate will be one where the demands grow stronger and stronger.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Gruending, welcome to the committee. I understand you're going to be doing the development aspect of the committee.

Mr. Dennis Gruending (Saskatoon—Rosetown—Biggar, NDP): Yes, I will.

The Chair: And it's your turn.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: Thank you.

Thank you very much for coming this afternoon. I have one question I would like to ask about CIDA's involvement.

You talk about delivering aid through civil society. We look at this from a distance and through television or reading. I remember reading Robert Kaplan's Coming Anarchy, and he's very pessimistic, especially about African countries. But could you give us a bit of a picture? When you say you deliver aid through civil society, who are these people and how possible is it for them to function in any normal way? Are they hampered from doing that by intimidation, danger, and violence? How easy or how possible is it for these people to work, even if you're helping them to work?

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: I have been personally involved with development for around 27 years, and to be honest with you, I've never seen a network of civil society institutions in the Congo as I have seen in this case.

I think civil society is an umbrella of institutions that not only touch the question of just governance or bringing peace back to the country, but also they are delivering services to the larger population. The government itself doesn't have the resources nor the structure to be able to provide basic health, education, and food to the people. The country is partitioned, and strangely enough, civil society has managed to find a way to work even within the occupied territories. So we're talking about a series of institutions, small organizations under a certain umbrella that really have a common voice and a common agenda, one in terms of living up to the Lusaka Peace Accord, ensuring that the government will participate by making their voice heard, which is one aspect of civil society. But again, there's another one, which deals with questions like providing basic credit for farmers, trying to support basic school education, building small schools.

• 1625

We don't have the capacity to send Canadians to work in the types of conditions that exist in the Congo. So the only way for us to ensure that our assistance is delivered to those who need it is not to go through government, because the government doesn't even have the institutional structure to be able to deliver that, but to go to these small organizations, provide sort of a large fund, as we call it, which is sort of a set of money they utilize, depending upon the projects they're going to finance, and in that way ensure that the little money we have to provide for the Congo will go not just to Kinshasa, but also to the other parts of the country to support education, agricultural development, small credit, micro-credit, even trying to start working on legislation on how to promote the role of women—the whole situation.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: If I may ask a quick follow-up to that, what I'm really interested in knowing is, can they do it given the situation and the circumstances in the country? I do not doubt the wisdom of going through civil society, but can they actually do it?

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: Yes, they can. The proof of that is not just Canada's approach to delivering assistance in that manner, it's the whole international community that uses this network of civil society institutions to deliver their own assistance. All the donors that I know of—the French, the Belgians, the Americans—are working through these institutions to deliver their assistance.

Again, it's a case that, at least to my personal knowledge, is really out of the ordinary. The capacity to organize, the capacity to deliver is very much there. We have evaluated our own projects, so we know the assistance is getting where it's going. That venue is utilized not only by Canada but by the whole international community, including United Nations organizations.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: I will ask this question, and any of you from Foreign Affairs may answer as you decide most fit.

When we talk about an observer mission, that we're in favour of a swift deployment of a strong UN observer mission, and we talk about having a senior officer there and we could contribute 10 military observers, it would seem to me then that our thinking and our plans in this area are quite modest, that we wouldn't see getting involved in some very large-scale way, such as had happened in Rwanda earlier on with some great difficulty. I'm curious to know what you see as our role there in this way, and if it would remain as modest as you have outlined here.

Mr. Joseph Caron: The context of that is as follows. The notion has been that, first, the United Nations had to demonstrate its support for Lusaka, and so there was an initial resolution that established MONUC, which is the UN operation there, and we've had a Canadian there, essentially from the outset, at the colonel level.

The next stage, which is what was approved on February 24, is a sort of phase two. Phase two is essentially the observing function, if you like, where I think—I stand to be corrected—the notion is that 500 observers and another 5,000 support troops, and so on, would underlie this observing function. That's what we're talking about here.

The third phase would be a much larger operation in the minds of many, which would be essentially to, first, observe to ensure that the ceasefire has taken effect and that the first elements of the Lusaka agreement are put into place, and then the next phase is the full realization of Lusaka.

We're very far from phase three, and indeed—I believe you weren't here when I mentioned this at the beginning—the current situation even makes phase two very difficult to deliver. Phase two is contingent on a judgment by the Secretary-General of the UN that the situation is sufficiently secure on the ground and the commitment to Lusaka is sufficiently clear that we are not putting our people in harm's way when we send them out as observers.

• 1630

The Congo is a huge country, and with 5,500 people in a huge country, you soon get them lost. It has no infrastructure, so you can observe only so far. You can observe the distance of the human sight and sound and whatever intelligence you are able to gather. People are extremely vulnerable under those circumstances if you spread them out in this vast territory that is the Congo. Until Kofi Annan and the people around him are satisfied—and indeed in Canada's case, until the Chief of the Defence Staff is also satisfied—that our people would be safe and secure, then they don't go.

As far as the 10 in 5,700 are concerned, which I think is the sense of your query, what we do increasingly, with some very important exceptions, the former Yugoslavia being the obvious one and East Timor also being a recent case, is we do not tend to send large.... In most operations our contribution has been more at the senior command level, at the top of either transportation or communications. That's where we see our functions to be most useful.

[Translation]

Since the Congo is first and foremost a francophone country, Canada's bilingual capabilities are obviously greatly appreciated, particularly in terms of communications. We have not yet determined what role our forces will be playing once they are on the ground. As I indicated, the decision to send them must be made at two levels.

[English]

Mr. Dennis Gruending: Do I have time for one more quick question?

The Chair: No, I'm sorry. But we will have time to get around to you again.

Mrs. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for coming to provide us with such information that will serve us in good stead as we progress on this.

I'm still grappling with the whole notion of the dialogue. If the people want peace, if those involved in the war say they want peace, what is the problem here? I don't fully understand that. If everybody agrees and they've all signed on to the accord.... Would you go back over what the problem is?

Mr. Joseph Caron: Would that life were so simple that a signature was, in the fullness of human intent, all that was required to concur with what you've signed. The fact of the matter is that the parties to the Lusaka accord obviously felt last summer that it was in their interests at the time to have a pause in the conflict, assess their respective positions, consider the position of the international community, and then decide what would happen.

Ms. Jean Augustine: So it was just a pause and not—

Mr. Joseph Caron: You're asking what I think has happened on the ground.

For one thing, the Lusaka accord is in a sense a very sophisticated, very complete document because it deals with many aspects of the conflict. It has a decision-making structure that is to oversee the implementation. One aspect, at a very simple level, is that Mr. Kabila says he's not going to proceed with his part of the deal until all the foreign troops are out. How can he have a dialogue intercongolais if half of his country is occupied by foreign troops and their Congolese allies. The Rwandans and the Ugandans, in particular, are saying, we're not going to pull out until we have a dialogue intercongolais that has resolved the situation, guarantees our borders, makes sure that all these guerrilla groups aren't going to come and attack. You have a classic case of a freeze.

To state the obvious, perhaps, they're still fighting. Obviously some people think they can still win points militarily.

Ms. Jean Augustine: So Mr. Masire's work then has not begun?

Mr. Joseph Caron: In fact it has. He's in the Congo, and we've been in contact with him. Mr. Beaulne met him recently. But he is just starting in his function, and he's not Congolese, of course; he's from Botswana. He doesn't speak French and doesn't have an infrastructure.

• 1635

One thing that perhaps hasn't been clear in either of our presentations so far is that while there are many elements of civil society—one thing we haven't talked about—all of the old political parties are still around. There is a tremendous lack of coherence, cohesion, and common vision among all of these players, including the civil society players. Some civil society members have a certain concept of how the country should be run, how the dialogue itself should be run, and what the role of the government is.

There was major dialogue of sorts held a couple of weeks ago, which lasted several days, under the auspices of the churches. Some of them invited Kabila's government to participate. Some walked out because Kabila's government was participating.

So you have to read Balzac and Dickens. You have all of the human tendencies at play, and they all agree that we have to have a dialogue, but they don't agree on who should be there, what the structure should be, and what the agenda should be. You got all that last week.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Yes, that was clearly outlined.

Is the United States an actor there—not the UN, the United States government?

Mr. Joseph Caron: Yes, that's a very important question.

The United States has been a bit of a “bad boy” at the UN in terms of not paying its dues, not being very supportive of a lot of UN peacekeeping, what we'd call peace-building action. But on this issue they have moved quite a bit, and in January it was very much at their instigation. Frankly, I think only the Americans could bring together all of the warring signatories. They were all sitting as you're sitting here in the same room. Of course their guys were fighting in the bushes, but they did bring them together. And the United States has of course very close ties with Uganda, for example, and Rwanda, and they have to play a role.

The participation of foreign actors may be crucial, indeed decisive in some cases, but without the will on the part of the principals it's pretty hard to force a solution, particularly in a situation that is so immensely complex as this one.

Ms. Jean Augustine: In terms of the support that we're giving to these civil society groups, are they on the right side of the issue, or are we funding regardless of which side of the...?

Mr. Joseph Caron: Let me reply, but we're counting on the wisdom of this group to tell us which side is the right side.

The Chair: Thank you for that.

That's a good lead-in for what I'm wanting to know. I think that when we see the civil wars—we saw them in Bosnia and Kosovo—we're generally in agreement that most of these wars.... You can talk about ethnic fighting and poverty as being causes, but ultimately it appears as though corruption and the quest for power and wealth are basically at the root of all of these things.

Africa is quite a contradiction. It has enormous wealth in its natural resources and, I would imagine, in its ability to farm and produce food, amongst other things. And yet we do see the most amount of poverty occurring in Africa, and I would assume that this also is a result of corrupt regimes. Upon listening to the history and the things that are going on, and having had witnesses, you want to throw up your hands and say, what can we do?

My question to you is do you believe there's a role for the Canadian parliamentarians in giving recommendations to the government to assist in the development of the civil society?

I think we all agree that the long-term solution is to educate everyone, and that once people are educated they can't be manipulated as easily. You were saying that there's going to be a review of the programs and what we've done there to assist the groups there that are makeshift groups of civil society. Do you see a role for us to be a part of that review, and who else should we be hearing from on this issue?

• 1640

Mr. Joseph Caron: There are several questions, and I invite my colleagues to contribute as well.

On the parliamentary role and the role of parliamentarians, there's a meeting actually going on at this very moment—it may be a bit late—until today anyway, in Lusaka.

Philippe, maybe you can elaborate a bit?

[Translation]

Mr. Philippe Beaulne (Deputy Director, West and Central Africa Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): We funded a symposium organized by various organizations, including Parliamentarians for Global Action. Right now two of our Canadian parliamentarians, Mr. Pratt and Mr. Guimond, are attending this symposium.

We wanted to bring together parliamentarians from various countries in the region, including some that are at war. There are 10 or so participating countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, Namibia and, of course, Zambia, because of Lusaka. A Congolese delegation also participated. We were looking for a way to get the parliaments and the legislative body to work together to resolve the conflicts in the region. A few hours ago, a declaration and an action plan were adopted which we will provide to you once we have the text. This is an example of what we can accomplish at the parliamentary level. I will now turn the floor over to my colleagues.

[English]

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: Thank you very much. If you'll allow me, Madam Chair, I would like to answer the question from Madam Augustine and then follow up, because they're very much linked together.

I think the question as to whether we have the right partners in the Congo is a very good one. The way CIDA works in terms of supporting civil societies is that we establish partnerhips within Canadian civil society and Congolese civil society. Indeed, perhaps we are not equipped to make that kind of judgment, but there are institutions in Canada—civil society, NGOs in Canada—that follow the Congo extremely closely and are actively working with these institutions in the Congo itself.

We established those partnerships, but I think also those institutions we work with we have been working with for quite some time, for the last three years basically, and we know they deliver. One could question perhaps the approach they use, but again I think there is a value in the work they're doing, which is in a way confirmed by Canadian partners and also by the work that other international institutions like CIDA or even multilateral institutions are doing with them. To the best of my knowledge, I think we are working with the right partners. That is, in a way, being confirmed through this process we were talking about, a revision of how CIDA supports development in the Congo.

How can the group participate? We do these program processes in a very open manner. Actually, we hold discussions with civil society and other interested Canadians when we are progressing in the programming process. I think the Congo is not an exception. We've already had a meeting with Canadian civil society back in November. I think we do intend again to try to call another meeting this coming spring. Certainly we are at your disposal if you want us to come and share with you the analyses and the way we are seeing the programming for the Congo for the next two or three years. We will be delighted to do so, or somebody can come and participate with civil society in those discussions. Again, we work in a very open, very transparent manner in terms of trying to bring a new programming process, precisely because Canadian civil society has a very strong interest in continuing to work in our program in the Congo.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you. Madame Debien.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien: Thank you, Madam Chair. I asked two questions earlier. The first question was answered, but not the second. Before you answer this question, I would like to share with you some observations and figures that were given to me and that I have just gone through.

• 1645

Between 1992 and 1998, Canadian mining interests in Africa rose by 50%, which is quite significant, and 30% of Canada's international mining investments are in Africa. Major Canadian corporations have set up shop in Africa, where they are engaged in mining operations.

However, CIDA is participating in the development of these private Canadian investments in the mining sector in Africa; not only is CIDA participating in the development of this sector, but it is also doing the groundwork. For example, I was told that in Botswana and in Zimbabwe, where diamonds are generating a great deal of interest, Canada provides more international assistance to the mining sector than any other country. In these countries, CIDA's role goes well beyond assistance in compiling an inventory of mineral or geological resources. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but in doing this, obviously, CIDA is helping to establish a mining department in Zimbabwe by training managers and employees. To give but one example, the School of Mining was supported by the Association of Canadian Community Colleges with the assistance of CIDA.

If there is a refusal to discuss CIDA's involvement in developing Canadian mining companies in Africa, I don't know what we're talking about. Obviously, this insistence helps Canadian mining corporations to get in the door. They therefore have easy access to the geological information of the country, they save both time and money and they find, within the governments and amongst those individuals trained in Canada by Canadians, people who are from the outset in favour of Canadian corporations and know-how.

I would like to ask CIDA questions about this matter. What is CIDA doing there? We are aware of the negative and dramatic impacts that such activities can cause. We had a very flagrant example with the Talisman corporation. I have here the names of Canadian companies that are operating there and they are either displacing the population or creating environmental disasters, and CIDA is indirectly involved. I find that intolerable.

Mr. Joseph Caron: I will give the floor to...

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: Thank you.

Thank you very much for your question. Unfortunately, I cannot speak for Botswana and Zimbabwe. I am responsible for the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. I can however make some general comments about CIDA's involvement in development in Africa.

I will send your question on to my CIDA colleagues. It is a good question, especially since there are now discussions underway on diamonds. Our role in Africa is to support development. Unfortunately...

Ms. Maud Debien: In mining.

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: Well, let's say that developing countries need to export and exploit their resources. I have no doubt that in Botswana and Zimbabwe mining is an important resource to exploit in terms of development. Without exporting their resources, these countries cannot import other goods. If mining in these countries is important and if there is an international market for these products, I think CIDA has a role to play. It must help these countries build their export capacity, be it in mining or other sectors.

At any rate, CIDA works in accordance with strict regulations. Our investments all comply with environmental rules, and the information that we gather on these projects belongs to the government with which we are working. We are working at a government institution to government level. So if we work with the Department of Mines in Botswana...

Ms. Maud Debien: With corrupt governments, of course. That is very interesting.

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: I understand, but it is very rare to find governments that are not corrupt in developing countries. That is the climate in which we work. As for the information and access to it by Canadian industry, it is not our information. The data belongs to the two governments, and I can assure you, Madam, that we do not give this information to the private sector. If companies want to obtain it, they have to ask the government, the Department of Mines.

• 1650

Of course, if there are consulting companies working for us in this area, they have access to the information, but as I already mentioned, the information belongs to the government on the receiving end; that is not us. At any rate, Madam, I will ask my colleagues in the Africa branch to examine your question. Unfortunately, I am not familiar with the situation in Botswana and Zimbabwe.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Maud Debien: I am not just talking about Botswana and Zimbabwe. Studies have been conducted, mainly by CIDA, by Elizabeth Smith, on the expansion of mining in Botswana and Zimbabwe, but many other studies have been published on the issue of exploration by Canadian mining companies in Africa which, in some of the roundabout ways I mentioned earlier, receive assistance from CIDA. That is what I find problematic. There was even mention of some community colleges in Canada.

I do not know if there are rules or codes of conduct. Of course, companies should adopt some. I think that is a priority, but as we know, it is not the case. We saw the situation heat up with Talisman. If we start delving into the matter, we will blow the lid right off it, and the Canadian mining industry will be left holding the bag, as will the Canadian government indirectly.

It is in that sense that I am asking my questions. I would like CIDA, the Minister or the authorities involved to settle once and for all this issue of codes of conduct and set out guidelines for businesses that set up shop in these countries, especially in Africa.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Caron.

[Translation]

Mr. Joseph Caron: If I may, I would like to add some comments. I am not an expert in development and I certainly don't want to speak in place of CIDA, but our department can provide its perspective.

First and foremost, Africa is vast, and it is true that there are some very corrupt regimes. Today we have talked mainly about regimes or non-regimes, States that are almost bankrupt, but there are some countries where things are going rather well, where they are moving towards democracy. We have just witnessed that in Senegal. We played an important role in the democratization of South Africa, Nigeria, etc. Obviously, the evolution of these countries is as slow or as fast as it might be in Canada or elsewhere.

The type of aid and our ODA policies for countries are not imposed on them unilaterally. They are programs that are developed in co-operation with them. They have their requests; if they correspond to our development objectives, we work with them and if they do not correspond, we do not. We no longer build, as we did in the past, big locks or bridges and roads. Today our involvement is different.

Ms. Maud Debien: Basic needs.

Mr. Joseph Caron: That is correct. Canada has a mining sector and experience in mining, geology, geomorphology, remote sensing, etc. which is the most sophisticated in the world. If a country does not have large tracts of agricultural land, or access to ports or an industry already, but has natural mining resources, it will ask Canada to help them develop its mines. That should not surprise anyone. Obviously, if we contribute to development, the companies that subsequently invest will benefit from Canada's role, whether they be British, American, Canadian, German or local.

But there are problems in some countries, and that is what you raised. Different things must be taken into account. You mentioned Talisman. That is the most well-known company, but Talisman is not alone. Mr. Axworthy is advocating the establishment of a code of social responsibility. It already exists. CanadianOxy, Canadian Occidental, is a world leader in developing performance codes for human rights. These codes are promoted by the company's board of directors and are implemented in countries as difficult as Nigeria.

• 1655

So there is some movement. I think your feeling that more must be done is justified. That is the approach we are adopting.

There is another dimension that must not be overlooked and that is very important. Some countries, even where there is conflict, face United Nations sanctions, whereas others do not. Where there are no United Nations sanctions, if the board of directors, the shareholders and the company's management, in the absence of the kind of stability that 99.9% of Canadian firms require, are prepared to go ahead, they will go ahead. As long as they are not violating Canadian law or multilateral sanctions, the instruments available to these governments are more limited. What is required is the kind of code we mentioned a few minutes ago. Shareholders and the media must be made aware. And that is exactly what is happening today.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Gruending.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: I'd like to bore down a little bit more on the civil society and the kind of work we're doing there.

As I look here, I see that through the Democratic Development Fund we encourage the holding of a national dialogue on the resolution of the conflict, and then under the support to democracy project, we talk of a national public campaign to support peace. We talk about strengthening institutional capacities and sensitizing public opinion. Later on we talk, under the democratic development support project, about supporting efforts of organizations to promote and protect women's rights and strengthen popular participation.

I'm still trying to picture how this works. It seems to me we're supporting a lot of dialogues, conferences, and sensitizing of public opinion, and I'm curious to know two things.

One, how freely can this be done? How freely can people go about sensitizing public opinion or promoting certain kinds of rights in the situation that exists there?

The second, I suppose, is around the choice of doing that as opposed to other things one might do, for example, more traditional sorts of things like wells, food, and certain kinds of agricultural development.

So I'm still trying to understand how all of this can occur and how it does occur with these groups, and second—I won't ask if this is the best use of money—what I'm getting at is, why this choice rather than others?

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: Thank you very much.

Regarding why this choice in place of others, I think one of the main objectives of our assistance to the Congo right now, as I mentioned to you at the beginning, is the question of ensuring good governance and human rights. If you don't have a society that has access to the law and has the right to participate in the process, you won't have democracy, ultimately. Don't get me wrong. The projects I gave you were an illustration of what we do. To me, those are the most current priorities vis-à-vis our support to civil society in the Congo. They are working among themselves. Yes, there are divisions, but there is a common voice to try to work toward the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and implementation of the Lusaka accord.

Without peace in the Congo, there's no sustainable development. Consequently, the way we see it is that we have to somehow try to create that capacity to dialogue and to participate in civil society to ensure they will have a place at the table. They do have it in terms of coming up with a solution to the conflict. That is the reason we are putting emphasis on that area.

How does it work? The country is at war, but I think it still functions. The institutions themselves have small units throughout the country that operate and function. They have umbrella organizations that bring the views of those little institutions from the country itself to the centre, to create that voice that I talk about in terms of civil society. But also, we do work on other areas. We are creating wells with Oxfam in Kinshasa. We are providing support for agricultural development through NGOs.

• 1700

So we're trying to find a way to operate in order to try in a way to contribute to the peace process. But also, as I was saying to you earlier, we're trying to develop a base from which we can sustain development in the longer term. Again, the choice is one that supports a short-term activity and a longer-term vision.... I think things have evolved over the last couple of years. This is the reason we are revising the program right now, trying to get the pieces together, to see where the Congo is moving toward and what the role of civil society is vis-à-vis the government, and come up with new programming over the next two or three years.

But as it stands right now, I think we have a two-pronged program: trying to support the peace process and trying to establish a base for future development.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: As a quick follow-up to that, then, are these civil society groups—you talk about 20 organizations in the Democratic Development Fund—able to carry out their work free of intimidation or danger, or is it a dangerous occupation for them to be doing this? How fully can they do what you're helping them to do?

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: I think security is an issue, and this is the reason we work with local organizations that are supposed to try to bring Canadian expertise into the country. But they manage that. I mean, they live with that. That's their everyday living. Certainly, in very hard security areas, basically there is is no access. But in the areas in which they can operate, they do operate.

But the question of security is an issue. It is an issue not just for us but for the rest of the international community. But it's the local organizations, the national organizations, that operate. They live with that on an everyday basis.

Mr. Dennis Gruending: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I have two questions, Madam Chair, that I'd like to pose.

Could you give us an idea as to the day-to-day life in Kinshasa? Is there a judiciary? Do they have courts? Do they have things? If someone commits a crime, do they have police on the street? What is the structure there? Could you draw something a little clearer for me in terms of the the day-to-day governance?

And if we are to make contact, is Kabila sitting in a presidential office with a telephone, a staff, and all of that, being able to respond? It's a simplistic question, but at the same time, I think it's an important one for us to really understand what happens there in terms of government and bilateral.... Is there anything of that kind?

My second question is, are we taking the chair of the Security Council in a week's time? Is the Congo on our agenda? How are we moving with this? Can you tell us anything in terms of the forward plans for April and in what direction Canada might be moving?

Mr. Joseph Caron: I'll ask Philippe, who was just in Kinshasa a week ago, to tell us if he picked up any tickets for jaywalking.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Or speeding tickets or anything like that.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: No, I didn't get any tickets for either jaywalking or speeding. I could have, but anyway....

First of all, life is difficult in Kinshasa for economic reasons, and it has always been difficult. This is not new. But the war has compounded the problems.

Mr. Caron referred earlier to the problem of infrastructure. There's very little infrastructure in the Congo. There is very little state, as one understands it, for services and so on.

• 1705

Kinshasa is quite a big city. They're not sure exactly what's the population, but it has maybe around 4 million or 5 million inhabitants. It is quite spread out. Because of the war, there's a problem with gasoline, so there's a problem with transport. People have problems getting from one place to another in Kinshasa, so they walk a lot. This has increased.

There's also a problem with the latest economic measures by the government, which have also compounded the economic difficulties.

You were referring to courts. There was never a very good or a very sound judicial system in the DRC or previously in Zaire, either under Mobutu or currently. There was a problem with military courts. After Kabila took over, he established military courts. One of the justifications was that very few courts were functioning, and that was a way of expediting things. It was quite contested, and I guess they did not apply what we would consider due process in the way cases were expedited. So the military courts are still functioning, but not as much as before.

I would say in the Congo there's relative anarchy in terms of what you can do. Rules are not really applied, but you have a lot of economic difficulties, and also you can have problems with authorities for different reasons. The regime has also established what they call comités de quartier, which do some policing, but also with a lot of intimidation.

So it's not a very easy picture for inhabitants. And we hear they're apparently starting to have malnutrition problems in some of the poorer neighbourhoods. I don't know if that gives you an idea.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Hospitals, schools?

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: Again, there were never a lot of hospitals. Because of the weakness of the state, a lot of the organizations, either churches or civil society or NGOs, were delivering some of the social services, including clinics and so on. But there's not a hospital system as such that is functioning.

Mr. Joseph Caron: With respect to Kabila himself, he occupies a riverside compound that was built by Mobutu. It isn't that lavish or anything. It's very pleasant, and there are public areas and private areas.

He is from, as I said, Katanga, in the south. He's a former guerrilla leader; he was in the bush for thirty years. So the habits he brought with him are those habits.

As for the people around him, he has a coterie of maybe six to ten very close associates who have been with him for a long time. These people are there for their loyalty and their absolute reliability in terms of his own security, because he was a victim of attempted assassination. They tried to kill him. So he brought the Katangese and they are there; they have tanks and they surround the area. But he circulates around quite a bit.

When you get beyond that to the cabinet level, people he's appointed to cabinet, there are some very good people who are well educated, understand the problems the country faces, and know how to deal with the IMF, the World Bank, aid donors, and countries that want to help the Congo. They want to do it for altruistic humanitarian reasons but also for raw, real political reasons, because that part of the continent is a disaster area. You have child soldiers and drugs and money-laundering and theft of raw materials and everything. So there are a lot of motives to be helpful, and there are people there who are competent, but they are deprived of the basic tools of state.

As I said, the personal surrounding of Kabila himself isn't necessarily made up of those people; it's made up of guys who were with him in the 1960s—including, by the way, Che Guevara. He had a relationship with Che. Che Guevara is not, however, in the Congo, just to quash any rumours.

Voices: Oh, oh!

• 1710

Mr. Joseph Caron: I think you had two questions.

Ms. Jean Augustine: The Security Council.

Mr. Joseph Caron: There are several layers to this. Monsieur Myiet, who heads the peacekeeping operations division, was just in the region. I think he briefed today in fact—

A voice: Yes.

Mr. Joseph Caron: —in a closed session to the Security Council, so we haven't had a report on that. It was just a few hours ago. Whatever comes out of that is going to flow into April, so there will be some generic, if you like, themes.

Sandelle has just reminded me we have indicated that we will raise the issue of the protection of civilians and the immense problem of internally displaced people. There are over 1 million of those, so we'll attempt to bring that onto the agenda as well.

The Chair: Thank you.

I just have a couple of questions. CIDA is giving $17 million in bilateral aid. Does Foreign Affairs spend more money in the region as well? And how does this $17 million compare to our total assistance to the region? The other thing I'm really interested in is, when we're talking about putting money into the reintegration of child soldiers, what is the mean age, the average age, of the population in Congo?

Mr. Rolando Bahamondes: The $17 million was a figure over three years. We don't have a fixed budget for the Congo as we do for other programs, precisely because of the conflict in the Congo. I cannot give you the figures—I don't have them in my mind right now—but I certainly will follow up and provide you the figures. To give you a comparable figure I would need the three-year disbursements by the Africa branch, and that I don't have in my mind right now. But I will definitely follow it up and provide you with those figures.

The Chair: Thank you.

And does DFAIT spend more money there?

Mr. Joseph Caron: No, we don't have those kinds of budgets.

We're just debating on the child soldiers.

Basically, with DFAIT, I think our total budget in Africa, for all of our posts, is something like $25 million or $30 million.

Ms. Sandelle Scrimshaw: That's an operational budget.

Mr. Joseph Caron: Yes, operational. That's what we spend in Africa, but that's to pay the electricity in the embassies and the staff and that sort of thing. We have some modest programming.

On the child soldiers....

Ms. Jean Augustine: There was a question today in the House that the foreign affairs minister answered. Or who answered? The Minister of National Defence answered a question today on child soldiers in Africa.

A voice: In Congo?

Ms. Jean Augustine: Well, I'm not too sure, but it was in Africa.

The Chair: It's my understanding that the population there is very young. It's a very young population.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: You're asking for the average age of the population?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: Well, there hasn't been a census in the DRC for probably three years, so there are no reliable figures, only estimates. That's why when we say 60 million, it's an estimate. It's the same thing for the population of Kinshasa.

It must be similar to elsewhere in Africa, so the average age must be somewhere around 20 or 25.

The Chair: When you have a very young population—

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: You were asking about child soldiers or population?

The Chair: Well, I mean, if you only have children or just barely above children in the nation, you're going to have child soldiers. I'm not sure how you can solve—

Mr. Joseph Caron: Child soldiers, I guess, include anyone under 15 or 14.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: Often they're pressed into armies starting at the age of 7 or 8. They do all kinds of chores and then eventually become combatants.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madame Debien.

[Translation]

Ms. Maud Debien: Mr. Beaulne, the new agenda for enforcement measures of the Lusaka Agreement, which you mentioned earlier on in your text, is scheduled for March. It is now March. It is not very realistic, if I understand you correctly.

Mr. Joseph Caron: The schedule is not realistic. What is realistic, but which has not yet been accomplished, is that it is a good framework. As I said earlier, the agreement is highly sophisticated. It is very long and deals with all of the key aspects of the conflict, but if there is no political will to carry it out, it will not be implemented.

• 1715

At present, the international community is focussing on the fact that the agreement is a framework for peace, and all of the factions have accepted it nominally. That is very important.

[English]

It's the only game in town.

[Translation]

Nothing else has credibility or the support of the United Nations. The United Nations resolutions refer to the Lusaka Agreement.

So there needs to be some diplomatic measures, some pressure and perhaps some defeats on the battleground which will result in the main players or some of the main players wanting to achieve the objectives that they set themselves, because they are the ones who negotiated that.

Ms. Maud Debien: We know that there is still conflict and sporadic violent eruptions despite the Lusaka Agreement. I was told that it is mainly due to mafia groups that do not want the Lusaka Agreement to be implemented because they have too much to lose. In your opinion, is that a gratuitous statement or one that can be verified?

Mr. Joseph Caron: I think it is a bit gratuitous. It is undeniable that some of the factions and perhaps even the leaders of these factions are getting richer.

Ms. Maud Debien: When I talked about mafia types, that is more or less what I meant.

Mr. Joseph Caron: That is part of the mix, if you will, but the soldiers are not marionettes. They must feel justified in their action. They must be paid. They do not want to lose their lives for nothing, whether they are from Canada or Zimbabwe. So yes, it is a motive, but it cannot be the only one. If it were the only motive, everyone would be mafioso all of the time. It is not the only deus ex machina at play, but it is undeniably there.

Ms. Maud Debien: I'd like to ask one last question of Mr. Beaulne. I was told, if I understood correctly, that you've just returned from Kinshasa.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: Yes.

Ms. Maud Debien: There has been discussion here on several occasions about parliamentarians conducting a mission there, and the Congolese expatriates have strongly encouraged us to go there.

In the context that you have just described, is it realistic to go there and meet people who are going to give us accurate information? We are not talking about meeting parliamentarians, but would it be possible and realistic to meet members of the civil society? If we want to get a good feel for the situation, will we be able to travel around easily? Will we be able to meet civil society stakeholders in a way that is safe and adequate for us and the people there? It's important. Since you have just come back and you have more recent information, do you think this is relevant?

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: Yes, it is possible to meet the various players. That can be arranged. Several delegations have gone there. Naturally, it depends on the goals and objectives of your mission and what you are seeking to accomplish in the field.

Now that is possible in Kinshasa, but outside Kinshasa it is very difficult, primarily due to infrastructure. You can drive for about an hour, and then you are in the bush. There is also a security issue if you travel by plane, because there is nevertheless a front line and battles that vary in intensity along it. You must also bear in mind that there is not a single conflict, but several. There are a dozen conflicts underway.

Ms. Maud Debien: In the region.

Mr. Philippe Beaulne: No, on Congolese soil. So yes, it is possible to meet with the various players in Kinshasa. Conditions are not easy over there.

[English]

The Chair: But would those be the most important ones? Would we possibly be able to meet some of the actors in the outlying areas better from one of the surrounding countries or several of the surrounding countries?

A witness: Well—

The Chair: Actually, you know what? I'm going to put that on hold, because we have a little more than ten minutes to get back to the vote. But Jim will be contacting you.

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You've been very, very informative. We appreciate your input, and we're counting on you to continue to give us some input and some guidance in our study.

Ms. Jean Augustine: I think we also should apologize. Some of our colleagues are very interested in Bill C-23, and that was the reason a few of them were not here. Everybody is interested in human rights usually, but they're pulled in various directions.

The Chair: Yes.

Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.