AAND Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES AUTOCHTONES ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DU GRAND NORD

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 22, 1998

• 0905

[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Guy St-Julien (Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik, Lib.)): Order. The meeting is called to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering Chapter 14 of the September 1998 Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada—Comprehensive Land Claims.

Today we welcome our witnesses, from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Mr. Denis Desautels, Auditor General of Canada, Mr. Grant Wilson, Principal, Audit Operations Branch, and Mr. Don Young, Assistant Auditor General, Audit Operations Branch. Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Desautels?

Mr. L. Denis Desautels (Auditor General of Canada): Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Welcome. We're very happy that you have agreed to meet with us at our request and we are eager to hear what you have to say.

Mr. Denis Desautels: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to present the results of our audit of Comprehensive Land Claims—Chapter 14 in my September 1998 report.

As you said, I am accompanied by Mr. Don Young and Mr. Grant Wilson. Mr. Wilson is one of the two main authors of the chapter we will be discussing this morning. Sitting in the room is Mr. Ted Bonder, who is the other author who has been with our office for nearly 10 years where he has been involved in Aboriginal affairs. I would imagine that, if necessary, we could invite Mr. Bonder to provide more details to the committee.

The Chairman: He can sit to your right if you wish.

Mr. Denis Desautels: We'll begin like this, and we'll see. If we need Mr. Bonder, I will call him.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Denis Desautels: Comprehensive land claims, as you know, are a very significant and complex topic to many Canadians. The stakes are high from moral, legal, social and economic perspectives. And the impacts of settled and unsettled claims can be far-reaching.

It is noteworthy that the settling of these claims directly affects thousand of people, whether or not they are direct participants in a claim. It is equally noteworthy that settlements seek to address unresolved issues that have lingered since the birth of our country and even prior to that.

At the time of the audit, 12 settlements had been reached between 1975, when the first one was finalized, and 1997. In 1998-1999, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada plans to spend $262 million on the program, which includes the negotiation and implementation of agreements.

These 12 settlements involve 48,000 Aboriginal people, full ownership of over a half-million square kilometres of land, direct payments by the Government of Canada of almost $2 billion and various rights and obligations of the parties, with attending costs.

Although these settlements are very significant, they may reflect only the tip of the iceberg. This is because there are over 200 First Nations that have actual or potential land claims and treaties still under discussion or to be addressed.

[English]

The challenges to successful settlements are enormous. They involve complex issues and require the goodwill of several parties and many non-parties to a claim. I believe negotiating fair settlements is far preferable to the lingering threat of, or actual, litigation. I also believe the nature of the relationship between first nations and the government will, in large measure, reflect the way settlements are reached and outcomes are achieved.

As long as there are outstanding grievances and unsettled land claims the relationship may suffer, thereby impeding the parties' attempts to achieve socio-economic progress through a multitude of programs funded by Parliament for aboriginal people.

We know, for example, that many first nations are in a catch-up position in terms of the quality of life enjoyed by other Canadians. Factors that contribute to the gap include the precarious financial position of some Indian bands, limited mobility of on-reserve residents, fewer economic development opportunities in remote locations, poorer health, lower education levels, high unemployment and high dependency on social assistance, lack of preparedness of some first nations to assume program devolution, and inadequate infrastructure on reserves. In addition, demands for services on reserves can be expected to climb dramatically because of the young average age of community members and the high on-reserve birth rate.

• 0910

Consequently, the gap in living conditions between aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities has the potential to widen. Increased funding alone is not a viable long-term solution. To begin, the parties need to clear the air by settling old grievances and by reaching an understanding on the expectations, responsibilities and obligations of both the government and first nations.

It is against this backdrop that I am attaching an appendix to this opening statement The appendix summarizes selected issues from audits reported from 1991 through 1997 that I believe will be helpful to your committee.

Turning to the September 1998 report on comprehensive land claims, there are a few highlights the committee may wish to consider. First, the audit was performed in the context of the department's objectives to provide certainty and clarity to ownership and use of land and resources through negotiated settlements, thereby encouraging socio-economic development. In this regard, the audit focused on the department's role and sought to identify opportunities for improvement in the way claims settlements are reached, implemented and reported.

We found that certainty achieved under settlement agreements can mean different things to different parties. The risk is that the parties may have agreed on the negotiated outcomes but have different expectations of the benefits and obligations set out in the signed agreements.

In addition, the audit found that more rigour is need to enhance the effectiveness of the settlement process in determining financial amounts, land transfers and other considerations that are ultimately included in final settlement agreements.

We also found that the department needs to act on its commitment to explore methods other than the surrender or extinguishment of aboriginal rights or title that would provide clarity, stability and certainty through negotiated claims settlements. Finally, implementation of final settlement agreements needs to be improved and timely evaluations should be performed and reported on the implementation results.

[Translation]

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, it is questionable, notwithstanding the complex issues, that 20 years or more have been taken, or will be taken, to settle some claims. In my view, protracted settlements do not contribute to cost effectiveness and may result in less desirable outcomes for all concerned.

Although the audit recommendations are directed primarily to the Department, a consistent, co-operative effort by all parties is needed in order to achieve the necessary goals, and to achieve them in a fair and expeditious manner.

In its response to the audit, the Department did not explicitly address the audit recommendations. Consequently, there is no commitment to specific remedial action against which it can be held accountable.

The Department suggests that under its current comprehensive land claims policy of 1986, things have improved and therefore the audit observations apply to approaches used prior to that date.

I wish to bring to the committee's attention that the audit included a review of settlements reached under the current comprehensive land claims policy. Further, because some claims settlements have taken 20 years or more to reach, and all are still being implemented, the audit issues need to be addressed regardless of which policy the Department wishes to apply.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this audit provides suggestions for improving the claims process and results for the benefit of all Canadians. With the encouragement of the committee, I'm hopeful that improvements will be made.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer the committee's questions.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Desautels, for your excellent presentation which seeks to improve the comprehensive land claims process in the interest of all Canadians.

Mr. Desautels, if throughout the course of the year you deem it necessary to come back to our committee, you will be most welcome. You may even come two or three times per year should you so wish. All you have to do is call me. I am aware of the credibility of both you and your team and I know that you want to improve the situation in Canada. Thank you for your presentation.

Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Derrek Konrad (Prince Albert, Ref.): I will defer to my colleague.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Scott.

[English]

Mr. Mike Scott (Skeena, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• 0915

Thank you very much for coming here today, for providing us with the report, and for the opportunity to meet with your staff after the report was released.

I have a couple of housekeeping questions. In the case of land claim negotiations that involve a province, such as the B.C. treaty process right now, does the $90 million you have put in your report, which is the cost to date, include the provinces' portion of costs as well, or is that only the federal government's portion?

Mr. Denis Desautels: I believe that's only the government's portion, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mike Scott: Would that $90 million include any accrued costs that may be considered repayable loans?

Mr. Grant Wilson (Principal, Audit Operations Branch, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): Yes, the $90 million is expected to be repaid. Those moneys are provided essentially to first nations for negotiations and will be repaid upon completion of their settlement agreement.

Mr. Mike Scott: My understanding is that only a portion of those funds that were advanced for negotiations are actually recoverable by the agreements that are in place right now with first nations.

Mr. Grant Wilson: The $90 million that is reported in that chapter relates to loans, and those loans are recoverable loans expected to be repaid. There are other funds provided to first nations that are non-loans, and those are not repayable.

Mr. Mike Scott: The $90 million is money that's been advanced to aboriginal bands for negotiations, but does not include the costs of the federal negotiators, consultants, legal advice, etc., that the federal government would availing itself of.

Mr. Grant Wilson: The federal government negotiates through the Federal Treaty Negotiation Office, and the costs of that office are not included in the $90 million.

Mr. Mike Scott: Have you examined what those costs might be?

Mr. Grant Wilson: We have not looked at what those costs are. I should just remind the committee that we did not do an audit of the British Columbia Treaty Commission but provided information in this chapter to give a context to where the next comprehensive land claims would be mostly carried out.

Mr. Mike Scott: I appreciate that. I'm just trying to get a handle on what the total cost might be and what might be included and not included in your $90 million figure.

With regard to the 12 land claim settlements that have been reached over the last 20 years, have you had occasion to examine the impact of these modern treaties, in terms of dependency rates, unemployment rates and the negative trends that are occurring on reserves across Canada, to see whether or not there's actually been a measurable benefit to having these treaties in place?

Mr. Grant Wilson: This is one of the concerns we've raised in this audit report. Evaluations have not been carried out on settlements completed to date that would provide information of that nature.

The department provides implementation reports for various claims settlements, and what one will see in those reports are activities carried out. There will be expenditures incurred and so on, but it's difficult to tell which of those relate to the actual terms and conditions of the settlement agreement or the implementation and which relate to ongoing departmental expenditures. So this is an area we have highlighted as a concern.

Mr. Mike Scott: You appreciate that Parliament and aboriginal people are being told that the treaty process is in aid of attacking those problems of dependency, unemployment and other social problems that exist on reserves. That's why I think it's vital there's an examination of what impact may or may not be felt on reserve as a result of these treaties.

• 0920

You have raised a red flag in your report, if I can paraphrase, that the federal government really doesn't have a good handle on what the final cost of the treaty process in British Columbia and other parts of Canada might be, and hasn't done proper assessments of what those costs might be, especially as it relates to non-cash items and what the valuation of those non-cash items might be. Having looked at the process, have you done any kind of estimation as to where these costs could run, and is that the base of your concerns?

Mr. Grant Wilson: We did not do a calculation of where those costs were. These costs relate to such items as we mention in our chapter about the potential value of transferred land, for instance, and access rights. That's exactly the issue when we're talking about the rigour that goes into the determination of amounts, because the settlement consists of two major components: one is land, and the other is cash. Where you have an idea of the land and what it may be used for and its value, not necessarily in a dollar amount but its value in terms of its use, then that could certainly influence the cash component of that settlement agreement. Without knowing that, we're not really sure how it's determined, except obviously through negotiation, how that cash amount will ultimately be arrived at.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Finlay.

[English]

Mr. John Finlay (Oxford, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that we looked at the background papers we were supplied. I have a feeling that we're dealing with this thing from perhaps two points of view and we're trying to straddle both points of view, and I don't think that's going to work. I appreciate the Auditor General's concern and my colleague's concern about the money and how much it's going to cost, how much land is going to be involved and so on.

Without being too specific, I read that so far in the auditor's report he says:

The settlements involve 48,000 Aboriginal people, full ownership of over a half million square kilometres of land, direct payments by the government of Canada of almost $2 billion and various rights and obligations of the parties, with attending costs.

I'm not sure whether this is supposed to be too much and out of line or whether it's simply a statement of fact. Now, 48,000 aboriginal people out of a projected population of 800,000 is not very many. Full ownership of over half a million square kilometres of land sounds like a lot of land, but if you divide it into the area of Canada, I imagine its minuscule. The costs of almost $2 billion may look the same if we line them up against other costs.

I think the thing we have to keep in mind is that we're dealing with negotiations and settlements among at least three parties—the government, the provincial governments and the aboriginals—and it's going to take time. It has taken time. To complain about it taking too much time I think is totally out of the way and not appropriate. It's going to take time. In some cases it will take longer.

But I would like to know what four comprehensive land claim settlements were the primary focus—I couldn't find that in here—and whether you had a reason why these four were selected. And I have a second question, Mr. Chairman. Do you have concrete examples of cases in which the disparity in resources available to the parties, which you comment on two or three times, affected the process and outcome of the land claim settlements, or examples of cases in which the fairness of the negotiation process or its outcome has been challenged?

[Translation]

The Chairman: You have the floor, Mr. Desautels.

[English]

Mr. Denis Desautels: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome these questions and I can deal with them.

• 0925

Just before I do, if I may, I'd like to say first of all that in terms of the information that we disclose on the numbers of settlements and what was included in those settlements, this is put here simply for information. It's a statement of fact. It's not an opinion as to whether or not it's too much or not enough. I assume that these were negotiated freely and all parties agreed to that. These are statements of fact.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the whole chapter was done with the intention on our part to inform Parliament on an activity that is not well understood by many people. It's a terribly important activity, a difficult activity that many people don't understand that well.

Our intent was to try to inform. The information you have in here, for instance on quantum, is simply with that in mind.

You asked two specific questions. One was what were the four treaties we were referring to. Mr. Wilson has that information. I'll ask him as well to deal with your second question of instances where the disparity in resources may have affected the negotiations themselves.

Mr. Grant Wilson: The four comprehensive claims that we looked at in depth were, one, Champagne and Aishihik; second, Sahtu Dene and Métis; third, Gwich'in, in the NWT; and fourth, Inuvialuit, in the NWT. The reason those were chosen is that the known minimum value of direct compensation is $350 million; so of the $2 billion, we said let's look at a significant number within that $2 billion, and 350 million was a reasonable area for us to consider. We also chose 160,000 square kilometres of the half million square kilometres of land of full ownership. That was really where we looked.

In terms of the second question, as to whether we found that disparity in fact resulted in unfairness, we did not address that question directly. All we have said in the chapter is that there is a potential for agreements not to be carried out in a fair manner because of the nature of the negotiating positions. As we indicated, the size of first nations can sometimes have a direct bearing on their capacity to be able to negotiate.

Also, the federal government does set the terms and conditions of the negotiating parameters. That may affect it. In fact, having said all of that, we don't comment that there was fairness or unfairness, but suggest that there could be a potential for unfairness. Perhaps some first nations, or perhaps even government, would believe that ultimately this wasn't a fair deal, but it was still a signed deal. One would presume that if you're signing it, it must be fair for both parties.

Mr. John Finlay: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Finlay.

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Mr. Desautels, it's always a pleasure to see you. I would like to congratulate you not only on the excellent work that you have done with respect to the Aboriginal issue, but also for all of your work.

The other day, I was at the meeting where you released your report and I asked you a few questions. Perhaps this may appear redundant to you, but you are familiar with the work of Parliament. We also have to do our committee work.

Here is my first question. Personally, I believe that the Department of Indian Affairs is often conditioned by the Department of Justice. My colleagues asked questions about costs and about the time it takes for negotiations. I think that many of these delays and much of these costs can be attributed to the fact that the hands of the Department of Indian Affairs are often tied. When the Department wants to proceed, it first of all has to go through the Department of Justice, which tells it to pay attention to precedents, to pay attention to this and that. This delays the negotiation process a great deal.

As far as the whole Aboriginal issue is concerned, when there are Supreme Court decisions, rulings that are 90 percent in favour of the Aboriginal peoples, whether this be the Calder decision, the Sparrow decision or the last one, the Delgamuukw decision, we get the impression that there is a change in government negotiations. My question is this. I asked you this question the other time and you handled it very well.

• 0930

Are you not under the impression that the federal government is withdrawing politically with respect to those negotiations and that it is simply reacting to the courts, particularly the Supreme Court?

Secondly, there is the issue of certainty and ancestral rights. I believe you mentioned this in your document. Are there not different interpretations of what certainty means? As far as we, the White people, are concerned, certainty means making an agreement and having it signed before a lawyer. We go to the lawyer and we agree to all of the provisions. However, certainty is not as important for the Aboriginal people. Moreover, the Delgamuukw decision states that oral tradition is just as important as a written contract.

Are you therefore under the impression that it is very difficult to define the two concepts of ancestral rights and certainty? There are even some people here, in the Indian Affairs Committee, who tried to do this with Judge Hamilton, but things were not made any clearer. Do you think that certainty constitutes the real stumbling block and that the parties don't have the same notion of what this means?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, it's difficult for me to answer the first of the two questions because we're talking about legal and political things.

The Department of Indian Affairs must, of course, work very closely with the Department of Justice in settling claims. We have even been critical about this matter. We have said that, once the negotiations have been completed, the Department of Justice should issue a comprehensive opinion about the agreement and we gave an example where this was not done. In fact, there have been cases where a party was against some of the conclusions drawn by the Department of Justice. Shortly thereafter, the matter was before the court and additional claims were made.

Now, as I perhaps have already said, I'm neither a lawyer nor a legal expert, but it is clear that the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Justice must take legal decisions into account. What we are all hoping to achieve is a settlement that is acceptable to everyone, one which will be able to stand as is. If we disregard important decisions made in various courts, we're taking the risk that, sooner or later, some party will challenge the settlement.

The decisions made by the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, will certainly have an impact on negotiations, and the Department of Indian Affairs will take them into account. The Department has to work very closely with the Department of Justice. The relationship between the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Justice can be improved in certain respects.

As for the question of certainty, we see this as being a very important objective of the claims negotiations program. This is what we are all striving to achieve. There are, of course, other issues, such as equity, clarity and so on and so forth. Certainty is a fundamental objective of all land claims negotiations.

Our report refers specifically to the question you have raised; namely, the fact that not all of the parties involved interpret certainty in the same fashion. The Aboriginal peoples don't have the same cultural traditions and interpret this issue very differently. The Department has to acknowledge these differences and bear them in mind during the negotiation process. There is no magic solution. This is a fact that has existed for a very long time, and we're going to have to pay proper attention to it.

• 0935

Mr. Claude Bachand: I'd like to clarify your first answer. You said that the government must take court decisions into account, and this is what it does do, but if this is so, it is because there have already been some gray areas that the government has perhaps refused to clarify precisely because it wants to avoid having the matter brought before the court. Don't you think that, in such instances, the government is shirking its political responsibilities? Could you give me an answer or do you feel that this question is perhaps too political and that I should discuss the matter with my colleagues rather than with you?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Indeed, this is a very political question. The government always has the choice to legislate or not in certain cases. Now, this is a strictly political decision. Does the government want to consider certain court decisions, which are an interpretation of certain pieces of legislation, or does it want to change the laws? The government or Parliament is always free to make this choice. I'm not prepared to suggest whether or not it should do this. It's up to Parliamentarians to make this decision.

The Chairman: Very good answer. Thank you, Mr. Bachand and Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Wilfert.

[English]

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): In your report, which I found quite interesting, you don't take umbrage with the objectives of treaty making, but you don't necessarily paint a very positive picture in terms of the process and, in particular, looking at the costs and the timeframe involved.

Obviously, for many Canadians this is an issue. For many there's a lack of understanding as to why it takes so long and whether or not all of the costs are actually reported. There are the department costs involved, and I understand they don't necessarily report all of their costs. Is that because they don't have all the relevant information? Can you provide some examples from the audit sample of the difference between the financial compensation components, that is, the settlement and the full costs? That would be the first question.

The second question is, going back to the Justice issue, there seems to be a constant theme of criticism the department has not followed the Department of Justice's advice. Are not the Justice officials required to be there every step of the way? Certainly they review each of the chapters that are negotiated, so they therefore would be there before there is final cabinet approval. If that isn't the case, how do we account for that?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I agree with the member we have no qualms with the intention here of reaching a settlement through negotiation, and that seems to be the better option. That's what the department is saying, and we have no reason to disagree with that at all.

In fact, if you boil down our chapter into two main recommendations, there's a set of recommendations that aims at improving the process to the extent possible, to shorten it, to make it more effective, and to make it such that it will stick in the end and that it will end up in an agreement that will not be challenged.

The second set of recommendations has to do with the implementation of the undertakings, particularly of government, under the agreements. Sometimes agreements come unstuck because of poor implementation afterwards.

So those are the two general areas where we think improvements could be made.

I'll answer your second question, and I'll then ask Mr. Wilson to answer the first one.

In terms of Justice advice, you're right, Justice is there every step of the way. There's lots of Justice involvement throughout. But you have to remember some of these negotiations last 20 years, so while there has been piecemeal involvement on different aspects over the 20 years, there has been a turnover of people. So what we're suggesting is maybe there's a need at the end, before the final solution, for an overview of the whole thing to make sure it's still okay. So Justice was certainly involved, but given the length of the negotiation, and people turning over very quickly sometimes, there's a loss sometimes of corporate memory. But there's also a need to look at the whole thing at the end to make sure all the pieces fit together properly.

• 0940

I hope that answers that question. I'll ask Mr. Wilson to answer your first question.

Mr. Grant Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to costs, we're really looking at two areas. One relates to costs that are reported; the second relates to costs that are used by the department to manage.

Now, with respect to the first, as Mr. Desautels indicated, $262 million is expected to be spent this year for comprehensive land claims. That relates to negotiations, to payments made under claims that have already been settled—the $2 billion is paid out over quite a number of years—and to implementation.

What we're saying in the chapter is you cannot tell readily when you look at the estimates and the performance reports of the department where that breakout is: how much is being spent for what, and in what areas. There's no question in terms of expenditures; the department reports its expenditures as part of its public accounts and that information is there, but it's in little bits and pieces and it's extremely difficult to put it together.

So that's the one question. It's not an issue of not reporting costs; they are reporting expenditures as incurred.

The second relates to costs for management. This relates to such things, as we mentioned earlier, as potential value of transferred land and resources, and consolidated costs of all the departments. There are quite a number of departments involved. It's a handful, like health, natural resources, and it goes on and on. They all have some role. The Department of Indian Affairs is the coordinator and the major player.

So these are the kinds of costs we're talking about, costs that relate for instance to the various projects under implementation plans. You cannot find out what those costs are, or the department does not collect those costs and consolidate them by project in a manner that would help them ensure the project in fact was achieving what it was intended to achieve. So it's those kinds of costs we're talking about, not the costs that are reported in a general sense to Parliament.

The second kind of costs would find themselves in a piecemeal basis in the implementation reports. And that's where we're saying those implementation reports, while they're provided, can't tell you how much of the costs relate to the comprehensive land claims settlement and implementation, and how much of those costs relate to the ongoing departmental operations, or other departmental operations, because again, all kinds of departments are funding programs for Indians.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: If I might, Mr. Chairman, what would the solution to that be?

Mr. Grant Wilson: The department does have a costing system, which they recognize is not producing the information they would like. It's a matter of improving that system to some extent. It's also a matter of collecting information in a manner that would facilitate managing the implementation process better. That's an internal management issue.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: You feel it can be done?

Mr. Grant Wilson: Yes, I do.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Ms. Hardy.

[English]

Ms. Louise Hardy (Yukon, NDP): Thank you.

I was wondering if you would elaborate on the ethical foundation you say you'd like to see implemented, where there are leadership principles and empowerment of civil servants to act in the public interest. Is that lacking in this department when it comes to negotiating with first nations people, and how would you see it put in place for the advancement of the claims?

Mr. Denis Desautels: That's an interesting question. I'll start, Mr. Chairman, and maybe Mr. Wilson can help me out.

• 0945

As a general impression, I feel that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development is well-intentioned. I believe their motives are to achieve, of course, certainty and to settle issues that have been festering for a long, long time. I believe, on the whole, their intentions are to do that in a fair way, an equitable way. We haven't seen evidence or heard complaints that they were basically running roughshod over people or not taking duly into account people's concerns and other values that our native people cherish. So my general impression is that the intention is to be fair and to do it properly.

Grant, maybe you would like to add to that.

Mr. Grant Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, indeed, Mr. Desautels, we did not find any indication that there was unfairness, as I've mentioned before. I think what you have to consider is that the first nations also have a capacity to negotiate, and they are very skilful. I would suggest that if there was any unfairness, you could be as unfair on either side, but we have no reason to believe there was any.

Ms. Louise Hardy: So everything is in place that would support the foundation you'd like to see, that you outlined in your introduction?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Well, I think the concepts from which people are working seem to be the right concepts.

Ms. Louise Hardy: So for the following 200 claims, you don't foresee any big problems.

I wonder what is taking the claims so long, because the money that the first nations lose by having the claims drag out is detrimental to those people. Is there anything inherent in the process that's taking the claims so long to be settled?

Mr. Denis Desautels: That's not an easy question to answer. We all recognize that many of those situations are extremely complex, and by their very nature they're going to take a long time to settle.

On the other hand, there could be examples of where the opposite has happened because there was a clear focus on reaching some settlement under some kind of...well, I wouldn't call it a deadline necessarily, but I guess a good example of that is the James Bay agreement, which I think was done within two or three years. Admittedly, there have been some implementation problems arising out of that since then, but that was complex. It was a big agreement, an important agreement, but it was done in a relatively short span of time.

Why was that the case? I don't have the real answer, but I think there was certainly an objective to get it done within a certain timeframe. People seemed to be motivated by that, and it got done a little more quickly. I'm sure you can't do that every time, but if you can improve the performance, shorten the duration of the negotiations by 25%, I think that's a win for everyone.

Mr. Grant Wilson: If I could elaborate on that a bit, one should be aware that during this period of time, from the time of James Bay to today, as Mr. Bachand has said, there have been a number of legal cases, Supreme Court decisions, that have greatly influenced the outcome and are expected to influence substantially again, for the B.C. treaties, the negotiation process. While some of those decisions are being made or awaited, the negotiations sometimes stop completely because people want to find out what the implications are: should I enter into this agreement now, not knowing what the Supreme Court will say, and therefore potentially create a problem for me? So sometimes there are reasonable reasons for slowing down the negotiations.

But we did identify a number of problems with respect to the timing, which, if improved, could address that time length a bit. We indicated, for instance, that in some of the claims settlements, there was no overall plan at the beginning of the process that would identify who was to do what, and that would identify the key events and target dates for those key events.

• 0950

It's understood that negotiations are a process in which perhaps you won't reach that target, but if you have a target, at least you have something against which you can work. We found that final settlement deadlines were often not set, and when they were set, they weren't met for those various reasons.

So there are some process issues that can be addressed that we think can improve the length of time, but of course those other events will mitigate that.

Ms. Louise Hardy: So there's no way for you to know that there has been stalling, because it depends on which government is in power and one government may not want to negotiate just because of their ideological beliefs?

Mr. Grant Wilson: We have no indication that claims under any particular government have taken longer than any other. In fact, if you consider that they're taking 17 to 20 years, it probably includes a number of governments.

Ms. Louise Hardy: The figures that are given on the amount of land sound like a lot, but they don't include any of our prime agricultural land, and certainly in the north it's not land that's arable or desired by anybody except the first nations who are there, certainly for the Gwich'in people.

I'm really concerned about the repayment. The repayment is part of the first nations' settlement, and so the longer the time takes, the less they end up with, and in certain cases there are actually penalties for not negotiating quickly enough.

Mr. Grant Wilson: The land in question may or may not...and you would know whether it included arable land in the north. In fact, the claims that have been settled to date, other than the ones in Quebec, are all in the north, in NWT or the Yukon, and that land that is allocated, the 500,000 square kilometres, is negotiated land; that is, it's decided between the two parties what land is provided as fee simple land.

Sorry, I forgot your other question.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Denis Desautels: It's all right.

The Chairman: Thank you. Before giving the floor to Ms. Longfield, I'd like to put a question to you because you've opened a door.

Did you have the opportunity to evaluate the follow-up on the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement? You said that the agreement was signed rather quickly. I know Chief Billy Diamond and the James Bay Cree. In many cases, the Canadian Government did not meet the expectations of the James Bay Cree. The Cree don't block off roads. They go to court.

Have you examined the James Bay Agreement? It's the first agreement that was signed, in 1975, and it served as a basis for all the others. You say it was signed rather quickly and the Cree often say that the government does not honour its word. Have you examined the James Bay Agreement?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Well, it was part of the parcel that we picked, but we didn't examine it fully, in detail. There are four we examined in more detail as we said before but the James Bay Agreement is still familiar enough to us.

In that case, we know that the Natives took legal action against the Canadian government for not honouring its commitments. That somewhat supports the criticism in our chapter; we said that the implementation of the rules by the Canadian government left much to be desired for a while. Things seem to have improved recently, but it still remains something extremely important. All the good work that may have gone into negotiating an agreement can come to naught if the implementation isn't done with sufficient rigour.

• 0955

I don't want to say any more on this subject, because it is now before the courts. I don't want to say who's right and who's wrong, but the Natives are saying that the government did not deliver the goods they had promised.

[English]

Grant, would you like to add to that?

Mr. Grant Wilson: No.

The Chairman: Madame Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you.

Much of what I was going to ask has been covered by Mr. Wilfert, but I'm going to zero in on three specific sections here. The first is paragraph 14.43, where you indicate the department has not done enough to demonstrate the deemed benefits relating to economic impacts of negotiated settlements. Are you talking about benefits on both sides? Benefits for whom? Economic impacts for whom? Do you have some suggestions on how this might be done, given it's a pretty new field of endeavour?

Maybe I'll deal with all three items and then come back. The other one is paragraph 14.50. This has been alluded to many times. There's the redistribution and transfer of assets. Many of those include land, and I think we all realize how very difficult it is to put a value on some of that property that's being transferred. Again, do you have any concrete suggestions on how departments might work up evaluation criteria?

The third item is paragraph 14.90. Again, you're critical that not all the costs are being reported, and I'm going to ask again if you have suggestions. Are we talking about hotel costs and negotiation costs? Are we talking about dividing up the cost of each staff member and apportioning a third of his or her cost to the actual negotiating process? Those of us who have tried to create budgets to reflect the costs know how difficult it is to divide people up. Do you have some suggestions to help us achieve the goals?

Mr. Grant Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the question related to economic benefits, that is, not enough work being carried out to determine those economic benefits, let's step back and consider what the department's objective is in settling these claims. One is to settle grievances that have been longstanding. In doing so, an objective of government is to reduce uncertainty relating to those agreements as to who has ownership of lands, who has access, and who has rights. A second objective is, in doing that, we'll open that area up for development.

The economic development relates to first nations as well as to non-aboriginal people. So we're saying the department has not carried out studies and done sufficient work to determine the impact of those agreements on economic development. Has there been an increase in economic development since these agreements have been implemented, and is it because of these agreements? It's hard to tell. The department is attempting to work on that, and it is my understanding they believe it's important they have those. Otherwise, you will never truly know if you have achieved one of your major objectives.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Is there a timeframe? Is it one year, ten years, twenty years? How do we quantify this? That's again very difficult, given the nature of the land.

Mr. Denis Desautels: I think you'd have to look at a longer timeframe to do this properly, and that's quite all right. We're not suggesting it has to be done the year after you've signed an agreement. And the timeframe could be longer depending on the difficulties involved.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: You suggest we're not doing it, but when do you expect us to do it? I think we have to try to be pretty balanced here. Is it that we're just not doing it, or is it just not possible to do it at this time? Would it need another five or ten years? I'd like to have some sort of benchmark you'd like us to be aiming for, such as ten years after the treaty is negotiated, twenty years, or whatever.

Mr. Denis Desautels: I think, Mr. Chairman, it would have been possible to do some by now, and they haven't been done for various reasons. The department doesn't disagree they should get on with those. I think there might be useful lessons learned that could then be applied to future negotiations.

• 1000

Mr. Grant Wilson: Mr. Chairman, when looking at the implementation, we suggest that evaluations be carried out periodically. We don't suggest a timeframe, because each one will, by its nature, have a different timeframe. Some issues and events could be evaluated early, such as in five years. Some will take seven years. Some will take ten years. We're not suggesting a particular timeframe. We're wondering what would be reasonable over that period.

With respect to the value of land, again, where it's possible to determine a value—I agree with you that it's quite difficult in the north—then what is land worth? We're not looking at a valuation of land per se, we're suggesting that land has a utility. Land has a use and a potential for resource use in a sense. In determining what land is eventually negotiated, it would seem reasonable to know what that land may be used for.

If, for instance, in a particular area there's a potential for mining—say it's diamond mines in the NWT—should the government not know that as they're negotiating? Shouldn't they have an idea? We're not suggesting they would need to know specifically every place in which there's a potential mine, but is there mining potential? Is there resource potential other than mines? That kind of use is what we're talking about, not the dollar value of land.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Realistically, that's pretty difficult to achieve. I've got a little piece of scrub land in northern Ontario. I may be lucky if they strike gold, but it may just be swamp land. With all due respect, I think particularly—

Mr. Denis Desautels: The point here is that if it's known that the land has some resources that could be of value, it helps to know that when you negotiate a deal that will ensure an economic base for the first nation in the years to come. That could also affect the amount of cash transfers you would also make.

We're not asking for something impossible here, but I think it's something on which you need to have, if possible, some kind of handle to enable you to develop a package for settlement that's presumably more satisfactory.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Grant Wilson: The third question related to costs and whether we had any suggestions for those costs or what the department might do to collect them. Again, we're not suggesting that we have a time allocation for individuals. That's not where we're going. We're looking for a reasonable estimate of costs when they can be estimated. We're looking for a reasonable allocation.

Every implementation plan has a series of projects. The cost of each project, or combination of projects, as would be reasonable to expect, could be allocated according to those projects. It could be on a large basis or a small basis, again depending on what was reasonable under the circumstances.

So we're not suggesting that you need costs for the sake of getting costs, because that's totally inefficient and it's not going to be useful for very many people. So it could be on a broader scale. If what you're looking for is ultimately to determine whether a particular program or activity under the implementation plan met its objectives, then costs relating to achieving those objectives would be reasonable. If you know that the costs to go from A to B should be such and such, then those costs should be collected and reported. Again, I think we've never asked for, and would never expect, an unreasonable allocation or collection of costs, such as collecting for the sake of collecting them.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Keddy.

Mr. Gerald Keddy (South Shore, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome the Auditor General here, as most of us have. I certainly appreciate his comments in his brief. I think most of us also appreciate the complexity of the issue and I'm sure the Auditor General appreciates it as well.

• 1005

I would like to make a point. As I listen to the comments around the table, I think I might have an interpretation that's different from the interpretations of some of the other members. I'd like to draw it to their attention and say that the Auditor General of Canada should not have a vested interest. I think his or her job—in this case, it's his job—is to present to parliamentarians and ministers of the departments an unbiased view of departmental activity and give some suggestions or perhaps areas where we should be more accountable and responsible to the people who put us in this Parliament.

Therefore, I welcome many of the comments that have already been said. Specifically, in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16, I think the Auditor General has hit upon the crux of much of what we're trying to do here in this committee and I think in the department as well. The audit was performed in the context of the department's objectives, which was to provide certainty and clarity to ownership and use of land and resources through negotiated settlements, thereby encouraging socio-economic activity. We cannot look at that without looking at moneys already spent, the total cost of the agreements, and some type of formula to judge economic activity after the agreements have taken place.

I realize, Mr. Chair, that I'm kind of in a preamble here, and there's not a specific question, but I want to continue along with the preamble, if I may.

In response to Mr. Finlay's comments, I don't think this is a matter of trying to defend or refute something that the Auditor General said. I don't see anything here that's an aspersion against the department. I see it as a kind of straightforward comment on how we can do this better. I think everyone at this table understands that we have a desperate need to do things better.

It moves on:

We found that certainty achieved under settlement agreements can mean different things to different parties.

Certainly we see that all the time.

The risk is that the parties may have agreed on the negotiated outcomes, but have different expectations of the benefits and obligations set out in the signed agreements.

It's again something we deal with all the time. I haven't heard specifically any way to deal with that.

I want to comment on the Auditor General's comments that a signed agreement is a signed agreement. People negotiate in good faith. Both sides represent a group. When they sign the agreement, there should then be some kind of an end to the process, because they obviously agreed on the process or they wouldn't have signed it. I think everyone does negotiate in their best interests.

I would like to make a comment, and I'd like a comment from the Auditor General on this. What we've seen so far is some dramatic settlements, treaty negotiations in northern Canada.

I have a specific point that I want to raise. I take exception to the comment made by Ms. Hardy that this is not arable land. Land still has value wherever it happens to be. It may be less productive. The productivity of an area may be its ability to support land mammals or sea mammals or, in coastal waters, to support migrating fish stocks, but there is some productivity.

The point made by the Auditor General is very true, that we haven't looked at potential mineral resources on much of the land that was discussed; we haven't looked at potential petrochemical or hydrocarbon resources. So when we're doing these protracted and ongoing negotiations, that should be part and parcel of the negotiation process. I think that point has been raised. Perhaps that point should be looked at.

The whole point of entering into this process is to improve the economic outlook and the future of first nations, and therefore the economic future of all of Canada. So it's important to look at other areas that perhaps we've overlooked in treaty negotiations and that may affect the amount of dollars presented. There's an accountability factor for everyone in negotiations and a responsibility at the end of the day to improve the situation for everybody who has entered into these agreements. I realize that's not always easy, but I certainly welcome the Auditor General's comments. I realize that with some of them, it's difficult to pinpoint certain areas. I think one that you pinpointed that maybe we've been a bit lax on is that we haven't looked at all of the possibilities of the value of some of the land areas.

• 1010

Maybe this isn't a fair question, but have you seen this tendency? We've settled huge land claims with the Gwich'in and the Inuvialuit, and we have ongoing claims with other first nations. Most of them have been in northern Canada, where there's a smaller population but more land. There isn't a good understanding by the majority of Canadians as to where that land is, how far away it is, or how vast the resources are. Maybe we've done that because it has been easier. There are other ongoing claims that have not been settled that are perhaps of more importance as perhaps more people are involved. I don't know if it's a fair question to you, but certainly the number of first nations involved in specific claims is very, very low. I think the comment was made earlier that this is so given the total number of first nations people in Canada.

I know that was rambling.

[Translation]

The Chairman: That was a rather good preamble.

Mr. Desautels.

[English]

Mr. Denis Desautels: I'll just try to rephrase the question to make sure I have the proper understanding.

[Translation]

The Chairman:

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]—Mr. Desautels because he's an excellent Member.

[English]

Mr. Denis Desautels: The question at the end, as I understood it, was whether there's evidence that we focused on settling claims in the north initially at this stage because it seems to be somewhat easier to do there than in the rest of Canada, where the issues might be more complicated.

I don't know. I'll ask Mr. Wilson if he has any evidence of that. I think they're working actively on many fronts. They're not only working on settling claims in the north; I think there's a whole list of other claims that they're actively working on all across the country.

Mr. Grant Wilson: Well, in fact that's true, Mr. Chairman. I think there's a reason why the claims were settled first in the north. As you can appreciate, the provincial governments, territorial governments, and federal government must work together to settle any claim with any first nation. For the longest time, the British Columbia government was not willing to participate. This is why there were no settlements completed in B.C. until just recent times.

With respect to other areas, of course, such as in James Bay and northern Quebec, this was an imperative. There was an interest from both parties, so they entered quickly into negotiations with the provincial Government of Quebec.

So where you have the agreement of the parties and the governments, then you can potentially get action more quickly. But this is why B.C. hasn't happened so quickly.

Mr. Gerald Keddy: I appreciate that answer. I understand that.

The other comment that was made earlier was the concept of ownership of land as fee simple, which most of us are familiar with. That process or concept is not in place in most reserves within Canada. First nations do not have ownership of that land as fee simple. Do you see that as a major hindrance in any further development of economic activity?

• 1015

Mr. Grant Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With respect to first nations, the concept of fee simple is indeed a new concept. Outside of the north, certainly the treaty Indians in southern Canada do not have fee simple ownership. This is not fee simple for individuals when we talk about fee simple for the north; this is fee simple for the first nations communities. So there is a different concept. Whether or not that will create increased economic activity by itself, I'm not certain. However, I do expect that because there are so many other things that will presumably support the development of economic activity attached to treaties and the comprehensive claims agreements, it's probably more of a factor than full ownership, but it's hard to tell.

[Translation]

The Chairman: I'm sorry, but that's all. You've already had 11 minutes. But you're an excellent Member.

Mr. Iftody.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody (Provencher, Lib.): Does that mean I get an eighteen-minute preamble to my question?

[Translation]

The Chairman: No. You have two minutes.

[English]

Mr. David Iftody: Thank you. If I could, I just wanted to pick up on the comments that Mr. Wilson made, but I'd like to direct my first question to Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Wilson, I think you made a very important observation about the reasons that were present for the speedy conclusion of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, that primarily being the injunction that was filed by Chief Diamond. Obviously Mr. Bourassa wanted to come to the table to build his hydro dams at the time, so there was agreement among the three parties to move very quickly. I think you've really touched on the central issue.

Mr. Desautels, I'm sorry I missed the beginning of your presentation, but I have reviewed your notes. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of your opening comments, sir, you talk about the importance of the relationship between first nations people and the state as the cornerstone in terms of executing quick, proper, legally sound, binding agreements between the affected parties. Following those comments, you go on to talk about the growth in aboriginal people in Canada. I believe, sir, that you are perhaps properly alluding to the growth in the number of aboriginal people in this country. Of course, by extension, that would also include the fiduciary obligations of the state—in this case, the Government of Canada—to deal with those. As Auditor General, of course, I believe you have a responsibility to flag those growing potential expenditures for the Canadian government and the people of Canada.

As an example, I want to refer particularly to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, although my colleagues have also raised the Nisga'a agreement. On that particular agreement, the JBNQA, I believe none of us—opposition members, government members, provincial representatives, or the aboriginal people—want to drag these litigations out for twenty years at a time. If the relationships are positive and we're making some progress on them, though, we're certainly going to have quick agreements and we're going to have good agreements.

For example, sir, I refer to the section in the Nisga'a agreement that has an eight- to twelve-year phase-out period for the payment of taxation. In this evolutionary transfer and implementation plan in that agreement, aboriginal people will start paying taxes. This, of course, will relieve the burden on the treasury and the Canadian taxpayer. I'd like you to comment on whether that's a good thing, a bad thing or a neutral thing.

Principally, if some of these negotiations collapse, such as those on the Nisga'a agreement, Mr. Desautels, based on the necessity of having good-faith relations between the state and the aboriginal people, would it be an unhealthful thing, a hurtful thing, or would it damage relations? In your view, as you've set out in your comments, would these damaged relations in effect drag things out further and complicate things, therefore becoming much more costly because we'll again be into years and years of litigation?

• 1020

In summary, then, I'd like you to comment on that question of relationships and the quick settlement of deals. Then, turn it around on its head. What will it mean to the Canadian people, Canadian taxpayers, in the long run if we don't have the settlement of those deals?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, I think the member touched on a number of very fundamental issues and important principles. Let me start by saying that in our opening statements we have referred a little bit to previous work that we've carried out. In fact, I've appended an appendix of a series of reports that we've prepared since I became Auditor General in 1991. Just to give you an idea of the flavour of the types of issues we've been touching upon, I thought I'd mention that at this hearing because this is the first time I've been in front of this committee since 1992. I've had certain catching up to do, so I hope you don't mind my having brought this to your attention.

Moving on to the question of relationships, of course they are something we all wish dearly to improve. There will always be room for improvement. Personally, as Auditor General, it's always been one of my priorities since the time I took on my job. I've tried to see if there was anything I could do through my work to improve that whole situation. This is why we've devoted more and more effort to those issues over time.

When you talk about relationships between first nations and the crown, I think there are many elements to that. You've touched upon the question of dependence or less dependence eventually on the crown. I can't speak for first nations, of course, but I think it would be a fair guess that most first nations would prefer to be as autonomous as possible in terms of their economic base. I think the recent agreement that you were referring to has that as a major objective. I personally think it's a tremendous objective if we can achieve it. I believe the ingredients for achieving that objective seem to be there in that last one.

In terms of commenting on the repercussions of approving or not approving that particular agreement, I don't want to go too far. It's not really my role, but I believe it's something that people need to fully understand. If they fully understand the ins and outs of the agreement, they'll be in a better position to judge its merits. I'd like to leave it at that, but I think settling all of those claims in as expeditious a fashion as possible is an objective that is in the best interests of everyone.

Mr. David Iftody: Without commenting on that specific agreement, then, isn't it just common sense that if we have an accelerated process in terms of settling some of these claims, it would send a positive signal to a number of the other claimants we have out there at the moment that their claims would be resolved more quickly?

You point out that we had thirteen agreements between 1972 to 1997. From that, I'm reading that we need to make more progress more quickly. If we continue to fail at this, it's obviously going to come back into your backyard. You, or some successive auditor general, will be back at a committee of this nature five or eight or ten years from now, saying that things have fallen apart, that the relationship is not working.

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Can this committee conclude that you believe—because I think we all do—that if we settle more of these agreements and come up with some positive solutions, as we did in the James Bay example, it'll be a good thing for Canada? Or will it be a bad thing for the country if we fail at a number of these current, contemporary agreements?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, as we can see, there is a significant cost in negotiating agreements. They take time, they involve a lot of people, and they consume a lot of effort. But there's also a significant cost of not settling. To me, then, the logic is quite evident. I think there is more to be gained by improving our overall performance in that area. It would be good for the Government of Canada, it would be good for first nations, and I think it would be good for all other Canadians. There's not much doubt in my mind that there is scope for improvement. If we could achieve that, I think everybody would be on the winning side.

Mr. David Iftody: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Iftody.

[Translation]

Mr. Konrad. I'm sorry and I thank you for your patience.

[English]

Mr. Derrek Konrad: Yes, thank you very much.

I refer to paragraph 14.21 in your report, in which you talk about the government's policy of having the first nations “cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty all their Aboriginal claims, rights, titles and interests in and to non-settlement land” and other things like that. You also say, “The government sees this as a means of removing uncertainty that is deemed to be a barrier to economic development.”

Going to paragraph 17, bullet 2, in your report to us this morning,

the Department needs to act on its commitment to explore methods other than the surrender or extinguishment of Aboriginal rights or title that would provide clarity, stability and certainty through negotiated claims settlements...

In light of your call for certainty, a time limit, and all those sorts of things, I wonder how you defend that statement in your report to us here this morning. No one knows for sure what aboriginal rights and title actually are or what they will mean in the courts.

Just as a follow-up to that, I wonder how you would view a referendum being used to provide that absolute certainty about the conditions of a land settlement that would be a template for other land settlements, such as the Nisga'a agreement. What would that effect be if it passed and gave a template for future settlements?

Mr. Denis Desautels: First of all, on the first question about certainty and this ceding of claims, rights, titles and so on, if you read the whole of our report, you'll note that we get further into that question, particularly as you get into paragraphs 14, 38, 39 and 40. For instance, in paragraph 14.39, a special report was asked of a senior jurist. It emphasized that:

explicit recognition of Aboriginal rights needs to be included in any treaty, and concludes that certainty can be achieved without the surrender of rights provisions contained in recent settlement agreements.

So I think the whole question of what gives you more certainty is very current, and it's an actively debated issue. You have a point of view here that says you can in fact achieve just as much certainty without necessarily extinguishing the rights that you thought you should extinguish before.

Again, these are very difficult issues and we're not being absolutely precise in our recommendations to the department. We're encouraging them to explore that avenue further, and to in fact pursue some of the direction that's being set in here. As I said, you have to read our comments in that context.

• 1030

Maybe, Grant, do you want to add to that particular part before we move to the second question?

Mr. Grant Wilson: Yes, Mr. Desautels.

One other aspect to this is when we're talking certainty, we're talking two concepts of certainty. First is the legal concept; that is, within that agreement there is surrender or whatever, and that is a legal concept, both parties signing. One would suggest, then, that having surrendered, that's the end of it. From a legal perspective certainty is established.

What we're saying is certainty goes beyond the legal perspective in the sense that these agreements are not only intended to clarify the rights, but they're also intended to provide the basis for the self-sufficiency, economic development, and well-being of aboriginal people. If the interpretation of those agreements is different, which we're saying they are, then notwithstanding the fact there is certainty established in law, there is still uncertainty in the fact that implementation may not give you what you expected. The fact that litigation continues to come out after agreements are signed would create greater uncertainty.

So for everything to work, what we're suggesting—and it is an extremely difficult thing for the department and others to establish—is that all of the components have to be there. The one aspect is what sentences do you put in the agreement? The other aspect is how does all this work to reduce uncertainty?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, the second question had to do with the value, I believe, of a referendum to settle this. I really would like not to answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I think it's really outside the scope of my mandate as Auditor General. When I'm finished my term as Auditor General and I run for politics, I'll get involved in that, but not now.

Mr. Derrek Konrad: I have just one quick comment.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead, Mr. Konrad.

[English]

Mr. Derrek Konrad: There's a quote here by a senior jurist that says there is certainty when both sides are happy with the results. I would submit that happiness should be subject to quantification, not some person's personal view of happiness. And to Mr. Finlay, who described half a million square kilometres as minuscule, it's about 10 times the size of New Brunswick.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Konrad.

Before giving the floor to Mr. Finlay, I have a question for you, Mr. Desautels.

Did you audit the relationship between the federal government and the provinces or territories in this whole matter of negotiations and settlement of land claims, and to what extent? Do you have any comments on this matter?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, we said a few words about this a few moments ago. We did actually recognize that, if negotiations are ultimately to result in an agreement, you first need the agreement and participation of the different levels of government. For example, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement required the agreement of the Government of Quebec and the agreements in Canada's Far North required the participation of the territorial governments.

In a sense, we took the role of the provinces into account. We recognize that the province and the territorial governments are important players, but we did not evaluate the quality of their participation here. We simply concentrated on the role played by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Part of this role is to try to find the support or consent of the other levels of government for the agreements that the department itself wants to conclude. So we didn't make any recommendations or specific comments on the role played by the provincial governments. We simply described what happened in British Columbia with the new structure that was set up. We only described the structure without commenting on its efficiency.

• 1035

The Chairman: Could you tell us how the Delgamuukw decision has already influenced or might influence the policy and the agreement on land claims?

[English]

Mr. Grant Wilson: We probably don't have a definitive outcome yet of Delgamuukw. It's going to take some time before everybody, including the Department of Indian Affairs, understands the implications. But what that Supreme Court decision does do is require the department or federal government to consider testimony that is oral evidence, which was not considered in the past, which could in fact have certain implications on what lands and what areas should be subject to claims negotiation. That's one aspect.

Another aspect relates to title of land by aboriginals, and this is the one area that I think will take some time for lawyers to break down and determine what that means in terms of who owns what land. Is the federal government negotiating with first nations on land that is crown land that is, in essence, owned by aboriginals? This is really the key of that decision, and we don't know at this point what the interpretation will ultimately mean.

The Chairman: Mr. Finlay.

Mr. John Finlay: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make three comments and then ask a couple of questions, because I really liked Mr. Konrad's question. I think he got a part of something that we have to remember and that I was striving to make clear earlier.

I want to say that I agree with Mr. Keddy; we'd like to see an end to the process. There should be an end; there must be an end. We want closure on everything. But I suggest that if there is to be an end, then all of us sitting around this table become, of course, redundant, because the law would be written, we wouldn't have to change it, and we wouldn't have to approve it, and so on.

A voice: That would be good.

Mr. John Finlay: You'll take that.

The Auditor General said that is what we are all striving for: certainty. I think aboriginal people have a different view of “certainty”, because I think their whole spirituality, their whole experience, is on a timeframe—and I tried to suggest it before.

We have had European influence on this continent for 500 years. The aboriginals have been here 10,000 years. They have an oral history, and Mr. Wilson has just mentioned that this has to be taken into account.

We have 25 generations of experience in this country, and they have 500 generations, and their value of land is not at all the same as ours. They don't look upon it as necessarily a good thing that we can find diamonds in the north, or iron ore. They have lived in concert with nature on this continent for 500 generations, or struggled to, and they understand that. What they want the land for, many of them, is simply to live on, to relate to their Creator, and that's very different.

We know the way they live, their behaviour. When it's goose season, we go and hunt goose, and then when we go and visit them, we eat goose, and that's the way it goes. If the window needs repairing, it will have to be done another time, because we have to do the things important in the diurnal role of things.

We say it takes so long. Well, I've mentioned that. Yes, it does, but that's what we need a little more of. I suggest that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples said what we need is recognition, respect, responsibility and sharing. We're not going to get recognition and respect if we say this must be settled by the year 2000, that this is the millennium and we have to have this settled, or that settled, or something settled. It may take us another 100 years, and even then, it make take some redoing.

We talk about James Bay. It was done quickly. Why? Well, Quebec Hydro wanted it, and Mr. Bourassa wanted it, and so on. Has it been satisfactorily implemented? When we talk to the aboriginal people, it seems it hasn't. We should put that down as a learning experience, and it might be better if we took a little time and weren't quite so concerned about having this all done on some sort of artificial timeframe because we want to mine diamonds, or whatever we want to do.

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So I have two questions, sir. Given the scope and complexity of land claim settlements and some of these background things that I think we have to keep in mind, could there also be disadvantages to negotiating comprehensive land claims artificially rapidly, particularly in the long term? How would you suggest the claims process be expedited, as the report recommends?

The other question is, given that the British Columbia Treaty Commission process was established only fairly recently, and given the length of time it has taken to reach negotiated settlements outside B.C., do you consider the fact that no settlements have been reached as yet under the current process unusual, that is, under the B.C. process, which establishes a framework?

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Finlay. Mr. Desautels.

[English]

Mr. Denis Desautels: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, before answering the two specific questions, I'd like to make a couple of quick comments, because I think those are very interesting observations.

Again, I don't want to put myself as an expert in this field. I'm far from being an expert in aboriginal cultures, and so on, and I respect people who have a lot more knowledge than I do in that area.

But I might want to say that from my limited knowledge, there is among our aboriginal peoples in Canada quite a variety of cultures and outlooks as well. I think it would be dangerous for us to conclude that they all have the same, I don't know, dependence on the land. Others are quite successful business people, according to my knowledge of some of the people; the Crees in northern Quebec run very modern businesses too. So there's a variety of cultures and values among our aboriginal nations.

It complicates the situation a bit. It doesn't make the situation any easier, but that's fine. That's not a problem as such.

I would also add, on one more point, it seems to me that first nations themselves—and I'm referring here to the Assembly of First Nations, I think—would like to see the process made more efficient and somewhat more timely. So it's not as though it's only in the interests of the federal government or the crown to do that; I think our first nations have expressed that wish as well.

So that leads me to your first question: are there disadvantages in rushing through this thing, through these settlements? Of course there could be, and so nothing we've said should be interpreted as saying you should neglect any aspect of these negotiations. I think they still have to be carried out quite properly.

That being said, despite the difficulties and the complexities involved, we think there may be different management approaches possible to make the process somewhat more timely and efficient. By setting a specific objective, targets by phases, and so on, and what has to be done to get there, I think there could be ways of reaching good settlements but a little faster. You could argue that it's easier said than done, but I think we have to try to do so.

Your second question dealt with the B.C. situation, whether or not it would be considered problematic or unusual that there would be no settlements so far. I'll ask Mr. Wilson to cover that.

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Mr. Grant Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Desautels.

Mr. Chairman, the BCTC themselves, when asked what kinds of issues and problems they saw in the next little while that they would have to address, brought up one major point: the capacity and resources of the governments of B.C. and Canada to enter into multiple, concurrent negotiations. In other words, are there sufficient numbers of negotiators and negotiation tables to address the desires of first nations to negotiate? As you know, there are quite a number of first nations that are presently in negotiation with B.C. through the BCTC process. So that's one aspect.

Is four years too long before settlement is done? I don't think we can comment on it other than to say that at this point in time 36 of 51 negotiations are progressing toward stage-four agreement of a six-stage process. That's still a long way to go, but there is progress. So I think we couldn't say that anyone is dragging their feet, or that this is an inappropriately long period of time. We really don't have a comment on it other than to say it is four years and there are 36 at a particular stage.

The Chairman: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Finlay has raised interesting facts. I don't want to get into a discussion with him because today's meeting is with the Auditor General. I will simply say that his reading of the importance of land for the natives is the right one but that things are changing a lot.

If the James Bay Cree were to find a silver or a diamond mine on their reserve, I'm sure they would mine them and make a lot of profit.

Second, I know that the James Bay Agreement has made many people jealous. The James Bay Cree on the Ontario side really envy those in Quebec. I think there are some “nuances” that should be taken into account.

Now, I'd like to get back to the matter of costs because it's an important point in your report. In your sampling, did you manage to find any examples of real costs, excluding indemnities?

You're right. When the bill is tabled in the House, it is often said that there's an agreement on so many square kilometres and costs of 50 or $60 million over 20 years. We have all that data, but we don't have the data on the real costs.

I'm with you when you talk about looking at the cost-efficiency ratio. It will have to be said someday that the Inuvialuit Agreement cost so many millions of dollars in financial indemnity, but that the land surrendered cost such and such and that the related costs in the different departments were for such or such an amount.

I'd like to understand you fully. Would you want the department of Indian Affairs to be responsible for collecting that kind of data and that it would be the one to say: “Here's what the Inuvialuit Agreement cost”? It might take four or five years to do it, but then we'd be able to compare the different present and future agreements to one another and adopt patterns that could be used for all the other negotiations.

You're in a position to review all government operations, those of the Justice department, amongst others, who must pour enormous amounts of money into the negotiations for Indian Affairs. I'm always afraid to be told by the Department of Indian Affairs: “That's not our jurisdiction, that's the jurisdiction of Justice.” However, it does hire lawyers for its defence in negotiations over litigious cases.

Would you want the department to be in charge of collecting all that data for the establishment of this cost-efficiency ratio?

Mr. Denis Desautels: For a while now, we have been suggesting that to inform Parliament more fully about the different programs of a sectorial nature, where you have several departments involved, it would be a good thing for the department that has the main responsibility for the matter to divulge the total costs of the sectoral program in its budget documents.

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That principle, which actually had been accepted by the Public Accounts Committee when we raised the matter, could be used and applied to this situation. It is clear that if there are several departments involved, Indian Affairs would have to go and find the costs to the other departments and divulge them in its own budget documents.

That principle is a healthy one, it was accepted by the parliamentarians when we raised it and some departments are actually starting to implement it. In my opinion, this should be done in this specific case.

Mr. Claude Bachand: In your sampling, did you find any examples of a situation where it was possible to determine the total costs of an agreement?

[English]

Mr. Grant Wilson: No, indeed, this is one of the concerns we've raised, that while the department provides the expenditures in estimates, we don't know what amount of that amount of expenditure relates to implementation and we don't know how much relates to negotiation. Nor is that information provided to us or to anybody in terms of the agreements. If you look at these agreements, there are 12 presently signed. These are significant agreements. They have significant implications for many people, with significant costs, as Mr. Desautels indicated. In addition to the $2 billion that have been decided that are transfer moneys, capital moneys, there are other obligations, which are the implementation obligations with attending costs. We don't know what those attending costs are because they aren't allocated to a particular agreement. So indeed you don't know the accountability with respect to that agreement.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Ms. Hardy.

[English]

Ms. Louise Hardy: Considering the claims were meant to bring the standard of living up to encourage social and economic development, in your opinion will the claims that are agreed to right now bring up the standard of living to a Canadian standard in housing, education and health care? Will they do what they're meant to do?

Mr. Grant Wilson: That one is a very difficult question to answer. As you know, the department each year spends approximately $4 billion for aboriginals on reserve, plus another billion for health. These moneys are for all first nations, and not withstanding those amounts, the social conditions are the way we've reported them in our opening statement. Will the comprehensive claims process and moneys that are provided, plus the implementation moneys and activities, address those? That is the hope, and we'll only know about this if they keep track of the implementation and do assessments of the effectiveness of those programs, of each individual agreement. Only that way will we know if in fact those comprehensive claims have had a positive impact on first nations.

Ms. Louise Hardy: I have a concern around the problems with implementation, because in the Yukon I've had chiefs come to me and say they thought they had agreed to this and that's not happening, that they're not ready to administer health or they're not ready to administer justice but it's being pushed on them. And you can see that it would collapse if people weren't trained and ready to take on those responsibilities. Their concern was “Now we've really entrenched a federal role when the objective was to free ourselves from that when it comes to land use, to education and to health, to have the freedom to really live independently and develop.”

Mr. Denis Desautels: I think you're touching on more than what we just read in this chapter, because I think the chapter talked more about the federal government being able to implement properly its share of the deal. But the point you're raising is the capacity of certain first nations to absorb all of a sudden many new responsibilities, and I think that's something we're all concerned about.

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I think even the minister recently referred to this phenomenon, which some people have called a “dump and run” phenomenon. She's quite concerned about that not happening. So there is a need to do this properly and to help those first nations develop capacity in areas that are in some ways technical—it could be, for instance, health programs—to make sure they're capable within a certain timeframe of taking all of that on.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Ms. Longfield, please.

[English]

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Exhibit 14.8 lists a number of statements, which are entitled Perspectives of Selected First Nations Involved in Comprehensive Land Claims. Some of them are pretty damning of the process. In your opinion—and I know you said you didn't want to comment further—are these typical, or are they exceptional comments? Will the department be provided with where they're coming from in order to try to address them, or are they just thrown out here and left in limbo?

Mr. Denis Desautels: I'll try to answer that. I think the comments here are fairly typical. In fact, we've been quite careful even to use some that are really off the wall. So we feel that in selecting those, they are quite representative of what people are really thinking. I believe some of these would come from departmental files, so the department would not be very surprised by any of these.

Grant, would you like to expand further?

Mr. Grant Wilson: Yes. Thank you.

These particular perspectives were from the claims we looked at in depth. As you know, we looked at four. These perspectives are from two of those first nations. We are careful to say we don't take a position on it, because it's—

Mrs. Judi Longfield: But they're included here, and there is a position.

Mr. Grant Wilson: Of course there is. The reason these were included was to indicate that notwithstanding that both parties signed an agreement, there were still disagreements as to what that means. This is a critical element in the sense of showing that although you would expect both parties would be pretty happy with this deal, in fact there are some concerns that continue to be raised. That's why it was important to set this out, just as it was for non-parties to an agreement.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: I appreciate that. That certainly sends out a red flag, from my perspective.

How remote were the comments from the actual negotiators? Were these people at the table, or are we seeing something that was fifth-, sixth-, or seventh-hand? Do we know that? I think sometimes the more removed you are from the original negotiations, the more dissatisfaction there is.

Mr. Grant Wilson: Yes.

These comments are from the community leadership, who may or may not have been involved in the negotiations. I'm not certain as to their involvement, knowing it has taken quite some time for agreements.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: From my perspective it would be very important to know if they were parties to the negotiations or just people within the community who felt their concerns weren't being properly put on the table. That would determine how serious these are and whose responsibility it is to rectify the situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Longfield.

Mr. Keddy.

[English]

Mr. Gerald Keddy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The subject of some type of economic parity has been touched on by many people around the table, but I still don't think we're zeroing in on the issue. You yourself have recognized that when you have comprehensive land claims that have been settled on by two groups of negotiators, quite often the first nations may not be prepared to take on some of the responsibilities they acquire from those comprehensive land claims.

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In your opinion—and I realize it may not be an opinion you want to offer, but certainly I think the Government of Canada has finally agreed to take a look at working this process in a slightly different way than we have in the past. We have a piece of legislation now before government, Bill C-49, which will give a group of specific first nations control of their reserve lands, with the ability for other first nations to join in.

The Indian Act itself is very prejudicial against any type of economic activity on reserve, because the Indian Act completely controls all that economic activity to the point that first nations have to apply to the federal government to cut standing timber on reserve, build houses, put in roadways, and develop gravel pits. It also protects certain aboriginal rights, but it's very prejudicial to economic activity.

Bill C-49 is not a panacea for all of the problems out there, but maybe because of the length of time involved in comprehensive land claims, we should be working in other areas at the same time to actually develop some economic activity on reserves, to give first nations responsibility for their own resources. Although it still wouldn't be fee simple ownership, it would certainly give them more responsibilities. Is that perhaps an area that would show promise, or are you familiar with that? Can we develop the ability for first nations to enter into various economic activities, whatever they may be, and then 10 or 15 years down the road when we finally settle this comprehensive land claim they will have already advanced beyond that first step?

Mr. Denis Desautels: I believe it's quite possible, and in fact it's happening. It's possible to pursue other economic development objectives in parallel with the comprehensive land claims negotiation process. I don't think everything needs to hang on that for a particular first nation. I hope that's not the case, but I know within the department they have a multitude of programs aimed at helping first nations to develop a better economic base on their reserves. There's a lot of that going on. I don't know whether or not it should apply to all first nations, including those with whom there is an active comprehensive claim being negotiated.

Mr. Gerald Keddy: Part of the problem with the multitude of programs is the fact they're generated from the top down, and not from the first nations up. We're implementing them. We're saying this is a great program and you can enter into it, but they still haven't got out from underneath the umbrella or aegis of the Indian Act to actually be responsible for their own destiny.

Mr. Denis Desautels: When you talk about the Indian Act that's a very fundamental question, but even if you don't touch that I think there's a possibility of doing some good work, including the involvement of first nations.

We did some work three or four years ago, I believe, looking at economic development programs, and we offered some comments then. There have been some success stories there involving ideas that came from first nations as opposed to maybe being fed from the department. Some good experience has been accumulated and could be emulated by other first nations.

[Translation]

The Chairman: So that's it for our second round. We will have a third round. Mr. Bryden.

[English]

Mr. John Bryden (Wentworth—Burlington, Lib.): You speak of evaluation in the report. Are you clear in your own minds, as you approach the audit, what the original targets or intentions of the land claims settlement program were? When you speak of evaluation you have to know what the intention was. Are you clear in your minds that you know what the government's intention was in beginning this process?

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Mr. Denis Desautels: You're absolutely right. I think the ideal situation, when you set up a program, is to set up at the outset the evaluation framework you'll eventually judge it against. In this case I don't think things were done quite that way, but nevertheless it's still worth while. In the attempt to do an evaluation there were some broad objectives set out. There's no doubt about that. I think these can be made a little more precise by an evaluator, or at least an attempt can be made at that, and an evaluation can be performed against that.

So even though it was not done that way initially, it's still worth while to try to do an evaluation against what you might call your presumed objectives going in.

Mr. John Bryden: Wouldn't there be an advantage of doing this kind of audit if the government were to re-express what it sought by this process? What is it trying to achieve? Is it trying to achieve economic and social independence? Is it trying to avoid political independence?

One of my problems in approaching this whole issue is that I'm really not quite certain what's going on and what the original intentions were. I have difficulty when I come to your own audit and the use of the word “evaluation”. Is this something that maybe the government should re-examine to decide again what its targets are?

Mr. Grant Wilson: The intent of the agreements, as I indicated, were really twofold: to settle grievances that had been long-standing with respect to rights that first nations believe they have, and to increase economic development.

Every agreement has a very thick implementation plan, and within those plans there are objectives set out. Now that we have signed this very thick agreement that talks about responsibilities, obligations, moneys and so on, the next step is how do we implement it. So with that detailed plan you set out the objectives. Are there sub-objectives? Yes, there are a lot of sub-objectives, because economic development is a very broad concept. The question was asked earlier as to whether this is for Canadians at large or aboriginals. It is for both.

So somewhere in there it's worth making sure those implementation agreements are clear, although we never looked at them to determine whether they were clear or not. It is important to ensure they are, so your evaluations will be clear against what you are assessing.

The Chairman: Mr. Scott.

Mr. Mike Scott: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll resist the urge to make speeches like some of my colleagues have done and just stick to the issue.

Mr. Desautels, are you aware of any legislative basis by which the department is expropriating funds for negotiating these land claims?

Mr. Denis Desautels: I mentioned at the outset that the cost of carrying out this activity will amount to something like $250 million, if you look at the 1998-99 estimates. That includes the negotiations, the implementation and certain payments under agreements that have been signed already. There's a vote covering that, I think, within the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

I hope I understood your question.

Mr. Mike Scott: Yes, I'm trying to understand the mechanism by which the department is accountable to Parliament for the expenditures, and the authority by which the funds are appropriated for these negotiations and for the cost of settling the land claims. On what basis is the department accountable for these funds and how are they appropriating the money?

Mr. Denis Desautels: I think it's all based on the appropriation acts, which quite clearly set out a legal basis for the department having the money to do this and then having an obligation to report back on what was done with the money.

• 1110

Mr. Mike Scott: As I understand it—and I haven't found any—there's no legislation that guides the department in the processing or the expenditure of these funds. It's all done through appropriations.

Mr. Denis Desautels: I think there's some general legislation, such as the appropriation acts and the Financial Administration Act, that provides the general rules for spending public funds. For some government programs, as you know, there is a specific piece of legislation that says under what circumstance you pay what money. If you take EI as an example, that's all very well laid out. For other programs the legislative basis can be the appropriation act itself, as opposed to another specific act.

Mr. Mike Scott: I understand that, and I was just building on the excellent questions Mr. Bryden was asking.

If I were going to paraphrase your entire report, I would say you're describing a department or a government activity that is operating on an ad hoc basis. They really have no game plan, they have no time line, and they have no system to measure their success or goals achieved against money expended. I think that is woven throughout your report. You don't say it in so many words, but that's really what the reader takes from that.

I'm wondering if there is any possibility for the government to consider a legislative basis to go forward from, because that would then force the government to look at self-discipline in terms of setting itself some goals, as my friend here has pointed out; setting its objectives clearly in writing so that everybody, including all Canadians and aboriginal people, would know what those goals and objectives are; and establishing some time lines. It's recognized you may not always achieve your time line, but if you set one, you have a better opportunity to actually achieve it. Is it reasonable to anticipate that this could be done by legislation so that Parliament and Canadian taxpayers would indeed have an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of the department and its treaty processes?

Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure if specific legislation would help in this area. I think we're looking at a very difficult activity. When I characterize our report, I would say we're not necessarily that harsh on the department because we recognize the inherent difficulty of carrying out that particular activity. Nevertheless, we do see opportunities for improving things, I think, substantially.

But whether or not putting all this in an act would improve the process, I'm not convinced. I think it's something worth looking at, but the improvements we're suggesting in here, such as time lines, could be achieved through different management techniques. So I think what you would need is some commitment from the department, either to this committee or to another committee, that they're quite ready to do that and they have a game plan for doing that. That's easier to do than changing legislation, I imagine. I don't want to say your idea doesn't have any merit. Quite the opposite, I think it's an approach. I'd like the department to consider our recommendation seriously and to see what they can do without changes in legislation.

Mr. Mike Scott: Again, what I see in your report is a plea to the department to gain some discipline. There's not enough discipline there right now. You point out you're not being overly harsh. I don't see you as being overly critical, but just laying the facts on the table is criticism enough. I think most people would see that.

I think what's badly needed is discipline. I'm trying to see, given that the department doesn't have a stellar record in terms of fiscal discipline, how we as a committee might make recommendations to the government in order for that to be achieved. I'm wondering if legislation is an option. Are there any other options that might be considered whereby we could make a recommendation to the government for a particular course of action that would require the department to have more discipline than they have evidenced so far?

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Mr. Denis Desautels: Mr. Chairman, as you know, I work very closely with the public accounts committee, and the practice of that committee is that when they feel the need, they request from different departments some kind of action plan to implement improvements in whatever practice is being discussed. I think in this case that could be quite appropriate.

On the whole I think the department doesn't disagree with what we say. I think there needs to be a little more buy-in and a little more enthusiasm on the departmental side to move on some of these points. I think a request of the department to actually respond with an action plan, which this committee or another committee, such as the public accounts committee, could monitor over the next year or two or three, would be a step in the right direction.

Mr. Mike Scott: Thank you very much. I won't take up any more of your time. I really appreciate your being here today, and I think you might have a future in politics when you get finished.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Scott. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Desautels, I would like to thank you for the very good work you do on behalf of all Canadianmen and women, and for appearing here today to talk about your report on Aboriginal land claims in Canada. Your recommendations will help us improve the implementation of land agreements.

I would also like to thank your team. You really are backed up by an excellent audit team. I would like to thank them all, as well as all your support staff.

Please remember that you are always welcome to appear before us. All you need to do is contact us, even on 24 hours notice, and we will be very happy to see you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Denis Desautels: Thank you.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.