SHUR Committee Meeting

SUB-COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SOUS-COMITÉ DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

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[English]

The Chair (Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)): I call to order the subcommittee on human rights and international development. We're going to get started before everyone's here because we have a very busy schedule this morning.

I'm pleased to welcome the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights. We have with us Salim Fakirani, Robert Young, and Jarat Chopra. They are here to discuss the sub-Sahara.

In order for us to get through your presentations and the questioning, we'll just start right now. Who's going to begin?

Mr. Salim Fakirani (Member, Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights): I'll start.

The Chair: Great.

Mr. Salim Fakirani: Good morning, Madam Chair and committee members.

On behalf of the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights, CLAIHR, I would like to thank you for affording us the opportunity to brief the committee on the recent developments in the western Sahara.

CLAIHR is a non-profit, non-governmental organization established to promote and protect human rights internationally through the use of law and legal institutions. CLAIHR was established in 1992 and is based in Ottawa. The organization has registered charitable status.

CLAIHR believes that the recognition of fundamental human rights is essential to the inherent dignity of the individual and is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world. CLAIHR has been active around the globe, including South Africa, Peru, El Salvador, and Guyana. CLAIHR is also a participating agency in the federal government's youth international internship program.

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In 1994 CLAIHR established the Western Sahara initiative, a project run by volunteers designed to help ensure, through legal analysis and greater international scrutiny, that a free and fair referendum takes place in Western Sahara. CLAIHR takes no position on the outcome of the referendum, but rather plays a non-partisan role.

At this time I'd like to introduce two individuals with extensive involvement in efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

We are fortunate to have with us Jarat Chopra, a Canadian now working as a research associate and lecturer in international law at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University in the United States. He specializes in international law and peace operations and has extensive field experience. He is the leading expert on this topic and has published widely on it. Professor Chopra has appeared in front of congressional committees and the fourth committee of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the question of the Western Sahara.

Our third presenter will be Robert Young, who was instrumental in developing this project as a CLAIHR initiative in 1994. Mr. Young is a lawyer with the firm of Nelligan Power in Ottawa and is the project leader of the Western Sahara initiative. Mr. Young previously worked for the Somalia inquiry, the Department of Justice, and the Canadian Red Cross. He is a founding member of CLAIHR and a member of the executive of the board of the Canadian Council on International Law.

As you know, I'm Salim Fakirani, and I'm a board member of CLAIHR. I've completed my law degree and I am currently in the bar admission course with the Law Society of Upper Canada. In addition, I'm completing my masters at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. I have worked on this project since 1996.

I will begin with the background information on the conflict. Professor Chopra will highlight the developments in the peace process in the last year, placing emphasis on the missing ingredients to the peace plan. Mr. Young will discuss what Canada can do in the peace process to ensure it does not result in failure.

Detailed information on the background to the conflict is available in a written submission to the committee from last year. I will, however, stress some background information to provide the context for our presentation. If you require further details on the background to the conflict, please do not hesitate to ask during the question-and-answer session.

Since our last presentation to the committee in March 1997, a great deal of headway has been made to resolve the dispute. Notwithstanding the positive movement in the peace process, obstacles must still be overcome in the next eight to 12 months for the fulfilment of a long-lasting, peaceful resolution to this conflict.

The two main parties involved in the conflict are the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement representing the Sahrawis, the people of Western Sahara.

As you are aware, the major issue in this conflict is the right of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. According to international law and practice and a decision by the International Court of Justice, the people of Western Sahara have the right to choose between independence or integration with Morocco through a process of a referendum.

During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the parties were engaged in armed conflict. The years of conflict claimed thousands of lives and created thousands of refugees. There has been a ceasefire in effect since 1991 as a result of a UN-brokered peace plan.

MINURSO, the United Nations mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, was established to carry out the peace plan. However, throughout the 1991 to 1997 period, as a result of disagreement between the parties over voter eligibility criteria, the body was ineffectual in holding the planned referendum.

In 1997 the new UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed former U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, as a special representative to mediate a solution between the parties. In September 1997 Secretary Baker concluded direct negotiations between the parties in Houston, and a referendum date of December 1998 was set. The referendum, however, has been delayed once again because of disagreement over vote identification of certain tribal groups.

In his April 1998 report, the Secretary General recommended that if problems with voter identification could not be resolved within three months, the viability of the mandate of MINURSO should be reconsidered.

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The stalemate cannot continue indefinitely. Once again, we are at a critical stage in the peace process. The international community must act, and Canada has a role to play.

I will now ask Professor Chopra to provide you with further details on the process that led to the agreement reached in Houston and to highlight the missing ingredients to the successful implementation of the peace plan.

Professor Chopra.

Mr. Jarat Chopra (Research Associate and Lecturer in international law, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University): Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the committee. I'd like to just read a very brief statement today, and then in the question-and-answer session I'll be very happy to answer any questions or elaborate on any points that may be of interest to you.

Full-scale negotiations throughout the summer of 1997 led to a new set of agreements on the terms of the original peace plan for Western Sahara. If the so-called Houston Accords are to be implemented, then the appointment of a new special representative of the UN Secretary General needs to be followed by a reconstruction of the mission, MINURSO, on the ground, as well as fresh staff appointments, on which now rest interpretation and application of the parties' code of conduct, and I would suggest also success or failure of the entire exercise.

The continued role of the negotiator, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, has been needed as a kind of court of appeal in the event of disagreement over any aspect of implementation. But Baker should not have been available only occasionally. He created a centre of gravity in last year's negotiations, and this needed to be translated into a comparable centre of gravity during implementation, which certainly has not happened.

At the technical level, the mission lacks a campaign plan that can ensure that each component of the operation—the repatriation efforts, the security elements, and referendum organization—is functioning in a fundamentally integrated manner and not separately, as is the case. One attempt to convene a drafting session for this fell through last December.

The direct and ongoing engagement of UN member states, such as Canada, is also indispensable. Given specific provisions in the code of conduct for the freedom of movement of non-governmental organizations, individual groups should travel to the area to observe and verify the objectivity of the process, which has been so much a problem in the past.

Without such ingredients, I would suggest a second diplomatic stalemate may paralyse and finally terminate MINURSO. Since this would indicate that the conflict had not been resolved, it would in turn inevitably threaten the resumption of hostilities.

Today I would like to say a few brief words about events over the last year or so, to give you a sense of where the situation stands at the present juncture, in my opinion.

With significant statements of political will from the Security Council and the General Assembly, the new Secretary General presented his first report on Western Sahara in February 1997. This rapid timing, so soon after Kofi Annan's election, indicated the new place the issue had on his agenda. On the one hand, he reaffirmed that from a technical point of view, it is entirely possible to resume and finish identification of the voters. On the other, he added that progress is possible only if both sides commit themselves fully, in deed as well as in word, to implementing the settlement plan.

Hinting at his next move, the report concluded with three significant questions: Can the settlement plan be implemented in its present form? If not, are there adjustments to the settlement plan, acceptable to both parties, that would make it implementable? If not, are there other ways by which the international community could help the parties resolve their conflict? Each question represented a different voice in the UN Secretariat regarding the feasibility of fully implementing the agreed provisions of the peace plan.

Fearing what an alternative might mean, Morocco's permanent representative at the UN, Ahmed Senoussi, addressed a letter to the president of the Security Council. He stressed Morocco's attachment to the settlement terms:

It considers that the drafting of the plan was a long and arduous process and that altering it, which would necessarily entail altering all the implementing measures adopted by the different organs involved in the process, could prove to be an even longer and more complex process.

Suddenly, in March 1997, it was announced that James Baker had been appointed as Annan's special envoy for Western Sahara. The two parties were mystified. Why had Baker been chosen? More extraordinary still, why had he accepted? Was Baker the man intended to functionally save or palatably terminate the costly peace process, which was the shorthand implication of the third question?

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In a press statement, he explained that his instructions were to make a fresh assessment of the conflict and explore all viable options, including implementation of the present settlement plan or any new initiative that might bridge the current impasse.

In April, Baker visited the region and met with the parties and neighbouring governments. Appropriately, he travelled with Chester A. Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who had been the architect of the Namibian peace process. This represented a powerful combination of experts in building diplomatic and political coalitions, but would they do in Western Sahara what one had done during the Gulf War and the other had done in southern Africa?

Disinformation seemed to trail the visit. The message from UN officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, was that Baker had come to arrange autonomy for the Sahrawi, as a third option between integration and independence. It was widely reported in the press that the Polisario would have to consider such an offer from the king.

This was false. Baker explicitly told the parties he was not interesting in overcoming only the problem of identification. He wanted to know what it would take to implement each and every stage of a settlement plan, including the repatriation of refugees, the confinement of troops, the conduct of the electoral campaign, and the final transfer of power to the newly elected authority. Baker was linking his involvement to the process as a whole and not to any single part of it, but there was never a serious consideration of autonomy.

In Rabat, interior minister Driss Basri spent some time lecturing Baker on the fact that Morocco would win the referendum. This was to be interpreted to mean not that the numbers were in its favour, but that Morocco would do everything in its power to win at all costs. He was later quoted as saying, “There are no negotiations on autonomy; the referendum is about integration or independence.”

In meetings near Tindouf, Algeria with the Secretary General of the Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz, it was clear that autonomy was not and could not be on the table. A banner welcoming Baker read, “Remember Big Fish versus Small Fish”. This was a reference to his memoirs, which described a Mongolian sentiment, from when Iraq invaded Kuwait, about the perilous position of small countries swallowed up by larger neighbours. The comparison between the 1990 aggression and Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara should have been clear. Another banner asked, “Iraq No, Morocco Yes. Why?” And still another complained, “UN no credibility; only complicity”.

Further position papers were forwarded to Baker clarifying the parties' final views. It remained to be seen whether Baker would marshal his coalition-building skills to establish some kind of joint guaranteeing mechanism. With him came at least the implicit authority of Washington as well as the explicit support of the Clinton administration and therefore the opportunity to harness the unifying influence of the U.S.

So it was significant that in London in early June of last year, Baker convened the parties and the governments of Algeria and Mauritania as observers to consider how to implement the settlement plan. The meeting was organized with the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, therefore engaging a largely impartial state that was also a permanent member of the Security Council and representative of European interests. Here were the nascent ingredients for establishing a legitimate and effective mechanism for decolonizing Western Sahara.

Even this limited combination produced a breakthrough in form, if not substance. Baker met separately with the Moroccan and Polisario foreign ministers as well as their Algerian and Mauritanian counterparts. While there was no actual contact, Baker advised them that the referendum could only be the result of direct negotiations under his auspices. He explained that there needed to be a point-by-point discussion. With their consent, he invited the parties and observers to meet in Lisbon in late June.

In a press statement, Baker confirmed that limited autonomy was not on the table. Rather than initiating an alternative, he was defining the measurement of success according to the concrete fulfilment of the settlement plan. In Lisbon, during face-to-face negotiations between the parties, he presented bridging proposals for achieving this, and in July in London, a compromise on voter identification was adopted.

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In exchange for Polisario acceptance of oral testimony additional to documentary evidence of individual identity, a long-standing controversial issue, Morocco agreed to defer consideration of 50,000 to 60,000 disputed names. A week later, back in Lisbon, discussion began on a code of conduct for the referendum, which was finalized and culminated in a set of agreements in Houston in September.

To implement these accords, a technical assessment mission was dispatched to the UN's area of operations in October. This was the first time since deployment in 1991 that a comprehensive review of the requirements for fulfilling MINURSO's mandate was possible. However, the resulting approach to implementation and proposed timetable was, according to Kofi Annan, “based on a best-case scenario” kind of planning. Assuming the likelihood of favourable conditions proved disastrous, not only in MINURSO's history, but in most other UN operations as well.

Indeed, statements in October and November by Driss Basri, the opposition Istiqlal and other political parties, and King Hassan, all continued to treat the referendum as a means of confirming Morocco's right to the territory. Also, a rigorous effort has been under way to prepare the sheiks under Moroccan control to take advantage of the newly agreed admissibility of oral testimony. This posed yet another hurdle for the completion of identification. In the chemistry that evolved at the negotiating table, Moroccan officials were unwilling to challenge the personal authority of Baker. But in the field, with respect to the honourable representative of the Moroccan embassy here today, I would suggest that Morocco continues to have a better chance of manipulating and undermining the broad terms agreed to in the manner that it had proved so successful in doing in the past.

A new chairman of the Identification Commission, Robin Kinloch from the United Kingdom, replaced the questionable Erik Jensen, and former U.S. State Department Arabist, Charles Dunbar, became the new SRSG in December 1997. A new civil police commissioner was appointed, Chief Superintendent Peter Miller from Canada.

However, without a legitimate and effective framework to embody in the field, the centre of gravity created by Baker's involvement on the diplomatic front, it was predictable that the parties' intransigence could quickly derail the process again. Identification was temporarily halted at the end of February 1998 due to continued disagreement over contested tribes, undermining the set timetable. By March, Baker had to consider reconvening the two sides to reassert the provisions committed to only months earlier.

According to the timetable established last year, the identification of voters was to have been completed by June of this year and MINURSO was to shift into the next phase of implementation, which it had never come close to in the last seven years. This is now unlikely to happen. I would argue that the distance between the negotiating table and operations in the field has not been bridged.

At this time, let me turn it over to Robert Young to suggest some recommendations.

Mr. Robert Young (Member, Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights): Thank you. Madam Chair, members of the committee, in a few minutes I'd like to touch briefly on some of the steps that Canada can take to contribute to the successful resolution of this dispute. I'll refer you at times to my speaking notes, which are brief.

Before doing so, I might mention that CLAIHR's preoccupation or interest in the Western Sahara is a preoccupation with the rule of law, in Canada and around the globe. We can no longer take comfort in the thought that disputes of the nature of Western Sahara, the ones that don't make the headlines, the ones that aren't on the front pages of the paper or on CNN every day, don't affect us and don't touch us.

In my notes, I begin talking about Canada's recent involvement. But before doing so I might mention how the global web increasingly engulfs us, how it affects issues even in far-flung places, as it sometimes seems, like the Western Sahara.

You may know that in the earlier version of MINURSO, Canada had participation—military observers as participants. Canada, you may also know, had committed to send a larger military contingent. When in the early 1990s the process broke down in the Western Sahara, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was scheduled to go to the Western Sahara, was stood down and did not go. As you know, after that, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which had been waiting its turn for an overseas mission, deployed to Somalia—a certain irony of history perhaps for Canada and Canadians that had the peace process gone ahead as planned in Western Sahara, we would not as Canadians have been faced with the experience of the Canadian Forces in Somalia that has so challenged the forces and the government and Canadians across the country.

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I would suggest that these small disputes, or what may appear to be small disputes, have links that reach around the world. It always makes sense to make small or modest contributions, which is how they may seem, rather than allowing these disputes to drag on and become larger and more costly in terms of money, in terms of personnel, and finally in terms of the quality and dignity of human life.

In terms of some of the recent involvement, I'll refer briefly to our organization's mission to the region—what we refer to as our phase I mission to the region just over a year ago. We refer to that as our phase I mission because we continue to have the intention of doing a phase II mission to Morocco and to parts of the Western Sahara, to see life on the other side of the fence. We think that's important, and an important role that a Canadian non-governmental organization can play.

That mission took place a year ago and we reported on it to this committee just over a year ago. We have copies of a report here for any members who haven't seen it.

Perhaps on a more upbeat note, in terms of the small roles that Canada can play, the current head of the civilian police force that now comprises the renewed MINURSO is a Canadian, the RCMP Chief Superintendent Peter Miller. Since before Christmas of 1997, he has been leading the civilian police component of MINURSO, and Canadians I think can take pride in that.

As well, since December 1997, RCMP officers and other Canadian police officers have been playing a role as members of the MINURSO civilian police force in the region. Indeed, in June of this year, additional Canadian police officers will be rotated in for stints as part of the MINURSO civilian police force.

Again, this is a contribution, modest though it is, in which Canadians can take pride. Most Canadians don't know that there are five Canadian police officers currently serving in MINURSO, but this is an important contribution and one that could be enhanced.

CLAIHR is pleased to have been assisting with the briefing of Canadian members of MINURSO who are going to the region to assist with the process, and again, CLAIHR takes pride in this modest role that we play. We are able to share our information built up since 1994 with Canadians who today are risking their lives, as people do as part of peacekeeping missions in the region.

Next month CLAIHR will be presenting papers at a peacekeeping conference at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. This is a conference of the Academic Council on the United Nations Systems. It's a major review of peacekeeping, and CLAIHR is pleased to be able to contribute to that and add to the debate about how effective peacekeeping can take place.

CLAIHR believes that Canada should and must continue to act multilaterally on an issue such as the Western Sahara. Acting multilaterally does not mean that Canada cannot also take initiatives to support the multilateral processes.

I'd like to speak briefly about some of the other efforts by other nations, which may set some examples and give some ideas to members of this subcommittee on roles that Canada can play.

In the United States, there was a congressional resolution last fall endorsing the Baker initiative and the Houston agreements and giving support to that renewed peace process.

Earlier this year a Congressional caucus was formed to allow members of Congress to work together and exchange information on the Western Sahara and provide some ongoing monitoring on the all-important task of implementing the new Houston peace process.

As well, more than 40 U.S. senators and congressmen have written to the U.S. President, calling for the appointment of a U.S. special envoy to assist in the process of implementing the Houston peace plan.

James Baker has made extraordinary progress since last summer, but James Baker alone cannot advance the process. The parties of course must be willing and interested, but the international community can play a role, and Canada can also play some roles to support the multilateral process.

Sweden has lent de-mining experts to MINURSO. There's a very real practical problem on the ground. In order that the many refugees living outside of the Western Sahara can return to their homes in order to vote, they must cross fields that have been laid with mines as part of the armed conflict that dates back 20 years. Sadly, the process has been delayed, because the UN lacks sufficient funds to deploy the de-mining experts to the field. This is now starting to be done, but the delay is an unfortunate setback, although it is being remedied.

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Pakistan as well has lent de-mining experts, but over 20 years, many, many mines have been laid in the field, and they're a tangible barricade to the proper restoration of civil society in the region.

Sweden has also offered increased support for refugees, and importantly, Sweden has publicly offered to send observers to the region.

France is sending a Senate delegation mission to the region, one of a number of initiatives by state assemblies and legislatures to go and see for themselves what is happening in the region, to provide some transparency and some monitoring of the UN process.

The United Kingdom has for many years had an all-party group on the Western Sahara. There have most recently been motions in support of the peace process. Motions alone will not resolve the process. This is a complex and difficult situation with historical roots going back many years, but motions are part of the process and are a way for parliamentarians to signal that peace is better than the alternative.

The European Parliament has addressed resolutions in support of a free and fair referendum and has established a Western Sahara inter-group to provide some ongoing attention to the issue.

My speaking notes include some numbers, as of earlier this month, as of May 7, 1998, of personnel contributions to MINURSO. I won't read them all, but you'll see that China has contributed 16 persons, Egypt 21, France 25, and the United States 15.

Canada, as mentioned earlier, as of earlier this month has only 5 or 6 personnel contributed to the MINURSO operation. This may be an area where Canada can contribute more.

In closing, we'd like to leave the subcommittee with some recommendations, based on our following of this issue for the last four years, of how Canada can play a more enhanced role.

We group these under three main headings. The first is of course greater support for multilateral initiatives. We believe there is a role for Canada to increase its participation in MINURSO. We believe Canada can play a role in strengthening the implementation of the Houston accords, through an ongoing diplomatic role. As mentioned earlier, James Baker has made much progress, but unless there is ongoing follow-up, the Houston plans, the lofty plans to implement the process in a speedy way, will not be realized.

Second, we believe that Canada can play a proactive role and has an important role to do in doing that. Canada can follow the examples of some of the other countries and the European Parliament in taking some initiative.

We believe that parliamentary resolutions, perhaps starting at this subcommittee, are an important signal that Canada is following the process and wants to see peace rather than a return to armed conflict in the region, which could only contribute to instability through the entire Maghreb and on through North Africa and the Middle East.

We believe parliamentarians in Canada may wish to examine the feasibility of establishing a working group or an all-party committee that could provide some ongoing links.

We believe that collaborations with other parliamentarians would be very useful. Not too many months ago, some British parliamentarians expressed solid and specific interest in taking part in a mission to the region with Canadian parliamentarians. We have details on this and would be happy to provide you with some parliamentary contacts in other countries who already have an interest in this issue.

We believe there is a need for monitoring an annual review of Canadian policy with respect to the region so that we can ensure that Canada's contribution and activities are supporting the multilateral efforts to bring peace to the region.

We also believe it is time for a parliamentarian visiting mission to the region. CLAIHR would be happy to work with members of this committee to organize a mission to the region to see the process at work.

We believe it is not sufficient to wait until a referendum is in progress. The all-critical task now of deciding who will vote in a referendum for self-determination requires monitoring, requires scrutiny, and requires transparency, because the parties face many challenges in deciding who are the appropriate parties to vote.

Finally, the third of our recommendations is that there is a need for Canada to support the work of NGOs. This is, in our humble view, a missing piece of the puzzle. Unlike past complex multilateral operations such as Cambodia or Namibia, there is very little NGO involvement in this dispute in the Western Sahara.

We believe that the absence of NGO involvement may well be a critical factor in the failure of the process to move forward. We believe, as we hope you do, that NGOs are cost-effective actors who can help ensure transparency in this case in the electoral process in the issue of refugee repatriation and generally in promoting the rule of law in the region in order that a free and fair referendum can take place. We also believe there is a need for additional humanitarian assistance during this transition period.

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Finally, as we mentioned earlier, CLAIHR hopes to send a phase II mission to the region to monitor developments in the region at that point.

In closing, I would refer back to the remarks of my colleague, Salim Fakirani, from CLAIHR. He referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. That was a decision taken in 1975. At that time the International Court of Justice, the World Court, said the people of western Sahara ought to have a referendum to determine their future. That referendum, 25 years later, has not taken place. This is, in our humble submission, an unconscionable departure from respect for law. Each of these small departures in far-flung corners of the world add up to a global community in which law is not respected uniformly and sufficiently, and that, in our view, prevents peace, stability, and prosperity from spreading through the globe.

Perhaps the difference between the advisory opinion and the reality on the ground is the difference between law in the courtroom and law on the street. As our guest from Brown University has said this morning, there is a distance between the negotiating table and operations in the field.

As lawyers, CLAIHR is concerned about these gaps. We hope that you as lawmakers will share our concern and we look forward to working with you to try to bring the conflict in western Sahara to a peaceful resolution in accordance with the rule of law.

Thank you very much for your time.

The Chair: Thank you. Is the international centre in Montreal involved at all in the Western Sahara?

Mr. Robert Young: The international centre in Montreal, ICHRDD—I guess formerly it was known as the Broadbent centre and now is sometimes known as the Allmand centre—has been a sustaining supporter of our association, of the Canadian Lawyers Association, and to that effect they are aware of and I suppose one could say supporting our efforts in the area.

I don't believe CLAIHR's coordinator, Susan Isaac, is here.

I'm not aware that ICHRDD is providing direct support for the project. If you'd like to encourage them to, we'd join with you in that.

Mr. Salim Fakirani: They're not working in that area.

The Chair: Thank you.

We're going to try to keep these to five-minute rounds due to time limits. Maybe we can get two rounds in each.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you all for coming today.

Briefly I'll just mention my question, and if you could keep your answers as brief as possible, you'll educate me.

I noticed a significant absence of the OAU in your comments. I wondered what the role is of the OAU, their position on the Western Sahara conflict, and what you saw as the role of the countries immediately surrounding the Western Sahara. Is the weakest link in getting a referendum the identification of voters, or is that a red herring and by putting off the actual process to come to a date for a referendum, one can actually offset the decision-making process and give the people an opportunity? Is that the biggest obstacle?

Lastly, how are the Sahrawi refugees doing in Algeria? Are they being affected by the current crisis in Algeria or are they currently a stable population?

Mr. Jarat Chopra: With regard to the first question on the OAU, I'm glad you raised this. I think it is an important point. The OAU is the original co-sponsor of the peace plan, and unfortunately it has been seen by Morocco to be somewhat partisan, which has to do with its history. The controversial issue was, of course, the admittance of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic into the OAU against the desires of Morocco, which caused, in fact, Morocco to pull out of the OAU. When the settlement plan finally was accepted between 1988 and 1991, there was more trust placed in the UN, at least by Morocco. This has translated into a very minimal role by the OAU throughout the peace process.

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Perhaps it came to something of a crisis when identification began for the first time in 1994 and Morocco was not allowing OAU observers into the identification sites. That had to be resolved.

Since then the OAU has played a role as observers, certainly, but their impact has been minimal, because of the specific geopolitics of the situation. However, there are people in the OAU, I would say in particular at the OAU office in New York, who are very good analysts of the situation and have some very good proposals about how to move forward.

So intellectually, they're critical. Politically, they are weakened somewhat, simply because of the past, but to have a regional organization and the UN involved in this is an invaluable combination. As strong as the OAU can be, it would be good, not just for this particular case, but generally for operations like this.

The second question had to do with the identification of voters and whether this was a red herring or not. It depends on what your meaning of “red herring” is. It certainly has been a real obstacle in the sense that deciding who gets to vote will determine the outcome.

It's a complicated issue in terms of who belongs to which tribes. Let me try to encapsulate it very briefly. Where the issue of the identification eventually broke down had to do with the fact that there was originally a Spanish census, which found there were 74,000 Sahrawis living in the area. This was just before the Spanish were about to hold a referendum, but history changed, and they never held that referendum. When it came time for international involvement in the situation, that became the definition of the status quo ante, the definition of the population of the self, if you like.

It was accepted that that list would have to be updated, but in what form? Ultimately the argument turned on who belonged to the Western Sahara. In that list of 74,000, there are individuals representing a number of different tribes. It was eventually accepted by the Polisario that if, let us say, 70% of a particular tribe were listed on the census, they would accept the other 30% belonging to that tribe who were not on the list. That's a different situation, they said, from accepting a tribe that may have three or four individuals on the list and then permitting the rest of that tribe, which is the Moroccan position.

Accepting which tribe genuinely belongs to the territory has been ultimately the blocking point, and that is in fact continuing to this day. I mentioned that Morocco had accepted to defer 50,000 to 60,000 voters—actually it was 65,000 voters—during the negotiations last year. In fact we find in the latest report of the Secretary General, as of 18 May, that that is still a contentious issue. So what has been resolved at the negotiating table seems still to be an issue in the field.

That issue of identification paralysed the process. Whether that was a genuine issue or not, the net result is that it did paralyse the process. And it is one of a number of possible places where the operation could be paralysed. It happened first with the ceasefire, then with identification, and there are many other issues, such as the confinement of troops and the reduction of the troops in the area, which is supposed to be significant in the next few months, with no sign that that will be the case.

So there are a number of places where the mission can break down. Whether it's a genuine case depends on how one looks as to whether this is merely a manipulation of the process or whether in fact these are real issues. It's probably a bit of both. It is certainly true to say that because the questions are in such black and white terms—independence or integration—determining who will vote does have an impact on the actual outcome. So winning the referendum has to do with registration, in fact.

The third point had to do with the Sahrawi refugees. They have not necessarily been affected by the conflict in Algeria as such. At some point they were wooed by the Islamic fundamentalists, and the Polisario will say they calculated that an alliance with the fundamentalists would have fewer gains in the short term than costs in the long term, so they rejected that course.

More interesting to look at at the moment, I would say, is the repatriation of refugees. They will not accept going to the Moroccan-controlled areas, because of the lack of security guarantees. This means moving them into Polisario-controlled areas where there's no food or water. So it is a logistical nightmare for the repatriation process.

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As I mentioned, because of the absence of an effective coordinating mechanism, the repatriation process is functioning separately from the security element, separately from a diplomatic negotiation process.

So we see a functional fragmentation of the mission. This is an unfortunate factor.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you.

The Chair: Madam Debien.

[Translation]

Mrs. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, gentlemen. Welcome to our committee. I have a few very brief questions, although they may be somewhat more pointed than the ones you have already fielded.

According to the latest information we have about the Houston Accords, both parties had come to some kind of agreement whereby between 80,000 and 85,000 names would be entered on the list. This came about after Morocco had added names to the original list of 74,000 names submitted by the Polisario. Why have the problems persisted? Why, after the two parties agreed on anywhere between 80,000 and 85,000 names, has the situation deteriorated? Is either Morocco or the Polisario making some kind of demands? Morocco seems to have a number of reservations about foreign observers monitoring the voter identification process and the referendum itself. Did factors other than the infamous voter identification list come into play? Mr. Baker appeared to have settled this matter with the parties involved.

If the referendum scheduled for December 1998 is postponed, I imagine the reason would be the problems you spoke of, among other things. Would most of the 145,000 persons now in refugee camps be allowed to vote at the camps or would they have to return to their homeland to vote? Earlier, you mentioned the problem of land mines. Could arrangements of some kind be made to have refugees vote at the camps?

I am concerned about the refugees in the camps near Tindouf. Most of them have been there for twenty years. I'm concerned not for legal, but rather for humanitarian reasons. I imagine you can answer my question, since you have looked at the situation very closely. Is it humanely possible to displace these refugees after twenty years and have them return to Western Sahara, their homeland? Shouldn't this issue be considered within the framework of the negotiations between the two parties and Algeria, since most of these refugees are living in Algeria? That is my main question: how, after twenty years of being in one place, do we send 145,000 or 150,000 persons back to their homeland? I'm thinking here about children who were born in the refugee camps. That is the only home they know. These may be philosophical questions, but they are weighing on my mind.

[English]

Mr. Jarat Chopra: I wish we had more time to discuss these philosophical questions, because those are very interesting questions sociologically and otherwise. But let me try to be very brief with regard to each of the points you've raised.

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With regard to the first one on the consensus at Houston, it's not so much that there was a consensus on 80,000 to 85,000. There was an acceptance by Morocco to reduce by 65,000 the 170,000 names it put forward additional to the 74,000.

Baker, in his press statement, said he thought the number we would end up with would be about 80,000 to 85,000. That was an estimation that he made publicly in a press statement. It wasn't part of the actual agreements; it was his perception.

This still left a wide margin between the 74,000 and what would be an additional 110,000 or 120,000 names, in spite of that. So that's the agreement. Even though there's that wide margin, that still has to be disentangled.

What was agreed on, which is still a problem, were the 65,000 names from tribes that have only very few names on the lists but that Morocco would like to have included in the identification process. That was agreed on at Houston but seems now to still be an issue.

With regard to the difference between a consensus and implementation, that's really the problem point. It was not so much that there was consensus on 85,000. The second important point, of course, is that there was still a very wide margin between 74,000 and what was in fact agreed at Houston.

Just to keep you up to date, there have been about 111,000 names that have been identified, leaving 50,000 names to be identified that are non-controversial, but 65,000 that of course are completely to be disagreed with. I think that issue will slow down the timetable considerably.

The second issue you raised had to do with the voting. As a point of information, the referendum is to be this December, December 1998, as opposed to last December, although I doubt that will be realistic.

With regard to where they should vote, unfortunately the agreements state that whereas the individuals may be registered in Algeria or in neighbouring countries, they must actually vote in the Western Sahara. Unless they open up that agreement to renegotiate that, unfortunately that is what they have to work with.

The issues of redefining that perhaps ought to be raised in the face of a logistical nightmare of moving people into what is really not a very hospitable terrain. I think that's a separate diplomatic issue, which no one has raised significantly at this stage.

The third point is of course something that we could talk about for some time, but let me just say that it was inevitable that after 20 years a certain degree of sedentary life would take root in the refugee camps. One began to see not just tents but some concrete structures, some fixed structures, emerging. At the same time, life in the camps was very transitory. The Polisario have made great attempts to make sure the children are not exposed only to the war. In the summers they try to send them to Europe or to any other countries that will accept their children, just to expose them to something different.

Whereas a generation has been born and brought up in the camps, I'm not so sure it's true to say that it has become a kind of homeland. There's still very much the feeling of being a guest in what is in fact a more hostile piece of territory environmentally than the Western Sahara, which is in fact more lush. It's not a place where someone might want to end up, particularly considering also the problems in Algeria, needless to say.

I don't think moving them is something that cannot be done. I don't think there is an option of staying, necessarily. That's the problem. It is a slightly different situation, I would say, to Tibet, where now there is a diaspora in a number of different countries, and repatriating Tibetans would be very difficult. But I don't think that's the situation here.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Next, Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. I note the time, so I'll be brief, with two questions.

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First of all, welcome to the committee. This is an important item that you bring before us. Why the low level of Canadian involvement thus far? Can you speak to that? And secondly, why the low level of NGO involvement?

Mr. Robert Young: Thank you. I can speak briefly to that.

I think the low level of Canadian involvement is a practical matter. As mentioned in my remarks, this is not a headline sort of story. Although hundreds of thousands of people are affected by it, it's not a CNN sort of newsworthy story. It's not news that people have been sitting in refugee camps for all that many years.

The Canadian government continues to monitor the situation. We meet regularly with Department of Foreign Affairs officials. One of them is here, I guess. They're abreast of the issue, but in fairness to them, and this is true around the world, the desk officers responsible for the western Sahara are typically also responsible for Algeria, and the wrenching difficulties that country has been experiencing are much more immediate than this difficult and somewhat intractable question of the Sahara.

In terms of NGO involvement, there hasn't been much in Canada, but throughout Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States, there are dozens of NGOs doing humanitarian assistance and what I would call solidarity work to try to raise a higher profile on the issues.

In Canada, we have done what we can. We are aware of other groups and other organizations. Salim met a couple of weeks ago with a Canadian documentary film maker from Quebec who hopes to be making a film on the region. We hope to support that in any way possible, precisely to bring this issue to Canadians' attention more widely. We think Canadians must know more about it.

Mr. Jarat Chopra: I would like to add one qualification to that. The problem is in terms of getting into the Moroccan-controlled areas, in particular. A large number of NGOs have visited the Polisario camps to date, I think, where a number of individuals have visited both sides. I think only one non-governmental organization has actually managed to go to both sides, and that is Human Rights Watch. They produced a report in 1995.

I think it should be one of CLAIHR's objectives to be able to go to both sides, particularly since the Houston accords and the code of conduct for the referendum allows for freedom of movement of NGOs. So I think that's very important. But the problem is in being able to get to both sides. It's not difficult to get to the Polisario side, but it's quite difficult to get into the Moroccan side and to see the situation.

Mr. Salim Fakirani: I would add one more thing. The north Africa region is actually Canada's largest export market for goods and services on the African continent, so ensuring stability in the region is to Canada's benefit in terms of trade.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Our next group is ready. Thank you for your presentation.

This meeting is adjourned.