NDDN Committee Meeting

     I call this meeting to order. We have a very unstable connection with Kyiv. The ambassador has literally moved heaven and earth in order to be with us today. We may lose her at any moment, so I'm going to start the meeting right now and ask for her opening statement. It's only in the last five or 10 minutes that we actually knew we were going to have the ambassador with us.

    Ambassador, thank you for all your efforts to be with us. I know you're in a very difficult situation, so I'll just ask you for your opening five-minute statement, and then members will move to questions.

    Colleagues, at one point we were going to collapse the whole meeting into one. Now we're back to what was in the published notice.

    Thank you, honourable Chair and honourable members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today.

    I'm addressing you from Kyiv, Ukraine, where just an hour ago there was another alarm. Sirens were loud in many regions of the country. Today we faced a big cyber-attack on the biggest mobile operator. That's why millions of people in the country have no access to their cell phones and no Internet connection. As I will brief you today, Russia's attacks are not only on the battlefield. It is a hybrid war, a propaganda war. There are also cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.

    According to the general staff of our armed forces, the Russian Federation continues to wage a war of aggression despite significant losses. From the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion up to today, Russia has already lost over 339,000 personnel, 5,600 tanks, 10,500 APVs, 8,000 artillery systems, 324 aircraft, 324 helicopters, 6,000 UAVs and 1,500 cruise missiles, but this does not stop Russia from continuing the war.

    Today, the heaviest fights are in the east, near Avdiivka, near Lyman and near Kupyansk.

    Despite the heavy losses and the average losses of Russian troops—in one day in November losses exceeded 800 people—Russia continues to use the tactics they used near Bakhmut, just throwing people into the fight and not taking into account the losses.

    Also, Russia continues to attack critical infrastructure. Just yesterday, eight ballistic missiles were launched by Russia over the Kyiv region. Thank you, Canada, for providing us with air defence systems. All of these eight ballistic missiles were intercepted.

    In the night of December 11, Russia also launched 18 Shahed drones, trying to use the same strategy it did last winter, attacking critical infrastructure and trying to deprive people of electricity and mobile connection. With the level of the UAVs Russia is using, it has now launched over 3,000 Shahed-type drones over Ukrainian critical infrastructure, 300 cruise missiles, 23 ballistic missiles and, just for Kyiv, 400 Shahed drones.

    We see that Russia does not stop its attempts. As we understand it and as we estimate, Putin wants, for his own propaganda inside the country, to show any small achievements, so Russia is putting in enormous efforts and suffering huge losses trying to claim either some small community or some metres of steps forward. It does not count any losses, either of equipment or of personnel.

    We are holding the line. In some regions, we are advancing. Of course, it requires artillery, artillery shells, air defence systems and armoured vehicles. I would like to thank Canada for being a partner in all of the major coalitions that we've had, together with our partners. Today we have 54 countries that are members of the so-called Ramstein coordination platform, with all of the NATO countries plus non-NATO countries.

    I would like to thank you for all of the military support that Canada has provided for the training of Ukrainian soldiers. It's crucially important.

     For us now, the top five priority needs for Ukraine as we move to winter air defence are, first of all, to protect civilian objects and to protect the cities.

     Ammunition is needed on a big scale, and ammunition is something that we need on a daily basis. This is one of the top five priorities for us.

     Armoured vehicles...we thank Canada for announcing its support in the form of the further supply of armoured vehicles. We really appreciate that they can be sent to Ukraine and delivered in the near future.

    Another important thing for us is the UAVs, because now, on the front lines, a lot of UAVs, as well as the electronic warfare system to protect our soldiers and our army on the front lines against the Russian UAVs.... The new system of electronic warfare is a high priority.

    What we're also doing on our side is putting a lot of attention into the strengthening of the Ukrainian defence sector. On September 29, we launched in Kyiv a big defence capability forum, in which 250 major players from countries all over the world participated. We are now building partnerships with the defence sector companies of Ukraine and our partners, including Canada, and we look forward to these partnerships being one of the ways to build defence capabilities and defence production with those companies in Ukraine.

    Thank you for having me. I will be ready to answer all of your questions.

    Thank you, Madam Ambassador.

    That will bring us to our six-minute rounds.

    Mr. Kelly, you have six minutes.

    Thank you, Ambassador, for being with us today. It's good to see you again. Please accept my best wishes for your safety and the safety of all of your people amid this ongoing, horrific, illegal war of conquest being waged by Russia.

    What does Ukraine need from Canada right now? What would the priorities of your government be?

    Thank you.

    Indeed, the top priorities that I've mentioned are the ones that we are also discussing with the Canadian government. Of course, these are the armoured vehicles, artillery shells, drones and the electronic warfare system.

    Also very important, and part of the support that we are really grateful for, are the training programs. We appreciate the training programs that we have, and their continuation, because they also help us put those new conscripts.... Specifically, when we are talking about medical evacuation personnel, demining and engineering, all of this training is of importance. It will also be important to continue the Operation Unifier program and the training for the future.

    Thank you.

    You've talked about the need for armoured vehicles. Would Ukraine benefit from light armoured vehicles?

     If Canada were able to retrofit the LAV IIs that are being decommissioned.... We understand they can be reconditioned, and I wonder whether they'd be useful to Ukraine.

    For this question, I think the discussion needs to be about the specifics, meaning what kinds of weapons need to be installed and what level of protection they give. The third important thing is the readiness for maintenance and the spare parts of the armoured vehicles, whether they're new ones or the decommissioned ones.

    As you can imagine, their usage in the battlefield is much greater, many times heavier than on the training bases, so for each specific type of vehicle, all things together, including the sustainability of their usage, are of crucial importance.

    How about the training of fighter pilots?

    On the training of the fighter pilots, as you know, Ukraine, with our partners, launched the coalition of the fighter jets. It was the top priority of working with partners for the F-16 fighter jets.

    Of course, we need the training for the pilots. The pilots themselves, the engineering part, logistics and navigation were the top priority. As of now, it is the F-16 fighter jets.

     Thank you.

    The Shahed drones that you mentioned in your opening statement are supplied by the Iranian regime. In some cases, are these actually operated by the IRGC?

    I cannot now comment on whether they are operated by the IRGC. Yes, the Shahed drones themselves are supplied by Iran. Russia also, as we know, started to produce its own version of the Shahed drone, which is called Lancet.

    With regard to Russia's ability to produce drones, the specific intention, and what we are asking our partners, is to increase the sanction pressure and especially to close any loopholes into circumventions of the sanctions, because what we discovered is that these kinds of drones, both Shahed drones and Russian-produced drones, have many spare parts that are produced in western countries, in NATO countries, and it is important not to allow Russia to circumvent the sanctions and to get the spare parts.

    Yes. We have heard troubling reports of components in land mines that may have circumvented sanctions and been manufactured in Canada.

    On artillery shells, in our travels as a committee we visited the Canadian base in Latvia, among other stops on our trip. We heard all about the importance of artillery shells and the expenditure rates.

    There are reports that Ukraine has successfully narrowed the gap a bit on firing rate, but what are your needs on artillery shells? What can Canada and other allies do to ensure that you have adequate supplies of artillery shells to be able to sustain and ultimately achieve victory in this?

    Indeed, the steady supply of the artillery shells, including the 155, is of crucial importance. For the first time this autumn there were days when Ukrainian usage of artillery shells was higher than the Russians', which was very unusual, because on the contrary, Ukraine, because of the heavy need for artillery shells, was using much less ammunition on the battlefield than the Russians were.

     That's why it is crucially important to maintain the steady supply of ammunition. Of course we are grateful to Canada for supplying us with ammunition, but that's the level, and in terms of the need for ammunition we are counting in the hundreds of thousands and millions of rounds of ammunition. That's why you can understand the magnitude of the need.

    The ramping up of production in both Ukraine and all of the NATO countries is crucially important to be able to sustain the supply of ammunition.

    Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

    Mr. Collins is next, for six minutes.

    Thanks, Mr. Chair.

    Ambassador, welcome to the committee. Our thoughts and prayers are with you, your family and everyone who is in harm's way where you are this evening.

    My first question is around Russia. You mentioned Russia's propaganda efforts in your opening statement. Of course, they continue to spread disinformation, not just in Russia, but in all parts of Ukraine. That disinformation has now, obviously, been spread to different parts of the world to try to undermine support for Ukraine and its people in its war effort.

    It's working in some sectors, not just with the general population, but with governments. We're seeing that right now. I'm watching very closely your president's visit to the U.S. and his efforts to try to get at some of the conservative Republican members who seem to have bought into that misinformation and disinformation that Russia is spreading across the world.

    What can parliamentarians do and what can the Government of Canada do to assist in your efforts to combat that disinformation that's being spread by Putin?

     Thank you.

    Indeed, the Russian war machine is conducting numerous disinformation campaigns. Just for example, I will tell you about one that we recently saw in Ukraine. There was special messaging, especially through social media, addressed to Ukrainian soldiers to just put away their arms and go on the Russian side. They are specifically able to target people. Of course, it failed, but the Russian disinformation is spreading the word in Ukraine to disunite people, to spread fatigue, and we also see it in many countries and in our partners.

    They especially use social media. They use these so-called “trolls”, so numerous thousands of accounts are spreading this disinformation and sharing this Russian narrative just to disunite people, to bring war fatigue and to try to undermine support for Ukraine.

    I believe Russia understands that, first of all, they already failed with their so-called “special operation”. The only way that Russia can somehow at least hold the line and not be kicked out of Ukraine is to try to decrease support for Ukraine. That's why they are conducting these disinformation campaigns in all the countries and among our partners.

    However, you need to also realize that in parallel, Russia just adopted a new budget for 2024. They have record-high defence spending, which increased from the previous year by 30%. Around 39% of all the budget spending in Russia for the next year will go to the military, the defence sector and law enforcement. Russia is putting in huge, huge amounts of money for its defence and law enforcement, over approximately $200 billion Canadian.

    In parallel, if they use this disinformation, what we all can do is spread the message of unity. All the steps to support Ukraine, all of the statements, are now very important for the people of Ukraine, because for them, understanding that there is strong backing for Ukraine from our partners is important. It is also to explain to people that in Ukraine, we are not only fighting for our territory but also protecting the eastern flank of NATO. The security of Canada and all of the NATO alliance is on its unity and collective security. We are now protecting one of the borders of NATO.

    I agree 100%.

    Ambassador, I have less than two minutes. Very quickly, President Zelenskyy was quoted recently as saying that delaying aid to Ukraine is a “gift” to Russia.

    We recently voted here. It wasn't unanimous in terms of our support here in Canada, and we've seen fractures—

     I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

    Standing Order 18 is quite clear. It says, “No member may reflect upon any vote of the House, except for the purpose of moving that such vote be rescinded”, so he cannot reflect on it.

    I'll also just add to this, in chapter 20—

    Just for clarity—

    I have the floor.

    In chapter 20, on page 1079, it says:

    The ambassador is a public servant of the Government of Ukraine.

    I would suggest that asking the ambassador to weigh in on decisions made by the House would be out of order. It's definitely in violation of Standing Order 18 in the ask, as well as putting the ambassador in an unfortunate position of trying to deal with political discourse here rather than updating us on what's actually happening in Ukraine.

    Chair, I'm well aware of the rules. We were lectured in the House this morning, several times, when this issue was raised. I, of course, didn't point out the result of the vote. I said that it wasn't unanimous, so I think I was very clear.

    Mr. Chair, if I could continue with my question....

    We're still on the point of order. I have Ms. Mathyssen next.

     Just as a note, the ambassador is not a Canadian public servant. That's just for clarification.

    Yes.

    Are there any other members weighing in on the point of order?

    I'm going to allow Mr. Collins to continue his questioning. The rule certainly applies to the House. I don't know that it actually applies at committee.

     It's a standing order—

    It's a standing order of the House. It's not necessarily a standing order here.

    It applies to committee.

     I have a point of order, Chair.

    I would just point out that during the discussion in the House today about this very matter, it was Conservative member Mr. Genuis who pointed out that the standing order pertains only to the House. It doesn't pertain to votes in committee. I believe the vote that Mr. Collins is referring to also took place in committee.

    Mr. Chair, on that point of order, the reality is that in the House, you can comment on votes in committee. You cannot take any vote in the House and apply it to committee. Committees are an extension of the House. We are a creation of the House, so the rules of the House apply here as well.

    In addition, the committee can set its own rules.

    My position—

    I challenge the chair. It's definitely in violation of the rules.

    You can challenge the chair. It's a dilatory motion.

    You can call the vote, Madam Clerk.

    I don't know what we're voting on.

    It's on whether the ruling of the chair is sustained.

    He made a point of order. I've ruled against him. He's challenged the chair. Therefore, it's a dilatory vote.

    Clerk, please call the vote.

    (Ruling of the chair sustained [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    With that, Mr. Collins, you have a minute and 21 seconds left for questions.

    Thanks, Mr. Chair.

    I apologize, Ambassador, on behalf of the committee, that we had to go through this.

    Why is it so important that we are united and unanimous in our support for Ukraine as it relates to providing aid as quickly as possible?

    Indeed, we are very grateful for the support Canada has provided to us. As you know, just recently NATO said that Russia was one of the biggest threats to NATO as a security alliance, which also means that it is a threat for all NATO members. Today Ukrainians, young men and women who are fighting on the front lines, are brave enough to sacrifice their lives to protect not only our country and territory but also the eastern flank of NATO. The support is much needed. As I mentioned to you, Russia is investing significantly in its defence sector.

    It's not only about Ukraine. You probably saw that an Iranian delegation recently visited Russia. You saw a Hamas delegation visiting Russia. If we join all the dots together, we understand that Russia, with the so-called axis of evil, is a threat to all of us as democracies. Yes, we have democratic discussions and differences in policies, but when it comes to the security of democracies that Ukraine is now fighting for, our people are dying today so that democracy will prevail.

    We have to leave the answer there, Mr. Collins.

    Madame Normandin, you have six minutes.

    Excellency, it's a pleasure to have you. Thank you for giving us your time.

    I'd like to begin with a question that follows up on the point you made about the defence sector, that you'd like to rebuild and develop in Ukraine, ideally with outside partners. I'd like to hear your opinion on that initiative. If foreign investors are willing to help out Ukraine's defence sector, not only would that be beneficial in the short term in the war against Russia, but it would also strengthen Ukraine's economy in the long term, which it will need after the war.

    Could you tell us more about that?

    Indeed, the attention we are now paying to the development of the defence sector has several pillars. One is, of course, to have production in Ukraine, which means that there are more jobs, that it's less expensive and that we save time and logistical costs for maintenance. The second priority behind why we are putting so much attention toward the defence sector is to be able to maintain and repair more quickly all the equipment that Ukraine is getting and to save both time and effort by having it quickly repaired.

    Recently, Ukraine signed not only an MOU but a more binding agreement with Rheinmetall, which is one of the leading defence conglomerates in the world, to launch a joint project here. We would also welcome Canadian defence sector companies building these capabilities in Ukraine. Before joining the committee, I was meeting with our Minister of Defence, and he first sent his best regards and thanks to the many committee members he managed to meet during his visit with President Zelenskyy to Canada. He also reaffirmed that Ukraine is ready to welcome Canadian defence sector companies to help us produce and maintain equipment in Ukraine.

    Thank you very much.

    I'd like to talk about sanctions, although it's not exactly a military issue.

    As you have stated, Russia sadly has access to a lot of equipment that shouldn't be reaching it. We know that there's been a massive increase in exports, for instance to Kazakhstan.

    Should we start to consider sanctions targeting third countries that facilitate the bypassing of sanctions, particularly in relation to the price cap on oil?

    Indeed, Russia is trying to use some intermediaries, meaning companies or neighbouring countries, to circumvent the sanctions. We have already seen several cases, and I would say more. Even today, the U.S. government imposed sanctions, including on the companies that were engaged in circumventing the sanctions. These controls need to be strengthened. I think it's in all our interests that defence technologies are not being transferred to Russia. Russia's ability to produce more weapons needs to be reduced.

    There are still loopholes. First of all, proper investigations need to be done on cases of reported sanctions circumventions, and there needs to be specific work on looking at the companies that served as intermediaries. Depending on where those companies are, if they're in third countries, they also need to be exposed to sanctions for specific actions supporting Russia's getting those technologies that are not in line with the sanctions legislation and regulation.

    In terms of specific actions, I would also like to mention the important decision of the Canadian government to be the first to impose restrictions on Russian-produced diamonds and jewellery products. Russia is the biggest producer of diamonds in the world, and that part of Russian exports significantly fuelled the Russian economy and its ability to wage the war.

    The third thing is, if we come back to Russia's military budget for the next year, Russia is still predicting an increase in revenues in the year 2024, and one of the biggest increases forecasted is additional revenue from oil exports. There are many tools for working on that, but I think joint efforts need to be made to decrease Russia's ability to fuel the war from its oil and gas revenues.

     Thank you.

    You have about 10 seconds.

    Ms. Mathyssen, you have six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Ambassador. We appreciate your being with us.

    A few weeks ago New Democrats asked the Canadian government to answer questions about a Globe and Mail report that Kyrgyzstan has re-exported Canadian-made electric detonators to Russia. The Liberals have refused to answer this question. If it's true, those Canadian-made detonators are possibly used with land mines and could be used by Russia in their war against Ukraine.

    Can you tell us more about the role of Kyrgyzstan in the war and why Canada needs to take the allegations extremely seriously?

    We believe that any allegations of cases about sanctions circumvention need to be investigated and that loopholes need to be closed.

    As to the specific reports, I have no additional information for the specific land mines or spare parts for the land mines case, but if that is true, definitely it is worth exploring and understanding how these spare parts were exported and whether it was done through the intermediaries. We need to ask who those intermediaries are and why they committed the illegal act.

    You spoke earlier about F-16 training. Could you go into a bit more detail about what you're looking at, what's required and how Canada plays that bigger role? I know I have folks in my area who are really eager to provide that support.

    Thank you.

    Canada and 11 other countries are the members of, as we call it, the fighter jets coalition, which is the coordination group working together on helping us with our needs in terms of building our capability in the air. As you see, since February 24, 2022, Ukraine does not have superiority in the air. For our ground forces to quickly move further to liberate territories, as many other NATO countries would do according to military tactics, they need support from the air. The transfer to Ukraine of the F-16 fighter jets will be important to secure air superiority or air control and air support for the ground troops.

    Of course, it requires training the top pilots, which is going on. I think I'm not able to share publicly many of the details, but as the Canadian ministry of defence, as a general staff that's a member of this capability, a member of the fighter jets coalition, there are discussions between all of the members of the coalition on what could be supported—of course, the training and many other things including the fighter jet itself. We know that we have political signals from our partners that they are ready to provide us and transfer F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine as soon as our pilots and infrastructure are ready.

    We are making a lot of effort to make it quicker.

    I just want to talk a bit about post-war reconstruction and that hope, looking forward, in terms of what's required for long-term support from the international community.

    Once Ukraine wins and regains its territory, how can Canada plan to support now that rebuild into the future?

     Indeed, the damage to the economy is huge. Last year the Ukrainian economy shrank 30%, and the World Bank estimated that the needed funds for recovery would exceed $400 billion. Each day, as Russia launches missiles and drones, there is damage to both the critical infrastructure and the housing. Lots of people have moved from the eastern regions closer to the front line, to Kyiv and to the other cities, but many of them are living in temporary shelters for residents who have lost their homes.

    We all understand that the amount of financing that will be needed for rebuilding is huge. That's why one important pillar or source of this funding is the Russian sovereign assets that are frozen in many western democracies.

    I would like to thank you for supporting the legislation, as Canada was the first to introduce legislation for the seizure of Russian assets. The procedure of the seizure of Russian sovereign assets could also be expedited, so that they can also be one of the ways to finance post-war rebuilding.

    Also, as I am here in Kyiv and talking with many people, including business associations, many of the Ukrainian companies and foreign companies that never moved from Ukraine even during the wartime continue to invest in Ukraine. They continue to work there. They continue to enlarge, build new facilities, move their facilities from the eastern regions to the western regions.

    First, Ukrainian companies are continuing to work. In the post-war recovery, of course, we will need more technology, more equipment for that rebuilding, and we would—

    Unfortunately, Ambassador, we're going to have to leave that answer there.

    Colleagues, we have slightly less than 25 minutes, and we have 25 minutes' worth of questions. If we're fairly crisp, I think we can do it.

    Mr. Bezan, you have five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Ambassador, thank you for appearing today. I hope that you're staying safe, knowing how dangerous things can be even in Kyiv. Pat and I have been there and heard the air sirens and seen the damage that has been done in the city, never mind outside the city.

     First of all, on behalf of the Conservatives, we thank all those Ukrainian heroes who originally took to the streets of the Maidan, and then went to the front line in Donbas, and who now are fighting for the very existence of Ukraine and, as you said, are protecting Canadians here at home as you deal with the Russian invasion and protecting NATO's eastern flank.

    Conservatives support Ukraine. We support Operation Unifier. We started Operation Unifier. We support the delivery of weapons and military kit. We started that process back in 2015. We've been calling for the government to send lethal weapons since 2018, which didn't happen until the hot war and full-scale invasion happened in 2022. We know there's probably more that we can do, including providing more munitions, more sniper rifles, made right here in Canada, both by Colt and by PGW in Winnipeg.

     I know both organizations have already supplied sniper rifles and machine guns. We also know that we have surplus kit here that we can use. I know Ukraine is getting armoured ambulances from Canada that are being built at GDLS in London, but that will be done after the Canadian armoured ambulances are finished off and supplied to the Canadian Armed Forces. This means that our existing fleet of armoured ambulances, which are LAVs that are still in running condition, should be donated to Ukraine.

    Would you agree that that would be a welcome donation to support the Ukrainian armed forces?

    As I've already said, we definitely need both the armoured vehicles with the equipment installed and the vehicles for so-called medevac. Both of them are needed on the front line.

    In particular, I don't want to commend any particular company. However, I would say the only thing that is of parallel importance, including what weapons are installed, is the ability to supply the spare parts—sustainability for the maintenance. As all of this equipment is heavily used—it's not in peacekeeping missions, but a real front-line vehicle—the ability to quickly repair it, maintain it and change the spare parts so that it can have a longer life is also the important thing.

     I believe that's done easily enough by providing enough of the ambulances. The ones in poorer condition could be used as spare parts for the other ones until the new ones got built and arrived.

    We also have brand new Role 3 mobile hospitals that were bought. I think a dozen of them were bought for the pandemic but never even taken out of the container. Would the brand new Role 3 hospitals be helpful to ensure that those who have significant and traumatic injuries are treated more quickly at the Ukrainian front line?

     As of now, I can't say that this is top on the priority list. The medevacs are able to quickly deliver the injured to the first line of support and the second line of support. As far as I know, this is not on the top priority list.

    I know there's a bit of concern still about the battles that are going on at Avdiivka and down in Kherson, but also near the nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia. Can you give us a quick update on how things are going in securing that nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia?

     It's really important, because that is another example of how Russia is actually using a civil nuclear object as another part of their warfare.

    They control the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. There are missions. The IAEA, in their report, clearly stated that there are weapons installed in the territory of the nuclear power station. There is one more thing, which is the risk. The personnel are working under pressure. They're not working according to the norms and the rotation norms. The people are threatened, and it also does not help to increase their security.

    The situation is an awfully big risk, including their attempts at shelling around the station. There were for the last—

    Unfortunately, we have to leave the answer there.

    Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

    Mr. Fillmore, you have five minutes.

    Ambassador Kovaliv, it's very nice to see you again. I wish it were under better circumstances for you. The conditions you're experiencing in Kyiv right now are bringing the war into very strong focus for us all here. It's wonderful to have you today. Please do us the great favour of staying safe.

    Ambassador, we know, and you've in fact referenced, that the sale of Russian oil is helping to fund the Russian war machine. You and I have spoken before, on various occasions, including at the Halifax International Security Forum, about Canada's readiness to provide and even export renewable energy options into Europe to help Europe get off Russian oil.

    I want to declare that Canada is absolutely committed to working with our European partners and the Ukraine to achieve our shared goals on energy security. So far, this has included the Canada-Germany and Canada-EU hydrogen alliance. It's included Bill C-49, which will modernize the Atlantic accords to allow the development of offshore green hydrogen for export to Europe and to Ukraine. There's also a recent deal between Canada and Romania to build new CANDU reactors, which will also shut off the need for coal and Russian oil and gas.

    Ambassador, I wonder if you could just speak to the shared priorities between Canada and Ukraine when it comes to Europe's long-term energy security.

     Since February 21, Europe has made a significant step forward in energy diversification and getting rid of dependency on Russian oil and gas. Of course, diversification of the energy flow is important. Europe is increasing renewables shared with Ukraine. We also see its rebuilding and maintaining the mixture of energy sources and the development of clean energy.

    I would also like to say that we are already building strong co-operation with Canada in the energy sector. Just this year, the Canadian company Cameco and the Ukrainian operator of all of our nuclear power stations signed a 10-year contract for the supply of uranium, and Canada is helping us. Before, pre-wartime—by which I mean before 2014—Ukraine was buying most of this nuclear power fuel from Russia. Now we are buying it from the Canadian-owned company Westinghouse, and Cameco will provide uranium as a source for production of this nuclear fuel, so we really appreciate the strategic partnership that has started. The contracts were signed this year.

    We also signed an MOU with our hydro power operator and another Canadian infrastructure company to help us to build hydro power facilities in Ukraine, because, in the Ukrainian strategy for rebuilding, Ukraine sees itself as the energy hub for Europe, having one of the most developed energy infrastructures in electricity, oil and gas. We have the biggest gas storage capability on the European continent, which is, even during the war, widely used by all of the European gas traders, so Ukraine will, of course, put a lot of effort into rebuilding the energy sector and into building more capacity in gas production, renewable energy and nuclear, which, as of today, is 50% of Ukrainian electricity production. We see here big opportunities for co-operation with Canadian companies.

    Thank you.

     I look forward to our next conversation, Ambassador. I'm going to yield the remainder of my time to my colleague, Yvan Baker.

    Thanks very much. That's very kind.

    Very briefly, Ambassador, we're all thinking about you and the Ukrainian people at this very difficult time, and especially today.

    You said something during your remarks about the fact that in this war, Ukrainians are not just fighting for their own country—their own survival, to protect themselves from Russia's attacks—but also doing a service to the rest of the world.

    Can you talk about why Ukraine's fight is a fight not only for Ukraine but for the rest of the world as well?

    As we all remember, NATO, as an alliance, was created post Second World War to build security, first and foremost—collective security. Of course, Russia, as of today, is named specifically as one of the biggest threats to NATO.

    In my introductory remarks, I shared with you the figures on how much Russian equipment we have already destroyed, how much Russia has had losses in its manpower, but also how Russian military capabilities have been reduced, which helps to strengthen security for NATO countries.

    The second important point is that it helps—

    I'm sorry, Ambassador. I'm running a clock here, unfortunately.

    That's a very important question, and I feel that you are unpacking a very important answer, but I'm going to have to cut you off, unfortunately. I hope you can work it back into some other answer.

    You have two and a half minutes, Ms. Normandin.

    Thank you very much.

    Madam Ambassador, experts have informed us of the fact that Russia seemed to have amassed a number of missiles in preparation for a much larger offensive over the winter, mainly targeting infrastructure.

    I'd like to know if supplying air defence systems is the only way that we can support Ukraine or if there was a way to also support the resilience of Ukrainian infrastructure.

    Is there anything other than air defence that could help protect infrastructure?

     I'll give you the figure. One missile for the air defence system can cost from $500,000 to $4 million. One destroyed energy object can cost from $20 million plus. Investing and helping us with air defence helps us to not have tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in losses of critical infrastructure.

    Plus, electronic warfare and drones.... Many of our partners are also learning what modern warfare is. This war is also a war where there are a lot of drones used—electronic warfare—and the ability to land the drones and the ability to bring them down and not allow them to destroy either the position of our troops or the civilian infrastructure is important.

    Modern technology in electronic warfare and the different types of drones are also important needs as the war takes on a very specific technological aspect.

    Russia seems to be placing its assets deeper and deeper into the territory. Would supplying more long-range missiles be useful to the Ukrainian offensive?

    Of course. Long-range missiles will help us to destroy Russian logistics and Russian military capabilities in the warehouses.

    Actually, one of the breakthroughs in the counteroffensive operation when we liberated Kherson was the usage of HIMARS and the ability for them to destroy the logistic chains. Also, it worked with some of the military bases in Ukrainian Crimea—the illegal Russian military bases.

    Madam Ambassador....

    The long-range missiles are important for us.

    I apologize again for cutting you off, but I'm just trying to get through this in a timely way.

    Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and half minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I think I'd actually like to hear the rest of the ambassador's response to Mr. Baker's question. It was on point. I'd give my time for that.

    Thank you. It's really important.

    One, as I've told you, we are protecting the eastern flank of NATO. You mentioned the other situation, Russian troops near the Polish border. It seems as if it would mean that all of the NATO countries, instead of supporting the welfare of their citizens, would need to invest more in their military to defend themselves.

    The second thing is security in the Arctic region. As we are now fighting with Russia and destroying their equipment, we are decreasing the Russian military capability in the Arctic. That is of significant importance for many countries that have a presence in the Arctic. Actually, Ukraine is also protecting the Arctic.

    The third thing is democracy itself. None of the leaders of democratic countries could ever wage a war with such a high level of losses. Russia does not care, because Russia does not have any democracy. When we look to the future, for many emerging economies, countries are now choosing their path, whether to become a democracy and build strong institutions or to look to the way of the Russian dictatorship, and they are closely watching what is happening in Ukraine, the support for Ukraine.

     The victory of Ukraine in this war will set, for a decade, the pattern for many developing countries in terms of how they develop themselves. Either they will choose human rights, democracy and the international order, or they will choose Russia's pattern.

     I think it's in all our hands to make the right choice now.

    Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

    Ms. Gallant, you have five minutes.

    Madam Ambassador, Ukraine has been a constant target for the Russian cyber-attacks, yet it remains resilient. How has Ukraine's cybersecurity adapted to Russia's cyberwarfare since the war began?

     Thank you. It's a very timely question, because even pre-war, Ukraine faced significant cyber-attacks. It included attacks on our critical infrastructure, electricity grid, banking sector, government institutions and so on.

    We managed to strengthen our digital infrastructure. When the invasion started, there was not one single day when our banking system was not working or when our government was not able to work. This is including the fact that Ukraine has very well-developed digital governance so that people, including over six million people who left Ukraine and another seven million IDPs, were getting many of their government services online with the special government application. It's working, because we are able to protect all this critical infrastructure.

    Of course, we appreciate the support we are getting from our NATO partners. We have very close co-operation on cybersecurity with both NATO country members and NATO itself, but Russia is becoming more sophisticated. The significant cyber-attack we are facing today on our mobile operator will also stimulate us to invest more in cybersecurity, learn the lessons and improve it.

    You have successfully hacked the Russian tax system and destroyed all the data. Has Russia been successful in responding in a meaningful way?

    As you mentioned, we have today been under a cyber-attack. None of the customer data has been reported to be damaged and the attack has not been reported as being successful. Now the connection is steadily being restored, so there are no major losses. Except for a few hours without connection, it has not had any—

    Ambassador, I was talking about the Ukrainian attack on the Russian banks and the destruction of their data.

    I am not ready to comment on the data. I don't have any specific information. I can't comment on that today. Frankly, one of the things...because there was a lack of connection and Internet in Kyiv for over 10 hours today.

    Congratulations on the success your side is having on that front.

    Do you find it concerning that our government is planning to cut its military spending by $1.4 billion into next year, which will impact our contributions to Ukraine?

    Thank you, but I am not in a position to comment on the decisions of the Canadian government.

    Operation Reassurance in Latvia is very important. As you said, Ukraine is on the eastern flank of NATO. How important is it that Canada continue to augment its presence in Latvia?

    I think I would have more comments when—not if, but when—Ukraine becomes a NATO member. Ukraine then would also be able, with one of the strongest militaries on the European continent, to support NATO security.

    For us, it's crucially important to maintain this military support and the training program that was launched back in 2015, the Unifier program, which has already trained over 37,000 Ukrainian troops. That, of course, is very important for us. We appreciate this continued support.

    With your cyber resilience, is there anything you can share with Canada so that we can augment our current capabilities?

    Yes. I think there is already co-operation. There's the NATO cybersecurity centre unit, where we are not only getting help but also sharing the experience, which is very important. Cybersecurity attacks are not the same. They don't have the same pattern. Of course, for us, sharing and increasing our own awareness together with the partners is crucially important.

    Also, when it comes to digital governance, Ukraine was among the first countries to introduce digital passports. We are building a partnership between one of the Canadian provinces, the Province of Quebec, and our minister of digital infrastructure.

     I keep apologizing for interrupting, but I have to.

    The final five minutes go to Madame Lambropoulos.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Thank you, Ambassador, for being here with us during these difficult times to answer some of our questions.

    I'd like to know from your perspective what impact Operation Unifier has had on the Ukrainian people and on the armed forces of Ukraine. Whether we're talking about supporting the training of Ukrainian recruits or we're talking about combat engineers assisting in the training of Ukrainian sappers, can you talk about what this support means to the people of Ukraine?

    I would say that there are two stages of the program Unifier. One was before the full-scale invasion, when 30,000 Ukrainian troops were trained. All of them, when the war started, were ready. They had been trained, and that helped. That was one of the important milestones in helping our resistance within the very first days of Russia's full-scale invasion.

    Then, in terms of the joint training happening in many countries, Unifier is part of the bigger training program that is happening. The core base is the U.K. Interflex program, but there is also a lot of specific training, including of engineers and sappers and the training that covers the usage of new equipment. It is important because, in most of the training of newly conscripted soldiers, we have a totally different strategy from what Russia is doing. First, we train people; then, we equip them with everything they need, and then they go to the front line. That is important, because it helps.

    I think what is also important is that, during this program, there is sharing of knowledge and sharing of experiences. Ukrainian soldiers share their knowledge from the real battlefield, from real military strategy, about what is happening and how it works during real war with their Canadian colleagues.

    The feedback that I got from many of those who are part of the Unifier program is that this feedback is very important, because it helps to exchange knowledge, and it will definitely increase the readiness of the commanders of both of our countries.

    Thank you.

    Thank you for sharing some of those examples as well, because it makes it more concrete for us.

    If you could choose one thing, one way in which Canada has had an impact, the most important or the most effective contribution that Canada has made during this time, what would you say it is?

    If it's Operation Unifier, is there something else that's equally important?

    It's very hard because, frankly, we are grateful for all of the strong support that Canada is providing to Ukraine, whether it's financial help, the $5 billion of loans that the Canadian government provided to us, the military, the diplomats or support with the sanctions.

    It's all important. Fighting the war is not only on the battlefield. We have the battle on the diplomatic field. We have the battle with Russian propaganda trying to undermine support and disunite people. We have the economic fight, because we need to maintain and we need to help people, those who have suffered because of the war and are internally displaced.

    It's very hard, and I would say that Ukraine is grateful for that support from Canada, and most importantly from the Canadian people. The way Canadian people helped Ukrainians fleeing the war by opening their houses and opening their hearts is really very important. We are really grateful to all those people.

    Thank you, Madame Lambropoulos.

    Ambassador, thank you for all your efforts to join us today. I express, on behalf of the committee—and others have expressed it as well—that we wish you safety and Godspeed. We look forward to seeing you back here doing your work. You represent your nation well. We thank you for it.

    With that, we will suspend.

     I call the meeting back to order.

     We have with us today Mr. Howard Shatz from the RAND Corporation, by video conference. Thank you, sir.

     From the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, we have Ihor Michalchyshyn, who is the executive director. He isn't feeling terribly well, so he's at home. We also have Orest Zakydalsky, senior policy adviser, who is here and who, I assume, is going to make the five-minute presentation.

     We also have, somewhere in the building, Mr. Perry. Colleagues will note that Mr. Perry was originally not scheduled. There he is. Mr. Perry is here with his Christmas tie on. He has the socks on too. We'll check that out.

    I just want to thank Mr. Perry for filling in at the last second. Up until about half an hour prior to the meeting, or maybe even 15 minutes before, it was not at all sure that we were going to be able to get the ambassador. Fortunately, she was able to make a connection and we were able to put in a full hour, but I want thank Mr. Perry for potentially bailing us out.

    Again, thank you to all of you.

    I'm going to start with Mr. Shatz. Sir, if you could open with a five-minute statement, that would helpful.

    Thank you.

     Thank you, and I thank the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence for inviting me to participate.

    My comments stem from work recently completed with colleagues at the RAND Corporation. When we started this work on Ukrainian reconstruction, my senior colleague, Ambassador James Dobbins, who had worked in a variety of crisis situations, noticed that two elements were missing from other analysis.

    One of those was that the relevant comparison cases for Ukraine reconstruction are those of European reconstruction throughout the 20th century and 21st centuries. There was too much discussion of Iraq and Afghanistan. The second issue was that discussion of security was missing, and without security, reconstruction will not succeed. They go hand in hand.

    I'll focus my five minutes on reconstruction. I welcome discussion of security co-operation and security issues in the Q and A.

    We looked at a variety of reconstruction events, including natural disasters and Japan after World War II, but we focused on western Europe after World War II, eastern and central Europe after the Cold War, and the western Balkan six after the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. There were a number of useful lessons from the cases for Ukraine.

    We found that in all cases, successful reconstruction efforts have involved strong linkages for international trade and international investment, so links to the international economy. They also involved reforms to the domestic business environment to attract investment.

    This issue relates to financing. Aid is going to be important. Aid encourages other sources of finance, and it often can cover the highest-risk aspects of reconstruction. Grants or equity injections are far preferred to loans. Historically, aid has provided only a small portion of total funding. Private investment that Ukraine mobilizes from new and existing foreign investors, residents and even—or especially—the Ukrainian diaspora will be essential to successful reconstruction.

    Russian assets, both international reserves and private assets frozen in the west, could be an important source of funding. There is a robust debate about that in numerous jurisdictions. However, legal authorities for using them are not on firm ground so far, and there could be consequences for the international financial system. This doesn't mean that they shouldn't be used, but care needs to be taken in how they are used and how they are seized.

    The amount of aid provided is only one issue. Donor coordination will be a challenge. It could burden Ukraine and slow reconstruction. Donors should adopt a structure, building off the multi-donor coordination platform that controls donor freelancing. Given the enormity of the task, each major donor should have a full-time, empowered senior coordinator, as well as a senior representative on the ground in daily contact with the Ukrainian government. Periodic donor conferences will not be sufficient.

    Finally, in the area of reconstruction, Ukraine's task is as much about reform as it is reconstruction. This is Ukraine's opportunity to reverse 30 years of unsatisfactory economic and political development.

     In other cases, reforms were in part driven by donor conditionalities. This will be true here. Conditionalities may include punishments and rewards. The attraction of EU membership should be the prime driver, but not the only driver, of these essential conditionalities.

    This effort will take years, if not decades. Waste, fraud, abuse and corruption could erode western support. Ukraine should have, and donors should insist on, a strong inspector general and effective monitoring and evaluation, with data sharing with donors.

     Ukraine also is very technologically advanced. Ukraine has the capability, and Canada, the U.S. and other donors should encourage the adoption of end-to-end, real-time monitoring of flows of assistance to the extent possible. An inspector general provides after-the-fact analysis. Real-time monitoring is possible and better ensures that the money is used properly.

    The only thing I'll say about security now is that durable security arrangements, supported by the west, will help Ukraine deter and defend against future Russian attacks. However, they'll do more than that. Historically, we have seen that such arrangements give investors the confidence to take risks and make long-term commitments.

    Let me move to policy recommendations.

    First, Ukraine's supporters, in this case led by the United States, will need to define arrangements for Ukrainian security and credible deterrence. Allies of the United States and Canada can and should play a role in this.

     Specific reconstruction needs have yet to be determined, but countries can organize for reconstruction, such as by passing enabling legislation or appointing a senior coordinator. The effort to explain and build support for longer-term policy needs to be carried out jointly across the political spectrum. We often focus on the Marshall plan when looking at previous reconstruction cases. The Marshall plan was not guaranteed to pass Congress. It passed because of a very aggressive bilateral effort in the United States. Such an effort will be needed now.

     Steps are needed to maintain the Ukrainian economy to set the stage for a longer-term recovery. Prime among these steps is keeping export pathways open. Partnerships with Ukraine's defence industries may be valuable for NATO and for the Ukrainian economy. There are still significant corporate governance issues to be settled.

    Mr. Shatz, can I get you to wind up, please?

    Thank you.

    Absolutely.

    Certain steps can be taken to prepare for the Berlin recovery conference. I can talk about those in discussion.

    I will leave you with the following thought. Ukraine is an advanced, sophisticated country. It should take the lead on setting reconstruction priorities. In this, leadership marshalling money and leadership of the effort organization can be played by the G7, but the priorities should come from Ukraine.

    Thanks for the opportunity. I look forward to questions.

    I'll close here, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, sir.

    From the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, we have Mr. Michalchyshyn.

    I still have my voice left, a little bit.

    Thank you for the invitation. I apologize for not being there in person today.

    The last time Orest and I were there was in April, some eight months ago. At that time, we had just finished marking the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale genocidal war against Ukraine. Today we are appearing as a second year of war is ending. We will soon be beginning our third.

    As the winter approaches, Ukrainian cities and towns are once again facing sustained Russian rocket, missile and air attacks. As we heard from the ambassador, the goal is to knock out Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, power stations and electricity, to freeze and starve Ukrainian people. Unable to conquer Ukraine, Russia will keep trying to make Ukraine unlivable.

    In what will be another difficult winter for the Ukrainian people, it's alarming to see reductions in aid to Ukraine. For example, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy reported last week that the global dynamics of support to Ukraine have been slowing. Newly committed aid reached a new low between August and October 2023. This is the lowest level of aid since January 2022, before Russian launched a full-scale invasion.

     Of course, I'm sure we're all watching the dramatic developments taking place today in Washington, south of the border, as President Zelenskyy visits with President Biden and the Congress at a time of increased volatility and key questions on the future of American commitment to aiding Ukraine's defence. As Olena Zelenska, the first lady of Ukraine, said just a few days ago, “We really need the help...we cannot get tired of this situation, because if we do, we die.”

    Our message to this committee and to all Canadians is this. Do not get tired. We must all guard against the normalization of Russia's war and the normalization of the daily horrors and atrocities that Russia inflicts upon Ukraine and its people.

     Your colleagues at the foreign affairs committee recently heard from children rescued from Russian captivity by Ukrainian non-governmental organizations. These stories are excruciating, and their experience is harrowing, but the experience of Ukrainian children tells us that more must be done to increase aid to Ukraine. This will not be happening through negotiations or peace. The result would be the murder of more Ukrainians and further destruction of Ukraine.

    I will turn it over to my colleague to complete our remarks.

     Although support for Ukraine and Ukraine's defence remains robust among Canadians, there are warning signs that there is a small but vocal minority here in Canada that wants Russia to win. This is unfortunate, but it is the reality. In order to fight against it, we must all make the case more forcefully that the least costly way to defend our own country is to provide Ukraine with the weapons and economic aid it needs to win.

     In April, when we were last here, we appeared alongside Ambassador Kerry Buck, who stated at the time, “We aren't keeping up our end of the NATO defence spending bargain...and we need to do more.” This remains true today.

     The global supply chain of weaponry that's accessible to democratic nations is woefully low. We must produce more in Canada and provide manufacturers with long-term commitments to enable them to do so. We must remember that Ukraine will need to defend itself even after it wins the war. We must also encourage our NATO allies to do the same. We must help the Ukrainians, through partnerships and joint ventures, to produce their own weapons. We need to do more to deliver the equipment the Ukrainians desperately need, and we need to do it more quickly.

     We echo President Zelenskyy's words from yesterday: “Ukraine will fight, Ukraine will stand. I’m confident that freedom must always prevail when challenged.”

     In April we made three main policy recommendations that we asked this committee to support. These were, first, to substantially increase the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine; second, to work with allies to increase the provision of fighter aircraft to Ukraine; and third, to contract with the defence industry to substantially increase production and procurement of armaments and materiel.

    These recommendations remain our key asks of this committee today.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Perry, you have the final five minutes, please.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear today.

     I'm going to build on some of the comments my colleague just made and focus on the respective ability of the two sides of this war to get the materiel equipment they need to keep prosecuting the conflict.

     As we've seen and the committee has heard, the Russians have taken very significant losses, both in personnel and in terms of equipment. Unfortunately, it's becoming increasingly clear that they've been able to compensate for this quite effectively for a few different reasons.

    We underestimated, I think, the Russians' abilities to pull significant quantities and materiel out of their stockpiles to a significant degree. That's something we should potentially reflect upon if this type of conflict is likely in the future. The way we've approached stocking and having very minimal stockpiles needs to change.

    More broadly, despite the very broad and extensive set of sanctions that the Russians had imposed upon them, they've been able to further acquire materiel through two means: donations from friendly countries—where again I think we underestimated their ability to absorb and be supplied—and their ability to ramp up their productive capacity despite an extensive sanctions regime. This has led to a situation in which, in a couple of key supplies, the Russians' ability at the moment is potentially outstripping what the west is able to help supply Ukraine with. That would relate to some types of ammunition, including artillery ammunition; some types of drones; and electronic warfare systems.

     All this would place a premium on the west's ability collectively to continue supplying Ukraine, and on the onus on Canada, given some of the challenges amongst other western members of that coalition, to increase their own supply to the furthest extent that they can.

     I was happy to read some of the recent comments made to the committee that there seems to have been some progress made on this in Canada, although the details of this remain a bit unclear, at least to me, in terms of our additional support moving forward on programs of donations of armoured vehicles and ammunition.

     Particularly since this is still opaque and will likely be an important issue to continue evolving, furthering Canada's ability to contribute, I encourage the committee to keep up its inquiry on this subject matter and potentially consider looking at three different avenues, specifically when it comes to Canada's ability to continue making material contributions to Ukraine.

    First, it's not clear to me what material, if any at all, has been replaced that Canada donated out of its own military stocks. I think that's worth examining, if for no other reason than I'm sure at this point it's starting to impinge on some of the considerations the Canadian military would be willing to take when it comes to further donating from its own stockpiles, their not having been replaced with the donations to date.

     Secondly, in September the government announced the commitment of multi-year funding for our material assistance to Ukraine, which is a step in the right direction. However, it's not yet clear that there's any short- or medium-term plan for executing that in a way that would help align industry capacity with government intent.

     Thirdly, and related to the second point, I think it would be useful to better understand how it is that we're only just at the point now—22 months, give or take, into this war—where we are making more meaningful donations of equipment and ramping up some of our own productive capacity on items like ammunition, which it has been clear for some time that Ukraine has needed—since roughly February 2022.

    With that, I'll thank you. I look forward to your questions.

     Thank you, Mr. Perry.

    Colleagues, I have a hard stop at 5:46, so I'm going to start the first round at four minutes instead of six, and then we'll see what that will yield for a second round.

    With that, Mr. Kelly, you have four minutes.

    Thank you.

    I'm going to ask Mr. Perry to continue in that vein, talking about the replenishment of supplies and specifically the artillery shells. We've had quite a bit of testimony at this committee about artillery shell production. We've had an announcement from the government about ordering more. We've had talk of being able to go from 3,000 a month to 5,000.

    Five thousand shells a month is not as many as it sounds like. It's less than a week's worth of firing supplies for Ukrainian forces. It's not going to get Canada caught up to having the level of stockpile that we need.

    Can you tell the committee how to make this happen? How do we ramp up production to what would be an acceptable war footing, given the acute need of both the Canadian Forces and our ability to support Ukraine?

    Thank you.

    It seems to me there's been a lack of urgency and focus on this issue. Notwithstanding the technical expertise involved in this, in the scheme of things, artillery shells are not complicated compared to air defence systems and many of the other pieces of equipment that Ukraine needs. They've been around for some period of time, so if we're having difficulty and are struggling to ramp up production with this, I have serious concerns about our ability to scale up on anything that's more complicated, which would be virtually the entire range of other war-related materiel.

    The other piece to this is that we have a standing offer and supply arrangement of long standing with Canadian companies that produce this materiel. Not only is it relatively simple in the scheme of things, but we have long-standing commercial relationships, which we should be able to activate relatively quickly, but we have been struggling to do so up until, I guess, about last week, with the mentions you had before committee.

    The third thing we should look for as we're looking forward.... I don't think there's any likelihood that the demand in Ukraine specifically is going to attenuate for this materiel. I think the conflict has shown us quite clearly that Canada needs to have significantly more of our own stock, as well as a significantly enhanced ability to ramp up production if this is likely to be the type of conflict we see in the future.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Shatz, did you want to comment as well on shell production and how to untie the knots between procurement and industry to ramp up production to meaningful levels that could replenish supply and supply Ukraine in significant numbers that could allow it to meet its objectives?

    Briefly, there may be opportunities for co-operation among allied defence industries. It would be worth looking at whether there are bottlenecks of inputs.

    I think Mr. Kelly's remark about preparing for the future is very important, too. Here at RAND, we joke that every sentence and every statement about security should end with “buy more munitions”. They're going to be important.

    I would investigate the defence industrial base and whether there are any additional legal authorities akin to, for example, the U.S. Defense Production Act that would help do that.

    Canada has delivered 20,000 155-millimetre rounds from our old stock. That's just a matter of a few days' supply.

    We've heard at this committee, though, that industry says it's waiting for orders, while procurement officials have been frustrated by industry's lack of capacity.

    Is it merely a matter of will to solve these problems on production? Do we need a signal from the government of willingness to get production up to where it needs to be?

    Answer very briefly.

    Did you direct that to Mr. Shatz?

    Yes.

    I'm afraid that would be beyond my knowledge of Canadian industry.

    Yes, I think it is a question of will and urgency. It's not rocket science. It's artillery science.

    We know it's not rocket science.

    Mr. Fisher, you have four minutes.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I want to thank all our witnesses for being here. David, thanks for filling in at the last minute; we see you a lot at this committee, and it's always great to have you and your matching tie and socks combination here. Merry early Christmas.

    Ihor, it's nice to see you. I'm going to direct my first question to you and then ask the rest of the panellists if they wish to comment. So far, Canada has provided over $2.4 billion in aid for Ukraine since the war started in February 2022. Of course, there is a lot of funding there for Operation Unifier, for ammunition, for tanks, for some of the equipment that we talk about in this committee all the time and for the things that the Ukrainian army officials have told us very clearly that they need urgently.

    I'm sure we're all aware of the 30-hour voting session that we had last week, in which we were fortunate enough to pass a vote for $500 million in support for Ukraine. That again included money for Operation Unifier, to train the Ukrainian soldiers and supply the army with the tools and equipment they need to win this war. They have to win this war.

    We heard very clearly in the last hour from the ambassador that the support for training and for Unifier is so important.

    I would ask you—Ihor, if you want to start—to talk about the importance of this funding and the need to continue to support Ukraine at this absolutely critical juncture.

    Certainly, as we hear that we're entering the second winter of a trench warfare situation, the brave men and women of the Ukrainian armed forces are literally freezing in the trenches in what is one of the most heavily land-mined countries in the world—among the top five now.

    This is all part of what Ukraine needs to win, which is the combination of financial and military support, equipment and training. What we're really seeing and hearing from the Ukrainians, frankly, is that they are not receiving things from all the allies as quickly as they need them. Even if an announcement is made, it takes months to implement. We've heard that they have to translate manuals; they have to learn how to repair things; they have to train on these things. In particular, a great Leopard tank coalition takes months and months to implement, and it's the same thing with the fighter jets as well.

    The combination of all the aid that Canada can muster with our allies is critical, because I think....

    I don't like saying the words, “Ukraine cannot lose,” but if Ukraine loses this war, it is almost an unimaginable scenario for global security and for us as Canadians, so I think that is a dire reason that we need to keep supporting Ukraine.

    Thank you very much for that.

    David, I don't know if you want to comment on that, or even if you have the ability to talk, maybe, about how Ukraine has put some of Canada's contributions to use, specifically speaking to training.

    I think Ukraine has done a commendable job.

    We've seen, in the last six months, a bit of a mismatch. There's a desire to see some western concepts and some fairly complex ways of employing combined arms military equipment on sort of a western mould that I don't know is really well suited to the composition of the Ukrainian armed forces, which is now a mobilization army; whereas in the west, in most cases, we've built our concept for employing military force on fully professional armed forces. Notwithstanding the aptitude and the skill of Ukrainian soldiers, I think there's a mismatch in training lead times, which has been problematic.

    I hope that going forward, collectively, the west is more nuanced about meeting the Ukrainian forces where they are in terms of what can be practically implemented in short order, and for the types of equipment that they're asking for and that fit their way of conducting operations.

    Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

    Madame Normandin, you have four minutes please.

    Thank you very much.

    My first question deals with aide to Ukraine and is for Mr. Shatz.

    From what I understand, Europe recently reneged on its promise to use the interest on the frozen Russian assets to fund the reconstruction effort in Ukraine.

    I'd like to hear your thoughts on that. Do you believe that bodes poorly for support for Ukraine in general? Are there reasons behind that that we should be taking into consideration?

     There's reluctance to use anything from sovereign assets, because the legal authorities are not clear. There are some very strong arguments that say these assets can be used. Ultimately, this is going to come down to either new legislation in different jurisdictions, some kind of court procedure, or some other procedure that will make all asset holders comfortable with using sovereign assets. This is a big step for them to take.

    In terms of assistance to Ukraine, I think the bigger concern from Europe is the slowdown of the 50 billion to 60 billion euros that they promised. They are having big discussions about their budget. They had budgeted, I think, 55 billion euros or so over four years in grants and loans. That is stalled right now. We should be concerned about that. We should be concerned about what's happening in the United States, though what's happening in the United States should be resolved soon one way or the other.

    From the last question, I would like to make a point, as well, about assistance. I said that aid will recede in importance. Right now, aid for something as simple as budget support is extremely important for Ukraine. They need money for payroll. They need money to repair infrastructure that is going to get bombed by missiles. The immediate need is budget support. There are concerns, and some of them should be resolved, but it might take some time.

    Thank you.

    I'd like to follow up on something you mentioned, namely coordination between the various donors to avoid certain donors going off on their own and possibly even attempting to dictate to Ukraine which projects to prioritize.

    Ought we not still try to strike a balance between that eventuality and the fact that donors also want to know where their money is going and maybe even want a kind of ownership over certain projects that need to be carried out?

    Where is that balance?

    That's a great question.

    It's not easy. It is very possible and very likely that without real coordination, donors are going to have all kinds of requirements generated by their parliaments and their aid agencies.

    We talk about the Marshall plan. The Marshall plan was one country to many. This is many countries to one. Ukraine will not be able to fulfill all of the requirements of all 30 members of the OECD development assistance committee. That is why we say that ultimately the priorities should be set by Ukraine.

    Now, there should certainly be traceability. Countries will not carte blanche give Ukraine the right to use any assistance as they wish. We recognize this, and Ukraine should recognize it. That's where the inspector general comes in. That's where donor meetings among senior coordinators come in. Compromises could be made in a room with Ukrainian officials. That's also where tracing of the finances comes in.

    We haven't really had a situation like this before, and we're going to have to stumble our way through it. In the end, there should be significant deference to Ukraine's priorities, especially if they draw on recent advances that they've made in the last 10 years on decentralization, and especially if we hear about priorities from localities in the different regions of Ukraine in terms of what would best help them redevelop and reconstruct.

    Thank you, Madame Normandin.

    Ms. Mathyssen, you have four minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to all the witnesses for appearing today.

    Ihor and Orest, I'd like to build off what Mr. Fisher was talking about in terms of what we saw last week in the House of Commons and the response from your organization publicly to those votes. I know that the UCC was extremely disappointed.

    I would like to hear from you about what your members and Canadian Ukrainians are feeling right now. As you mentioned, this is going into the second winter, and there are feelings about Canada's support and what happened last week.

    As you can imagine, the length of this war is extremely difficult for our community, many of whom have family and friends in Ukraine. There are now some 200,000 Ukrainians who have been welcomed to Canada as refugees.

    One of the main priorities of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is to keep Canada unified in support for Ukraine. We will continue to do everything we can to ensure that unity and that consensus in Canadian society.

     Was there still an overall belief that the Canadian government overall is in support? Is that the message coming out of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress as well?

     I think Canada, the Canadian government and everyone involved is in support of Ukraine. We would like to see more being done on the military, economic and humanitarian fronts to support Ukraine, especially at a time when some of the support from other countries is, if not under question, then certainly becoming more difficult to predictably sustain, as we're seeing right now in the United States.

    Thank you.

    One thing that concerns us—I asked the ambassador this question as well, but the Canadian government didn't really answer—was a report in The Globe and Mail a few weeks ago about Kyrgyzstan re-exporting Canadian-made electric detonators to Russia. These detonators are potentially being used with landmines. We didn't receive answers from the government. They could be used by Russia against Ukraine.

    Can you comment on the seriousness of Canada's arms export control system? Is it not working as intended? What is your perception of that?

    We were asked for comment on those reports. If these reports are true, they're deeply concerning.

    We've written to both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Public Safety to see what the situation is and whether those reports are accurate.

    Did she respond?

    We have not yet received a response from the government.

    The only thing I will add is that one thing we keep talking to the Canadian government about is the need to ensure that sanctions are not only implemented but also enforced. Sanctions that are implemented but not enforced are not really sanctions.

    Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

    We need to do 25 minutes' worth of questions in 15 minutes, so we'll do three minutes, three minutes, one minute, one minute, three minutes and three minutes.

    Mr. Bezan, go ahead for three minutes.

    Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for appearing today.

    I'm looking at the fall economic update and what we're doing in the estimates around military assistance in the world. For this year, it's $816 million, less $55 million for in-kind contributions. Next year, it's down to $318 million, and in 2025-26, it says $197 million.

    Is anyone here concerned that there is a lack of support going forward for Ukraine, based upon the economic update?

    Dr. Perry.

    I'd say a couple of things.

    I think we're seeing the importance now of multi-year funding and commitments, and sustainable, predictable support with that.

    I think we're also seeing the consequences of not having that in the past in terms of investing in our own armed forces over multiple years, decades and governments, which has directly impacted what they've been able to donate directly. We're seeing the impact of having, I think, far too lean a structure, with very limited ability to donate.

    I'm also concerned by what was in the fall economic statement about additional budget cuts. We don't have details yet about the impact on National Defence, but I don't think it's at all inconceivable that it could potentially impact some of the programs, like the munitions supply program, as well as the maintenance of existing military equipment. That might have an impact down the road on our ability to make donations to Ukraine in the future.

    Dr. Perry, with your experience and expertise on the Canadian Armed Forces.... One thing Ukraine was calling for last week was to include provisions of F-18 fighter jets. Of course, we have a fleet of CF-18s that are going to be replaced with F-35s. That took 10 extra years to make a decision on, unfortunately.

    What would be the time frame for when our surplus CF-18s might be available to donate to Ukraine when we get our F-35s?

    I'm not clear on that, because it remains a bit murky. I don't know what kind of serviceable state the ones we aren't currently operating are in or to what standard the Ukrainians would want them. We certainly have expertise in that, but I think—

     We just got 18 F-18s from the Australians that were retrofitted. Supposedly they're in good flying condition, you would think.

    My understanding was that some quantity of them are in the process of being further upgraded, so I don't know exactly how many are flyable and able to be donated. I've seen some concerning reporting, too, about how many technicians and pilots are available to operate and service the ones we already have. I don't really have the full details—

    We were looking at donations of Howitzers and Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Have you heard of any plans to replace those Howitzers and Leopard tanks or any plans to even buy new tanks to replace our aging fleet of Leopards?

    No.

    Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

    Mr. Baker, you have three minutes.

    Thanks very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all the witnesses for being here.

    I'd like to direct my question to Mr. Michalchyshyn. I was going to ask about something else, but today in the House of Commons, a comment was made that upset me. I want to know if he has a reaction to it.

    The Leader of the Opposition referred to Ukraine as a faraway foreign land. We heard those comments in the lead-up to World War II from other leaders.

    I'm wondering if he has any comments on that.

    I wasn't able to hear question period today. Ukraine has been described as a close neighbour or as the easternmost province, and Canada as an oblast of Ukraine. I think our people-to-people ties are incredibly close, as committee members around the table know.

    I think that's a mischaracterization of the relationship in terms of the people and the history of our cultural, economic and now military co-operation. Certainly we've seen that the Canadian public is very supportive of the refugees, as Orest said—the 200,000-plus, I think, displaced persons or refugees, as we call them colloquially. The public support for increased humanitarian and military assistance continues to be strong.

    Our job is to maintain that consensus with the public and with Parliament, to keep working forward.

    Thanks very much for that.

     First of all, I want to highlight that the funding from the Government of Canada for Operation Unifier and for military aid for Ukraine in various forms continues to increase. I want to get that on the record.

    I also want to ask about this. A comment was made by Mr. Zakydalsky at the beginning, if I heard him correctly, that there are people in Canada who don't support Ukraine and who don't want Ukraine to win. We've seen Russia, really in a dedicated way over the past number of years, using misinformation campaigns to influence people's perceptions around the world. We've seen it in the United States. We've seen it here, I believe.

    I'm wondering if our representative from the RAND Corporation wants to comment on what we are seeing in terms of the weakening of support for Ukraine in some small but vocal circles.

    Is this the result or consequence of those misinformation campaigns by Russia?

    That's a good question, Mr. Baker, but you've given the gentleman four seconds to answer it, so—

    I apologize for that.

    Can you perhaps provide us an answer in writing?

    I have colleagues who are looking at this. I will reach out to them and we will get you an answer to this.

    Thank you, Mr. Baker.

    You have one minute, Madame Normandin.

    Thank you very much, Chair.

    My question is for Mr. Perry and deals with ammunition production.

    We know the situation is rather critical. We've often heard the argument that the government doesn't need to support ammunition production because the industry should realize there's a market due to the war that's going to last a long time.

    Why is that not a valid argument?

    It's an entirely government-influenced and controlled market, either to supply to our own government or to export to another one. Without a surety.... It's not like producing any type of product that is not controlled by an export control regime or purchased directly by the Department of Defence. It requires government support.

    If it was your own capital, you'd be putting it at risk by investing it without an assurance of a government contract or pre-approval for an export permit.

     Madam Mathyssen is next, for one minute, please.

    In terms of that production, ultimately a defence update would certainly be of use and helpful. Have you heard anything that's coming forward on that?

    I heard it was going to be swift in April 2022. It's December 2023.

    I agree.

    I would just like to, with my final seconds, give a verbal notice of motion. We'll send it out appropriately as well. It reads as follows:

    With that, I'll end my time.

    You will.

    I don't think that was within the parameters of this study, so it does require 48 hours. I'm going to wait for it to be tabled properly.

    With that, I have Ms. Gallant.

    Dr. Perry, Russian ships are—

    I have a question for the clerk.

    Do the Standing Orders apply to committees?

    They apply generally.

    I would suggest that motion is out of order, since it reflects on a vote taken in the House.

    It doesn't reflect on how persons have taken the vote. Anyway, I've already ruled on this.

    I have Ms. Gallant, for three minutes.

    Russian ships are also trying to circumvent the sanctions by turning off their ships' transponders. They're known as ghost ships. They also know how to manipulate their ships' locations, particularly to naval ships enforcing sanctions.

    How should Canada, with our allies, combat this threat?

    We should try and do as much as we can to strengthen the regime of sanctions to interdict illegal material. More broadly, I think we need to recognize that it's ultimately going to be imperfect. Because of that, I think we need to spend at least as much time focusing on our own domestic production as worrying about what we can or can't do to limit what the Russians can do.

    I think, if I were a Russian right now, I'd be pretty happy with what they've been able to produce, but equally, if not more pleased with how limited our collective ability in the west has been to ramp up what we can do in response.

    Ukraine's grain is vital to feeding the world, but most of that grain has to pass through hostile waters in the Black Sea. With the breakdown of the grain deal last summer, the security situation of the Black Sea has been dire. What can Canada do more with our allies to monitor the deteriorating situation in the Black Sea?

    That's for Dr. Perry.

    I'm not sure that there's anything specifically more we can do. I know we've been providing some surveillance information, but I don't know that it's the most useful role that we could play.

    Canada currently has troops in Latvia as part of Operation Reassurance. That's our contribution to NATO's eastern flank.

    NATO is also concerned about security in the Baltic Sea, given that the Russians have territory sandwiched between its enclave and Kaliningrad. With the threat of Russian submarines, what should Canada's navy do more with our allies to counter this threat?

    I don't know that there's a lot we can do. As we've seen recently in some reporting, I think our navy's ability to deploy operationally has become degraded due to the advanced stage of our naval frigates, as well as limitations on sailors in terms of actually going to sea. Right now we're stretched on having to make unfortunate choices around making contributions to NATO while simultaneously trying to deliver on the commitments we made as part of our Indo-Pacific strategies. It's not clear to me that there's any more that we could do without sacrificing elsewhere.

    How long would it take to get a fleet of submarines, say our first submarine, from right now, if we decided to tender an order?

    It would depend a whole lot on how we would go about doing that, but I have a huge concern that it's longer than the current submarines will last.

    Should we then be thinking about planning our next submarine purchase once we have our current purchase, which needs to be now, on the books?

     I think that, ideally, we would have been planning that five or 10 years ago, but now is better than later, yes.

    Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.

    The final question is from Mrs. Lalonde.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I know I have only a few minutes, so bear with me.

    Last week we saw, from the Leader of the Opposition, somewhat of a temper tantrum—that's what I would call it as a mom—where we had to vote for 30 hours in the House, and I was very pleased to be here in the House of Commons.

     There was a certain aspect where most Canadians usually, as we go to vote on the supplementary estimates, wouldn't know what's important or not.

    During this marathon, there was an aspect where I would like to hear whether you think that what we've been proposing as a government is important for Ukraine.

    Part of the supplementary estimates was $500 million of funding for military aid to Ukraine. Would you say it is relevant, significant and important for the Canadian government to continue supporting Ukraine, yes or no?

     I do, but I'd say that I spent more time reading the estimates than I did following the votes, and I recognize that the structure of the parliamentary system means that, a lot of times, specific issues get lumped in with wider voting issues and are not kept individual.

    That's perfect.

    Orest.

    I'm sorry. Is the question whether continuing to fund aid to Ukraine is important? If so, the answer is yes.

    Thank you.

    What about the other individuals online, by video conference?

    Mr. Shatz is an American and probably not in any position to comment on that.

    Okay. I'm sorry about that.

    I'm going to ask our Canadian friends, and I'll continue.

    There was another aspect of it that I think, since 2015, we've been supporting, and I hear only good things about Operation Unifier. There was funding to reinforce Canada's support for Ukraine, and that meant $58.4 million as we—

    I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

    Just for the record, in 2015, on the estimates that came forward, the Liberals voted against Operation Unifier.

     You're not allowed to say that in committee.

    An hon. member: That's according to you.

    An hon. member: He already ruled—

    The Chair: Again, I—

    An hon. member: Now it's all over.

    Order.

    An hon. member: You pick your set of rules, and I'll play by them. You'd get mayhem pretty quickly.

    The Chair: Order.

    An hon. member: But you guys haven't supported it.

    The Chair: Order!

    You may continue, Mrs. Lalonde.

    Thank you very much. It's interesting to see the double standard in this committee.

    I'm going to ask again: The funding to reinforce Canada's support for Ukraine through Operation Unifier, through which over 38,000 Ukrainians have had the benefit of training from our Canadian military, is a $58.4-million allocation. Was that important or not?

    Yes, I think the money to support Operation Unifier is important.

    Yes.

    I want to say thank you to all of you.

    Certainly, I want to say thank you again to the UCC for its advocacy. I know that there have been difficult times, and you made reflection on Canada's involvement with the welcoming of Ukrainians who had to be displaced temporarily for this time. My heart goes out to them.

    I had the pleasure of visiting some of our families who have been displaced historically in the last year, and I certainly want to say, with all due respect, that Canada stands with them and that we will continue to.

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

    That brings our time together to an end.

    I want to thank all the witnesses for their contributions and their patience with the way this place works around here.

    With that, the meeting is adjourned.