NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 16, 2000

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[English]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I call this meeting to order.

As you know, there will be bells very shortly in the House, a thirty-minute bell. The chair is going to be a little late. I was hoping we could start with our witness and perhaps hear some of the presentation before we get onto any other points of business.

So I'd ask our witness to come forward and take a chair, Mr. Douglas Bland, the chair of the defence management studies program at the school of policy studies.

Welcome, Dr. Bland. Whenever you're ready, please give us your presentation, and then we'll go to questions later. But I just want to inform you there are some motions going on in the House right now, so we'll probably be interrupted by a thirty-minute bell.

If you could start, we're most anxious to hear your presentation. You may proceed, sir.

Dr. Douglas Bland (Chair, Defence Management Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University): Thank you, Chairman. I'll try to say a few notes in a more or less extemporaneous way.

I'll begin by saying I think it's important that Parliament is considering this issue, because as far as I'm concerned, the revolution in military affairs, or the so-called revolution in military affairs, is a political issue; it's not a military issue or even a technical issue. It is essentially in the domain of defence policy-making, and that's what's important.

The first point I'd like to make is that in my view, the revolution in military affairs is an idea; it's not a fact. It doesn't actually exist. It's a contest of ideas, and it is the strength of the ideas that will determine whether there is going to be a revolution or not. But the influence of the idea of a military revolution will tend to favour particular policies, institutions, services, strategies, and defence policies. It's for this reason that it's important Parliament lead the discussion and not follow the discussion.

According to many of the people who study this business, if there is to be a significant revolution in military affairs in Canada, there needs to be a reordering or a re-placing of the way the Canadian defence establishment is organized. In other words, the revolution in military affairs is an organizing principle that will lead the defence policy debate in the country.

The revolution in military affairs may be filled with all sorts of interesting ideas about structures, institutions, policies, and strategies, but what is important for us and for Parliament is, what are the consequences of this idea for Canada and for Canadian defence policy?

I've said before that the revolution in military affairs is an idea and not a fact. It is in fact a framework of concepts, of ideas, about the nature of war, about politics, about assessment of current military capabilities and assumptions about future capabilities, and a number of other issues, and how all these issues fit together.

But one thing is sure about the revolution in military affairs: there is no sure definition of what it is. In fact the only reliable definition of the revolution in military affairs is that it is an idea without a definition.

It does have various faces, and what I thought I might do for a few moments in this presentation is talk about various images of the revolution in military affairs held by different types of people. What I want to do for you this afternoon, because I come from a policy school and I'm interested in defence management and defence organization, is try to come to some idea of how the idea of the revolution in military affairs is going to affect defence organizations and then defence policy. More to the point, whose idea about the revolution in military affairs is going to affect defence organization and defence policy?

So let me give you five images of what the revolution in military affairs is about.

The first one interestingly comes from the Soviet Union many years ago, when their leading military thinkers thought of the revolution in military affairs as a revolution in military doctrine. It's not about technology, but it's about doctrine and the way military assets are applied to the battlefield. In particular, what they were talking about at that time—and the Soviets first advanced these ideas—was that the battlefield had been reshaped from a structure with a front and flanks and lines into a three-dimensional if not a four-dimensional area. So for them, technology followed but doctrine led the discussion.

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The second image—and it's mostly a western image from advanced technical states—is that the revolution in military affairs is in fact a technical Rubicon across which lies some new world that has been transformed by science, and that this transformation will affect in unprecedented ways how warfare will be conducted. They argue that the fundamental character and the conduct of operation have been irrevocably changed, and we cannot depend much on past experience.

The third image talks about a revolution in the nature of warfare. Warfare over the centuries has been characterized as an activity of persistent, pervasive, and incurable uncertainty filled with frictions and fogs of war and so on. According to one image, the third image of the revolution in military affairs, that fog of war has been lifted. Now we can know all and see all, or from the other point of view, we can keep our opponents from knowing anything. It's changed fundamentally the way warfare, politics, and societies are going to relate to each other.

The fourth image of course is that there is no revolution at all, that nothing has actually changed and nothing is changing in a fundamental way, but that the introduction of new technologies to warfare is simply a predictable and incidental consequence of technical process; it's a process of adapting new technologies to current conditions. The former commanding general of the United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, General Van Riper, said he thought this romance with the revolution in military affairs came from a particular American faith in science's ability to engineer simple solutions to complex human problems. A writer in the United Kingdom thought the current romance with the revolution in military affairs was much like the romance with, if you will, the nuclear weapons in the 1950s—that the nuclear weapons were going to fundamentally change warfare forever. He thought overconfidence in nuclear weapons from the 1950s will be reflected in overconfidence in microchips in the present environment. These people from this image argue that the revolution in military affairs is nothing more than a mistaking of the ever-present evolution in military affairs for something it isn't.

Finally, there is the important image that the revolution in military affairs is actually about organization, or rather a bringing together of arrangements of weapons, information systems, units, command structures, and so on. As Eliot Cohen, from the United States, has written, “Revolution in military affairs is not about tools of war. It's about changing organization.” Another American wrote that the revolution can only be obtained, if it can be obtained, by adopting substantial changes in operational concepts and organizational structures at the centre, that critical modifications must be made in the nature of government decision-making and the location of decision-making within military structures.

Certainly all of these images form part of the reality of warfare in the future, but we're not sure how they all fit together. Most analysts believe the revolution will require policymakers and commanders to integrate if not unify within one structure technical, doctrinal, and organizational imperatives. Everything must change at once and together.

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What is important here from a political point of view and a bureaucratic point of view is, whose image is going to prevail in the long term? Who's going to define the problem of the military revolution and how it affects policy? The prize for these people will be predominance in defence decision-making, primacy in long-term procurement, control over the selection of national defence policy and national defence missions. Consequently, in some cases it will provide institutional life for some organizations over others.

The question or the combat or the conflict in ministries of defence about the organizing principle—whether we maintain the status quo that has been with us for more than 50 years and moderated slowly, or whether there's actually a revolution and therefore a need to change the organizing principle based on the assumptions of the revolution in military affairs—is a critical political problem. That's why it's important that it be discussed here.

Generally, two themes on this question are emerging in defence ministries. The first strategy is championed by those who see the revolution in military affairs as simply—if that's the right word—an evolution in military affairs, a continuing introduction, modification, and adaptation of new technologies to other established ways of doing things. As they'll argue, there's no deep transformation in the way states prepare for or wage war. Thus, there's no need to radically change the fundamental structure of national defence organizations—ministries of defence, for instance—to allow the wizards into critical decision-making processes, nor is the revolution in military affairs a new organizing principle for national defence in this country or any other country.

On the other hand, there are some who see the revolution as essentially an organizing principle, as the main idea for determining future policies, programs, and bureaucratic relationships—in essence, as a tool to shape ministries—for evolving strategic realities and for providing choices to government. According to these, the revolution in military affairs, as it is defined by zealots, perhaps, should be the prerequisite for organizing defence ministries, where organization in and of itself should be treated as a form of applied technology for war-fighting purposes, because technical superiority means little without organizational superiority.

From this idea flows the notion that ministries of defence must be organized with new actors in different types of organizations, using different defence decision-making processes suited to the information age, and that this new organizing principle will replace, if not dispose of, actors in the current system. What they argue is the system and ministries need more scientists, more technical people, more members of industry, more wizards in the decision-making process.

What these two strategies or ways of thinking about the revolution have done is set up a contest inside ministries and inside defence organizations across the western world. They may be seen as a threat to the established order, advancing technology over warriors, or even advancing one service, a technical service—perhaps the navy over the army—and I think we've seen that happening here.

How will we know if there's a revolution actually going on? How will we know if something is happening out there in the world? One way I look at it and one way to study this thing is to look at the present organization of a ministry of defence—National Defence Headquarters, if you will—to find out who are at present the senior authorities, who makes the decisions, not just in the formal sense but in the informal sense, who has authority, who has the power. You need to pay special attention to who bargains best, about whose policies are approved, which organization gets what, who decides who gets what. And when you look at the pool of national resources for national defence, are they rising or falling in one particular organization or one area? Who is deciding on the split?

Finally, to bring it into the notion of what is going on today, to measure if there is anything going on, you want to look for changes in these factors. For instance, are there observable changes in levels of authority within the Department of National Defence? Are senior scientists or members of industry being added to or removed from committee structures? Is the management process changing? Is the relationship between authorities changing? But mostly, who's getting the money? Who's getting the resources? Which service, which present organization, is getting something from the system because of the revolution in military affairs?

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Most people will agree that if there is no structural change of significance in ministries over a measured period, then there is no revolution in fact. Most would agree now, I think, that the safe course is a gradual integration of new technologies into standing organizations. So for those who believe deeply in a revolution in military affairs, this would be quite disheartening.

The outcome of the battle of ideas is a battle of power in the Department of National Defence, which will critically influence Canada in the future and the capabilities for defence in the next numbers of years. Therefore, as a I said at the beginning, I think it is encouraging that Parliament is looking at this issue, and I hope we can look at it from a political as well as a technical point of view.

Thank you very much.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you very much, Dr. Bland.

I want to indicate to the committee that if we don't have time for questions, the committee will have to decide to have the witness back. Right now we are hearing a half-hour bell, and we will have to go and vote, so we may not go....

The other method is for the members to submit written questions to the clerk to be relayed to the witness for response, but we prefer the live thing. So we hope we can invite you back if we don't have time for questions.

Before we go to questions, I have a notice from Mr. Hanger that he has a point of order. I'll take that first and go from there. Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, given the serious allegations made last week by the ombudsman, Mr. Marin, regarding the attitudes and actions of the Judge Advocate General's office, and given the recent motion by members of this committee to issue a declaration of support for the ombudsman, I would request or move that the JAG be invited to testify before this committee in order to fully comprehend his perception of the ombudsman's role vis-à-vis the legal and security branches of the Canadian Forces.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): I'll take that under notice, because that's a motion, and a motion requires 24 hours notice to the committee. I would accept a notice of motion that you wish to bring before the next meeting or take it under advisement. But a point of order deals with.... Well, you know what a point of order is, so—

Mr. Art Hanger: I know what a point of order is.

A voice: In both languages.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): In two official languages, yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: I know what a point of order is, Mr. Chairman.

The matter certainly has been broached by this committee before. When Mr. Marin testified before the committee, the issue of calling the JAG forward was brought up at that time. It's not that the committee is unaware of the situation. I haven't seen or heard anything from the committee since that day that the issue has been considered or that the JAG's office will in fact be represented here as soon as possible.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Well, I would suggest that you move a motion in both official languages, or give us a notice of motion now and move the motion at the next meeting and allow us to have it translated by our clerks and we'll vote on it at the next meeting. I take that to be a normal point of business with the committee.

Mr. Art Hanger: I'll do that.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): He's already done it.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Well, he's given us notice, so we'll deal with it at the next meeting. It will be circulated and interpreted—

Mr. Robert Bertrand: In 24 hours.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): It will be circulated in both official languages and we'll deal with it at the next meeting. A motion has to have 24 hours and it has to be in both official languages. Those are the rules, and we don't deviate, even if I'm in the chair and I'm a rookie. You're going to have to suffer through it.

At this point I'll go to the first round of questioning, a seven-minute round, starting with the Alliance party and then to the Bloc, then to the NDP and then to the Liberals. We'll see if we can get at least the first round in.

Mr. Hanger, are you ready to start your round?

Mr. Art Hanger: I am, indeed.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): You're on.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Thank you, Dr. Bland, for coming before the committee and giving us a viewpoint of this revolution in military affairs. I know there has been all kinds of discussion over the last several months regarding the revolution in military affairs.

In fact I have in my hand here an article written by Dr. Elinor Sloan, of the directorate of strategic analysis, National Defence Headquarters in Canada. And she has a rather interesting point of view, given the fact that she has concentrated on the revolution in military affairs as it pertains in the European context and comparing it to that of the United States. Nowhere in the article is Canada mentioned.

One of the points she brings up in here, which I find rather interesting, is her statement that the widening gap is partly due to substantially reduced defence budgets in western Europe countries. From what I know of the NATO countries as far as their budgets are concerned, many of those budgets surpass substantially what has been allotted here in Canada. Many of those budgets are over 2% of their GDP. In Canada I think our budget is somewhere at around the neighbourhood of 1.1% or 1.2% of our GDP. So if that gap is that wide in Europe as far as defence budgets are concerned and as far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, where does that leave Canada?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Mr. Hanger, I haven't read that article, although I have a great deal of respect for Dr. Sloan's work.

I would simply say that in many cases the defence budgets in European states have fallen. They may be more or less than ours, but they have fallen. Every state is wrestling with this difficulty of trying to improve or change their armed forces while budgets are falling. All that means is people are going to have to make choices between people, equipment, the present force, the future force, and so on. The less money you have to spend in your capital budget, the more difficult the choices are going to be.

How much spending makes a revolution I'm not sure, but what is quite clear in the Canadian case is that the armed forces we are going to have five years from now have already been established. The choices have been made. What we're talking about is the armed forces we're going to have five or six or seven years after that.

If there is, in my view, no substantial increase in the moneys allocated to capitalization of the armed forces, it will be difficult to join the revolution in any meaningful way, but it would be also, in my view, imprudent to take the money for that project from personnel spending or from necessary operations.

Mr. Art Hanger: Americans are leading the pack, I gather, in this so-called revolution, the technology innovation. You had mentioned reorganization of the military as being a prerequisite. I don't know where they fit into the big scheme of things. I would assume that matters such as that could not take place overnight; it would be over a period of time. And yet there seem to be certain needs to be compatible to support one another, and again I'm referring to our allies, needs such as rapid deployability, sustainability, advanced weapon systems and interoperability.

With Canada's present budget, where are we going to be sitting in five years? I know, from what I understand, that there is already a dangerous line drawn here when it comes to our position in terms of compatibility with our allies, but are we going to be in a better or worse position with our present budget?

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Dr. Douglas Bland: I would think that if the projections of the defence spending, as I understand it, are carried through in the next months and years, we will be in a similar position to what we are now. In other words, we'll have basically the same capabilities, but they will be older. The Hercs will be older, the helicopters will be older, the vehicles will be generally older. The Americans will in some respects have advanced in all these areas.

I don't think it's necessarily fair to us to compare ourselves with the United States, where they can send $5 billion on a missile defence system, which is half our budget. The scale and scope is entirely different.

In the sense of the remarks I made today, they are suffering, or engaged in, the same conversation at the bureaucratic-politics level that we are. The army necessarily wants to have more people, and they think that the nature of war is going to require feet on the ground. The air force and the navy look at it differently.

The division of the defence budget in the United States suffers from many of the things that we understand. I listened to an American colonel, from an armoured unit, complaining that his troops do not have adequate housing. Their families are suffering. They're not getting food and their quality of life is diminished. And in the next scene in this documentary, the chief of the American army was saying that's not such a big problem—we have to spend money for new technology.

These are familiar arguments to us. I think we need substantial changes to the funding for national defence if the policy is to maintain a high level of compatibility with the United States. But is that the policy?

Mr. Art Hanger: I certainly wasn't attempting to compare Canada with the United States. I'm very much aware that there's a wide gap between our budgets, our capabilities.

What I am saying is with the advances the Americans are proceeding along in this revolution, and if we as a country aren't keeping up technologically, even in a minor way, our compatibility isn't going to be there. When will we actually have a military that's irrelevant to the whole process? Is it going to be in five years?

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Just before you answer that, Mr. Hanger's out of time. I'm going to let you answer that as we go to Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

M. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): I was a bit shocked by what you first said this afternoon. You indicated that the revolution in military affairs was only an idea and that, actually, there was no such revolution. Yet, everybody realizes that war is not the way it was 10 or 20 years ago. There are much fewer arms of mass destruction. Today, war is waged on the information front, using sophisticated information tools, targets are reached through command guidance. I thought that was revolution in military affairs, but you say it's only a concept.

I hope we're not simply starting a war of words, If it's not a revolution, there's certainly something going on in military affairs nowadays. I don't know how you would term that, but most of the witnesses that appeared before this committee called that a revolution in military affairs. You also said that if there was a real revolution in military affairs, the whole Canadian Forces should be reorganized. Still, most of the witnesses also told us that the White Paper released in 1994, which gives the Forces strategic directions, is still up to date and relevant. I would like you to clarify your thoughts on these two issues.

[English]

Dr. Douglas Bland: Often, at least in my field, in defence studies, conversations can be overtaken by clichés and words that have not been very well defined. I'm suggesting that the term “revolution in military affairs” has no precise meaning that policy makers can grapple with. You can't just take those three words and do something. You have to make an interpretation of what revolution we're talking about.

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In the literature and in other states, capitals, and ministries of defence, you will find that there are contests between people who define the revolution in military affairs as something to do with technology, and if we just buy all the whiz-bang machinery, everything will change. Other authorities will argue that is not what's happening, that we are going to have all sorts of different capabilities, but it's not going to change warfare fundamentally.

One way I try to look at this is to say there are two facets to warfare. There's the nature of warfare. It's about fighting, combat, fear, running, honour, cowardice, and fight or flight—the same things that have been going on in warfare since the Peloponnesian Wars. It's no different in Kosovo, as you'll see perhaps in a few weeks. People are still beating each other in the same way. But there's another aspect of warfare, and that's the environment of warfare. What we use to make war on each other changes. The contest of ideas now, in some areas, is whether the nature of warfare has changed fundamentally, or whether it's just an adaptation to the environment. We have to be careful in policy-making that we don't destroy our capabilities to put soldiers in the field because we think machines are going to solve all our problems. They're not.

I believe you're going to Kosovo. You'll see soldiers performing missions in the field in much the same way they've done for perhaps centuries—maybe even in that area—although the Canadians will be mounted in brand-new high-tech machinery.

It's the bringing together of these two aspects of warfare that's important. What worries me sometimes is that zealots on one side or the other may capture the policy process and create an imbalance in defence policy and defence capabilities.

Mr. René Laurin: What about the white book?

Dr. Douglas Bland: Ah, the white paper. It's one of my favourite topics.

I think sometimes white papers are promissory notes we give to the people and our allies that will be paid eventually. They are statements of intent. You could make an argument that we are fulfilling the essence of the white paper, or we're not fulfilling it, but it's very hard to come up with a criterion that allows you to measure that. So I don't take too much stock in that. I'm interested in the next white paper.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): I want to thank the witness for the presentation. You certainly have given a little bit of a different perspective to this concept we've been looking at.

I too am interested in your discussion around whether there's really a revolution, or whether it's just an evolution we've named a revolution. You've given about five different concepts there, but I'm just wondering what your own opinion is. What do you lean toward? To me it seems that gradual changes are taking place and then we've given it this new name. We're calling it a revolution, whereas revolution is usually something that's more definitive, where someone takes the lead and actually brings about quite drastic change. It seems to me that technology has been involved for many years and we're slowly adapting to it. I'm just wondering which of those you personally are leaning toward, as what's happening in this whole concept.

Dr. Douglas Bland: I'm an academic, so I can be ambiguous, I guess.

I believe there is the possibility for significant change in the way advanced technological states can organize their armed forces and wage war on other people. How much advantage that will give to one state or the other when they're balanced—when they're both technical states—is something we don't know and may not find out for a very long time. But it changes the way we make war on lesser states, and that's going to cause a repercussion from those states in some manner.

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We saw—I thought it was fascinating—in the Kosovo campaign the initial discussion was the revolution and military affairs inaction. Missiles were raining down on tanks, destroying things all over the place, but we've discovered now that in many cases the revolution in military affairs was defeated by an old army trick of setting out decoys. Rubber tanks with microwave ovens inside to emit energy were used to attract missiles.

I think one aspect of the nature of war—the way it's been fought for many centuries—is that opponents will always find ways to adjust to circumstances. I think there is a revolution in military technology underway, but I would be very careful, if I were trying to decide where to put my money, about putting all my bets on microchips, when you may need soldiers in combat boots.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Mr. Earle, I let you in ahead of the government side because I wanted to be fair and make sure every opposition member got a question.

On the bell system, Dr. Bland, when there are two bells it's fifteen minutes. When it goes to three bells we wrap up, because that means we have five minutes.

Monsieur Bertrand.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay, thank you very much.

Dr. Bland, I'd like to have your views—you mentioned it a while ago—on NMD. As you know, this committee has been studying the question quite extensively, and I would just like to have your views on it.

Dr. Douglas Bland: I don't actually have many views on it. It's not my field and I haven't followed it in the literature. I've attended a few conferences where people have spoken about it. As one of my colleagues said to me today, it's an issue that almost everybody in Canada and the United States, officials included, wishes would go away.

In some respects it is an interesting example of the technical revolution in warfare moving forward, because it's just possible to make machinery that will shoot something out of the sky at great distances. So it seems inevitable that in an advanced technical society like the United States, with lots of money and scientists, they will seek out the frontiers of military technology. Doing that has put pressure on commanders and political leaders in the United States, and as a consequence it has flown over into our country.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Do you think the U.S. has the moral authority to go ahead with this?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think the United States has the traditional position of states and the right—even within the United Nations Charter—to self-defence, as they define it.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Bland, I just want to go back to the RMA for a couple of questions. Do you believe the Canadian Forces are doing enough to develop a strategic plan that builds on our current strength, while also allowing us to take required steps toward the future? In other words, are we doing what we should to get there on the RMA?

Dr. Douglas Bland: I think the Chief of Defence Staff and the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff have put out significant documents—Strategy 2020 and so on—that you're familiar with that set out a vision for the armed forces and what might have to be done. The only part of those documents I miss when I look through them is the dollar signs.

Strategy, for me, is a joining of ends and means. I see the ends, but I'm not sure of the means. I would hope to see in some documents, some day, a dollar sign for the vision, and we haven't seen that yet. At least I haven't seen it.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Last question. Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

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A lot of people are feeling these days that in terms of Minister Axworthy's human security agenda, some of the conflicts we'll be trying to deal with will be in Africa, as we've seen with Sierra Leone most recently. Do you think the RMA is going to help the Canadian Forces get over what could be described as their current allergy to things African?

Dr. Douglas Bland: That's interesting. I recall we had an experience in Africa in the Congo in the 1960s, which was very unfortunate and cost us some lives. I don't think the Canadian Forces have an allergy to actions anywhere. I think the Canadian people might have an allergy to action someplace, and I think they may be suffering—or are beginning to suffer—from peacekeeping weariness.

In going to places like Kosovo—at least in the image and myth of Canadians and not necessarily military people—they're there as saviours to lead the way and bring good to the world. To find that people are throwing rocks at you, and so on, dampens the enthusiasm for what's going on. As we saw in Somalia, Zaire, and other places, Canadians are tired of people who won't accept help. They're beginning to ask why we're doing these things.

If I may—just on the topic—relate the revolution in military affairs to what's been going on in Sierra Leone in the last few weeks, you'll notice it wasn't the high-tech, precision-guided munitions that brought stability to Sierra Leone this week; it was the airborne regiment in combat boots giving direction on the ground. That's the old revolution in military affairs. That's the capability Canada will need in spades if, as most of us predict, the kind of conflict we're going to be in will be not high-tech revolution warfare, but good old mudslinging blood and combat.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Dr. Bland, I want to take this opportunity to thank you very much for attending. I'm sorry our question period is shortened. We are called to the House to vote. We're within the five-minute bell now and have to go. But let me take this opportunity once again to thank you very much. I think we all managed to get a question in that was burning. We appreciate your answers and certainly your interest. Thank you very much, again.

The meeting is adjourned.