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STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, February 11, 1998

• 1536

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.)): I welcome everyone and call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee will commence consideration of chapter 25 of the December 1997 report of the Auditor General of Canada; that is, “Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Immigration and Refugee Board—The Processing of Refugee Claims”, particularly that part dealing with the removal of rejected refugee claims.

We are very fortunate this afternoon to have two very distinguished, competent, and knowledgeable guests: the Assistant Auditor General, Richard Flageole; and Serge Gaudet, Principal of the Audit Operations Branch.

I will throw it into your hands, gentlemen, and ask whoever's going to be the first to speak to proceed. We will then go through our usual process—and you're very familiar with the process—where we will throw questions at you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Richard Flageole (Assistant Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those nice opening comments.

I have a very brief opening statement, and afterwards we will be pleased to answer any questions the committee might have. So if you like, I will proceed with the opening statement.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Richard Flageole: First, I would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to discuss chapter 25 of our December 1997 report.

As you know, the primary role of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada is to serve Parliament. I mention this to emphasize the independent nature of our audits and reviews. Our purpose is to provide Parliament with objective information, advice and assurance.

As provided for in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, our reports are referred to the public accounts committee. Nevertheless, we are more than pleased to respond to any inquiries from parliamentary committees and subcommittees such as yours.

We are here today to present the results of our audit of the processing of refugee claims. As per your request, our focus will be on matters relating to the handling of failed refugee claims.

Generally speaking, Mr. Chairman, we have noted that results under the existing system are disappointing. We are especially concerned by the size of the backlog, the lengthy processing times at both the board and the department, and the difficulty of carrying out removals.

At March 31, 1997, some 37,500 claimants were awaiting a decision by the department or the board with regard to their claims. We estimate that a person claiming refugee status can count on staying in Canada for an average of more than two and a half years.

With regard to failed claimants, in particular, Citizenship and Immigration Canada could confirm, at the end of our audit, the departure of only 4,300 of the 19,900 claimants who should have left the country. The low rate of success in sending back those who are not in need of protection fosters a notion that it is easier to immigrate to Canada by claiming refugee status than by going through the regular immigration channels.

To preserve the integrity of the immigration program, removal orders need to be carried out quickly. This is the message we conveyed in our 1990 report and have repeated in our 1997 report.

[Translation]

Claimants who are denied refugee status by the Immigration and Refugee Board would normally be required to leave Canada soon after the decision is made. However, the files go through a slow, complex process and many cases remain unresolved. Failed refugee claimants are generally entitled to a reassessment of their need for protection—a reassessment based on the risk of return. This reassessment adds to processing times and contains ambiguities that raise questions about the application's merits. Finally, because of the time taken to arrive at decisions, claimants settle in and create ties within Canadian society. After a while, it becomes very difficult to remove them. Some therefore apply for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

• 1540

Although we did not conduct a thorough audit of the removal function, we did attempt to determine what factors make it difficult for the department to carry out removals quickly. Among the factors noted is the time that elapses between the Immigration and Refugee Board's decisions and the decisions connected with supplementary review mechanisms, as well as the fact that some countries take a long time to issue travel documents to their nationals, or even refuse to do so. Apart from these factors, a number of individuals delay leaving the country or, in fact, elude the department.

We have also noted that Citizenship and Immigration Canada has insufficient information to manage removals adequately. For example, the department does not know exactly how many persons are ready for removal. The lack of coordination and management information impacts on the effectiveness of the removal process.

As indicated in our report, there are inherent limits to the improvements that can be made in the performance of the existing system. Choices that we as a society make significantly influence performance. Your committee will need to take this into account in its review of issues related to detention and removals. The past will no doubt be a complex and delicate one.

In 1995-96, the department conducted a review of the operational context and the rules and procedures pertaining to removals of individuals under the Immigration Act. The Committee may wish to question the department about its follow-up on the ensuing report. It may also wish to take a closer look at the department's removals strategy and inquire about expected and actual results.

[English]

Mr. Chairman, as you requested, my remarks are focused on that part of our chapter which deals with the handling of failed refugee claimants. It is important, however, to bear in mind our overall assessment to the effect that there is a need for a thorough review of the process. The entire infrastructure for coordination and control of activities needs to be improved. The process must quickly grant protection to those who genuinely need it and discourage those who do not require or deserve Canada's protection from claiming refugee status. We hope to have the opportunity to discuss this matter further with your committee.

This concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be pleased to answer any questions members may have.

The Chairman: Thank you. We'll proceed with questioning and we'll start with Mr. Reynolds, from the opposition side.

Mr. John Reynolds (West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The lack of adequate computer tracking of rejected refugee claimants would seem to be one of the most serious flaws in the removal system. Does it appear to you the department has given up on introducing a national computer tracking system, and are the systems the regions have developed capable of communicating with each other?

There are really two questions in there.

Mr. Serge Gaudet (Principal, Audit Operations Branch, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): To the first question, yes, the department was developing a new computer system to keep track of those who are supposed to be removed, and as we mentioned in our report, the project has been stopped, has been cancelled, because of budgetary restraints and other priorities of the department. What we're saying is there's a big need for a lot of information about removals: where the people are, etc. So yes.

Mr. John Reynolds: What have they spent so far? I know they started the program. There are a lot of stories out there about whether it was $2 million or $20 million or $60 million that was spent on putting this tracking system together. How much had they spent by the time they cancelled it, and how much more would it have cost them to complete that program?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: We did not obtain this information. In fact, a cancellation occurred just at the time when we issued our report, back in October. Our audit was complete at that time.

Mr. John Reynolds: Would that be something the Auditor General would look at? If you were spending money to put in a tracking system, and we know the cost just to the welfare system alone for people who are queue-jumping is about $300 million a year, would you be looking at what the cost of this tracking system is and how much it might save in one of your next reviews?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Definitely. The office has issued many reports on system development, mainly oriented towards financial systems in government. At the moment we are looking at it as an issue we think should be examined.

• 1545

Mr. John Reynolds: Great.

Talking now about the communication with each other, I know when I visit the Vancouver airport, there's even a difficulty sometimes communicating between the U.S. and Canada, between the computers right at the border and those at the airport of Vancouver. How easy is it for the ministry's offices across the country to communicate with each other and store information? If somebody comes illegally into Toronto and you deport him, and then he goes out to British Columbia and comes across there, is there any way of tracking that to know these people are coming back more than once?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: There are many dimensions to your question. First, when somebody arrives and asks to be accepted as a refugee, for example, the file is sent to the RCMP and they look at whether or not there was a claim before. Then the information is entered into what they call the FOSS system, their internal system, and they can keep track of the claimants, yes.

But then there is a question of two entities. There is the Immigration and Refugee Board and there is Citizenship and Immigration. I know one of the components they wanted to improve with the new enforcement system that you mentioned earlier was the exchange of information between these two. At the moment I don't know the status of these two organizations.

Within the department, yes, there is some exchange of information, but we also saw that there was a lot of regional assistance, which complicates things, because not all the information is available on the FOSS.

Mr. John Reynolds: Would it be possible for the Auditor General to be looking, possibly not just at this ministry...? Certainly within this ministry we have Citizenship and Immigration and the RCMP all involved, working together. We have the police departments in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver with a major problem here. Wouldn't it be possible to coordinate all those systems?

I toured the streets in Vancouver a while ago, and the police told me they had somebody from another country who had $1,700 worth of cocaine in his mouth. He'd been here nine days and had applied for refugee status. They don't even record that. It's not worth arresting him, because they couldn't get it through the system in British Columbia, they told me. So they just let him go. But there's no record of that now, even on his refugee form, so when he goes to apply, it doesn't say he's been involved in criminal activity.

It would be interesting for us to find out how much money could be saved if all these police and things could be coordinated together, so at least we know what's happening in our country. I'm wondering if that's something you would look at in your department.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: This is definitely an aspect we are interested in, and in fact in our recommendation we say there should be better coordination between everybody. The good start is with information: everybody knows where everybody is and at what phase of the process a particular claimant is in the system.

Mr. John Reynolds: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Is that it?

Mr. John Reynolds: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay, fine. We'll jump across to Mrs. Folco.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco (Laval West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): This is not what we voted to do last time.

[English]

The Chairman: You're next.

Mrs. Folco, go ahead.

[Translation]

Ms. Raymonde Folco: My two questions are either for Mr. Gaudet or for Mr. Flageole. Apart from your report, I have read others on the issue of personal risk of serious harm. In such cases, the claimant has already been denied refugee status by the Board, and his application is then looked at by the department, which evaluates the personal risk.

Could the Board perhaps do both those evaluations? First, the Board would assess whether the claimant was genuinely a refugee, while at the same time or later it could assess whether the claimant would be at personal risk if he returned to his country of origin. I would like your answer on that.

• 1550

My second question is on what we call "tarmac applications". If I understand correctly, a claimant who has been denied refugee status can, at the very moment he is preparing to leave the country, just before actually getting into the plane, submit an immigration application.

I believe this does not appear in your report. I would like to hear any comments you have on the subject. Thank you.

Mr. Richard Flageole: In answer to your first question, I believe that we do mention an evaluation of the risk of return carried out by the department after claimants are denied refugee status by the Board. At present, this takes about seven months. The review by Citizenship and Immigration Canada extends the claimants' stay in the country by about seven months.

In the chapter, we raise some questions about the merit of this review. We noted that there were some ambiguities and that the IRB's position was not necessarily clear. One possibility would be to carry out this review almost simultaneously. I believe that the Legislative Review Advisory Group suggested some form of combining these two reviews. This is certainly an option that would significantly reduce the claim processing time.

In the second question, when you mention an immigration application, are you speaking of an application for humanitarian reasons?

Ms. Raymonde Folco: Listen, I will read you the exact sentence:

[English]

    A person may refuse to leave and become the subject of enforcement machinery. A person facing imminent removal may seek landing under article 114(2)

—which I think is parrainage

    commonly referred to as a tarmac application.

[Translation]

Does that bring anything to mind?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Subsection 114(2) really is based on humanitarian considerations. That is why we said that this application could be made at any point in the process and as often as desired. If a person had applied for humanitarian reasons, for example, for fear of personal attack or persecution, and the claim was refused, applications could then be reviewed in the light of other considerations, such as the time spent in Canada, the links that have been created or the presence of children. The applicant could ask to stay in Canada for those reasons.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: "Tarmac", in my opinion, means on the ground, before getting into the aircraft. This means that someone can apply just before climbing the steps to get into the aircraft. I would like to have your opinion on this. Is this something that you reviewed, and did you assess this matter of a last minute request?

Mr. Richard Flageole: As Mr. Gaudet said, under the Act, an application can be made at any time on humanitarian grounds. Someone can clearly use this provision at the last minute to delay a removal or to request residency.

In most of the cases that we examined, we saw that people went first through the IRB before making such an application. If the decision was negative, they then asked for a risk of return review, and if that answer was negative, then they invoked the provision concerning humanitarian grounds. This is the sequence followed in a good number of cases.

In our review, we also asked some questions concerning the rigour of this process. It obviously comes down to a question of time. If the time between the various decisions is relatively lengthy, circumstances may change and other factors may be brought to bear on the subject.

On the other hand, combining all of these reviews and carrying them out in a very short time would certainly contribute to accelerating the entire process.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Ménard, you have ten minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Your finding is quite worrisome to us as members of Parliament.

• 1555

Basically, you're telling us that the whole process is inefficient and costs the provinces concerned, namely the central provinces, which receive more than 50% of the refugees, $100 million.

I know that you are not here to elaborate government policies, but you did have the opportunity to review the process quite thoroughly. Take the situation at an airport. A refugee arrives, and is first seen by Immigration Canada. He is not yet seen by the Immigration and Refugee Board. He has papers, and is then sent to an officer who asks him to fill out a personal information form, and, at that point, the IRB gets involved.

Once the person has completed the personal information form, it will be decided whether the application is well founded and whether the person can stay and, thereafter, the entire process is launched. In your opinion, why have we failed to eliminate the backlog since the Conservatives introduced their reform? Basically, there is certainly something wrong when a process that should take three or four weeks if everything is going well—

The report of the Legislative Review Advisory Group, the Trempe report, stated that it would be desirable to aim for six weeks. In your opinion, is this because staff rotates too frequently, or because there really is a problem in the sequence of events, or is it inevitable, given that we are dealing with people who have no papers and have difficulty establishing their identity? If you were the decision-maker and had to identify the most important factor, what would you say?

I will then have two other questions.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: If I could choose only one element, I would say that the system needs to be reformed. Having said that, when we examine the various steps of the process, we find that there are major problems at each step. In the first step, people come without documents; 60% of them do not have documents. We cannot expect things to go well with respect to removals and informed decision- making by the commissioners, if they do not know in advance who these people are and whether their stories are credible.

Mr. Réal Ménard: That is beyond the scope of the legislator, because it results from the nature of the client. There is really no way, unless you have given some thought on how to deal with people who come from Sri Lanka or Bangladesh... We have to work with this type of client. Would you say that the major reason is that people do not have documents?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Problems relating to eligibility are among the most important. If you are considering only the legislative aspects, this raises the whole issue of co-operation with other countries. I believe that we raised this in 1990, and we have come back to it in 1997. Bilateral agreements with other countries may be of assistance in this regard, regardless of whether people come from the United States or Australia. This would make it possible to share the responsibility for processing. It would help, if you are talking only about the Act. As for the IRB, the matter of the availability of people is important.

Mr. Réal Ménard: That's fine. Let's look at these one by one, so that we can fully understand the details. Mr. Pérusse and his team, whom I believe you met in Montreal, have implemented a quick procedure for people with papers. If this quick procedure were accelerated, do you think that we would be able to clear the backlog? You know that there is a pilot project in Montreal? Mr. Pérusse and his team have worked very hard to develop it.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: An accelerated procedure is a very sensitive question. Our objective with respect to refugees is to protect those who need protection. As for an accelerated procedure, we have noted, as you stated, a decreased use of this procedure. In Montreal, it is used more than elsewhere. Elsewhere, there is a fear of using it. There is certainly some potential in this regard, but it depends on the procedure used to protect those who need to be heard and to tell their stories.

• 1600

Mr. Réal Ménard: That's fine. I have two other quick questions.

One very original aspect of your report is that you clearly express something we have known intuitively about the IRB for years. The IRB is the highest and largest tribunal in this country. That means it is an administrative body. So what you get is a confrontation between two structures: the public service structure and the political structure. You have said some very hard, cruel and even devastating things about training. In this report, you tell us that training is not always adequate, and it takes about a year for someone to reach operational level after being appointed. By reaching the operational level, I mean hearing cases properly.

If we had a specialized agency with career officials hearing all cases, there would no longer be appointments. People would be there long enough to learn the job, and would be knowledgeable in international law and human rights legislation. Do you think this would make the process more efficient? Please tell us a little about the confrontation between the civil service and political structures involved. Don't be shy.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Obviously, the issue of appointed IRB members has been debated in all the media. In my view, when the minister decided in 1995 or 1994 to set up a selection committee for the appointment of Board members, his goal was to increase the independence and skills of members of the IRB. Criteria were established so that competent people would be appointed to the Board. People who would be an asset to the system.

We have noted some areas that could be improved. The system is very new, and it is in fact being improved.

There is no doubt training is very important. We have noted that good training is provided. They put a great deal of emphasis on training, because they know that people don't have very long before they have to sit at hearings. Luckily, the current procedure is to have two Board members at a hearing, because this gives the new ones a chance too...

Mr. Réal Ménard: If I remember correctly, though I might be thinking about the wrong report, you concluded that your first concern was turnover. You said that turnover was very high, that Board members didn't stay very long, and that it cost $91,000 to train someone who would be ruling on cases. You were also concerned by the fact that it took quite a long time before Board members became operational.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: I don't think that is necessarily a concern, but rather a fact of life. It takes about 8 to 12 months for a board member to understand properly how the system works.

We attended some hearings, and we saw how complicated situations in some countries are, and how difficult it can be to understand all the details. If a claimant has no papers, you have to have a good understanding of the situation in his country of origin. A great deal of training focusses on that aspect. Moreover, the claimant must understand how people came to their decision. You must understand what criteria they used. That takes a great deal of time.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Have you had the pleasure of interviewing Michael Hamelin of Alliance Québec?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: No.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Excellent. Thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Ménard.

Madam Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming before us today to answer some of our questions.

I have one that's twofold. One, I was surprised by the statement that your 1997 report showed little improvement over 1990. I was just wondering what happened in that seven-year period that somehow seemed not to have adhered to whatever recommendations you made in 1990, which could have improved the situation in 1997?

My second question has to do with the issue of removals and some of the strategies the department has so far employed, such as using cash bonds, exchanging information with other countries, etc. How are those efforts working to solve the problems of travel documents and a whole series of issues to bring about greater numbers of removals?

• 1605

Mr. Richard Flageole: I will respond to the first question. I was the audit principal responsible for the 1990 audit, so I can make quite a parallel between the two. In 1990 we looked at a fairly new process: the process had been put in place on January 1, 1989, so we really looked at it after its first 12 or 15 months of operations. At the time we noted that the system was already falling behind. So some of the problems we noted were already showing up at the end of 1990. The department made some changes to the legislation—mainly in 1992 and 1994.

So we're really looking at some fundamental problems, and if I might just expand on what Mr. Gaudet said, we found problems at every step in the process. When Mr. Gaudet mentioned the people who show up without any documentation, I think it's important to realize that there are fairly strict controls over airline companies. Most of the members have travelled abroad and you know that when you're going to board an airplane they're going to ask you for your passport. You at least have a plane ticket, so it's reasonable to suspect that a fair amount of those people had in fact travel documents when they boarded the airplane. When they arrived in Canada those papers were gone.

So when we're looking at possible changes to legislation, there might be ways to address those types of questions. The smuggling business is real. This might be an opportunity to look at the penalties for those types of situations.

Among the other problems we noticed at the refugee board, the turnover of the members is certainly a very serious problem. As Mr. Gaudet mentioned, it's normal that it takes six to twelve months, but if the average period of nomination is two years I think we're looking for problems. We have to start all over again. And if we look at the end in terms of removals, we found pretty well the same type of situation in 1990. There are many reasons for that. There's a question of strategy, there's a question of resources by the department, and there's a question of priorities.

One of the things we noticed was that the balance between the removal of refugee claimants and non-refugee claimants is quite different in 1996-97 from what it was in 1991-92. We had more removal of claimants in 1991-92; now we have more removals of non-claimaints. That reflects the priority of the department to switch resources from removing failed refugee claimants to removing criminals. That might be a very valid choice, but given the level of resources the department has, they have to make those kinds of reallocations.

So those would be the key problems we found. And again, in terms of results, the situation is pretty well the same as it was seven years ago. That's why we believe it's probably more of a structural problem than strictly a management problem. That's why we called in the chapter for an overall review of the whole process.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: To address the question concerning the removal strategy, the removal strategy talks about, as you mentioned, a number of initiatives. It's difficult, since we don't have an overall progress report on the overall strategy.... Everything regarding the removal strategy started in 1994, and there have been a few adjustments, but generally it calls for better cooperation. And definitely we need better cooperation in order to improve the system, better cooperation with the department, better cooperation with IRB, and better cooperation with other countries.

One particular aspect that is important for the system to improve removal is the time aspect: you need to take decisions faster. I'm not sure that the strategy is looking at this aspect. The fact that people don't have travel documents—I know they are trying to improve on that aspect, to have cooperation with other countries in order for them to provide them with those documents. So this also could be an improvement.

• 1610

The overall answer to that is we probably need a clear identification of what are the steps and the strategy for removals and what has been done up to now, probably to determine from there if the steps have been sufficient and what else can be done. From what I saw back in 1994, there were a lot of good activities related to that.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Now we'll jump to Steve Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): My questions will be around the appeal process.

As far as I can determine, there seem to be three areas of appeal. One is a risk review. Another is on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, which can be made basically at any time in the process. I'm not sure if it can be made more than once at any time in the process, but I think it can. Then there's a judicial review as an option. So there are at least three pressure points where people can appeal, say, a deportation order.

I find it strange that we would have a humanitarian and compassionate appeal process, because I would have thought the whole issue in the first place was based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Presumably refugees are claiming they are refugees because they fear for their lives, for their safety, for their loved ones, they have fear of torture or whatever. I would have thought that the initial appeal was based on compassionate and humanitarian grounds, so it seems somewhat redundant to me.

If there's something that I hear on an ongoing basis, it's that there is a perception that there are too many avenues of appeal or that there are not enough clear avenues of appeal where a firm decision, one way or the other, can be made.

We've seen instances in some of the Toronto media of young students who have been here for several years who are excelling in their academic studies. They're terrific citizens in every sense of the word and every Canadian would, in my view, want them to remain in the country. Yet they're being sent back to their land of origin. It has taken years and there have been all of these processes.

It seems to me there needs to be a balance. I wonder if you've looked into this and if you have any thoughts. We don't want arbitrarily to take away a human being's right of appeal here. We're dealing with lives, so they are very high-risk decisions that we're asking people to make. So we want to make sure that they have reasonable avenues of appeal.

At the same time, it seems to me that if one appeal court can make a decision with the knowledge that somebody else can easily overturn it, then maybe it takes a little bit of pressure off of them and maybe it allows the system not to work as efficiently as it should.

I've identified at least three, and potentially more, avenues of appeal, and presumably in the case of a judicial decision you can appeal that. So it can go on and on, of course costing the taxpayers a lot of money, but, perhaps even more significantly than that, putting someone's life in limbo, having them establish themselves in what they hope to be their new country in various ways and then, boom, it's cut off and there's a last-minute reprieve through the media—which of course is another court of appeal, the court of public appeal, I suppose.

So there are probably half a dozen avenues whereby an appeal can take place once a decision has been made, which to me would seem only to exacerbate the length of time that it would take to get some kind of a fair decision for these people.

I know there's a question in there somewhere, and you can probably find it. I guess I could just ask if you agree—that's a good question. Did you analyse the appeal process and do you have any comments about my comments? And can you think of a way in which we could make it better?

• 1615

Mr. Richard Flageole: You're raising a very fundamental question. That's the way the process is structured now and that's the way the Immigration Act works.

We raise questions about the multiple levels of appeals, and when we say appeals I think it is important to understand that there is no appeal on substance in that process. If you go to the refugee board and your demand is refused, you have leave to appeal to the Federal Court, but it's more of an appeal on process. The Federal Court can send the case back to the refugee board and it will have to start all over again. It's not a question of reversing the decision of the board.

Once you get a refusal at the board, you become an immigration case. You're not a protection case any more, so you're back to being like any other persons in Canada who would like to claim any kind of status under the Immigration Act. You have that risk-of-return review and you have the humanitarian and compassionate grounds. It's important to note that the refugee board will render a decision based on the Geneva Convention, so there might be situations where somebody might fear something that is not necessarily included under the Geneva Convention.

That's the whole process that should be looked at. And in our report, again, I think we make it very clear that there is a need to review the overall process. There are certainly ways and means to achieve the same type of objective, to have a fair and equitable hearing for those people and do it more quickly. There are certainly ways to combine some of those things and to make sure we'll achieve the same results but in a much faster way.

The Chairman: Mr. Mahoney.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I just wanted to follow up, if I could, very briefly.

The Chairman: Sure, go ahead.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Would you see any sense to combining the humanitarian and compassionate issue into one appeal process, with the risk review and the humanitarian and compassionate grounds being part of it?

I note that you also talk about the need to train people in the area of humanitarian and compassionate grounds. To me, training somebody to be compassionate seems to be a difficult thing to do.

In any event, would it not make more sense to look at one appeal, which would include risk review on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and then a judicial review beyond that and then that's it?

Mr. Richard Flageole: It is an option, but again, there's a very basic question. The refugee board the way it is now is only looking at the application of the Geneva Convention. An option would be to broaden the protection question to include factors other than those actually included under the Geneva Convention. In that case, the body in question can look at all of the issues at the same time and render a decision. There might be a need after that for an appeal process based on substance. That would be a way of doing it.

But again, the board now looks at the Geneva Convention and then we look at any other factors in not returning that person to the country. There's a very fundamental question to be examined.

The Chairman: Mr. McNally.

Mr. Grant McNally (Dewdney—Alouette, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to start by saying that it might be difficult for us to focus just on this one recommendation, given the fact that we have 172 recommendations here. And I know that some of the things you're talking about in your report have been mentioned in this legislative review as well.

You mentioned earlier that you see this more as a structural problem rather than a management one, and you've alluded to that throughout your report. My main question is whether you think the idea of moving resources earlier, to the entry point of refugees coming to Canada, would be a valid way of shifting resources. You spoke earlier about travel documents disappearing en route. Would there be a way to shift or allocate our resources to maybe screening or scanning documents when someone comes on a plane? Would that be a way to go, rather than allocating resources to the tail end of the process, which is what we now seem to be doing? Do you think that would have merit?

• 1620

Mr. Serge Gaudet: There are two points there. The first is the absence of travel documents. Even if you have a process at the beginning I don't think it will help. I think it's another issue, a question of what we are ready to do about that. Are we ready to slow down the whole process of people arriving and disembarking, getting off the planes and checking everybody? That's a difficult one. So that's one issue.

In our report we focus on getting the information as soon as possible. It is obvious that sometimes people don't have passports or citizenship documents or whatever. What we think is important is that the story be put on paper as fast as possible and questions be put as soon as possible by people who know about the conditions of the country. I think that's very important. At the end of the day, when three months later we start to have the hearing, we then have better information to assess the claim.

Mr. Richard Flageole: Maybe I can add to this, Mr. Chairman.

Any problems at the front are going to be multiplied by three, four or five at the end. I think you're raising a very fundamental question. If we look at the removals, again, whatever we do at the front has quite an impact at the end. I think your committee should be careful, and not try to solve those issues in isolation.

The refugee determination system is a continuum of events. It's very important that we look at it in a continuous way. So if there's any way to tighten the controls up front, it will have a very significant impact on the ability to carry removals at the end.

Again, it's a choice of where we put the resources. There are also choices we have to make as a society. Are we willing to turn away people who show up at Pearson airport without any documents? Some countries do that. Again, that's a choice of society. We have to realize that some people are going to come here without any documents. If you are fleeing your country for political reasons or whatever, I don't think you're going to show up at your embassy to ask for a passport.

That's the very delicate balance parliamentarians will have to deal with.

Mr. Grant McNally: I certainly wouldn't advocate turning anybody away, but as you were mentioning, the factor of doing this quicker, or going through the process quicker, closer to their arrival time, is where the answer lies. Again, you've alluded to that throughout your report and in your comments today.

What would be your best solution to synthesize the main recommendations of your report for this committee that might be turned into practical and applicable types of activities that could be put in place by the department in this area? You've alluded to some of them, but I'm wondering what your opinion is of what might be the best route to go in putting practical things into place.

I know there was some mention in this report about linking something called “provisional status” to acquiring a travel document when someone first arrives. I don't know if you read through that, or see that as holding merit. What would be your best solution to this?

Mr. Richard Flageole: I think you're referring to the Trempe report. I don't think it's the role of our office to tell the government specifically how they should do it.

There is a certain number of options. We looked at the report of the legislative review committee. There are some interesting options there. Again, choices will have to be made.

• 1625

I think the main message we have is to be very, very careful not to try to patch up the system. The system was patched in 1992, in 1994. There have been some fires. We have just tried to extinguish the fires. What we're saying is now we should try to prevent fire.

We really believe there's a need to review the entire process, from the beginning to the end; and again, it's a continuum of events. It's very, very important that we look at it globally, that we look at the players involved, the divisions of responsibilities in the system, the role of Citizenship and Immigration, the role of the Refugee Board. Again, there are different options.

You have a certain number of options on the table, based on the report. The minister announced public consultations within the next two months. It is not an easy system to fix. I think it will be quite a challenge for parliamentarians and the department to come up with a system that will respond to the challenge.

That's the overall comment I can make on that.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Saada.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard—La Prairie, Lib.): I have a brief question. In the figures you cite, on March 31, 1997 37,500 claimants were awaiting decisions. Approximately 50% of those claimants were denied refugee status, and were to be removed. Yet, barely 25% of them were actually removed.

The system we have has been patched up many times. I believe you even call it a patchwork system. Do we have any idea whether these figures have changed over time? In other words, have there been any changes in these figures between 1990, when you tabled your first report, and 1997? Have the changes made any difference? Are we still living with the same percentages today that we had in 1990? I'm talking both about absolute figures and percentages.

Mr. Richard Flageole: In 1990, we had about the same percentages. If I remember correctly, we were talking about 25 to 30% in 1990-91, for essentially the same reasons. Obviously, time is a very critical aspect of the whole process. If it takes two and a half to three years to decide on a claimant's status, it then becomes extremely difficult to remove that claimant.

That is a fact of life. So we have to ensure that decisions are handed down much more quickly than they are today. The problem of missing travel documents was also there several years ago. Then too, people arrived without documents. That means we have to contact their countries of origin to get the documents, so that we can remove them. And in some cases, claimants do not cooperate very much. In other cases, it is the countries of origin that refuse to help, because they do not want their people back. Then, it becomes a matter of international relations.

In some countries, the conditions are such that we simply cannot send people back there. There could be a civil war on for example or something equally dangerous. Many people also manage to disappear into the system. We said earlier that the department does not have enough information. It does not monitor these people, and it does not know where they are. There have been a fair number of questions on the issue of detention.

That, of course, is a societal choice. Obviously, if we extend detention, we might increase the number of successful removals, however, that option does involve a financial cost, as well as humanitarian and social costs that we also have to consider.

We also talked about departmental priorities, which depend on departmental resources. Resources are moved from one place to another. There has been no real increase in the resources allocated. Perhaps, investing more resources here could lead to savings in other areas. We often tend to analyze costs in isolation: that is, we say that removals are expensive, but we forget that if we could remove people more quickly, we would save in other areas.

• 1630

A few moments ago, a committee member mentioned the cost to provinces of providing social assistance and other services to these people. Obviously, speeding up claims processing and removals would result in savings. In any case, what we have to do is find a balance between the resources we should invest and the potential benefits of such investment.

Mr. Jacques Saada: You said that, in order to get on board a plane, passengers need a travel ticket, a passport, or some such document. So we have a problem right there: if these tickets and passports have disappeared, there are problems and there are delays.

In your opinion, could international law provide a framework for agreements with carriers, to the effect that travel documents would be handed over directly to on-board authorities and to authorities in destination countries, so that we don't risk having them disappear during the trip? Could such a system be set up?

Mr. Richard Flageole: I am not a counsel in international law, Mr. Chairman, but I believe that pursuant to Canadian legislation, and with agreements between the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and international carriers, we could set up something of the kind.

At present, legislation provides for fining carriers who bring people into Canada without documents. So that could be an option. But some people have pointed out it would cause delays. People come to Canada and are in a rush to get off the plane. But the system is certainly an option that could be explored, and as far as I know there is nothing in international law to prevent it, provided that it is permitted under Canadian law.

Mr. Jacques Saada: Thank you.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Ménard.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, may I point out a correction?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The cost for social assistance, at least in Ontario, which would probably be the largest cost for this area, is not with the provincial government, it's with the municipalities. I just want that to be clear and on the record.

The Chairman: Thanks for that information.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I would like to come back to a statement you make in your report, on the last paragraph of page 16. We know that there are systemic problems, and a lack of resources. You would very much like to see an in-depth review, and I think that message has been heard by most members here today.

However, I would also say that some officials and immigration officers could be doing a bit better. Among other things, you point out that nowadays, at some ports of entry, claimants are virtually never questioned about the circumstances of their claims, and are asked only to fill out the information forms.

So you are saying that, while the claimant is before you, there are ways of getting better information. Is that a correct interpretation of what you mean? Perhaps you could tell us a little bit more about your investigation in connection with this statement.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: You are absolutely right. This is one aspect where there is certainly room for improvement. At ports of entry, we should not just be getting claimants to fill out a questionnaire, and then sending the questionnaire on to the IRB. There are important questions that should be put to each claimant, depending on his country of origin.

Not all ports of entry have the same procedures, however. During our audit, we visited several. Pearson Airport, in Toronto, has adopted a new procedure, for example. On arrival, claimants are welcomed by customs officer, as in every port of entry, then sent on to immigration officers. Their fingerprints and photographs are taken, then they are given a document they must take to Terminal 3 in Toronto, and then their application is accepted and forwarded to the IRB.

We noted that very little was done in the way of interviewing refugee claimants. They were not asked why they had come, how they had come, or what they meant by saying they were persecuted. This is all done in writing. We think that the interview provided a little more information.

• 1635

Mr. Réal Ménard: I don't want to ask you to take a position on government policy, because I know that is not part of your mandate. But could you just tell me whether, in your opinion, one way of dealing with the backlog—which is always there—would be to establish a specialized agency? If there was a specialized agency administered by career officials knowledgeable in international law and human rights legislation, would the process be more stringent, in your view? Would that be an effective way of reforming the system? Do you understand my question? I don't want to put words in your mouth.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: No, no. We said that the system needed enough decision-makers to deal with the cases, and that decision-makers had to be experienced. We are saying that, with two and a half year terms and turnover rates like those we saw, we are undermining... We end up with an organization that perhaps lacks the experience to be productive.

We have pointed out that productivity was 50% in some cases. This causes difficulties and delays the whole process. We need to have enough decision-makers. But it's not just a question of numbers; we also need to have them in the right place. Vast numbers of refugees land in certain ports of entry, and the system must provide the capacity to process them when necessary.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Couldn't there be another way of speeding up the system? Once the questionnaires have been filled out and we have gone some way into the process, couldn't the hearing itself be chaired by a single Board member? That would certainly speed things up, since I believe many hearings are still held before three Board members.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Two Board members.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Two Board members and the officer who dealt with the claim, so three people.

Mr. Serge Gaudet: The request has been put forward, and they are waiting for the government's decision. If hearings were chaired by a single Board member, decisions would be speeded up, but over all would not be reduced by 50% overall. There is still the matter of training, and of coordination. However, it would certainly speed things up. Adjustments would of course have to be made to maintain the calibre of the system.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You have conducted interviews and shown us clearly that there is a latent conflict between officials and Board members. They could of course have two perspectives, and even be loyal to different things. Their relationship to the organization is not the same.

With respect to Board members, there is a problem associated with political appointments, which could not be dealt with in your report. With respect to officials, what can you tell us about their motivation? How do they see their role in the organization?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: The IRB has worked very hard on identifying and clarifying roles. I think this is in the report. An IRB poll showed that some people were opposed to certain issues. That is not difficult to understand, given that some Board members are only there for two or three years. Officials help Board members prepare for hearings, and provide information for them during hearings. So they encounter a great many Board members with little experience. There is some frustration about that—that is what we were told. When you have experienced decision-makers, a relationship of trust is established. But it is difficult to establish that sort or relationship when the people you report to are only there for a short time.

Mr. Réal Ménard: One last question.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Obhrai, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: But earlier, you allowed—

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Obhrai.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: What a bad chairman.

• 1640

[English]

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Ref.): Thank you very much for coming. I wasn't here to watch your presentation, but I have read through this, and I have a couple of questions in general.

Could you give us an idea—and I don't know if it's within your mandate—as to what categories the failed refugee claimants fall into? I mean to say, why do they fail? How does the whole process come very quickly to the recognition of the fact that these are failed refugee claims? Because this in one way can work out in the front, as you said, if you don't fix the system in the front. So what has been your assessment when doing your audit as to what the major reasons were that the refugee claimants failed?

Mr. Serge Gaudet: Mr. Chair, the reason we have failed refugee claimants is because they don't meet the definition of the convention. The members don't, in their judgment, feel that the person is persecuted because of their race, their nationality, their religion, or because they belong to a social group or because of their political opinion. That's the reason for the failed refugee claimants.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: When does criminality come into it—those with a criminal record claiming? That wouldn't come in in the first one.

Mr. Richard Flageole: There are two steps to the process. You have an eligibility requirement in the act, so when somebody arrives at Dorval airport and claims refugee status, there is a provision in the Immigration Act to determine whether they are eligible to claim refugee status.

Serious criminality is one reason you would not be eligible under the process. If you have a serious criminal record, your file will not be referred to the refugee board. You're simply not eligible under the Immigration Act to claim refugee status.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: But you just mentioned the fact that in your audit, when you went to the Toronto airport there was no interview. A guy just came in, and if he had a criminal record, okay, he's made an applicant—he's in. It takes two and a half years to get rid of him. In most cases the other country may not take him, as you just mentioned. So bingo—we have a system here where the guy is in the country. Right? Is that a big problem?

Mr. Richard Flageole: What we found during the audit is that when somebody arrives there is a criminality check in Canada. The immigration people will look, and the case is referred to the RCMP, but there's a check as to whether the person has a criminal record in Canada.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: The check is done at the airport, or within a short period of time after he's left?

Mr. Richard Flageole: It's done in a reasonably short period of time by the RCMP. They have the fingerprints of the person. But again, we're talking mainly about criminality in Canada. So if that person has never come to Canada, it's for sure they don't have any records in Canada.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Right.

Mr. Richard Flageole: The person will become eligible for the process and will go through the whole process. The security checks are done mainly at the end of the process, when people go for landing. When they go for landing, they will go through a thorough security investigation. That's where the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will get involved. Then we will check at the international level. If there is a problem we will stop the process. So that's the type of situation that we—

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: But based on your own report, that's two and a half years down the road.

Mr. Richard Flageole: Yes.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: But in that time things may have changed, where he will not be able to go back to his country of origin. It may not accept him.

Mr. Richard Flageole: It is possible.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Is that a big problem in your audit? Did you find among the failed refugee claimants that a criminal element was a big element of the two and a half years' backlog that we have, of the 30,000 that you mentioned?

Mr. Richard Flageole: It's extremely difficult to know, because the ones who are not accepted as refugees will never go through that kind of security review, because they won't go for landing as a permanent resident. It's only the ones we accept who will go through that process. If they're refused, theoretically they're gone, or should be removed. They might still be hiding in Canada, but they won't go through that evaluation process. So it's extremely difficult to know whether there are serious criminals among the people who have been refused as refugees.

• 1645

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: So there is a problem in the sense that, as I read your report, if a person comes saying there's a criminal record, he's refused, and he's in the country for two and a half years. You've also mentioned a backlog of 30,000. Some disappear into the system. So one would probably say that there is a serious problem in that area, wouldn't one?

Mr. Richard Flageole: We might suspect that there is in some cases, but again we're not able to look at that because the information is just not available.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: You are an assistant auditor general and you probably have been trying to be politically correct. I'm not trying to be politically correct. From my point of view, that refugee board is packed with commissioners or appointees who basically are politicians, as we see more and more appointees who are working with the best view of getting votes to let them in. So this board here is really not the board doing its job over there.

How does this tie in with the actual law that we have in this country as far as the Supreme Court having said that a refugee claimant should be treated within the context of the Charter of Rights—that signal?

So we have here appointees, and then we have the court, our whole system here, that, as the Supreme Court said, should follow the Charter of Rights. Isn't that one of the reasons why we have the backlog?

Mr. Richard Flageole: I don't think that as an office we made any comments on the competency of the people. I think we raised the fundamental issue, as Mr. Gaudet said, of the need to have a sufficient number of decision-makers. These people should be competent, should be trained. The nomination process, I believe, doesn't have anything to do with the competency of the people. The judicial system is a very good example of where we have people nominated by order in council who are very competent and have a lot of respect.

So whether we should have a separate agency or keep the present system I don't think is the issue. The issue is to have a process whereby we will have people with the competence needed to do the job.

Again, the key problem is the turnover of people. You don't find people specialized in refugee determination out of university. You have to train those people. You have to develop those resources. So it's very important that those people will be there for a sufficient period of time so that whatever the organization, whether it's the board, a separate agency or another model, they have at all times the right number of competent decision-makers.

So I don't think it's an issue of how they're nominated or not.

The Chairman: Thanks for clarifying that issue. It's a good answer.

Ms. Folco.

Ms. Raymonde Folco: I would like to address, if you'll allow me, Mr. Chair, a couple of comments that were made by one of the members. I would like perhaps to bring some clarification.

Regarding the refugee claimant who the board has some idea may be a criminal in his own country or in one of the countries that he has come through before he arrives in Canada—so he may have a criminal record out there—the board then invites a representative of the Minister of Immigration to sit during their hearing and to bring proof during their hearing. That representative of the Minister of Immigration then becomes one of the persons who brings the proof before the commissioner. I wanted to bring that out, because there is a process that the vérificateur général just alluded to, but there is another aspect where during the hearing there is somebody there representing the Minister of Immigration who brings in proof.

• 1620

The other clarification I wanted to bring was regarding the Charter of Rights. There is a very important department within the board, which is the judicial review department, where every decision is written up. Every time a member of the board says no to a refugee claimant, he must write up the reasons he has refused that refugee claimant. These reasons then go to a department, and there's one in Montreal, one in Toronto, and one in Vancouver. Wherever there's a board, there is a judicial department that then reads over these decisions and says perhaps you should have added this, or you should not have said that, because this is not according to the Canadian Charter of Rights, or this is not according to the Geneva Convention.

This is an important point that one must understand on how the board functions. These are not people who are nominated and then are just sort of trained and just go out there. There is a very rigid set of controls within the board, which is there at all times and controls all these decisions.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

That brings to a close our two rounds. I appreciate the kinds of questions that have been asked and the kinds of comments we received from our two witnesses.

I would like to point out to the members of the committee that tomorrow there is no meeting, simply because we were not able to bring together the kinds of witnesses and the people we wanted to, because they are so busy and they have other obligations. However, from next Wednesday on, our meetings are booked solid. We do have the people we want and they're all lined up for the immediate future, starting next Wednesday, February 18, at 3.30 p.m.

Also, as for the steering committee, you'll be notified tomorrow, probably, of when we're going to have a steering committee meeting. We would like to have that steering committee meeting as early as possible in the beginning of the week, before Wednesday, absolutely. There's a tremendous amount of very important information that has to be dealt with.

The other point I'd like to make is for clarification of process. After my meeting with the minister today, we made it very clear that once the government, in other words the minister's office, goes through her process—that is, after she's been on the road and gathers the information she has to gather and all the information the minister's office already contains, which is thousands and thousands of documents that they have been collecting for a long time, and they know what the problems are—they're going to be coming up with recommendations, a direction, and their proposals.

Those proposals will be presented, not only to us, but also to the country. We will have the opportunity to examine those positions, reactions, and directions of the government and what they are proposing in dealing with those.

That would mean we would have to bring, over a very short period of time, a great number of witnesses to react to that proposal. We ourselves would probably, more than likely, hopefully, go on the road and listen to people in various communities to get their reactions to the government's proposed position regarding the recommendations that were presented in the review committee by the troika.

So that basically is the format for our committee for many months to come.

I now adjourn the meeting.