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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

1105

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

1140

The Chair

Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1145

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1150

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

1155

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Toews

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1200

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Regan

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1205

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1210

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

1215

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jordan

The Chair

1220

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Godin

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Godin

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1225

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Yvon Godin

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Yvon Godin

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1230

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Ms. Marlene Catterall

1235

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1240

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

1245

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.)

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Tony Tirabassi

1250

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Geoff Regan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

1255

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

1300

VAdm G.R. Maddison

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm G.R. Maddison

The Chair

CANADA

NUMBER 047

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á (1105)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues and members of the media, in a moment I'll ask the cameras to leave. My suggestion, given that there's a vote, is that we do convene the meeting now for a few minutes to deal with some routine business. I've spoken to our witness about this. I will then suspend the meeting and we'll start again, start afresh, after the vote. We'll begin with the witness' statement and continue through.

At the moment, even though it's only going to be routine business, I have to ask the cameras to leave. The meeting is going to be fully televised on CPAC. We will suspend. The cameras can come in again at the beginning of the regular meeting, if you like, following the vote. So I'd be grateful if the cameras would leave.

Colleagues, we're here pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31, 2002, by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements to the House.

As I said--and I hope, colleagues, this is convenient for you all--it means we can start more promptly when we come back after the vote. There are a few things. I'll introduce our witness after the vote.

First of all, we requested further information from one of our witnesses, the Clerk of the House. That information has been received and circulated. We have additional copies here if you need them. We requested additional information from our first witness, Brian Pallister. We have received a reply from him, but we're having that translated. It will be circulated to you as soon as we have it translated. We have received the Minister of National Defence's replies to Cheryl Gallant's requests. My understanding is that is being circulated at this meeting, and each member will receive a copy of those replies as they come in to the meeting.

We have Jay Hill's request for documents. DND is processing that request. They're working on them and they'll get them to us as soon as possible. We know, all of us here, about some of the complications associated with that, and that includes some translation. Jay, we'll have that information for you as soon as we can.

The answers from Commodore Thiffault.... You'll recall that a week ago today we sent written questions from all members to Commodore Thiffault in Florida. We expect those replies this afternoon. As soon as they're available, they'll be circulated. We do have a meeting at 7:30 this evening. It's quite possible that I'll be able to circulate those answers at that meeting.

I was asked by one of the parties about CPAC and the televising of these meetings. The question essentially was why, on a particular evening I think it was, we were not going out direct. The arrangement with CPAC is that when the House of Commons is sitting, meetings of committees that are televised are taped and CPAC broadcasts them, but at a later date and at a later time. Also, with respect to times when the House of Commons is not sitting, they are not obliged to send out something live. So regarding the meeting I was asked about, I guess there was something else on the CPAC schedule that evening. In their judgment, as long as over a period of time they meet the requirements for televising live committee meetings, they're not required to do so.

By the way, I was quite satisfied with their explanation. If there's more to it and if we have to, we can get someone here as a witness, but my understanding is they were completely within their rights not broadcasting live that particular meeting.

I want to remind you all before I go to the point of order that we're working on the new schedule. Today Vice-Admiral Maddison is first. The Deputy Minister of National Defence is at 3:30 and General Henault, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, is at 7:30 this evening. Tomorrow we proceed to Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, followed at 7:30 by Mel Cappe, Clerk of the Privy Council. The change from our last meeting that you will see is that General Henault is now the last of the military witnesses rather than the first, and it was agreed we should do that the last time. On Thursday we get Jim Wright, ADM, global and security policy, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, followed by Joseph Maingot, who will talk to us about parliamentary privilege.

Jay Hill has a point of order.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I just want to acknowledge the efforts made by the chair and the clerks, I'm assuming, in getting the witnesses to agree to change the order. I appreciate that.

Secondly, with this vote interrupting the proceedings, I want it on the record at the start that should we have additional questions--in other words, if we run out of time, as we did last week when we had to adjourn for question period--we have the wherewithal to bring Vice-Admiral Maddison back. Obviously, as I think everybody on the committee agrees, he's a key witness in this investigation. As long as that's the understanding, because we're going to be interrupted and lose at least a half hour from the time we were going to--

The Chair: I have no intention of cutting off these proceedings before we need to. My understanding as chair is that the terms of reference under which we are operating are that witnesses can be recalled if we wish.

Are there any other points of order?

Folks, just a minute. I'm going to allow the media to come in again at the start, because I think it's part of the agreement. I'm going to suspend the meeting, which means the media will come in. I will then ask the cameras to leave again, just as I did before.

The meeting is adjourned until after the vote.

Á (1109)

Á (1139)

The Chair: If we could resume the meeting....

I apologize to our witness for the delay--and I'll do so again in a moment when we start properly.

Members have returned from the vote. We have representatives of all parties here, so I would be grateful if the cameras would leave now. As you all know, the meeting is going to be fully televised on CPAC, so I'd ask the cameras to leave. The other media can certainly stay.

Cheryl Gallant, a point of order.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): On a point of order, last week when the House was no longer sitting in committee--

The Chair: Just a minute, Cheryl.

Could the cameras leave, please.

Okay, go ahead.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: After the House had closed and we were still in committee, in this particular committee, CPAC was not broadcasting live off the Hill. Could we ensure that tonight, once the chamber is closed, CPAC will broadcast live the proceedings of this meeting, off the Hill?

Á (1140)

The Chair: Cheryl, as I explained, I looked into that--and I will ask that this be solved--but my understanding from their explanation of the agreement they have is that they don't have to. They have to broadcast the proceedings at some point, but they don't have to broadcast in real time. But I would be quite willing to ask, if you so wish.

Colleagues, I'll repeat our order of the day, as we're beginning again. It's pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31, 2002, by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements in the House.

Our witness for this meeting, which is the first of three meetings we'll be having today, is Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff.

Admiral Maddison, we are most grateful to you for being here, and I again apologize to you publicly for the delay. As you realize, there was a vote in the House of Commons, and House of Commons business always takes precedence on these occasions. So we're glad that you're here. I know you have a statement, and I believe members have copies in both official languages.

Admiral Maddison, we're in your hands.

Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Good morning.

As you've stated, Mr. Chairman, I am the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, an appointment that I have had now for eight months. In this capacity I am responsible for coordinating the strategic-level planning and oversight of Canadian Forces military operations. On behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff, I provide operational direction to the Canadian Forces, conducting contingency operations both domestically and abroad.

[Translation]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: This includes our foreign missions with the United Nations, NATO and other coalitions as well as domestic operations such as the Canadian Armed Forces intervention during the flooding in Manitoba and the ice storm here in Eastern Canada.

[English]

In addition to developing operational plans and recommending the allocation of military resources, I also oversee the control of these operations on behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff, who always maintains full command of all members of the Canadian Forces at all times.

As such, Operation APOLLO, which is the deployment of our conventional forces in the campaign against terrorism, and the employment of our special forces are both my direct responsibility. Part of my responsibilities includes briefing the CDS daily on the conduct of Canadian Forces operations, including those of our special operations forces, and on occasion, in the absence of the CDS, I personally brief the Minister of National Defence.

In the case of our special operations forces, or Joint Task Force 2, we maintain tight security in order, first, to protect the safety and security of the members of Joint Task Force 2 and their families; second, to prevent our adversaries from gaining any operational advantage over JTF-2; and third, to minimize the risk of compromising the security of coalition operations. This information is tightly guarded and comes directly from the special operations force task force commander in theatre to the CDS, through me, and from the CDS to the minister. This process is very similar to what other coalition allies do who are providing special operations forces.

[Translation]

To help me carry out this task, I have a staff of dedicated professionals, and I have access to communication systems which provide me quickly with precise information on all operations.

Á (1145)

[English]

Let me say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that it is a real privilege to be part of a team in which our sailors, soldiers, airmen and women are performing in such an exceptional manner in all of our operations, including the campaign against terrorism, which is a particularly difficult and dangerous mission.

I would certainly be happy to answer your questions and assist in the important work of your committee, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much for your presentation.

[English]

If I can explain to you and again to the members, the procedure for questioning that we've agreed to in these hearings, Admiral, is that the parties have ten-minute blocks for the first round, which will take up most of the meeting. We begin with the official opposition and then we cross the sides of the House.

The parties may use the ten minutes for one questioner or for however many they wish--quite often it has been two. The ten minutes includes the replies, just so that you know. You may see from time to time the members get a bit restless when you're giving a very useful reply. Generally speaking, by the way, you should give your reply, but I will err on the side of the member, because it is the member's time I'm trying to deal with. I also say to them, and I know that you are already doing this, that we try to address our remarks through the chair, as we do elsewhere in the House of Commons.

Again, we're most grateful to you for the presentation.

The questioners I have at the moment are Vic Toews, followed by Geoff Regan, followed by Michel Guimond.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank Vice-AdmiralMaddison for being here today.

Vice-Admiral, I appreciate the security issues. I know that we have to be sensitive to that issue. If there's ever an issue that you think borders on that, you'll let the committee know. Given the limited amount of time available, I would appreciate a yes or no answer, whenever possible. Many of us here want to ask questions. We have limited time.

Did you, sir, discuss your testimony with the minister or his staff either directly or indirectly?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In terms of preparing myself for this testimony, I did that on my own. Although I did talk to some of the staff in terms of clarifying some of the points in terms of scheduling of when various briefings occurred and so on, this is my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vic Toews: Were you able to review any of the testimony provided by the minister to the committee on this issue last week, either by reading transcripts or indeed through newspaper reports or otherwise?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, I did, Mr. Toews, read the minister's testimony.

Mr. Vic Toews: This incident you briefed the minister on, on January 21, was this the first time Canadians were actually involved in the taking of detainees? I know they were involved in prior operations. Was this the first time in Afghanistan they were involved in the taking of detainees?

The Chair: No, that's fine, and Vic did say this to you as well, and I repeat it to you. You should feel comfortable whenever you wish in refusing to answer questions. The committee may follow up on that question later on, but you, yourself, should make that decision. Please continue.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To answer your question, sir, this was the first time in which Canadians were involved in capturing detainees.

Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you.

Did you have any written material that you relied on when you provided the minister with the briefing on Monday, January 21?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: When I briefed the minister on January 21, it was an oral briefing. I had received a number of oral briefings myself in terms of how the mission was unfolding and briefed the Chief of Defence Staff right near the end of the mission itself and then subsequently the following day briefed the minister, and it was an oral briefing.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you had no written materials in providing that briefing.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, I did not have any written materials at all.

Mr. Vic Toews: Did you summarize your briefing to the minister, in writing, for your own purposes or for the purposes of your staff at any time after the briefing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, when I briefed the minister, as I said, it was an oral briefing. I did not provide him with any written documentation thereafter.

I think it is important to note, however, that subsequent to a mission that occurs there is a report from the joint task force commander himself in theatre after the mission has ended. Basically, this is an after-action report, if you will, in terms of what transpired, and it has some specific details in it. That comes to me, and if there was any difference at all, which there wasn't, in what it was I briefed the minister on, then I would in fact go to the chief and to the minister and say perhaps there was some difference. But there wasn't in this case, and in fact in none of the missions so far has that occurred. But there is a written report that comes back after the mission has been completed.

Á (1150)

Mr. Vic Toews: But following your briefing of the minister on January 21 you didn't prepare any written notes?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, I did not.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right. But you would agree that you provided the minister with the following information on January 21: you advised the minister that, firstly, the troops were safe, that the mission in respect of the detainees was successful, and that the mission was carried out in accordance with government policy and the rules of engagement.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That was very much the message, Mr. Chairman, that I passed the minister.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right, and as far as you're concerned, you provided the minister with all the necessary available information on the taking of the detainees on January 21.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: When the minister was briefed by me on January 21, I stated to the minister that a mission had occurred; that it was a very successful mission; that it was done entirely professionally, done entirely within the rules of engagement and the direction our special forces had; that we had captured suspected terrorists and they had been transported and were turned over to American authorities, to their detention facility, as was the direction our people were to follow.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you were clear to the minister on January 21 then, Vice Admiral, that the Canadian troops were involved in the taking of detainees in Afghanistan and you were clear to the minister that the Canadians had turned over the detainees to the Americans?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is indeed my understanding certainly of the message I passed to the minister.

Mr. Vic Toews: Without getting into any security issue, did the minister ask you any questions on this issue?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I've had the opportunity to brief the minister on many occasions over the past number of years, both as the commander of the navy and certainly in my current position. He is one who always asks questions whenever he's briefed in terms of points of clarification, reaffirming some of the key messages: was this done safely; was anybody hurt; was it done in accordance with the rules of engagement; and so on. Those are the sorts of questions that were asked of me, about which I was able to respond affirmatively.

Mr. Vic Toews: Was there any indication from the minister at that time that there was in fact any further need for information then, given his thoroughness? You've indicated he was very thorough throughout this briefing. Was there any indication that he said he needed additional information?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I certainly understood in terms of the briefing I gave him that there wasn't any other further information on the major points in this particular mission that needed to be briefed to him. I subsequently spoke to him later on in the week when I was able to brief him on some very specific security-sensitive details around the mission itself.

Mr. Vic Toews: I don't want to get into anything security-sensitive, but you're satisfied that you provided him with the basic information that Canadian troops were involved in the detaining of these Afghanis, that they were turned over to the Americans, and it was clear that you communicated this to the minister--is that correct?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The minister was briefed that we had been on a successful mission, that we had followed the appropriate rules of engagement, that none of our people were hurt, that we had captured suspected Afghani terrorists or al-Qaeda terrorists, that they had been transported safely, that they had been turned over to the Americans, and that they were now in a detention facility.

Mr. Vic Toews: I have one last final question. You didn't withhold any significant operational information from the minister that may in fact, Mr. Chair, have impacted on the involvement of Canadians and their relationship to those detainees in Afghanistan?

Á (1155)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The answer to that is I think I was pretty clear.

Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you very much. I appreciate the witness' very frank and enlightening testimony.

The Chair: Thank you, Vic.

It's Geoff Regan, Michel Guimond, Joe Jordan, and then Yvon Godin.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Vice-Admiral Maddison. I know you are obviously very busy these days, and we appreciate you taking the time to come to meet with us today.

Would you give us a general idea--I think you have, but maybe you could reiterate for us--of the nature of the briefing you gave the minister on the 21st? What was the range of issues of which you can tell us? What sort of a briefing was it? Was it on one issue, or on a variety of issues?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly. As I said in my opening remarks, every day I take the opportunity to brief the Chief of Defence Staff. It is a wide-ranging brief, in terms of the various and diverse operations we have across the world. At the moment we have 13 different operations, with some in the Balkans and some in Africa. In the campaign against terrorism, we have close to 2,600 people operating in the Afghanistan and north Arabian Sea area.

There are other areas, such as the Middle East, where our people are involved, so I regularly brief on the situation in the Middle East, tensions between India and Pakistan, and other areas that would impact on the ability of the Canadian Forces to either do their job or perhaps be involved at a later date.

So the briefings I provide to the CDS--and to the minister, on those occasions when he is not available--cover a gamut of different topics. We start off with a general sort of situation, particularly in Afghanistan, and deal with the maritime component and some of the issues they may or may not be dealing with.

We deal with what they have done and what they are going to be doing; the air components that are involved; the land component; and in this particular case, the status of the preparations for the deployment of the land forces.

We deal with any issues that come up with special forces, and then with any other areas of concern or interest that should be briefed to the CDS, and subsequently to the minister.

So it's a wide-ranging set of issues that impact on security and the Canadian Forces.

Mr. Geoff Regan: First of all, how long was this briefing, if you can recall, and what portion of it dealt with the issue of the taking of prisoners on this mission?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: From my recollection, the briefing was somewhere between 15 and 20 minutes. I suspect, although I can't give you an accurate timing, a good five minutes of that brief was on the issue of the Joint Task Force 2.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Could it have been as little as three minutes?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, it was more than that. I think it was probably five or six minutes--in that area.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Due to the nature of this briefing, and the fact that it was a fairly brief discussion and covered a broad range of issues, do you think it would have been possible for someone to have left the briefing--to use the minister's words--without having a complete understanding of all the details of the mission?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As I've stated before, I've had the opportunity to brief the minister on a fairly regular basis. Certainly after my briefing on the phone with him in Mexico, I didn't have any doubt that the message I wanted to pass to the minister had not been passed.

Mr. Geoff Regan: The minister told the committee he had been involved in an earlier briefing, where Canada was involved in a multinational operation and prisoners were taken--apparently some weeks before this particular mission--but in that case it wasn't directly by Canadians.

Do you think it would have been possible for the minister, in haste, to have simply left your discussion with the impression or assumed that this was a similar situation--that we were involved in a mission where prisoners were taken, but not necessarily that Canadians had taken prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I obviously can't speculate on what the minister was thinking or not thinking, but we have certainly been involved in a number of different missions, not only with the special forces but with our other forces. A significant amount of information gets passed back and forth.

It is true to say we were involved in a multinational mission where detainees or prisoners were taken, but they were not physically taken by Canadians. That's certainly true, but there were a number of missions like that. On whether or not there's the possibility of confusion there, I would certainly expect that.

Â (1200)

Mr. Geoff Regan: In relation to your concerns, your priorities in this briefing, what where the key messages you wanted to convey? What was the most important message you were trying to convey in that briefing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The most important messages I wanted to convey to the minister were first of all that our people were safe; that they had executed the mission in accordance with the direction they had been given in terms of the rules of engagement; and that the mission was successful--they had captured prisoners, transported them, and turned them over to the American authorities at the detention facility in Kandahar.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Those are my questions for the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: It's Michel Guimond, then Joe Jordan, Yvon Godin, Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Maddison, thank you for your presentation.

In answer to a question asked by my colleague Mr. Regan, you said that the January 21 briefing lasted somewhere between 15 and 20 minutes. Is that correct?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, sir, that's correct. It lasted about 15 or 20 minutes, probably more around 20 minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Okay.

In response to a question from Mr. Tonks, you said earlier that you had read the Minister of Defense's testimony. You knew, and you were involve, that there had been briefings every morning from January 21 to 29.

What is the average length of a briefing? Is it 15 to 20 minutes? Is that approximately the time needed to go over things? Or was the January 21 briefing longer than usual because prisoners had been taken?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult question to answer. Sometimes there are a significant number of activities that occur. This would mean that the briefing would be somewhat longer. Sometimes it is relatively straightforward, when there hasn't been a significant amount of activity over the past 24 hours. So the briefings will vary in length.

It has been my experience that the least amount of time is somewhere in the vicinity of about 10, maybe 15 minutes. Sometimes they can be longer than that--like they can last over half an hour.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: When you know that you will be briefing the minister on a given day at 10 in the morning, do you write down the night before and until the time of the briefing various things that you have to make the Minister aware of? Through this specific question, I'm trying to find out if there is a precise agenda for such a telephone briefing.

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much for the question.

There are a series of meetings--a protocol or process, if you will, that is followed.

I have a very robust, very professional staff, who over the course of the evening will follow the events that have occurred. They will certainly be looking at what needs to be done over the next 24 hours. They brief me when I come in in the morning.

We have a formal meeting, if you will, that draws in experts from all disciplines within the Canadian Forces, disciplines that range from logistics support to medical support, to policy issues, to representatives from the army, navy and air force, right across the gamut of capabilities of the Canadian Forces. I have the opportunity to get their assessment of what has happened. A report is then put together, synthesized, which I use to brief the Chief of Defence Staff in the morning.

Once the Chief of Defence Staff is briefed, he then turns around and briefs the minister. After this has occurred, those within the ministry we call “level one colleagues” are briefed at a meeting co-chaired by the deputy minister and the Chief of Defence Staff, where I discuss and raise issues from an operational perspective that are not security-sensitive.

Then of course if anything very significant happens over the course of a 24-hour period, I will immediately brief the Chief of Defence Staff or the minister, so we don't wait until the following morning to brief, sir.

Â (1205)

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: In your opinion, did the January 21 briefing cover everything?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As I've answered before, the messages that I needed to pass to the minister I believe I passed.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Where there outstanding items on January 21?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As I think I've already said, Mr. Chairman, there were a number of very sensitive issues surrounding this mission that were also passed. Not all were passed, because they weren't as significant as others. When I had the opportunity to brief the minister next I was able to put those issues on the table, in terms of tactics and type of equipment used, etc.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: But in terms of the taking of prisoners, you considered that the message was clear, right?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: From my perspective, I certainly had the understanding that the minister understood that.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: You have said that there were no outstanding items, that the message was clear, that your remarks were specific. Can you explain to us why the minister waited until January 29 before informing the Prime Minister, why it took him eight days, from January 21 to January 29, to do so? In answer to specific questions about that, he said that there were some points to clarify. If, on January 21, you had delivered a clear message that left out no aspect of the issue, why would he think, for his part, that there were still points to clarify?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, I think you've had the opportunity to listen to the minister here in front of your committee. It is not for me to say, sir, what the minister may or may not have said.

In the briefing I gave on January 21 I certainly understood that the messages...in terms of the fact that we were involved in a mission, it was safe, and people were not hurt. They did what they were supposed to do, which was to capture al-Qaeda terrorists. They were transported to Kandahar and they were turned over to the American authorities.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Guimond, you have two minutes and a half left.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In answer to a question asked by Mr. Tonks earlier, you pointed out more clearly that on either January 20 or 21, it was the first time that Canadians actually took prisoners. Is that correct?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is correct. It was the first time.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: There was no prisoner taking before that, either by a joint task force or...? No prisoners had been captured before that.

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not sure I can respond in terms of the specifics of your question. Of course, there have been many prisoners captured by our coalition allies throughout this whole process.

In terms of answering Mr. Regan's question, there was a multinational mission in which Canadians were involved. Prisoners were captured, but they were not captured by Canadians. They were captured by other nations.

Â (1210)

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: What was the date? Do you remember the date?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is an issue I'm not at liberty to be able to provide you with, in terms of the specific date.

[Translation]

The Chair: One more minute. All right? Very well.

[English]

Joe Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.): Vice-Admiral Maddison, in answer to Mr. Toews's testimony, you said you had read the minister's testimony before this committee. Is that correct?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is correct.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Did you find in your reading of that testimony and your personal knowledge of the circumstances being described that the minister had said anything that wasn't accurate?

Mr. Vic Toews: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, that's for us to make the determination.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Excuse me, I think it's fairly critical.

The Chair: Hang on a minute.

It's not a point of order, Vic. I think the witness can answer.

By the way, you can also refuse to answer.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Can you ask me that question again, just to make sure I'm clear on it?

Mr. Joe Jordan: Okay, and I'll be specific in asking it.

You have read the minister's testimony, as you told this committee. In your view, in terms of the circumstances that you had personal experience of--you were involved in some of the circumstances being described, and I'm not asking you to speculate on other stuff--is it your sense that the minister said anything that wasn't accurate?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In terms of what my role was in terms of briefing the minister, I think the minister was fairly accurate in terms of what he did say.

Mr. Joe Jordan: In terms of the logistics of the briefing, under normal circumstances the minister would be briefed at what time of the day?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In normal circumstances, CDS briefs the minister at around 8 a.m.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Why were you briefing him, as opposed to the CDS, this time?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The CDS was out of the country, in fact, and because I am responsible to the CDS for the operations of the Canadian Forces, it was my responsibility to brief the minister.

Mr. Joe Jordan: That's a seamless transfer: if he's not there you do it. Is that correct?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Indeed.

Mr. Joe Jordan: In terms of the logistics, then, this briefing took place over...you were in Ottawa, he was in Mexico.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is correct. I was in Ottawa and he was in Mexico.

Mr. Joe Jordan: In terms of a situation where the minister is going to be out of country, was this a special briefing set up, or was this a scheduled briefing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Before the minister goes on a trip, through the various staffs his schedule is designed in terms of when it is that the minister can be briefed. That is done well before he takes a trip, sir.

Mr. Joe Jordan: So this was not a conscious decision made because of the content of the material, that a special briefing had to take place. In your view, it was a mission, it was done within the parameters and terms of engagement and there was nothing, in the military sense, that would have warranted special attention.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly it was scheduled to brief him on that particular day. But the day before, in terms of the mission actually being conducted, obviously I knew that the mission was being planned for, was going to be conducted, and when I briefed the Chief of Defence Staff, who was about to leave on a trip, we obviously decided that when we could, the following morning, I would brief the minister, although it was already scheduled to make sure that particular information was passed to him.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Again, in terms of logistics then, this briefing took place over the phone. Is that correct?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, it is. It was over the phone via a secure line because the information that was being passed was obviously very sensitive.

Mr. Joe Jordan: So you established a secure line and then you spent 20 minutes briefing the minister. Is that correct?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is in fact correct.

Mr. Joe Jordan: There was no problem with the phone line, was there?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: To be totally precise on that, we did have an initial challenge with the phone in terms of its connection. But shortly thereafter, if I recall correctly--within half an hour or so--we were able to establish that secure communication that was needed for me to brief the minister.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Yes, and I understand why that would need to be done. But did the briefing start and then stop, or did it logistically have to be delayed?

Â (1215)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, not at all. When I was able to get the minister, to communicate with him on a secure phone, we were able to go right through the whole briefing for the full 20 minutes.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Good.

Now, one of the things that has been alluded to in the House.... I realize this may not be within your purview of knowledge, but there was a claim made in the House during debate that there's always a parallel bureaucratic communication channel in the government. So you would have the communication channel you described through the minister, but there's also some other channel that would go from bureaucrat to bureaucrat to PCO. In terms of JTF-2, does that parallel communication channel exist?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's a very good question, sir. With respect to Joint Task Force 2, based on the objectives that the government has directed us to conduct, based on the missions and tasks for that particular unit, based on the fact that we really have to preserve a level of security around the operations of Joint Task Force 2, the process that is used is that the information comes from the Joint Task Force 2 commander in theatre to the CDS through me, from the CDS to the minister, and from the minister to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Okay.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That is the process for Joint Task Force 2 that is used. That is not the process used for Operation APOLLO for our conventional forces.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I'm not sure I came away from this exchange with a clear understanding of the details. That's a no, then, is it? There is not a parallel.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's correct.

Mr. Joe Jordan: One of the issues that has been raised here is that the minister's mindset would have been affected by the fact that the political issue of the transfer of prisoners was becoming an important issue because of what was going on in the States and the debate that was going on between Rumsfeld and Powell. How much of the politics of the issue makes its way into the contents of your briefing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, I brief on the military operations; that's what I'm responsible for. That's what I'm concerned about. My number one concern is the safety and security of our people. In this particular brief, they did exactly what they were supposed to do in terms of going out, finding, locating, capturing, transporting, and turning over suspected terrorists. As you say, the politics of a detainee issue is not something I pay a lot of attention to. I brief on the military side of the house.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I have one final question, Mr. Chair.

You said that the minister seemed to understand the details. To the best of your knowledge, was your conclusion that he understood based on the fact that he didn't ask specific questions or that he did ask questions about that, or can you recall? I'm talking specifically about the fact, which was what differentiated this from other briefings, that in this case Canadians took custody. I'm wondering what your statement that the minister understood or seemed to understand is based on. I would also want to know whether you are the individual who briefed the minister on the previous occasions where we were involved in operations where prisoners were taken but we didn't take custody.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: To the best of my recollection, in terms of the incident that you just mentioned in the latter part of your question, it was the Chief of Defence Staff who briefed the minister.

In terms of my briefing to the minister on January 21, in the course of the discussion or the conversation I certainly came to conclude that the minister was told that this mission had been successful, done very professionally, within the rules of engagement, that a number of detainees had been captured, had been transported, and had been passed over to American authorities.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you.

The Chair: It's Yvon Godin, Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill, Tony Tirabassi, and Leon Benoit.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie--Bathurst, NDP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome Mr. Maddison to this briefing session.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to know whether the taking of prisoners had occurred, according to the information received on January 21 and at what time this information coming out from Afghanistan reached Ottawa. How was it sent to you, through the commander or through somebody in the United States? How did you get this information?

Â (1220)

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Gauvin.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Godin.

[Translation]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Sorry.

[English]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Gauvin is the guy who ran against me in the last election.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The process that occurs in terms of my being briefed is that the joint task force commander responsible for special forces in the theatre will indicate, well in advance of a particular mission, that a mission is being planned. We have a series of concepts of operations and specific missions and tasks that are authorized.

We have a concept of operations that has been authorized. We have rules of engagement, which means what force and how that force can be applied to achieve a particular mission, and we have a targeting directive. In that targeting directive are very clear instructions as to the types of targets that our forces can indeed go against. Some of them are relatively benign, and that can in fact be decided by the joint task force commander himself in theatre, based on the criteria that he has been provided well before the Joint Task Force 2 ever went into theatre.

If the risk of a mission is such that it's above the threshold that he is permitted, then what's called a “targeting committee” will sit and will go through the process of what the target is, what the risks are, both to our people and to others who might be involved, what resources, what assets, and so on. A decision will be made and will come to me in terms of this mission being recommended to follow. If I agree with that, then I will inform the Chief of Defence Staff, and the mission will be pursued.

If the risk is even higher than that, then a process called a “targeting board” will sit, which is chaired by the Chief of Defence Staff himself, of which I and other experts are members. A decision will be made as to whether that target will be pursued.

Sir, in this particular case we knew the information ahead of time, we knew what the target was, and we knew how this was going to be laid out, so the Chief of Defence Staff was aware that this was going to happen. I knew when the mission started; when they arrived on scene, I knew that; and when they completed the mission, I knew that. I have some communications capability that allows me to do that.

So I was made aware of the successful completion of that mission on the evening of January 20. I briefed the Chief of Defence Staff, who was in Ottawa, on the details of the mission, and because the minister was airborne, and the like, he was subsequently briefed within hours the following day on the status of this mission.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, the witness said that there was no written material, that everything was discussed orally. In terms of the January 20 briefing concerning the mission, was that also strictly oral? Has the witness taken any notes during the January 20 briefing?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, sir, I did not take notes. I do not have written notes in terms of the briefing from the joint task force commander. I passed the information that I needed to pass to the chief, and then subsequently the next day to the minister. But as I said before, after the mission has occurred, the joint task force commander himself sends an after-action report as to the details that occurred. If there were any differences between the information that he had passed me verbally and what was in the written report, then that would obviously be passed to the chief and to the minister, but there was no difference.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, is the witness saying that in such a major department as the National Defence when some outside briefings come into Ottawa there are no notes taken, briefings to the minister are done without any notes and when things don't seem right, the commander's report is checked for accuracy? Is he telling us that everything is done orally in our National Defence Department?

Â (1225)

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: For missions regarding Joint Task Force 2, this information is so sensitive, from our perspective, that we do these briefings orally when things are happening, and subsequent to the mission we get a written report from the joint task force commander.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Then, Mr. Chairman, the witness agrees that this is a sensitive mission. Does he also agree that this mission creates controversy here in Canada and even in Parliament where people are concerned and wondering what Canada will do with any prisoners taken by our troops?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, if I could answer again in terms of trying to describe to Mr. Godin the processes we have in place within the ministry in terms of the objectives the government has put forward, the missions and tasks we derive from those objectives, the concept of operations that's put into place, the different orders to implement those missions and tasks, the rules of engagement that are used to allow us to determine what type of force is used, the targeting directive that's out there--a number of these processes are in place to provide a level of oversight so the actual actions of our people in the theatre are indeed accurate, professional, and done within the rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, if I was one of the people responsible for national defence, I would be concerned if I knew that my comments to the minister were not written down because the minister could come back to me and I might not remember what I had told him. The witness is telling us that he doesn't take any notes when the minister speaks to him, that he doesn't write anything in order to protect himself later. That everything is done orally.

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, I think I've explained this and it is in fact the case.

Once again I say once the mission is over we do get a report from the joint task force commander. If there's any difference--which there hasn't been--between what has been briefed orally and what is in the written report, that would obviously be brought to the attention of the chief and the minister.

An hon. member: Are we going to have another turn?

The Chair: It's up to the committee. You have one and a half minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: On January 29, or around that time, have you had discussions with the minister to clarify the January 21 briefing?

[English]

The Chair: You have about a minute.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, the minister and I had a conversation on the 29th in which I outlined again what had happened in terms of the briefing on the 21st and the issue of the mission on the 20th to remind the minister that the mission he was—

Mr. Yvon Godin: Had he lost his mind or what? He didn't take any notes?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, the minister was here to comment on this.

Mr. Yvon Godin: But he was actually checking again on it.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: He was reconfirming in his own mind.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Reconfirming. Okay, checking the notes--out of the mirror.

The Chair: The order is Marlene Catterall, Jay Hill, Tony Tirabassi, Cheryl Gallant.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.): I was just wondering if we could ask the vice-admiral to repeat his reply to the last question he was in the middle of when he was interrupted. Could he complete it, because he was cut off in the middle of his answer?

I think you were starting to say that on the 29th you....

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the 29th the minister and I had a discussion in which I reminded him of the briefing that had been given on the 21st.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: And what precisely did you remind him of at that moment, if I may ask?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Madam, what I said to the minister was basically the briefing I had given him on the 21st with respect to the JTF-2: that this was the mission in which our folks had been involved where a number of terrorists had been captured, transported, and turned over to the American authorities.

Â (1230)

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Did you at that time specifically say to him that it was our troops who captured people? Because as you just said to me and to the committee, you reminded him of the briefing on the 21st and about the fact that our troops had been involved in an operation in which detainees had been taken. In replying, you didn't say “in which Canadian forces had been involved in the taking of detainees”. There's a difference there, and that difference seems to me to be a little central to the job in front of this committee.

I presume this briefing, this conversation, took place after question period. In this conversation did you remind him specifically that the briefing on the 21st pointed out that the Canadians had taken detainees?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, madam, I did.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: In other words, you were reminding him that the photos he had seen were in fact related to the incident you had briefed him on on January 21.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's correct. I also had an opportunity to speak to the minister on January 25, on the Friday when he had returned. He was shown the picture on front of the newspaper, and I clarified to him that those were not Americans as depicted in the picture, but those were our people. So I told him that on January 25 and related it to the briefing on January 21.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I want to go back to, more generally, these briefings and how they happen. Would you normally be present while the Chief of Defence Staff is briefing the minister?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: On some occasions that is the case. On a number of other occasions that is not the case.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Were you there at the immediately previous briefing to the one you gave the minister in Mexico on January 21?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Not that I recollect.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: How long does one of these briefings normally take, the normal daily briefing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The briefing, as I've said, normally lasts between 15 and 20 minutes. It can last maybe only 10 or 15 minutes, and it also can last 30 to 35 minutes, depending on the number of different issues our Canadian Forces could be involved in, not just in Afghanistan but in the 12 other missions that are also ongoing.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: How many different items might be involved in a briefing? Obviously it varies from briefing to briefing, but would it usually be one? Would it more likely be somewhere up to five?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It could be as many as 10 or 15.

If I remember correctly, on this particular day there was certainly information in terms of the overall political situation with respect to Afghanistan, and how Mr. Karzai and his administration was functioning; what the ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force led by the British, were doing; what various warlords might be doing; there were issues surrounding the Middle East in terms of some of the difficulties that have been occurring there between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and issues with respect to India and Pakistan.

You may recall that the volcano in Goma, in the DRC, also was happening at the same time. We have Canadian folks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, so we were looking at whether there was going to be a requirement for a response there.

As well, there was information as to what our navy was doing in terms of supporting the campaign against terrorism, what the air components were doing, what the land component was doing, and indeed what the special forces were doing.

So there's quite a number of different topics that were raised in that particular briefing.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: What I hear is that so far in a 15- to 20-minute briefing, 15 different items were raised with the minister. So that would be maybe one minute per item?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Except in this case, because of the fact that this was the first mission, as we have said, in which we had captured suspected terrorists, my recollection of the briefing would have been that I was in there about five minutes with respect to this one.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: My time is up, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

Â (1235)

The Chair: With the answer where you said that as far as you could recollect you were not there, we'll take that as a no. If later you discover that's not so, you would let us know.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly.

The Chair: It's Jay Hill, Tony Tirabassi, Cheryl Gallant, Geoff Regan.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Vice-Admiral Maddison, for appearing today. As was the case with all the others, of course, we have many questions that we'd like to pose, so I appreciate the fact that in your answers you've been keeping them extremely short and to the point.

You've stated that clearly your recollection of the briefing of January 21 was that you were very clear in communicating a number of things to the minister. I wonder, how many prisoners did we capture? Did you communicate a number?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, I did communicate a number, but I'm not at liberty to tell you what that number is.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

Clearly, JTF-2 Canadians captured these suspected terrorists, not Afghans who turned them over to our troops, and then we turned them over to the Americans.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, as I have stated, I think the Canadians did capture a number of suspected terrorists.

Mr. Jay Hill: Specifically to that briefing of January 21, the oral briefing that took place over the telephone when the minister was in Mexico, to your knowledge, was there anyone else present on speakerphone or on a conference call, that type of thing, either at your end or at the minister's end, who could corroborate that the minister clearly understood that our forces had taken prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: At the minister's end, I don't know, and I certainly didn't ask him. At my end, my chief of staff operations was with me when I briefed the minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: Did that individual--perhaps you could provide his name--hear both sides of the conversation, or just your side of the conversation?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: If I recollect correctly, I think I had the speakerphone on. In terms of the minister's response, one could hear. He was in the office with me, with a closed door, obviously.

Mr. Jay Hill: What is his rank and his name?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: He is Commodore Jean Forcier.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you very much.

Now, I'd like to move on from that briefing to subsequent briefings. The minister stated during testimony before the committee that he was briefed again, sort of an update, when he was in Tampa, Florida on January 23. So that would have been two days later. To your knowledge, was there any briefing given orally, by yourself or the CDS, on January 22, on Tuesday, the next day?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, there was not.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. So then he received a briefing in Tampa, Florida, on January 23. Were you involved in that briefing at all?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, I was not involved in that briefing. He was down for the first time to take a look at our national command element, led by Commodore Pierre Thiffault in Tampa. He was briefed extensively in terms of the APOLLO operation. There was no change to any of the missions with respect to JTF-2, so I did not need to brief him with respect to JTF-2, for example. The rest of the briefing, in terms of Op APOLLO, would obviously have been done by Commodore Thiffault in Tampa.

Â (1240)

Mr. Jay Hill: Do you know if either Commodore Thiffault or anyone else at that January 23 briefing in Tampa, Florida, reiterated what you had told him on January 21--that Canadians had taken prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, just for a point of clarity here, Commodore Thiffault was the joint task force commander for Operation APOLLO, which is the conventional forces: the navy, the army, the air force. He is not responsible for the special operations forces. We have two separate joint task force commanders. One is Commodore Thiffault, and the other one is responsible for special forces. Both of them come to the CDS through me. So Commodore Thiffault would not have been at all informed or know anything about JTF-2 operations.

Mr. Jay Hill: And the CDS was not involved in that briefing of January 23?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, he was not. He was out of the country.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

Let's move on to the next day then. It would be Thursday, January 24. Were any briefings given to the minister that would have reiterated that Canadians had taken prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: On that particular day I was engaged in something else, and my chief of staff, Commodore Forcier, briefed the minister.

Mr. Jay Hill: Do you know if Commodore Forcier told the minister again, reiterated, refreshed his memory, if you will, or conveyed to him in any way that prisoners had been taken?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I don't know whether he did or not.

Mr. Jay Hill: In reply to a question from one of my colleagues, you stated that you had a conversation with the minister on Friday, January 25. At that time, did you have any conversation with the minister during your briefing that would have again conveyed to him that JTF-2 had taken prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That was the day on which the minister had returned to Ottawa, if I recollect correctly. I was asked to come to see him and we discussed the picture that was in the newspaper. It was at that particular point in time that I said to the minister, “Those are Canadians, and they refer to the mission that occurred on January 20 that you were briefed about on January 21”.

Mr. Jay Hill: So you reminded him on the 25th of January that we had taken prisoners and specifically that the photograph was of this.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's correct, and I gave some additional very specific information, which was quite sensitive, about that particular mission at the same one.

Mr. Jay Hill: How much time have I got?

The Chair: Four minutes.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

The minister has stated that over the weekend, because there was some confusion--I forget his exact wording--he wanted to seek further details. Were you involved in any briefings over the weekend? That would be January 26 to 27, prior to the House resuming the next week.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, in fact I briefed the minister on Saturday morning and on Sunday. They were the normal sorts of operations briefings. There was nothing that had changed from the information that obviously had been passed on January 21 and January 25, so there was no need to raise any issues surrounding the operation on January 20 in those briefings.

Mr. Jay Hill: So since nothing had changed, then, I'm led to believe that you did not remind the minister during the briefings that you gave him on Saturday morning, January 26, and Sunday, January 27, that prisoners had been taken. Or was that discussed?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That was not discussed.

Mr. Jay Hill: It was not discussed. But by this point in time, with the briefing on January 21, the briefing on January 25, which also involved referring to the photograph, clearly your understanding was that it was very clear to the minister that prisoners had been taken by Canadian Forces, specifically by JTF-2.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: I’m sure that you follow what happens in the House of Commons. How did you feel, knowing what you did, when on the Monday in question period, and that night during a take-note debate specific to our operations in Afghanistan, you saw or heard that the minister did not reveal this to Canadians when he was specifically asked? Did it surprise you? Did it puzzle you? Because it would be completely contrary to your understanding of what the minister knew.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I didn't have the opportunity to watch the take-note debates, so, quite frankly, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Jay Hill: You weren't aware of that on January 28? When did you become aware that the minister was embroiled in these conflicting or what would appear to be contradictory or conflicting statements about us taking prisoners?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: If I recollect properly, I think it was on Tuesday, January 29.

Mr. Jay Hill: I have one final statement or question to the admiral for this round, and I'm on the list again.

The minister stated that he waited eight days to inform the Prime Minister, the cabinet, and more importantly, I believe, Canadians, because he was, I think the quote is, “waiting for further details”. What details did you or the CDS provide to the minister that would have further enlightened him, or reinforced his view of what had happened that would explain--or at least potentially explain--his lapse in memory?

Â (1245)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Could I be clear on what timeframe you're talking about here, sir?

Mr. Jay Hill: The minister has stated that he waited eight days. The reason why he waited eight days to inform the cabinet, the Prime Minister, and Canadians--by Canadians I mean through the House of Commons on Monday, January 28--was that he needed further details. What details did you provide subsequent to January 28 that would cause the minister to change his story the next day, January 29, that he did not have from the briefing on January 21, or the briefing on January 25, or the briefings over the weekend?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: With respect to all the details from my perspective in terms of how that mission unfolded, some of the information in terms of the major information was conveyed on January 21, but the rest of the details on January 25.

Mr. Jay Hill: So he had that. There were no further details provided.

The Chair: Jay, you're already over time.

Mr. Jay Hill: I see.

The Chair: Admiral, just so you know, this is going to be the last ten-minute round. It's going to be shared by two government members and then we proceed to five-minute sessions in a similar way.

So it's Tony Tirabassi, Geoff Regan, Cheryl Gallant, Joe Jordan, and Michel Guimond.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi (Niagara Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to convey my appreciation to Admiral Maddison for his appearance here today.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi:Admiral Maddison, I'd like you to describe for us the difference, if any, between an oral telephone briefing and a one-on-one, across-the-desk briefing that may take place in a room here in Ottawa at the Department of National Defence, wherever the minister has his briefings. Is there a difference in structure generally speaking, a difference in formality, depth of detail? In other words, are there any significant advantages or disadvantages to one over the other?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: From my perspective, there is no difference. The sort of information that is passed, whether it's on a phone or face to face, is the same.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi: What about the hard copy, for instance, in a one-on-one briefing across the table? Obviously it's impossible, over the telephone airwaves, to exchange notes. On certain issues, might there not be an exchange of paper with the minister, for his perusal at a later time?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly in terms of Operation APOLLO itself, when I brief the Chief of Defence Staff, and subsequently when the chief briefs the minister, that is done on an oral basis. But later on in the day--on Operation APOLLO, not the special forces--there is a written report that goes to the minister and the Privy Council Office on the issues that occur surrounding the conventional forces. But in terms of the special operations forces, there is no written report that goes.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi: Okay.

When you or the CDS is briefing the minister, do you assist the minister with categorizing the information he is receiving? Do you say, for example, “Mr. Minister, this issue we just spoke about is highly classified”, or, “Mr. Minister, this information is for your information only”, or, “Mr. Minister, at this present time this issue is being acted upon in accordance with the guidelines, but it may evolve into something else; we'll keep you posted”? Do you make those types of recommendations to the minister?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly on a number of occasions, particularly when dealing with the special operations forces, I try to make it very clear that it is sensitive information. When there are other issues developing.... When we were going through the process of planning for the deployment of the 3 PPCLI Battle Group, there were other issues that were having an impact on that.

We would--I would, when I had the opportunity--with the chief, and presumably the chief with the minister, put some caveats, in terms of saying, “We know this information from a certain source; it's very sensitive”. They would pass that on to me and the chief, and I know from the chief to the minister.

Mr. Tony Tirabassi: With regard to the telephone briefing on that infamous Monday the 21st, do you remember, once you apprised the minister of what was happening with the capturing of the prisoners, suggesting or recommending the classification of material on that particular issue?

Â (1250)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: : I'm not certain whether I said that this was very sensitive. I just can't remember whether I did or not. But I certainly was clear in terms of from my perspective what the mission was all about, that it had been done in a safe and secure manner, and that we had captured individuals, transported them, and handed them over to the Americans.

The Chair: Geoff Regan, for five minutes.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let's go back to the 29th for a minute. Would you go over how it came to your attention what the minister said and what you said to him that day?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: On the 29th, Mr. Regan?

Mr. Geoff Regan: Yes.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As I recall, it was after question period.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Did you watch question period?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, I did, and subsequently when the minister came back I took the opportunity to discuss this matter with the minister, with the Chief of Defence Staff, the three of us, and to go over with the minister in terms of what had transpired previously to indicate that he had been briefed on this issue on the 21st.

Mr. Geoff Regan: And how did the minister react?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think if I could put in visual language, so to speak, there was a click and he said, “Right, you're right, it did happen that way”.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So what was your sense of the minister's understanding of the situation prior to that click?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not sure I can answer that, Mr. Chairman. I think he recognized then that he'd made a mistake here.

Mr. Geoff Regan: No, before the click. In other words, before you reminded him the 21st, what was your impression of his understanding of the thing?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: From my perspective, my understanding was that I thought it was clear to him what had transpired on the 21st.

Mr. Geoff Regan: I'm not talking about several days earlier. I mean when you saw him stand up in the House of Commons and say “I was informed on the 25th”, what was your impression at that point after hearing this from him, and as you began your meeting with him that afternoon but before you told him the situation? That's what I'm talking about.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: My sense was that there was some confusion there, and that when the minister came back to our headquarters the chief and I needed to sit down with the minister and to remind him of what had happened previously.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So the minister stood up on the 29th and said in the House, “I was first informed on the 25th”, you saw that, and in your meeting afterwards you said, “Minister, you're mistaken about that, you were informed on the 21st”.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Right.

Mr. Geoff Regan: And he said “oh”, or something like that.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's quite correct.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Let's go back to the 25th for a second. First of all, I want to ask about the fact that on the 25th the minister saw the photograph for the first time, we understand, and you connected for him that photograph with the fact that Canadian troops had taken prisoners. What was his reaction to that at the time?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: When the minister came back and asked me to come and talk to him, wanted to see me, he asked me whether the picture in the paper was indeed that of American soldiers. I said, “No, Minister, those are Canadians, and they relate to the mission that occurred on January 20, on which I briefed you in Mexico on the 21st.” I provided some further specific details of the mission, which are sensitive, and I left on that particular occasion with the minister with the belief that the minister well understood the mission itself that had occurred on the 20th.

Mr. Geoff Regan: When you made it clear to him that the photograph was of Canadians taking these prisoners and that Canadians had taken the prisoners, what was his reaction?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: My answer to that is that he basically nodded his head and said “I understand”.

Â (1255)

The Chair: Colleagues, that's the end of the ten-minute rounds. The admiral looks almost as fit as I am, so he's fine.

We're now in five-minute rounds, and I know this is important. The list I have is Cheryl Gallant, Joe Jordan, Michel Guimond, Yvon Godin, Jay Hill, and Leon Benoit. That's the list I have. I would ask you to keep to it.

Admiral, I would suggest to you that if you feel you have answered something before, I would be grateful if you would simply say that. I will from time to time try to say it, even if a member has asked it. They're entitled to ask you the question, but you're entitled to say “I think I answered that before”.

Colleagues, you understand why I'm explaining that.

Cheryl Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Mr. Chairman, the opposition is finished asking questions.

The Chair: Cheryl, I appreciate you saying that.

Joe Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Vice-Admiral, I just want to give you a little bit of background as to why we're here, because you indicated that it's not your practice to watch Commons proceedings, and I certainly don't fault you for that.

We've had a very direct reference from the House to this committee to address the issue of the Minister of National Defence. Before the House of Commons, one day he said he found out the details on the Friday, and then the next day he corrected that and said it was actually within 24 hours of when the action took place, which would have been the regular procedure. That's the issue we're dealing with here. Where we go from here is going to be directly as a result of your statements, because you're the only other person who was involved in that briefing on January 21.

What's critical here is not so much whether the statements the minister gave the House were accurate--clearly the first statement was not accurate, because the minister corrected it--but whether the minister deliberately did it. That's the issue we have to address here.

I guess my only question to you, as the only other person involved directly in that briefing on January 2.... It's your sense that you came away from that meeting having provided clear details of what took place. I don't think anybody is saying that's not true, but that's your impression. From your side, the briefing on January 21 involved a very clear description of the mission and what took place on that mission.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's my sense of the conversation we had.

Mr. Joe Jordan: But then subsequently to that--and all we really have to go on are the actions of the minister--it became apparent that the minister was acting and speaking as a person who may not have received the information in the same form and with the same clarity in which it was given.

What I'm getting at here is that if the minister's explanation, the testimony that he gave before the committee, accurately reflects what happened, then we can save people a lot of time here. As the only other person involved, in your view, has the minister accurately reflected the sequence of events? We are going to have to study your testimony, and we'll all be repeating it and spinning it any way we want.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: This is the work of the committee. That is who is going to make that decision.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Vic Toews: That's exactly right.

The Chair: I have to explain that I misunderstood. All of the opposition parties pulled their questions, and I just thought you should know that. You have the floor, and I misunderstood that.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I appreciate that, and I think we're going to be finished here in short order as well.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): I have a point of order.

The Chair: Yes, a point of order.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'm wondering if you're referring to the first time the minister presented his position of what had happened, or the second time.

The Chair: As usual on a point of order, Joe, you can reply if you wish.

Mr. Joe Jordan: As usual, it's a partisan stunt, and I think what we're trying to avoid is that sort of activity.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jay Hill: And what you're doing isn't?

Mr. Joe Jordan: What I'm doing is not a partisan stunt, sir. I'm saying that this gentleman stood before us and said that he has overseen a difficult and dangerous mission, and I would suggest that his appearance here today is probably taking away from that. I think we've had enough press conferences and enough media scrums on this issue.

I have one last question, sir. As a military person, how many years of military experience do you have, sir?

· (1300)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Actually, I could probably answer that by saying 50 years. I'm only 52, but the reason I say that is that my father was in the forces. As a dependant, I've been involved in this profession for all of my life, quite frankly, but I joined in 1968.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Sir, let's suppose, then, that the Minister of National Defence, hypothetically, is in possession of information about JTF-2 in which, given a sequence of events and the logistics involved in his mind, he is not absolutely clear on either the details or other operational information. From a military perspective, would you prefer that this minister go public with that information in the interests of transparency, or err on the side of safety and not go public with JTF-2 unless it's absolutely vital that he do so?

The Chair: That's the last question.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not sure, Mr. Chairman, that it's within my purview to answer that question.

The Chair: I agree.

I again apologize to our witness for the way we started.

Admiral Maddison, I want to thank you for being with us and for what I think has been a very useful testimony.

I also want to thank you for what you and your colleagues have done. You previously mentioned those of you who were involved in the ice storm, those of you who were involved in the floods, in the peacekeeping missions, and particularly those involved at the moment in the Afghan theatre--on land, on sea, and in the air. I would like you to convey to them, on our behalf and on behalf of the House of Commons, that we greatly appreciate what they're doing.

(Applause from the audience)

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Colleagues, we will meet again at 3:30 in this room, when our witness is Jim Judd, Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence. We resume again at 7:30, when we have the Chief of the Defence Staff here.

This meeting is adjourned.