FISH Committee Report
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PART I
The Meetings
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
General Attitudes
12. Most of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee felt that the federal government had betrayed their communities. They said that the federal government had the responsibility to manage the fishery, a responsibility which it has totally failed to meet. Now that the groundfish stocks have collapsed, the federal government has abdicated its responsibility for the people who were dependent upon them for their livelihoods. Hence, income support provided under the TAGS program should not be regarded as social assistance but as compensation for the federal government's failure to properly manage the fishery.
13. Particularly in Newfoundland, witnesses pointed out that the fishery had been the backbone of coastal communities for 500 years, during which the fishery had been sustainable. Although there had been cycles of lean years in the past, the cod had always returned. There had never been a famine of groundfish to compare with the current crisis. To illustrate the impact on Atlantic Canada, a witness asked the Committee to imagine if Ontario and Quebec's auto industry were to be closed down for five to ten years, or if Alberta's oil industry were to be shut down or, for some reason, British Columbia's entire forest industry were to be wiped out. The people of Newfoundland and Labrador did not have to imagine such a catastrophe - they have been living and dealing with it for the last five years. The economic importance of the groundfish fishery should not be underestimated. One witness made this comparison:
"Hibernia in 25 years will probably be gone, but it will have contributed $16 billion to the economy, or at least the value of the oil taken out of the ground. So here you are looking at a Hibernia which has been elevated to a new level, representing $16 billion, as opposed to a resource which [even when] half-depleted [was] worth $3 billion annually, and most important of all, renewable."14. Witnesses felt that they had been abandoned by the federal government - "left", as one witness put it, "to the whims of the paper pushers and bean counters." There was a perception that Atlantic Canadians were ignored or misunderstood by other regions of Canada and that they had been stigmatized by an unsympathetic media. The people of Atlantic Canada, they said, were angry at having to beg for money, and resented being portrayed as lazy and unwilling to work.
15. Many witnesses pointed to the economic contribution that Newfoundland's resources have made and will continue to make to the rest of the country, resources like Churchill Falls, Voisey's Bay and Hibernia. With these resources and only a 500,000 population, Newfoundlanders dispute being tagged as a "have not" province. They also pointed to the fact that the true cost of TAGS, when all of the incremental tax benefits to the federal and provincial governments were taken into account, was closer to $900 million rather than the official figure of $1.9 billion.2 They also recognized that the economy in many other parts of Canada was doing very well and asked if being Canadian did not mean that there was a policy of sharing the wealth. They were not, they emphasized, asking for indefinite assistance but only for help until the current crisis in the fisheries could be turned around.
16. In Newfoundland a number of witnesses told the Committee that they were beginning to question the wisdom of having joined Confederation. By ceding responsibility for management of the fishery to the federal government, Newfoundland had lost control of this resource. They felt that their interests had been sold out for the benefit of corporate interests largely elsewhere in Canada and in the interest of Canada's foreign relations. One witness said "Our fishery has been constantly used by our National Government as nothing more than a pawn, to be bartered with foreign governments in order to sell and promote trade in other commodities."
17. One issue that was particularly offensive to many witnesses was the decision by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to spend $350,000 training officials to deal with violent demonstrations and sit-ins that HRDC anticipated could happen at the end of the TAGS program. Many witnesses stressed that Newfoundlanders were not violent and that in none of the previous demonstrations had there been any violence or threats of violence. HRDC's decision, it was felt, demonstrated a lack of sensitivity and understanding.
Social and Economic Impacts
18. For many people who appeared before the Committee, the moratoria have had a devastating effect on their personal lives. Many have been under severe financial stress. This has contributed to family breakdown, bankruptcy, substance abuse and even suicide. Some witnesses had been faced with difficult choices. One witness described how he had been forced to use savings set aside for his daughter's education in order to make ends meet.
19. If conditions were difficult in coastal communities on the island of Newfoundland, they were even more so in Labrador. We were told that, in the Labrador community of Black Tickle, some residents were forced to choose between buying food or buying heating oil and that as many as half the children were going to school hungry.
20. The approaching end of the TAGS program and the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of some other program to follow TAGS has heightened the stress. Many witnesses felt the original promise they received in the form of a letter - that income support would continue for eligible TAGS clients until May, 1999 - amounted to a contract that the federal government had now broken. This was causing difficulties for many TAGS clients who had used their letters as collateral at the bank to obtain financing for important purchases.
Community Impacts
21. For many communities, the loss of fishing and plant work income has been devastating. While TAGS has allowed many families who were directly dependent on groundfish to scrape by, it has meant a large decrease in community income as a whole. This has also caused a dramatic downturn in businesses and services that were indirectly dependent on the fishery. Many communities have seen as much as 30% outmigration in the last two or three years. Of those leaving, most are young. More than once, witnesses asked the Committee to look around at the audience and to ask themselves how many of those present were under 40 or even 50 years of age. One witness suggested that Newfoundland's greatest export to the rest of Canada was now its university graduates.
22. Many witnesses expressed fear for the future of their communities. Without youth to follow in their footsteps, these communities would eventually die. Indeed, many are rapidly deteriorating. "As bad as anything in the '30s", said one witness. Another likened the situation to a Steinbeck novel. He could not remember which one3 but the image was clear to everyone present.
23. For many older residents, moving to other parts of Canada is not a realistic option. Most have worked their whole lives in the fishery and finding another occupation at this stage in their lives would be an almost insurmountable challenge. Even if there were good employment opportunities in other parts of the country - a questionable assumption - most are ill-equipped to make a transition to a new career. Many people own their own homes but, because of the economic conditions, the properties have virtually no resale value. We were told in one community that a house that would normally sell for $80,000 could sell for as little as $2,000 to $3,000 dollars. Renting is not an option. Some of those who have left have just boarded up the windows, loaded what possessions they could in a truck and set out for somewhere else, simply abandoning their homes.
24. To many witnesses, it was clear that a way of life that had endured for centuries was now in danger of being lost and they questioned whether there was any appreciation of the value of their way of life. Some went so far as to suggest that the government's treatment of rural communities went beyond simple neglect and was, in fact, part of an undeclared agenda to eliminate rural communities.
TAGS ISSUES
Income Support
25. There was considerable anger over the government's decision to terminate TAGS by May 1998, and almost unanimous agreement that income support would still be needed beyond this date, at the very least until the originally planned date of May 1999. For many people, the original letter from HRDC that promised income support until May 1999 amounted to a contract that they had used as collateral at the bank. This letter stated, "You will remain eligible for TAGS income support, services and programs until 8 May 1999." Many of the witnesses told us that they had made financial commitments on the basis of this letter and that these commitments would now be put in jeopardy as a result of the decision to terminate income support at an earlier date.
26. Many people went further to argue that income support should continue until it was possible to resume fishing. In fact, a number of witnesses declared that, when income support ended, they would resume fishing: "…if the funding is over, in our eyes the moratorium is over, and we are going fishing." Pronouncements such as these were universally greeted by loud approval from audiences. All witnesses believed that income support should continue at least at current levels. While most viewed these levels as barely adequate, they at least allowed people and their communities to survive.
27. Many witnesses pointed to inequities and the sometimes arbitrary designation of those eligible for TAGS support. One issue for a number of witnesses was the treatment of plant workers who, for some reason (perhaps injury or pregnancy), had had a break in an otherwise long attachment to the industry. Because of the eligibility criteria, the entitlement of these workers under TAGS was severely reduced, often to a period of support shorter than that of other workers with significantly less history of attachment to the industry. Witnesses asked that any future support program deal with workers who had "fallen through the cracks" and restore support to those workers who had unfairly been cut off support prematurely.
28. Another situation cited was the case of a company with two fish plants operating in the same area. For management reasons, one of the plants had been designated by the company to process all the groundfish and the other plant processed other species. The outcome was that workers in the plant processing the groundfish were eligible for TAGS while workers in the other plant were not, even though all of the company's workers had been affected by the downturn in the industry. Had the company known ahead of time about the 25% groundfish criterion for processing plants, it could have quite easily processed sufficient groundfish in both plants to meet this requirement.
29. In Labrador, witnesses felt that they should also have been compensated for the loss of cod stocks. Northern fishermen had not been treated fairly under the TAGS program, either because the area they fished was ineligible (e.g. 2H) or because they had already been affected by the disappearance of cod long before the current moratorium was announced.
30. Although there were some positive views on the value of training and education programs under TAGS, most of the views expressed by the witnesses were critical. One of the most widely-condemned aspects of training programs under TAGS was the perceived waste of millions of dollars that could have been put to better use. Witnesses suggested some educational and training organizations had taken advantage of the program more for their own benefit than for that of clients and demanded that an audit be carried out to determine where the money went.
31. Training, it was argued, had often had a doubly negative and destructive impact on people. In many cases, unmotivated and aging clients filled classroom seats in programs established by HRDC, while thousands of motivated, enthusiastic high school graduates were denied entrance to post-secondary programs because their parents were filling the classroom seats.
32. Nevertheless, there were few inherent objections to educational and training programs but the prevailing view was that they should be voluntary, of high quality, and that they should be related to real employment opportunities. It was pointed out that there was no need for "legions of carpenters, heavy equipment operators, and hair dressers or other trades with a dozen weeks of training."
33. The clawback on earned income under the TAGS program was an especially sore point for many clients. It was criticized as a strong disincentive to work even when there was work available. There were several issues with the TAGS clawback. The first was the threshold which, for TAGS clients, was set at $26,000. EI claimants, on the other hand, are allowed to earn $39,000 before a clawback kicks in. The second issue was that while the EI clawback starts at 30% of earnings above the threshold, earnings for TAGS recipients are clawed back dollar for dollar. Many witnesses pointed out that, when their gross incomes exceeded $26,000, their entire TAGS cheques were being seized to recover the TAGS payments that were made in the previous winter as income support, leaving them with no TAGS cheque at all. Many witnesses asked that TAGS recipients be treated under the same rules as EI claimants.
Vessel Owners Expenses
34. A further issue was that vessel owners are allowed to claim only a nominal 25% of gross vessel landings to cover operating expenses. In many cases, however, actual expenses were significantly greater than 25% of gross revenues. As a consequence, vessel owners could find their incomes actually reduced by going fishing. The end result was that fish that could have been harvested were being left in the water and the additional income that could have been generated from processing work and spin-off jobs was being lost. A captain in les Îles-de-la-Madeleine explained his situation this way:
"Yes, I'll go on. This year, I caught $40,000 worth of fish, gross. My earnings were $16,000. I paid $5,500 in fishing expenses, $5,400 in fuel, oil and other things, $5,525 in repairs because we were out of luck, $4,775 for electronic equipment, $1,500 in groceries, $4,000 in car insurance, $1,400 for the CSST, and $2,400 for other expenses. Then there's interest on the loan I had to take out from the Credit Union, and taxes - that's 25% of the boat payment. So I have a deficit of $30,000, and $10,000 in expenses. And they still want to take my TAGS benefits back? I cannot accept that."Early Retirement
35. For many older workers in the fishing industry, retraining and relocation are not realistic options. Many witnesses suggested that the government provide an improved early retirement program. This would allow people to leave the industry with some dignity. Fifty years of age was suggested by most as an appropriate age for eligibility for an early retirement program but it was also recognized that it would be potentially unfair to make such a program available to people who had had only a short attachment to the industry. A common proposal was a formula that combined age with years of attachment to the industry.
Licence Buyouts
36. There was less unanimity on the need for capacity reduction, particularly in the inshore sector. Indeed, the notion of "too many fishermen chasing too few fish" was more than once treated with some derision. Many witnesses felt that a greater issue was more equitable distribution of access to the resource. Nevertheless, witnesses conceded that there were many fishermen who would like to be able to retire from the industry but who were unable to. An effective licence buyout program would not only enable them to leave with some dignity but it would improve the viability of fishermen remaining in the fishery. Some witnesses suggested that, given the expectation now that recovery of groundfish will be considerably longer than anticipated at the time TAGS was implemented, there are many more fishermen who would be amenable to a buyout.
37. There was general consensus that the two rounds of licence buyouts under TAGS had been largely ineffectual. In part, this was simply because the amount of money allocated to licence buyouts was too small. It was also because previous buyouts had targeted smaller operators. Capacity reduction under those buyouts did not occur because the boats, gear and other licences were transferred to core fishermen. To be worthwhile, any future licence buyout would have to remove the catching effort from the fishery and not allow it to be transferred to other fishermen.
DFO AND FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ISSUES
38. At this point, there is little confidence among fishermen and coastal communities in DFO's ability to manage the fishery. Instead, there is a widespread belief that DFO policies are driven primarily by corporate interests and that DFO has an undeclared agenda to eliminate the inshore fishery. To some extent, these views are fuelled by the perception that DFO senior policy makers in Ottawa are remote from the fishery and have no contact with fishermen, plant workers and their communities and have little understanding of, or empathy with, traditional fisheries and the rural way of life.
39. Although there was generally respect for the DFO's front line staff, witnesses frequently voiced frustration over the lack of authority of local DFO staff to make decisions. Centralized decision-making at regional offices often contributed both to delays, and in some cases to questionable decisions. In some cases fishermen reported that DFO was not providing critical information such as deadlines for permits, applications, licences and quotas until after the appropriate dates. We also heard complaints about a lack of effective enforcement resources by DFO.
40. Inshore fishermen were quite blunt in their assessment of what destroyed the fishery. It was not the inshore fishery using fixed gear such as cod traps, hook and line or even gillnets but federal policies that sanctioned both foreign and domestic dragger fleets in the interest of foreign policy and domestic political patronage. Only the draggers were capable of fishing year-round and fishing through the ice and it was the draggers that were able to target the heavy concentrations of cod on their spawning grounds. The northern cod that had been protected by nature for centuries, was no longer given the chance to rejuvenate during the respite dictated by the seasonal nature of the traditional fishery.
41. Other witnesses supported the midshore and offshore fisheries. Communities on Newfoundland's south coast have had a heavy dependence on the offshore fishery. Thousands of residents of the Burin Peninsula have earned a living as a result of the good wages and the year-round work provided by the offshore fishery. These witnesses insisted that the first right of access to reopened Grand Banks stocks should go to the offshore fishery and the communities and plants that have historically relied on these stocks.
42. It was pointed out that the offshore sector has been devastated more than any other sector. A consequence has been that many deep-sea fishermen have been dispersed around the world. One witness indicated that the offshore sector was not necessarily tied to its traditional technology, which has been blamed for most of the destruction of groundfish stocks.
DFO Science
43. In general, witnesses had little confidence in DFO science. Errors in the scientific estimates of the sizes of the cod stocks were seen as a major factor in the collapse and not enough has changed to re-establish confidence in DFO's ability to manage the fishery in the future. DFO leadership was viewed as more concerned with defending its reputation in the wake of criticism directed at DFO by the scientists and others who accused them of bureaucratic interference in science. Having failed so far to face up to its mistakes of the past, the Department could not be entrusted to manage the fishery any better in the future.
44. There was also some skepticism about the independence of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC). The FRCC was created in 1993 to provide an arm's-length body to provide greater independence on fisheries management advice - primarily allowable catches - to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. It was observed that the Council operates from the Department and uses departmental staff for its secretariat. It was suggested that politics continues to influence the FRCC and that it is falling under the Department's control.
45. Other witnesses spoke in support of science. One acknowledged that there was a great deal of sentiment against science but cautioned against "throwing the baby out with the bath water." What failed was not science per se but DFO science and what was needed was for science in DFO to have complete autonomy from management.
46. The same scientists who had been responsible for overestimating groundfish stocks and underestimating catches were now being overly cautious in their estimates of cod stocks. An issue in point was the methodology of the acoustic surveys used to measure cod stocks. According to witnesses, these surveys were conducted along straight-line transects across the bays rather than on the shoals where the cod were known to congregate. Few fishermen were surprised that the scientists were reporting low densities of cod based on their acoustic surveys as they were simply looking in the wrong places and as a result few fishermen had confidence in the results of the surveys. Instead, many fishermen believed that there were enough cod to support a limited inshore fishery in 1998.
Foreign Fishing
47. The quotas allocated to foreign fishermen were a particularly sore point for many of the Committee's witnesses. For a fisherman in 3L to be forced to stand idly on shore knowing that he could be prosecuted for jigging even a single cod for food while, in the same area, foreign fishermen are allowed a legal bycatch of northern cod in their turbot quota is a bitter pill to swallow. "We can stand on the shore and see ships fishing for cod while we are on the shore not able to catch our supper." There was a widespread belief that Canada had made concessions to foreign countries in the interest of trade deals that primarily benefit other parts of the country.
48. The seemingly generous concessions made to French fleets throughout Canadian waters was also a sore point, particularly on the south coast of Newfoundland. It was argued that Canada had conceded 15.6% of the cod quota in 3Ps in exchange for a "non-existent" scallop quota in the French zone. As it stands, the benefits to Canadian fishermen are limited since only seven vessels, primarily large draggers, were allowed inside the French zone. Skepticism was also expressed over the diligence of the monitoring effort applied to Canadian draggers hired to catch the 70% of the French quota being fished in the Canadian zone of 3Ps.
49. There was also considerable resentment over differences between the way fishermen have been treated in the French and Canadian zones of 3Ps. Fishermen from St. Pierre and Miquelon have continued to fish both inside and outside their zone throughout the moratorium. During the 1997 season, the fishery was still underway for the French fishermen when the Canadian fishery had closed. In addition, it was said that fishermen in the French zone were permitted much greater amounts of gear than those in the Canadian zone. The fact that fishermen in southern Newfoundland could see French fishing boats continuing to fish in the Canadian zone while they would be prosecuted for fishing simply added insult to injury. One fisherman said, "I have to be careful how I say this, but we say the French boats are only a gunshot away."
50. Many witnesses called for an end to foreign fishing in Canadian waters or, at the very least, to get back the quotas now given to foreign fishermen and to Canadianize developmental fisheries such as the silver hake fishery as quickly as possible.
51. Although some witnesses said that Canada is obliged under the Law of the Sea to make underutilized quotas available to other countries, we were cautioned that so-called underutilized species are part of the overall ecology and may represent an important link in the food chain. Some witnesses, for example, asked for controls on the capelin fishery pointing out that capelin is a primary forage of cod and that depleting capelin stocks could inhibit the recovery of cod stocks.
52. Charter fisheries employing foreign vessels and crews also came in for criticism. Some witnesses pointed out that Canadian vessels capable of fishing these quotas were tied up while Faroese or Baltic country vessels and crews were being hired. The sole reason, many believe, is that the foreign vessels did not have to ensure Canadian labour standards or pay Canadian wages. One suggestion made to us, in order to level the playing field, was that foreign vessels under contract to Canadian licence holders should be required to be operated under Canadian labour standards and pay Canadian minimum wages while fishing in Canadian waters.
53. The following quotes highlight concerns over foreign fishing:
"The fishery is the biggest foreign aid program around."
"Why are these foreign ships fishing off Black Tickle in zone 2J in Canadian waters? I saw one dragging for turbot flying a foreign flag. It was a huge ship."
54. The latter observation was disputed by DFO:
"Contrary to statements made recently there are no foreign vessels fishing turbot off Black Tickle. Black Tickle is found in NAFO division 2J and the turbot there is allocated entirely to Canadian fishermen."
55. Mention must be made of the commercial salmon fishery operating in the French zone of 3Ps. The Canadian government has restricted commercial salmon fishing in Canadian waters as a result of the poor condition of Atlantic salmon stocks. Witnesses noted, however, that fishermen in St. Pierre and Miquelon have continued to fish for Atlantic salmon, using gillnets purchased from Canadian commercial salmon fishermen whose licences were bought out by the Canadian government. The observation that markets in France were so flooded with Atlantic salmon that salmon was cheaper than almost any other species of fish has created a suspicion that there is extensive gillnetting of salmon along the length of the French zone extending south from St. Pierre and Miquelon. It was suggested to the Committee that this could be a major factor in the failure of Atlantic salmon stocks to recover despite the severe restrictions on commercial harvesting of Atlantic salmon in Canadian waters.
Adjacency and Historic Attachment
56. There appeared to be a widespread feeling that a more equitable sharing of fisheries resources would enable more fishermen and more fishing communities to survive. Adjacency and historic attachment were frequently cited as the two fundamental principles on which access to the resource should be based. The relative importance of adjacency and historic attachment were, however, viewed somewhat differently depending on the area we visited. In Labrador, for example, adjacency was regarded as an especially important issue. Labradorians have found themselves in the situation where they have relatively little access to the resources directly off their own shores while the majority of quotas are being allocated to licence holders from other parts of the Atlantic region, particularly fishermen from the northeast coast of Newfoundland, and to foreign fishermen. Witnesses from Labrador felt strongly that resources in Labrador waters should be fished by Labrador residents and processed in Labrador plants.
57. This was a particularly sore point since the fishery is the only resource available to support most of the small communities dotted up and down the Labrador coast. A particular issue was the share of the shrimp quota allocated to residents of Labrador. The majority of the Total Allowance Catch in shrimp fishing area 6 is allocated to non-residents and all of it is currently allocated to the offshore sector. Based on the principle of adjacency, the residents of Labrador feel that they are entitled to greater access to the shrimp in the waters adjacent to Labrador. They also requested an allocation of shrimp for the inshore fishery and pointed out that better access to snowcrab and turbot fisheries would also help to support the coastal communities of Labrador.
58. In the Strait of Belle Isle area of southern Labrador, fishermen asked that all of Labrador be considered "adjacent" for all species so that fishermen from the 4R area would have access to 2J.
59. Lack of access to adjacent resources was not the only impediment facing Labrador communities. DFO policies have prevented fishermen from upgrading and increasing the size of boats in order to prosecute the shrimp fishery safely. This policy was seen as discriminatory as snowcrab fishermen were earlier allowed to increase the size of their vessels. In addition, a moratorium on infrastructure development prevents Labrador communities from developing local fish processing facilities. The justification for this is that there is already sufficient existing processing capacity. However, the fact that the existing capacity is situated on the "island" once again places the communities of Labrador at a disadvantage.
60. We were told that if Labrador communities had equitable access to the resources off their own shores, they would have no need of "degrading handouts." Funds spent on income support could be put to better use upgrading and developing processing facilities in order to create onshore processing jobs.
61. In other areas, such as the south coast of Newfoundland, witnesses stressed the importance of continued access to traditional fishing grounds in order to maintain the viability of fishing and fish-processing operations. In a number of instances, witnesses emphasized that they did not want to be restricted to narrow regional fishing zones.
Cost Recovery and Licence Fees
62. Many witnesses pointed to the dramatic increases in licence fees as evidence of the government's agenda to squeeze out small fishermen. In some cases witnesses claimed that licence fees have increased by a thousand percent or more. Furthermore, gross revenues have no direct relationship to the ability to pay. Skippers of fishing boats were laying off crew, as this was the only area left in which they could downsize.
63. In addition, fishermen and their communities are being hit with a large number of other costs including mandatory dockside monitoring, observer fees, costs for harbour authorities, and changes to EI regulations. Under the types of partnering arrangements proposed by Bill C-62 in the previous Parliament, fishermen expect that many of DFO's costs for management and science would also be off-loaded to fishermen's organizations. These changes are all coming at a time when the fishing industry is least able to absorb them and this is putting a great deal of additional stress both on fishermen and their communities. There is concern over the 'cost' of partnership with DFO. Any new 'partnerships' result in increased fees for fishermen. One fisherman described this relationship as, "…true partners only when it comes time to pay the bill."
Non-resident licences
64. Another complaint on the East Coast that committee members heard was that there are Canadians awarded licences who no longer reside in Canada. We heard from one witness who complained there is a dentist now residing in Florida who has a licence. He said this person is not involved in any way with the management or operation of fishing but simply collects the royalties.
OTHER ISSUES
Individual Transferable Quotas
65. There was much criticism of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). ITQ type schemes were widely viewed as a means of passing control of fisheries resources out of the hands of small, traditional inshore fishermen to those with the most money. This could result in the resource becoming concentrated in the hands of a small number of wealthy or corporate owners, said some witnesses. ITQs were also criticized as fostering a "shopping list" approach to fishing. They promoted a temptation to high-grade and discard, and required need for greater monitoring and enforcement.
66. In South West Nova, however, a representative of the inshore mobile gear fishery viewed the ITQ system differently. Before the ITQ system reorganization, the fleet had grown rapidly despite attempts to limit fishing effort, with the result that capacity expanded to an estimated 400% of that needed. Switching to the ITQ system had brought benefits such as the ability to plan fishing activities according to market and weather conditions, and availability of the resource. It also provided the opportunity to develop other fisheries that would not have taken place under a common property regime because of bycatch provisions.
Ghost Nets
67. The problem of fishing by "ghost" nets was raised by a number of witnesses. Although in some areas fishermen did not believe they are a significant problem, witnesses in other areas believed that ghost nets contribute significantly to fish mortality. A major part of the problem is that the nylon filament used to fabricate gillnets is especially resistant to decomposition. As a result, ghost nets can continue to fish long after they have been lost. Some witnesses suggested that the gear replacement program had encouraged a "relaxed" approach to recovering lost nets and suggested that fishermen who lose an excessive number of nets should be penalized.
68. One witness referred to a project in the Gulf of Maine where 2,240 nets had been recovered from an area of 64 square nautical miles. Ghost nets in this area had been estimated to fish at a rate equivalent to 15% of the commercial catch. A recommendation was made to the Committee for a large-scale ghost net retrieval project.
69. Many fishermen spoke at length about the ever expanding seal population on Canada's east coast and its adverse effect on fish populations, in particular cod stocks, and the threat seals now pose to the recovery of those cod stocks. During public meetings in Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador, fishermen described in vivid detail how seals eat the stomachs of cod and suck the spawn from lumpfish leaving their carcasses in the water or on top of ice pans. Seals are also believed to feed on other species that provide food for cod. The seal population was described as a symptom of an ecological system seriously out of balance.
70. Many fishermen ridiculed DFO and the scientific community in general for their claim that the increase in the seal population does not have a significant effect on cod stocks. They were irate and frustrated with the scientists' argument that cod is not one of the principal foods of seals and that researchers have examined the stomach contents of seals to find that the main food of seals is the same as that of cod. Fishermen claimed that if the scientists could see first hand how seals eat cod there would be no difference of opinion between themselves and the scientists. They would then be able to agree that the contents of seal stomachs include cod stomachs showing that cod is, in fact, a primary food source of seals.
71. The frustration of the fishermen was being further exacerbated by editorial support for the scientists' point of view in local newspapers in eastern Canada and also by what many felt was a misleading campaign against the seal hunt sponsored by the International Fund for Animal Welfare. Some witnesses felt that this campaign was more about raising funds than protecting seals.
72. In southern Labrador and the north shore of Quebec, the Committee encountered an additional issue concerning the hunting of seals. In this region, fishermen have traditionally harvested seals by netting them. DFO regulations now prevent these fishermen from netting seals, either for themselves or for the winter food supply for sled dogs. Even a seal found dead in fishing gear cannot be brought ashore.
73. On the northeast coast of Newfoundland, fishermen complained that even though blueback seals can be legally killed, they are not allowed to sell the pelts because of a regulation recently passed by DFO. Fisheries officers have verified that fishermen can kill these seals and sell the meat but that they are not allowed to sell the pelts. At the time of our hearings, over 100 fishermen had been charged for trying to sell the pelts of bluebacks. These fishermen, if convicted, face thousands of dollars in fines, confiscation of their boats and gear, and possible jail terms.
74. Many witnesses felt that one of the contributing factors in the explosion of the seal population has been the restrictions on the seal hunt, which had also contributed to the loss of markets for seal products. They also expressed some optimism for the development of new seal products and the expansion of new markets, particularly in Asia. Witnesses asked for support for an increased seal hunt as a means of providing enhanced economic opportunities and a way of helping to reduce the current imbalance between the size of seal herds and fish stocks.
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
75. The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is intended to improve maritime safety through a system that uses satellites and digital selective calling technology to improve communications with shore-based search and rescue and other marine traffic in the event of an emergency. The system will be required on all vessels greater than 300 gross tonnes as of February 1, 1999. Operators of smaller vessels were concerned that large vessels will no longer monitor VHF channel 16 or the Marine Frequency Channel after this date and, as a result, the smaller vessels will be at greater risk. This was an issue particularly in areas such as the Strait of Belle Isle where the traffic density is high and where the area is often fogbound.
Closure of les Îles-de-la-Madeleine Coast Guard Radio Station
76. Another safety-related issue was brought to the attention of the Committee in les Îles-de-la-Madeleine. In September 1997, operators at the Coast Guard radio station were informed that the station would close effective March the 31, 1998 although there had been previous assurances that it would remain open until at least the year 2000.
77. It was pointed out that the telephone link to the mainland is not completely reliable, having broken down several times in 1997. Despite measures intended to ensure backup in the event of a failure of the telephone link, the mayors and the various fishermen's associations continue to believe that closure of this station places users lives needlessly at risk, particularly in winter when the search and rescue team is not operational. Concern was also expressed over the ability of personnel at the Rivière-au-Renard Station to respond effectively to emergencies because of the different navigational conditions experienced in the center of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
78. Witnesses pointed out that neither local officials nor fishermen had been consulted and that DFO had not conducted any serious studies to justify closing the station. The Committee was asked to intervene.
Miramichi Issues
79. The decline of salmon stocks on the Miramichi was a serious concern for many witnesses who insisted that the government of Canada has a constitutional obligation to conserve and enhance salmon. They also expressed serious concerns about DFO's motives for divesting itself of the South Esk Hatchery.
80. Witnesses representing inshore fishermen warned of what they called an attempt by DFO to privatize the fishery and expressed their frustration with what they termed a "massive and aggressive fishery unleashed by Canadian draggers since the 200-mile limit". Some witnesses recommended a community-based fishery with decentralized management and warned that too much technology has devastated the fishery and that some types of gear wreak havoc on the environment. Other witnesses requested that DFO either purchase the few commercial salmon licences left in New Brunswick or allow licence holders to trade them for licences for other species. They also complained that DFO was very uncooperative and lacked understanding of the needs of those who were attempting to develop oyster beds.
81. Several witnesses talked about the aboriginal food fishery, claiming that agreements are not signed until well into or even after the conclusion of the fishing season. Witnesses also claimed that 400,000 pounds of lobster as a food allocation to the Burnt Church First Nation community of fewer than 1,000 people is an unrealistic allocation, equivalent to the catch of 40 commercial licences. Fishermen also told the Committee that the minimum size of lobsters harvested should be harmonized throughout the Gulf and that fishermen who lose traps during the fishing season sometimes require a full day's travel to obtain new tags from the nearest DFO office. They also said that fishermen should be given a small quota of snowcrab and should fish it with their own boats.
82. The midshore fleet stressed the need for management methods which would sustain and enhance the resources and suggested that quotas should be divided among the licence holders.
2 According to an in-house study by HRDC, the incremental cost of the HRDC portion of the TAGS program was $880 million after taking into account a $225 million contribution from HRDC's budget to TAGS, incre mental tax revenues to federal and provincial governments, and expenditure reductions in social programs such as EI and social assistance. The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy: Incremental Net Cost of TAGS/HRDC, Evaluation and Data Development, Strategic Policy, Human Resources Development Canada, January 1996.
3 Probably the "Grapes of Wrath."