NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, April 29, 1999

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[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order. We're here today to receive yet another briefing on the situation in Kosovo.

We have with us today witnesses from the Department of National Defence in the persons of Lieutenant-General Raymond Henault, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; and Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison, Chief of Maritime Staff.

With us as well is Mr. Charles Bassett, vice-president of the central and eastern Europe branch of the Canadian International Development Agency; and Hélène Corneau, program manager, central and eastern Europe program.

Welcome, lady and gentlemen.

Lieutenant-General Henault, do you have an opening statement you wish to make?

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Yes. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I do today.

I don't believe Mr. Wright is going to be here this afternoon. We're going to go primarily with an update and a naval presentation, which is why Admiral Maddison has joined me here today.

I will give you a very brief update on the last 48 hours, and then I'll hand over to Admiral Maddison, who will give you a good presentation on naval operations.

[Translation]

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and committee members.

[English]

The NATO military situation is this. Over the last 48 hours, since I last spoke to you, NATO aircraft have flown a total of 740 sorties, of which 175 were strike missions. Those were against a wide variety of targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I can tell you that the total number for today, by the way, was in excess of 650 sorties planned, so because of good weather, there is an escalation in the activity levels.

The targets over the last 48 hours include, over this current period, both Serb and special police assembly areas; infrastructure support sites; petrol, oil, and lubricant facilities, which have been common in the past as well; active radar sites; of course munitions storage areas; concentrations of forces; radio relay sites; and so on.

Also, as you may have noted from previous reporting or from our NATO briefings or from the British briefing today, the airfield at Podgorica, Montenegro was hit today, primarily because it's a staging area for Yugoslav aircraft conducting operations in Kosovo.

[Translation]

General Clarke, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, now has more than 700 airplanes, including those based on American, French and British aircraft carriers present in the Adriatic. All the airplanes on these aircraft carriers are available to General Clarke.

[English]

NATO of course continues to support non-governmental organizations, as represented here by CIDA, and other governmental institutions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania in the relief effort. To date, just for your information, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of NATO have delivered in excess of 3,000 tonnes of food and water to the refugees in the different camps in both Albania and Macedonia, in excess of 850 tonnes of medical supplies, and in excess of 1,600 tonnes of tentage.

For the information of parliamentarians, some of the NATO planning issues being worked on in NATO at the moment include the maritime search and visit regime in the Adriatic, which I know you're very interested in, with Admiral Maddison's presence here today. It's currently under review by nations and by the SACEUR authorities of course.

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Another planning issue is third-party assistance to internally displaced persons in Kosovo, including all of the options, such as air drop options and so on. Those feasibility studies are still ongoing in NATO.

In terms of our operations, in the past 48 hours, we have flown 22 CF-18 sorties of a total planned number of 30. Eight were cancelled due to unfavourable weather, which continues to plague us. However, the next several days are expected to be very good. Over the last 48 hours, our aircraft have hit highway bridges in Serbia, storage facilities, and concentrations of troop and assembly areas.

Having received government approval on Tuesday as well, I've since issued the order to the relevant land and air forces to prepare to deploy to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The preparations are ongoing. As we mentioned previously, our intent is to have them operational in theatre within 60 days.

For that reason, the men and women of the Canadian Forces, primarily from Land Force Western Area, or the brigade based in Edmonton, and one Canadian air division, are completing their pre-deployment preparations—the preparation of vehicles, primarily, for loading on rail and so on. That contingent is expected to be operational in theatre for a target date of 25 June.

That's all I have to mention for today, Mr. Pratt.

[Translation]

Thank you for your attention. I'd now like to turn the floor over to the Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral Maddison, who will give you a briefing on maritime operations.

[English]

Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison (Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, distinguished members of the standing committee, mesdames et messieurs.

It's my pleasure to speak to you today about maritime interdiction operations. I'll provide a short introduction to the concept of maritime interdiction operations and the three basic categories under which it is conducted. Then I'll highlight recent Canadian experience in this type of operation, and close with a short overview of some of the considerations regarding the current situation.

There are essentially three categories of operations that involve the interdiction of commercial maritime trade.

[Translation]

The first is that of visit and search. Under international law, warships have the right to approach and visit any vessel other than military or government vessels, in international waters, at any time, if that vessel is suspected of conducting illegal activities such as piracy or being involved in transporting slaves for example.

[English]

A second category is embargo operations. It is one of the measures designed to resolve disputes through actions short of actual combat. Maritime embargoes have in recent decades normally been conducted under United Nations Security Council resolutions passed to deal with specific situations. Embargoes are normally targeted at specific commodities such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles, and oil, as examples.

The final category is blockade. A blockade attempts to prevent all material from entering a given area of operations between two belligerents. To conduct such an operation, a number of sequential steps occur at sea.

A commercial vessel is approached and hailed by radio. A number of questions are asked of the vessel to determine its cargo, its port of registry, its destination, its last port, and so on. This information is then passed by the warship to a command ship in theatre, which, through various means, verifies the information provided by the commercial vessel. Assuming that the vessel's information is verified and that it is bound for a port not in the area of operations, it can be cleared to proceed unescorted to its intended port of call.

If, however, the declared port is within the area of operations, or for some other reason the vessel is assessed as suspicious, the decision to board will be passed to the warship's commanding officer by the force commander at sea. The warship will prepare itself to board, and when ready, will inform the target vessel of its intent to board.

The vessel is then boarded, either by fast boats or by helicopter. The ship's documents, cargo, charts, crew lists, and so on are inspected, and the decision is made whether to clear the vessel to its declared destination or to divert it to another port.

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To do this successfully, a commander at sea has to know exactly what is going on in his or her maritime area of responsibility. As a result, these operations are normally supported by maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters. In particular, helicopters—Sea Kings, in our case—have the unique capability of assisting in the surveillance of the area, hailing vessels by radio themselves, lowering a boarding party to a vessel being boarded, and being used for logistics resupply. The ships patrol assigned areas, conduct most of the boardings by boat, and make the final recommendation as to whether a commercial vessel should be cleared or not.

[Translation]

These types of operations. Our Navy has conducted a number of maritime interdiction operations in the last nine years.

[English]

In the Persian Gulf, since 1990, there have been five separate deployments, involving seven Canadian ships. The most recent of these was HMCS Ottawa's six-month Persian Gulf deployment last year. HMCS Regina will deploy in June of this year to the Persian Gulf to participate with a multinational force enforcing the embargo against Iraq.

We've also conducted maritime interdiction operations in the Red Sea, off the coast of Haiti, and in the Adriatic itself. Indeed, for these last two, Haiti and the Adriatic, it was Canadian commanders who initially set up and executed the embargo operations with coalition and NATO partners. I personally had the privilege of commanding for a year a multinational naval force conducting embargo operations against Serbia and Montenegro in 1993 and 1994. In the Adriatic, Canada has maintained a continuous presence to support this previous operation from June 1993 to May 1996.

These activities have greatly enhanced our ability for these types of operations. Indeed, in these operations, allied commanders have been enormously impressed with our capabilities. We have well-trained and well-disciplined ships' companies, excellent ships, and the right equipment to conduct maritime embargo operations.

At present, as I think you are aware, a Canadian ship, HMCS Athabaskan, is the flagship, or the command ship, for NATO's immediate reaction force, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. As well, a Canadian, Commodore David Morse, is the NATO commander of this force. Should an embargo occur, this force is one of the options being considered by NATO for deployment.

With respect to our current situation, for a possible embargo in the Adriatic, there are some considerations I'd like to highlight.

First, these are waters in which we have had recent experience conducting similar operations. We know this area of operations. Geographically, the Strait of Otranto, between Italy and Albania to the south, is a natural choke point for ships going in and out of the Adriatic, where the boarding of ships could be done outside of Serbian weapons capabilities.

The Serbian navy and air force have minimal but some capability to conduct offensive operations within their territorial waters. NATO have significant offensive and defensive power in this area, should it ever be required, including the capabilities within the Standing Naval Force Atlantic itself, should it be deployed.

Finally, we would only operate from a solid legal basis.

In summary, ladies and gentlemen, assuming that a solid legal basis can be established and that a clear mandate can be provided to the military commanders and to NATO, the international community has the forces available to conduct a maritime interdiction operation, should it be required by NATO. Please be assured that the Canadian navy has the skills, experience, training, capability, and equipment to effectively participate in such an embargo, both as a participant and as a force commander.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Vice-Admiral and Lieutenant-General.

Mr. Wright, welcome back to the committee. Do you have any comments you'd like to make today?

Mr. Jim Wright (Director General for Central, East, and South Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much. I apologize for my late arrival.

Perhaps I could give just a few remarks concerning Mr. Axworthy's ongoing visit to Moscow. We don't have a lot of details.

[Translation]

He had two important meetings today. He took part in a meeting with Minister Ivanov, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Giorgos Papandreou. After this meeting he had a private conversation with the Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, and he will be dining this evening with Giorgos Papandreou from Greece.

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[English]

Tomorrow he will be having a detailed meeting with Mr. Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister.

In terms of some very general observations, Mr. Axworthy has made clear to his interlocutors that the United Nations and NATO have five conditions that President Milosevic must agree to, and that the UN Security Council has to be involved in the road ahead. Mr. Axworthy is very pleased to see Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, in Moscow, directly engaged in the process.

The focus of attention right now very clearly is on the modalities of implementing a peace process. Mr. Axworthy is there as both a NATO partner and a UN Security Council member in that search for peace. Mr. Axworthy will be also addressing the question of the humanitarian crisis in and around Kosovo. That perhaps gives you the main parameters around which the discussions are taking place.

The minister will be pushing a number of very specific themes while he is there. He will emphasize that following the Washington summit, NATO is very united in the air campaign, that there is also unity of purpose in NATO in a search for a diplomatic solution, and that NATO is committed to preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. There were concerns on the part of Russia that the international community might be considering a change of borders, and Mr. Axworthy and NATO leaders in Washington made very clear that that was not in the cards.

We will also be making the point very clearly that NATO has to be at the core of an international military force in Kosovo for two reasons. Number one, we want to reassure the Kosovars that they can return safely. In essence, if there is no NATO presence in that international peacekeeping force, the refugees will not return. Likewise, we want to ensure the KLA is disarmed. The risk you run with no NATO presence on the ground in an international peacekeeping force is that the wrong refugees will return—in other words, the refugees with Kalashnikovs and uniforms, instead of refugees returning home.

The final point he will be pushing is the need to ensure that the UN Security Council is directly involved in all aspects of the peace implementation process.

I think I'll stop there, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you for your comments. We'll go to a round of questioning now.

Since we don't have all that many people around the table, perhaps we could expand the length of the questions to two minutes.

Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Maddison, I don't think anyone has any concern at all that the Athabaskan and its crew are capable. I think we all know the ship is capable of command and also that the Tribal-class destroyer is first-rate in the navies of the world today. So that's not the concern.

I suppose most Canadians are asking whether this is an escalation of the conflict and what ramifications that will have, in particular when you're looking at Russia. That is our concern there.

The other question I want to raise is with regard to our 800 peacekeepers we're sending. Everyone now knows they're going to be attached to the 4th British Armoured Brigade. My concern is this. The best-case scenario is that there will be a peace agreement and they will move in as peacekeepers. But in the event that that doesn't happen, the worst-case scenario is that they will move into a non-permissive environment. What's going to happen to our troops at that point? It doesn't seem to me they would be able to just come back to Canada at that point, and in fact they would be a part of a ground combat mission.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'll answer the first question, if I may.

Ultimately the goal of a maritime embargo would be to reduce the flow of petroleum and war materials to Mr. Milosevic's war machine. What you may or may not know is that in terms of Russia, for a number of years now, we have had what is known as an Incidents at Sea agreement between Russia, Canada, the United States, and a number of other nations to avoid incidents at sea and to de-escalate any tensions that might occur.

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We have signals and codes that we pass back and forth to make sure there is no misunderstanding between the actions we might do and the actions the Russians might do—to make sure in fact that we do not have any escalation in any tensions when we happen to be operating in the same water space.

Mr. Jim Wright: Could I add something on the question of Russia?

This past weekend in Washington, the Prime Minister made clear on a couple of occasions that in terms of the oil embargo, there would be no intention of provoking Russia in whatever action NATO agrees to. The Prime Minister spoke fairly clearly on this issue.

Mr. Jim Hart: Okay. And what about the second question, with respect to the ground troops?

LGen Raymond Henault: With respect to ground troops, you're absolutely right, Mr. Hart; they have trained to do peacekeeping duties in a permissive environment, as we've mentioned previously. That doesn't mean they're not combat-capable. Of course all of our forces are multipurpose and combat-capable, so they are obviously trained to that level.

Nonetheless, though, the permissive environment is what they're going into. That's what we've signed up to with our NATO allies. If that were to change, there would have to be another round of consultation with Parliament, as the Prime Minister and the minister have already indicated.

We do know that every capability that's required to do the job, as we currently understand it, is there. We have a very clear picture of what's going on in the contingent in that we always deploy a national command element. We haven't talked about this in a lot of detail, but we have both a national support and a national command element.

That national command element is led by a full colonel, who has a staff of some 50 who provide the link and the liaison between Canada, the contingent commander, and the actual contingent we're sending in there, Op Kinetic. He provides the advice back to us on employment. He ensures that we have employment, as we understand it, in accordance with what Canada has signed up to.

We do this for all of our missions, by the way. In Aviano, for example, we have Colonel Dwight Davies, who is our national contingent commander.

Therefore the Canadians who go into this operation go under the command of a Canadian. Command responsibility rests with the Chief of Defence Staff. They're placed under the operational control of the operational commander in theatre, and that will be the commander of the U.K. brigade, obviously, the British brigade. Any change would then have to come back to us, and we would have to go through the normal process of consultation before they took on a different mission.

Mr. Jim Hart: But if we decided not to participate in that and the British did, wouldn't we be leaving a hole? If for some weeks they had been training with the British and the British moved into a non-permissive environment, and Canada turned tail and ran home, wouldn't we be leaving—

LGen Raymond Henault: I would suggest that is a change that would have to be introduced by SACEUR and by NATO. It would also have to be endorsed by the North Atlantic Council, and in doing so, you have to do it by consensus. Therefore all nations would then be in a position to agree that there be a change to the actual mission and the mandate. So it could not be done unilaterally by the British.

Mr. Wright might be able to give a little more information on that, but that's the way I understand it. I can't see that happening as you describe it, where the British would unilaterally decide to go into a non-permissive environment.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): We can go back to that at a later time, Mr. Hart.

I'll recognize Monsieur Turp at this point.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Mr. Laurin will be the first to speak.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Good enough.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): So far we have been unable to receive assurances that the Americans are not providing oil to the Serbs. The question was put in the House of Commons but the Prime Minister was unable to reassure us on this point. He did state that Canadians were not providing any, but we know that Texaco sent a shipment of 65,000 gallons or barrels 15 days after the beginning of hostilities.

Will the naval embargo enable us to find out? Since Canada is to command the naval force, will it adopt the same stand towards American vessels as to Russian vessels? How will this operation take place?

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[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Monsieur Laurin, to answer your question, before any maritime embargo would be put into place, there would obviously be very clear direction to the naval commanders as to what they could and could not do. There's also a very strong intelligence network that would indicate various ships, shipping companies, and so on that the commander would have to be aware of.

And certainly if we were to put an embargo in place where we are attempting to reduce the flow of oil to Mr. Milosevic's war machine, if you will, it would be very clear well in advance the restrictions that would apply to any vessels from various nations, in terms of importing that oil to Montenegro and into Serbia from Montenegro.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Have the maritime embargo operations begun? Can you inform us about the directives that have been given?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, the embargo has not commenced, or a naval operation has not commenced, in this regard. Right now NATO planners and military planners are looking at the various options open to them to commence some sort of operation in the Adriatic. A number of different factors are being considered in terms of what type of embargo may be put into place. Legal considerations are being actively examined by legal experts, not only from our country, but from the various nations within the alliance. I expect that within a number of days, those options will become a bit more visible for nations to consider, but there is work at the moment to put together those options. But certainly the embargo has not started.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: There has also been talk about dropping food supplies by parachute. Is it possible to conduct such an operation without it being considered military aggression above the 800,000 people wandering about Kosovo and, if so, is there a real danger of attack? If such a danger exists, would it be possible to drop such supplies by parachute and at the same time protect the airplanes doing this job?

LGen Raymond Henault: The parachuting option is still being considered by NATO and the Supreme Commander, as we already mentioned.

At the same time, the military committee has examined this parachuting option in relation to the risk for the airplanes, and particularly for the crews. In view of the activities underway and the risk for airplanes, such parachuting should be done at a low altitude in order to be efficient. A plane like a C-130 flying at low altitude and at slow speed would be vulnerable to any anti- aircraft system, either a missile or canon fire one. So at the present time this option is considered too risky to be implemented. There would have to be agreements or even a cease-fire before embarking on such an undertaking because of the risk for crews.

We have not yet made any final decision on parachuting but I know that the military committee is looking into all options of this type, particularly within Kosovo.

Mr. René Laurin: Could NGOs carry out this operation?

LGen Raymond Henault: NGOs would run the same risk as military aircraft, in my opinion, unless their planes were obviously very different from the military ones.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I'd like to add a little bit to that question in terms of food shortages in Kosovo. Obviously the situation for the internally displaced people is of immediate concern to the international community.

We know a number of international organizations—in particular the UNHCR, the International Red Cross, and the World Food Programme—are all talking to Belgrade, trying to get cooperation from the Yugoslav authorities to get the necessary guarantees from them for the safety of aid organizations to get food supplies into Kosovo. We have not got those guarantees up until now. A lot of the NGOs in fact had significant stockpiles of food and other supplies in Kosovo before the crisis began, and all of these have been either burned or looted by Serb forces.

• 1550

So in addition to the options NATO is looking at, international organizations and NGOs are trying to see what they can do to help internally displaced people on the ground. They're not getting the kind of cooperation they need from Belgrade. There has been very limited access to date by NGOs. I think there's been possibly one organization from Greece and I think a chapter of Médecins sans frontières, and I think when that was done, it was done on the understanding with Belgrade that this would be assistance not just for the Kosovars, but for the Serbs as well.

So this is being looked at, and it's being looked at urgently, but there is not in place right now an international strategy to respond to the needs of the Kosovars.

I should also add that we have been trying on the UN Security Council to see whether or not a Security Council resolution could gain acceptance from all countries—a neutral Security Council resolution calling on all parties to respect the needs of the internally displaced people in Kosovo and facilitate the arrival of humanitarian relief. Sadly, up until now, the UN Security Council has not been able to achieve a consensus on this. A number of countries with vetoes have refused to cooperate on such a resolution.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

I'm going to have to go to Mr. Earle at this point. I'm sure we'll be able to get back to that line of questioning, but in fairness to the members of the committee, they should all be allowed generally the same length of time.

Mr. Earle, followed by Mr. Price, then Mr. Reed, and then Mr. Turp.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

First of all I'd like a little clarification around embargoes and blockades. You've mentioned that you will only operate on a solid legal basis. Being a layperson, I see a distinction between an embargo and a blockade, but they may be a little bit different militarily.

An embargo, as I understand from the dictionary, is something a state would impose upon itself that would prevent goods from going out of its territory or coming in, whereas a blockade would be something an enemy would impose upon a state whereby it would prevent things from going into that port. There's quite a bit of difference between the two. So which are we really talking about here in the present conflict?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Well, I'll admit right at the very beginning that I'm not a legal expert, Mr. Earle, but what we're really talking about here, from my perspective as a naval commander at sea, is an embargo, not a blockade. A blockade is very much between two belligerents, if you will—two nations that are at war—where one nation is trying to stop all goods going into the other nation. That's not my understanding of what is going to be occurring in this case. In this particular case, we're trying to develop an operation by which we target certain commodities and restrict their flow into, in this case, Montenegro, or Serbia through Montenegro, such as arms and oil.

Mr. Gordon Earle: This may be an interpretation of war and conflict and that kind of technicality, but I would say we have two opposing sides here, one bombing the other, and it seems to me when one side says they're going to prevent material from going in, that's pretty much a blockade. However, we'll leave that to the legal experts.

I'd like to move on to the other issue of the bombing of Montenegro. It was explained that that was because there was an airfield there that was being used by the Serbs, but nonetheless it still seems to be moving into another territory. Was there any kind of agreement or understanding by Montenegro that that was acceptable, or is this in fact an escalation that could be looked upon by Montenegro as an invasion of their territory?

LGen Raymond Henault: Before Mr. Wright starts, I would just reiterate that the bombing of the airfield was done because that airfield is one of the primary airfields. In fact it's just outside the capital city, as you're aware, and it is one of their primary air-to-ground aircraft airfields, so they do launch low-level and air-to-ground attacks from that particular airfield. That was the primary reason it was targeted by NATO.

I'll turn it over to Mr. Wright, though, for the legalities.

• 1555

Mr. Jim Wright: Thank you very much.

NATO has made very clear right from the very beginning its support for the democratically elected government in Montenegro. Montenegro is one of the two republics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On that territory of the republic are Yugoslav armed forces. The second army of the Yugoslav government is based there. There are strategic assets—command-and-control, air defence, airport, and other strategic facilities—that are used by Serb forces in their campaign of repression against Kosovar citizens.

NATO is doing everything in its power to ensure that there is as limited damage as possible in the Republic of Montenegro, but at the same time, NATO has no choice but to degrade those essential strategic assets of the Yugoslav authorities on the ground in Montenegro, just as we are doing in Serbia and just as we are doing in Kosovo, to ensure that NATO prevails in this.

Our understanding is that the government of President Djukanovic understands full well the position of NATO. Clearly he would prefer that there be no bombing in his republic. We would prefer not to do that as well. But the fact of the matter is that these are strategic assets that help feed the war machine of Mr. Milosevic, and we cannot leave them untouched.

Mr. Gordon Earle: You mentioned five conditions that NATO is insisting Milosevic must agree to, and that's been fairly consistent throughout; that's been stated each time. It seems to me one is in a position where if one is insisting upon those five conditions and yet one is trying to find peace, and there is no give and take on any of the areas, it's going to be a constant stalemate.

I have seen a copy of the Simitis plan, the Greek peace plan, and I have heard of other peace plans. To me these seem reasonable approaches, but they may not embody all five of what NATO is insisting upon, one of which being, I think, the NATO international force going in.

I notice today you said NATO is a core part of the force, and you didn't say “NATO-led”. Is that a bit of a compromise there in order to facilitate bringing about a peace, or are we still sticking so rigidly to the five that there will never be any chance of getting a peace?

Mr. Jim Wright: The condition you're referring to in the five, and what Rambouillet talked about, is an international military force on the ground in Kosovo to provide the Kosovars the security and safety they need to be able to return home. That's the first point.

The second point is that Greece of course is a member of NATO, a full member of NATO, and fully subscribed to the results of the NATO summit this past weekend in Washington, D.C.

The communiqué that was issued by NATO in Washington refers to the need for an international military force on the ground, where NATO would provide a core representation. NATO also invites Russia and other countries to participate in that particular international military force.

You're right; the language of Rambouillet referred to “NATO-led”, and this past weekend NATO was referring to core representation from NATO. I think what you can take that to mean is we are still looking for the experience, the skills, the command-and-control, and the rules of engagement NATO can offer in terms of administering, overseeing, and participating in an international military force on the ground. But there is a very clear signal to Moscow and an invitation for them to participate and for other countries to participate as well.

It's important to remember that in the case of Bosnia, over 40 countries are represented on the stabilization force there, including Russia, Ukraine, and a number of other countries as well.

That's the kind of model we are looking at.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here today. We realize you're under a very heavy work schedule these days.

I have a couple of questions.

• 1600

I was quite interested to hear the vice-admiral say he'd already been through an embargo search and visit situation. Coming out of the Black Sea and going up the Danube, where most of the resupplying is taking place now, and going through Romania.... Of course this is all hypothetical, because it isn't in place at the moment, but should we put embargo search and visit in place, would that be done in the Black Sea, dealing basically with Russian resupplying up through? And what about Romania? Are they on board on this? If it doesn't happen in the Black Sea area, is it going to happen within Romania? We don't want to stop trade going on within Romania at the same time as we're blocking things going to Serbia.

That is my first question. I have another one I can come back on after.

Mr. Jim Wright: This is a question for each country to decide.

It was a hypothetical question you put to me, so I'll give you a factual response. You may have noticed that about three weeks ago there was a “humanitarian shipment” from Russia to Yugoslavia that transited Hungary. In that shipment there were a number of vehicles that were deemed by the Hungarian authorities to be military vehicles, and the Hungarian authorities made the judgment that there was an excess supply of fuel in that particular convoy. In that case the Hungarian government stopped those vehicles that they deemed to be military and stopped the excess fuel and allowed the rest of the humanitarian shipment to go forward. They did that to be consistent with UN Security Council resolutions preventing the shipment of war materials into Yugoslavia.

So each country will be called upon to respond to their obligations under international law, under UN Security Council resolutions.

The only point I would make with respect to Romania is that Romania is also a member of the Partnership for Peace program with NATO and is cooperating with NATO in the current campaign.

Mr. David Price: So it could be a combination.

My other question is for you, Vice-Admiral, and it's regarding the Adriatic, which you already have had experience in. We know the Serbs do have four subs. As for whether they're operational or not, maybe you could tell us that. And they have a couple of fast-attack craft. You mentioned that we'd be out of range of their coastal defences, but they do have coastal cruise missiles. Would we also be out of range of those?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you for that question, Mr. Price.

What I was trying to put forward was that because, to get into the Adriatic Sea, you have to go through the Strait of Otranto, which is at the very southern part of the Adriatic Sea, one would hope that if you're going to put an embargo in place, you could do it there, well away from the offensive capability the Serbs and the Montenegrins do have.

You're quite correct in saying, however, that they do have a capability. They have a number of mobile missile sites that they can move up and down the coast. They have artillery sites as well that can go out a fair number of miles to sea. They have a submarine capability. I'd rather not get into the numbers specifically, but they do have a capability. They have some air capability. And indeed they have a capability to lay mines should they wish to do that.

We've seen no indication, or very little indication, that they're prepared to do anything offensive in terms of the use of those missile sites and the use of their navy. They have basically remained in port by and large, and we haven't seen them move at all.

Mr. David Price: My last question is about the problem with the Sea Kings on the backs of our ships. The capabilities are useable 50% of the time, and the mission systems are failing a lot of the time. If we have a submarine problem, how are we going to work around this?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The Sea King is a multipurpose aircraft and can certainly deal with submarines, whether it's in the open ocean or in a little area such as this. And as I said earlier, they have other capabilities as well, such as conducting surveillance and assisting in maintaining the maritime picture, putting boarding parties on ships, and in terms of logistics, resupply, and so on.

• 1605

Our best advantage in this regard is that we have a tremendous group of maintainers who do a lot of hard work to be able to make sure the availability rate of the Sea Kings is in fact quite good. We may have the odd occasion when the availability rate on one particular Sea King is not as good as we would like like, but by and large they are providing yeoman service for us.

Also it's important to state that we are not the only people there with helicopters. We would be there as part of a coalition of force that would bring a whole series of capabilities, including helicopter assets, to the table, and the commander at sea would be able to use all those assets to optimize his ability to conduct the mission.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Price.

Mr. Reed.

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Earle actually asked the question I had conjured up on embargo versus blockade, so we won't go into that.

I just wanted to acknowledge and appreciate Mr. Price's comment about the workload these witnesses are under. I would hope that all members of this committee—although I'm not an official member of the committee—would also acknowledge that workload. There are people here who are working 18 and 20 hours a day and are coming here to brief us. I'll express my own personal view that we have to cut them some slack.

So I thank the witnesses for the incredible work they've done, above and beyond the call of duty.

Mr. Daniel Turp: What does that mean, Mr. Reed?

Mr. Julian Reed: Well, you were very insistent on—

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Gentlemen, could we deal with the questions to the witnesses before us?

Mr. Reed, do you have any questions?

Mr. Julian Reed: No, I don't have any.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Okay.

I have Mr. Turp on the list.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I don't understand the purpose of that remark, particularly since Mr. Henault, Mr. Wright and their colleagues seem to have been able to find the time to come and meet us here today. I would like to reiterate my appreciation for what you are doing for members of Parliament who must be properly informed to ask appropriate and relevant questions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, and this is what you enable us to do when you provide us with your information.

As for the legal aspect, I'd like to suggest that it be a maritime embargo or blockade. The expression "a sound legal basis" is the term used in the resolution of the Security Council. I'd like to ask Jim whether he considers that the present Security Council resolutions could be considered a sound legal basis for imposing an embargo such as that contemplated by NATO or whether it should be based on the national legislation of several NATO member countries.

My second comment may perhaps be more useful to the Department of Foreign Affairs. It is difficult for us not to imagine that a land intervention is being prepared and is imminent when the Department of Foreign Affairs publishes an information document entitled Kosovo Clips. We received this yesterday in our offices and noted that it carried the heading "Potential Routes of Attack". You might perhaps draw to the attention of the employees of the media relations service and the communications directorate of the Department of Foreign Affairs that the first page of the document carries the heading Potential Routes of Attack, including of ground attack.

Let me now turn to more serious questions. Is it true, Mr. Henault, that there are more Serbian troops and soldiers in Kosovo now than there were on March 24? Do you have any information on this subject? It is disturbing.

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My second question is for Jim Wright. Jim, could you enlighten us on the position of the United States, of the President and Congress members, as well as the result of the meeting with Mr. Talbott, something I find rather difficult to understand. I'd be interested in knowing your assessment of what the United States is doing, because quite clearly, diplomatic efforts are being made mainly by Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom in this context. Ms. Albright's intervention was limited to:

[English]

Milosevic doesn't have to step down, but he has to back down.

[Translation]

I'd like to understand the role played by the United States because it seems that it could become an important one. Mr. Clinton does perhaps have the solution in his hands.

LGen Raymond Henault: I can answer your first question. Mr. Turp, the last time we were able to verify the number of troops in Serbia, and more particularly in Kosovo, was March 20, when we carried out the Kosovo verification mission. We were then able to obtain fairly precise and reliable figures concerning the number of troops stationed in Kosovo.

As far as I know, there has not been any great increase in the number of troops in Kosovo, although reinforcements are being brought in. We can see that operations aimed at quelling the insurrection are being continued in spite of air operations and so forth. I think it is quite obvious from media reports. The number of troops has probably increased, although certainly not considerably, but it would be very difficult for me to provide you with precise figures.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Is the same true of military materiel? Is there reason to believe that there is more Serbian military equipment in Kosovo than there was at the beginning of the conflict?

LGen Raymond Henault: Once again, it would be very difficult for me to give you figures. In the briefing we provided for you at the beginning of the conflict, we indicated that we believed there were approximately 400 assault tanks in Kosovo, armoured tanks, troop transporters, as well as pieces of artillery. It's hard for me to know whether their number has increased but we are inclined to believe that it has decreased because of the success of a number of the air attacks. We have been rather successful in stopping the Milosevic war machine since, as we mentioned the other day, we struck 40% of the SA-3 anti-aircraft systems and 25% of the SA-6 systems. We also hit a certain number of tanks, armoured tanks and artillery pieces. I don't have the precise figures but I would say that the sites we attacked have undergone moderate damage. I think we can say that we have inflicted moderate or serious damage on less than 50% of the equipment through our shelling of targets. It's very hard to give you figures about the military materiel that is left in the country since we are unable to see inside buildings and warehouses, nor under tree cover, when they have not been targeted.

I hope I've been able to give at least a partial answer to your question, although I do not know the exact figures.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I'll deal with the most difficult question first, and that's the “Kosovo Clips”.

We are always trying to educate ourselves from the Canadian media, and if you look at the bottom of that particular map, I think you'll see the source. It probably indicates the newspaper it was taken from, or maybe it doesn't.

Mr. Daniel Turp: It doesn't, but it's the Sunday Times.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, okay.

Every day we put together a summary of what we think are the best articles from the international and Canadian press, and we usually try to choose an interesting photo or map that we've stolen from somebody's newspaper to educate us all, and that's one example. But that's not a reflection of Canadian government policy, let me assure you.

• 1615

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Wright: With respect to embargo versus blockade, Mr. Turp is an international lawyer and I am not.

In your reference to national legislation of each country, you're absolutely right. Whatever decision is taken by NATO—and the same is true with respect to the European Union; the European Union has already decided to support an oil embargo—it's up to each country to then use its national legislation to ensure it is putting in place the necessary regulations to ensure that is done.

In Canada this relates to both our Special Economic Measures Act and our Export and Import Permits Act. It would be a question of adding Yugoslavia, for example, to the area control list and then insisting on export permits for any export to Yugoslavia, including petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Very clearly the Canadian government is looking at all of those options right now, consistent with the direction in which NATO is going.

But NATO has not rendered a decision on this yet. It's a complicated issue. There are different views on this within the NATO community. It needs to be looked at very carefully, not just from a military perspective—that's one component—but from a political perspective and from a legal perspective. We want to understand each of these aspects very clearly.

Also, with respect to the UN Security Council resolution, if you were looking for an international embargo beyond NATO countries, then clearly you would want to look to see whether the existing language out there covers an oil embargo or not. Certainly our judgment is that existing Security Council resolutions—particularly, I think, resolution 1160 from 1998—talk about war materials. Our lawyers have reached the very early judgment on this that petroleum, oil, and lubricants do fall into the category of war materials.

But the additional judgment that needs to be made here is the manner in which you effect an oil embargo. Is the implementation of an embargo also covered under existing Security Council resolutions? That matter is being looked at by our lawyers and by other lawyers within NATO. In due course, the Supreme Allied Commander will be making recommendations to the North Atlantic Council, and each country will have to decide, on a consensus basis, how it wants to proceed.

I hope that answers most of Mr. Turp's questions.

Finally, with respect to the United States, they play a critical role in this process; there's no question about it. There is daily engagement on the part of U.S. authorities, including the President, Mrs. Albright, and Secretary of Defense Cohen. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, was in Moscow earlier in the week. We are talking to the Americans all the time.

I emphasized in my opening remarks that when Mr. Axworthy goes to Moscow, he goes as a NATO foreign minister and he goes as a member of the UN Security Council. NATO is approaching this situation, especially with Russia, as a team effort. We are consulting each other very carefully and we are ensuring that we are engaging Russia constructively and in a coordinated fashion.

The Americans are critical players in this process, and I can say very confidently that their role has been helpful to date and that we will be working very closely with Washington in the days and weeks ahead.

• 1620

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Hart, please make it very brief—perhaps a one-minute question and a two-minute answer. This meeting was originally scheduled to go until 4 p.m., and we're already 20 minutes over that time. With respect to the time commitments our witnesses have, it would be best if we tried to be brief.

Mr. Jim Hart: Okay, I'll be very quick.

Gentlemen, I know when we left we were saying no country would act unilaterally. I understand that as an alliance we would work together, but what I'm trying to get at is this. The hypothetical best-case scenario that we and the Canadian public have been presented is that we would go in, after a peace agreement, as a peacekeeping force. I'm talking about the hypothetical worst-case scenario, where we would move as combat troops into a non-permissive scenario and how Canada could possibly even back out if we've been attached to the 4th Armoured Brigade with the British. I think they would have a lot of problems with that if we were going to do that.

The other part to my question is this. I would like to know at what stage the mobilization of the Canadian Armed Forces is at this present time. Will we be increasing it? And what will trigger an increase in mobilization?

LGen Raymond Henault: Thank you for those questions.

Before I answer them, Mr. Pratt, Admiral Maddison has to catch an airplane in the next little while, so if the members have no additional questions for him, I would appreciate it if he were released. I'm more than happy to stay.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): That was in fact the last question.

LGen Raymond Henault: Okay.

Mr. Hart, I would have to go back to the comment I made originally in terms of unilateral action. I can't foresee that happening at this point in time.

The only thing I might offer is that if the peacekeeping force were on the ground and the environment became non-permissive, at that stage Canadian troops would act in self-defence, as they would in any other situation where this type of operation was going on. At that point in time, the commander on the ground would have to make a very on-the-ground type of assessment of where he is, what he's doing, and what he needs to do to provide force protection and a very appropriate reaction to whatever type of engagement he's faced with.

But by the same token, I can't imagine that kind of offensive action happening without North Atlantic Council approval and so on. I keep coming back to that because it's firmly what I believe, and I can't foresee it happening unilaterally in any case. I know you've reflected that, but we would not see that happen without some extraordinary event, in my view.

In terms of mobilization, we're not mobilizing at this point. We do include reservists in our operations. At this point in time we are able to sustain our operations with the numbers of regular force and reservists available to us at the moment on a voluntary basis. So there's no intent at this point in time to mobilize.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. David Pratt): I'd like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the committee, to thank all of the witnesses for the information provided today and for their continuing cooperation with the committee.

Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.