AAND Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES AUTOCHTONES ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DU GRAND NORD

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 9, 1999

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[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Guy St-Julien (Abitibi—Baie James—Nunavik, Lib.)): Good morning everyone. Before we hear our witnesses, I would like to tell you that the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Program and Procedure scheduled for nine o'clock this morning had to be cancelled because four of its members could not attend.

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I have therefore worked with our research attachés and Ms. Fisher to establish the schedule of meetings when we will continue our consideration of Bill C-56. I have selected witnesses from the list prepared by our clerk on March 3 following the discussion among members from all parties. As indicated in the document you have in hand, we planned on Tuesday, March 16 to summon the representatives of the Norway House Cree Nation and those of the Manitoba Aboriginal Rights Coalition and, on Thursday, March 18, those of the Cross Lake First Nation and of the Grand Council of the Crees.

This selection does not in any way prevent other witnesses which committee members might wish to summon from appearing. You may consult the list compiled on March 3 and select the names of other organizations which may be of interest to you. You might also add other names since the list is an open one. Thank you very much.

We will now go on to today's agenda, which provides for the consideration of Bill C-56, An Act respecting an agreement with the Norway House Cree Nation for the settlement of matters arising from the flooding of lands, and respecting the establishment of certain reserves in the Province of Manitoba.

Today we have Mr. Warren Allmand, former Minister of Indian Affairs, who is appearing as an individual, and a university professor, Peter Russell.

Mr. Allmand, do you have an opening statement?

[English]

Mr. Warren Allmand (Individual Presentation): I want to start by thanking the committee for inviting me to appear.

I'm here because I was the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs in 1977 and supervised the negotiation of the Northern Flood Agreement. Of course we were able to reach an agreement, and while I was minister I signed the order in council authorizing the execution and signing of the agreement and also sent a formal confirmation of the agreement to the Northern Flood Committee, which was the committee of the five nations making up that area who were concerned with the flooding. I described this formal confirmation as a charter of rights and benefits for the northern flood bands. It's interesting to note that the Cross Lake Band has put that document I sent them on the front of their brief.

I was shuffled out of that portfolio at the end of September 1977 to become Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, so I wasn't actually in the portfolio for the formal signing of the agreement. The agreement that was formally signed in December 1977 was exactly as it was negotiated when I was the minister.

The purpose of the Northern Flood Agreement was to compensate the five communities in the northern part of Manitoba for the land and livelihood they lost and the disruption caused as a result of the flooding of their lands by the Manitoba Hydro development known as the Churchill River diversion project. The agreement provided for a wide range of benefits, and I presume that members of the committee have a copy of that Northern Flood Agreement and are able to examine the wide range of benefits that were to be available to the five communities.

I will read subsection 25(1) of the agreement, because it provided that this agreement should continue as long as the project should last. It reads in subsection 25(1):

This Agreement, with the exception of...Article 24, shall remain in force and be binding upon the parties hereto, for the lifetime of the Project, including any substantially similar redevelopment thereof. It is understood and agreed that this provision shall remain in force and be binding upon the successor to any party hereto, and upon the heirs, executors, and successors of any claimant.

That's a very important section, because, as I will mention in a minute, I believe this bill rescinds that agreement.

Last year, much to my dismay, I discovered that the greatest part of the Northern Flood Agreement was never implemented. After 21 years, virtually nothing had been done. Of course, after I was shifted out of the portfolio and then we were defeated and went into opposition, I didn't hear too much about the agreement. But last year I was approached by certain members of the Norway House Band who were filing a legal action against this agreement, and they asked me to provide them with an affidavit setting out my understanding of the agreement.

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It's interesting to note that while these lands were flooded and while much of the livelihood of these people was destroyed, for a lot of them, while their situation wasn't good in the first place, there was an increase of impoverishment in those areas. While all that was happening as a result of the flooding, Manitoba Hydro benefited considerably. As a matter of fact, they brought in $800 million in electricity revenue generated by this project in 1997 alone, and sales to the United States also brought in a lot of revenue.

So here we have a situation where the lands are destroyed, and the hydro project that flooded the lands brings in revenue to Manitoba and Manitoba Hydro and the agreement is never implemented. It's another case, I must say, of betrayal to our aboriginal peoples.

There were four master implementation agreements, MIA, one for each of the involved nations, leading up to this one. But in fact they are not really implementation agreements when you read them; they really rescind and terminate benefits that were provided under the 1977 Northern Flood Agreement. They do provide for certain benefits, but they're of a different nature. A real implementation agreement would build on the Northern Flood Agreement and would set out means for implementation rather than terminating benefits that were in the original agreement.

When you ask why this happened, it appears that there must have been a rethinking or a re-examination of what we had done in 1977, because, as I mentioned to you, when I agreed to this agreement I agreed with the full consent of the cabinet, my party in Parliament, and, I must say, with a lot of other parties in Parliament. It was an agreement, a formal, serious agreement, but something must have happened after 1979. We lost the government to Mr. Clark, a Conservative government came to power, and then we came back in power in 1980 and I wasn't associated with that portfolio. After that we had the Mulroney government. But somewhere along the line, government officials must have come to the conclusion that this was not a good agreement for them. Whether it was or not for the people who they had signed with is another thing; but it seems they set out to block the implementation, destroy the agreement, and then finally to rescind it through these master implementation agreements and these bills, which I believe to be a shocking and shameful development.

The strategy of the governments, and I say governments because it means both Canada and Manitoba and Manitoba Hydro, appeared to be to divide and conquer among these bands—to buy them off, one by one, because that's what they did. They started with the smallest band in this process. And of course the one that hasn't come onside yet, the biggest one, is Cross Lake, which has 5,000 citizens. The whole area includes about 10,000 native people, and the Cross Lake Band is more or less half of them, and they're still fighting to get this. I understand from what you said they're going to appear.

It's my feeling that the committee has an obligation and Parliament has an obligation to look into this matter very closely. I fully agree that every first nation has the right to decide what they want to do. They can decide if they want to sell their land or not sell their land, and they can decide if they want to make agreements or not make agreements. But the committee must decide if the process for decision in these first nations was constitutional and in accord with international treaties Canada has ratified such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. They must examine whether or not the federal government's trust responsibility was adhered to. Many people do not believe that the federal government's trust responsibility was carried out. And finally, the committee must examine whether the general conditions of justice and fair play were present. My view is that these conditions did not prevail in the decision-making process, but I say it's your obligation to check all of this out.

First of all, with respect to the reasons for my view, we should look at the referendums. The first referendum on this master implementation agreement was in July 1997, and the referendum was lost. It failed; it did not get the approval of the Norway House Cree Nation. So what happened was the federal government and others decided to have a second referendum within two months of the first one, and of course that one they won.

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I can recall that when I was in Parliament, and I'm now still of this view as a Canadian citizen, I believed that when you lose a referendum.... We've been critical of the PQ government in Quebec, who, if they lose a referendum, have another one. They lose that one, they have another one. But at least, I must say, in Quebec and at the federal level, and with our municipalities in Canada, you can't have a second referendum on the same question until you've had an intervening election. That's in the federal legislation, that's in the Quebec legislation, and it's in our municipal legislation, where they have referendums quite frequently.

So here you have two referendums within two months on the same question, and I say that is totally contrary to practice and law in other places.

Secondly, they lowered the threshold for winning in the second referendum. So if you don't win the first one, you make the threshold lower so you can win in the second referendum.

And finally, the most shocking aspect of it all, they promised to pay $1,000 to every man, woman, and child in the nation if the agreement was approved. Can you imagine if any political party or any government in Canada tried to do that in a general election or in a referendum? Imagine if Mr. Bouchard or Mr. Chrétien promised in the last referendum, if you vote my way I'll give $1,000 to every man, woman, and child, or I'll give $1,000 or $2,000 or $3,000. It's totally unheard of. In my view, that whole system stunk. It stunk to high heavens. To say “I'm the government, and I'm making a proposal to you, and if you approve I'll give you $1,000 for every person, every citizen, in the band”, that's totally unacceptable.

The next question is with respect to the constitutionalization of this agreement. In my view, the Northern Flood Agreement was like the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement for the Cree and Inuit. In that situation Hydro Quebec flooded the lands in northern Quebec, and the Cree and the Inuit went to court. When they got to appeal finally the Quebec government and the federal government decided to make a settlement to compensate the Cree and the Inuit. And the chair knows this very well, because he lives in that area and he knows the people involved. They signed an agreement called the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, and it was recognized as a modern-day treaty and was considered to be constitutionalized under section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982.

Now we have a similar situation in northern Manitoba. Bands are being flooded by Manitoba Hydro. An agreement is reached. In my view, it becomes a treaty subject to constitutionalization under section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982. By the way, that's not just my view. Look at the report on aboriginal justice in Manitoba of 1991—a very important report—where you have the Chief Justice of Manitoba, A.C. Hamilton, and the Associate Chief Justice of Manitoba, C.M. Sinclair, agreeing, and in pages 172 to 175 of that report making the statement that the Northern Flood Agreement is a land claims agreement according to section 35 of the Canadian Constitution and therefore they should be considered as treaty rights constitutionalized in virtue of that article.

Therefore, I believe another question the committee has an obligation to examine is whether they agree with the chief justice and associate chief justice of Manitoba. Is this a constitutionalized treaty in virtue of section 35? And if you come to that agreement after listening to testimony, then what is required to amend a constitutionalized document such as a constitutionalized treaty? Usually when a document is a constitutional document it has a higher standing than an ordinary law or an ordinary legal document. For example, our Constitution prevails over all other ordinary laws and can only be amended by special amendment proposals. The ordinary amendment formula for the Canadian Constitution I think is two-thirds of the provinces representing 50% of the population. Does that apply here? In other words, is there a higher standard for amending or rescinding a constitutionalized treaty or document under section 35?

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I have to put it to the committee that I think it's your obligation to look into these things. If you do all these things I'm suggesting, and come to the conclusion that they were done, then of course the decision by the Norway House Nation in the second referendum can be accepted.

If you don't come to that conclusion, I think you have an obligation to suggest amendments to this law and to the agreement. By the way, there could be many good things in the MIA that is presently before you, but it should be built on top of the NFA of 1977, and not replace the NFA of 1977.

Those are my opening remarks. I'll be glad to answer questions to the committee when you come to that point in the meeting. Once again, thank you for having me. I'm pleased to be among old friends again.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Allmand.

Before giving Mr. Russell the floor, with your consent, I will invite members to ask Mr. Allmand questions.

[English]

Monsieur Duncan, do you have a question for Mr. Allmand?

Mr. John Duncan (Vancouver Island North, Ref.): Yes, I do. I'll start where you ended. On this whole business of constitutional protection, we have amending formulas in the Constitution. Would you concur that none of the amending formulas was actually foreseen to apply to section 35, entrenched aboriginal agreements?

Mr. Warren Allmand: That is a very complex legal question, and I don't think it's ever been tested. Maybe some lawyers could come before the committee. I know it says in subsection (3), “For greater certainty...`treaty rights' includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.”

It says in subsection 35(1) “The existing aboriginal treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed,” which means they're recognized in the Constitution. That gives those treaties a status beyond other types of documents, like band council resolutions and a whole lot of other things. The treaties are given a certain standing in the constitution.

In answer to your question, I suggested you should have some lawyers before you to advise what is exactly required to amend a treaty that has been affirmed under section 35. Is it two-thirds with 50%, like the Constitution in general, or is it something less than that?

When you look at the system by which this agreement has been agreed to, with a lower threshold in the second referendum compared to the first one, the $1,000 and a lot of other factors, is that an acceptable way of amending a treaty that has been recognized under section 35? I don't know the answer because I'm not practising law now.

Mr. John Duncan: We're seeing the tip of a very large issue here, because a lot of our treaties deal with an issue that really affects one province, and one province only. But on section 35, the amending formula, it would be difficult for most lawyers to find a way to agree that you could amend it with only one province's concurrence. So it's a very difficult issue.

I'm not looking for further comment. I'm just pointing out that we're seeing for the first time the potential ramifications of section 35 entrenchment. It's only going to get more complex over time.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I agree with you fully. I think before the committee agrees to this bill, you should look into these issues.

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As you point out, there are certain amendment formulas in the Constitution Act of 1982. There's the two-thirds with 50% when it just concerns one province. There's another formula that if you touch the Queen or Parliament it has to be unanimous. But I don't think Parliament has faced these treaties that are constitutionalized under section 35 seriously before, and you should do it before you approve of this bill.

Mr. John Duncan: Right. We've certainly used that argument before with other aboriginal agreements.

I'd like to move to the other major issue we're talking about here, which is democracy and the democratic process.

In terms of things federal in Canada, we normally look to Elections Canada as the vehicle that will provide us with a watchdog—with the supervision and mechanisms to ensure the democratic process is well served in all things that are considered federal jurisdiction in Canada. The one glaring exception is aboriginal affairs. I know you're currently posted with—is it Human Rights Watch?

Mr. Warren Allmand: No, it's the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

Mr. John Duncan: We don't seem to have ever developed in this country an effective, for-all-time kind of watchdog over this democratic process. We know in the area of aboriginal affairs we've had considerable ongoing criticism over a long period of time on this front and many examples have cropped up. Here we have another one.

What are your thoughts on either utilizing the existing framework of Elections Canada to run referendums and elections, or setting up a parallel organization that could do the same? Is that an issue your organization would be interested in pursuing?

Mr. Warren Allmand: As I mentioned, and I think you would agree, the aboriginal nations have the right to decide and run their own affairs. But that right to decide has to be done in accordance with the rule of law everybody knows, so when you either win a referendum or lose a referendum, you know it's been done according to a set of rules that have been accepted.

The problem in this case is the rules changed between the first referendum and the second referendum. As you pointed out, sometimes on reserves or in first nation communities the rules are changed quite often, and many members of those first nations become confused and extremely upset because they feel there's been a manipulation of the rules.

Yes, everybody has the right to decide, as we have in municipalities and provinces and in Canada generally, but it has to be done according to the rule of law. When the rule of law isn't respected you can go to court and challenge it.

Elections Canada is now helping countries around the world by supervising elections in Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe with the support of CIDA. We're asked from time to time to monitor elections. It's not one of our major duties, but we've done it from time to time. I've done it in both Russia and El Salvador.

You make a good point: that if we assist in elections and referendums in our provinces and municipalities and at the national level, and we assist outside of Canada, why shouldn't Elections Canada assist our aboriginal people? Of course they would have to be in agreement with that; some sort of agreement would have to be worked out. But when you do these things they have to be done according to the rule of law; otherwise you get confusion, disappointment, and even hostility.

Mr. John Duncan: You gave the example of our supervision in third world countries and so on. In my opinion, democracy is not negotiable. Doesn't the fiduciary obligation of the federal government require them to ensure the democratic process is followed?

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Mr. Warren Allmand: Absolutely. I agree with you. When I was minister—and I was on this committee later for several years too—we dealt very often with the whole question of the trust relationship, the fiduciary responsibility and the federal government. If you read the royal commission report, the Erasmus report, they get into that. There are many examples that help put forward some assessment of that.

The minister has a trust responsibility to make sure the people with whom he or she deals are dealt with fairly and according to the principles of democracy.

Mr. John Duncan: We have failed.

Mr. Warren Allmand: In my view, we've failed here. I signed the original agreement. I believe these people deserve just compensation. They should have been given it 20 years ago, 15 years ago, or 10 years ago. I'd like to see them compensated quickly and fairly. If you have to amend this bill or do something to make it right, that's fine, but Norway House must be compensated.

Mr. John Duncan: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Messrs. Duncan and Allmand.

Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody (Provencher, Lib.): I'm up already. Gosh, I'm still doing my homework.

Welcome, Mr. Allmand, to the committee. It's good to see you again. I notice you have a patch. I don't know if you were fighting on the way here. I know you're a fighter. I played hockey against you, and you've had a history of—

Mr. Warren Allmand: I have ten stitches, yes.

Mr. David Iftody: There you go. Anyway, it's good to see you again. Welcome to the committee.

I want to point out something. You made reference to Justice Hamilton and Justice Sinclair in the aboriginal justice inquiry of Manitoba report. I'm familiar with that because I wrote some research documents for that report in the late 1980s.

I want to quote to you from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples by George Erasmus, who, having incorporated the report of the aboriginal justice inquiry and commenting specifically on the implementation agreement of the Northern Flood Agreement, had this to say:

The NFA has been the subject of much controversy (in many respects the agreement has become the model of how not to reach resolution), and its history has been marked by little or no action in implementation of NFA obligations and a long, drawn-out (and continuing) process of arbitration....

We've heard from other witnesses that 3,000 arbitration cases are emerging as the birth children of this agreement. In other words, George Erasmus wrote that in the original agreement, as designed, it was impossible, in his view, to reach resolution. In other words, it was drafted so poorly, without specifics, proper guidance, and pathways of negotiation for the affected parties that it was, for all intents and purposes, an impractical agreement.

How would you respond, Warren, to the observation and criticism of George Erasmus on the aboriginal justice inquiry report?

Mr. Warren Allmand: First of all, the report didn't say it was impossible; the report said exactly what you said in the first place. He didn't use the word “impossible”; he said it was not the way to do things. But I interpret that to mean the way they implement it. I interpret that to mean here you had an agreement and there was no effort, no political will on the part of government, after a certain point, to implement it. In my view, all those arbitrations were due to obstruction and so on.

I was also the minister who put through the bill on the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. We passed it. We thought it was a wonderful agreement. But I can remember in this very same committee, time and again, Ted Moses and others such as Chief Billy Diamond coming to the committee saying that despite the fact we agreed to it, we were not implementing it—we and the officials in the department.

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So in my view, when Erasmus said in the royal commission that this was not the way to do things, or was the worst way of doing things, he wasn't actually criticizing the agreement; he was criticizing.... You used the words “realization of the agreement”, and I think you could have put in place implementation agreements to implement the Northern Flood Agreement without rescinding the benefits of the agreement.

What you have now is you're rescinding the ongoing benefits of the agreement. I referred to subsection 25.(1), which was supposed to go on as long as the Manitoba Hydro development was being used, being operated. Whether that was 25 years, 50 years, 100 years, or whatever, the benefits were supposed to flow to the bands.

You could have put in place provisions to implement the agreement rather than rescinding them and having kind of a one-shot payment, which is what it seems under this thing. You're going to make one-shot payments to the band, and then the bands or the nation, the government of Norway House and the other nations, will have to distribute those benefits.

I agree with the royal commission that the way this was implemented was horrible, but I don't think the solution is to rescind the agreement; the solution is to have a proper implementation agreement.

Mr. David Iftody: I don't know if I read that sentence that way at all, but I think it's perhaps instructive—

Mr. Warren Allmand: Maybe you should call Erasmus.

Mr. David Iftody: Well, we'll give George a call.

Incidentally, I think I'll be seeing some of these chiefs tomorrow. I'm speaking at a conference in Toronto, so I'll get heckled over whatever I say here today.

I made a joke the other day, sort of a joke, that in Manitoba it's hard to find a lawyer or a relative of a lawyer or somebody who hasn't been involved in the Northern Flood Agreement in Manitoba in the last twenty years. It's probably one of the most well-known things, particularly in the law department.

Isn't it perhaps instructive that if you have an agreement.... And I know many of the key actors that have been involved in this agreement in Manitoba for the last 10 or 15 years. They have told me over a number of years that because the agreement is so fluid and loose, it creates on the one hand an opportunity of an ongoing discussion and relationship, perhaps in a fiduciary sense, between the affected parties—which is good, it gives room for negotiation—and in the sense of a relationship with first nations people, an opportunity to flesh out the details. But I would argue that if it has given birth to 3,000 arbitration cases where in each one of these situations good-minded people wanting desperately to resolve the problems—Hydro, of course, for their interest, the Government of Canada, and the first nations people....

In many instances, potable water became one of the fixed issues here that we couldn't resolve. And of course there was pressure on the first nation to resolve this. There was never agreement in the dispute, and every time a point of discussion came up about a particular concept or construct of the implementation agreement, negotiations would invariably break down and everyone would end up in court.

Surely, I would suggest to this committee, you would find great difficulty—maybe Mr. Russell can correct me on this—in Canada finding another contractual agreement that led to this kind of collective twenty-year dispute. I would think, therefore—and I think I'm reading the royal commission properly—there is, if not passing concern, active concern about the loose nature of the original agreement and the absolute difficulty it put everyone in in trying to resolve these issues, no matter how much good faith there was when they brought it to the table.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Well, David, this is the agreement. It's a thick agreement. It has 25 articles or more, and several annexes.

You say you don't know of any other agreements. Look at all the treaties, treaties right up to Treaty No. 11. They're bare bones documents of principle. When they were agreed to by the crown with the first nations of Canada, going back into the last century, the aboriginal people had trust in those treaties; they felt that the crown had undertaken certain obligations. But those treaties, compared to this Northern Flood Agreement, have no articles of implementation in them whatsoever. The implementation comes from the good faith and the political will of the crown and the various agencies of the crown to do what they've agreed to in the treaties. And this Northern Flood Agreement is a modern-day treaty, just as the James Bay agreement is a modern-day treaty.

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By the way, the James Bay agreement is very thick, and there are still problems with the implementation. If you compare this Northern Flood Agreement with all the treaties that came before it, it is very detailed, but I agree with you that it doesn't have all the provisions of implementation.

I was on this committee for several years when John Munro was the minister and Keith Penner was the chair. We received many complaints before the committee about the non-implementation of treaties and agreements and so on. This is just another example. The government felt that perhaps they wanted to renegotiate it after they looked at it ten years later. They said they didn't like it and they were going to renegotiate it.

I congratulate the government for trying to put in place implementation agreements, but I don't think they should rescind the solemn undertakings that were taken in an agreement. They were supposed to last not only for the people who signed it but also for their heirs and successors, etc., as long as the project existed. I guess it depends on how you look at it.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Perron.

Mr. Gilles-A. Perron (Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, BQ): I would like to welcome you to our committee, Mr. Allmand, or perhaps I should say to your committee, since you were here before us. I am pleased to hear that you're interested in the James Bay Treaty. We entered into this treaty thanks to people like you and to the representatives of the Quebec government, Hydro-Quebec and the Crees, who decided to sit down around a table and try to come to an understanding, respecting human rights and working to find a possible solution. Not everyone is happy yet, but important things have been done. As our Chairman can confirm, the James Bay Cree now have a training school and are taking part in Hydro-Quebec's day- to-day activities. In addition, Air Creebec and Cree Construction have been founded as a result of this treaty. I believe the treaty has enabled Hydro-Quebec, the Quebec government and the federal government to make profits, and, on that note, I will end my little story.

When you made your statement, you seemed to be bitter and angry that an attempt had been made to undermine democracy through this agreement with the Manitoba reserves, which provides for the payment of $1,000 and so on. Do you believe it would be a good idea to go through the same process again?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Not at all. As I mentioned, we tried to do for the Aboriginal nations of Northern Manitoba what we did in Northern Quebec. The two situations appear to be similar since lands were flooded and destroyed in both cases, by Hydro-Quebec in Quebec and by Manitoba Hydro in Manitoba. We tried to reach a more or less similar agreement, although the Quebec agreement might have been more detailed because we had to consider the Cree and the Inuit. In addition, the territory was larger. We tried to use the same model and we reached an official and solemn agreement with these five Aboriginal nations. I believe there were problems with the agreement and that it was poorly implemented. I'm bitter because, for 20 years, I believed the agreement was in effect. Since I live in Montreal, I don't often have the opportunity to go to Manitoba. When I heard about these problems last year, I was very surprised and I decided to speak out in order to help them. I asked to appear here today to tell you my story about the origins of this agreement. I'm bitter because, when a government or Parliament undertakes to solve problems by implementing an agreement, one expects follow-up and no obstruction.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Perron.

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Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden (Wentworth—Burlington, Lib.): You would agree that government as a term really applies to two sorts of entities. One is the political government represented by the people of this committee and the Prime Minister or the minister. The other is the bureaucratic government; that is, the officials who implement the laws and the proposals made by the political government. The political government can be very idealistic. It's motivated by any one of a number of agendas. I'm sure you would agree that the bureaucratic government, in this country at least, is amoral; it's pragmatic. In its very best conscience its job is to try to implement what the political government does.

Given that, why do you suppose that the bureaucratic government seems, in your view, to be deliberately obstructionist in implementing the Northern Flood Agreement? We can all agree that the political government would love to see a resolution of this, but the bureaucratic government would appear to be the target of your very strong remarks that there's no will here to implement the agreement. Given that the bureaucratic government is amoral, pragmatic, trying to do a good job, what is it, then, in the Northern Flood Agreement that gives the bureaucratic government such trouble?

Mr. Warren Allmand: I would agree with your general statement that very often the bureaucrats don't really do what the political side of the government wants to do. You pass laws and then you find out the way it's being interpreted or applied. This happened to me as Solicitor General. We'd say this was to happen, and whether it was in CSIS, the RCMP, or in the prisons, they were doing sometimes the very opposite thing. This isn't always brought to the attention of members of Parliament. When they find out about these things they try to correct them. I would hope that these hearings will provide an opportunity to try to correct some of these things.

When it comes down to it in some of these departments, especially in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, which operates all over the country, in the little Arctic communities that people don't visit very often it's hard to know whether the policies of the government are being implemented or not.

One role this committee used to play, and I presume it still plays, is a willingness to hear from representatives of Indian nations or first nations with respect to their problems and to look into them for them. You act as a kind of ombudsman for those people. Once you know what is happening, you have to try to correct what the bureaucrats are doing if they are going astray and they are being obstructionist. Why are they being obstructionist? I don't know.

Sometimes you'll get bureaucrats who don't believe in what the government is doing and they put those things at the bottom of the pile all the time. You have to keep looking at their pile and moving it to the top if that's what you want done. When it comes down to it, once we know about it on the political side of government we have to correct the bureaucrats and direct them to do what we want them to do, to do what Parliament and cabinet have agreed to.

What really happened, John, was that after the Mulroney government came into power and we had Erik Nielsen looking at everything, they were cutting all over the place. They were looking at places to cut. They examined, if you remember, the whole realm of government. They came to the conclusion that certain agreements like this were perhaps too rich. It wasn't just here. It was in many areas of the government. They tried to cut them back and looked for ways of.... That's led to a lot of the arbitrations and a lot of the different viewpoints.

Probably the first nation governments in Manitoba under the Northern Flood Agreement thought they were deserving of certain things, and the government was saying no at the time. So you had lots of arbitrations, lots of problems. The cuts started to come into effect in the middle 1980s, and they carried through until just recently, perhaps a year or so ago. Now the reversal is in place.

The government is responsible in the long run, but it's hard for the government to know always how these things are being interpreted at the bureaucratic level.

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Mr. John Bryden: My impression of Canada's bureaucracy is that whatever its shortcomings, it probably is one of the most honest and the most desirous of acting in good faith. When you give it orders it does try to carry them out, at least in comparison to any other bureaucracy across the world. So if we assume that after all these years the bureaucracy is trying to carry out the Northern Flood Agreement in good faith and is failing to do so, could it be, Warren, that it's because the Northern Flood Agreement itself may be impractical in terms of its implementation?

Mr. Warren Allmand: No, I don't think it's the agreement. I know that's the point of view of the government in putting forward this bill on the agreement. Don't rely on my say-so alone, as you'll be hearing other witnesses, but I believe they really decided at some point back five or ten years ago that they didn't like these agreements and they tried to buy out the bands one by one, picking them off, starting with the smallest ones, so they could get a cheaper and better deal.

I don't think it's the agreement itself. When we signed the agreement it was approved by cabinet, discussed in cabinet committee. It had a wide discussion in Manitoba. By the way, it was very controversial in Manitoba at the time. Ed Schreyer was the Premier of Manitoba, and he didn't like what we were doing here in Ottawa. A guy called Sid Green, who was in his cabinet, believed aboriginal people were like all other people and they didn't have special rights. There was some disagreement in his own party on that question. There was a Manitoba election, so at the time the agreement was put together with a lot of forethought. And as I say, we had the James Bay agreement, which preceded it on a similar set of issues.

No, I don't think it's the agreement. I think it's the political will with the governments that followed after 1979-80. We can't blame the bureaucrats for this one. I can see where implementation at certain levels can be blamed on bureaucrats; there are good bureaucrats and bad bureaucrats, in my mind. But the responsibility is with governments, not just with the federal government—with the Manitoba and Canadian governments and with Manitoba Hydro. There should be implementation programs, but not this kind we have before us.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bryden.

Ms. Desjarlais.

[English]

Ms. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): I've got four or five questions here, and hopefully they'll be fairly quick.

Since you're indicating that you recognize the Northern Flood Agreement as a treaty based on what's down legally, do you believe that by going from that Northern Flood Agreement to this new implementation agreement it may set a precedent for an easy process to negate other treaties?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Certainly.

There are so many things, and I mentioned them. First of all, you've got to decide whether you can amend treaties that have been constitutionalized in the same way you would amend any other document. Is there some special standard of amending, changing, or rescinding constitutionalized treaties under section 35? That's one thing you have to consider.

Second is this whole process of the two referendums, one within two months of the other one and with a lower threshold to pass it and the giving out of $1,000 to people to approve the document.

If you pass this bill as it is, you're confirming that process, which I think is a very bad precedent. It's not really what I would call the right of aboriginal peoples to decide in accordance with the rule of law. What is the rule of law here, if it changes from month to month?

At the International Centre for Human Rights we deal with non-democracies or democracies in transition in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where the government of the day changes the rules from month to month. In a way, this is a bit like that: you never know what the rule of law is. You set the rule of law to suit your own purposes. If you don't win under this set, you change the rules and you get another set.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: My understanding is that we're working under rules that were approved by the Department of Indian Affairs. Why do you think the Department of Indian Affairs would approve this process and allow this to take place?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Did this committee look at those rules beforehand?

A voice: No.

• 1205

Mr. Warren Allmand: Sometimes rules and regulations are set out by bureaucracies and don't go to Parliament. That's a very.... There used to be a joint committee—I think there still is—that examines all regulations and rules, but they have a lot of work to do. I don't know if they get around to all that.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Having in the past been a Minister of Indian Affairs, why do you think the Department of Indian Affairs would have approved this kind of a process?

Mr. Warren Allmand: I have no evidence on this, but I think that at one stage a few years ago—I don't know whether it was under this government or the previous government—they came to the conclusion that they didn't like the Northern Flood Agreement, that maybe it had too many obligations and it was too rich, and they decided they would try to get something better in its place.

First of all, they tried to get it interpreted in a narrow way, which led to a lot of arbitrations. Then they actually tried to replace it with this bill and this MIA that you have.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: You were involved in some of the negotiations with the James Bay agreement.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Not the negotiations, but the passing of the legislation.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: And the implementation of it?

Mr. Warren Allmand: The minister at the time was the present Prime Minister. He negotiated the deal—

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: And the implementation?

Mr. Warren Allmand: —and then I became the minister and had to put it through Parliament.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. So he was able then, as Minister of Indian Affairs, to implement the James Bay agreement. Would you say that it's similar to the Northern Flood Agreement?

Mr. Warren Allmand: No. The implementation of the James Bay agreement has been better than the Northern Flood Agreement, but not without difficulty. When I was a member of Parliament with this committee, we had Billy Diamond here on our doorstep quite frequently, and his successors, complaining that the federal government was not implementing the agreement as agreed to.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Was the agreement itself similar?

Mr. Warren Allmand: No. The James Bay agreement is much more.... This one is about this thick, and the James Bay one is about that thick. There's much more land, there's the Naskapi in addition to the Cree, and the Inuit, who have different rules. So there are several parts to the agreement. And it's a much bigger territory. It goes from James Bay right over to Labrador and right up to the Hudson Strait. It's a huge territory.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: From some of the things you've said, I'm kind of getting the impression that you're saying that the first nations in Manitoba are getting a raw deal, as compared to the Cree in Quebec.

Mr. Warren Allmand: No. The agreement that was signed or agreed to, the Northern Flood Agreement, was agreed to, was ratified, etc., and it was expected to be implemented. It was never implemented. It came after the James Bay Cree agreement. And you're dealing with different provincial governments too. I'm not intimately familiar with the politics in Manitoba. My friend David is.

Mr. David Iftody: It's bad, very bad.

Mr. Warren Allmand: In any case, it's not just the federal government; it's the federal government and the provincial government.

In Quebec it was the same thing. They had to work together, because the lands under our Constitution, those lands.... While the federal government has responsibility under the Constitution for Indians and Indian lands, as it said back then, the provincial government has jurisdiction over the crown lands that need to be used for settling the claim.

The peoples in the five nations in Manitoba agreed to the Northern Flood Agreement, because I went out and met with them. I remember sitting around the table with them at the time, and at the time they were pleased with it. But it wasn't implemented, and now we have this thing in its place.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: When we're talking about the rights of first nations to have their own government and to make decisions accordingly, what happens then, in your opinion, if you have a hereditary chief in place? Also, with regard to the section of the agreement that you said was to go on for the length of the project, how then does that enable the next government of that first nation to carry through on what changes they might want to make?

Mr. Warren Allmand: My view is that changes to treaties that are recognized under article 35 of the Constitution should.... There should be a possibility of change, but those changes should be made in accordance with the rule of law. In other words, the rules shouldn't change from day to day, month to month, or year to year. People should know the rules, so that if you win or lose an election or win or lose a referendum, you know it's done fairly.

• 1210

Yes, I think there should be provisions for amending the Northern Flood Agreement if it needs to be amended, if the bands want to amend it, the nations want to amend it, or if the governments want to amend it, but it has to be done through agreement, in accordance with the rule of law. The people who lose in these referendums and the people who win have to be assured that it's being done fairly and being done properly in accordance with the rule. That's good for everybody when you do it according to the rule of law.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Perron, I'll give you the floor one last time before we hear Mr. Russell's remarks.

Mr. Gilles Perron: I would like some clarification, Mr. Allmand. A moment ago, when I asked you whether we should throw out this bill and start over, you answered, no. In your discussion with my colleague, you noted that passage of this bill as it stands would risk creating a precedent. In other words, you profoundly disagree with this bill. We should therefore start over.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I don't know. I believe this bill has weaknesses and that it is a bad bill. Perhaps you could amend it or correct certain provisions. I know that, as it is currently worded, this bill would put an end to the benefits provided for in the original document. I doubt that it is a legitimate approach to amend, repeal or terminate the original document.

The Chairman: Thank you. Are there any other questions? Thank you very much, Mr. Allmand. Your remarks to our committee were very interesting. I thank you for sharing your Canadian and Aboriginal experience with us.

Mr. Warren Allmand: May I stay?

The Chairman: Yes, of course. I know you are an excellent hockey player, Mr. Allmand. We have the scars to prove it.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I'm too old now.

The Chairman: We'll now invite Mr. Russell to make his opening statement in the next five minutes, after which there will be a question period. We should adjourn the meeting at 1:00 p.m. because the MPs have other obligations.

[English]

Professor Peter H. Russell (Individual Presentation): All right. I might say, though, I think the Canadiens could have used Mr. Allmand last night.

Mr. Warren Allmand: It's too late.

A voice: They're that bad, eh?

Mr. Warren Allmand: It's a sad situation. They could have used you too. Things have come to that.

Prof. Peter Russell: This is a very important occasion, a very important challenge your committee has. I agree wholeheartedly with the first gentleman on the opposition side. I'm sorry, sir, I can't see your....

Mr. John Duncan: John Duncan.

Prof. Peter Russell: I should know your name. Mr. Duncan's point at the beginning is one I think you should bear in mind. I certainly have it in mind.

You are dealing with an issue that's going to be before the country and before the world in a big way over the next couple of decades. Canada is leading the world in trying to work out consensual relations with its indigenous people. We often are tough on ourselves and critical of ourselves, but I see a lot of the indigenous situation abroad, and we're at the cutting edge. The world's watching us.

At the centre of our work are these consensual agreements, which we call treaties and which we, unlike and above and beyond any other country in the world, have put in our Constitution. As Mr. Duncan pointed out, we still don't even know, in terms of a Supreme Court decision, the answer to Mr. Duncan's question. It might come bubbling out of the challenge in the Nisga'a treaty. His question is what is the proper constitutional process for changing a section 35 constitutionalized treaty or ratifying one in the first place. I'll come back to that at the end, because I don't have a definitive answer, Mr. Duncan and members of the committee.

• 1215

There is one thing I hope we can agree on. As a matter of principle, we know it must be ratified by the signatories in a manner that has integrity and legitimacy. We know that as a matter of principle. We know that on the federal Parliament side and the provincial legislature, however many may be involved in ratifying an amendment to a treaty or ratifying a new treaty. You are parliamentarians and you have some idea of the integrity that must be there, and today your committee is faced with the integrity of the process on the aboriginal side.

If I were you, I would find that a somewhat, of the face of it, embarrassing seat to be in, because you're looking at the other side, if you like, of the tables process. Was the process whereby the wishes of the Norway House Cree Nation...was that a process that had integrity and legitimacy? As members of a House of Commons committee, you may feel that's almost beyond you.

I have a practical suggestion at the end, where there's a question, a controversy within the aboriginal community—because there is a controversy within the Norway House Cree Nation community about the integrity and legitimacy of the process, and that's a fact—how this country may go about trying to settle that, other than just by a sort of verdict of a parliamentary committee or just a majority on the floor of the House of Commons.

Let me first of all address this question of the process used to ascertain the wishes of the aboriginal party to this modification of their treaty rights. That's what I'm really here to talk about.

Unlike Mr. Allmand, I won't be addressing the substance of the agreement. I'm not nearly as familiar with it as he is or you are, but I have heard a good deal and read a fair amount now about the process that was used at Norway House for ascertaining the wishes of the first nation there, and I'm very, very troubled by how it looks.

I test my trouble by telling people like my wife and my family, who know nothing about this, where you have two referendums, one with one result, which some party doesn't like, which certainly the Government of Canada didn't seem to like and some of the aboriginal people didn't like. So you then have another referendum a few months later, and you change the rules for the second referendum. In all of that, the people are being promised that every man, woman, and child will get $1,000 close to Christmas if they vote yes, in a situation where their regular welfare payments have been paid early and they're going to be in desperate need of money.

Most people, when you spell that out, if those facts are correct, say that stinks—I'll use Mr. Allmand's word—if it was carried out anywhere in the world.

I'm aware of Mr. Justice Muldoon's decision of the Federal Court; I've read it. I'm not equipped legally to critique it, but I did notice that he doesn't really raise the question that I think is fundamental here, of the honour of the crown, under the fiduciary obligation that Canada has with regard to aboriginal people, whether it was an honourable process.

It may be consistent with pieces of the Indian Act; I know not. But the measure of what is legitimate and proper in dealing with aboriginal issues in Canada is not the Indian Act; it is principles over and beyond that, as the Supreme Court has frequently reminded us and has underlined this principle of honour in dealing with aboriginal people. I simply cannot find the process that's being described to me and to you an honourable one. It's not one I can take pride in as I go around the world saying how we deal with aboriginal people and how we deal with the process whereby we ascertain their wishes.

• 1220

One point of detail about the change in rules for the referenda, from the first referendum in July to the second one in September 1997, is that the requirement of a special majority was dropped. In my submission to the Federal Court—and I have it here—I go into democratic theory about why it is often democratically required to have rules requiring special majorities. That's when there's a difference in the intensity of interest and when there's a very special interest within a larger community.

From the little I know about the situation of this first nation, it struck me that there was a special interest in the sense that those who actually live on the reserve in this part of northern Manitoba will be immediately affected by any changes in the treaty rights, any change in the way the flood agreement is implemented. They have, if you like, a larger special interest than those who move to Winnipeg. It struck me that if that was a reasonable requirement in the first referendum, and it was—not only did there have to be a majority overall, there had to be a yes majority among the reserve electors who were eligible to vote on the reserve—why would you then have a second referendum? Why is it just that when you don't meet that, you get rid of that rule and won't require it any more? To me, that looks just terrible. If it was sensible in the first place, it should have been kept.

I'm also troubled by having another referendum so quickly after the first. There are many reasons for not bludgeoning any electorate with referenda. I've been one who has been critical of the Quebec government threatening us with a referendum every five years, but at least it's every five years, every mandate. I think it is the most cynical use of the referendum device to say you're going to have referendums until you, one party to all this, get the result you want. That's making a mockery of the democratic legitimacy of the referendum process.

There are other points made that trouble me, particularly in the affidavit of Maggie Myrna-Dunler to the Federal Court about the way the referendum was carried on, such as the ballot being only in English, or the opponents being denied use of the community hall at certain points and access to the local radio station. None of this struck me as very honourable, and if it's true I would want to know more about it.

I put it to you: What would any of you think—Mr. Allmand's already tested you on this, but let's do it again—if the Quebec government, following a narrow loss in one referendum, said it was going to have another referendum very soon, in a few months, that it was going to change the rules, that it was going to promise everybody who votes yes $1,000, and that it was going to bar its opponents' access to certain media in Quebec? Would you say that's honourable? I wouldn't. And if it's not honourable for non-aboriginal Canadians, why is it honourable for aboriginal Canadians? Or is it?

• 1225

I said I would just conclude with one practical suggestion. Mr. Duncan, Mr. Allmand, and I think—and maybe the rest of you do too—that we're dealing with an amendment to a constitutionally entrenched treaty here today, and we're debating the proper process.

We should remember that there is a section of the Constitution Act, 1982, section 35.1, that deals with amendments to any parts of the Constitution concerning aboriginal people. Class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, is such a section, as you know. It gives exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indians and their lands. Section 25 of the 1982 act of course protects aboriginal agreements and so on from charter encroachment. And section 35.1 itself, the very section we're dealing with here this morning, says that when any of those are being dealt with, the first ministers of the country should have a meeting, and should invite to that meeting “representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”.

Given the point Mr. Duncan made at the beginning, and which I endorse, my suggestion—and you may think it's a pretty radical one, because we hoped we wouldn't have too many of these constitutional big meetings again—is that we may be heading into a lot of these situations. I think it would be unwise—and I would even argue that it's unconstitutional—to start making up rules and establishing precedents about the proper procedure for amending aboriginal treaty rights that are constitutionalized without consultation with representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. I think their voice is absolutely crucial in order to give legitimacy to whatever you decide. It's not an easy question.

Mr. Chairman, that's basically what I came to talk to you about today.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Russell.

Many members want to ask you questions. Since our meeting will have to end at 1:00 p.m. or 1:05 p.m., I will only give each member five minutes.

Let's begin with Mr. Duncan.

[English]

Mr. John Duncan: Thank you.

Your testimony was very interesting. Can you give us a thirty-second thumbnail of your qualifications? What you do is not clear to me at all.

Prof. Peter Russell: Well, I've been a professor for forty years. I'm now just called a university professor, so I don't have to do any more teaching, although I occasionally teach. I've written a lot on the constitutional process of Canada and the Supreme Court. I have a number of books on the Supreme Court and the constitutional process, and I've done a fair amount of work in the aboriginal area.

Most importantly, I suppose, I was one of five members on the 1985 Coolican task force to review comprehensive claims policy, which looked at the comprehensive land claims process. I did not chair the research committee for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which George Erasmus co-chaired with René Dussault, but along with five other eminent Canadians, I was the chair of the research advisory committee for RCAP.

I have recently served as an envoy of the Minister of Indian Affairs to the Deh Cho people in the Northwest Territories, in order to try to get a process going there that is satisfactory to both sides.

I am now writing a book about Christopher Columbus and Mabo, Mabo being an aboriginal person in Australia, a Torres Strait islander who died but who did establish aboriginal rights in Australia, the worst country for aboriginal people in the British tradition. Things are moving slowly there, and Canada is certainly a kind of model to that country, or it tries to be. That's why, when I go abroad, I like to take some pride in the way we conduct our affairs.

Sorry to go on so long about that.

Mr. John Duncan: No, that's fine. Just to clarify, though, you're not being paid to represent any one here?

Prof. Peter Russell: No, I'm here as a citizen who is very interested in and concerned about this part of our public life and our constitutional development.

Mr. John Duncan: Okay.

Just so I don't have to go on at length, you heard me earlier when I posed the question about the role of Elections Canada or a parallel organization. Do you have some thoughts on that?

• 1230

Prof. Peter Russell: Again, Mr. Duncan, I wouldn't want to send Elections Canada into an aboriginal community to police, if you like, the democratic legitimacy of its process unless it was done in conjunction with representatives of the aboriginal people of Canada and unless they thought it was a good idea. I would think they might have other ideas about a monitoring agency that is more bicultural—if I may use that word—in terms of having proper aboriginal input, as well as non-aboriginal input. Elections Canada probably doesn't have that kind of equality.

Mr. John Duncan: But what I hear you saying is that an agency of some description would be appropriate.

Prof. Peter Russell: Yes, I think maybe something creative has to be done here. Something has to be worked out, but I would want to see it worked out with the leaders of the aboriginal people.

Mr. John Duncan: Do I have any more time for a brief question?

The Chairman: A brief question, yes.

Mr. John Duncan: Mr. Allmand, the one unanswered question that I posed was whether or not your organization, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, would offer to take a position on this legislation or this issue.

Mr. Warren Allmand: The mandate of our centre is to defend and promote the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We operate internationally, and we always work with partners. If Canada was not living up to its obligations under the universal declaration or under the two covenants, we would bring that to Canada's attention and call it on that fact, be critical. On the other hand, when Canada is advancing human rights, as it did with landmines and with the International Criminal Court, we work with it to try and achieve those goals.

We wouldn't intervene in a Canadian situation unless it was a clear violation of an international human rights convention. It's not our role to administer. We may suggest that it be done—and that's what I'm doing today—but we don't do it ourselves.

Mr. John Duncan: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Messrs. Duncan and Allmand.

Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden: If I understand you correctly, Professor Russell, you feel very strongly that stakeholders in a referendum process should not have another referendum after the decision of an earlier referendum, except after an election. Is that correct?

Prof. Peter Russell: Not necessarily an election, but I think some time should go by, first of all, to respect the first referendum. That's the first point. If you've had a referendum and don't respect the result because you almost won, and you then have another right away, that means you're not respecting the first outcome. At least some time should go by so that the first one is legitimate.

Mr. John Bryden: Are there some circumstances in which you might bend that rule, in which it might be appropriate to have another referendum very quickly?

Prof. Peter Russell: Sure. Under a proper appeal system, if it was established that there had been irregularities in the first one and that it was not a fair poll, you would probably want another one.

Mr. John Bryden: So had the Quebec government won its referendum, would you feel that the Quebec Liberals, for example, would be entitled to ask for another referendum promptly on the basis that the earlier referendum was not held on a clear question?

Prof. Peter Russell: Not a clear question? That's something the federal government—

Mr. John Bryden: As stakeholders, I'm talking about the Province of Quebec.

Prof. Peter Russell: The federal government represents a lot of the stakeholders in Canada, Mr. Bryden. Unfortunately, before the last Quebec referendum it adopted no position on either the legitimacy of the question or what it would do if there was a yes vote. I was mortally ashamed of its silence on such fundamental issues as that.

Mr. John Bryden: What you're saying, then, is that the stakeholders, be they the federal government or the Quebec Liberals, would not be entitled to ask for another referendum promptly on the basis that the question was not clear; or, alternatively, because the winners of the referendum said 50% plus one is all it takes, yet that wasn't defined beforehand.

• 1235

Prof. Peter Russell: If you're going to have a referendum that is in effect part of a treaty process, the parties to that have to agree in advance on the ground rules—what constitutes a satisfactory majority for a yes decision, and what the consequences are of a yes decision. Since the federal government hadn't spelled that out, hadn't made any effort to spell that out, and seemed to assume it would just be a no answer, it was derelict in its duties to all of us. I don't think it's going to happen again. I hope not.

Mr. John Bryden: As a consequence of that, what you're saying—and it does apply to Quebec—is if the question is flawed because one of the stakeholders did not do due diligence, and that certainly is the case with the Quebec referendum, then the referendum result should hold. I can say to you, Professor Russell, had Quebec won the referendum, I probably would have been one of the last Canadians to hold your position, because I would have wanted to have another referendum with a clear question that clearly defined what a majority was, to legalize that referendum.

Prof. Peter Russell: I'm with you entirely.

Mr. John Bryden: In that context, I find your position hard to take. I would suggest the real problem here isn't the fact that another referendum followed an earlier referendum where there was a quick turnaround or whatever else, because in the Quebec analogy I would expect a quick turnaround because they would have to have another referendum very quickly. The problem is using referendums in this context.

I would go back to what Mr. Duncan said. I would have preferred a democratic process, where the Norway House or whoever elected representatives to speak for them on this issue to make a decision. But to do it by a referendum of course is always fraught with difficulties because of the wording and the rules of the game. When you lose you might, in the grand public interest, want to have another referendum again very quickly. So I don't know.

Prof. Peter Russell: You're focusing just on there being a second referendum. Do you think it's fair and right to offer $1,000 to every man, woman, and child if there's a certain result? If it is true that the ballot is only in one language, do you think that's correct? Do you think it's correct if people are denied access to the hall and the radio station? Is that okay? Is it okay to change the rules of the referendum?

Mr. John Bryden: I think you'll find, in the referendums we are talking about in Quebec, there was denial of access to the ballot—

Prof. Peter Russell: Mr. Bryden, we're not dealing with Quebec today.

Mr. John Bryden: Professor Russell, my questions were not dealing with those other issues. My questions were dealing exclusively with the referendum issue. I thank you; you've answered them.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bryden.

Mr. Perron, followed by Mr. Nault and Ms. Desjarlais.

Mr. Gilles Perron: Mr. Chairman, my blood is boiling.

The Chairman: You're a good member and you ask good questions.

Mr. Gilles Perron: My blood is boiling. Let's talk about the referendum when people on the reserve said no. It seems to me we went through the same process a few years earlier. In 1995, the immigration offices were open 24 hours a day so that they could grant Canadian citizenship to a large number of immigrants so they could then vote. There were also some who disregarded Quebec's referendum legislation, which requires that all expenditures and revenues of the Yes and No camps be accounted for. We could also talk about this $1,000 amount, Mr. Russell, or the people in Vancouver who came to the “We love you, Quebec” parade and spent $74 for a return ticket, Mr. Chairman. If we want to talk about these things, it's over, Mr. Chairman, let's close up shop.

Mr. Russell, you mentioned a disagreement between the Quebec Crees and the Norway House Cree Nation. Could you elaborate on that?

[English]

Prof. Peter Russell: It's not between the Quebec Cree and the Norway House people; there's a division of opinion within the Norway House Cree.

Mr. Gilles Perron: What's that division position?

• 1240

Prof. Peter Russell: A number of the members of that community feel the process I've described and Mr. Allmand has described was not a legitimate process. They think all those features of the referendum—changing the rules, a second referendum so soon after the first, the opponents in the referendum campaign not having equal access to means of communication and places to meet, and the ballot in one language—were not fair. They do not think they had a fair process. That's a division of opinion within that aboriginal community.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Perron. You made a good speech.

Mr. Nault.

[English]

Mr. Robert D. Nault (Kenora—Rainy River, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to get some clarification from both presenters. They made some suggestions that this is a treaty under section 35 of the Constitution.

I want to test Mr. Allmand's memory from when he was the minister and signed the Northern Flood Agreement. Was it the belief of the first nations when they signed this that it was an amendment to their original treaty?

Mr. Warren Allmand: They didn't believe it was an amendment to their original treaty. They thought it was a modern-day settlement of a land claim. By the way, it was before the 1982 Constitution, so we didn't have section 35 when we concluded this agreement in 1977. When we concluded the James Bay agreement, we didn't have section 35 either.

It was considered to be a solemn modern-day land settlement agreement. When we got to the discussions on the Constitution—and I was on the parliamentary committee at the time—they felt these modern agreements should be considered as treaties and then they put in section 35. It wasn't that they were amending Treaty 5.

Mr. Robert Nault: I'm not asking what the white men on the committee thought about this, because that's what we're doing here—we're doing this again. I want to know what the chiefs in the communities thought when they signed the agreement. My understanding, in present-day terminology, is that these agreements that are being signed—whether the Government of Canada calls them self-government agreements or a rectification of wrongs that were done in the past when reserves were shortened because they gave them to third party interests or whatever—when you talk to chiefs and elders in the communities, these are not modern-day treaties, but administrative agreements.

The treaties themselves, whether they are Treaty 11, 3, 5, or 9, remain as they were intended when they were signed. They will not be tinkered with and their rights will not be extinguished.

I'm asking you, as the minister who signed the agreement—you were there—was it the intention of the people who were there to open up Treaty 11 or Treaty 5 to make some major changes, or were they looking at an administrative agreement in order to rectify the fact that some non-natives decided to flood some of their territory?

It's very important, because you're making the suggestion that this is a treaty. I argue that it's not and that you're factually incorrect that this is an administrative agreement to deal with some wrongs of the past.

Mr. Warren Allmand: My recollection is they thought it was more than simply an administrative agreement, because under their original treaty you referred to—Treaty 5 or Treaty 11, I forget which one, I think it was more Treaty 5—there was provision to give land to these people. As a result of the flooding, land was being taken away from them. So you had to provide for how to compensate them for their lands being reduced because of the flooding and the diversion of the Churchill River—how to deal with the land of so many acres they were supposed to have under the treaty, etc.

This Northern Flood Agreement was considered to be more than a simple administrative agreement. It had to do with the land they were supposed to have and respect for the rights they had under the original treaty.

I would ask the chiefs who were there. From my recollection—that's 21 years ago—they considered this to be more important than an ordinary administrative agreement because it touched on the lands, hunting rights, and so on. Because of the flooding, they couldn't do what they used to do. They didn't have the same amount of land, and under the Northern Flood Agreement they were supposed to get compensated with land and other things to make up for that. I agree with you there.

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Mr. Robert Nault: I appreciate that. I respect the fact that this is trying to rectify the fact that certain lands were set aside under the treaty. There was a formula dealing with every family; you received so many acres. I understand that. Treaty 3 was the first one, then Treaty 5. When you talked about the numbered treaties, they were all implemented based on a template called Treaty 3. So I respect that.

When you talk to the elders and the chiefs, my sense of it is that whenever we have a reserve boundary extension because of population growth, they don't see that as opening up their treaty. They see that as flowing from the fiduciary responsibility of the crown to look after the needs of the first nations. There's a big difference. You're leaving the impression on the record that the Northern Flood Agreement was in fact an amendment to the treaty.

If I brought those people who were here in 1977 in front of the committee, they would probably.... I don't know this, because I haven't asked them yet, but I hope we will. If we ask them whether that was an amendment to their treaty, I am sure they are going to say no to you, just as the people are saying to us on the Norway House agreement now that this is not intended to be—

Mr. Warren Allmand: I never said that it was an amendment.

Mr. Robert Nault: No, but we went on to discuss all of section 35 and the importance of it and the treaties, when in fact we're not talking about treaties here at all. We're talking about an agreement that will allow for the flow of compensation because we did not meet our fiduciary responsibility. It not only flows from the treaty, but it also flows from the inherent right of self-government itself. This is a lot more significant than section 35, as far as we're aware, if you talk to the folks.

I'm trying to get a sense of why you and Mr. Russell seem to think that this is opposed to section 35—

Mr. Warren Allmand: I never said that.

Mr. Robert Nault: —or that we're not dealing with the treaty in the way we should be.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Excuse me, I don't think I ever said in my opening comments that the Northern Flood Agreement was an amendment to the treaty. What I said was it was meant to compensate the bands for the loss of their land, for the flooding of their land that they had in respect of the treaty. I never used the term that it was an amendment to their treaty; I never said that anywhere.

I agree with you 100% that the best people to interpret how they looked on the Northern Flood Agreement are the people who signed it on that side. All I know is that I was in Winnipeg in November and I met with some of the people from the northern flood communities. They didn't use the term “amendment to Treaty 5”, but they considered it to be a modern-day treaty that should be recognized as constitutionalized under section 35.

I'm not an expert in these things, but the Chief Justice of Manitoba and the associate chief justice in the royal commission in Manitoba said that these should be considered as constitutionalized documents under section 35.

Mr. Robert Nault: I would ask those people you suggested.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Russell would like to speak.

[English]

Mr. Robert Nault: Before Mr. Russell answers—

[Translation]

The Chairman: Okay, go ahead.

[English]

Mr. Robert Nault: —I would like to get Mr. Allmand to verify this for me.

When you were the minister, if you can go back that far—I know it's not easy—when you were sitting around the room with the representatives of these first nations, was it their belief that this...? I don't want to play with words, but the reality of it is that when you say that they consider this a modern-day treaty, one has to take precedence over another.

If you sign a modern-day treaty today, you're basically changing the original treaty that was signed under Treaty 5 or Treaty 11 to some extent. As I'm sure you know, that's why you will find the majority of first nations people will say that because we're signing this agreement today, don't get the wrong impression that we're changing the treaty that we signed in 1873, 1875, or whenever it was, because that's not the case at all. You were there. Did they think they were in fact signing a form of a modern-day treaty?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Nobody thought they were amending their original treaty, neither on the aboriginal side or on our side. What they thought they were doing was agreeing.... An initiative had been taken by Manitoba Hydro to take away land that they did not want to be taken away. They were opposed to the flooding, but they couldn't fight it. There was a big movement to oppose this flooding. They wanted to keep their land as it was. When that failed, this was the next best thing. They agreed to this agreement, but there was never any suggestion that they were amending their original treaty. This was a modern-day agreement, which later, in 1982, became eligible for constitutionalization. We didn't have any provision at that time to consider it for constitutionalization.

The Chairman: Thank you.

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Prof. Peter Russell: I hope the record will not read that I said this was an amendment to Treaty 5. I don't think there was any authorization of the signatories to this agreement, whoever they were, to change Treaty 5. I do not accept the implication of the questioner's question that if it's not an amendment to Treaty 5, it's therefore just an administrative agreement and it really doesn't matter if there's integrity in the process whereby it's made.

I see it as a modern agreement with the kind of status that a treaty ought to have in the sense that it should be entered into solemnly, very carefully, with integrity on all sides, and not subject to unilateral change by any of the parties. That's what's crucial, always, about these arrangements: they can't be unilaterally changed by one side, and the process is one of integrity. To suggest that if it's not an amendment to an old classical treaty then a modern agreement needn't have those treaty-like qualities or that kind of constitutional protection is a dreadful point of view.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Messrs. Russell and Nault.

Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody: Thank you very much. My questions are for Mr. Russell, Mr. Chairman.

I know who you are, sir. You wrote Federalism and the Charter: Leading Constitutional Decisions. That was one of my first political science textbooks, so I've contributed to your pension plan, sir, in one way or another. Here I am many years later questioning you. Isn't life wonderful?

Mr. Russell, I'm concerned about some of the facts you have raised, because some of them are actually blatantly incorrect, may I say.

On your point about the affidavit sworn by one of the band members, I don't know the name you quoted, but you said, for example, there was a breech of the electoral rules because the ballots were not in Cree but only in English. That is not true. That is factually incorrect, and I believe it was read into the record as well, and in the process of discoveries, to the appeal court that heard this case. So that's not true.

With respect to the individual who alleges that he was denied access to the radio station because he opposed the agreement, we don't have all the facts on this at all. This is one individual making that allegation. That's perhaps up in the air as well.

The third thing I wanted to comment on was your language with respect to.... I understand the emotion behind it because of the facts you presented, but they are wrong again. The fact is, within the agreement itself, in terms of the payment to individuals, the fee schedule to do that was long set out, even before the agreement was finally drafted. In fact, first payments went out in 1995-96, and then another payment was made right after the first referendum failed. So that is in total contradiction to the arguments you presented here, sir, that in some way they were bought off. There was the impression that they were bought off because certainly if I wanted to influence you and you voted no in the referendum, why would I give you $1,000 in cash?

I'm saying on three or four points here, Mr. Chairman.... I don't want to leave the impression in this committee that this is true, because they are proven to be false and suspect in others, because it's the statement made by one individual. We've had no opportunity to check that, and others in the scheduled agreement itself, sir, set out those forms of payment made clearly and quite outside of the outcome, even to the decision to appeal the referendum. These payments were made before and they are not unusual.

Twenty years ago, as Warren would probably know, when they made their settlements on the oil claims in Alberta, the Hobbema Band made payments to band members at the age of 21. No one at that time suggested, for example, that it was untoward, a “bribery”, perhaps, if you could use that word. I'm using that word; you didn't.

It's perhaps stretching it a bit too far, sir, to make these kinds of suggestions outside of some clear facts.

Beyond that, Mr. Chairman, Justice Muldoon has ruled on this. There was a due process of law. Anything that's made available to us, I would argue.... We have the courts, because that's essentially your argument. The pith and substance of your argument really is that we have due process in democracy and we must follow that. But we've done that.

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Finally, the larger question that is raised is if you don't accept, as some members of Parliament argue, that there is a collective decision made by the communities expressed through the chief in council, if we call that into question and we want to bring in other kinds of regulatory bodies to take control of that, then you attack, as Mr. Nault has said, the substance of self-government, the substance of section 35, which is the dignity and right of the people, rightly or wrongly, Mr. Russell, to make their own decisions.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Russell.

[English]

Prof. Peter Russell: I certainly agree with your last point. That's why I wouldn't do anything without aboriginal peoples' advice and agreement that what you were doing was proper.

As to the money payment, as I understand it, certain payments had been made but there was a situation where if you voted yes you would get another payment, and if you voted no there was an implication you wouldn't. I think that's a very unfortunate situation.

As to the allegations about the meeting hall and the language and so on, sir, I have only the affidavit. If there are false statements in there, that's dreadful, but I would hope the committee will bring people to it, because—

Mr. David Iftody: Get some to the committee who support the agreement. We haven't been able to do that yet. Anyway, please continue.

Prof. Peter Russell: I think it's very important. I may be totally wrong on the facts. I'm really saying there should be a process here that everybody, all of you, can agree has integrity.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Iftody.

Ms. Desjarlais.

[English]

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: I actually was going to comment on the information we were given at the last committee meeting that there was a payment plan that was set in place, and supposedly all those dates were set out ahead of time. There's no question some members have indicated that it was done in a certain manner, and if there have been irregularities and illegalities involved, it will come through the courts and then we'll know exactly what we're dealing with, rather than statements or innuendoes.

I want to comment also on the acceptance, so to speak, of payments being made for whatever the reasons in elections. Just recently in the southern part of Manitoba there were comments about gas vouchers being given out prior to elections. I wonder how those types of things would have evolved—I know it's Mr. Russell I should be asking, but you might tie into this—within the aboriginal culture and the self-government of aboriginals. We obviously didn't have gas vouchers way back when, so why would that type of a system even be thought of within the first nations?

Mr. Warren Allmand: They learned that from us. We used to do that all the time.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: I just wanted it for the record.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I remember when I was young in Montreal.... In Nova Scotia they used to hand out rum. They learned all those tricks from us.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: We recognize it's a practice. I wanted that for the record, actually.

Mr. Warren Allmand: It was practised much more than it is now.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: That's right.

We recognize it's a practice that's unacceptable.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Yes.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: I don't think there's any question that it's an unacceptable practice in democracy, and I fully believe that first nations, like other democracies and governments, will work those things out in the process of self-government.

In regard to the new land that's given to them under the flood agreement in payment for the land they have, all the rights of treaty will apply on that land the same as they would under a treaty. Is that not correct?

Mr. Warren Allmand: I'd have to.... I put the document away. It's a thick document.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Don't take it out again.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Yes, from what I understand, on the treaty rights, they try to compensate the bands for the loss of the land and the loss of enjoyment of the land for hunting and fishing and so on that they had prior to the flooding.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Right. So if there was an agreement on minerals or anything that's on the land that is now under their treaty land entitlement, all that would still apply as if it was their regular land?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Originally on the Northern Flood Agreement, not only did the Northern Flood Committee, which represented all the bands, all the nations at the time, partake in the negotiation, but they all had to ratify it—not only sign it, but it had to be ratified by each band.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Okay.

Mr. Warren Allmand: So I don't think they agreed to diminishing any of their rights under Treaty 5.

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Desjarlais.

Mr. Wilfert.

[English]

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, being in a cleanup position, it tends to fall to me that most of the questions have already been answered or asked.

• 1300

I've heard terms like “illegitimate” and “integrity”, and that obviously would call into question the nature of the bill before us as to whether or not.... Process is obviously critical in any issue. They were five votes short for approval in July 1997. We've gone through how they had another referendum. We had the issue about payments, for which there was a schedule ahead of time, and one of my questions of whether or not that was good or bad but it has been done.

People who tend to write us and the people who tend to come before us usually are not here to wave the flag in support. People normally, I found, come because they object to one or more issues. We have some letters I've read here in which people say the band wasn't really consulted; the leadership really didn't represent them; the chiefs didn't represent them. Therefore they call into question the legitimacy of that even in terms of negotiation.

We're supposed to be, under this bill, dealing with the settlement of matters arising from the flooding of the lands, and to try to get the compensation to those who have been affected by the flooding. In the first part of this meeting I was questioning what course of action you gentlemen were suggesting—whether or not we should scrap the whole bill and start over again because the process was so flawed in the views that I was hearing.

Everything seems to have been pretty well dealt with. In terms of the process here, in terms of the approach that has been used in terms of this bill, there are two distinct subject matters in what's called an omnibus bill. Mr. Russell, in the past you've dealt with them on a stand-alone basis in terms of issues. This is different. Could you comment on your view of the approach being taken, and whether or not you think it's fraught with some difficulty?

Prof. Peter Russell: Could you clarify?

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: In the bill as I understand it—I'm reading my notes here—there are two distinct subject matters in this so-called omnibus legislation. In the past, the government has dealt with these issues in terms of flood agreements on an individual, stand-alone basis. And in what we've done here there is some question as to whether or not the approach that's being used is in fact appropriate. It's in section.... I see you have it there; okay.

Prof. Peter Russell: I know it talks in general terms about any first nation in Manitoba. My problem with that is I would like to know whether the various first nations of Manitoba like to be dealt with in an omnibus way.

My criterion, my starting point, in what I call a decolonized relationship with aboriginal people is to proceed by consent. If it's a process they have consented to and Canada is happy with, then I'm happy with it. But I don't know where the first nations sit, in part or entirely, in Manitoba—and some of them are in part there and some of them are entirely there—in terms of how they feel about this or what their position is.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: What would your advice be in terms of soliciting that?

Prof. Peter Russell: Your friend Mr. Bryden talked about the political branches of government and the bureaucracy. I think this is very much something for the political side of government, the minister, to deal with. How does one ascertain that you have the support of the first nations in Manitoba? Probably in consultation with Phil Fontaine and his Assembly of First Nations executive.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I would suggest that you hear both sides and put tough questions to both sides. It's like what you should do to us and—

Prof. Peter Russell: On the integrity of the process.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Yes, on the integrity of the whole system, and get to the bottom of it.

It seems to me, as I mentioned, that if you look at our municipal acts you're not allowed to have two referendums in the same.... In the Quebec legislation you can't have two in the same mandate. It shows disrespect, as I think Mr. Russell said, for the first one, despite what Mr. Bryden said. If there was fraud and everything else in the first one, then I could see that.

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The other thing is the rhetoric of the election campaign and the use of provisions that were legitimate along with the payment of moneys. But to use them in a campaign.... You've been in a campaign; we've all been in campaigns. Sometimes in an election campaign we say “If you don't do this, you won't get that bridge or you won't get that road or you won't get this”. But it's recognized that this is not always the best type of politics. Certainly we've got provisions in our Elections Act today we never had when I started: declaring election expenses, control of election expenses. Twenty or thirty years ago we didn't have that.

What I personally would like to see is maybe you could put the bill on hold while you look into some of the questions as to if this is a constitutionalized treaty, how do you deal with the whole question that was discussed earlier and whether there were really shenanigans in the vote or not. Talk to both sides.

There's no reason this has to be rushed through in a week or two. I don't know what the timetable is, but it would be good if you could get a real hearing. I think the implications and the precedents down the road on what you do with these new kinds of modern-day treaties that come under section 35 is a very important question, and it will keep coming back. If you do something wrong this time, that might set a precedent for the future. It might be good to clarify that. I think it would be good.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Duncan and Ms. Desjarlais, would you like to ask one final question?

[English]

Mr. John Duncan: I don't have a question, just a quick comment for Mr. Allmand. It's very interesting to watch two generations of Liberals disagreeing with each other and trying to make their case.

Mr. Warren Allmand: We don't totally. I agree with him on many things.

Mr. John Duncan: Oh, I understand that.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I'd like to be in the caucus. We always disagreed on different things.

Mr. John Duncan: I can agree on some things.

Mr. Warren Allmand: A real democracy.

Mr. John Duncan: For Mr. Russell, one thing that might be more interesting, rather than looking at the timing of the payment, is to look at the timing of the second vote in relation to the predetermined timing of the payments.

My last comment is that we are looking at the front end of what is going to be the most important social issue in large parts of Canada over the next 25 years. We're showing ourselves to be quite incapable of dealing with this thing in a realistic fashion. We're going to do it a bill at a time until we get into such a mishmash we won't be able to turn and find the next corner. That's my concluding comment. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Duncan.

[English]

Prof. Peter Russell: I'd like to emphasize Mr. Allmand's point about your committee having an obligation to find out the facts. Sir, my understanding of what's in that affidavit may be wrong; maybe they're not accurate. I don't know. But I don't think you know either, sir. As to Mr. Muldoon's judgment, you can go through it, and it does not go into these facts. They have not been argued in the court. So I think your committee needs to do some fact-finding.

Mr. David Iftody: I would just respond to that.

[Translation]

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody: You are wrong on that. And I'll say that—

[Translation]

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Mr. Iftody. Ms. Desjarlais.

[English]

Ms. Bev Desjarlais: Actually, I'm only going to push this one because I know I gave up my earlier question so you could leave early, but since you're still here I guess you get to wait until I have my turn this time.

I just want to make the point that I don't want there to be any impression given that there isn't an attempt to hear both sides, because I think the committee fully intends to do that. Actually, we never got a chance to complete the list last week because there was a suggestion that not all members of different parties were here. I don't think there's going to be any attempt to not hear both sides.

I understand that representatives from Norway House chief in counsel are going to be here, and I'm pretty sure they're supporting the bill. I think I can say that quite comfortably. So to say that we're not going to hear both sides is just not accurate, and I don't want it to be recorded as such. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody: Thank you.

It's getting a bit late, but I'll try to confirm those facts for you, Professor Russell. I think it's particularly important, because you put great weight in terms of your legitimate outrage based on what I think are noble intentions based on incorrect facts. But I'll get that for you.

• 1310

I would just say, Mr. Chairman, as a follow up to our last committee meeting after the full meeting, that I was quite frustrated, as you will recall, because I felt I couldn't get the opposition members—and I think it's on record in the Hansard—to bring in sufficient numbers of those who support the agreement. I think this has been brought out by the witnesses today—that in order to have a thorough debate and discussion on this, we have to have all the facts before us, those for and those against.

If you check the witness list, of the 35 or so that we have lined up right now—Warren, for example—99% of those oppose the agreement. So if we're going to have a fair discussion about this, we need to have both sides representing. If I recall, most of the opposition, including my good friend from the NDP, was quite opposed to having some of these other people. So I want to get that on the record.

[Translation]

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Ms. Desjarlais and Mr. Iftody, but I must end the sitting.

On Thursday, March 11, we will have appearances by Mr. Robert F. Roddick, of the Norway House Cree Nation, R.D. Bettner of Manitoba Hydro, and Gord Hannon, from the Department of Justice of the Government of Manitoba. Other officials, including Ralph Abramson, will appear on March 2.

We appreciated your testimony and would like to thank the technical team, the interpreters and all the staff who supported us. The committee members were very patient, as it should be during the consideration of a bill. Thank you for your patience.

Until the next meeting, tomorrow afternoon.

The committee adjourned.