NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

• 1530

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

I welcome back to the committee General Baril. It's nice to see you, sir. If you'd like to introduce the people you've brought, then we're in your hands. I understand you have an hour you can spend with us. Following your opening remarks, I know a number of, if not all, the members will have some questions. Welcome once again. It's good to see you, sir.

General Maurice Baril (Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Hanger, and Mr. Pratt, mesdames et messieurs.

I'm accompanied by Chief Officer Parent, the Canadian Forces chief warrant officer, who is my adviser on all matters that concern the non-commissioned members of the Canadians Forces, both regular and reserve.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'll have about ten minutes of remarks today.

I last appeared before you in June of this year, as you remember, and I am pleased to be here again today to give you an update on a number of issues, including quality of life, of course. While there have been no dramatic developments I need to draw to your attention, I do want to re-emphasize the overall climate in which the Canadian Forces are operating. We continue to face multiple challenges of significant institutional change, scarce resources, and wide-ranging operational commitment.

[Translation]

The operational tempo has not subsided, in fact we are busier now than when I last spoke with you. In addition to our major operation in Bosnia, and our other United Nations, NORAD and NATO commitments, we have deployed the Disaster Assistance Response Team to Honduras to assist in the recovery from Hurricane Mitch.

The men and women of the DART are doing an excellent job. Through their efforts, Canada is once again demonstrating why we have an international reputation second to none.

I also want to assure you that the wide-ranging process of change in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence continues unabated. These changes are vital to the future of the Canadian Forces, and we will not waiver in our commitment to move them forward.

[English]

As a senior officer of the Canadian Forces, I have continued to insist that the highest standard of leadership and ethical conduct be our hallmark. I have sent an unequivocal message to everyone under my command. Those who do not reflect these values have no place in the Canadian Forces. Individuals who harass their subordinates or colleagues will not be tolerated.

This June, in a letter to all members of the Canadian Forces, I addressed in detail the issue of sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, and general military discipline in the Canadian Forces. Everyone in the forces understands the standard of conduct I am demanding of them, and that I will not accept any behaviour short of that standard.

Change has been a constant feature of the last few years. You'll soon be hearing from a number of reserve advocates who are concerned about the coming changes. We are listening to them as well.

Hard choices have been unavoidable, given our current fiscal realities, and no element of the forces can be exempt from this difficult but unavoidable process of adjustment.

[Translation]

I want to assure you, as we have stressed to our Reserve advocates, that the restructuring initiative is necessary for the Reserves to continue to be ready to participate in operations. Although your report on quality of life issues has only recently been received, I would like to take this opportunity to make a few remarks.

First and foremost, on behalf of the men and women of the Canadian Forces I want to thank you for your work. Your report clearly underlines the importance of quality of life issues to the overall health of this important national institution. It also demonstrates that the concerns of the men and women of the Canadian Forces have been heard, and understood. Your recommendations cover the complete range of potential initiatives, including those currently beyond the fiscal abilities of the Department.

We are reviewing each and every recommendation in the report with great interest. In a previous appearance I informed you that we had established a project management office to act as the coordinating agent for quality of life initiatives. This office will receive strategic direction from a Senior Review Board. Together, they will ensure a comprehensive and coordinated implementation of those initiatives that are within our means, current or future.

[English]

Today I'm accompanied by the project manager of this team that I've just mentioned, Colonel Preece.

• 1535

In closing, I would like to draw attention to the introduction of your report. In my view, it offered a most eloquent case for supporting the men and women who wear the Canadian uniform and who defend and promote Canadian interests and value. If your words cannot convince Canadians to rally behind these men and women, no words can.

[Translation]

I have been in the field visiting many of the same men and women that you met with in the course of your work. I know we both share the same admiration for these outstanding individuals. Canadians are proud of this country's reputation. They want Canada to stand for certain values, and to defend certain interests. As a national institution, that is our raison d'être, but the tendency to view the Forces as an “institution” at times overshadows something very important.

[English]

The men and women who have earned Canada its reputation are not in the Canadian Forces; they are the Canadian Forces. They risk life and limb to advance the interests and values in which Canadians believe. Major Bruce Henwood lost his leg in Bosnia putting these beliefs in action. Corporal James Ogilvie lost his life there in the name of these same values.

The men and women of the Canadian Forces are paying a high price to serve Canada. They understand that to serve their country, they must be required to risk their lives, limbs and sanity, to defend and promote what Canadians stand for. For this unlimited liability, they have a simple request: they ask their fellow Canadians for support, they ask to be equipped against the danger they face, and they ask that the country provide for them and their family.

I believe a nation can be defined as a people with a shared sense of having done great things in the past and an eagerness to do more in the future. This certainly defines Canada. It also defines what Canadian Forces have done for this country, and what our men and women can accomplish in the future. But if we fail to see to their well-being, Canadians will be the ultimate losers. If we are unable to retain and attract people who are willing to serve this nation under demanding circumstances, this country will not achieve what Canadians expect and want.

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, General.

I know I can speak for the full committee, and indeed for everyone in the House of Commons. This is the first meeting at which I have been chair and have had the pleasure of your attendance. I hope you will pass on to all the men and women in the forces our sincere thanks and gratitude for the good work they're doing, not only in Central America, but in so many other countries, including our own.

With that, we'll go right to questions. We'll hear first from Mr. Hanger of the Reform Party for ten minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much, General, for your presentation and your appearance here.

I keep thinking back to the tour this committee made to the different bases and to the opportunity to speak to the different members of the Canadian Forces. Those were certainly very positive for me in terms of coming to a better understanding of military affairs.

The committee put its report forward. There was also a clear indication from the government side to put a budget restraint on military spending, at $9.2 billion or $9.3 billion. I can see that with that budget restraint, of course, the opportunity to look after some of those recommendations made by the committee are going to be somewhat restricted. The minister has come forward with a $700-million request to fulfil at least some of the recommendations in that committee report. In the meantime, everywhere I go, whether I'm speaking to NCOs or even to the officer ranks, I hear there's going to be a budget shortfall of nearly $1 billion by next year. This is apart from anything that may be required to meet the recommendations within the report.

I'm going to ask you, sir, is there going to be a budgetary shortfall in the army, air force and navy? Is there a budget shortfall now, and is there one to be expected again by the end of next year?

• 1540

Gen Maurice Baril: By law we're not allowed to run a deficit budget, so there will not be a budget deficit, if you were mentioning that.

As for a budget shortfall, we can certainly say that it could be several billion dollars, depending on what we would like to have the forces look like today, in five years, and ten years down the road.

I'm not in a position to give you a precise number as to how much it would cost to implement the recommendations of your committee if all the money were to come from the central purse—which I'd love to come from the central purse. But to give you a very quick example of the cost of the recommendations, a 1% augmentation to the Canadian Forces is in the order of about $38 million a year that we incur in costs. That's the cost of the recommendation.

As to a budget deficit, it certainly will depend on how we face the future and how we cycle our equipment acquisitions and upgrades, how we can spread them out.

What are the threats to our nation, and what are the capabilities required to deal with those threats? Certainly, from my point of view, I have to have operational forces that are capable of meeting the missions today, tomorrow, in one year, five years and ten years down the road. But at the same time I have to make sure that the forces I have today are capable of fighting the threats or facing the threats we will face ten years from now.

I believe you attended the whole session of the RMA. It's rather scary, scary because of the threats that are developing out there, but especially because of the capability and expense we will have to put in to face those threats.

A voice: That's right.

Gen Maurice Baril: Certainly not only we, but the whole nation, have to look inward and see what kinds of resources we're going to put in. I've said it before: our country will have the forces they're willing to pay for, and it's certainly up to us, as managers and commanders of the forces, the leadership of the forces, both civilian and military, to advise the government as to what is needed, when it is needed, and how much money is required. When we're given an amount of resources, we have to make sure we squeeze every penny out of it.

Mr. Art Hanger: I think this is a very important issue, because it's going to determine if the operational budget is running a shortfall. My understanding right now is that it is running a shortfall, and that there will be an even greater shortfall in our operational budget by next year.

Even with the $700-million infusion of money from the treasury, if you will, as the minister has claimed, it will not permit any of the recommendations in the report to be fulfilled as suggested, which deal with quality of life. To get that under control, one of two things would have to happen, obviously. There would have to be a cutback in troops again. Is that kind of discussion going on in the department, about cutting back troops? I've heard numbers down to as low as 40,000 instead of the present 60,000, and the mothballing of equipment besides. The last figure I received was 49,000 military personnel. Is that discussion going on, to actually cut back on the troop strength?

Gen Maurice Baril: I guess your information is probably faster than mine.

The minister has stated before, and I have too, that quality of life is the number one priority, and we are going to take care of our people. Hopefully we're going to do that with the help of money coming from outside. Rules and regulations are kind of slack in allowing us get money from reimbursement from United Nations operations or some of the real estate we sell, but the minister has said before, if money doesn't come from outside, all options are open, and as for what you're saying, of course we have to look at that.

• 1545

Mr. Art Hanger: So there is discussion that the troop cutbacks could be to 49,000, and the quality-of-life issues will centre around that 49,000. That's what you're saying.

Gen Maurice Baril: That's not what I said. You asked me if there were discussions, and I said yes, and it would be rather irresponsible if we would not be thinking about it.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay, sir. Thank you.

In your annual report on the state of the Canadian Forces, you admit there are some major shortcomings in its operational capability, and this is your comment in there:

We possess a limited capability for deploying our forces... The limitations are in the areas of: troop movement and lift capacity; intelligence-gathering; and the ability to effectively lead or coordinate multinational operations. A working group has been formed to address these issues.

When I look at that, that's quite a significant hit for our military if we're very limited in those areas. So beyond the formation of a working group, what is being done to correct this situation? For instance, how is our transport capability being improved, and what type of transport capability would you like to see the Canadian Forces acquire?

Gen Maurice Baril: The comment I made in my report was linked to the operation that was undertaken by Canada and its allies in central Africa, in eastern Zaire to be more precise, where Canada was asked and accepted to lead a coalition to go in and help in a rather demanding humanitarian operation. As for the comment in there, it was rather obvious that Canada as a small nation had some limitations if it wanted to lead such a coalition with some pretty heavy and big players, some Europeans and the U.S.A.

Following the lesson learned, which had been made public, it became evident that we had some limitations to be able to run such a large operation, not only from the military side, the command and control capability, but also from the intelligence side. We don't have our own national sensor to be able to know what's going on in the heart of Africa. We don't have such means. We have to rely on our allies. We did not have the lift capability to go into central Africa. We have a large fleet of Hercules, but these are not big enough to take some of the oversize equipment we have.

So we came out and said publicly to my leadership, listen, if you want Canada to lead one of those operations, here are the limitations we have—that is, intelligence and lift capabilities, both sea and air, and please take that into consideration. So if you are going to commit us to participate in operations overseas, make sure it's with people who can provide some of the pieces we're missing.

The structure of the forces was conscientiously made this way. We didn't have the resources to have a roll-on, roll-off ship. We didn't have money to buy C-17s, 141s, or C-5As. We are relying on the allies and coalition partners we have, and when we do accept an offer to join a coalition, it is with the limitations we have at that time. This is well known in military circles. It's well known by our political leaders also that the Canadian Forces have limitations when we're talking of joining a large operation, either with NATO, the UN, or other coalitions.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

[Translation]

Mr. Godin of the Bloc Québécois now has the floor. He may take ten minutes.

Mr. Maurice Godin (Châteauguay, BQ): If I may, I am going to share my time with my colleague from Chambly, Mr. Lebel, who would also like to ask a question.

General Baril, I am pleased to meet you for the second time. I am going to turn to something much more basic. In your report, we often come upon the words “values,” “quality of life” and “well- being.” This is something that interests me a lot since in the past six or seven months, this is what we have heard about. The media have also talked a lot about it.

• 1550

In my riding—this is the example that comes to mind—, there is a citizen who belongs to the Armed Forces. He was doing doctoral work. Since the month of May, he has been asking the Army to let him leave its ranks. He'd like to leave the army because he no longer feels useful. His work has changed and he would like to leave the army. He'd be prepared to pay back what he owes.

Since the month of May, however, we've been trying to talk to someone. It's one grievance after another. I spoke with General Marleau and General Laschkevich. On November 19, I actually wrote to you about the matter.

It seems to me that this must greatly affect the morale of the people around him. I think this is something that could readily be resolved. Can you tell me why it takes so long to release someone from his commitment when he wishes to leave the army?

Gen Maurice Baril: You must be talking about someone with a contract and who owes us service time after completing a university program, either at a civil university or a military college. Is that what you're talking about?

Mr. Maurice Godin: Yes.

Gen Maurice Baril: It is therefore someone who was knowingly recruted under contract in the Canadian Forces. At the end of his studies, if a company is prepared to hire him at a higher salary, obviously he would like to give us up. However, when a contract has been signed, we feel responsible for providing the individual with a job for five years. Furthermore, when we have signed a contract and paid several tens of thousands of dollars to keep him, we want him also to fulfil his contract, unless it is not in the interest of the Canadian Forces.

If you wish to give me his name, however, now or later, I will look at his case, but it must be such a case. Perhaps he is in electronic engineering and, depending on his diploma and his qualifications, he is no doubt very much in demand outside. But we need him too.

Mr. Maurice Godin: Yes.

Gen Maurice Baril: The Y2K bug has been announced, and I'm not prepared to let some people leave, despite he'd prefer to go and work somewhere else for a higher salary. A contract is a contract.

Mr. Maurice Godin: I'll take a look at this with you later, but I don't think this is the case. It seems to be someone whose skills are not being used, from what he says, and who has made an application which has been approved. The person would be prepared to assume any costs incurred on his behalf.

Gen Maurice Baril: If it's a matter of bureaucratic slowness, perhaps I can speed the process up.

Mr. Maurice Godin: Very good. Thank you.

Perhaps this case is not unique, and it may be good for you to know about it. Naturally, this must affect the troops' morale and, at the very least, this particular individual's motivation.

The Chairman: Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel (Chambly, BQ): Thank you, General Baril.

Gen Maurice Baril: Good afternoon, Mr. Lebel.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: We've met each other on various occasions. I know that you have kept a close eye on the movements of the special committee.

When I joined the committee, it was chaired by Mr. Bertrand, who is across from me. We visited the military bases in Ontario, the Maritimes, etc. Some women came to complain about being sexually assaulted and frequently being victims of abuse, if not physical, at least verbal. In any case, you know about the problem.

When we were working on this in the summer and the report was being written, many other cases began to come to the fore, really more than we thought, to such a point that, in the House, it was said that a case a day was being revealed.

Have tangible measures be taken in the field to curtail this sort of epidemic? If this does not undermine morale at present, I don't know where it will lead. It's dreadful, seem from the outside, what is happening to women in the army.

Gen Maurice Baril: You talk of an epidemic. I'd like to correct what you say somewhat. I think that the first article which appeared in a national magazine which we know indicated that there were more problems than we thought.

• 1555

Personally, I was really upset to see that so many people were afraid to go out. I shouldn't have been surprised. I should have expected it. But you know, in life, there are many things which are clear and which we don't see coming. I'd have liked to know, ten years ago or even only six months ago, that people did not feel comfortable, that we didn't have the security mechanisms to enable them to go out.

I think now that the mechanisms are in place to allow them to go out and to talk to us. As you know, in our Canadian society, statistics show that only one incident in ten is reported, that is, 10 per cent. I daresay that in the Canadian Forces, this rate concerning reported incidents is much higher, especially since last spring.

We've put mechanisms in place involving our military police, our national investigation unit, an ombudsman to be appointed, an 800 number and even my own office. I think that the epidemic you're talking about does not concern so much the incidence of sexual abuse in the Canadian Forces as the number being reported.

I must tell you, Mr. Lebel, that in my office, an incident that occurred in 1943, a rape from 1943 was reported. This is part of your epidemic.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Perhaps.

Gen Maurice Baril: So many cases of assault and harassment, involving women and men, or attacks, go back a year or even five years. This shows that the level of trust is on the rise. I don't say it's complete, but it's on the rise.

I think not only that the level of trust has stopped this wave of violence we were unaware of, but also that the wave is being turned around. As I have often said, harassment, sexual or other, seriously compromises quality of life. Taking care of our people and providing them with an environment in which they can live in security is the least we can ensure the women who wish to serve.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I know that, General, and I congratulate you. This is not a criticism. Far be it from me to criticize you, especially you who testified before this committee and took action.

My English-speaking colleagues probably didn't see last week's program on the presence of women in the Armed Forces. You will recall that colonel from Quebec City who was opening the arms of the Armed Forces wide to women, who was welcoming them by saying that, in his unit, there was no discrimination. Some journalists, however, stated that when the military were on camera, on television, they said that women were welcome, but that, off camera, they said women didn't have any business in the army. You saw that.

As luck would have it, last week, I bumped into a girl in my riding, aged 21. She attended an interview in Montreal to become part of the reserves. The interview was a complete disaster. The interviewer was not even polite. He made her feel that, unfortunately, there were some women who were accepted in the army and that, in his opinion, the fewer there were, the better it was. That's how the interview ended. The girl, who is trilingual, went home saying to herself that the army didn't want anything to do with her.

Have strict instructions been given for modifying this tendency and these attitudes?

Gen Maurice Baril: Strict instructions have been issued. The particular case you mention shows once again that there are still lots of ignorant people around, no matter where you go, and not just among the military. You find them everywhere.

Let me tell you that the presence of women in the Armed Forces no longer depends on the orders we might be given; we need them for our operations. The Canadian population consists of 52 per cent women. The future, which I talked about in my earlier answers, which holds lots of new threats, requires the services of talented people of great worth, people who have a command of high technology. We cannot help but recruit people in the other 52 per cent of the population. There are some absolutely outstanding talents throughout Canada. It would be going completely against any business sense not to want to hire them.

However, there are still some dinosaurs around. I've seen these dinosaurs give instructions or insinuate that there have never been women in combat forces, that that had never caused any problems and that things were fine this way.

• 1600

I remind you that in Israel and Russia, there were a lot of women's units during the war, but that after the war, they were dismantled. I think that they were no longer needed. It was said this hadn't worked during the war. They were used, however, but after the war, they were dropped.

So, in my opinion, the presence of women in the Canadian Forces is no longer a question of choice but a question of necessity. I'm not saying that requirements in the Canadian Forces are going to be changed. That is not at all necessary and we have no intention of changing requirements with a view to allowing anybody into the Canadian Forces.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: May I ask another question?

[English]

The Chairman: No, I'm sorry, you do not. I'll try to come back to you, but we're well into 11 minutes now.

I'm going to go now to the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): I thought I was next.

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: It's hard to get a good chairman, isn't it?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chairman: That's right. I've got Bob 1 and Bob 2 here, so I have to—

Mr. Bob Wood: It's okay, and it'll get you off the hook, because we're going to share the time anyway. So don't worry about it.

The Chairman: All right. Who's going to start?

Mr. Bob Wood: I think I might.

The Chairman: All right. Make that the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs.

Mr. Bob Wood: I drew the short straw.

General, I have just a quick question on the quality of life. I was just wondering if you could discuss the specifics of implementing our recommendations. Certainly the bigger issues such as pay hikes and housing require an influx of money, but how many of these recommendations could be taken care of in-house? I wonder if you could speak for a moment of the numbers and types that are being addressed either internally by the department or maybe between government departments. I'm thinking of DND and Veterans Affairs.

Gen Maurice Baril: The easy answer is that we could implement every one that doesn't cost anything, and all the ones that are expensive would be taken care of by the centre.

But as I mentioned earlier, I have the project manager with me, Colonel Preece.

Mr. Bob Wood: Can we hear from her?

Gen Maurice Baril: She's right here.

Mr. Bob Wood: Come on up.

The Chairman: Welcome, Colonel.

Colonel Christine Preece (Project Director, Quality of Life Project Management Office, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Could you give us your name and rank for the record, please.

Col Christine Preece: Yes, it's Colonel Christine Preece.

The Chairman: Welcome. Did you hear Mr. Wood's question?

Col Christine Preece: Yes, I did.

At the moment we believe we can address by the letter or in principle all the recommendations the committee made in its report, understanding that some of them are perhaps difficult to implement as they are described. But we certainly embrace the principles that have been expressed, and we believe we can in fact address the issues that are underlying the recommendations in the report.

We are actively pursuing everything that does not require legislative change or large influxes of funds, and there are quite a few. If I were to try to give you a number, I would say that we are moving forward internally on about 70 of the recommendations. Obviously, we'll be prepared to respond to the committee through the process.

Mr. Bob Wood: Even I can't remember how many there were. Were there 86?

Col Christine Preece: There were 89.

Mr. Bob Wood: I missed it by three. So there are about 19 or so—

Col Christine Preece: That we need assistance with.

Mr. Bob Wood: —that we're really going to have to work on.

Col Christine Preece: That's right.

Mr. Bob Wood: But you feel that the others can be done.

Col Christine Preece: That's right. So that work is certainly ongoing through the project.

Mr. Bob Wood: Can you give me one or two examples? I don't need a lot.

Col Christine Preece: With regard to child care facilitators on bases, resources have been applied internally to that now, and the military family resource centres are in the process of hiring those people and locating them across Canada to provide that service to spouses, for example.

Mr. Bob Wood: Okay. Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Bertrand.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, I'd like to welcome our witnesses.

[English]

Thank you, by the way.

• 1605

[Translation]

I know that we've worked quite closely together, since the beginning of the hearings the committee held. My question unfortunately touches a bit on what Mr. Wood raised. You said in your general presentation

[English]

that “this office will receive strategic direction from a senior review board”.

[Translation]

Who will be on this new board?

Gen Maurice Baril: The Deputy Minister and I will chair this meeting. All my level 1 advisers, thus all naval, army and aviation force chiefs, and all equipment and communications officers are members of this review board. In fact, it is Defence's board of management. This is a term you're going to hear increasingly in your new position.

Defence's board of management is the meeting of members of the Department at the three-star or assistant deputy-minister level.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have another question for Colonel Preece.

[English]

How many people are working in the project management office now?

Col Christine Preece: There are a total of 35 altogether.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: And is it going to expand as...?

Col Christine Preece: No, it will not expand. In fact, hopefully, as we get through the process of responding to the committee and we're able to move into implementation, the project office itself will shrink in size. And because we are using the Canadian Forces' existing organization to deliver these things, what we are doing is monitoring what they do—ensuring the money is spent as we have designed, so we will be able to report back on the status of any of the initiatives or recommendations at any time. Eventually there will be a small secretariat left that will continue to collect quality-of-life questions and problems and ensure that quality of life maintains a presence within the Canadian Forces as an issue.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much.

My last question is for you, General. You mentioned a while ago; I noted it here in English,

[English]

that it would cost $38 million for every 1% of pay raise. Did I understand that right?

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes. I might be a million or two off, but that's about it. It's about $70 million. Yes, that's what it is.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay. Now, in our report here, in numbers 3, 4, and 5 we had suggested a 10% pay raise. So if you just look at the sheer numbers, we're looking at about $380 million. The recommendation we made was that for the entry level it should be 10%, and then

[Translation]

raises were decreasing. So it wouldn't necessarily be $380 million. It could be a lot less.

Gen Maurice Baril: You're right. You cannot extrapolate 1 per cent and up for the 60,000 individuals and 30,000 reserve members that we have.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: That's right.

Gen Maurice Baril: But the large proportion of the regular force and the reserves is nevertheless made up of subordinate ranks. So the cost would be very high and would probably come close to the figures you are quoting.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: That's all, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

There are three minutes left for the government side. I have Mr. O'Reilly, Mr. Proud, Mr. Pratt, and Mr. Richardson. I knew there'd be many questioners, General.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much.

General, I was interested in your statement on DART, the disaster assistance response team, in Honduras. I wanted to know how many people are still there, how much equipment is still there, and how much longer this tour is going to last.

Gen Maurice Baril: The whole DART is still there, minus two people we pulled out last week to go on an information trip across Canada with two of our ambassadors in that region. In addition to the DART, we do have a helicopter sub-unit that is operating in there.

We will start to pull them out on December 15. This is a 40-day organization. After 40 days, it starts running out of steam, because that's how it was designed, that's the amount of supplies they have, that's the capability. We will bring them back, and the time limit will be around December 25. So we're going to bring them back.

• 1610

The reason it has been suggested that it was time for us to pull out is that the humanitarian organizations, the local authority and the local government are taking over from us. As our capability becomes redundant, we can start pulling them out. All the Canadians should be back home around Christmas, and hopefully before Christmas. The rapid extraction will start on December 15.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you for that information.

The recruiting program that's going on right now seems to have an extremely long delay for answers. People are going through the program, and there are even some who want to rejoin the forces after reading the quality of life report. Believe it or not, there are people who want back in.

The complaints I have are from two people in particular. One is a new recruit who applied in North Bay but has never heard back. After months, he can't seem to get an answer. That's suggesting to me that there must be some budget constraints at the lower end of the scale. There seems to be a waiting program for anyone who wants in, wants out or wants to rejoin. Is that just a bureaucratic nightmare that isn't working, or is it a planned wait for budgetary expectations?

Gen Maurice Baril: It has always been linked to resources, of course, but we're not hiring or recruiting more than we need. Unfortunately for the applicant, we have waiting lists. If you would check with the individual who says he hasn't heard anything for three months, he probably will clarify that he has not been called in for three months because he is on the waiting list. It can be up to several months, and maybe even a year, depending on which trade he is trying to get into. If there is more demand, then we have slots to train them in the regulars.

Regardless of what is being said about the forces, the attrition level is quite low. We have a lot of demand to join the forces. Again, however, I'm not quite sure we're attracting the right ones. Where we are failing is in attracting more women, not only in the forces but especially in the combat arms. That's why we had such a recruiting drive a few months ago. It had some limited success. We learned a lot of good lessons from that recruiting drive, and we're looking at the whole process, from the recruiting drive to the training—which is coming to the end—of those who accepted the challenge of joining the combat arm.

Mr. John O'Reilly: What do you consider the force size to be at the end of this year?

Gen Maurice Baril: It will be 60,000, plus a few hundred.

Mr. John O'Reilly: And at the end of 1999?

Gen Maurice Baril: It will be the same thing, 60,000. It's always up or down when we take into consideration the basic training list and advanced training list. The basic training list is those you throw in the training machine. They don't fill a combat position or a regular slot. We're just training them, and then they go into the 60,000.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. Earle, for ten minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Thank you for your presentation, General.

It's been mentioned that about seventy of the recommendations are being working on in-house at the moment. That leaves about nineteen others. Has your review committee come up with an overall estimate of what it might cost to implement all the recommendations in this report? Do you have any indication at all?

Gen Maurice Baril: The only figure I can echo is the one mentioned by our minister, $700 million.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I see.

Another issue is one that I've raised before. It has been raised with me, and I've brought it up a few times, but I haven't really got an answer that I can work with yet: Is there an inventory of equipment that is warehoused across the country, that is no longer being used, and for which there are perhaps no plans for immediate use? Do you have that kind of inventory available, or would it be possible to get that information through you? Is there any high-tech equipment, aircraft or whatever, that may be in mothballs or is not being used? What would it be worth and where is it, if I can get that kind of information?

Gen Maurice Baril: I don't know the purpose of the question you're asking. Is it to have access to some of the equipment for...?

Mr. Gordon Earle: I'll explain what I'm trying to get at. The point has been raised with me that perhaps one means of supplementing funds to assist with the quality of life report may be through the use of selling equipment that is no longer in use. If you have say ten fighter planes stored somewhere that are no longer in use and are not going to be used, maybe these could be sold to our NATO allies or to someone else who could use them. That money could perhaps then be channelled back into the system to address these quality-of-life issues.

• 1615

Do you have the capability of coming up with a list of equipment that is not in use and is never going to be used, what it might be worth, and how it can be disposed of?

Gen Maurice Baril: Any of the equipment we have that is declared surplus—and I mean totally surplus, such as the Kiowa helicopter, the Twin Hueys, and a bunch of vehicles that are dead—is turned over to the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation. As for any other department in our country, Crown Assets disposes of the surplus equipment. If it's land or real estate, then there's another process, because it becomes a project of its own. Any of that material is turned over to Crown Assets. Unfortunately, the money goes into the central fund; it does not come back to us.

I'm not quite sure if we're getting a little bit of a commission out of this sale, but I just don't have that information. I can find it for you. As to whether we have a list for that, yes, of course we do.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Do you currently have equipment that is not being used, that hasn't been turned over to crown lands surplus, and for which you may not have any immediate plans?

Gen Maurice Baril: Good heavens, no, I hope we don't, because it's an extra expense. If we keep stuff, we have to pay for it. But we certainly do have replacement stock, which includes everything from airplanes to vehicles—we used to call it the war stock, but now we call it the replacement stock—to manage the rotation of the fleets of vehicles or other equipment, from weapons to tanks, that we have in this stock. There might be some where the decision has not been taken as to what we're going to do with it.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

On the issue of sexual harassment, which you mentioned in your talk and which was also raised earlier, unfortunately, sometimes you read about incidents that have been reported by the media, and we know that some of the media doesn't always report as accurately as we would like, but the sad part is that quite often it leaves the impression in the minds of the reading public that things are very bad and nothing is happening. I'm just wondering whether once these complaints and these issues are dealt with by the mechanisms you mentioned, there's an intent to produce a report that will then indicate how these matters have been put to rest in a way that will give the public some confidence they had been dealt with and that people were not left hanging.

Gen Maurice Baril: Since early in the spring the provost marshal, Colonel Samson, has been producing a report every month on exactly what you're requesting, and it was made public again this week on Monday. It's always not only made public but also the media is invited to come in and question the provost marshal. She's always available when she makes it public.

On the other hand, I cannot comment on investigations that are running, because the national investigations unit does not answer to me, and the last thing I want is to get involved in this stuff. But whenever some action is being taken, the provost marshal normally puts out a press release, and I see press releases going out just about every week on what has been done, especially on investigations that have been completed and charges laid or not laid either by us or by the civilian police. As you know, when it comes to sexual harassment or sexual assault, about one-third of those investigations are not carried out by us. They're carried out by civilian police. We don't have the jurisdiction to investigate. The civilian police in the community where we are has to turn it over to us, and they will turn it over to us for a definite reason.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle: Is that my last question?

The Chairman: Yes.

[English]

Mr. Gordon Earle: Finally, on the issue of helicopters, we see from time to time articles again in the media on the helicopters. I know it's a very serious issue, and we don't want to add to the confusion and undermine any of the morale that people are trying to re-establish, but we do hear about things such as bolts being broken, screws being broken, and problems around icing, that sort of thing. I'd be interested in hearing your views on the safety issues around search and rescue helicopters that have come forward. Can you give us your views as to where that issue stands, whether we should be looking to have the government expedite alternate methods or alternate equipment, or whether you're comfortable with the way the situation currently is?

• 1620

Gen Maurice Baril: There is no airplane, either rotary wing or fixed wing, in the Canadian Forces inventory that flies that is not safe, that is not believed to be safe, that is not certified to be safe, just like any airplane in Canada that flies has to be certified by Transport Canada. Some of them go down. Some of them went down in the last few days. You might have read in the newspaper over the weekend about one of the aircraft accidents in the north. It was a pretty long article. I don't know if people were interested in it, but I was because of the controversy we're talking about.

It's pretty horrifying stuff, if what is being said is true, and I suppose it is true. What the media are reporting on our Labrador helicopter is, as you said, sometimes confusing, and it's certainly not good for the crew who have to fly them.

Let me tell you, in the last thirty days our Labrador helicopters participated in sixteen real live search and rescue operations. Just going over it, we saved at least seven lives during that time, including in Montreal, where we had a Labrador that came from Trenton. We were the only ones who could go down at night with a hoist and pick them up, and we picked up the two injured people and probably saved their lives. They would have died of exposure. We had a Labrador on the crash yesterday, but it did not participate. The search and rescue did the diving to see what was going on.

Our crews are flying them. Our mechanics are maintaining them. We're keeping them up to par with the latest modifications there are. It is a 35-year-old airplane. I don't know how old the airplane was that ditched in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. I understand the helicopter in Montreal was only three years old. The Swiss Air airplane that went down in Halifax was about five years old.

So you can see that it's not linked to the age or the bolts that broke up and damaged one of the engines. This is something that happens quite often. We have a large fleet. We're very careful of what we do.

Yesterday one of our helicopters, the newest fleet we have, the Griffon, as it was flying off, had one engine catch fire. There is a kind of lever inside and they fired a fire extinguisher and landed. It happens in our profession. It's a big bunch of mechanical pieces that all roll and fly in the same direction. Sometimes it goes wrong. But I have the greatest confidence in the maintenance program of the Canadian Forces. I would fly in any of the airplanes, in any conditions we have, especially the search and rescue. When they take off in their Labradors or any other flying machine they use, they take it to the absolute limit of the capability of the machine, and the human capability also.

Mr. Parent is a search and rescue technician whose whole career is there. I don't dare ask him how many lives he has saved and how many thousands of hours he has on all those airplanes, but if I asked him today to go back on the Labrador, he would.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

General, you're with us until 4.30 p.m., I understand, so we can begin a second round of five-minute questions, starting with the Reform Party. Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger: Colonel, I have one quick question. You indicated that you will be able to actually bring about approximately 78 of the recommendations in that report.

Col Christine Preece: I said about 70, yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: How much will that cost?

Col Christine Preece: I don't have figures at my fingertips, but for the initiatives we can pursue internally, the funding has been identified without harming other departmental programs.

Mr. Art Hanger: Including training?

Col Christine Preece: That's right, sir, because in many ways what we are doing is reallocating within National Defence Headquarters. In other words, we're doing things smarter; we're doing the right thing in areas where you've made recommendations to improve the way we deal with these issues.

Mr. Art Hanger: Does it include cutting back on military personnel?

Col Christine Preece: No, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: So you're saying that with 60,000 personnel, you can institute 70 of those recommendations with the existing budget.

Col Christine Preece: Yes, sir.

• 1625

Mr. Art Hanger: Without any troop cuts, without mothballing any equipment, technically without any additional funds?

Col Christine Preece: That's right, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Hart, for three minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much. We have three minutes, so I'll just fire some rapid-round questions at you.

First of all, General, are we combat capable?

Gen Maurice Baril: Of course we are.

Mr. Jim Hart: Do you put a caveat on that? Is it combat capable only in low intensity?

Gen Maurice Baril: I never said that. When you're facing somebody who is firing at you and the bullets are going around your head and shells are coming down, you really don't care if it's high or low intensity. What we've done with our troops for five or six years...it was high and low and never in between. That's what it was.

When I say we're combat capable, we have not in the past several years been involved in conflicts alone. We always go within the alliance, within the coalition, within the UN, and we share the resources we have, just as we did during the ice storm with our friends to the south.

Mr. Jim Hart: Do we have a mobilization plan?

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes. Actually, that's a good question. I have the mobilization planning framework that has just been produced by the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. It's out to the level one adviser for not only evaluation and comments, but consultation with those who will be affected by the mobilization plan. It just came out actually. It is pretty extensive. It was a lot of work, and it's finally the result of the policy direction we had in the white paper of 1994 that told us we had to work on a mobilization plan.

Mr. Chairman, we will leave you a copy of this.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. We'll circulate it.

Mr. Jim Hart: Yes, I would like to see that.

Does the mobilization plan include the reserve forces?

Gen Maurice Baril: Of course it does.

Mr. Jim Hart: They are the cornerstone of the mobilization plan, at least levels three and four?

Gen Maurice Baril: Not only the reserve force, but the whole industry of Canada and the whole capability of the nation when we're talking of stage four mobilization.

Mr. Jim Hart: The concern I have with my first question is you said we're combat capable, but you've also said today that we don't have proper airlift, proper sealift. We probably can't deploy—or can we deploy?—a brigade group for an indefinite period of time within 90 days. Can we do that?

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes.

Mr. Jim Hart: How do we do that without proper airlift or sealift?

Gen Maurice Baril: I don't think we would commit a brigade to any place in the world on our own. If you're telling me that we have to deploy a full brigade with the fleet of Hercules we have into some odd place in the world, I guess the government would turn around and say we're not going to go alone.

Mr. Jim Hart: But, sir, in 1885 we didn't know we would need 8,000 troops in the Northwest Rebellion. We didn't know we would need the troops we required in 1885. We didn't know we would require the troops in the Second World War. There has been no time in Canadian history where we've had the benefit of being able to plan for these events. That's my point. I don't think we are ready. I really question whether we are combat capable at this point.

I would like to move on because I have some quality-of-life questions.

The Chairman: Very quickly. If I could just interrupt, if the committee wants, we'll invite the general back. I know he is certainly always willing to come back. This is not our only opportunity.

One last brief question.

Mr. Jim Hart: It's really quick. It's on quality of life. It also seems that in the Canadian Armed Forces we tend to do things backwards. A couple of years ago we had an FRP where we were paying to get rid of our best people. We should have been paying to keep our best people instead of getting rid of them.

To meet the quality-of-life situation we're in now, I'm wondering if creative methods...of giving our people in the Canadian Armed Forces more spendable income. For instance—and I'll throw one out because I've also passed this along to the minister—there is the idea of offering a basic exemption for military service for Canadian Forces personnel. It would give a recognition for the unique service that military personnel do. They could lay down their life, as people have in Bosnia. It would also put more spendable income in their pockets, and it would also protect the integrity of the budget so that we don't get into this rust-out situation. It's a unique idea. What do you think?

Gen Maurice Baril: You said a basic exemption...

Mr. Jim Hart: It would be a tax exemption for military service.

Gen Maurice Baril: It exists in other countries, and anything that would put more money in the pockets of the men and women in the forces, I agree with.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart. Thank you, General.

Our last question is from Mr. Proud. Obviously there is such interest that I think we will invite the general back.

Mr. Proud.

• 1630

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I just want to change the scene for a minute and go to the reserve forces. Many concerns have been raised by members of the reserves, and some people from the reserves will be coming before us when you people are through here today. Some of the concerns we hear are that the reserves are not paid on time, sometimes they are not paid at all, they don't get the same benefits, and there are probably more cuts coming. Could you give us your view of what you see in the foreseeable future for our reserve forces across this country? Many studies have been done on them in the last four years that made some recommendations, which are in place now. What do you see happening in the near future?

Gen Maurice Baril: Probably many studies, but the action we're taking now is following the Dickson special commission on the restructuring of the reserves. That's what we're implementing now. We are in the evaluation phase, the consultation phase, and the planning phase to put it in place.

As you probably know, if you've been involved de près ou de loin with the reserve, it's a very emotional issue, especially with the militia, whenever we want to restructure or change anything to do with the militia. This is part of the fabric of our nation. There are militia units all across the nation in just about every community, and there are a lot of very influential people who are connected with the reserves and the militia. Whenever we talk about funding, restructuring, doing anything to any of the units, withdrawing from the order of battle...

The last restructuring of the reserves was in 1965. Since then there have been many attempts, but nothing has happened. But with the system we have, the plan we have in place, the consultation, and the fairly slow pace, I think we're heading in the right direction.

Let me say at the same time that resources are very scarce. I have to do a lot of things with the limited resources I have, and we're trying our best. As I said in my opening remarks, when we go through such changes, everybody has to do their fair share. So all the changes we're facing do impact on the reserves.

Mr. George Proud: Do you see them paying somewhat the price for the quality of life we're expecting to take place in the regulars?

Gen Maurice Baril: No. Quality of life is for all those who wear a uniform. I don't make any difference between men and women, regular or reserves.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Proud.

General and your staff, thank you very much for being here today. In the new year we'll look forward to meeting with you again. Thank you very much.

Gen Maurice Baril: It's always a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Colleagues, as we are excusing the general and his staff, and before the other witnesses come up to the table I'd like to give Mr. Earle the opportunity to introduce his motion, which was presented a full day in advance, in accordance with the proper rules of the committee.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Excuse me. The committee has to carry on. Perhaps the media could meet with our witnesses outside. We'd appreciate that.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Do I have all the committee's attention? Good.

At this point I'd like to make a motion. I'd like to move that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs support the reinstatement of the Halifax Rifles and recommend that the federal government bring the reinstatement into effect by the end of the 1998-99 fiscal year.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Colleagues, you have the motion by Mr. Earle. Are there any brief comments? Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: Mr. Chairman, I thank the member for getting this motion to us in advance. I certainly do support the reserve forces and the militia in particular, but I think we're undergoing a process right now where we're reviewing the reserve, and there is a restructuring of the reserve going on.

When we get into this issue in detail, I would like to find out exactly what the role of the militia is. I know that has been a concern. The mobilization plan was mentioned today by the general. All of that folds into this, and I think it would be premature of this committee to pass a motion like this at this point.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

Is there any other discussion? Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: I just want to agree with what Mr. Hart has said. The idea may be good, but with the way the reserves are structured and with what they're going through at the present time, I think it is probably too soon to do something like this.

The Chairman: Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chairman, I agree with the thrust of the motion, but I don't agree that we should have one individual group singled out.

• 1635

My unit was disbanded at the same time as the Halifax Rifles, and they'd also like to be re-formed and have a military presence in my home town. I think we have to look at it on a different scale from each individual unit coming forward with an emotional plea to be re-instituted. I think we have to look at it as a study of the overall concept of all the militia units being withdrawn.

(Motion negatived)

The Chairman: I'm sorry, it's lost, Mr. Earle. Thank you.

Now I'd like to welcome the second group of witnesses to speak to us, Reserves 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Hunter, retired—welcome, sir—and Brigadier General Peter Cameron, retired. Welcome to you, sir. Please have a seat and make yourselves as comfortable as you can.

I neglected to welcome Lieutenant Colonel John Selkirk, retired, as well. Welcome to you, sir. I didn't see your name on the other page.

I believe committee members are receiving your information, and I welcome you to begin your submission. Just before you do that, I would indicate that we may be interrupted by bells, unfortunately, for a vote. So if we begin to look a little nervous, you'll understand why. As long as we leave about five minutes before the end of those bells, we'll be all right.

Given that time constraint, you may wish to tailor your remarks, if you could, and I know the members will have some questions for you.

Are you going to begin, sir?

Brigadier General Peter A.G. Cameron (Ret.) (Reserves 2000): I will act as the chief spokesman.

I didn't quite hear you. Could I just ask what the time deadline is?

The Chairman: We will probably be interrupted at 5.15 for bells to go to the House to vote. That's a fact of life around here. It could be a little later, but I doubt it. You've given us some extensive information. I guess I'm encouraging you to focus your remarks as much as you can to allow some questions from the members of the committee.

BGen Peter Cameron: Chairman, that's fine. That may be a little tight. However, with respect to the document you have in front of you, it was our intention to make a few remarks in support of that document and, to conclude, in speaking to that document, to leave in fact the document with you, because obviously you can't possibly go through a document of that length in the short time we have available. It was our understanding from the clerk that this might well happen and that we might then come back at another time to answer any questions you may have, after your Christmas break is over with.

The Chairman: Yes, that's possible too, but I know the members will have some questions today, if you would entertain those.

Anyway, you go ahead and make your submission and we'll go from there.

BGen Peter Cameron: Okay, sir. First of all, as you already mentioned, Colonel Hunter and Colonel Selkirk are with me. I'd like to introduce as well two other members of Reserves 2000 who are accompanying us, General Pryer and General Beno. All of us are retired regular or reserve officers. We're all business executives in civilian life, and we're all members of the organization known as Reserves 2000.

We last appeared before this committee on November 28, 1995. At that time, we presented our vision of a multi-purpose combat-capable land force whose mission is the defence and security of the nation. This vision recognized the need for the land force, comprising both regulars and reserves, to be available for the defence of Canada and North America, to support the United Nations, NATO, or other alliance partners in international security operations, and to support governments at home by providing assistance to the civil authorities in emergency situations, such as the Manitoba flood or the Quebec-Ontario ice storm.

• 1640

The vision we presented to you at that time was one of a judicious balance between regulars and reserves to meet the needs I've just mentioned.

In our submission to the special commission on the restructuring of the reserves, and in our presentation to this committee, we recommended strongly that as a prerequisite to adopting any form of organization structure, the CLF produce a mobilization plan embracing all four stages of mobilization. I won't go through the four stages of mobilization because I understand you gentlemen are all familiar with this.

However, because the CLF has lacked an organization design that would meet Canada's overall needs, particularly in stages three and four of mobilization, as well as in national security matters, we did in fact go on to recommend that the design and force structure for the Canadian army be based on a corps concept, which would be composed of regulars and reserves. We also provided additional recommendations on the actual structure and location of reserve units and the formations comprising the corps itself. We illustrated at that time how the existing organization could be readily converted to the proposed structure.

In support of the foregoing, we made a number of recommendations concerning the army reserves. These included the efficiency and cost-effectiveness that could be achieved by making greater use of the army reserves themselves; the need to include reservists in the overall planning process; the need for more realistic training standards; the recognition of civilian qualifications in determining rank and trade progression; the need for training resources to be allocated to army reserve units, including equipment and training areas, courses, and funding; the recognition of the important link that the Canadian Forces provide to the individual communities in which they are located; the preservation of the regimental system as the most viable means of meeting all of our military and civil requirements; the leadership and command of the army reserves; and finally, the unit establishments, the administration, and the funding of the reserves.

What has happened since our last presentation to you? The short answer is much of a positive nature, resulting from the guidance contained in the 1994 white paper on defence, the recommendations contained in the report of the special commission, and the recommendations of SCONDVA itself and its counterpart organization in the Senate. Senior leadership in the army over the last four years has made considerable progress in implementing some of these recommendations.

With respect to the reserves, a national consultation process, to which General Baril referred a few minutes ago, has been set up, and that allows input from the reserves community in all planning activities.

Units across the country have been assigned to brigade groups, replacing the old district system.

A unit evaluation system based on success criteria developed between the army commander and the reserves community has been established, and it's now in its third and final year.

Steps have been taken or are in process to determine the real cost of maintaining a reserve presence in virtually all of the communities of Canada. I might add that they are now determined to be significantly lower than those quoted three years ago and, incidentally, much more in line with those estimated by Reserves 2000 in its submission to this committee.

There is recognition at the army command levels that there are three primary roles for the militia. Basically, they are the provision of a base for mobilization, if needed; the provision of the vital link between the army and the communities of Canada; and the provision of individual augmentees to the regular force for international security operations and for national emergencies.

Work is in progress to develop more realistic training standards and requirements for rank and trade qualifications, and this of course is to recognize the differences between careers in the regular force and in the reserves.

In sum, army leadership is to be commended for what it has achieved to date. Regrettably, three major issues, raised in each of the 1994 white paper, the SCRR report, this committee, the Senate committee, and by Reserves 2000 itself, and as recently as last month by the minister's monitoring committee on change in DND, have not been resolved. They are, very simply, mobilization—and I won't give you the description I've written, in the interest of time, because we just discussed that with the last speaker. The framework for mobilization, which we choose to call Canada's army of the future... The present organization of the army has been in place for a number of years. The command and administration of all units, both regular and reserves, are located in four geographic areas across the country. We wish to raise the question, is this the most appropriate structure for today's army and the army of the future, and if not, what is?

• 1645

Finally, on funding, steady state funding is the key to viable, efficient Canadian Forces. This is particularly true in the case of the militia. And I should abbreviate here to simply say as an example that this has really not been happening. Despite the guarantees of two previous ministers, unit budgets have been cut, sometimes quite significantly, across the country. Certainly what is being received by units on the armoury floor in the communities of Canada is well below the 36 mandated by the minister acting on your advice and the advice of others.

That being the case, it is virtually impossible for units to meet the evaluation criteria, and the process of evaluation to that extent is flawed. In the more strategic perspective, given that the roles of the reserves are national mobilization providing the military's link to the communities of Canada and augmentation of the regular force, ever-declining funding compromises the army reserves' capacity to fulfil all or any of these roles.

We also want to address that issue of funding later this afternoon.

I'm now going to turn the floor over to my colleague, Colonel Hunter.

Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Hunter (Ret.) (Co-Chair, Reserves 2000): Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and committee members, since the end of the Cold War, and in particular for the past four years, the structure, size, equipping and training of the Canadian land force or army has been driven almost exclusively by the funding envelope. Little or no heed has been given to the current or future needs.

As a result, the army, both regular and reserves, as we knew it just a few years ago has been emasculated. It is both enlightening and frightening to note that Canada's regular army, navy, and air force could all be comfortably seated in Toronto's SkyDome. The regular army component would fit easily in Montreal's Molson Centre, and the entire army reserve or militia could sit in Maple Leaf Gardens. Yet by some miraculous means our soldiers have met every call, be it peacekeeping, humanitarian missions abroad, or domestic disasters such as the Winnipeg or Saguenay floods, the Quebec-Ontario ice storm, or the crisis in Oka several years ago. But let us not lose sight of the fact that we have been fortunate that these events have not been simultaneous or bigger. Had that been the case, Canada's army likely would not have been able to respond.

Canada is a first-world nation of 30 million citizens. We are economically strong and a member of the G-7, the UN, and NATO. We have other alliances that, like the G-7, UN and NATO, carry obligations and commitments that require us to have a viable military of reasonable dimensions. At the present time it is doubtful we could meet these obligations, particularly if we were required to meet more than one at the same time.

Today we will speak only to the army component of the Canadian Forces; however, we believe what we will present is both applicable and can serve as a model for navy and air force planners as well. In our submission we address the principles, fundamentals, planning process and framework or model for Canada's army of the future. It is not a comprehensive or detailed mobilization plan, nor is the structure proposed necessarily cast in bronze, but it does map out the route to move ahead and suggests a form for the future army to take.

We know budgets and funding are driving forces in today's government planning. As business people, we understand and respect that particular issue. Equally, we realize this situation is not likely to change in the short term or mid-term. What we will talk about today has no cost assigned to it; it is somewhat premature for that to happen. We do know, however, that as changes are made, there will be savings. We also know there are better and more cost-effective and cost-efficient ways of doing things. And of course we also know that a new and expanded structure for Canada's army of the future will in the end cost more than today's army. But those costs need not come all at once and can be planned over a period of time.

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In order to be prepared to action a mobilization plan, such a plan being part of government policy, the army, regular and militia, must be dramatically restructured. There is an important place for both regulars and reservists. The reservists, located in communities from coast to coast, are the basis for mobilization. The regulars augmented by reservists provide the government with its ability to meet short-notice national and international demands as well as providing training and support for the militia. The two components must work closely together as an integrated team with a common mission in order to be a combat-capable, multi-purpose army maintaining as many capabilities as possible, including the ultimate ability to fight a war.

In order to have this kind of army, a structure must be designed that is appropriate, of sufficient size, flexible, and composed of all the elements necessary to perform military operations in the year 2000 and beyond. We recommend an organization of at least a corps' worth of capability at stage three of mobilization, as defined by government policy.

Once designed and adopted, this model must be kept in the forefront of all army planning. While at the outset it will not likely be possible for financial reasons to staff and equip it fully, the model must stay intact and be fleshed out as dollars become available. To do otherwise is to buy an army that fits the envelope but is not capable of doing what will be required of it. If this principle is honoured, Canada will in a reasonable time have the army it needs to meet its national and international obligations and commitments and an army of which all Canadians can be proud.

The army of the future must have operational focus. It must be proactive, not reactive. It must be designed to allow for the maximum in combined operations, not just in the military sense but also with other government departments, NGOs, and civilian bodies. It must be a structure where components can be cherry-picked if needed. It must be an army prepared for high-intensity warfare, regional conflicts, and asymmetrical operations, including terrorism, chemical warfare, electronic warfare, and information warfare. Finally, it must be prepared to cope with domestic emergencies as they occur.

Canada's present army must be reinvented to meet the challenges of the future. There must be an appropriate melding of regular and reserve units and soldiers. It must come at a realistic cost for a country of Canada's size. It must be properly staffed, trained, and equipped. For Canada to have anything less would be irresponsible and unpatriotic. We must plan to build Canada's army of the future, and we must start now.

Colonel John Selkirk is going to highlight the plan for you.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Selkirk (Ret.) (Reserves 2000): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm going to paraphrase my remarks in the interest of speed.

I would like to skip right to slide number four, please. However, I would ask members in their own time to refer to page 66, where we talk about our vision of what this is all about. I think that after having read that, in the fullness of time it will become very clear to you.

The aim of our exercise in creating this document was, as you see on this slide, to develop a mobilization concept for the Canadian army to meet the defence and national emergency requirements of Canada. Note that is not simply war but national emergency as well. In doing so we looked at 21 factors that we feel have an impact on mobilization planning. From each of these factors we drew deductions of how each factor would affect the plan. I will now summarize these factors and deductions.

The first factor was mobilization. We felt that mobilization is indeed a logical and essential activity for any army. Any plan, however, has to be realistic, and it also has to be maintained in its current state.

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All these are contained in much more detail in the first part of the document you have before you.

Any mobilization plan must contain a clear statement of the intent. The plan must be tested periodically. It must be flexible enough to be adjusted depending on how the tests work out. And ownership of the plan must come from the highest levels of leadership of the army.

Our historical experience in World Wars I and II would lead us to believe we ad hocked a number of things, and eventually we were found out. There were crises in both world wars in sustaining the forces we had in the field. In ramping up for the Cold War, fortunately there were many veterans from the Second World War, and the ad hoc plan that evolved worked. However, the point is that ad hoc solutions do not address the need of the nation.

Another factor is international practices in mobilization planning. Most countries have mobilization plans. They do more than simply provide a plan for expansion of the armed forces. They are used as a form of nation building, in that most citizens participate. Finally, given the size of our standing forces, the fact that we had a mobilization plan, a workable way to get a larger force, would enhance the perception of Canada in the rest of the world.

The strategic environment: the lower state of immediate readiness that is possible now with the demise of the Soviet Union means that indeed a mobilization plan is much more viable, and we must have plans for expansion short of war. There will be many occasions when we'll want to expand the forces short of a war. We are involved in many international alliances and coalitions, and we have to have a plan to meet our obligations for these alliances and coalitions.

Stages of mobilization as currently laid out from one to four mean that a great deal of effort goes into planning for the lower stages, which are the simple stages. We feel that one has to look first at the most difficult, which is stage four, and work backwards while making sure that every stage up to four allows you to get to that point.

On the linkage between the militia and mobilization, at the moment mobilizing the militia is the most effective way to expand the army. The militia exists in all communities across Canada, and any decrease in the militia at this point would seriously jeopardize Canada's ability to mobilize in the future.

In particular, the supplementary reserve has to be included in any mobilization plan. As the SCRR noted, the supplementary reserve, which is a pool of trained officers and other ranks, is a priceless resource. We're not using it at the moment.

All training must focus on mobilization. The militia needs adequate funding for training, and the regular army must drive the training plans with realistic training. The army must become a total learning organization, and everyone should be trained for positions higher than those they hold today.

On personnel and human resources management, the peacetime administrative systems we now have would probably not work in a war. Everything we do now should be prefaced with the question, will it work in war?

Demographics: we must include all communities of Canada. By this I don't mean geographic communities exclusively, but all ethnic communities must be brought into our planning. The militia is the only organization that is represented by every community across Canada.

On operational equipment, weapons, and vehicles, naturally we cannot afford to build a stockpile of equipment for a corps and leave it sit. However, there are innovative and other ways to plan for alternate methods of equipping the Canadian army of the future, and this has to be planned for now.

Alternate service delivery has to do with how things can be done by contract that were formerly done by people in uniform or civilian members of the department. We caution that too much reliance on this could diminish the ability to mobilize in the future.

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Next is the industry. If industry doesn't know what we want, they won't know how they can help us in the future. We need to have a plan so they can understand this.

Next is command and control. The responsibility for mobilization must be clearly defined throughout the army, and all activities must flow from that plan.

Next is the current organization and structure. There are insufficient forces today to do much beyond stage two of mobilization. We feel that at least a corps' worth of capability is required at stage three. We also have tested to show that all units that are now in the order of battle of both the regular army and the militia are required.

Next is courses of action. After studying these 21 factors and drawing deductions, we determined that there were four potential courses of action for the Canadian army.

The first course is to meet only the needs required. We feel that while it's the simplest course, it will not suit the requirements of the nation.

The second course is much the same idea in being affordable and achievable. But it doesn't give us the range to meet the full potential of commitments we foresee.

The third course provides a sound doctrinal foundation for the army. It allows for significant flexibility and a graduated response. Although this option would stretch current capabilities, it doesn't demand undue expenditures on purely theoretical possibilities. A corps contains all the elements required in higher formations. Thus, it's an ideal building block.

The fourth case must be considered, but not in such detailed terms as the terms for course three. The detailed plan to go to stage four should be developed as a sequential plan during stage three. It's our recommendation, therefore, that course three be adopted and that detailed planning and implementation commence immediately.

Finally, in conclusion, Reserves 2000 outlines a mobilization plan for the Canadian army that should be prepared. We have shown the instructions that must be issued in order to turn the analysis, factors, and deductions into a plan. That's found in the second part of the book. The paragraphs are renumbered from that point forward.

Our submission is not a definitive plan. It provides, however, the principles, planning processes, and framework for a required mobilization plan.

In conclusion, we feel that our analysis clearly shows the need for a mobilization plan. The plan must address stage three of mobilization. The plan must raise a corps at stage three. Mobilization planning must be the foundation for army doctrine, training, and professional development. Finally, the militia must provide the base for mobilization.

Thank you.

BGen Peter Cameron: Mr. Chairman, this is a real race.

The Chairman: We empathize, but we live with this all the time here.

BGen Peter Cameron: I'm very sorry that Colonel Selkirk didn't have the time to go through what represents hundreds of hours of work. We do hope—we earnestly entreat you to do this—you read this before we reappear, because it's a very important document.

I'm going to summarize my conclusion—I think it was going to run seven minutes—by saying that you might well ask this question. Say you buy the mobilization concept, and that it should be at stage three, and that it should be in a corps concept. You might well ask how much it's going to cost. I'm going to answer the question by saying that it will initially cost very little more than the army is presently spending.

If we want to achieve the full requirements of the model and do it more quickly, then there has to be increased funding, of course. How much would that be? That depends on how quickly we want our army to completely man, equip and train to achieve the completed model status. Clearly, with defence budgets waxing and waning, as they do these days, the rate of progress must be adjusted.

One of the things about this plan that we recommend to your attention is the fact that it has the flexibility built in. The Chief of the Defence Staff was here. If he doesn't have the money, fine. You can change the concept and move slowly toward filling the corps positions. When more money becomes available, you increase the rate at which you up the scale.

The final point I'd like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that you would not think it unusual at the end of our presentation, representing the militia as we do, not to suggest to you that the key of being able to move in this direction is a viable, cost-effective militia. By making use of this militia, we can achieve the model status much more quickly than by any conventional means.

That's a very truncated version of what we came to say. We'll be happy to try to answer any questions.

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The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your presentation, particularly given our time constraints. If necessary, we would be able to welcome you back. I know the members will be interested in reading your submission.

We have time to start a five-minute round of questions. I think in fairness, with any luck, we'll get through a five-minute round. So I'm going to start the five minutes with Mr. Hanger from the Reform Party.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank you, gentlemen, for your presentation. I'd like to hear more about what you have to say. I'm hoping our committee is going to draft that into our plans when we look at the reserves overall.

The Chairman: Yes. We'd be happy to welcome these witnesses back if the committee so desires.

Mr. Art Hanger: I'm going to be sharing my time with my colleague, Mr. Hart.

I have one quick question. The minister set up a monitoring committee in charge of looking after change in the Department of National Defence. I think it was headed by Chief Justice Dickson.

LCol Peter Hunter: The monitoring committee was headed by Mr. John Fraser.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes, it was Mr. John Fraser. It criticized the government's efforts to restructure the reserves. The special commission is what Mr. Dickson looked after.

I'm kind of curious. With the budget cuts of 1998-99, it pointed out that the number of training days for some units were reduced from 65 days per year to just 36. One brigade had to cancel their training program completely for 1999.

First of all, which brigade was that? And just how serious are these problems when it comes to training?

BGen Peter Cameron: Can I make one correction?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

BGen Peter Cameron: The 65 days is what the chief of the army says it takes to run a militia. That's taking into account the soldiers on the floor of the armouries. By the time the money for that gets down to the level of the armouries, it's 36 days. The other amount is streamed off at the various headquarters for various other purposes. It's the 36 days that the SCRR recommended as the basic minimum to be paid to any reserve soldier in any one year.

What I said in my opening remarks was that this 36-day minimum has not been met for the last two years because of the budget cuts absorbed by the militia.

I'm going to ask one of my colleagues who knows the brigade you're referring to about this, because I'm not sure myself which one it was. I have a feeling it might have been out west, but I'm not sure.

LCol Peter Hunter: It was a western brigade. I can't give you the actual brigade number, but I believe it's the brigade headquartered in British Columbia. Their number of days were reduced even below the 36, I think to 24. That's my understanding. Don't take that as gospel, but that's the number I understand it got to, which is almost too little to attract reservists to come out at all. They'll get other avocations to participate in. As a result, the units become emasculated very quickly.

BGen Peter Cameron: I have one final point on that. I don't think any brigade or any serving soldier in Canada did get his 36 days during this past fiscal year. That's because of the budget cuts that were downloaded to the militia, which means the units and soldiers on the floor.

Mr. Art Hanger: I'm going to pass to my colleague.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Hart, you have a couple of minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you very much.

Congratulations, gentlemen, on your work. It's about time we had a framework for a mobilization plan. Congratulations.

I have a couple of questions for you. These are problematic things. One is that we have a volunteer force in Canada. How did you deal with that issue when it came to the mobilization strategy in terms of a reservist who has a part-time job? Did you look at job protection legislation at levels three and four of mobilization? Go ahead and answer that one.

LCol John Selkirk: Mr. Hart, we made the assumption in writing the initial paper that the necessary legislation would be enacted at stage four, but not before. So forming a corps at stage three without some more legislation is certainly problematic.

BGen Peter Cameron: I think the key to this, Mr. Hart, is that we have a concept in front of us, which is a corps' worth of troops—there are divisions, brigades, corps troops, and division troops—into which we could fit today all of the regular force units and reserve units in the country.

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That would not fill up the corps. Nor could we afford to fill up the corps. But if we kept that model in front of us and tasked each of the units to a specific role in mobilization, then we have the beginnings of a corps that can be fleshed out over time as more dollars become available and as DND funds that are being devoted to other less useful things, shall I say, get rediverted to our building this corps concept. I think that was your underlying question.

The Chairman: Thank you. That's your five minutes there.

We will now go to Monsieur Godin.

[Translation]

Mr. Maurice Godin: I thank our witnesses for their brief. In the past 25 years, the army has often been used to conduct missions involving civil security and we see that it is used more and more for peace missions. But I read somewhere that it was being suggested that reserve personnel be used for peace or civil security missions and that the regular or active army be used for what might be called war missions. Would this be possible and what do you think?

[English]

BGen Peter Cameron: Yes, the armed forces of Canada have been used for peacekeeping. We would see peacekeeping as still being a part of what might be required. The international security we referred to is another name for peacekeeping. It might not be peacekeeping; it might be peacemaking, for example.

Yes, we do see that the forces in being, i.e., the regular force, should be the primary focus for that sort of operation. What we do see, however, is that the army has more than just international peacekeeping that it must take into account; it must plan for the future. Hence the recommendation we're making for a mobilization plan. We see a plan to mobilize the army in such a way that it could go to war if it had to, honour its peacekeeping assignments as necessary, and honour its domestic emergencies, as it has already done in the case of the Quebec-Ontario ice storm this winter.

Our plan foresees a mix of regulars and reserves performing all those things. The situation will dictate whether they are all regular force with no reserve force, all regular force augmented by some reserve force, or a mixture of the two. Perhaps there might even be the guarding of a vital point in any emergency that might result from the Y2K problem. That's what we're trying to show: a reorganized army mobilized to a corps concept.

I don't know if that really answered the question. If anyone else would like to try, please do.

[Translation]

Mr. Maurice Godin: I would also have liked you to tell me whether the reserves, who are people from the milieu, would be much more suitable to perform peace missions than soldiers who are trained for war.

[English]

LCol Peter Hunter: I think, sir, that soldiers trained for war have the maximum and ultimate training. After being trained for that job, you're then qualified to do virtually any of the other jobs. That might perhaps be as mundane as working in an ice storm, a peacekeeping job, or a humanitarian mission such as the one in Honduras.

Once you've been trained for war, you have been very well trained; it's the leadership that makes the difference at that point. It directs the soldiers to what they have to do in a given situation. The training doesn't vary that much for the different assignments.

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BGen Peter Cameron: One more add-on, if I could, sir. It is not envisaged in what we're proposing that we would send reservists on a war mission without work-up training having taken place.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lebel.

[English]

We'll go to the Liberal side now, and my colleagues are agreed that Mr. Jordan will lead off for the government side. Mr. Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I want to congratulate you on your report, but I agree, I think the framework for mobilization is something that's going to take a while to digest. I also agree with the general thrust of the notion that it's a good idea to define what we're trying to do before we start doing it.

I want to bring the issue of reserves down to a very local level, because I am from a riding that was affected by the ice storm. I saw firsthand how the reserves saved lives, quite candidly, in my riding in terms of the resources they brought to bear—the portable kitchens replacing people cooking in their own homes, which opened the door to all kinds of contamination issues; helping with rural searches; wood and water delivery; a host of things. There was also the logistical training. What I saw were young people who were applying very worldly skills, and for someone with a business background, I was very impressed with the skill bases they had. Those would be the same skill bases required in industry.

Yesterday we announced half a billion dollars for youth employment. I hope somebody is thinking in terms that there may be some overlap here.

I want to talk about the cuts. I'll read from General Baril's statement:

Hard choices have been unavoidable given our current fiscal realities and no element of the Forces can be exempt...

That worries me, because I don't think the reserves are a line item. If someone were to take a good look at this, the reserves are perhaps part of the solution to some of the challenges the military face in terms of finances and in terms of reducing idle capacity and increasing the skill base, given the new challenges the military faces. You can go to industry and take what you need and then return them to industry without having to pay them for 365 days a year.

I have two quick questions. One, is there a culture that the reserves' gain is the regular forces' loss? I'm just dealing with the “how do we get from there to here” issues. I know in terms of our own regiment, they can't afford to send people on courses, and then they're evaluated because they don't have people who went on courses. It's a catch-22 for them.

My second point is this. Is there a recognition within the military that the unit viability assessment process is completely flawed in terms of the terms and conditions? The landscape changed midway. Are they going to hold reserve units to that viability assessment, or do they now realize that they have to take...?

BGen Peter Cameron: I'll take the second half of your question, and then I'll ask General Beno, who is a retired regular force officer and probably can give an even more learned reply than I can, to respond.

Yes, there is a recognition that the evaluation process has been flawed. The commander of the army himself has acknowledged that to Reserves 2000. What we don't know is what is going to replace the evaluation process when the decision has to be made to downsize. We trust that as a fair man he will create objective reasoning and rationale for so doing, but we can't answer your question at the moment, other than to agree with you.

Now, General Beno on the broader question.

The Chairman: Could you state your name, sir, for the record?

BGen Peter Cameron: I introduced him at the beginning, Mr. Chairman. He is one of our party. General Ernie Beno is a retired regular force officer and now a businessman.

The Chairman: Thank you, and welcome.

Those bells mean 15 minutes, which is probably now about 12. So if you would answer, I'll let Mr. Jordan have his second question and then we'll have to get to the House.

Brigadier General Ernest B. Beno (Ret.) (Consultant, Reserves 2000): First of all, could you please tell me what the second half of the question was? We couldn't hear it over there.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Sure, and I don't need a second question.

I'm just concerned that when the military start to deal with fiscal restraints, they cut across the board. I'm just hoping that somewhere along the line somebody is giving some thought to the fact that what the reserves can do is actually help them do more with less. It seems to be rather short-sighted to be cutting the reserves when they're bringing flexibility, when they're bringing increased capacity without idle capacity to the equation.

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BGen Ernest Beno: The answer to the question is it's a balancing act, because if you cut the regular force considerably, then they don't have the wherewithal to train the reserves, to have the doctrine, to nurture them, and to work alongside them. It's a partnership, and each partner brings certain strengths and limitations. The regular force is not in touch with the main communities, such as in your riding, whereas the reservists are. So there are advantages to having both.

You really have to keep the two in balance. They do not and should not be working one against the other. It's a team effort. It's a partnership exploiting the strengths of each party, but recognizing the limitations of each party. That's essentially what I would say.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. I would like to thank our guests very much. We'll have you back again. We are sorry about the time constraint.

The committee will reconvene in February. So to all members, best of the season to you. Thank you all.

The meeting is adjourned.