Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for the invitation to contribute to the committee's study of aircraft certification.
Transport Canada appreciates the committee's work on all issues related to the safety of the travelling public and is pleased to help in any way it can.
Aircraft certification is essential to the safety and security of our transportation system and is part of Transport Canada's mandate.
March 10 marked the one-year anniversary of the tragic Ethiopian Airlines accident. And it's been nearly 18 months since the tragic Lion Air accident. Our thoughts continue to be with the victims, along with their family members and friends.
As committee members know, the model of plane involved in both accidents was the Boeing 737 MAX 8. On March 13, 2019, days after the Ethiopian Airlines accident, Transport Canada received and analyzed new satellite data that informed its judicious decision to swiftly close Canadian airspace to the aircraft.
These restrictions will remain in place until Transport Canada is fully satisfied that all safety concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place.
Civil aviation relies on the global collaboration of manufacturers, operators and regulators. All stakeholders, including governments, work together to minimize the risk of aviation accidents. The International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, facilitates this collaboration. Under the ICAO convention, the country that manufactures an aircraft—known as the “state of design”—is responsible for certifying its airworthiness and safe operation. The state of design must conduct the testing needed to certify the aircraft and then share this information widely. Under annex 8 of the ICAO convention, countries can either accept the state of design certification or use the results of the original performance tests to validate the certification.
Boeing manufactures the Max 8 in the United States, and the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, is responsible for its certification.
The FAA is also responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the problems identified in the wake of the MAX 8 accidents. ln addition, it must ensure the effectiveness of any recommended changes to the aircraft's design and operation, as well as to crew procedures and training.
Transport Canada continues to work closely with the FAA on its review of the MAX 8. We also continue to work closely with civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil in hopes that this model of aircraft can return to service, and transport travellers safely to destinations around the world.
Transport Canada has been, since the accidents, conducting an independent review of the design changes proposed for the MAX 8 that the FAA are working to certify. This review will include test flights of the aircraft to validate the proposed changes. Any changes in an aircraft's design or operations can also impact crew procedures and training.
A Joint Operational Evaluation Board, comprising international civil aviation authorities, including Transport Canada, is analyzing the proposed changes to the MAX 8 and will identify any potential impacts on crew procedures and training.
The board's analysis might, for instance, identify new training requirements, such as additional simulator training, before the Max 8 can return to service. Transport Canada may also require additional training for crews that operate the Max 8 in Canada.
A key contributor to the Lion Air accident and a suspected contributor to the Ethiopian Air accident was the automatic activation of a system known as MCAS, manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system, following a failure of an angle-of-attack indicator that measures the aircraft's angle relative to the oncoming air. MCAS is part of the larger system that also controls speed stability of the aircraft.
Under specific flight conditions, MCAS automatically moves the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer, the device that adjusts the nose of the plane so that it points up or down.
In the wake of the Lion Air accident, the FAA, the state of design responsible for the Max 8, issued an emergency airworthiness directive related to the MCAS. The directive amended procedures by drawing the crew's attention to the existing runaway stabilizer procedure that would allow crews to effectively counteract the unwanted activation of the MCAS system.
Three Canadian operators fly the Max 8: Air Canada, Sunwing and WestJet. Transport Canada immediately shared the FAA's airworthiness directive with these airlines, and then took an additional step to further improve safety. In collaboration with the three airlines, Transport Canada developed and implemented enhanced training requirements for pilots.
The requirements exceeded the standards implemented by the FAA's airworthiness directive and were specifically designed to reduce the time delay in the crew's use of the runaway trim stabilizer procedure required to counteract the effects of an unwanted MCAS activation.
The additional step of new training demonstrates Canada's commitment to the highest possible safety standards. To complete the training, aircrews had to memorize the five steps required to exercise the runaway trim-stabilizer procedure. Previously, aircrews had to memorize only two of the five steps and then, if needed, consult the cockpit handbook for the other steps.
I am confident that the measures implemented by the FAA Airworthiness Directive, subsequently adopted and enhanced by Transport Canada in collaboration with Canadian MAX 8 operators, significantly reduced the risks involved in situations like the one that led to the Lion Air crash.
The combination of mitigation strategies better prepared Canadian pilots to manage the failure conditions that were evident in the MAX 8 accidents.
Commercial aviation operates in a highly complex, continuously evolving environment. I encourage committee members to recognize that Canada maintains one of the safest civil aviation systems in the world. Our safety record results from the hard work, dedication, experience and technical expertise of the men and women directly involved in the system.
On behalf of the public, Transport Canada remains absolutely committed to safety and bases all of its safety-related decisions on accurate, current and relevant evidence.
Thank you. I'll do my best to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you, Minister, for being here. Thank you to your guests.
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight 610, a Boeing 737 Max crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 people on board. Less than five months later on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, another Boeing 737 Max, crashed just six minutes after takeoff, and 157 people perished, including 18 Canadians.
We're here today in search of answers for the families of the victims of these crashes. We're here in search of answers for Canadians as to how the 737 Max aircraft received certification by you, Minister.
Transport Canada has world-leading technical professionals who are experts in their field. You are absolutely right with that statement. They're hard-working, and they're smart, dedicated people who did their jobs at all steps of the 737 Max certification process. They asked questions and they brought forth their concerns. They did their job.
Based on the internal information that we have obtained from a concerned citizen, Minister, you didn't do yours.
Despite serious safety concerns raised repeatedly at every step of this process by Transport Canada's technical experts starting from the test flight, then again just prior to certification, concerns were raised time and again in the certification report, yet you still certified this aircraft.
Canadians deserve to know and, most importantly, the families of the victims who died in this crash deserve to know why.
Minister, at any time prior to or during the certification of the 737 Max 8, were you aware of Transport Canada's concerns with this aircraft—yes or no?
Thank you. I'd like to ask you one last question, since I have 30 seconds left.
Your officials, including Mr. Turnbull here, say they have full confidence in the FAA. Last week, when we called them in on February 25, they said, "We trust the FAA [...]".
Not only do the Americans seem not to have given us all the information, but they also let their companies certify themselves. For example, since 2005, due to budget cuts, with the new ODA procedure, Boeing itself has been certifying its own aircraft. So it was Boeing that chose the engineers who did the tests on the famous 737 MAX, and the FAA just approved things without quibbling.
Do you believe, as I do, that our officials may have made a mistake in blindly trusting the FAA?
Thank you, Minister, for being here.
The congressional House committee on transport, which has been holding hearings as you know, released a preliminary report a few days ago. They describe how the financial pressure on Boeing to compete with Airbus led to decisions and assumptions that “jeopardized the safety of the flying public”. The company was prioritizing its finances over the safety of the flying public.
They also found that there is a “culture of concealment" that saw Boeing withholding crucial information from the FAA, including “hiding the very existence of MCAS from 737 MAX pilots".
On the current regulatory process, the report states that “the FAA’s current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public”.
Given these revelations and how they relate not just to the certification of the 737 Max but also to a more general failure of self-regulation at Boeing and the prioritization of financial interests over safety, can Canadians still trust FAA-certified aircraft?
Minister, a number of times in your testimony you have referred to hindsight as being 20/20.
The information that we have received shows us that you had a clear view from day one: from November 9, 2016, when the test pilot wrote about their concerns; from May of 2017, one month before the certification, when they raised the concerns once again; from four weeks after the first crash, when concerns were raised once again by your technical experts. It was raised in the concern paper that you're referring to.
Minister, at all of steps along the way, you had an opportunity. You said you'd take full responsibility. It took one person to say, "Wait a second. We're not getting the answers to the questions that we have." Your technical experts did their job.
At any time during the process prior to the certification of the 737 Max, did Boeing or the FAA communicate to you a tight timeline for delivery of the 737 Max to Canadian operators and that they would like to see the certification made in June of 2017?
Yes, and I think very few people know about this, but Canada has played an extremely important role in the last year in addressing the problem with the MCAS system and in working with other regulators to come up with a solution to it.
If I may be permitted to cite the following, because it is quite a long list.... We have played a leading role internationally in ensuring a safe return to service of the Boeing Max 8. In April of 2019, a month after the Ethiopian crash, Canada set the stage by identifying to the Federal Aviation Administration keys areas of concern that must be addressed before the aircraft can return to service in Canada.
These key areas include acceptable levels of pilot workload—an extremely important factor—the architecture of the flight controls and, thirdly, the minimum training required for crew members.
In April last year, I publicly said that simulator training was required. In addition, Canada had been advocating since the beginning that simulator training would be required before pilots can fly the aircraft again. Boeing has now agreed that simulator training is required. Boeing has since committed to full-stall simulator training to familiarize crews with the angle-of-attack failure that occurred in both the Ethiopian and Indonesian accidents.
Canada also discovered that natural stall characteristics testing had not been performed on the Max with the speed trim system, the FS system and the MCAS system while those systems are inactive. In other words, when those systems are inactive, the plane can still stall, but there had not been testing of those characteristics when those two systems were turned off. That's something that we brought to their attention. We convinced the FAA that stall testing was required to validate safe-flight handling characteristics with the MCAS system off.
Canada also proposed a procedural change to reduce excessive cockpit distraction and workload conditions by allowing the crew to disable the stick shaker warning within the cockpit, which is another important contribution.
The leadership that we have demonstrated with my team in working with the FAA and with the Europeans and the Brazilians is clearly indicated here in how we are actively working to fix this problem, and Canada's input is being taken very seriously.
I want to remind those who are here today and those who are tuning in why we are here. It's for the families of the victims: Ameen Ismail Noormohamed, Dawn Tanner, Rubi Pauls, Darcy Belanger, Stéphanie Lacroix, Angela Rehhorn, Kosha Vaidya, Prerit Dixit, Ashka Dixit, Anushka Dixit, Micah Messent, Pius Adesanmi, Amina Ibrahim Odowa, Sofia Abdulkadir, Derick Lwugi, Danielle Moore, Peter DeMarsh and Jessica Hyba.
Minister, I don't believe this meeting has brought any relief or solace to the victims' families. If anything, I think it's raised even more questions, or perhaps it has validated the questions they've had. It took almost a year for you to meet with these families. As a matter of fact, in the last Parliament, when the motion to study this was raised, the Liberal majority shut it down. We are here today for them. We are here for the families who have listened every day to this testimony.
I appreciate that you've taken full responsibility for this. The concerns we have and the concerns that have been raised by the FAA or by the congressional hearing clearly point to the fact that this aircraft should not be recertified and that the FAA, and Boeing as well, should be held accountable for this.
Minister, will you be looking internally at this process? What is your message, given the information that we shared today, to the families that are listening in?
Minister, even though Boeing had hidden the MCAS anti-collision system in its aviation manual and falsely claimed that it did not require additional training, your officials were aware of the new MCAS system. However, they decided not to test it during validation. In fact, they trusted the FAA. Furthermore, on February 25, when I asked them if it was a mistake not to have tested the MCAS, they said no.
Since 2018, Transport Canada has engaged in a new automatic accreditation process with the United States, Europe and Brazil. Despite all of the FAA issues we've just been talking about, when I asked your officials, they told me that they intend to move forward and continue this process.
I have two questions for you.
First, do you agree with your officials, and do you believe it was not a mistake for them not to test the MCAS?
Next, before considering a new common certification process, such as the one currently being considered, will Transport Canada ask the U.S. to end the ODA process, under which companies certify themselves and which ultimately results in no quality assurance?
Good afternoon, honourable chair, members of the committee. My name is Murray Strom. I'm the vice-president of flight operations at Air Canada and the designated operations manager responsible for Air Canada's air operators certificate to Transport Canada.
I've been a pilot with Air Canada for 33 years and I'm currently a Boeing 777 captain. For most of my 33 years, I've been involved in the training certification of Air Canada pilots, and I've held various positions such as chief pilot on the Airbus A320, 787, 777. I was also responsible for the initial program to bring the Max 737 aircraft to Air Canada.
Before I begin speaking to the certification process, on behalf of Air Canada and our 36,000 employees, I'd like to express my condolences to the family and friends of the victims of these two tragic accidents that ultimately led to the grounding of the 737 Max aircraft. As someone who has spent his entire career promoting safety in aviation, I and the entire Air Canada family are reminded by events like these of the importance of my job and our motto, “Safety First, Always”.
My expertise is in training, inspection and operation of aircraft at Air Canada. It is not in the certification of the aircraft. That is a function of Transport Canada and other authorities such as the Federal Aviation Administration in the United States. I have, however, been involved and worked closely with the certification group at Transport Canada during the introduction of the A330, the 777, the 787, the 737 and finally the A220, formerly known as the Bombardier C Series.
Air Canada presently has 24 737 Max aircraft, of which 22 of these are stored presently in Arizona, and two are presently in Windsor, Ontario, undergoing routine maintenance, and where we are installing dual heads-up displays on all of our aircraft. This is a state-of-the-art safety system that enhances pilot situational awareness and is an added safety system for all of Air Canada's aircraft, which include presently the 787 and the A220.
We have another 12 737 Max aircraft at the Boeing-rented factory in Washington that are ready for delivery, and 14 aircraft that are currently on the factory floor being built. These aircraft were originally scheduled for delivery by July 1 of this year. As of July 1 of this year, we should have had 50 airplanes in our fleets.
Through the certification and introduction of the 737, I can assure you that the aircraft certification group at Transport Canada has been extremely thorough and professional. I would say the same is true for all the previous aircraft introductions that I've been involved in over the course of my career. They are experts in their field and respected throughout the world.
The worldwide grounding of the 737 Max fleet presented and continues to present an immediate operational and financial challenge. Our focus on this issue has always been the safety of our customers and our crew. Following the first accident, Canadian carriers, Transport Canada and other agencies immediately came together and co-operated to ensure the safety of the industry and the travelling public in Canada.
Transport Canada and the three operators of this aircraft have worked as a group to come up with a solution based on the information we had at the time. The sole purpose of this work was to ensure the safety of the Canadian public. This collaboration is still occurring today as we continue to work our way through the process. The 737 has been examined from wingtip to wingtip, nose to tail, by most of the regulators in the world and numerous agencies, including this committee. Once the process is complete, this aircraft will be, in my opinion, one of the safest aircraft in the world.
It is important to remember that accidents like this do not occur for one reason. There are many factors involved. The manufacturer and the regulatory bodies are in the process of doing their part. Rest assured that the airlines in Canada are also doing their part. I will ensure that our pilots are properly trained on all aspects of the 737 Max, both new and old.
I thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions related to the aspects of the certification process.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and honourable members. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today, proudly representing more than 14,000 WestJetters who every day commit to the safety and success of our airline in service of the travelling public.
The grounding of the Boeing 737 Max aircraft in Canada 364 days ago has raised important questions. I commend the committee for having these hearings, for seeking information to support its questions and for its support of our dynamic industry.
My name is Scott Wilson. I currently serve as WestJet's vice-president of flight operations as well as the Transport Canada operations manager. In this role our CEO and accountable executive Ed Sims and I are designates of the Minister of Transport. Together we have a shared duty of care for the safety of the travelling public and are directly responsible for the safety of our 700 daily flight departures.
I'm also a current and active Boeing 737 NG and Max pilot, with 19 years' experience on the Boeing 737 across five variants of the aircraft.
My comments today will reflect the motion passed by the committee to better understand the certification process and the various relationships between regulators. I'll speak briefly today on our observations and interactions as an air carrier through this process.
On behalf of the WestJet family, let me start by sharing once again our sympathies and condolences to the families and loved ones of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302. When tragedy strikes the aviation industry, we act like a family. We become closer, we support each other and tackle the challenges together in common bond. On matters of safety for the travelling public there are no competitive considerations. Our focus is always to learn from the accident to ensure that we become an even safer industry moving forward.
This commitment has helped ensure that commercial aviation remains one of the safest forms of travel available today. To achieve this objective, we rely on and work closely with a host of regulators and officials, including highly experienced Transport Canada national operations inspectors across the nation who interact with our airline at a technical oversight level on an almost daily basis, as well as officials headquartered here in Ottawa.
Last week you heard from Nicholas Robinson. The committee should know the tremendous work that has taken place under his leadership within the national operations and national aircraft certification teams. WestJet has full confidence in Nick and his team. Their transparency and commitment over the past year has been commendable.
WestJet took delivery of the first Max in Canada on September 29, 2017. Speaking to the FAA certification and Transport Canada validation process, I can only pass on my observations, as the process is rightly independent from the operator, who can only operate the aircraft in Canada upon the successful completion of the validation process culminating in the issuance of a Canadian type certification data sheet.
It is my observation that Transport Canada took a thorough approach with their review and subsequent validation of the Max. Of note, the FAA state certification date was March 8, 2017, followed by the European/EASA validation on March 27, 2017. The Transport Canada validation process was not completed until June 23, 2017.
The Transport Canada TCDS, with the Max incorporated, tripled in size from the NG that it was based upon, highlighting the thoroughness of Transport Canada's validation work and the depth of information added. Transport Canada went outside standard conventions when it also included head injury criteria safety requirements into the Max validation in Canada.
Shortly following the tragedy of Lion Air 610, Transport Canada and the three Max operators represented here today took the unprecedented approach of transparency and commitment to safety by working together on a common, made-in-Canada solution. This approach ensured that we could align to a single standard of safety for the Max fleets across Canada and capture the common attributes the operators share, with the high level of expertise across our flight crews and the strength of our training programs. It also allowed us to work together to quickly ensure the best output to our crews, training for the newly acquired knowledge of the system and the checklist enhancements.
The unique approach across three airlines with the regulator served as a pivotal point, one that we have maintained now for close to 16 months as a strong collaborative safety model, and one that will serve us well to ensure a safe reintroduction of the Max when it is approved to return to commercial service.
If the airspace restriction grounding the Max were lifted today, our pilots would be ready and qualified to operate the aircraft, pending the completion of any final training required by our regulator.
When it comes to training and expertise, our pilots are highly qualified operators of the 737, having safely flown millions of flight hours through our operating history across five successive variants of the 737 aircraft for now 24 years.
Since the Max aircraft was grounded last year, our pilots have maintained currency on the 737 fleet, continuing to safely operate close to 400 daily 737 departures. During this time our flight crews have also been actively engaged in our recurrent training programs, which see our pilots return to the simulator no less than once every six months. Because our training evolves through continuous improvement, we have already incorporated many of the learnings of the past year's events into our recurrent simulator training.
I'd like to note that WestJet recognizes that at the heart of all safety decisions are people: our employees and our guests. For our well-trained and highly capable cabin crew and pilots, the aircraft is a place of work. We've asked the minister to ensure that labour is at the table and is considered a partner as we go forward. This effort must be collaborative and inclusive. We are committed to honouring that partnership.
I want to thank the committee again for the invitation. I'd be pleased to answer questions with my colleagues.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and honourable members of this standing committee.
Firstly, I want to thank you for this invitation to seek information and to perhaps assist in answering your questions relating to aircraft certification in Canada, from one of the three airlines with the 737 Max in its fleet.
My name is John Hudson. I'm the acting director of flight operations at Sunwing. In addition to being a Transport Canada check pilot at Sunwing, I've been there in both standards and technical roles since 2012. I'm proud to be a military veteran. I have been flying Boeing aircraft for just under 30 years. I'm currently flying the 737 NG, as I said, as a Transport Canada check pilot, an instructor pilot and a captain.
My employer, Sunwing Travel Group, is the largest tour operator in North America. The airline doubles in size to 40 aircraft in the winter season to service Canadian holiday travellers and shrinks to half that size in the summer while we send pilots and aircraft to serve our European partners, keeping a smaller fleet within Canada in the summer.
Sunwing is devastated by the loss of life from the two Max accidents, Lion Air 610 on 29 October, 2018, and Ethiopian Airlines 302 on 10 March, 2019. We wish to express once again our deepest sympathies, as my colleagues have expressed here today. This is an unprecedented event in my aviation career and will never be forgotten by all of us in the Sunwing family. I want to make that point.
We took deliveries of our four Max aircraft from 25 May, 2018, to 11 March, 2019, and we had more than 7,000 hours of flight time on the Max aircraft when we stopped flying them. I conducted several of the customer demonstration flights in Seattle with Boeing pilots on the first of our Max delivery aircraft. I currently have about 80 hours flying on the Max 8 itself and have been conducting several post-grounding maintenance flights on our Max fleets. Like all of our pilots and like those at WestJet, we are dual-qualified on the Max and the 737 NG.
In addition to my role at Sunwing, I am humbled and privilege to represent the three Canadian Max-operating airlines for the IATA—the International Air Transport Association—Max task force since May 23 last year. That task force consists of international airline representatives from 11 airlines representing North America, South America, Europe, Singapore and China. It's a truly international group.
I have been asked today to bring my airline's perspective on the aircraft certification process. This perspective is strictly from an operational viewpoint and does not include the perspective from our engineering and maintenance groups. Nor will it delve into the unprecedented economic strain that has been inflicted on each of our airlines.
From the start of the entry-into-service project, Sunwing's interaction was with Boeing directly through a dedicated entry representative. The level of collaboration with Boeing directly was very high, but our initiative to liaise with the American airlines that were taking early Max deliveries and with our European partner, the TUI Group, greatly enhanced our training. Once again it was done in collaboration. Transport Canada national operations was also with us every step of the way as we worked through our entry into service.
For the entry into service pilot training, the Max was a relative easy conversion. Based on what we knew at the time and based on 12 years of operating the 737-800, the NG, there was little difference in procedures and in the pilot-level systems knowledge required. We were aware of the more complex differences confronting engineering in the systems; for instance, new engines, new digital environmental control systems and fly-by-wire spoilers. From a pilot's perspective, though, flying the Max in normal operations was truly like flying the NG.
Following the Lion Air accident and resulting airworthiness directive that Minister Garneau referred to earlier and that my colleagues referred to, we established unprecedented collaboration under the leadership of Transport Canada national operations and the three Canadian airlines operating the Max. This collaboration was a result of the AD that pointed to MCAS activation during an erroneous angle-of-attack event.
When those of us in the standards and fleet management groups looked at the AD, we saw that it revised a document called the “Aircraft Flight Manual”, which is essentially a certification manual and is not directly used by the flight crews. It did not address our own pilot manual—the “Flight Crew Operations Manual”—directly. It left the airlines open to possible different interpretations among ourselves for our respective operations.
That was the point of the collaboration. In our collaboration, we felt it was extremely important that we as a group get the runaway stabilizer procedure correct when we changed it and aligned, and that there be no difference among the three airlines in the way this non-normal event was to be conducted, if necessary. What this unprecedented Canadian collaboration demonstrated was the absolute commitment to safety that the airlines and our regulator in Canada possess.
Early on November 8, 2018, Transport Canada approved our made-in-Canada solution, and we were operating the Max that day with the new checklist. We did and still do firmly believe that these actions significantly mitigated any residual risk surrounding MCAS and runaway stabilizer events on the Max.
Since the Max airspace closure, we have continued and expanded upon this collaboration. However, there have been significant challenges in obtaining timelines and even agreeing on development of the road map for return to service. These mainly surround conflicting information occasionally between the airlines and Boeing—we deal directly with Boeing on a weekly basis—and sometimes between the airlines and Transport Canada and among the Max-operating airlines themselves. We have weekly technical calls with Boeing and periodic meetings with Transport Canada, sometimes with small conflicts in information concerning on which we have to collaborate, regroup and make sure that we're aligned. I don't have a solution to this issue, but occasionally it makes it difficult for the airlines to react.
Last fall and last week, Transport Canada's national aircraft certification, national operations, and standards and the airlines held a Webex meeting at which Transport Canada national aircraft certification explained in very appropriate detail their past and current issues, in addition to several possible Canadian-only changes to both procedures and training when the return-to-service airworthiness directive is published.
We now know approximately what to expect when return to service comes, depending upon the outcome of a couple of meetings. The joint operational evaluation board report and a couple of other events have to happen.
Those of us who operate the NG will also have to react to several changes for that fleet as well, as an outcome. This is now more than a Max issue; rather, it's a 737 issue in some respects. WestJet and Sunwing will have to overcome that to make sure we're all aligned.
In summary, while Sunwing cannot comment significantly on the initial certification process of the Max, I hope I have given you a perspective on the absolute common thrust of “safety first” that all of Transport Canada and the three Max airlines represented here share, and on the way this thrust has been demonstrated in a collaborative and coordinated manner thus far during our return-to-service effort.
I now look forward to answering your questions.
I want it on record that I was in aviation for 22 years, both on the airline side.... I was a proud WestJetter—sorry, Air Canada—and I had a company that worked with other carriers as well. I also was in airports and Transport Canada.
I take safety and security, as you mentioned so aptly, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Strom and Mr. Hudson, as being always paramount. If a mistake is made, that's a bad day, which is, I guess, why emotions are running high, given some of the information that I've received.
I'm not an expert on certification. I will defer to Mr. Turnbull and the minister on that.
My question is for all three of the carriers, given the information that was mentioned in the previous testimony.
At any time, was information brought forward to your carriers about Transport Canada's concern with respect primarily to the stall identification the FAA was using on the 737 Max?
Well, most of the involvement on the collaboration side of it has happened following the entry into service. As we have explained, the actual entry into service—the certification part of the Transport Canada role of validating or certifying aircraft—is not typically something we get to have collaboration or involvement with.
In this extraordinary event that happened, however, as I was trying to explain, we collaborated among the three airlines, because we took it upon ourselves, under the leadership of national operations at Transport Canada, to....
First of all, we were all reacting in a combined call when the emergency directive came out, and those of us who were a bit more the technical experts or subject matter experts thought at the time—and again, this is in a “time compression” time frame—that we could go further.
That started us down this post-Lion Air emergency directive process of making sure that when we changed an operation or we had an idea or things like that, we would....
We collaborate regularly with Transport Canada anyway, on the operational side. The thrust of my comments, then, was post-entry into service, not on the certification side.
When you take a look at the miss on having MCAS fully understood by the operator and properly promulgated through the publications, that's unusual. I've certainly never experienced it myself, at this time.
When you take a look at the training, it's important to understand that we train continually and through many levels of fidelity. We train face to face in ground school. We use the benefit of our electronic flight bags, which are our iPads, and the opportunity to train on systems differently through them. A one-hour or two-hour or three-hour system is not uncommon.
Of course, we are all, through recurrent training programs that follow an initial training program with many hours in the simulator, very adept at ensuring that we have the right level of fidelity to ensure the right output, which is a safety output for all of our pilots who are training.
One hour using an iPad on a system, then, is not unusual. Most of us did much more, on a transition course training out the Max for differences, than was the regulated requirement.
I'll take that motion right now and then go to Mr. Barsalou-Duval. Then I'm going to go to the Conservatives, because Mr. Davidson has two motions as well.
Turning to this motion, we all have a copy of it. It was distributed earlier, and we also have it being distributed now.
That motion having been moved, are there questions or comments on the motion?
All those in favour please signify.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
The Chair: Mr. Rogers, when did you want to schedule this, to begin with?