Good evening, everyone. We'll call the meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 12 of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship. Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the Canada-People's Republic of China relations, with a focus on police service stations.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.
For the benefit of witnesses and members, please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and please mute yourself when you're not speaking. For interpretation for those on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.
I will remind you that that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.
Let's see. I believe, Madam Clerk, that we have tested all of the connections. Yes, everybody has been tested. You're all healthy. That's good.
I'd now like to welcome the Honourable Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety. He's accompanied today by Tricia Geddes, associate deputy minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; Brenda Lucki, commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and David Vigneault, director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS.
Minister Mendicino, you have up to five minutes for your opening statement.
Mr Chair, thank you for the opportunity to present to you and committee members today.
I would like to begin by commending the committee for studying the so-called police stations, which are a suspected vector of foreign activities steered by the People's Republic of China and operate in Canada as well as other democracies around the world.
The reports of the PRC attempting to enhance its clandestine footprint on Canadian soil reflect two incontrovertible trends. First is that the geopolitical landscape is increasingly complex, with hostile actors looking to disrupt the international rules-based order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War; and, second, like other democracies, Canada has increasingly become a target of foreign interference, which is a direct by-product of the agenda driven by hostile actors whose objective is to undermine our national interests.
Today, I will outline the concrete steps the federal government is taking to mitigate the threat of foreign interference. Before I do so, let me emphasize that Canada has a strong and resilient democracy that is bolstered by a community of national security and public safety agencies that work around the clock to protect our institutions. These agencies have important resources, technologies and tools at their disposal to ensure national security.
The federal government does not undertake this work alone. Rather, we work collaboratively with other levels of government, as well as key allies in the Five Eyes, G7 and NATO. Together, the whole of government is positioned to assess, mitigate, investigate, prosecute and report on threats to Canadian national security.
We need to be always vigilant, because those threats are constantly evolving and manifesting in different ways, including through state and non-state hostile activities, foreign interference, cyber-attacks and threats to the security of our democratic, economic, academic, environmental and public health institutions.
In the face of these threats, the federal government is vigilant, and we are acting. I'd like to highlight five priority areas of our work.
First, we have put into place robust measures to protect our democratic institutions, including our elections.
We introduced Bill to crack down on foreign funding from third parties to federal campaigns and candidates. We created the security and intelligence threats to elections task force, or SITE. We created the critical incident reporting protocol to communicate transparently and impartially with Canadians during elections in the event that there is a threat to the integrity of a federal election. We also introduced the digital citizen initiative to promote democracy and social inclusion by building resilience against online disinformation and building partnerships to support a healthy information ecosystem.
The SITE task force looked at the federal elections of 2019 and 2021 and independently concluded that in both cases the integrity of the election was not compromised.
Second, we implemented a national cybersecurity strategy and action plan, which resulted in the launch of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
In budget 2022, we allocated more than $850 million to enhance the Communications Security Establishment's ability to conduct cyber operations and better protect the privacy of Canadians.
Moreover, last spring, I introduced Bill , our new legislation on cybersecurity, which prioritizes critical infrastructure protection as it relates to the financial, telecommunications, transportation and innovation sectors.
Third, we have introduced national security guidelines for research partnerships that are backed by a research security centre and a $12.6-million investment, in order to protect the integrity of our academic institutions. The purpose of these guidelines is to integrate national security considerations into the overall assessment of research partnerships. Among other things, the guidelines require clear information about who researchers intend to partner with, what researchers intend to research and what additional due diligence will be taken to mitigate if the subject of research involves a sensitive area. In addition to the guidelines, research partnerships are subject to rigorous admissibility screening and required to comply with existing authorities that regulate exports and imports.
Fourth, when it comes to protecting our economy, the government vets foreign investments under the Investment Canada Act and has the capacity to reject those deals when they are contrary to our national security. The government, as you know, is proposing to further augment the authorities under the ICA.
We also have a new national critical minerals strategy in place. It will help leverage Canada's national resources in a sustainable way, in partnership with indigenous peoples.
Fifth, and finally, we've also modernized our foreign policy with the Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy calls for the strengthening of our intelligence capabilities in the region, in order to enhance our cyber-diplomacy and deepen our partnership with allies. It is supported by an investment of over $100 million for these particular areas. Within the Indo-Pacific strategy, vis-à-vis our relationship with China, Canada states its commitment to challenge, compete, co-operate and coexist. Put simply, we will never apologize for defending our national interest.
Taken together, these give the committee an overview of the government's approach to managing threats, including foreign interference.
In closing, I would like to say a few words about the activities of foreign governments in Canada. Under international law, all foreign government representatives have a duty to respect our laws and regulations. Any foreign state that threatens, harasses or intimidates Canadians and Canadian residents is in violation of these international agreements.
I assure you that the RCMP is working with the intelligence community and our law enforcement partners to address these so‑called police stations that appear to be operating in the greater Toronto area. Its goal is to ensure that the public feels safe in its own communities. It's about building trust and, where possible, enforcing the law or disrupting activities.
The only way to build trust, Mr. Chair, is by being transparent. That is why we have grown the arsenal of national security tools. However, we have simultaneously raised the bar of transparency through the creation of NSIRA, NSICOP and more frequent public reporting by our intelligence agencies. In a similar vein, we have expressed that we will explore ways to further enhance transparency with regard to our fight against foreign interference. All options are on the table. These could include requiring foreign agents to be properly registered.
However, we must bring all Canadians into this discussion as we reform our institutions so they are more diverse, inclusive and free from systemic discrimination, biases and racism.
The objective of these and other ongoing efforts is to recognize that the threat of foreign interference is not static and that we must continue to develop the tools available to Canada to deal with this evolving threat.
Colleagues, as I close, I will underline that our national security and intelligence agencies continue to investigate and monitor reports of Chinese overseas police stations in Canada. There will be no tolerance for this or any other form of intimidation, harassment or harmful targeting of Canadians or individuals within Canada.
Canada will continue to stand for its interests and values, both at home and abroad.
The short answer is that there is an intention to begin consultations on the possibility of creating such an initiative.
Before we do that, we have to be sure that Canadians understand why we are looking to modernize our tool kit when it comes to protecting against foreign interference. That means bringing them along, engendering trust and making sure that the appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place, so that we raise the bar when it comes to transparency.
The fact of the matter is that, even as the geopolitical landscape becomes more complex, we are, at the same time, reforming our institutions within the public safety and national security apparatus so that they are more diverse, more inclusive and more culturally sensitive, as you have just asked. You're beginning to hear the reflections of those values in the various initiatives that are being rolled out to support the diaspora, who are often the target of foreign interference.
We have to keep all options open, including the potential creation of a foreign agent registry.
As we embark on that I would say two closing things. One is that we need to maximize our current tool kit, which we are doing vigilantly every day. Then, as we expand it, we need to make sure that we bring Canadians along in a way that is transparent.
Mr. Trudel, thank you for your question. I will give you a two-part answer.
First, I can talk about national security and security intelligence. Then I may ask my colleague the RCMP commissioner to talk about the investigation.
It is unfortunately not a surprise when these types of situations occur. We have made it clear to Canadians in the past and in recent years that economic espionage, among other types of threats, is one of the things we are most concerned about. The future sovereignty and prosperity of all Canadians and Quebeckers is at stake. Our secrets being stolen will prevent us from prospering.
What is also important is to look at what enables Canada to be competitive and prosperous in advanced technologies. You mentioned green technologies. We're also talking about biotechnologies and artificial intelligence. Many places in Canada and Quebec have established centres of expertise. Those are unfortunately targets.
Therefore, we work closely with other national security partners to try to raise awareness and inform people, within the limits of what we can make public, to increase their resilience. We have some very real examples where, as a result of different interventions on our part, companies have told us that they have been able to stop some of the interference and espionage activities.
As far as this particular investigation goes, perhaps I can ask the commissioner to talk about it.
Thank you very much to all of the witnesses for being here.
Thank you, Minister, for making the time to come. I do understand that you have lots of invitations, so we're grateful that you were able to make this one of your stops.
Like my colleague Mr. Trudel, Canadians and everyone in this room are concerned about their security. Canadians of course are very worried about hearing things like that our elections are at risk, that our academic institutions are at risk, that there are police stations operating in our communities or that there are spy balloons floating over our communities. This is very worrying for all Canadians and certainly everyone in this room.
I have a series of questions for you with regard to the police stations.
How have you talked to impacted communities? What does that dialogue look like? How have you made sure that impacted communities are being heard? What we've heard in my constituency office and from groups around the country is that they don't feel protected. They don't feel heard. They don't feel that the government is listening and doing things. They're being told to contact the RCMP, and the RCMP tells them to contact their police. The police tell them to contact the government. They're not feeling like the government is taking care of them.
Minister, how do I respond to that? What you're telling other members of this committee is that these groups are being protected, but what they are feeling is that they are not.
Minister, CSIS said in its February 2021 briefing note that foreign interference is a serious threat to the security of Canada. It also indicated in that briefing note that “PRC media influence activities in Canada have become normalized” in Chinese-language media outlets operating in Canada.
The government issued order 2022-0183 a year ago, asking the CRTC to review Russia Today's broadcasting licence, which led to the revocation of that licence several weeks later. However, CGTN, China's authoritarian, state-controlled broadcaster, is still operating here, spreading disinformation and propaganda, and violating international human rights laws.
In fact, the Financial Times reported about a year ago that they were airing pretrial confessions of, for example, Simon Cheng, a former employee of the U.K. consulate in Hong Kong. He was tortured to obtain that confession, and that confession was aired on CGTN. As a result, Ofcom, the United Kingdom's equivalent of the CRTC, yanked the broadcaster's licence off their airwaves.
Why hasn't your government done the same, based on the advice from CSIS, based on the advice from Five Eyes intelligence and based on what's going on here in Canada?
Why hasn't your government issued, under section 7 of the Broadcasting Act, an order of general application to a new policy that would remove authoritarian, state-controlled broadcasters off our airwaves?
Thank you for that answer, but I note that it was an order from this government—order 2022-0183—that led to the revocation of RT's licence. I would hope it doesn't take a war for the government to change its position on state-controlled, authoritarian broadcasters on public, Crown-owned airwaves, spreading disinformation and violating international human rights law.
I have a second quick question.
Reports indicate that CSIS told your government this past fall that China's consulate in Toronto had targeted 11 candidates in the 2019 election. CSIS also indicated in its briefing notes released to the committee.... As I mentioned before, this foreign interference is a serious threat to the security of Canada. CSIS advised the government in its briefing that, “Canada can make use of a policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to highlight the point that foreign interference should be exposed to the public”. However, your government, in many respects, hasn't followed this advice.
We have been asking about who the 11 candidates are who were targeted in the 2019 election. We have been asking for specific briefings from intelligence before and during elections. All we get are briefings of general application. Our national campaign team in the last election asked for the specific names of candidates who were targeted. We didn't get them, so we couldn't take action as a political party to stop foreign interference and ensure that our candidates weren't being subject to this.
That's not the case in other countries. For example, last summer, a year ago, MI5 went public with an agent of the PRC in the U.K. Parliament by the name of Christine Lee. She had targeted MPs with hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations. Those names were made public by the Speaker of the House, based on MI5's request.
Why isn't your government doing the same thing for parliamentarians here, so that we can protect ourselves from foreign interference that doesn't rise to the level of a prosecution in law?
Mr. Chong, I am as concerned as you are about protecting the integrity of our elections. I would provide you with two answers.
First, on the specific issue that you raise around the threat that is posed by foreign funding, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, this government has raised the bar when it comes to providing legislative tools to crack down on foreign funding that could potentially compromise candidates and campaigns in a federal election. I would hope that would be something you would applaud as a tool to protect the integrity of our elections.
Secondly, I would clarify, and I take your point about wanting to see transparency, that this is precisely why we created the SITE task force. That is a task force that is made up of the clerk and deputy ministers from a number of portfolios that are directly implicated in the protection of our democratic institutions. Within the protocol around critical incidents during elections, there are thresholds. Those thresholds are assessed and evaluated not by me and you, who are elected officials, which, in my view, would be wholly inappropriate given our vested interest in the outcome of those elections, but rather, by the non-elected, independent, non-partisan professional public service. They make the calls about what can and should be released with regard to any events that implicate foreign interference, and we put our confidence in those officials to make those calls.
That does not mean, I would add, that the elected branch of government is not accountable. We are accountable for those policies that we put into place. That is precisely why the conversation that we are having today at this committee is important. It is not a partisan issue. We do not want to go down the path that we've seen in some other democracies where people start to question our elections. We want to have full faith and confidence in our elections, and that is something that I think we're all united behind.
Yes, I'm going to share some time with my colleague, MP Dancho.
Minister, just to follow up on the SITE task force that was established, its primary purpose is intragovernmental coordination. It's not a decision-making body. Each constituent entity of the task force is responsible for making its own decisions and its own communications, coordinated through the normal process during the writ through PCO.
The problem with this task force is that it doesn't tell political actors, doesn't tell parties and candidates, if there is a threat going on during the election. Clearly, SITE was monitoring interference in the election that was targeting MP Kenny Chiu. They highlighted that in their documents that were released months later, but MP Kenny Chiu—the candidate Kenny Chiu—had no idea this was taking place.
Again, there's a lack of transparency in informing political parties, candidates and MPs about the threats they're facing. We get these general briefings of general application, and we're never told if we're the target. I very well could be a target. I want to know if I'm a target. I want to know that.
That's the kind of information the government is failing to provide to parties, candidates and MPs, which other democracies are doing as a best practice. As CSIS has highlighted, sunshine and transparency are tools available to the Government of Canada to counterpoint interference. A lot of this stuff doesn't rise to the level where it can be prosecuted through law; therefore, the only tool we have is transparency. If we're flying blind and we don't know who the 11 candidates are, if we don't know who's being targeted, we're not going to be as effective as we could be and as some of our allies are.
I thank the honourable members of this committee for the opportunity to discuss the issue of foreign interference today concerning the allegations of police stations that are allegedly affiliated with the People's Republic of China and operating in Canada.
My name is Brigitte Gauvin, and I am the acting director general of federal policing in the national security program. I am accompanied by Matt Peggs, the officer in charge of criminal operations in O Division, which is in Ontario, where the RCMP is responsible for federal law enforcement.
The study of this issue is important from a law enforcement perspective, and the RCMP takes this very seriously. While I cannot discuss precise details of ongoing investigations, I want to assure this committee that the RCMP may leverage criminal offences to investigate potential threats to public safety involving a state actor, including Criminal Code offences such as intimidation, criminal harassment, uttering threats and also specific foreign influence threats of violence or violence offences under the Security of Information Act.
Today, I'll focus on explaining three specific concerns from a law enforcement perspective.
First, why is foreign interference, including the activities allegedly connected to the police stations, a problem? This is because the foreign interference threat is multi-layered. It can range from students being pressured to support activities that are favourable to a foreign country, to the theft of intellectual property or the coercion of an individual.
The common thread among each of these foreign interference-related activities is that they are clandestine, deceptive activities that may involve threats to a person and are detrimental to Canada's interests.
This state-backed harassment and intimidation of Canadian communities is no different, as foreign actors seek to benefit another country by limiting certain dialogue and messaging in Canada. There is a collective concern on this topic, which has been expressed both domestically and internationally. This is not only because these alleged police stations have been reported to be operating in the greater Toronto area, but also reportedly around the globe.
This is concerning for several reasons. These alleged police stations may contribute to the involuntary return of individuals to China. Also, families living in both China and Canada may become the target of harassment, intimidation or experience other negative consequences. If the activities of these alleged police stations are consistent with those reported by Safeguard Defenders and the media, they would be operating outside existing Canadian legal mechanisms.
Second, how is the RCMP responding to the alleged police stations issue, and how is the RCMP countering foreign interference more broadly? The RCMP has a specialized team dedicated to countering foreign interference. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the public feels safe in their own communities, building trust and confidence where possible, enforcing relevant legislation or disrupting activities.
We are working directly with the community, our domestic and intelligence law enforcement, security and intelligence partners and other Government of Canada partners on this issue. Our efforts include investigating, preventing and disrupting foreign interference, and we use the knowledge gained from our strategic and criminal intelligence functions, as well as our collaborations with our partners, to adapt to the criminal methods used by foreign actors.
As mentioned, I cannot share specific details about the RCMP's investigations. This is because the investigations are ongoing, and foreign interference investigations are some of the most sensitive national security investigations the RCMP currently conducts.
Third and finally, I will explain how the Canadian public can assist in countering this activity. We encourage the public to report state-backed harassment and intimidation, as this will allow us to investigate and will assist the RCMP in creating a more complete picture of the criminal threat environment. The local police of jurisdiction are typically the first to learn of a foreign interference-related issued. The RCMP works closely with its law enforcement partners, including police of jurisdiction, to respond to these state-backed threats.
If someone is in immediate danger, 911 or local police should be contacted. If an individual is not in immediate danger, the RCMP's national security information network may be contacted by phone or email.
In conclusion, I would like to re-emphasize that the RCMP is taking this situation very seriously. This is a nationwide and global issue. The alleged police stations rightly concern Canadians. We share these concerns.
Thank you for your time today.
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, good evening.
My name is Adam Fisher and I am the director general of Intelligence Assessments within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I would like to thank you for inviting me to meet with you today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have about this study.
As has been noted, the case this committee is studying is under close investigation by the RCMP. While I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot get into specifics in order to protect our sources and methods, CSIS endeavours to support its partners to the best of its ability across all manner of foreign interference investigations.
CSIS investigates and provides advice to government on threats to the security of Canada, such as foreign interference. We take any allegation of foreign interference seriously and have several long-standing and emerging foreign interference investigations across Canada today. As always, close alignment with the RCMP on national security matters is critical.
Foreign interference is covert and malign activity undertaken by a foreign state to advance its national interests to the detriment of Canada's. These activities threaten Canada's democratic institutions, policy process, economy, communities and free press.
Foreign interference can take multiple forms. Threat actors may attempt to elicit sensitive information from those they perceive to have access and influence, cultivating relationships with these individuals over a very long period of time. Threat actors may aggressively threaten or coerce their targets into acting in a certain way. This is a common activity impacting Canada's diverse communities. Other techniques include illicit financing, cyber-attacks, espionage and disinformation campaigns.
A number of foreign states engage in these activities. For example, China's attempts to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world have been well reported in open sources. To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China. Their activities can instill fear and silence dissent in Canadian communities and communities around the world.
Fighting foreign interference requires a pan-Canadian approach. Those threatened often lack the means to defend themselves or are unaware that they can report such activities to Canadian authorities, such as CSIS.
This also requires an understanding of the threat. We have prioritized outreach and engagement with communities across Canada to build awareness and resilience. Last year, for example, CSIS's “Foreign Interference and You” publication outlined in several languages concrete ways that Canadians can defend themselves against foreign interference. Our goal is to strengthen individual resilience and to protect Canadians and their interests.
Canadians can be assured that CSIS and the government take these threats very seriously. Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24-7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
To conclude, foreign interference is a rising challenge for the whole of our society. However, I want to assure this committee that CSIS is steadfast in its commitment to keep all Canadians safe.
With that, I'm happy to take your questions. Thank you.
Thank you to our witnesses for appearing as we continue this hearing we're having today.
My question concerns both the protection of national security and whether it's being threatened by foreign interference, and the protection of our intellectual property as it's threatened by espionage.
To my knowledge, in the last several years, only one person has been investigated and charged with either of these two things. That was a Hydro-Québec employee who was charged just a short time ago with allegedly stealing secrets, intellectual property, to transfer to the People's Republic of China.
I don't want to talk about anything that concerns an active investigation. I want to point out that's the only case I know of that has led to the arrest of someone, the laying of charges and prosecution. I don't know of anything else, yet I read in newspapers every day and every month that our closest Five Eyes intelligence allies are actually arresting agents of China in their territory and charging them. Just last year in the United States, on May 18, four PRC intelligence officers were charged with spying on prominent dissidents, Hong Kong activists and pro-democracy activists. On October 24, the United States charged 13 people in three separate cases regarding foreign interference and espionage. On October 20, six people were charged as illegal agents of the People's Republic of China in the United States. On November 17, a U.S. court sentenced a PRC spy to 20 years for stealing trade secrets.
In the United Kingdom a year ago, MI5 came forward with naming and shaming Christine Lee for a being an agent of the PRC in the U.K. Parliament. Just over two years ago, the United Kingdom expelled three people posing as journalists who were actually spies and agents of the PRC.
Yet here in Canada, I don't hear about anything other than this one case that I heard about three days ago.
Maybe you can tell us if I'm wrong, if there are any other cases that have led to prosecution.
Ladies and gentlemen, witnesses, I am sure you are very competent officers. I do not question your competence. However, China has been in the news a lot lately. I mentioned it earlier. There was the balloon story, there is talk of Chinese police stations, interference in elections, and so on. This is a major issue. It is discussed during question period, when ministers are often asked about it. We also hear about spying at Hydro-Québec. You mentioned it earlier. It's all been in the news.
As police officers involved in these kinds of stories, when they make the headlines, it must affect your pride a little. You must want to do something about it and stop it from happening. It's almost as if drug dealers are having fun doing deals outside municipal police stations or as if China is taunting your services in broad daylight.
Clearly, there is something Canada is not doing. There are tools that we don't have to deal with these problems, since it's in the news day after day and you don't know when it's going to stop. Given these problems, I imagine that you have frequent meetings with politicians and ministers and that you make representations.
Since you are on the ground, you must know what tools you lack to prevent Chinese balloons and police stations from making headlines, and spies from being discovered day after day in Canada's sensitive infrastructure. You must know what we're missing, what we're not doing here that other countries may be doing.
What are these tools? What do you say to politicians when you meet them? What do you say to the , who was here earlier?
There was talk earlier about the creation of a foreign agents' register. We were told that this could be a useful tool. What other tools would you need to prevent China from continuing to make headlines and taunting our intelligence services?
I want to return to this issue of foreign interference. Three cases were mentioned: the 2019 case with the Canadian Space Agency that involved an employee acting on behalf of a Chinese aerospace company; the 2019 case that was mentioned regarding an Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada employee who was acting on behalf of a Chinese university and an Italian pasta company; and then more recently, the Hydro-Québec employee case that involved espionage.
It seems to me that all these three cases involve espionage and not foreign interference in the form of illegal police stations or the intimidation of citizens and pro-democracy groups and human rights activists, which involves things like targeting democratic institutions, political parties or candidates.
The source of frustration that I and many MPs have is, first of all, we have not heard of any criminal investigations that have led to prosecution with respect to foreign interference in the form of intimidation of citizens and the targeting of political parties or candidates. In respect of illegal police stations, we have not heard of any investigations that have led to charges, yet we hear of this happening among our Five Eyes allies.
Then for the stuff that doesn't rise to the level of criminality, we're not even told who's being targeted. The 's brief said that 11 candidates in the 2019 election were targeted by the People's Republic of China, but nobody tells us who the 11 candidates are. We are not even getting information to help equip ourselves to defend ourselves, to defend our institutions, yet other Five Eyes allies are using sunlight and transparency to do exactly that.
Then last year we read about a lack of inter-agency co-operation. The agencies aren't sharing information. CSIS has an active investigation on what's apparently a threat to our national security, calls up the RCMP and says this individual or individuals need to be arrested, and the RCMP refuses. When you put this all together, can you understand why we're concerned about what is seemingly a lack of institutional capacity to defend our national security and our intellectual property?
One question, has this inter-agency rivalry between CSIS and the RCMP that was highlighted in an internal report of last April been resolved? Has the lack of information sharing within the Government of Canada been resolved?