HAFF Committee Meeting

Notices of Meeting include information about the subject matter to be examined by the committee and date, time and place of the meeting, as well as a list of any witnesses scheduled to appear. The Evidence is the edited and revised transcript of what is said before a committee. The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of the business conducted by the committee at a sitting.

For an advanced search, use Publication Search tool.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.

Previous day publication Next day publication

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

1930

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. Mel Cappe (Clerk of the Privy Council, Privy Council Office)

The Chair

Mr. Mel Cappe

1935

1940

The Chair

Mr. Toews

The Chair

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

The Chair

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Toews

1945

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

1950

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Toews

Mr. Mel Cappe

1955

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

2000

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

2005

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

2010

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

2015

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Tirabassi

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Tirabassi

The Chair

Mr. Blaikie

2020

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Blaikie

2025

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Blaikie

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.)

2030

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

2035

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

2040

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

2045

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

2050

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

2055

The Chair

Mr. Toews

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

2100

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Mel Cappe

2105

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

2110

The Chair

Mr. Guimond

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

2115

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Hill

The Chair

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

2120

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Benoit

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

2125

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

2130

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Mel Cappe

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

NUMBER 051

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

½ (1930)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, we will begin. These meetings will be fully televised on CPAC, but the rule is that other cameras should be out of the room, so I'd appreciate it if the cameras would leave. Thank you very much.

By the way, I forgot to mention this afternoon was actually the 50th meeting of the committee. This is the 51st. Had I remembered, I would have brought the champagne for the golden anniversary, but I forgot. I regret that. I hope this won't count against me the next time we elect a chair.

This is our 51st meeting, pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31, 2002, by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements in the House.

Our witness today, who I'll introduce formally in a few moments, is Mel Cappe, Clerk of the Privy Council.

Before I do that, I'll try to bring you up to date again on where we are. After this one, we will have two more meetings. There are two more witnesses on the preliminary list: Foreign Affairs tomorrow morning and Joseph Maingot tomorrow afternoon.

The answer to Brian Pallister's question has now been circulated. I believe, with one exception, that's the last item on which we've requested further information be circulated from witnesses. You should all have that. If you don't, please indicate so to the clerk.

As I mentioned at the last meeting, Jay Hill and I had a discussion clarifying the list of documents the committee has requested from the Department of National Defence. We clarified various points, and it's my assumption the list will be responded to very soon.

Also, as I said this afternoon, because we've had a considerable number of meetings, each of us has a fairly large pile of documents. I know you use those documents quite often in your questioning, so I would ask you once again--and I won't take it away from your time--to carefully identify any document you're using, and the page number, when you're quoting from it. This will help the translators a great deal.

It's my pleasure to welcome to our committee Mel Cappe, Clerk of the Privy Council. Mr. Cappe, I don't know how you want to proceed. Are you going to make a statement?

Mr. Mel Cappe (Clerk of the Privy Council, Privy Council Office): If I may.

The Chair: By all means. We each have a copy of your statement.

Please proceed, Mr. Cappe.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

I know the Committee is engaged in important deliberations, and I hope to be able to assist. I would like to start this evening with brief opening remarks, after which I will be pleased to try to answer any questions members may have.

½ (1935)

[English]

I think it's important at the outset of my appearance here to tell the committee a little bit about my job, so members might better understand my role in the day-to-day workings of the government.

The Privy Council Office reports directly to the Prime Minister and is headed by the Clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet. It's both the cabinet secretariat's and the Prime Minister's source of public service advice across a broad spectrum of policy questions and operational issues facing the government.

As Clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, I am the senior public servant supporting the Prime Minister. I have three primary responsibilities. As the Prime Minister's deputy minister, I provide advice and support to the Prime Minister on a full range of responsibilities, as head of government. As the secretary to the cabinet, I provide support and advice to the ministry as a whole and oversee the provision of policy and secretariat support to the cabinet and cabinet committees.

[Translation]

As the Head of the Public Service, I am responsible for the quality of expert, professional and non-partisan advice and service provided by the Public Service to the Prime Minister and the Ministry. I believe Committee members will be most interested in the first two areas of responsibility I described, as Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet.

[English]

As I said, Mr. Chairman, I provide advice and support to the Prime Minister.

Before I go any further, it's important that committee members understand the position I find myself in. I said at the beginning of my remarks that I want to be as forthcoming as possible with the committee. I want to answer members' questions in as fulsome a manner as possible; however, I cannot discuss advice I provided to the Prime Minister or any other minister.

Equally, I cannot talk about discussions that took place in cabinet, and I want to say that up front, Mr. Chairman, so that if at times I seem less than completely forthcoming, I hope members will appreciate and understand and realize that I may at times be constrained in my responses by certain duties and obligations.

Mr. Chairman, providing advice and support to the Prime Minister includes briefings on many issues. These briefings are often face to face, but they may also take place via telephone. Information is also provided to the Prime Minister in written form.

[Translation]

These briefings take place on a regular basis. In my absence, the Associate Secretary to the Cabinet provides briefings. So it is fair to say that there was and is a regular and appropriate process in place to ensure that the Prime Minister is briefed on Canada's military involvement in Afghanistan.

[English]

Mr. Chairman, I'd now like to address the issue of when I was informed about the JTF-2 taking prisoners. I found out on January 29, at the same time as the Prime Minister. One might ask if PCO should have been informed earlier. With the benefit of hindsight, I would say perhaps, but perhaps with the following explanation.

The fact that JTF-2 may or may not have transferred prisoners to the United States was not considered an extraordinary event or a diversion from government policy. The government had already satisfied itself that detainees were being treated humanely and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. It was over the course of the week that certain statements by members of the U.S. administration gave us cause to seek clarification of U.S. intentions, which they have since provided to our satisfaction.

[Translation]

The normal, daily activity of the Canadian Forces, within their mission, agreed tasks and Rules of Engagement would not be considered extraordinary information that should be passed on to the PCO. Rather, it would be the Canadian Forces doing the job assigned to them by the Government. Operational details are handled by the Chief of Defence staff and the Minister of National Defence.

[English]

Extraordinary operational events would include, for instance, casualties to our troops--God forbid--accidents, or actions involving civilian casualties, or other events of that degree of significance. The United States continues to acknowledge its willingness to treat all detainees humanely and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions.

I believe the Minister of National Defence put it somewhat more succinctly during his testimony before this committee when he said:

...I did not call the Prime Minister because there was no diversion from government policy. They were sent there to capture al-Qaeda terrorists. They were sent there...to bring these people to justice. So there was nothing out of the ordinary....

Should the Prime Minister have known earlier? Again, I believe the Minster of National Defence has already told this committee that in light of the debate over the issue of detainees that took place in this country, he regretted not having told the Prime Minister earlier and indeed subsequently apologized to the Prime Minister.

This leads me to my next and possibly most important point, Mr. Chairman, which is, do I believe the briefing system in place for the Prime Minister is appropriate? My answer is yes. PCO is being provided the information that we need to keep the Prime Minister briefed. If I believed otherwise, I would advise the Prime Minister and change it. Have we made changes? No. We did review the system currently in place and determined that it is a sound system. Did I do anything? Yes. I had a conversation with the Deputy Minister of National Defence; in fact, I had a few conversations with the deputy minister, during which we discussed the need for careful consideration of what information is relayed from DND.

Mr. Chairman, I realize my allotted time for these remarks is almost over, and I would beg the indulgence of the committee for just a few more minutes, because I believe strongly that there is a very important point to be made regarding JTF-2.

As you've heard before, and I'm sorry to repeat, it is the policy of the Government of Canada not to discuss the operational details of JTF-2, and there's a good reason for this policy. The success of special forces operations, indeed the lives of the people who belong to these groups, depends on surprise and speed. Surprise includes not only the time and place of future operations, but denying the enemy knowledge of our capabilities, our whereabouts, our equipment, tactics, and training. The greater the public discussion, media coverage, and disclosure of this information, which is of great interest to terrorist organizations, the greater the risk to our special forces personnel, and the greater the possibility that a counterterrorism operation, wherein the lives of Canadian men and women are at stake, will be unsuccessful.

½ (1940)

[Translation]

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I would simply reiterate that I believe that the process that is in place to ensure the timely provision of important information to the Prime Minister is appropriate.

[English]

This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I would now be pleased to respond to any questions.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cappe.

[English]

Mr. Toews, on a point of order.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Yes, I understand from the comments of the witness that he indicated his allotted time for these remarks was over. I wasn't aware that the--

The Chair: Okay, thank you. That was a point of order.

Mr. Cappe, there was no allotted time.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I presumed I would have about ten minutes, and I thought I was coming up to about eight. But if I could go for longer, Mr. Chair--

Mr. Vic Toews: I would want to hear the witness for as long as he felt he had something significant to add.

The Chair: And, Mr. Cappe, so would I.

I assure you, Vic, there was no allotted time. I heard the remark.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, then, I regret not having taken more.

The Chair: Mr. Cappe, if I can explain to you, as I have done to the other witnesses--and I think you've visited our committee before--for these public hearings, the five parties have agreed that the first round of questioning will be ten minutes, and it will alternate in the usual way. Those ten minutes might be one person or they might be shared, and I will indicate to you if they're going to be shared.

When we've done one round, we'll go to five-minute questions and answers, also alternating, but that time can't be shared. So you'll have one question for up to five minutes, and so on.

I'll try to keep you advised of that.

I should advise you that the ten minutes includes your answers, and should I sense that a member thinks you're going on too long--and heaven forbid...I mean we have a member here who wanted you to go on--I will intervene in an appropriate moment on the side of the member.

We have Vic Toews, Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Joe Jordan, and Bill Blaikie.

Mr. Vic Toews: Mr. Chair, I want to thank the witness for his summary in respect of his responsibilities, and I think we should assure this witness that if at any time our questioning crosses the line in terms of what he is entitled to disclose, I would rather be specifically told by the witness than to assume there is any other reason for failure to answer a question. So if we have that understanding....

I noted, Mr. Chairman, that the witness indicated he found out on January 29 with respect to the JTF-2 taking prisoners at the same time as the Prime Minister did, and perhaps the witness could tell us how he knows it was at the same time and how he knows whether or not the Prime Minister could have found out earlier.

½ (1945)

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would ordinarily not talk about what happens in a cabinet meeting, except it already is public knowledge that the Minister of National Defence told the Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet in the cabinet meeting of January 29. I was present then, and the Prime Minister indicated that was when he found out as well.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you're relying on the Prime Minister's statement that this was when he found out.

Mr. Mel Cappe: That and the fact that I certainly was not aware myself and had not so informed.

Mr. Vic Toews: So it was at the cabinet meeting, then, of January 29, Mr. Chair, that the witness found out that the JTF-2 had taken prisoners. I'm wondering, Mr. Chair, whether the witness had a conversation with the minister about the prisoner issue at any time prior to the actual cabinet meeting on January 29.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chair, just to be precise, I'm virtually certain that I did not. My only hesitation is that I was with the minister on the previous Friday at a cabinet retreat, but I'm fairly confident--in fact, now that I think of it, I'm quite certain--we did not discuss the prisoner issue.

Mr. Vic Toews: And to the best of your knowledge, did anyone in the PCO have conversations with anyone in the Department of National Defence on the prisoner issue prior to January 29, or on January 29 prior to cabinet?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I've asked that question of all the staff reporting to me, and I'm comfortable in assuring you that no one in the Privy Council Office was aware that Canadian Forces had taken prisoners.

Mr. Vic Toews: Have you made inquiries in that respect?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I have.

Mr. Vic Toews: Have you satisfied yourself?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I have.

Mr. Vic Toews: The deputy clerk testified that either you or Mr. Laverdure brief the Prime Minister on foreign affairs and defence issues up to five or six times a week. Is that correct?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Indeed, I meet with the Prime Minister about four or five times a week, when the House is sitting. I have not travelled with the Prime Minister in the last three years, and have stayed here.

Mr. Laverdure travels with the Prime Minister, and also meets with him here to advise him on foreign policy matters.

Mr. Vic Toews: So briefings occur virtually on a daily basis.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I want to be as helpful as possible. Briefings occur on a continuing and continual basis--

Mr. Vic Toews: On a wide variety of issues.

Mr. Mel Cappe: There is a very wide variety of issues, and the bulk of those briefings are in paper form and memoranda to the Prime Minister. There may also be frequent telephone calls. In fact, during that week in September, we were just about continuously on the phone with the Prime Minister. As well, there are oral briefings in person.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you would have a great deal of access to the Prime Minister, to ensure the Prime Minister received all necessary information.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I think it's a very good way to put it. Indeed, I try to ensure that the Prime Minister has all necessary information.

Mr. Vic Toews: But I understand that these briefings, on the virtue of the policy in place now, do not encompass the JTF-2. We've heard the policy explained here.

Would it be fair to say then that the Prime Minister is out of the information loop--and I don't mean that in a derogatory sense--except insofar as the Minister of National Defence chooses to bring him into the loop? That's the policy. Is that not correct?

½ (1950)

Mr. Mel Cappe: That is correct. In fact, on several occasions we in the Privy Council Office, as we discussed deployment of JTF-2 prior to the decision to deploy in October and the actual deployment in December, often discussed how we would not discuss, even among ourselves, anything more than was necessary.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right. So that policy is currently in effect, in respect of keeping the Prime Minister out of that particular information loop. I don't want to leave a false impression here. This is in accordance with a policy that has been described. Is that correct?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Indeed, the line of authority, the chain of command, and the flow of information flow up within the military to the CDS, ultimately, and to the minister.

Mr. Vic Toews: Yes, but there would be nothing to prevent the Prime Minister from making an inquiry of the Minister of Defence, in respect of the JTF-2, because, ultimately, he is the head of government; he is the one who appoints the minister, through cabinet. So the Prime Minister could in fact say, “I need that information and I'm making that inquiry”.

Mr. Mel Cappe: The Prime Minister could, yes.

Mr. Vic Toews: That doesn't violate the policy.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I don't believe it would violate the policy, but it would raise the question about the issue of maintaining security of information.

Mr. Vic Toews: It would be unusual, in practice.

Mr. Mel Cappe: It would be very unusual.

Mr. Vic Toews: The deputy clerk has testified that you launched this inquiry to determine whether anyone in the PCO knew of the taking of the prisoners prior to January 29, and perhaps up to the date of cabinet on January 29. What was the nature of that inquiry?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I met with all of my direct reports. We discussed whether any of us were aware of it. The two most likely people who might have been were Mr. Laverdure and Mr. Fadden. I asked them to check with their staff, in case they had been informed, and no one was aware of that.

Mr. Vic Toews: After the cabinet meeting on January 29, did you specifically consult with Mr. Laverdure or General Ross on whether they had previous knowledge of the incident?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, Mr. Chair, I did.

Mr. Vic Toews: And what did they say?

Mr. Mel Cappe: They did not.

Mr. Vic Toews: They had no knowledge of the capture of the prisoners prior to the cabinet meeting?

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's absolutely so, sir. In fact, Mr. Laverdure found out at the same time I did.

Mr. Vic Toews: I have a final question.

If it was well within the purpose of sending the troops to Afghanistan, if there was an expectation--indeed, it has been expressed that there had even been a hope--that prisoners would be taken, why would the Prime Minister say this was simply hypothetical when the question was put to him? Do you have any insight into that answer? It strikes me as very strange, given that this was the purpose for sending our troops, that the response would be, “It's hypothetical”.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, there are two important points here. First of all, I think the capture of al-Qaeda prisoners was a measure of success of the operation of JTF-2, for which I would hope the troops would get the response of support they deserve.

The second point is that I believe when the Prime Minister was asked that question, the question was actually posed in terms of whether the PPCLI, once deployed, would be capturing prisoners and turning them over to the Americans, and at that point the PPCLI had not yet left Canada. In that sense, it was a very hypothetical question.

Mr. Vic Toews: But a policy must have been in place at that time as to what to do with prisoners, if that was the purpose of sending our troops over there.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Very much so. And, indeed, when the decision to deploy was made--and I go back to October--you have to recall, Mr. Chairman, that the UN section 51 charter had been invoked, the NATO article 5 charter had been invoked, and indeed, we were deploying troops for the purpose of engaging in combat. It was anticipated that Canadian law would be respected and international law would be respected.

½ (1955)

The Chair: Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Joe Jordan, Bill Blaikie, Marlene Catterall, and Jay Hill.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, and thank you, Mr. Cappe, for being before us.

Let me ask you about the week of January 21 and what the priorities were of the government at that time, what the focus of the government was in relation to the military's activities.

Mr. Mel Cappe: It's hard to cast my mind back that far, but indeed, there was a preoccupation. If you'll recall, this was the week before the House was resuming, if I'm not mistaken. There was a cabinet retreat planned for the Friday of that week, which is all public knowledge, and the preoccupation at this point was on the issue of the deployment of Canadian troops. There was a great deal of planning under way for the deployment of the third PPCLI.

I'm not sure if that's getting at the answer, Mr. Chair, that Mr. Regan's looking for.

Mr. Geoff Regan: I think that answers...the Princess Pats were getting ready to go. You're saying that was a lot of the focus that week.

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's right.

Mr. Geoff Regan: We've heard that elsewhere, so that's the same answer we've heard previously.

In relation to the JTF-2 and its mission, what were the key priorities and what was the focus on that?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, actually, there wasn't a focus on that, because they had been deployed back in December. The expectation was that a month later, they're in situ, doing their job, that the Chief of the Defence Staff is in command of those troops, and that as far as we are concerned, they're doing their job.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Well, let me ask it a different way. Through you, Mr. Chairman, what were the key concerns? What would you have been anxious about, if anything, in relation to the JTF-2?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, in relation to the JTF-2, as such, I don't think there was a major preoccupation. There was a current debate at the time that built over the course of that week about what the United States administration was going to do with detainees, but that was not directly related to JTF-2 as such at that time.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Was there any doubt about the authority for JTF-2 to take prisoners and turn them over to the Americans?

Mr. Mel Cappe: None whatsoever.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Was there any substantive policy problem with the transfer of prisoners or the taking of detainees?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Certainly not, because as I indicated in my response to Mr. Toews' question, the UN charter had been invoked, the NATO charter had been invoked, Canadian law had been followed, and there had been a cabinet decision to deploy the troops.

So there was really no doubt they were sent there with a mission, which was to search out and capture Taliban and Al-Qaeda members and treat them appropriately, under Canadian law and international law.

Mr. Geoff Regan: If the JTF-2 had captured 50 or 100 prisoners, or Osama Bin Laden, do you think the reaction would have been different?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I'd make a distinction between the 50 and Mr. Bin Laden. I would not see the capture of 50 prisoners as an extraordinary event. We sent them there for that purpose; they were working in conjunction with other nations' forces; we expected them to be effective, and they were. If they had detained Osama Bin Laden, I would have seen that as an extraordinary event.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Clearly.

Richard Fadden was here this afternoon, and I asked him about the Prime Minister's management style.

I wonder what you can tell us about the minister's management style, in terms of what ministers are left to do...what departments are left to do on their own, and to what degree the Prime Minister puts his hand in and gets involved in those departments.

¾ (2000)

Mr. Mel Cappe: I actually saw Mr. Fadden tread delicately over this, because it's always awkward for an official to comment on a minister, let alone the Prime Minister. But I would say the Prime Minister is very proud--and I've heard him say it publicly--that he lets his ministers do their jobs. If that's a management style, I think he lives up to it significantly. He does leave it to ministers to do their jobs within their portfolio responsibilities.

When there are issues that cut across responsibilities, the Prime Minister likes to make sure there is appropriate consultation among other ministers, but otherwise he lets his ministers do their jobs.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Just to be absolutely clear on this, was Claude Laverdure in the chain of information, in relation to the military operation in Afghanistan?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Laverdure was not in the direct chain of information relating to JTF-2 at all, and he was not in the chain of information on the operational activities of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you.

The Chair: Next is Pierre Brien, then Joe Jordan, Bill Blaikie, and Marlene Catterall.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): Good evening, Mr. Cappe. I imagine you are very much aware of the agenda established for Cabinet. I would like to know when the Minister of Defence might have been informed that the subject of the prisoners was going to be on the agenda of the 29th.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I cannot discuss a specific question on a Cabinet meeting in particular, but, with your permission, I will discuss that type of question in general.

We usually have a system of planning, over a few weeks at a time, for questions that will be on the Cabinet agenda. At times, we also add ad hoc items which are important for the government. In the case of the Armed Forces, for example, or the Canadian Forces, when our forces are in danger and are deployed as they are at the present, we have more or less regular briefings from the minister responsible to Cabinet. It is not really weekly, but it is quite regular.

Mr. Pierre Brien: The item on the agenda on the 29th was the specific question of the detainees.

Mr. Mel Cappe: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe that Mr. Brien is the Clerk of the Privy Council, and I will not assume that is the case.

Mr. Pierre Brien: I'm going to quote the Minister of National Defence, who, in speaking about January 25 while returning to his office, said:

[English]

My executive assistant, Mr. Young, then informed me that the issue of detainees was on the cabinet agenda for the following Tuesday.

[Translation]

Do you believe him more than me?

M. Mel Cappe: It is difficult to answer that question without revealing confidential Cabinet issues, but I must say that the question was even a bit broader than that.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Cappe, one moment, please. I don't think we have French translation.

They have it now. Please carry on. Thank you.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I'm just raising the point that the issue was a larger one.

[Translation]

Of course, the question of the detainees was an important point in that broader question.

Mr. Pierre Brien: I suppose that, if it was on the agenda, it was because the government had certain concerns about the situation, particularly since there was some controversy in the United States. So I imagine the point was raised somewhat within that context. Am I on the right track?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Once again, without disclosing Cabinet secrets, I must say that the question was more about the way the detainees were being treated and the U.S. government policy on the question.

From the start of our deployment, we were convinced that the Americans had decided to comply with the Geneva conventions. It was not until the week prior to the 21st that the questions were raised in the media and were the subject of public debate here. In our opinion, it was clear that the Americans had to comply with existing international law.

¾ (2005)

Mr. Pierre Brien: That didn't concern you even after you saw this headline in the American newspapers: “Powell wants detainees to be declared POWs; Memo shows differences with White House”?

M. Mel Cappe: It doesn't surprise me that there are different views within the U.S. Cabinet, but the important point for us was whether they were complying with international law. In our view, that was the case, but we obviously tried to obtain clarification from the United States.

Mr. Pierre Brien: We learned from the Deputy Minister of Defence here in the Committee that he was not part of the chain of command. Despite that fact, on January 22, he learned through discussions about the photographs that appeared in the newspapers that JTF2 had taken prisoners.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Pierre Brien: A representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Tampa Bay learned the same thing on Friday. He was not part of the chain of command. Nor was Mr. Thiffault part of the chain of command either. So we have two civilians, three persons in all, who were not part of the chain of command and who were aware that prisoners had been taken by Canada, but you, in the Privy Council, were not aware of that, and that does not trouble you.

Mr. Mel Cappe: If the troops complied with the Rules of Engagement and the mission as such, that does not trouble us at all because, in our opinion, the Americans complied with international law and the Geneva Conventions.

Mr. Pierre Brien: On the 28th, the Prime Minister made a public statement and said that we had not taken prisoners and that when we had, we would say it. In your structure, then, there was the Deputy Minister of Defence, who was aware, but who was not part of the chain of command, the Minister of National Defence, who was aware, and someone from Foreign Affairs in Tampa Bay who was aware. No one informed you that the Prime Minister was mistaken, and that does not trouble you.

Mel Cappe: No. I believe that Mr. Eggleton, the Minister of National Defence, admitted that he regretted not informing the Prime Minister and that he had expressed his regrets.

Mr. Pierre Brien: I'm trying to visualize the situation. You are in Cabinet, and the Prime Minister learns that prisoners have been taken by Canada. I imagine that he was nevertheless somewhat surprised. That is important, strategic information. JTF2 is said to be secret. At noon, you left the room, and the Minister of National Defence went before the media and told them that we had in fact taken prisoners.

A piece of information classified as extremely confidential and secret became public a few minutes or, at most, a few hours after the Prime Minister learned about it. You did not attempt to make any more checks. Did you approve the Minister of Defence's public disclosure of that information? I find that the delay was very brief between the moment you learned about it and the moment it was made public.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I must say that it was already public because of the photograph. I don't know what the Minister thought, but I imagine he thought the photograph was already public.

For my part, I made requests to my people in my department, and I called the Deputy Minister of Defence to remind him that it was necessary to ensure the flow of information.

Mr. Pierre Brien: In reading your brief and hearing your statements, I am quite surprised to learn that, when you drew up the list of extraordinary events, you did not include the capture of prisoners in that list.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, that was the purpose of the mission.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Perhaps, but, to my knowledge, that was the only time when they took prisoners. If that was the purpose of the mission, was it achieved only once? I wonder about that because I believe the mission was broader than that.

Are there any precedents? Have there been many cases in which our groups have captured prisoners of war? Has this happened often, for you to classify it as something ordinary?

¾ (2010)

M. Mel Cappe: Frankly, I cannot tell you whether that also happened in Korea, for example; since I am the Clerk, this was the first time, as far as I know, but I must say that the

[English]

peacekeepers we have sent into other environments have also engaged in such activity where they are ensuring peace, and I don't know whether they have also taken prisoners in those circumstances.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: This is my last question for the moment. We know that the chain of command was broken somewhere because there was, among others, someone from Foreign Affairs in Tampa Bay who learned the news on Friday. We're talking about the way the prisoners were captured.

Does the fact that the chain of command was broken concern you? The Minister came and told us here that he was the only civilian aware of it. We know there were at least two others: his deputy minister and a Foreign Affairs employee. Is this a concern?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, especially because of the need to keep all matters pertaining to JTF2 secret. The safety of our personnel is of prime importance and a priority.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Cappe, Joe Jordan and Tony Tirabassi will be sharing the next ten minutes. Then we will go to Bill Blaikie, Marlene Catterall, and Jay Hill.

Joe Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Mr. Cappe.

Mr. Cappe, from a series of witnesses I'm trying to piece together the functions of these various arms of government. In the PCO you are getting at any point in time simultaneous information from any number of ministries.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have officers who are assigned the responsibility to keep in touch with all departments and agencies as appropriate.

Mr. Joe Jordan: We had an interesting quote from the Deputy Minister of National Defence. He characterized the flow of information within the defence ministry, given its scope and scale, as drinking from a firehose. So you're essentially drinking from any number of firehoses simultaneously.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I have often thought of it as Niagara Falls and we're sitting down there with our mouths open.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Just to draw on my previous life experiences, in business, when you're dealing with very complex systems like that, one of the strategies you put in place is you take a lot of time and thought to develop parameters. The farther you go up the hierarchy, the more you're dealing with exceptions outside of those parameters. Is that a fair characterization of the management processes that are in place in PCO?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, the whole principle of management by exception has to be the watchword.

I should indicate there are two or three elements.The first is that there is forward planning, where there's a lot of activity in policy development and policy planning. But in terms of the actual operations of government--as I responded, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Regan's question--the Prime Minister relies on his ministers to do their jobs. I rely on the deputy ministers to do their jobs, etc. It is by exception that we want to be informed, but we do want to be informed when there are exceptions. But it's by exception to what the mandate of the department is and the delivery of programs as appropriate.

Mr. Joe Jordan: And the rationale for that is just the sheer volume of information. There wouldn't be enough hours in a day to go through it.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, there are two rationales. One is the volume, but the other is--and I think Mr. Fadden referred to it--the need to know. It's not in a military or security sense, but it's “for what purpose”. Is there a value added that the Privy Council Office would bring? That's why I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, the idea of issues cutting across ministries.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I just want to pick up on the point that Mr. Toews made.

In your statement--and I'm quoting from the statement, page 3--you said:

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to address the issue of when I was informed about the JTF2 taking prisoners. I found out on January 29, at the same time as the Prime Minister.

Mr. Toews made the point, and I thought very well, that you're certainly in a position to say when you found out, but you're getting into the speculative realm when you talk about what and when the Prime Minister knew, other than the fact that he said he didn't know.

¾ (2015)

Mr. Mel Cappe: When the Prime Minister says that to me, I believe him.

Mr. Joe Jordan: But you're basing it on what he said to you, right?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Indeed.

Mr. Joe Jordan: You have no cognitive ability to read his mind.

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, sir.

Mr. Joe Jordan: That was a very helpful intervention by Mr. Toews, and I think it would have been equally appropriate with Vice-Admiral Maddison.

I have a final question, Mr. Cappe. You may not know it from the questions we're giving you tonight, including my own, but the reason we're here is that we have a reference from the House to deal with conflicting statements by the minister. Specifically--this is the cumulative knowledge that I have on this committee now--it's not a breach of privilege, it is in fact potentially a contempt of the House if it's found that the minister made those statements deliberately.

Do you have information that you feel is relevant to the issue of whether or not the Minister of Defence made those statements deliberately?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I do not have any such knowledge at all. I do not.

The Chair: Tony Tirabassi.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and through you, I'd like to thank our witness, Mr. Cappe, for coming out and providing us with his briefing tonight.

Now, without getting into details as to the roles of the JTF-2, which is obviously highly classified, as we've been told several times, is it fair to say the capturing of suspected terrorists, the al-Qaeda, is not the only role of the troops that are being deployed in Afghanistan?

Mr. Mel Cappe: The mission of the troops that were sent...we should be careful, because there are many missions here.

If you'll recall, the first deployment was actually naval resources on October 7 or 9--in that period. As well, there were air resources deployed to the region. It was only later that the actual deployment of JTF-2 took place, and subsequently land forces.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Mr. Chairman, through you, there certainly seems to be a bit of a preoccupation with certain lines of questioning that the capturing of these prisoners was an extraordinary event, and as such, someone, somewhere, starting with the military hierarchy, should have flagged this, passed it along to the senior officials in the civil service, and then subsequently it should have been reported immediately to the minister or the Prime Minister.

My question is simple: why did this not happen?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, Mr. Chairman, I question the premise. I don't believe it was necessary for that information to flow to the Prime Minister or to me. It's not that it was ordinary, but it was the purpose for which those Canadian troops were sent to Afghanistan. They did their job. They did a good job. They were successful. And we don't celebrate every success.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Thank you. I have no further questions.

The Chair: It's Bill Blaikie, Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill, Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP): Mr. Chairman, maybe I could just pick up on this. Whether or not the taking of prisoners by Canadian troops was in fact an ordinary or an extraordinary event seems to be a main point of contention. Perhaps it's wrong to set up the argument as ordinary against extraordinary; rather it should be, is it something the Prime Minister should have been told about or not?

You give advice to the Prime Minister and you can't tell us what advice you give. But certainly, when asked questions about what the Canadian policy would be when Canadian troops took prisoners, somebody was advising him--or he was advising himself--to say that it was a hypothetical matter. As one who is a key adviser to the Prime Minister, would it not have been useful for you to have been in a position to have advised him that it was not a hypothetical matter?

It seems to me that your being left out of the loop puts you in a position where you couldn't give the appropriate advice or information to the Prime Minister. This seems to me to be a very key thing.

That fact that you were left out of the loop has been described as anomalous, not just by members on this committee but, for instance, by a very highly respected former deputy minister, now chancellor of Carleton University, Mr. Kroeger, who I'm sure you're familiar with. When he was asked about this on Newsworld, whether there was a failure to transfer information to the civilian side, he said it looked to him as though there must have been.... He thought it highly unlikely that if a deputy minister had been aware, he would not have gone immediately to the Clerk of the Privy Council and ensured that other people of that nature were informed.

This committee heard testimony to the effect that the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Mr. Judd, knew about this on January 22. According to Mr. Kroeger, it would have been in the natural course of events for him to have informed the Privy Council. There does seem to be a kind of mysterious black hole here as to why the Privy Council is giving advice to the Prime Minister on a matter that was politically contentious--and therefore not an ordinary matter, but the kind of thing on which you would expect the Prime Minister would want to receive advice as to how to handle it, whether it had already happened, whether it was still a hypothetical matter or not.

Can you not see what people are getting at here? It does seem kind of strange that you didn't know anything about this and that you actually had to learn from the Prime Minister, when you're the one who's supposed to be briefing the Prime Minister, not him briefing you on what has happened. Isn't that right?

¾ (2020)

Mr. Mel Cappe: It was the minister, but yes.

Mr. Chairman, I do understand exactly what is being driven at here. If I can help the committee, I'd like to make the distinction between the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the JTF-2. It's very important to keep the two distinct because they're there for different purposes and they have different chains of command and information flow.

In the case of the JTF-2, the information flow goes up through the DCDS to the CDS and to the minister and, if necessary, to the Prime Minister. With this “if necessary”, I come back to where Mr. Blaikie was going, Mr. Chairman. I think it's important to recognize that when I talked earlier about a need to know, it was the understanding that a decision could be taken or a direction could be changed that determined whether there was a need to know.

Was it necessary? There would be nothing that would have changed. No one would have done anything differently because the JTF-2 had done its job.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: The Prime Minister might have answered differently.

Mr. Mel Cappe: The question about this hypothetical question Mr. Blaikie referred to was about the troops who had not yet departed from Canada, the PPCLI.

Mr. Blaikie's premise, though, is that if it's politically contentious, the Prime Minister should know. And it's an interesting one. In a sense, that's why I responded in my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, that I think it perhaps would have been helpful had the Prime Minister been aware. The minister, indeed, regretted not having informed him. But in the end, Mr. Chairman, if everything that was politically contentious forced us to brief the Prime Minister, then ministers would not be doing their job.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I would just like to pick up on this distinction between the PPCLI and the JTF-2. I admit I have not always been our representative on this committee--and maybe this has been dealt with before--but it seems to me you introduced a new element here, making a distinction, when you said when the Prime Minister answered the question and used the word “hypothetical” he was talking about the PPCLI, not the JTF-2.

Of course, it was hypothetical for the PPCLI, if they hadn't left the country yet. So it just seemed to be a rather tenuous defence of the Prime Minister.

Clearly he was being asked about Canadian troops in Afghanistan. They're not taking prisoners in Edmonton before they leave, right? So they're going to take prisoners in Afghanistan. When they do, what is the policy of the Canadian government?

For you, or anyone else for that matter, to hang a defence of the Prime Minister on the fact that he was asked about the PPCLI so he didn't say anything about JTF-2 and what they might do seems to say the Prime Minister seized an opportunity to not tell the whole truth because of the inadequacy of the question.

¾ (2025)

Mr. Mel Cappe: That is not what I was driving at, obviously. I was rather making the point that if you actually look back at what the actual question was in that context, it was about when and where we were going to deploy. In fact, the Prime Minister responded to that question by saying it was a hypothetical question because the troops hadn't even left yet. He was clearly talking about the PPCLI.

But I take Mr. Blaikie's point that indeed there were troops on the ground in Afghanistan, and they, as we now know, had taken detainees. That's why I think the minister said, as he did to this committee, he wished he had told the Prime Minister, and has apologized to him for that.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: But you haven't addressed yet why the deputy minister, having been aware of it on January 22, wouldn't have done what Mr. Kroeger, someone who knows a lot about how government works.... Why would they have made this decision to kind of treat you guys like mushrooms?

You're the people who were supposed to be briefing the Prime Minister, and you couldn't brief him. You couldn't tell him not to say this was hypothetical because it wasn't hypothetical any more--because you didn't even know.

Mr. Mel Cappe: As I indicated, I have since had a conversation with the deputy minister to remind him of the importance of that. But indeed, I think it's a judgment call. If you cast your mind back to that period, that week, and the nature of the conversations that were going on in the public, I don't think it was a mistake for him not to tell me.

Should he have? Would it have been preferable had he done it? It would have been preferable if he had, looking back on it, because I wouldn't be here having this conversation. But frankly, was anything changed as a result of him not telling me, in terms of the troops on the ground? No.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: But that's the point. What changed was that the Prime Minister gave an answer that wasn't entirely true. What changed was that the Prime Minister--unless he was up to something, and we'll give him the benefit of the doubt here--said something was hypothetical when he shouldn't have; when he should have treated it as if it had already happened. That's what changed; the behaviour of the Prime Minister changed.

That's why I don't understand why you say, in your statement to us, nothing needs to change, everything's cool. You could at least say, “The deputy minister and I have had a chat about this, and we've put in a new rule that when something like this comes up he'll tell me right away”. That seems to be, at the very least, what would be required.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I'd like to be as accommodating as I can to Mr. Blaikie, so let me say that the deputy minister and I have had a conversation about this. But I'm not sure what it means when Mr. Blaikie says, “when something like this happens”, because this is very much in the grey zone. It requires judgment. It is very credible, at the particular moment when the troops have done what they were sent there to do, to say this is not an extraordinary event.

The Chair: Bill, you have time for an exchange if you wish.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Just the fact that people do what they're sent there to do, and then they do it, doesn't seem to me to be an excuse for not reporting back to the Prime Minister. We sent people to invade a country. They invaded it. They did what they were supposed to do. So there's no need to report back.

This was a significant event. I can understand why people want to play it down, because they want to play down the fact that the Prime Minister didn't know about it. But to me, given the debate that was swirling around government policy with respect to the Americans, with respect to not just how prisoners would be treated but what their status would be, because that was the key point, it seems unbelievable to me, and I'm sure to a great many others, that this was something that people didn't feel the Prime Minister should know about. Without that information he was left in a position to accidentally mislead the House by saying it was hypothetical.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I said in my remarks and I say it again, we were satisfied that the Americans were respecting international law. We turned the prisoners over to them on that understanding.

The Chair: Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill, Mauril Bélanger.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.): Mr. Chair, I wonder if it might help to clarify the situation, to put it clearly on the record. My colleague, Mr. Regan, has just handed me the transcript from that interview, in which the Prime Minister said “At this moment it's a hypothetical question”. Mr. Blaikie's questions were around what that meant.

The Prime Minister continued “We don't have any”--i.e. detainees--“and our troops are not there.” It is very clear that in saying it's a hypothetical question, he was referring to the Princess Pats, who were at that time not even yet in Afghanistan. That's what was hypothetical. Of course, it was hypothetical. They weren't there. They couldn't have taken any prisoners.

Mr. Chair, I wonder if I could pursue a couple of points that I raised this afternoon, and some related ones, directly with Mr. Cappe. As my colleague said earlier, we are very far from our purpose here, which is to determine, did the minister intentionally mislead the House? We're straying into all other kinds of areas. But since that's where we are, we might as well all go there together.

This item of--and I won't ask you to be more specific--a policy matter that involved the treatment of the detainees to some extent or another was obviously on the cabinet agenda for Tuesday, January 29. The Minister of National Defence told us he became aware of that on January 25.

I presume you know everything that's on the cabinet agenda. Your job is to prepare the Prime Minister for that meeting. You must have known on January 25, if the Minister of Defence did, that this was going to be on the cabinet agenda the following week. So I find it surprising that you would not have found out everything about what could possibly relate to that particular item so you could thoroughly brief the Prime Minister.

Yet you say you weren't aware even, until January 29, I think you said, that Canadian Forces had in fact taken detainees. So you're telling us you weren't aware of the photo. You weren't aware of any of the questions in the public mind about the treatment of detainees. You made no inquiries with the Deputy Minister of National Defence to find out more.

¾ (2030)

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, in fact the issue--and perhaps this is the answer I should have given to Mr. Regan earlier--of the day was not whether there were detainees, but rather, how were the Americans treating detainees? We had satisfied ourselves going into this exercise that the United States would respect the Geneva Conventions.

There was some ambiguity that arose through the course of the week of January 21. Indeed there were many conversations and a lot of work going on to ensure that we could clarify that the Americans were indeed respecting the Geneva Conventions.

That was a preoccupation, and we did work on it at the time. In fact, the update, the mise à jour, that was taking place of Canadian activities in Afghanistan would have included all elements of the military, the foreign policy initiatives, aid initiatives, and a whole host of other elements as well, all of which were in the mix at the time.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: But the issue must have included not only the treatment of detainees but whether, given the treatment, as much as we knew what that treatment was, Canadian forces should be turning over detainees. That must have been part of the issue.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I remind honourable members, Mr. Chairman, that the JTF-2 was sent there with a purpose, and they were meeting that purpose. Whether they actually had captured individuals who they were going to detain or not was not particularly a preoccupation because we were confident that the U.S. was respecting the Geneva Conventions. I was not in the information loop or in the chain of information flow regarding JTF-2, nor should I have been.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I understand that, but my--

Mr. Mel Cappe: Which is why I wouldn't have asked the question, frankly.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: You wouldn't have.

But my point--and I'm going to leave it for now--was not that you would be in the loop, but that you would make a point of finding out given the issue on the cabinet agenda.

¾ (2035)

Mr. Mel Cappe: But my staff did get themselves informed about what was going on.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I'd like to go back to some of the questioning we had with Mr. Fadden this afternoon. He is responsible for security and intelligence within the Privy Council Office. He was clear about that. One of his roles is to support the Prime Minister by providing information, advice, and recommendations on security and intelligence policy matters. That word “policy” is probably key to the question and the answer.

But one of the things we found out from the Chief of the Defence Staff is that there was a very significant breach of security with the taking of photographs of our JTF-2 forces and the detainees. No doubt intelligence on that would have been shared. Would it have been shared with Mr. Fadden?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Intelligence on what?

Ms. Marlene Catterall: The fact that there had been a serious breach of security affecting JTF-2--not their activities but the breach of security.

Mr. Mel Cappe: As I indicated, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fadden was not aware prior to January 29 that this photo was a photo of Canadian troops.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: But he indicated that he regularly receives current information on security and intelligence. In fact, that photo arose from a serious breach of security, and I'm questioning whether or not that intelligence reached him. If it didn't reach him, I'm surprised and a little concerned.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Remember, Mr. Chairman, that it's important to put it in context. This is an issue of military security. The protection of the forces and the protection of the security of the information about their deployment was a military matter. It was not a matter of civilian security. The fact that it had been breached, even once we realized after January 29 that there was a breach, it was for the military to look after setting it right and ensuring it didn't happen again.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I'll make just one comment before going to my last question. Mr. Fadden also said that one of his responsibilities is to ensure the effective coordination among the members of the security and intelligence community. So to cross those barriers between what's military intelligence, etc.

My final question, however, is this, and this is the only one that's on our task here today: aside from anything you've said to us today, do you have any information whatsoever as to what the Minister of National Defence knew about the taking of detainees by Canadian troops, when he knew it, and how he found it out?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, all I know about that I have learned from the testimony before this committee.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Thank you.

The Chair: Jay Hill.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, you said that you first learned of the fact that JTF-2 had been involved in capturing prisoners at the cabinet meeting on January 29. Did you receive a copy or did anyone in the PCO that you know of receive a copy of any diplomatic cables or communiqués between embassies or anything like that that alluded to the taking of prisoners at any time between the 22nd and the 29th?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Not in that period, nor since.

Mr. Jay Hill: So there's been absolutely nothing to your knowledge in writing, through the diplomatic channels, that talked about the taking of prisoners?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Not that I'm aware of at all.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

You found out, as you say, on January 29, but you were at the cabinet retreat on Friday, January 25?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, I was.

Mr. Jay Hill: To your knowledge, did the Minister of National Defence discuss with anyone at the cabinet retreat the issue of JTF-2 capturing terrorists?

¾ (2040)

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, it would be a breach of my responsibilities in keeping cabinet confidences if I were to answer that question directly. But I've already alluded to the fact that I did not have that conversation. And I'm not aware of any others.

Mr. Jay Hill: I meant in hindsight. Obviously you wouldn't have known at the time, because you didn't learn until January 29.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Right.

Mr. Jay Hill: So I meant later on you might--

Mr. Mel Cappe: To my knowledge, the answer is no.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

Do deputy ministers attend those cabinet retreats?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Only when they're invited. And in this circumstance.... I have to be careful here, sir, in not going into who actually was at the cabinet meeting, because that in itself is a confidence. But it's fair to say that typically, deputy ministers do not attend, except on items with which they are dealing. At the retreats, typically, deputy ministers do not attend.

Mr. Jay Hill: Would you be allowed to enlighten the committee as to whether Deputy Minister Judd attended that Friday retreat?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I'd really rather not go there, because you could start to go down the list of everybody you're interested in. But because I know the committee is particularly focused on this, I would say no.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. I appreciate that. And I'm sure the committee appreciates that, because we do know from his testimony that he was aware of the fact that JTF-2 took prisoners because of the photograph he was advised about by Vice-Admiral Maddison on January 22.

So he did not attend.

When the defence minister was out of the country on his trip to Mexico, and then into the United States for a period of time, I think between January 20 and January 25, who was the acting Minister of National Defence in his absence?

Mr. Mel Cappe: This is a complicated answer, Mr. Chairman, and I won't go on for too long, but there are actually two answers.

The first is that at the time of the naming of the cabinet and the appointment of ministers, there is a naming of an acting minister who has authority in law to act as the minister. And the Interpretation Act indicates that the deputy minister can also act as the minister. So it depends on the purpose.

Mr. Jay Hill: In this particular case, during his absence, who was the acting minister? Was it his alternate, as laid out, or was it the deputy minister?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I'm sure the answer is yes, it was the deputy minister at the time, in the sense that the deputy had the authority required to act as the minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: Wouldn't it be normal procedure for the acting minister in a case like that, or if the deputy minister was the acting minister, to immediately call you and be briefed by you about any issues that the minister would normally know about?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, Mr. Chairman, as I've said earlier, I'm not in the chain of information flow on JTF-2. So I would not expect to be told about that, as long as it was within respect for Canadian law, the rules of engagement, and mission objectives. So I would not expect to be told.

Mr. Jay Hill: Just so I'm perfectly clear, are you saying that while the minister was out of the country, the deputy minister was filling the role as acting minister, or was there an alternate cabinet minister filling that role?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Now that I think about it further, Mr. Chairman, I would say there are three answers to this question. For certain purposes the Interpretation Act allows the deputy minister to act as minister; for certain purposes the acting minister named by order is the acting minister; and for certain purposes, the minister, when he is away, is the minister.

My guess is--and I shouldn't guess in front of this committee, but if you'll allow me, Mr. Chairman--Vice-Admiral Maddison was briefing the minister in Mexico as the minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: But he indicated to this committee during his testimony that he did not brief the minister on January 22, 23, or 24. Three days went by without a briefing. Did he brief anyone else? Did he brief whoever was the acting minister named by the order in council?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Not that I'm aware of. He didn't brief anyone in the Privy Council Office that I'm aware of.

Mr. Jay Hill: So this acting minister, who may have had some of the responsibilities during Minister Eggleton's absence, may have been briefed or may not have been briefed. Do you know?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I don't know. But again, I come back to the purpose. Ministers or acting ministers are briefed for a purpose. If there were something they needed to know in order to take a decision or take some action, I would assume the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff would so inform whoever had the authority to take those decisions.

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Fadden, your deputy, testified this afternoon--and we've already touched on this in a few questions--that he launched an inquiry following.... I was asking him specifically if he recalled how it happened. You came back from the cabinet meeting and informed him. He said he thought it was within two hours, but he couldn't remember whether it was by telephone or whether you came to his office or summoned him to your office or exactly how it happened. But he said that within two hours, you'd told him that prisoners had been taken by JTF-2. Then he said that you had asked him to launch an inquiry into finding out whether anybody in the PCO knew about that. Is that relatively correct?

¾ (2045)

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's more or less correct. I watched Mr. Fadden's testimony, Mr. Chairman, and my recollection is that indeed it was by telephone. I have a strong recollection that it was about a half hour after the cabinet meeting.

Mr. Jay Hill: About half an hour after?

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's my recollection. I could be out by a bit, but that's more or less the case, yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: I have about three quick questions, and I have two minutes to ask them.

The first question that comes to mind is that if, as per this secret cabinet document that's in the news, it was normal reporting procedure for the JTF-2 activity reports to be only conducted orally and go from the field in Afghanistan to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff and then to the minister.... It would probably end there or perhaps go on to the Prime Minister. If that was the normal procedure, why would you conduct an inquiry? Why would you even think that anybody in PCO could have known?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, Mr. Chairman, I wondered if anyone had been made aware. Had the Privy Council Office been aware of it, I would have wanted to tell the Prime Minister--

Mr. Jay Hill: Quite naturally.

Mr. Mel Cappe: --for the reasons that honourable members have raised as a rationale. We did not need to know. We had not been informed. As I said, I wanted to ensure that I reminded people of the need to inform us of extraordinary events.

Mr. Jay Hill: How was this inquiry conducted? Did you send out an e-mail to everybody?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No. My recollection is that we had actually discussed it in a couple of meetings over a period of time, and I had met with my people.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did you do this yourself? I apologize for interrupting, but I'm running out of time here. Did the Prime Minister ask you to find out if anybody in the PCO knew?

Mr. Mel Cappe: The Prime Minister did not ask me.

Mr. Jay Hill: The defence minister?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I took it upon myself to find out because I wanted to know.

Mr. Jay Hill: Just returning to my last question, to this issue of the acting minister in the minister's absence, who is that minister?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I was hoping Mr. Hill wouldn't ask. I generally am not aware. I have a guess, but I'd rather not. There's a press release with that information, and I can get it for the committee.

The Chair: Okay. Again, I see no objection. We'd be grateful if you would.

Mr. Cappe, the next round is the last of the ten-minute rounds. It's going to be shared by Mauril Bélanger and Joe Jordan.

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger (Ottawa--Vanier, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[English]

Mr. Cappe, out of curiosity more than anything else, I just wanted to explore a couple of areas. Whatever concerns the JTF-2, there's a very straight line of information progression from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff to the minister and to the Prime Minister, where warranted. Nowhere else; that's it. Am I correct?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, that's certainly my understanding, yes.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: In the regular matters, there may be a variety of ways that the information will arrive at the Prime Minister's office through various departments--Defence, Foreign Affairs, CSIS perhaps, and so forth. Am I correct in believing that as well?

Mr. Mel Cappe: In the normal course of events, the Privy Council Office would be made aware of things taking place on an extraordinary basis. I think it was Mr. Jordan who was sort of probing that earlier. Yes, we would find out about unusual events or extraordinary events from a number of departments.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I noted in your testimony, on page 4 at the very bottom in English,

[Translation]

and in the second paragraph on page 5,

[English]

you ask yourself if you did anything and you say:

Yes. I had a conversation with the Deputy Minister of National Defence, during which we discussed the need for careful consideration of what information is relayed from DND.

I don't know if this has been asked of you. If it has, I apologize for repeating the question, but can you tell me when this conversation occurred?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, in the interest of being precise,I'm going to be vague. I had a conversation on the 29th with the Deputy Minister of National Defence and I had subsequent conversations where this took place. I believe it was later in the week of the 28th, 29th, but I can't be certain.

¾ (2050)

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Would you care to elaborate on what you said, in terms of what was discussed?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I would not care to elaborate, Mr. Chair, but I will indicate to the honourable member that he indeed offered that he regretted not having ensured that information had flowed in the circumstances. And we discussed--if you will, I reminded him of--the importance of keeping us informed of extraordinary events.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Okay.

Is there a reason why it is restricted to that on the JTF-2 chain of information?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, Mr. Chairman, in fact it is restricted to the individuals who are in that particular trade of information for the purpose of security. It's the Canadian men and women on the ground whose operational security must be protected. For this reason we don't let that information circulate.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: So it's on a need-to-know basis.

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's right.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: So you're saying that once the deputy found out--as he said to us he did on the 22nd--he thought about it, thought it could be that because of the picture on the 22nd, and then further on in the day it was confirmed. Did that create a need to know?

[Translation]

Mr. Mel Cappe: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it was not necessary for the Deputy Minister to inform us because it was not an extraordinary event since they had successfully completed their mission.

[English]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: But you just said he recognized he should have.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I come back to the statement of the Minister of National Defence. He said he regretted not having informed the Prime Minister and apologized to him. Was it necessary that he had to inform the Prime Minister? I would say--

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: No, the deputy; I'm talking about the deputy.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I understand that. I'm coming back to the minister's point. I think the deputy, when he was before this committee, was a bit hard on himself. I would have liked to have known in the circumstances, but I don't think it was necessary that I was aware.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: You didn't need to know.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I did not need to know.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: That decision rested with the minister.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I think it was the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Chairman, who indicated in the House that, in operational terms, no decision would have changed for JTF-2 if the PCO had been informed.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I'll ask you if you know from other countries and other organizations if it is normal to have a chain that relies strictly on the one next element to process and further the information. Is this a normal course of action with this kind of organization? Is it because of the nature of this organization?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of the actual details of the reporting relationships in other militaries, except to say that I do know that for commando forces and special forces in other militaries there is a different reporting relationship and a different flow of information than for regular troops.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: You don't know if there may be some with some checks and balances, and perhaps more than one?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I'm not sure of all the details, but I know that most militaries have a more restricted flow of information for special forces.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Are you cutting me off, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: No, I'm not cutting you off. You can carry on. It's just that you are cutting into Joe's time.

Joe Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Cappe, the discussion we seem to be having now about process and about the flow of information is, I think, a useful discussion. I think what you're getting here is that we are parliamentarians and we don't necessarily have an absolute understanding of some of these processes because we don't have experience with them, but there seems to be some concern. We're just trying to get through that.

Now that's all well and good, but that's not why we as a committee are here. I think there is at least an attempt at relevance in Mr. Pallister's theory. Mr. Pallister's theory was this: in the absence of any direct evidence about the minister's actions, he theorized that the motivation was there for the minister to deliberately mislead the House. What he said was that one of the reasons why the minister would have fabricated and misled the House deliberately was to protect himself, given the fact that he should have told the Prime Minister and didn't. I'm just trying to capture this theory that Mr. Pallister put forward.

That's why we're here. That's why we're having this discussion. That's the aim of some of the questioning, I think. The problem I'm having with it is that when you put the timelines down for the advocates or proponents of the theory that the minister deliberately misled to protect himself because he didn't tell the Prime Minister, it would suppose that the minister actually had full comprehension of all these events on the 21st. The Prime Minister, on the 28th, at 10:30 goes into a scrum and makes a statement about this being hypothetical. The minister then goes into the House of Commons at some time after 2 o'clock and says “I learned on the 25th”. Saying you learned on the 25th does not get you out of the situation that you knew prior and didn't tell the Prime Minister.

So parallel to this committee going on and with the help of some of the opposition parties, there's this media event taking place, Mr. Chair. I don't remember holding press conferences and I don't remember sending out press releases, but those things have been done.

Initially there's this dichotomy being presented. Somehow it's either/or. Either the minister is dumb or the minister is devious.

An hon. member: What about both?

Mr. Joe Jordan: Given the information I've proposed, they are now saying it's both. It's dumb or it's devious or it's dumb and devious, and we have the makings of a Dr. Seuss book here. As this magical mystery tour continues, I'm sure they'll be adding more words to it. But I would suggest that the minister provided us with an explanation for this. He stood before the House and said he didn't deliberately mislead.

The motivation to mislead is pure nonsense. It doesn't make any sense. If he were going to lie, he would have said he didn't find out until after the Prime Minister made his statement. That would have got him out of this and that would have been a motivation. This thing just doesn't make any sense.

When they refer to things out of context, build this cumulative argument, and say it quickly, I think that sometimes on the surface somebody might say there's something to this. When you look at it....

¾ (2055)

The Chair: Please continue. I apologize. I was doing something else. Carry on.

Mr. Vic Toews: On a point of order, I was just wondering how this can help us on this particular issue. I mean--

The Chair: It's the member's time. A member can recite the bible if he wishes, as long as it's his own time.

I would continue.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I would say that I listened for two hours to the hallucinations of Mr. Pallister and I don't remember these people jumping in and saying, “What's the point of this?”

I'm just saying my perspective on an analysis of these facts is that there's nothing here. We have a situation where, during an extremely busy trip to Mexico involving an operation for which the default position is secret unless there's a reason to go public, we had a series of events. The minister made a mistake, admitted that, said that clearly to the House, and apologized to the Prime Minister. I think we're getting to the point where, unless we're in the business of writing Dr. Seuss books, we should probably take a serious look at whether or not this is a valuable use of the taxpayers' money.

An hon. member: Yes, but they want a hanging.

The Chair: Mr. Cappe, you don't have time to reply to that.

We'll go to the five-minute rounds. Colleagues, I'm going to go in sequence through the parties, as we've done before. I have Cheryl Gallant, David Pratt, Michel Guimond, Jay Hill, and I have Leon Benoit.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): On my time, I would like to remind the committee, in the absence of any transcripts yet, at least on the part of the opposition, that both the Chief of the Defence Staff and Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff testified that it was their understanding that the minister understood, on the 21st of January, exactly what was going on.

In explaining why he was left out of the loop on this particular JTF-2 mission, through you, Mr. Chairman, to the witness, your deputy testified this afternoon that this particular mission to Afghanistan was the first time the JTF-2 had been deployed outside Canada. That's why there was a change in the chain of information.

Mr. Chairman, there are published sources that indicate this is not the case. I refer in particular to an article in the spring 2001 edition of Canadian Military Journal entitled “Operation 'Assurance'”: Planning a Multinational Force for Rwanda/Zaïre”, by Dr. Michael A. Hennessey. And, Mr. Chairman, I will now table it in both official languages.

¿ (2100)

The Chair: There are copies, colleagues, I'll circulate them. Please continue.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I refer to page 18, the bottom paragraph, where it states that as a part of the combined multinational force sent to Rwanda, “Elements of the JTF-2 were also employed”. Given those facts, would you not agree that your deputy clerk has misinformed this committee?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that someone go back and look at the transcript, but if he didn't say it, he should have said that to the best of his knowledge this was the case. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time we've deployed JTF-2 for combat purposes as well, so this is news to me.

In my response to an earlier question, I talked about whether we'd go back to Korea or not.

I was not aware of this. Did he mislead the committee? I don't think he did it intentionally, if that was your inference.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The deputy clerk did not qualify the deployment as being any particular type. He said it was the first time they had been deployed outside Canada.

Mr. Mel Cappe: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I thought this went back to the CDS's testimony before the committee, but I may be wrong. I think either the CDS or DCDS also made reference to something similar. I'm not sure, but I believe so.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: We'll look at the transcripts. My follow-up question to you is, in these previous situations, where in fact JTF-2 was deployed outside Canada, was the Privy Council Office part of the chain of information then?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I am not aware that the Privy Council Office would have been in the chain of information for operational information on JTF-2 then or not, but frankly, Mr. Chair, I would doubt it. I would be very surprised indeed if the Privy Council Office were in the chain of information for operational activity of JTF-2 any time.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that if, as it would appear, your deputy misinformed this committee on this point, he may have misinformed this committee on other points as well.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I think that's outrageous, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fadden is an honourable man and testified fully in this committee.

The Chair: I do agree. We've tried to be as courteous as we can. I understand you did try to use some parliamentary language, but it was very close. You have about 30 seconds.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I have no further questions.

The Chair: David Pratt and Michel Guimond.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): I'll be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I have a follow-up to the previous questioner, and maybe Mr. Cappe can respond. It's my understanding, Mr. Chair, that JTF-2 has deployed overseas on a number of occasions, but always in a bodyguard capacity and in an advisory role, never in a combat capacity. So I think there's some confusion, perhaps, from the standpoint of the previous questioner's questions, and some of the allegations she makes arising out of those questions I think are completely unacceptable in that respect.

I can say, from my own experience, for instance, back in 1999, the government was thinking of deploying JTF-2 with me when I when to Sierra Leone on the first trip I made to that country. So it's not unusual for JTF to be out of the country, but on a combat operation, it's a completely different situation, and it's my understanding that this is the first time this has been the case.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I would just add that I believe the Chief of the Defence Staff noted that JTF-2 had been abroad in a training capacity, as well as the advisory capacity Mr. Pratt referred to, and the bodyguard role they have played.

I know they have been abroad on several occasions, and I know many of the people they have gone with, including Mr. Pratt. But I think the question that was being put and that was responded to in the committee was whether they had been sent abroad in a combat role. That's why I think it's worth looking back at what the Chief of the Defence Staff answered.

¿ (2105)

The Chair: The member indicated she would look back.

Michel.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cappe, since you are a constant reader of the testimony before this Committee, I hope you have the time to do your important work. You will be rereading your own testimony because now you have lost us. You will reread your testimony with regard to your characterizations of the incident involving the capture of prisoners. I put the question to you again because you have given contradictory answers.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I hope not, but...

Mr. Michel Guimond: You will reread your testimony on your computer, sir, not this evening, but tomorrow morning, because it will be published tomorrow morning. For you, is the capture of prisoners an ordinary or an extraordinary event?

Mr. Mel Cappe: The capture of prisoners or detainees is not an extraordinary event. In my view, we sent our JTF2 troops to do exactly what they did.

Mr. Michel Guimond: So you consider that it was not an extraordinary event, even though you know perfectly well that this was an important point for debate in the United States. I don't know whether you subscribe to the Washington Times or whether you regularly read...

Mr. Mel Cappe: No.

Mr. Michel Guimond: ...but the Washington Times began its news coverage on Saturday, January 26, by saying--I'll translate as best I can--that Secretary of State Colin Powell had asked President Bush to reverse the presidential position on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees and to declare them prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. So although you said that it was not an extraordinary event, you knew that it was an important topic of debate in the United States, did you not?

M. Mel Cappe: It was also a topic of debate here in Canada.

M. Michel Guimond: That is the second point I wanted to raise. You know...

Mr. Mel Cappe: With your permission...

Mr. Michel Guimond: Yes, and you are introducing my second question. You know that it was also a topic of debate within the Liberal caucus, since you are the deputy head of the Prime Minister's department. You are the Prime Minister's deputy minister, and you knew that, during the techno-debate on the evening of January 28, members of the Liberal caucus, Messrs. Godfrey, Karygiannis, Lincoln, Bryden, Cotler, Szabo and Bagnell, expressed their objection to the government position on the status of those prisoners. Is it correct that you were very much aware of that?

Mr. Mel Cappe: What I was aware of is that we learned that the Americans had complied with international law, that there was some doubt because of this debate in the newspapers and that we approached the U.S. administration to obtain clarification or confirmation of the fact that they had complied with the law. As I said a moment ago, we observed that they had complied with the Geneva Conventions.

The Chair: Be brief, Michel. Your time is almost up.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Already?

¿ (2110)

The Chair: Yes. You have perhaps 30 seconds. This is very interesting, but...

Mr. Michel Guimond: On January 28, the Prime Minister said that Canada had not taken prisoners and that we would be told when any had been taken. The Americans claim that they are not prisoners of war; they are prisoners of the Americans and not prisoners of the Canadians; when we have prisoners, he said, we will take steps to ensure that they are detained in a manner consistent with Canadian and international law. So the Prime Minister made that statement on January 28, without knowing that prisoners had been taken because, you say, the Prime Minister learned about it on the 29th, at the same time you did.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes, that is true. The Prime Minister learned about it at the Cabinet meeting on the 29th. All I can tell you is that the Prime Minister spoke about the deployment of the other troops we have discussed. I am sure he did not learn earlier that prisoners had already been taken.

[English]

The Chair: Next is Jay Hill, followed by Leon Benoit and Pierre Brien.

Mr. Jay Hill: I want to begin, Mr. Chairman, by quoting from statements Mr. Eggleton, the defence minister, made to the committee. I don't have the page number, unfortunately. He said:

As I indicated on January 17 when I appeared before the committee

--and he's speaking about the defence committee there--

two members of the committee, two of our Liberal members in fact did raise the question of detainees. I indicated in my testimony today my response at that time about the matter.

Here he is talking about January 17.

Later that day, I did phone the Prime Minister and talked with him about this whole issue of detainees.

Why do you suppose it would be important enough for the defence minister to talk to the Prime Minster on January 17 about the issue of detainees but not important enough to actually tell him when he learned on the 21st or again on the 25th that we'd actually taken prisoners?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, perhaps the best way to answer the question of Mr. Hill would be to cite the Minister of National Defence, but I don't suppose and I don't pretend to understand more than what the minister has said. The minister indicated before this committee

...if there is anything out of the ordinary, anything that is a diversion from government policy, a diversion from the rules of engagement, then I have the obligation, responsibility to inform the Prime Minister.

I think what the minister was saying, as I have said to this committee, is that the taking of prisoners was within the mission, the mandate, the rules of engagement, and Canadian law, and that was not something that was a diversion from the rules of engagement or government policy.

Mr. Jay Hill: But the whole issue of detainees obviously warranted a phone call to the Prime Minister.

In an earlier round of questioning I asked you who the acting or alternate minister would have been when Minister Eggleton was in Mexico between the 20th and the 25th, I think it was. You said you did not know but that you'd let us know, and I believe you said there was a press release.

Mr. Mel Cappe: At the swearing in of the cabinet, there's a press release with an annex that lists the alternate ministers.

Mr. Jay Hill: So that's in the public domain.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: The whole world knows. It's just you and I who don't know who it is.

Mr. Mel Cappe: We both have seen it, I'm sure.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

But we're still not clear as to what the role of that individual, male or female, would have been while the minister was out of the country and whether they would have received any briefings from Vice-Admiral Maddison on the 22nd, 23rd, or 24th.

¿ (2115)

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I really want to reiterate or perhaps clarify my earlier statements and to be as precise as possible. It really does depend on the purpose for which the minister is exercising authority. If it's for financial administration purposes, the deputy minister might well exercise authority when the minister is out of the country. If it's for the purpose of taking action pursuant to the National Defence Act and the minister is inaccessible, then the acting minister might well take that responsibility.

If it's for the purpose of being briefed on the activities of Canadian forces, then there may not be a need for the acting minister to be informed, but rather, as Vice-Admiral Maddison has indicated to the committee, he found the minister in Mexico, got him to a secure place to make a secure phone call, and briefed him there. So the minister is still the minister for many purposes even when he's abroad.

Mr. Jay Hill: I think your key words there, with all due respect, are “there may not be”. We don't know, or at least you're indicating you don't know.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I don't know, but I just want to make sure the committee has that as well.

Mr. Jay Hill: I have a couple of final questions, if I still have time.

The Chair: Jay, you have just over a minute.

Mr. Jay Hill: Are we going to have another round?

The Chair: I'm in the hands of the committee as always, but I hope not.

Mr. Jay Hill: I want to come back to this issue of what is extraordinary, and if I only have a minute, I had better hurry.

How often since the Second World War have Canadian soldiers taken prisoners?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I do not know.

Mr. Jay Hill: You do not know.

I'm really puzzled by the fact that in your statement tonight you say, and I'm quoting from page 4:

Extraordinary operational events would include casualties to our troops, accidents or actions involving civilian casualties....

We know there have been lots of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. I'm not aware at this moment as to whether or not there were many involving actions of JTF-2. That in your mind is extraordinary, yet taking prisoners is not extraordinary. Couldn't it also be considered part of the mandate that there's going to be some collateral damage if our troops go into action?

The Chair: Very briefly, Mr. Cappe, please.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I think the minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff would see Canadian troop casualties as something extraordinary and would inform the minister, and the minister would inform the Prime Minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: I was referring to civilian casualties.

The Chair: Leon Benoit and then Pierre Brien.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for being here tonight, Mr. Cappe.

I'd just like a little more clarification on the briefings and that type of thing that you provide for the Prime Minister. You made a statement that you provide the Prime Minister with all necessary information, something along that line. It's your responsibility to do that?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you or someone under you provides the Prime Minister with briefings involving the policy of the JTF-2 when it comes to capturing prisoners, not the actual event, but the policy? It would have been done sometime before they were sent over, I would imagine.

Mr. Mel Cappe: In fact, I would not have been involved in the operational policy of JTF-2, but on the decision to deploy, I would be involved in providing advice to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Only on the decision to deploy? No information whatsoever on what the procedure would be if the JTF-2 were to capture prisoners, and what they would do with them?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Let me be precise, Mr. Chairman. Let me use as an example the question of the rules of engagement for the Canadian troops, which would include what they do when they're faced with hostile forces on the other side. The rules of engagement would be defined by the Chief of the Defence Staff pursuant to the National Defence Act, and I appear nowhere in that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You're saying they're the same rules of engagement whether it's the JTF-2 or the Princess Pats?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, I'm not. I'm saying that the same responsibility, the same chain of command, is in force in that sense, in that the chief has the responsibility to determine the rules of engagement.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you would have nothing to do with briefing the Prime Minister on what those rules of engagement are, even in a general way?

Mr. Mel Cappe: This is an area where the lines tend to blur a bit. You'll recall the debate that was actually going on--and it was in the media--about whether article 7 of the UN charter was being invoked or not. That was the question of whether Canadian troops--that is, the PPCLI--would be able to initiate combat as opposed to being defensive and responsive. That's the kind of issue where we would have provided advice, and indeed we had many discussions internally on the subject. But that's still at a pretty general level, as opposed to operations.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But not on the capture of prisoners? Nothing even in a general way in terms of briefings before the--

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, if it's a decision of whether to shoot them or capture them, that's something we would be playing on. Yes, it would be to capture them.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Then why would the Prime Minister have said when he did that it was a hypothetical situation, if he'd been briefed on what the policy was?

¿ (2120)

Mr. Mel Cappe: Again, I think the Prime Minister was referring to the Princess Patricias.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's an interesting distinction, though. Really, what is the difference there? The PPCLI were already being deployed at that time, maybe even slightly before, and some after. Are you saying then that the policy on what would happen to prisoners should the PPCLI capture prisoners hadn't been determined, in spite of the fact that they're heading out right now?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No. In fact, I'm saying that policy was determined before JTF-2 was deployed. I'm actually going beyond that. I'm saying that before JTF-2 was deployed, we had.... If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would just remind the committee that the Chief of the Defence Staff has the advice of the Judge Advocate General in this, ensuring that Canadian law would be respected and that international law would be respected. So that decision was taken before deployment.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You mean the decision as to how the PPCLI would handle prisoners as well? If that's the case, then why on earth would the Prime Minister, in response to the media, say it's a hypothetical question as to how prisoners would be handled?

Mr. Mel Cappe: The Prime Minister went on to say that we will respect international laws. He said we will respect Canadian law and we will respect international law.

Mr. Leon Benoit: With all due respect, if the media ask a question of the Prime Minister on how prisoners will be handled if they're captured and he's been briefed on the policy as to how prisoners would be handled if they're captured, then why on earth and how in good conscience can the Prime Minister say that's a hypothetical question?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Well, because it was. The question that was--

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, because he's not waiting until the prisoners are captured. He will be following a policy--

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I think when we're going over the same point over and over again--

The Chair: We have 20 seconds for this exchange.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't think we've received a complete answer. It seems--

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, it was clear from my reading of what the Prime Minister said that he was referring to the fact that the Princess Patricias had not yet been deployed, that the troops indeed had been deployed, that the JTF-2 had been in place, and he had indicated that Canadians will respect Canadian law and international law.

The Chair: Pierre Brien, Jay Hill, and then Geoff Regan.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: You are an intelligent man, Mr. Cappe, and I need your opinion because one of the challenges before us here is to establish the following reasoning.

Is it possible for me to make a false statement to you, knowing that what I tell you is false, but without intending to mislead you?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I feel like saying, sir, that I am a public servant and that I have no opinion, but I would like to answer and be forthcoming. I do not follow the argument.

Mr. Pierre Brien: It's not possible, is it?

Mr. Mel Cappe: It's a game of logic, and I do not play with illogical things.

Mr. Pierre Brien: But that is the challenge before us. Do you understand?

Mr. Mel Cappe: I don't see anything illogical there.

Mr. Pierre Brien: All right.

Are you aware of the briefings the Prime Minister receives for question period?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No.

Mr. Pierre Brien: You're not aware of that?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Sometimes I am for specific briefings, but his briefing for question period doesn't come from me.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Who does it come from?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Sometimes his office deals directly with my people.

Mr. Pierre Brien: All right. I would like to come back to the ordinary and extraordinary events.

A public debate is being conducted on the status of the prisoners in Afghanistan. There is a photograph in the media showing that prisoners were taken by Canadians. There were people who were aware of that. At this point, is it still an ordinary situation?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, as I said, if Canadian troops detained individuals in Afghanistan, it was not extraordinary because we had assurances that the Americans had complied with international law.

Mr. Pierre Brien: But when that information concerning the capture of prisoners became public through the publication of a photograph of an operational group classified as top secret, were we still in an ordinary situation?

Mr. Mel Cappe: As Mr. Judd, the Deputy Minister, said, there may have been a breach of security, but it is not a matter of a breach of the Rules of Engagement.

¿ (2125)

Mr. Pierre Brien: In your view, that situation was not out of the ordinary.

Mr. Mel Cappe: It's unfortunate. Of course, for the military personnel, the question of their security must be resolved, but it is not a question of being outside the Rules of Engagement.

Mr. Pierre Brien: That's not what I asked you. I did not ask you whether it was outside the Rules of Engagement. I asked you whether that was something ordinary.

I am now going to take my question a little further. There was a public debate on the status of prisoners. A photograph was circulating showing that Canadians had taken prisoners. Civilians were aware of the situation, regardless of whether they were people from Foreign Affairs or the Deputy Minister of Defence. There was a public debate on that. This is normally information that should be secret. You did not learn about it until seven days later.

Is that something acceptable and ordinary?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, it's not acceptable, but if we want to look for the source of that leak or disclosure of secret information, it's not my job to do so. It is for military authorities to ensure that their security is appropriate. I can't ensure that kind of security.

Mr. Pierre Brien: And the Prime Minister was not aware that such a situation had arisen.

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's true.

Mr. Pierre Brien: You said that you had talked with the Deputy Minister of Defence. I imagine you spoke about the future. Are you telling me that, in future, if a similar sequence reoccurred in the same way, you would be completely satisfied with the way the machinery of government operated?

Mr. Mel Cappe: As I said a moment ago, it was a question of judgment and that is never clear. One never knows whether it is important to inform the Privy Council Office. In this case, I don't find that it was an extraordinary event.

[English]

The Chair: Jay Hill, Geoff Regan, and Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are there different policies in place for the handling of prisoners if they're captured by the PPCLI or by JTF-2?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Not that I'm aware of, but I'm not certain. That would be a question for the Chief of the Defence Staff, but I don't believe there are.

Mr. Jay Hill: So if a suspected terrorist or an al-Qaeda terrorist were captured by JTF-2 on January 20, for example, or by the PPCLI later when they were deployed to Afghanistan, they'd be treated the same, to the best of your knowledge.

Mr. Mel Cappe: That's my understanding. Yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: Then why would the Prime Minister say in response to that question--because he understood it to be specific to the PPCLI--that it was hypothetical?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Because the PPCLI had not yet been deployed.

Mr. Jay Hill: But if the policy and the handling of prisoners were exactly the same, what difference would it make?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Are you asking me, or should I ask you, sir?

Mr. Jay Hill: Why would you say it's hypothetical when we had already taken prisoners?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, the question was posed about whether we would continue to deploy Canadian troops, the PPCLI, if this issue had not been clarified by the United States of America. The Prime Minister indicated that when he was then asked, “And what about prisoners?” He said it was hypothetical because he was still talking about whether the PPCLI would be deployed, so I think there was a logic there.

[Translation]

To return to the point raised by Mr. Brien.

[English]

there was a logic there because he was asking the question, should they be deployed or not? So the challenge from the journalist in that interview was, should the Princess Pats be deployed?

Mr. Jay Hill: I think the logic is probably lost on everyone except the Prime Minister.

I want to get back to this. You found out about JTF-2 taking prisoners at the cabinet meeting on January 29. Was when they were taken clear to you? Was it made clear to you that they were taken on or about January 20?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jay Hill: So you didn't know when they were taken? You just knew that we had taken some prisoners at some point in time.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Actually, Mr. Chairman, what the Minister of Defence had indicated was that there had been a photo in the newspaper and if people had remembered it, then there were actually--this is my recollection of it--Canadian soldiers taking those prisoners. That was what he had said. I don't believe he put a date on it, although maybe he did, but I don't believe he did.

¿ (2130)

Mr. Jay Hill: So then it didn't surprise you when the minister, right after that, right after informing cabinet and you, went to the House and made a misleading statement about when we'd captured the prisoners, or when he found out about the capturing of prisoners?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I was surprised that the minister had gone public with that information, but I did not have a date to make a comparison with what he said publicly.

Mr. Jay Hill: As for the now quite famous photo of JTF-2 that appeared in the Globe and Mail, was that brought to your attention at any time in the week of January 22 to 29?

Mr. Mel Cappe: Mr. Chairman, I'm almost embarrassed to say that I didn't remember the photo when the Minister of National Defence made reference to it. It had not been brought to my attention previously. Having seen it afterwards, I did recall the photo.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay, but at no time during that week did it touch off something?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

The Chair: Geoff Regan, then Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Through you to--

The Chair: Then, by the way, colleagues, if I can I'm going to draw it to a close.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Fine idea, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Cappe, for your patience. I want to ask you this: if the RCMP were to arrest three ordinary members of an organized criminal gang in Canada, would the Prime Minister be advised of that?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, sir.

An hon. member: That's hypothetical.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Geoff Regan: Hypothetical?

A voice: It happens all the time.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Today, for example, dozens of members of Hell's Angels, according to the Canadian Press, were arrested in eastern Canada in police raids by the RCMP. This is organized crime. What is more comparable to a terrorist group than an organized criminal gang? It's a major political issue.

Mr. Mel Cappe: Not that I'm aware of, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Geoff Regan: The police were put in harm's way and you're telling me that the Prime Minister would not be advised in that case?

Mr. Mel Cappe: No, sir.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Why not?

Mr. Mel Cappe: There's nothing he could do that would alter the treatment of those prisoners.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mauril Bélanger.

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I want to return to a question which Mr. Brien raised when he was talking about the photograph. It is true that the photograph depicts Canadian soldiers capturing prisoners or taking them to the Americans, I imagine. But it was clearly stated in the newspapers that the photograph was of Americans. I saw the picture, as my colleagues did as well, and I don't remember members saying that it was a picture of Canadians before that information was disclosed and confirmed.

I wanted to make that distinction. I don't remember hearing an opposition member, or a government member either, say, after seeing that photograph, that it showed Canadians until it was explained by the Minister that they were Canadians and not Americans. That is an important distinction, and I hope my colleague will acknowledge it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Yes, very briefly, Mr. Brien.

Mr. Pierre Brien: In talking about the photograph, you said that you were surprised that, after the Cabinet meeting, the Minister of National Defence made public the fact that Canadians had taken prisoners. You said you were surprised by that. Explain that.

Mr. Mel Cappe: I don't believe the Minister intended to do it publicly. But obviously, it was already public, because it was there and because other persons had learned or suspected that Canadians had been involved.

Mr. Pierre Brien: So the Prime Minister was never involved in the official public disclosure of the fact that the JTF2 had taken prisoners. The Minister of Defence made that decision alone following the Cabinet meeting.

Mr. Mel Cappe: As I said a moment ago in responding to Mr. Regan, the Prime Minister leaves it up to the Minister to administer the portfolio.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Cappe, thank you very much. It is getting late. On behalf of my colleagues, I want to say we appreciate your being here, we appreciate your patience, and we appreciate your answers.

Colleagues, tomorrow, as you know, we have two more meetings scheduled. The first meeting is at 11 a.m. Both of those meetings are in this room and they're televised. The witness is Jim Wright, assistant deputy minister, Department of Foreign Affairs. In the afternoon, at 3:30 p.m. in this room, our witness is Joseph Maingot.

The meeting is adjourned until 11 a.m. tomorrow.