FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 10, 2000

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Colleagues, I'd like to start this hearing on Kosovo.

I'd first like to apologize to those who were kept waiting in the hall, but as you know, we had to finish a procedural meeting.

This is an important hearing for us, and we will be dealing with many complicated issues. We're pleased to have today for our opening meeting witnesses from the various departments, many of whom are, if I may say, old friends of this committee, because with the defence committee, we sat with them on a regular basis during the operations in Kosovo. They were good enough to come and give us the benefit of their experience and expertise at that time.

I also would like to draw to the attention of members of the committee that we're likely to have votes this morning; therefore we may be interrupted, so just bear that in mind. The clerk will keep an eye on the time, and we'll have to go ten minutes before the vote, if one is called.

• 0955

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I did want to raise one issue, particularly because the committee may be interrupted and because of the importance of the subject, the comprehensive nature of the subject, and the many witnesses we have before us. If members of the committee are not able to follow up with questions at this session, perhaps we might agree as a committee that we can submit those questions, through the chair of the committee, to the witnesses, and they would be asked to submit written responses back to the committee. Could we agree to that?

The Chair: Yes, I think the members of the panel... We wouldn't perhaps be able to do that when we have Canadian citizens and other groups coming, but I think particularly with government officials—

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm talking about this panel.

The Chair: They're more than happy to send us paper.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Maybe we could make Mr. Wright just send us paper.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: His silver tongue will tell us all.

Mr. Wright, would you be good enough to start by giving us your overview of where things stand now? We're primarily interested, or at least some of us are primarily interested, in knowing where we're going from here and how we can ameliorate the situation. There's a great deal in the press at the moment of the problems the operations are having in Kosovo, and we're anxious to hear about that, and we're also anxious to hear about the consequences of our actions there.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General, Central, East and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada): Mr. Chairman, honourable members, it's a delight to be back with all of you again to discuss Kosovo. I'll make my remarks as brief as possible, but I'm trying to provide an overview for the committee of what has happened and of the Canadian broad engagement, so I may go a little bit over the timeframe. But I've spoken with the other panellists here, and I think it will balance out in terms of the amount of time that's available to us.

Exactly eight months ago today, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1244, which created the framework for peace in Kosovo. At this juncture, it's important to remind ourselves what precipitated the crisis in Kosovo; why Canada, together with its NATO allies, decided to act; what progress has been made over the past several months; and what challenges remain.

Long before NATO's action, Kosovo was already a dysfunctional society, deeply marked by forty years of Communism and ten years of an incompetent and repressive regime. One year of open conflict between Serbs and Albanians in 1998-99 made a bad situation even worse.

For several years, the international community made every effort to encourage Yugoslavia to find a peaceful arrangement with its Albanian Kosovar population. Scores of diplomatic missions went to Belgrade. The UN Security Council, acting under chapter 7 of the UN charter, issued crucial resolutions identifying the conflict as a threat to peace and security in the region. Resolutions 1199 and 1203 of 1998 imposed a clear legal obligation for Yugoslavia to respect a ceasefire, to protect the civilian population, and to limit the deployment of its security forces in Kosovo. An OSCE verification mission designed to monitor the ceasefire and build confidence was deployed in October 1998.

Despite all these measures, however, the conflict intensified. An international peace conference was held in Rambouillet, France, and in a final effort to broker a solution, meetings went on for several months.

The international community gave diplomacy every chance to succeed. Yugoslavia, however, ultimately rejected dialogue and a peaceful solution.

[Translation]

While these diplomatic efforts were underway, Yugoslavia was ignoring its legal obligations in Kosovo, and was engaging in a massively disproportionate and often indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population. As Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, reported to the Security Council last May 5, more than one-quarter of all asylum requests in Europe in 1998 came from people from Kosovo. She reported to the UN that by March 23—the day before the air campaign began—the UNHCR had almost 500,000 Kosovars on its rolls: 90,000 refugees outside Kosovo, and 400,000 people displaced inside Kosovo.

• 1000

[English]

Sufficiently strong evidence of Belgrade's campaign of terror existed for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Madam Justice Louise Arbour, to take the unprecedented step of indicting a sitting head of state, President Slobodan Milosevic, along with four of his most senior officials, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The indictment recounts in chilling detail the murders, deportations, and persecutions that took place in the months just prior to NATO's campaign.

The tribunal continues to gather evidence of these crimes. In her most recent report, the chief prosecutor for the tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, stated that approximately one-third of the 529 reported gravesites had been examined and 2,108 bodies had been exhumed. Bear in mind that the tribunal gave priority to sites related to the indictments, that this figure reflects only a small part of the total number of victims, that not all the graves have been examined, that more sites may be discovered, and that the tribunal has discovered evidence of tampering with graves.

The testimony of refugees and the findings of impartial international organizations point to the same conclusion: before NATO acted, a humanitarian disaster was already unfolding, and an entire region was being destabilized. NATO allies had the capacity and the will to act effectively to end the systematic, state-directed repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Under the circumstances, the international community could not stand by and allow Milosevic's aggression against the Kosovar people to go unchecked.

Canada did not take lightly the decision to act in the face of the crisis, but like our NATO allies, we believed and continue to believe that the human security of the civilians of Kosovo demanded action. Canadians can be proud of the exceptional quality of our contribution during the crisis. Our armed forces carried out their duties with courage and determination. Canadians opened their hearts and their homes to the victims of this conflict when up to 8,000 Kosovar refugees arrived in our country.

On the political front, Canada, and in particular Minister Axworthy, was at the forefront of diplomatic efforts throughout the campaign to affirm the Security Council's role in resolving the crisis. We worked closely with our partners in the G-8 to craft resolution 1244 of June 10, which ultimately brought an end to the crisis, and encouraged the Security Council to pursue its role in the peace implementation process.

[Translation]

Resolution 1244 set out the framework for the international community to assist in constructing a lasting peace. It authorized the establishment of international civilian and security missions, UNMIK and KFOR, to meet that challenge. This resolution is the basis for everything we are doing now. The objective remains to encourage reconciliation, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Kosovo.

There is a good deal of commentary in the media to the effect that, while the war was won, the peace is being lost. It would defy credibility for anyone to argue that all has gone well in Kosovo. But some perspective is necessary. The UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR have achieved important goals on the road to re- establishing normal life in Kosovo.

[English]

Within a few short weeks of the deployment of KFOR, over 800,000 Kosovars, predominantly women and children, who had been forcibly deported by Milosevic's forces returned home. This in itself was a remarkable achievement, constituting a reversal of ethnic cleansing unparalleled in the Balkans. It has served to avert the worst-case scenario of refugees facing harsh winter conditions in the hills of Kosovo or in hastily organized camps in neighbouring states.

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With the return of the refugees, basic necessities became urgent priorities. Overall, winterization has proceeded well. UNMIK has distributed emergency housing repair kits and provided wood-burning stoves. Basic health care services are now provided all over Kosovo, and more than two-thirds of the student population has returned to school. Over one million square metres of land have been de-mined or cleared of unexploded ordnance, and mine awareness programs have been established.

It is well to bear in mind that there was no government structure in Kosovo when KFOR and the UN arrived there. The Kosovars had been marginalized in their own governance for a decade. Interim administration and governance structures overseen by UNMIK have now been set up throughout the province. Furthermore, regulations covering a wide range of issues, from the appointment and removal of judges to banking, licensing, the establishment of a central fiscal authority, and a Kosovo budget, have been introduced by UNMIK.

Still we recognize that a situation as disastrous as the one that prevailed in Kosovo cannot be fully redressed in an eight-month span. The international community and the people of Kosovo still face many critical challenges in ensuring that resolution 1244 is fully implemented. The greatest challenge remains the level of violence and killing in Kosovo, especially against Kosovar Serbs and Roma. While violence is nowhere near as widespread as had been the case prior to the adoption of resolution 1244, the security situation remains tense, and revenge attacks, sadly, continue.

The NATO action in Kosovo was to end the gross suffering of the Kosovars and to restore them to their homes. It was not to ally ourselves with the Kosovars. Canada strongly condemns attacks on innocent people, whether Serb on Kosovar or Kosovar on Serb.

[Translation]

Furthermore, intimidation, fear, and limited local employment opportunities have led to an outflow of Serbs and Roma from the province. UNMIK acknowledges that present conditions in Kosovo do not yet make their return in safety a viable proposition. Those who remain have moved into mono-ethnic enclaves, a factor which improves their security but also complicates the building of a truly multiethnic society. Their freedom of movement has been restricted, their access to essential services sometimes jeopardized.

[English]

Some people equate the current attacks against Serbs and Roma to the ethnic cleansing committed against ethnic Albanians in 1998 and early 1999. All violence is of course unacceptable, but this comparison is inappropriate. What the Albanians experienced was a campaign of terror planned and systematically carried out by the very authorities who, under international law, were supposed to protect them. Now crimes of violence and intimidation are being carried out against the Serbs and Roma, but UNMIK and KFOR are working relentlessly to combat the culture of revenge, to protect all inhabitants of Kosovo, and to bring the guilty parties to justice—not an easy job.

Both KFOR and the UN mission are treating security as the highest priority, especially for vulnerable communities. KFOR now numbers approximately 45,000 troops, with forces being provided by all nineteen NATO members, along with fifteen partners from non-NATO countries.

KFOR dedicates extensive resources and attention to the protection of minorities. KFOR also devotes significant energy to the monitoring of border crossing points and conducting patrols in order to prevent illegal cross-border movement of people and goods. To supplement these efforts, the international community has sent nearly 2,000 civilian police to Kosovo, and that number is growing.

UNMIK has also had to address the total breakdown of institutions that support law and order: local police, the judicial system, and the corrections system. In a modern society, reform of these institutions takes years. UNMIK is determined to deal with these issues over the coming months and has made important progress on each front.

Local police are being trained at the OSCE's police training school. The first class graduated October 16, and the second group began training November 29. The graduates are being closely monitored by UNMIK police as they go about their work, and so far they have performed very professionally. Minority groups and women are increasingly well represented.

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To underlie the police work, UNMIK is working to assemble a coherent legal system based on the pre-1989 Kosovar legal code, UNMIK regulations, and the Yugoslav legal code. Criminal trials have begun, with 47 judges currently in place. In addition, 300 Kosovar judges were named last month and are now in training.

UNMIK has opened one prison, in Prizren, and will take over other prisons from KFOR control over the next 12 months. Corrections Canada experts are assisting with the planning of the Kosovo Corrections Service and the development of training programs for Kosovo Corrections recruits.

[Translation]

Reconciliation is not achievable overnight in the context of the massive violence which most Kosovars suffered in 1998 and 1999. It is a serious challenge to build a multiethnic future in this climate of hatred. UNMIK has recognized that secure conditions are a precondition to the difficult process of rebuilding trust between deeply suspicious and hostile communities. They have recognized that respect for human rights must be embedded in all new institutions. UNMIK has also assigned some responsibility for putting an end to the harassment of minorities where it belongs: with the leaders of all communities in Kosovo. Minister Axworthy met with the Kosovar and Serb leadership in Pristina in late November to encourage reconciliation and to offer support in this respect.

[English]

As civil society develops in Kosovo, it will be a further challenge to lay the groundwork for democracy. UNMIK is working to ensure the local population participates in the decision-making process of the interim administration. On December 15, UNMIK established a new joint interim administrative structure in order to share the administration of Kosovo with local leaders. The Kosovo Transitional Council will continue its consultative role, enlarged to better reflect the pluralistic nature of Kosovo's population.

Kosovo's Serbs are not yet at the table, but UN Special Representative Bernard Kouchner is making every effort to draw them fully into the process of making new governance structures representative and efficient. UNMIK is also trying to use existing Kosovar expertise to encourage the active participation of the local population, while still allowing Dr. Kouchner to exercise his own decision-making authority.

[Translation]

A significant amount of groundwork will be needed before elections become a possibility. Registration must be conducted - in a context where many Kosovars have either been stripped of identity documents by Yugoslav authorities or are currently refugees elsewhere. In addition, KFOR and UNMIK must work to ensure that moderate political parties can campaign without fear of intimidation or violence. The existence of an independent media will be an important prerequisite for holding elections which are both free and fair. Provisional municipal elections are expected sometime in the fall. This will be a useful first step in instilling democracy in Kosovars. Elections at the provincial level will follow according to a schedule still to be determined.

[English]

The final chapters of Kosovo remain to be written. Resolution 1244 is clear in reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, while giving provisional control of the province to UNMIK and KFOR. As long as Milosevic remains in power, the outcome will be problematic. Clearly, the Milosevic regime will not be allowed to reinstate its control based on terror, repression, and ethnic segregation. UNMIK's role is to create democratic institutions and favourable conditions for reconciliation within Kosovo.

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Meanwhile, the role of a future democratic government in Belgrade will be to reach out to moderate Kosovars in an effort to find the means to live together again. This process will take time. In the midst of all these challenges of reconciliation and peace-building, perhaps the ultimate challenge will be to retain the interest and engagement of the international community until the job is done. When winter is over, many activities, such as de-mining and rebuilding, will be taken off hold. After years of neglect from Belgrade, long-term reconstruction is crucial to rebuild infrastructure, revitalize enterprise, and bring back employment. UNMIK desperately requires more resources and now has identified areas of civilian expertise where deployment is essential.

This brings us to Canada's role. On November 1, 1999, five Canadian cabinet ministers announced a new funding commitment of $100 million for peace-building and rehabilitation activities in Kosovo and the Balkans. This brings Canada's assistance to the region over two years to $212 million. Some 60% to 70% of the funds will be spent in Kosovo.

[Translation]

Canada's contribution is being closely coordinated with other UNMIK donors and carried out in partnership with the people of Kosovo. These initiatives focus on what Canada does best. Our assistance programme will continue to be geared towards the most effective means of supporting the key aspects of Resolution 1244, in particular human rights, rule of law and public security. We will also seek opportunities to encourage a process of reconciliation between the people of Kosovo. Much of the money is already programmed and many of the projects have already commenced. My CIDA colleague will be able to provide further details, and we have together circulated background documentation.

[English]

Much of our work is carried out by Canadian experts serving on the ground. The depth and breadth of their activities are remarkable. Fourteen hundred Canadian Forces personnel are serving with KFOR. They will be gradually redeployed from the Kosovo theatre beginning in late April as part of a process of force rationalization in the region. My colleague from National Defence, General Henault, will be able to provide further details.

We can also be proud of the significant contribution made by Canadians to civilian peace implementation and peace-building. We have provided 100 Canadian police to improve the security situation, protect members of vulnerable minorities, and train the new, multi-ethnic Kosovo police service. We have also supported Canadian de-mining teams. We have sent forensic experts to examine mass grave sites in support of the tribunal's investigations, and we have sent human rights and democracy experts to work with UNMIK on such issues as elections and media reform.

Furthermore, Canada has opened a liaison office in Pristina. We are well equipped to ensure an efficient implementation of these projects and support the activities of international organizations operating on the ground.

This work takes place in difficult circumstances and is not without serious risks. Tragically, Corrections Canada officer Dan Rowan was killed in a plane crash on his way to a mission in Kosovo last November. He, along with all his colleagues, has served with distinction. The presence of these Canadians working to develop peace in the region is perhaps the most visible marker attesting to Canada's commitment to peace in Kosovo.

[Translation]

We must also keep in mind Belgrade and the role it will play in bringing about a solution in Kosovo. We have re-opened the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade, but our approach to Yugoslavia continues to be cautious. We have reduced the size, the programmes and the level of representation of the embassy. We are limiting contacts with the regime to the strict minimum. The priority of the embassy is to assess the political situation in Yugoslavia, and to promote democratic reform. Canada also supports the democratic and reformist government of the Republic of Montenegro as a centre of political and economic reform within Yugoslavia.

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[English]

Canada will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yugoslavia and assistance for democratization that does not benefit the regime. However, we will not provide reconstruction assistance to Yugoslavia before the current regime changes and a new leadership demonstrates a clear commitment to democratic values. Kosovo and the region continue to embody Canada's top foreign policy priorities: human security and human rights, peace-building, European security, and consolidation of the multilateral system.

The list of challenges is long and we do not underestimate the complexity of the situation. Determination, patience, and support from the international community are crucial to the success of this mission. Reconciliation among the different ethnic groups is also essential. The Canadian government will continue to strongly support the peace implementation process in the Balkans to bring stability, and eventually prosperity, to this troubled region.

Mr. Chairman, I brought with me some additional documentation for the committee, just for the record: a copy of the UN Security Council resolution 1244; the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations interim mission in Kosovo, dated December 23, 1999; the UNMIK mission status report, dated January 13, 2000; the OSCE Kosovo verification mission, KOSOVO/KOSOVA As Seen, As Told, volumes 1 and 2; and a UNEP-Habitat report titled The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements. In addition, I brought a copy of the indictment of the tribunal against President Milosevic and his four colleagues.

That ends my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wright. I appreciate that.

General Henault.

Lieutenant General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence Canada): Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ladies and gentlemen.

[Translation]

It is a great pleasure for me to be here once again to discuss Canadian Forces contribution during and after the crisis in Kosovo.

[English]

My objective this morning, as requested, is to provide you with a brief outline of the Canadian Forces' contribution to the Kosovo crisis and the follow-up to Kosovo, as we currently know it.

I'd like to begin with a little bit of an expansion on the background that was provided by Mr. Wright, and this is primarily in the military context.

As noted by Mr. Wright in his testimony, when the situation in Kosovo became increasingly tense, as we saw it in the very early part of last year, Canada deployed a number of civilian and military observers to form part of what we call the OSCE Kosovo verification mission, or the KVM. Now, there were several reports provided by the KVM, and as you may remember, one of the more prominent members of that organization was Brigadier General Mike Maisonneuve, who provided sterling service in the region during the period that he was involved with the organization.

[Translation]

If we go back in time to June 1998, we also deployed six CF-18 fighters and 130 personnel to Aviano, Italy to support this show of force, directed at the time by NATO, again in response to the growing crisis.

[English]

Repeated attempts, as we've heard very eloquently from Mr. Wright, were not successful. They ultimately failed, and we got into the Kosovo campaign, particularly the air campaign, as we currently know it.

As a result of the failure in diplomatic activity, all the OSCE observers, including the Canadian observers who were involved, were ultimately withdrawn from Kosovo, and on March 24 we became directly involved in the Kosovo air campaign through the use of our CF-18 Hornet fighters. In fact, on that day, and that is on the first wave of fighters that went into the region, four of our CF-18s took off from Aviano as part of a large formation of NATO aircraft to begin the bombing campaign over Kosovo and the former republic of Yugoslavia.

Incidentally, this actually represented the first use of Canadian air combat power, if you like, or the first air combat mission for the Canadian Air Force in Europe since World War II.

Over the next 78 days, as we will remember as well, we had 6, then 12, and then 18 CF-18 fighters employed in the operation. They flew a total of 678 combat sorties over the region and delivered over 530 bombs of various kinds on a variety of military targets throughout Kosovo and the former republic of Yugoslavia. This included 316 or so precision-guided munitions, or PGMs, used for the first time in actual combat by Canadian Forces fighters, a capability that was in fact just introduced into the air force a couple of years earlier.

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[Translation]

As we all know, the bombing campaign was a success and it achieved its objective, as Mr. Wright pointed out, on June 9, 1999. A military technical accord was signed with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Of course, NATO suspended its air offensive.

[English]

On June 11, as the Serbian troops started to withdraw from Kosovo, Canada then carried on with its mission in the region, and the NATO ground force that had been built up in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia during the campaign itself, including Canadian Forces, as we're all well aware, entered Kosovo to take up the peacekeeping mission that we have watched over the last many months.

Among the lead elements of that land force or the ground force that went in, known also as the Kosovo force or KFOR, were the Canadian armoured reconnaissance troops in Coyote vehicles. These Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicles are state of the art and considered to be amongst the best in the world in terms of the reconnaissance mission they are doing in support of Canadian troops, as well as the KFOR troops themselves, in the region.

[Translation]

I would be remiss not to mention the participation and contribution of our naval forces during the same crisis. They were part of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic and were represented by a Canadian, a two-star marine, and by the ship Athabascan, which was on maneuvers at the time in the Adriatic and which was deployed to provide a Canadian naval presence during the later part of the crisis.

[English]

The deployment of the standing naval force under a Canadian commander again was very successful and in fact carried out a number of sea control type operations during its deployment to the Adriatic.

I know this committee is also very well aware of the humanitarian contributions we made during the crisis, including the airlift of humanitarian aid supplies both into Europe and ultimately into the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and into Albania, as well as the reception and housing of some 5,000 Kosovar refugees here in Canada, with reception and dispatch, as well as some accommodation, on our bases here in Canada.

We learned a number of lessons through the Kosovo campaign, of course, through the crisis itself. In particular, from a military point of view, and specifically from an air force and army point of view, we confirmed the suitability of the operational equipment we employ and in fact the interoperability we continue to enjoy with our U.S. and NATO allies.

For example, our CF-18 fighters exercised their multi-role day-and-night capability very effectively during the campaign, carrying out both air-to-air and air-to-ground operations throughout, and provided an invaluable flexibility to the commander of air forces in the region. In fact, as the minister has stated on a number of occasions, we were considered to be amongst the “first teamers” in the actual operation itself, again based on the high level of cooperation and the high degree of interoperability we've achieved with our allies.

[Translation]

Furthermore, thanks to the CF-18's capacity to launch precision guided munitions ,our forces were able to contribute in a very significant way to the bombing campaign.

[English]

As we all remember, the focus on the limiting of collateral damage was paramount during the operation, and the use of precision-guided munitions, or PGMs, was key to the success we enjoyed in that respect.

The Chair: General, you may have seen that the light is going. For the knowledge of the members, it's a half-hour bell, and they want us in the House around a quarter to the hour. We're going to break at about 10.40 a.m., so that leaves another ten minutes. Have you any feeling about how much longer you're going to be?

LGen Raymond Henault: I'll be about another three minutes.

The Chair: So that's three minutes, and then, presumably, we'll get to Mr. Kane from CIDA, if we could possibly get through that. We'll go and vote, and we'll come right back. But we do want to have time for questions.

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Mr. Svend Robinson: May I suggest that perhaps when we get back from the vote we proceed to questions in order that there at least be some opportunity for questions. We have some extensive written documentation from other witnesses who perhaps aren't able to give oral testimony.

The Chair: We certainly need to hear from Mr. Wallace on the assistance program, though, and I'd be very interested in hearing what our RCMP officers have to say, because they are the ones who are actually in the middle of all the problems that are going on at the moment.

Why don't you finish, General Henault, but you'll understand when we break at 10.40 a.m.

LGen Raymond Henault: Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to jump ahead through some of my notes and just hit the high points, if you wish.

I would only add, from an air force point of view, that we did carry out about 50% of the missions we participated in—again, the high degree of interoperability that we know about.

I would only emphasize one more time the emphasis that was placed throughout the campaign on the minimization of collateral damage, which became very important for us overall and ensured very specific, tight, and controlled conditions for target assignment, target acceptance, and target engagement. Again, we were very successful from a Canadian point of view in all those aspects.

[Translation]

The current commitment of Canadian Forces in the region is still comprised of 6 CF-18s based in Aviano, Italy and of some 100 mission support personnel in Italy.

Furthermore, as Mr. Wright already mentioned, we have approximately 1,450 troops in Kosovo comprising a tactical infantry group, an armored reconnaissance squadron of Coyotes, a helicopter unit and national support and commanding components.

[English]

We're very much aware of the strain on the Canadian Forces throughout this organization in terms of the numbers of missions we have in the region. For that reason, we, in concert and in consultation with our NATO allies, particularly those with which we are intimately involved in both Bosnia and Kosovo, went ahead with a Balkans rationalization process.

We have done that, and again, as mentioned by Mr. Wright, we are gradually going to be withdrawing forces from Kosovo over the next several months, starting in April, to consolidate and concentrate our efforts in Bosnia, where we will in fact increase the size of our commitment slightly and take on a larger area of responsibility, which we are already doing, and also take command on a rotational basis of the multinational division that we participated in, in Bosnia, starting in October of this year. That rationalization process is already underway, and we are looking forward to the opportunity to increase that presence, command responsibility, and continued contribution in the region.

With that, I'll end my comments and only say that we're proud to continue operating in the region, to continue providing the support we do. This, in concert with all of the other missions in which we are currently participating, not the least of which is East Timor and others, has in fact clearly spelled out the capability of the Canadian Forces to operate on a global basis.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.

[Translation]

I will now turn the floor over to my colleagues. Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, General Henault. I appreciate that, and I'm sure there will be some questions for you.

Mr. Wallace, perhaps you could at least get started.

[Translation]

Mr. Stephen Wallace (Director, Southern Europe, Central Asia and Humanitarian Assistance, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I will be brief.

[Translation]

I'd like to introduce to you my colleague Hélène Corneau, a country program manager with CIDA who is in charge of Kosovo. Ms. Corneau recently returned from a mission in the region and can therefore give us a timely report on the situation in Kosovo.

[English]

Mr. Wright has described the general context of Canada's involvement in the Kosovo crisis. I would like to draw your attention in particular to the role played, and being played, by our assistance program.

[Translation]

The documents which were distributed to you give you a broad overview of Canadian initiatives.

[English]

CIDA has so far developed a portfolio of over 30 planned and operational projects along four fronts.

First, at $75 million over two years, humanitarian assistance has been the largest single area of Canadian action. Our programming has been concentrated in Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Apart from emergency aid at the height of the crisis, Canada has provided support through multilateral organizations and Canadian NGOs for such programs as the winterization of destroyed homes, emergency heating oil, and child protection. By next summer we anticipate that the requirement for humanitarian assistance will be greatly reduced.

Secondly, drawing in particular on Canadian experience in the Balkans, Canada has earmarked $45 million for key peace-building initiatives in areas of civilian policing, corrections, justice—including, as Mr. Wright has mentioned, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—human rights, and an independent media. Our engagement is shaped by our conviction that there can be no peace without justice and the rule of law.

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Approximately 135 Canadian civilians are currently deployed in peace-building, with the majority attached to the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. May I say that they are doing an extraordinary job, Mr. Chairman, in very difficult circumstances.

On mine action, we are now moving from emergency operations into the consolidation phase, and we anticipate that all priority areas will be cleared by the end of the calendar year.

Canada is also committed to supporting the Kosovo civil registration and electoral process.

[Translation]

Although the European Union has assumed much of the responsibility for reconstruction work in Kosovo, a number of initiatives with an estimated value of $20 million correspond closely to Canadian capacity. A number of Canadian institutions and NGOS, including DND, are working at the community level to rebuild schools, develop the health system and strengthen civil society. This support is being extended to all ethnic groups in Kosovo.

[English]

Fourth, and last, Mr. Chairman, Canada is providing direct support for the development of a multi-ethnic and non-partisan public administration. As part of a $25 million envelope of economic assistance, Canada is helping to finance essential public services, starting from scratch, under the aegis of the UN and the OSCE.

Mr. Chairman, Canada's assistance is much needed and well regarded. We have a distinctive role to play in the region. We are committed to contributing our share of the international effort to relieve suffering, rebuild lives, and promote a lasting peace.

We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[Translation]

Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wallace.

I don't think we should start somebody else at this point because we're all getting a little antsy.

We'll adjourn now and come back immediately after the vote. I hope we'll be back here by 11.15 a.m. at the latest. We may extend ourselves a little beyond 12 noon. We can't go much beyond that, but we can go a few minutes over that. So we're adjourned until the vote is over.

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The Chair: As the members of the public and our witnesses may not know, another vote has been called with a half-hour bell. So this is a very unfortunate morning to have brought you for this. I apologize to you, but it's the system.

What I propose is that we hear from Mr. Kane and hopefully from Mr. Wawryk from the Mounted Police, but we'll have to cram both of you into about 10 minutes because we have to get back up there for the other vote. We have 20 minutes left.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I agree that we should hear from as many witnesses as possible. I assume that we will reschedule a session in order to follow up with questions.

The Chair: We'll have to have time for questions.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Perhaps we could reschedule that then.

The Chair: We might find that there are no questions for some witnesses and some questions for others and things like that.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I think we'll have to have witnesses back. Certainly, both Mr. Wright and Mr. Henault have raised very significant issues.

The Chair: I agree with that. However, let's get this work done.

Mr. Kane, perhaps you could be five minutes at the most.

Mr. Dan Kane (Permanent Investigator, Correctional Service Canada): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to make this presentation. Having recently returned from Kosovo, I am very interested in the comments that have been made. I will give you an edited version.

Although the number of CSC staff deployed in Kosovo is small, our contribution has been significant given the level of expertise that has been provided. Among the staff that have been deployed have been many senior level staff, including the director general of security, the director general of policy and strategic planning, and one of our assistant deputy commissioners from the Ontario region.

The first phase of CSC involvement in Kosovo involved a reconnaissance mission in August 1999, which was made up of two Canadian and two British correctional experts. They undertook an overall assessment of the conditions in Kosovo and a more specific assessment of the immediate correctional requirements.

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The reconnaissance team found a system that had largely been destroyed by the armed conflict in the province. None of the province's penal institutions were in a condition that would allow them to be immediately used for the housing of offenders. An evaluation of each facility was made in terms of what would be required to not only repair the damage caused by the war, but also to bring the facility in line with international correctional standards. There was also no administrative structure for corrections in the province; therefore an entirely new system would have to be designed and implemented.

A team of two CSC senior officials arrived in Kosovo on September 28, 1999, and were soon followed by two correctional curriculum development experts and a parole officer, who was fortunately fluent in Albanian, having been born in Pristina. These staff members worked with two British correctional experts and a handful of United Nations staff. Within the first two weeks, the niche that had been identified for Canada was the dual role of strategic planning and training. With its role identified, the Canadian team began the task of establishing a training curriculum. The training program is based heavily on the Correctional Service Canada training model, with emphasis on human rights.

In the area of planning and policy, based on the Canadian models, CSC staff have developed a mission statement and core principles for the Kosovo Correctional Service. Strategic planning is underway, and an action plan for the year 2000 has been developed, along with a draft budget for the Kosovo Correctional Service.

Under the Canadian role of policy and planning, CSC will continue to provide the expertise of senior Canadian correctional officers in order to develop policies for the service, consistent with Canadian best practices and the Yugoslav Penal Code, as well as international law as it applies to human rights in the treatment of offenders. There is a need for planning in terms of organizational structure, facilities, staffing, budgeting, and offender information systems. I'm obliged to note that it's hard to imagine how feeble the administrative structure can be.

Policy development will be required in the areas of offender classification, parole, early release provisions, and the housing of inmates with special needs, such as women, youth, and inmates requiring specialized medical, psychological, or psychiatric care.

The need for the continued presence of the CSC in Kosovo cannot be understated. To date, only Canada and the United Kingdom have provided correctional expertise. With the departure of the British this month, Canada will be the only country providing ongoing correctional expertise in Kosovo. The contribution of the UN is limited to a commissioner in charge of corrections and a very small support staff to aid him in his task. If an effective, self-sustaining correctional system is to be developed in Kosovo, more support will have to be found both from the UN and the international corrections community.

[Translation]

An effective correctional service urgently needs to be established in Kosovo. The stability of the country's justice system, which must rest on three pillars, namely the police, the courts and the correctional service, depends on this happening.

[English]

As one who was in Pristina at the time of Dan Rowan's death, I feel obliged to express my personal appreciation and the appreciation of his family for the purely spectacular support that was shown from this House, from every dimension of government in Canada, from everyone, including the military, CIDA, and Foreign Affairs. Most particularly, the ambassador's office in Italy was truly spectacular.

I have tried to keep my comments brief and will be happy to respond to any questions. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Kane. I appreciate that. We all did share with you the grief of the tragedy of the loss of someone in Kosovo. We recognize also that many of you and your colleagues, and particularly all Canadians serving in that area, run these risks. I think everybody in the House is very grateful to them for the risks they run. We owe gratitude to all of them for the service they have provided.

Now we'll turn to the RCMP and Mr. Wawryk.

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Mr. Wayne Wawryk (Director, International Liaison and Peacekeeping Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police): Thank you, and good morning. Bonjour.

Just in an abbreviated way, I'll try to share this with you. As of February 2, there are 1,903 male CIVPOL peacekeepers in the area and 65 females. The UN Security Council recommends 4,718. For our part, we will have 96 personnel in uniform as of tomorrow morning, because some people are leaving tonight, including five female members of their respective police services. We have five police trainers operating with the OSCE in the training of the Kosovo police service recruits. We have 47 RCMP personnel, and our partner agencies have been so kind as to share with us 35 personnel.

I know in the briefing material I've given you are a vast number of partner police forces across Canada. We were joined yesterday by personnel from Edmonton and the Cape Breton regional police. So it's a Canada-wide effort of federal, municipal, and provincial police officers at work, and we will have reached our target of approximately 100 personnel to this mission tomorrow morning, when they arrive in the area.

We have been fortunate and enthusiastic in competing for positions within the mission operation. Some examples are the training officer at the induction training centre; the chief of administration and personnel for the Kosovo police service; deputy commissioner of operations in Pristina; and chief of the border police. There is also an elaborate list of other posts that we occupy or have been asked to occupy by CIVPOL.

Many of you are familiar with our duties, of course. KFOR liaison is an important one, as is recruiting. Traffic law enforcement is becoming more and more important in the region, as alluded to in perhaps Mr. Wright's paper. There is also border policing, as well as various other duties. Of course, criminal investigation is paramount among those, and patrolling is paramount among those.

Some of the problems we've experienced in the mission have been mostly of a logistical nature. Our brig brothers, the Canadian Forces, are considerably more acquainted with these things, but we have gone to very great efforts to support our police officers, who are living in towns and diverse areas with logistical requirements, through a little bit of upgraded communication in the form of some satellite phones. At present, the officer in charge of the peacekeeping branch, Chief Superintendent Peter Miller, is in Kosovo this morning taking care of some of these details.

Of course, this is an armed mission. All of our contributors are armed to one standard, with one weapon. I'd like to share with you that we have not had to use any of our weapons in the region. Despite the frequency of officer-violator contact, we've been fortunate to use what I guess is the best weapon, a police officer's mouth. That's the one that seems to be working most of the time.

One thing that I think is remarkable and should be dwelt upon is the fact that there is a wide availability of automatic weapons, explosives, hand grenades, and munitions in the area. Our police officers are encountering them on a regular basis, and as you can see from the news reports, these are frequently used in the commission of offences. That is a noteworthy thing.

The traffic control and enforcement situation is a serious problem. As spring wears on, heavy construction vehicles take to the road, and it's going to become worse. Two of our Canadians have been involved in motor vehicle accidents resulting in fatalities. Of course, we suffered no serious injuries, but the driving conditions, as everyone is familiar with, are quite difficult.

The ethnic minorities do not feel secure, and the frequency of ethnically motivated crimes is high. The emergence of gang-related organized crime and violence motivated by profit and the vying for potential markets are facts of life in this area. They're also facts of life on some of our other missions that we are familiar with.

The first people to recover after a conflict are the people who were organized during the conflict—the people who had the networks to get the guns and the explosives. These people then turn those to the movement of other commodities.

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There's a significant percentage of the crime and violence originating within the Albanian populace. There have been threats of intimidation against UN personnel. I think the high incidence of reported crimes may indicate that the police are gaining some confidence, some trust, from the Kosovars.

The Kosovo police service has graduated 173 graduates. They will be up to a total, we think, of 648 by the end of April. The capacity of the OSCE school is increasing. We are hoping that the OSCE can—we will try to help them—achieve their goal for the end of the year of having many more Kosovar persons involved in policing.

Of course we are very much involved in the field training program. As Mr. Wright said, that has been a positive experience. The professionalism exhibited has been noteworthy to our people.

One lack that you saw last week is that there are no special police units for riot and crowd control. Of course KFOR had to deal with a tense situation. Tear gas was used. I doubt that it would have been much different had a police tactical squad had to deal with the same situation. If you have to move to that level of force in a tense situation, that is what is required.

The future for us is reminiscent of the remarks of Mr. Wright. As long as we are contributing to human rights, civil order, and security for all Kosovars, we would be accomplishing something. On some days, you can allow yourself to think that is being achieved and on other days it might be a little more difficult. We might say that democratic policing is a new thing for the people of Kosovo. Building trust and confidence in legal systems will take time. As an indication, there have been 19,500 applicants for the Kosovo police service. That's an interesting indicator of interest.

We may be asked to send another forensic team. We are standing by for that request if it comes. We have sent two already; they have been discussed.

As part of the funding arrangements, we have conducted an assessment of the regional needs for training. The top item is dealing with organized crime and the threat of organized crime, and how to do major criminal investigations, how to process information. However, our analysis indicates that other partners are going to deal with that portion. So in our recommendations that are soon to go forward to our partners, we will be talking about what Canada can do, which would be something very substantial, if we could, on management training and professional development at the senior level in these police forces in the region.

I think it's very important that senior management of these police forces develop vision, direction, effective police administration, and structures the way we're familiar with them, that is, somewhat independent of political interference and potential internal corruption. That's a very great challenge. “Without fear, favour or affection”, as it says in the RCMP oath, might be something that is an arm's-length situation that would really help civil society.

That's in essence what I have for you this morning.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I thank both of you for rushing through your presentations, because I know they're both extraordinarily important areas.

What I'm going to propose is this. We just can't stay for questions. There's no point in going back to the House and coming back here; we'll only have ten minutes when we do get back. I appreciate it's an imposition on your time, but with the clerk's help, we'll consult with you and arrange for... Maybe we can't bring you all back at exactly the same time, but we'll bring you back for questions.

Mr. Robinson has made a reasonable suggestion, which is that some people had asked if they could send written questions. Maybe if we send some written questions and we get the answers before you come back, that will clear away some of the underbrush.

Just following up, Mr. Wawryk, on your last comments, it seems to me that one thing we will all want to do when you come back, obviously, is to address the problems that are there. I mean, just look at this morning's Citizen. There's an article by General MacKenzie, and there's an article saying there are equipment shortages, that the whole thing is falling apart, that the Secretary-General of the UN is going to resign.

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The Canadian public wants to be assured that in our participation we are doing the best we can—and also in the context of the overall operation. I just came back from Washington yesterday, where I heard that Kosovo is a total sinkhole for drugs coming into Europe from Afghanistan. These are issues that the public will want to know about and will be asking you questions about.

So we'll have a look at the problem areas. Also, I think we want to know where we fit in the general picture. I know we're doing a terrific job, but the problem is that we cannot do it by ourselves. We want to know what our European, American, and other colleagues are doing, how we coordinate with them, and how well the overall operation is working.

Those are the types of things that I know are on the minds of all of the members. They'll all have individual questions. I'd appreciate it if you could come back ready to deal with those kinds of issues.

I'm going to adjourn this at this time, and we'll be in touch with you about an opportunity to ask questions. Again, I appreciate your coming here, and I apologize for the inconvenience of the interruptions.