:
Welcome, colleagues and guests.
Given the events of the past week and that this is our first committee since the tragic events of last Wednesday, I would like to begin this meeting with a moment of standing silence in memory of Warrant Officer Vincent and Corporal Cirillo.
[A moment of silence observed]
The Chair: Thank you.
In today's meeting, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study on the defence of North America.
We have two witnesses with us today. They are appearing as individuals, but they are co-authors of a recent study on NORAD and, by implication, the defence of North America.
We have in our committee room Dr. James Fergusson, who is a professor and director of political studies at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.
Welcome, Dr. Fergusson, and thank you for your appearance here today.
As well, by video conference from Winnipeg, we have Dr. Andrea Charron, associate professor and deputy director of political studies at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.
Thank you, Dr. Charron, for appearing with us today. If you will, please go ahead with your opening remarks.
:
Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.
I understand that this committee has sought information from a variety of academics and practitioners on the subject of the defence of North America on an ongoing basis. My assumption is that I'm being asked to make comments on NORAD and its role in the defence of North America based on the study that Jim Fergusson and I, with other academics, completed. My remarks today will focus on what is working vis-à-vis NORAD, and the current challenges it faces, especially with respect to the Arctic.
In 2006, NORAD was signed in perpetuity, and a new mission, maritime warning, was added to the air warning and control mission. The justification for the new mission was that 9/11 had proven that defence of the homeland was paramount and that threats could originate from a variety of sources, even from within North America.
NORAD is now undergoing a review of its ability to remain relevant to new threats given current command policies, current mission challenges, potential evolving or emerging roles, and missions and partnerships. This high-level review, consisting of approximately a dozen working groups, is called “NORAD Next”.
This is timely, given that the new maritime warning mission means that organizations other than military-to-military ones, which is the hallmark of the air warning and defence missions, are required to provide information so that NORAD can create a North American-wide maritime picture in addition to its air picture. However, while NORAD Next is preparing for 2030, our study focused on the here and now and what is working and not working for NORAD.
I'll begin with what is working. The binational partnership that is NORAD is incredibly important to both countries, but especially for Canada because of the geostrategic significance of this partnership and for the training opportunities and information it receives. NORAD can provide all-domain awareness and has the benefit now of an air and maritime picture of potential threats to all of North America.
Still, there are areas of concern that I wish to highlight. I have chosen to focus on the Arctic given my research area of expertise.
Arguably, the Arctic has always been a critical focus of NORAD. Indeed, during the Cold War, NORAD was focused on the threat emanating from the direction of the Arctic, hence, the logo of NORAD has a broadsword facing northward.
There is a fierce debate in Canada about whether or not the Arctic is subject to increased threats, especially from states like Russia and China, because the Arctic has garnered more attention for a variety of reasons, including melting ice, maritime boundary issues, and resource extraction. First, none of these activities in and of themselves are defence threats to the Arctic automatically, and second, there are many things the Canadian government can do that can help ensure increased traffic and attention in the Arctic is of benefit to Canada, such as better infrastructure, more services, and more navigational aids.
Based on the unclassified information I have reviewed, we can say that, yes, there have been Russian sorties of late, but this is not new, nor is it new for NORAD. Indeed, this is its bread and butter. What is of concern, however, is the aging NORAD infrastructure and general rust-out, especially with respect to the north warning system, which is made up of long-range and short-range radars. The north warning system is coming to its end of life, and some would argue that it is located too far south.
The north warning system provides critical information not only to allow NORAD to detect threats, but also to provide valuable constabulary information to both Canada and the U.S. We need this information to continue to be fed to Canadian Joint Operations Command, or CJOC, U.S. Northern Command, and NORAD.
Whether the north warning system remains in its present or some other form—for example, perhaps space-based—the cost of replacing or reinventing a north warning-like capability will be in the billions of dollars, and governments tend to be chary of such capital outlays, especially during uncertain economic times and when trying to replace infrastructure and capital across the country.
Often it is reported that melting ice leads to automatic increases in shipping and resource extraction in the Canadian Arctic, but (a) there is no direct causal relationship, and (b) increased traffic is not a NORAD-only concern.
A number of projects are tracking the amount of traffic in the Arctic. I'm involved with one: the Arctic marine use and transportation project, run by Jackie Dawson at the University of Ottawa. It will map for Canada the ultimate route for ships to follow in using the Northwest Passage, to limit the impact of shipping on Arctic ecology, benefit northern communities, and be safe for ships, given the incredibly difficult navigational realities of the Arctic. Such predictability would be a boon for NORAD, which could then separate the predictable law-abiding vessels from those they and other departments flag for warning.
Other concerns include the need for more communication infrastructure in the north, both for civilian and classified military use. We will need to ensure that these assets can be protected from cyber-attacks.
The NORAD maritime warning mission is new and is not as mature and well resourced as the air warning and control functions. This is why Dr. Fergusson and I have applied for funding to study this mission specifically.
According to testimony by General Jacoby, the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in February of this year, the number of maritime warnings issued by NORAD increased from 8 in 2012 to 14 in 2013.
We do not have any idea of what percentage of all potential threats this represents or how many potential threats were dealt with at the national level before a NORAD warning was warranted. Still, another set of eyes on the North America-wide, all-domain picture is another opportunity to protect the homeland or to put Canada first, the number one priorities of both the U.S. and Canada.
Finally, the bifurcated command arrangement between the Canadian NORAD region, or CANR, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command needs to be considered. CJOC represents the amalgamation of several former commands. It is nearly two years old and is now being tested because of combat operations outside of Canada in addition to the need to conduct domestic missions. CANR, via 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg and the joint force air component commander, is historically well linked to NORAD, but CJOC is still making and perfecting links with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and CANR as a result of this new maritime warning function.
Finally, I'm conscious that with last week's events in Ottawa and Quebec, despite those being ground events, NORAD was put on heightened alert, which was important given that at the time there was uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the threat. It demonstrates the continued importance of this binational agreement that binds the U.S. and Canada inextricably to the defence of North America.
Mr. Chair, these are my opening remarks. I'd be happy to answer any questions.
As noted by my colleague, Dr. Charron, who's a lead scholar for the “NORAD in Perpetuity?” study, this brief presentation draws directly from some of our findings. As I have no doubt that you are aware, the subject of the defence of North America is an extremely broad, deep, and complicated one, especially in terms of the range of issues involved, encompassing land, sea, air, outer space, the cyberworld, defence industrial, defence technology, and research and development, among other issues.
As the defence of North America has consistently been qualified in government documents over time by reference to the phrase “in cooperation with the United States”, one is immediately directed towards two questions or considerations as a means to understand Canada's North American defence relationship with the United States. One I loosely term as the dominant but not exclusive Canadian question, and the other is the dominant but again not exclusive American question.
The dominant Canadian question concerns the type or form of cooperation with the United States that should be undertaken in order to enhance Canadian defence and security in North America. The American question is the proportion of American defence and security in North America that should be undertaken in cooperation with Canada.
The foundation for the first question is simply the fact that Canadian military capabilities are dwarfed by the capabilities of the United States. The United States possesses the capabilities to defend all of North America. As such, under the traditional idea of “defence against help” that is produced by the reality of capabilities relative to an evolving or changing threat environment, Canada's fundamental national strategic interest continues to seek the means to ensure that U.S. plans to defend North America take into account Canadian defence requirements.
In effect, Canada seeks opportunities to influence American thinking and American planning. The means have been twofold: binationalism and bilateralism.
Binationalism, embedded in the NORAD arrangement, was initially driven by the common threat posed during the Cold War by the Soviet Union and its long-range bomber force, and functional defence requirements to ensure an effective and efficient response. This led NORAD into its two main missions: aerospace early warning—initially air breathing—and then ballistic missiles/space threats and aerospace control or defence, which remains restricted to air breathing threats.
Since its establishment, NORAD has been the institutional centrepiece of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in North America, but NORAD or binationalism does not account for the majority of the actual defence relationship. Beyond its two missions and the addition of the maritime early warning mission in 2006, the overwhelming majority of the relationship has been bilateral in nature.
There was an expectation after 9/11, in the context of the new threat environment and the subsequent establishment of first the binational planning cell and then the successor, the binational planning group, which issued a final report in 2006, that NORAD or binationalism would expand to encompass greater cooperation. This did not occur beyond the addition of the maritime early warning mission, and this mission, in functional terms, was driven by the recognition that a maritime threat approaching the North American continent might quickly transition into an air breathing threat requiring a NORAD response. Specifically, a freighter might become the platform for the launch of a cruise missile.
Importantly, the new mission did not entail additional NORAD assets per se, but rather placed NORAD as a recipient of new maritime domain awareness information at the end of national sourcing and as an add-on to evolving bilateral arrangements between these national sources, which included both military and civilian agencies in both countries.
The dominant perception in this regard is that the United States sought a broader and deeper binational arrangement to include both sea and land, but Canada said no. I would suggest that the U.S. believed that its defence required expanded cooperation with Canada but was largely open to a range of modes of cooperation. Canada's preference was bilateralism, for a range of political reasons stemming primarily from concerns related to Canadian sovereignty.
The core issue confronting this committee is whether the current structure of the relationship concerning the defence of North America, dominated by bilateral arrangements relative to the three existing binational missions, is functionally efficient and effective for the defence and security of Canada relative to the current and future threat environments and the reality of constrained and limited defence resources on both sides of the border.
In this regard, let me add that NORAD binationalism, in practice, has not been a one-size-fits-all relationship or one dictated by the United States. There are national caveats that exist within the binational relationship, and the operational reality of NORAD's air defence mission, for example, is aptly summed up in the phrase “decentralized command and decentralized execution”.
The American recognition post-9/11 that homeland defence requirements required greater cooperation with Canada has not been replicated in the case of the thorny issue of ballistic missile defence in Canada. Importantly, the current system deployed in Alaska and California, and possibly a future interceptor site in the United States northeast, is a function of a congressional mandate in law to defend all of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii—not Canada.
As a function of its evolution and the failed 2003-04 negotiations, which were initiated by Canada, it is clear that the United States, for now, does not perceive cooperation with Canada as required for defence of a ballistic missile attack. The only portion of the missile defence equation sought through cooperation with Canada was a link of NORAD's aerospace—the ballistic missile and space component part of it—early warning assessment into NORTHCOM, or the Northern Command missile defence system, which Canada agreed to.
Even then, dedicated forward-deployed missile defence U.S. tracking and queuing radars are not linked into NORAD. It may be the case, however, that the U.S. will identify, if or when a third site is established, that a forward-tracking radar on eastern Canadian soil is necessary. If so, this will provide a range of options relative to the specific form of cooperation or Canadian participation.
For the time being, the issue of ballistic missile defence for Canada is a national one. Does Canada need the capability to defend itself against a ballistic missile attack relative to its origin and nature? If so, the issue becomes the possibility and cost of acquiring a national capability from the United States, and such a decision would naturally alter U.S. defence thinking and planning and possibly place NORAD back into the equation. If not, then missile defence will remain, in American thinking, a U.S.-only mission.
I look forward to your questions.
:
Briefly, satellites can do a lot for you, but they can't do everything that most people think they can do.
The current system that does provide limited wide area surveillance of the Arctic is RADARSAT-2. It provides all-weather capabilities 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
The planned deployment of our RADARSAT constellation for an additional three satellites will boost the coverage or exposure time, the ability to revisit areas. It basically provides wide area surveillance to identify something going on, such as a ship moving out there. The technology does not now provide the capability to provide a specific, narrow “what is this vessel?” answer. It may be able to provide that it is a vessel, but you need to send in something else for narrow surveillance or reconnaissance purposes.
Whether these should be drones or existing aircraft or new aircraft—and I'm not considering the F-35 here—is an interesting question from a cost perspective. There's an assumption that drones are cheap. Well, they're not cheap: you will still need infrastructure and alternative training. It requires significant investment.
We have an existing capability, which is an air breathing and pilot-driven capacity for reconnaissance—very limited—relative to investing in the large numbers of drones that you're going to need and the infrastructure that goes along with it. I can't answer on the trade-off, but you still need a supporting system at the end of the day, a north warning system.
One thing that's important to remember about satellites, and I'll conclude here, is that the north warning system was modernized in the 1980s. We are now 30-plus years away from that. Satellites don't last 30 years. You have to replace them in five to ten years, depending on how lucky you are relative to the harsh environment in outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty has no bearing on this issue at all.
Thanks to both of you.
In another life, I was down at Colorado Springs and, as part of the committee, talked to General Jacoby, and I think it was General Perraut at the time, about this strange relationship we have over ballistic missile defences. It got to be some sort of theatre of the absurd that once it was identified as a threat, somehow or other our guy had to leave the room and it would be handled by the Americans and only by the Americans.
I was struck by Philippe Lagassé's comment that “Canada's current abstention acts as an obstacle toward closer cooperation”. Ferry de Kerckhove says: “To me, it's...very simple.... We are [all] in it together.” Then Lagassé said that, really, we could get into it at no cost to Canada, and de Kerckhove said no, that there are going to be cost implications, let's get real here—I added “let's get real here”.
So the threshold question is, should we at this point decide that we should go back in? Second, is it going to be costless? In 25 words or less....
Voices: Oh, oh!
:
That's the key question: what do we mean by participation? Certainly if Canada went to the United States and said that we think the effective defence of the United States can be enhanced if we provide them with territory or if we allow certain.... This is the issue of the third site, if or when it develops. Then, I think, the whole negotiating process changes.
But remember, in the context of the negotiations of 2003-04, they partially failed because, one, we were not going to get a guarantee from the United States that Canadian cities would be defended, and I can understand from an American perspective why they couldn't give you that guarantee. Also, command and control was not going to go to NORAD. That was out. Specifically what access Canada would have relative to the system—information-planning filtered by the United States—remained an open and ill-defined question until the negotiations stopped.
The United States has left that open for Canada. The United States position on this is that if you want to consider participation, involvement, they're open to discussing this.
But before Canada goes to discuss this, this is something that I think was part of the reasons negotiations failed: there were unrealistic expectations that the nation, the government, or the department had in the time of 2003-04 about what we were going to get, and there was this idea that we were going to get it for free.
Canada—the government, the Department of National Defence, and this committee—has to decide exactly what we want out of this. Then you can start to consider what Canada will need to invest in order to get what we want. It's relative to all the competing demands on resources and investments, which have a greater priority within the military in Canada, for example, than ballistic missile defence will have.
:
A lot of this is highly classified, so they don't tell us academics.
But what I would say to you is that in the North American and the traditional NORAD aerospace warning assessment mission—integrated tactical warning and attack assessment—the primary mission, based upon by and large relying on American assets, is to take a look at that threat environment, the aerospace threat environment, and assess whether or not Canada or North America is under attack.
That information then is transmitted to the national command authorities. In the air world, the person who's in command of that mission is also in command of the air response. It operates through standard operating procedures that have been developed and honed over decades and decades.
The maritime warning, however, doesn't work that way, and this is one of the reasons why we're going to look at this. NORAD gets the picture from the United States, the American maritime domain awareness picture and a Canadian picture, and we think that it sort of puts it together into a North American picture and then makes an assessment.
Where, then, does the assessment go? Well, it should go to the national command authorities or the particular actors involved in the responses. But as for how that works relative to the Canadian Joint Operations Command, the American command, the unifying command structures that exist, the issues of the Coast Guard in the United States and the U.S. Navy and the 500-mile limit between the two, where the line is drawn—everything from the land out 500 miles is Coast Guard and everything beyond that is U.S. Navy—that is an open puzzle right now.
:
Mr. Chair, I have a point of order. Can we do the test for the interpreters before my five minutes? I see the witnesses have not put on the earphones.
Do you both understand French?
[English]
Are you okay? We're good to go? Thank you.
[Translation]
You made a few observations in your report and please correct me if I miss something.
The report says that state actors are not a direct threat to North America, but that the risk of other armed non-state actors acquiring high-technology weapons, such as cruise missiles, is increasing.
Could you elaborate on that? For instance, are the threats from Iran and Korea growing? That is not what I am reading, but do you have any information on that?
Also, is the situation so serious that we must consider it when we are wondering whether or not we should think about participating in a North American ballistic missile defence system?
We can start with Ms. Charron. Mr. Fergusson can answer next.
:
Thank you very much, Chairman.
Dr. Fergusson, I'm pleased you suggested for a second that we turn to the military because they can do so much, but in fact their capabilities are limited when we're dealing with domestic issues. I think you're right to put the emphasis on the RCMP and the coast guard to be the boots on the ground in the north.
With that in mind, as well as some of the questions my colleague Mr. Davies raised, when we think of the defence of North America, I'm wondering if we really do need to be on two tracks. I'd like both of you to comment on this.
On the one hand, we can strengthen NORAD's capabilities and continue to work with the Americans in areas of shared jurisdiction, but when it comes to the Arctic, given the size and the scope, it really is up to Canada to play the primary role, because it is our front yard and our backyard. It's our territory and it is so large, so on the one hand, it's important to have the onesies, the twosies, and the communities there to have a vigorous coast guard that is able to patrol the north, but also to at the same time have that military overlap, where the air fighters are able to move quickly should there be a marine or an air threat.
What are your comments on that? I believe it's not just a question of working with the Americans. In fact, there are areas where we do work with the Americans, but at the same time, there are other areas where it's up to us to be the pointy end of the spear.
I'm curious to hear comments from both of you, if you have any.
:
Okay. Let me follow up on that, then.
I take your point. I think what we've seen from Russia is, as I think Dr. Charron said, typical. It's not necessarily enhanced now. These are practices that they've done before and that they'll continue to do.
I represent eastern Canada. Even in a territory that is relatively small, resources are limited, whether it's coast guard or navy, and when I look at northern Canada, I see a huge territory. I wasn't speaking so much of jets to be used in terms of any foreign threat. I'm just thinking about what happens up there if there is an incident with a foreign ship coming through, for example. While radar installations and satellites are helpful, so is having the ability to scramble a fighter jet quickly to cover a vast territory very, very quickly.
That's my thinking on it. It wasn't so much the foreign threat that is there, but how are we going to police our own territory?
Dr. Charron, I see that you have returned, so I'll turn things over to you if you have a few comments.
Mr. Fergusson, could you provide more details about the options you are proposing in your report? One of them is to maintain NORAD's operational status quo. However, my understanding is that decision-makers could then give more weight to the interests of organizations other than NORAD, which might marginalize NORAD. That is my understanding based on what I have read.
You also propose that NORAD go back to its original mission, drop the maritime warning mission, expand its early warning and attack assessment mission to include space, cyberspace, sea, land and air. In other words, you are referring to all the environments that might imply threats for North America. You add that these possible options will always entail decisions plagued by political and sovereignty concerns, command, organizational and jurisdictional issues, as well as legal obstacles.
Do you think that we, as elected representatives, should give priority to some of these proposals in our studies? Do you think we would be able to deal with the challenges that will automatically accompany the desire to make the slightest changes to how NORAD works?
Thank you.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I'd like to connect a couple of dots. You can tell me if my connection is wrong.
It has been the observation of many—and I'm referring specifically to the Ukraine crisis of a few months ago—that whatever Vladimir Putin said, he did the opposite. For instance, when he said that the tanks and personnel carriers were heading east, away from the Ukraine, they were actually going the other way. When he said that he was telling the terrorists to desist, they were actually increasing in severity their actions within the Ukraine.
In this last hour and three-quarters, I think there was some mention of Mr. Putin saying this: “Over decades, step by step, Russia has built up, strengthened its positions in the Arctic, [and] our goal is not only to regain them, but also to qualitatively strengthen them.” I wonder if you could comment. Did he mean it? Are they serious? How do we know they're doing that? Have they actually done something with their infrastructure? What policies should Canada be taking?
Quite frankly, when you were mentioning why the United States wouldn't really take us seriously with ballistic missile defence and they're going to do it on their own, I think it's because Americans tend to be a little on the xenophobic side when it comes to their defence. They're very introspective. The average Canadian knows more about the U.S., so we carry on and on.
So I'm not so much worried about that. The U.S. will never ever allow anything to happen to Canada, because we're their buffer to the north. We are their friends. When they're down and out, they can usually count on us—rarely can they not— because it's in our mutual interests. We share the same kinds of freedoms, rights, and all those other things.
My connection of the dots, quite frankly, is that Russia is something we should be worried about. Mr. Putin has intentions. Russia wants to build that buffer in eastern Europe, and if they can leverage the Arctic to get what they really want—and that's sort of the old Russian empire, as it was—they will. To understand that, all you have to do is realize where Mr. Putin comes from—the KGB. Can you connect some dots or would you be more likely to disconnect those dots when it comes to the defence of North America?
:
Well, I'm still of the opinion that the dots do not connect that way. There was great promise of having more integration between the ports of Murmansk and Churchill as a way to get out of the grain surplus problem that we had this summer in Winnipeg, because it was an outlet to get it out to European and Asian markets.
I was with Admiral Papp, who will be taking over as the U.S. ambassador to the Arctic Council, and never once, even when asked about Russia, was there any indication that the U.S. was looking to freeze them out. The great advantage of having Russia in something like the Arctic Council and working with them in these other fora is that there is that opportunity for the back-hall discussions about these other events.
For Russia, their backyard, which is the Ukraine, is geostrategically extremely important for them. For us and for Russia, it is the Arctic, and they do see them as being different.
NORAD has always been concerned about Russia. That's why their logo is the broadsword facing north. We will always watch them.
But to automatically assume that they have designs on the Arctic.... Remember, we have very little infrastructure up there, so I'm not sure what designs they're going to have. I think there are far more opportunities and advantages to having more discussions and links with them than there are in freezing them out pre-emptively.
:
You saved the best for last, didn't you?
It's been an interesting discussion, and I thank you both.
I want to ask you a question about threat assessment.
The reason I was slightly late is that I had to wait for Secretary Kerry to be escorted off the Hill. It required a total of 13 vehicles, both trucks and cars, to escort Secretary Kerry from the Peace Tower onto Wellington Street. I had trouble visualizing how that would apply to .
When I was talking to some U.S. networks last week, I was surprised by one of the questions which was, “Should the U.S. close its border to Canada because of all of these terrorist activities up here?” This was a serious question by a well-known....
I'm playing that through as far as threat assessment is concerned. Our perception of threat, right or wrong, and American perception of threat, right or wrong, can from time to time be quite different. Do we, by bringing ourselves further and further into the NORAD fold, in effect by default end up with the American threat assessment?