:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
Thank you for having invited me. I know several of you because I participated in the committee's work previously.
[English]
I'll make my remarks in French. If you would prefer to ask any questions or to debate in English afterwards, that's absolutely no problem. It's just easier for me to do this in French.
[Translation]
I participated in your work, in particular the proceedings having to do with NATO and Canada's participation in various alliances. Today in examining the issue of Canada's cooperation with the United States, you are broaching a topic I know very well, since my doctoral thesis was about Canada-U.S. relations in the area of defence. Moreover, by extension, one of the topics involved is security in the Arctic, which is another of my research topics. Most of the topics on the committee's agenda are also familiar to me.
I would like to remind you briefly of my understanding of Canada-U.S. relations. Basically, when discussions are held with the United States, the work of the Canadian government must consist in seeking two basic points of equilibrium. On the one hand, Canada's relations with the United States have to be balanced with Canada's relationship with the rest of the world. There can be contradictions, or links between the two. In addition, the Canadian government's central concern has to be to attempt to balance matters of security, prosperity and national identity.
Very often, those considerations are contradictory. If we put the emphasis on one of those considerations—for instance, we can emphasize security and defence—we risk causing problems or difficulties involving prosperity or identity. I could come back to that later.
On several occasions I have declared publicly that I am a “continentalist”. That means that my concept of foreign policy and Canadian defence is based on the idea that Canada has to line up as closely as possible with U.S. policies. Prosperity and security and even Canadian identity is dependent on a very cautious, but real, closeness with the United States. I label myself a “continentalist”.
However, I generally advocate for a mature “continentalism”, that is to say that Canada must manage its relations with the U.S. in a cautious way. What I mean by that is a continentalism within which Canadian identity considerations—i.e. Canada's own identity—must be preserved. That is an important element not only for Canada's very existence, but also for Canada's national unity, as well as public opinion and the public support the Canadian government must have.
My concept of continentalism, contrary to what certain governments have done over the past few years, is not one that anticipates the requests or expectations of the United States. Offering gifts to the American government in the hopes of obtaining something in return is generally a strategy that does not work in Canada-U.S. relationships.
Moreover, I firmly believe—I believe in liberalism as a political philosophy—in multilateral and bilateral institutions. Certain actions or positions taken by the government over the past few years may lead one to believe that some institutions are no longer held in high regard, as they were before. Certain institutions may be seen as cumbersome, ineffectual or costly, but they also come with a lot of extremely important advantages particularly as concerns Canada-U.S. relations in the area of defence. The institutions thus play a very important role because they allow for balance in the relationship between the two countries. They make the relationship more predictable, and they set anchor points that we can use as benchmarks to develop a long-term relationship.
Finally, I firmly believe that the common values and vision held by Canada and the United States constitute a cornerstone we can use to build a long-term relationship. All of that, if you will, forms the basis of my thoughts on the matter.
Regarding the current state of Canada-U.S. relations, I will first of all discuss the Arctic and issues relating to security that come up periodically.
As you know, there is necessary debate on the nature of the problems and challenges that will arise in the Arctic over the coming years. We do not know what they will be yet, because this belongs to the future, but whatever we may think, those challenges will be important and will absolutely require international cooperation. That cooperation may be multilateral, via institutions such as the Arctic Council or the United Nations, but it is crucial that Canada examine more attentively the possibility of developing relations with the United States in that region.
Some progress has been made over the past years. For instance, the agreement signed with the United States in December 2012, or the Canada-U.S. Framework for Arctic Cooperation, 2012, are steps in the right direction. However, I would like to suggest that we go a bit further, as I did publicly before the committee several times by suggesting that a joint Canada-U.S. advisory committee be created on matters of security in the north. This would be a type of permanent joint committee on northern defence which would resemble a parity committee. Its mandate would be to explore matters of security that are of concern to both countries and to make recommendations to both governments. The committee would not be a decision-making body, but it would have the power to make recommendations.
You also want to examine missile defence. That is one topic on the list I was sent, and I will close on that point.
In 2004 or 2005, that question raised a lot of interest among Canadians when the bases were laid for the current Canada-U.S. relations. I consider this situation uncomfortable and incomplete. This would probably be the right time to go back to the issue and allow Canada to take part directly and openly in missile defence. I have in fact spoken out in favour of that participation on several occasions.
The difference between 2004 and 2005 and today's situation is that the opposition to missile defence in Canada was due in large measure to the hostility a good number of Canadians felt toward the Bush administration. That was also due to feelings that remained about the very controversial war in Iraq.
That situation has dissipated today and most European states have come out in favour of missile defence. Canada has not given itself the opportunity to talk about it openly because it has stayed outside of the program. Perhaps the time has come now to look at that issue.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, I think I have used my 10 minutes, so I'll stop.
Merci beaucoup.
:
Thank you very much for the question.
[Translation]
Curiously, I am tempted to say that the environment is coming full circle. A lot of observers, with a wry smile, say that we are back to the cold war or that the situation somewhat resembles the situation that existed during the cold war.
That element, that is to say the deterioration of relations with Russia, is relatively new. Another new element is the international tension among governments, particularly the tension between Russia and western governments. I understand that this is what you are alluding to.
That changes raise a certain number of issues. In particular it brings us back to a topic you studied a few years ago, i.e. Canada's position within NATO. For a few years now Canada has blown hot and cold about NATO. NATO does not have the same polish or grandeur that it had in the past. For instance, Canada's opposition to the development of a NATO strategy in the Arctic indicated that it was feeling a certain malaise about that institution.
In fact, what the resurgence of tensions means is that Canada is going to have to clarify its position in the North Atlantic organization, which is being done today. The announcement that Canada has sent troops to Poland, I believe, or to Romania, is going to force a discussion on that topic.
For you and for Canada-U.S. relations, this may mean also that you will have to carefully consider the relation between, on the one hand, the defence of North America, the defence of the Arctic in particular, and on the other hand, the defence of Europe, or the situation in Europe.
This may also mean re-examining where Canada wants to invest. Does Canada want to re-invest in the defence of North America, or invest in its intervention capability abroad? That tension between both aspects of Canada's defence policy is always going to be there.
:
You were mentioning the Arctic; I have a particular interest in the Arctic. We have seen a reinforcement of the Russian interest in the Arctic with the refurbishing of bases in their part of the Arctic and the latest developments testing the airspace of various other countries in the Arctic.
What are the security threats that you envisage in the future, for Canada especially? How can we mitigate these threats?
How can we make common front with the United States? The United States is also part of the Arctic, in Alaska. How do you see us doing something positive in the Arctic?
Our government has a continuous interest in the Arctic, as has been shown by the Prime Minister's visits several times every year in the Arctic and also by certain measures that we took before the situation deteriorated in the present way with Russia, which is one of the main representatives in the Arctic.
I'm telling you this because I lived in the eastern bloc and I don't like this kind of evolution of the situation there, because we are going back, as you mentioned. I know that sometimes the intentions of Russia are long-term ones. We need somehow to defend against the kind of aggression being shown by Russia.
:
There are different dimensions to the question you just asked. Thanks for asking it.
My view on this is that we must be very careful. We should not fuel the fire. One of my strong pieces of advice is to please try to compartmentalize. Do not mix what's happened now in Ukraine and Russia with what happened in the Arctic.
[Translation]
To the extent possible, we need to address the two issues separately.
We shouldn't use the situation in Ukraine as an excuse to take a harder line in the Arctic. I would say that probably the best way to proceed is to deal with the two issues separately.
Does Russia pose a medium-term or long-term threat in the Arctic? Possibly, and we need to take that possibility into consideration. But it's critical to ensure that neither Canada nor the U.S. is to blame for triggering a potential arms race or escalating tensions in the Arctic.
In recent years, Canada has often been depicted, by the Europeans in particular, as the most aggressive state in the Arctic, the one with the strongest and firmest stance. And that attitude could trigger other behaviours, especially on Russia's part. It could use Canada's aggressive position to justify its own.
Canada's and Russia's respective identities are deeply intertwined with the Arctic. And that is not nearly as true for the other Arctic states. To be Canadian is to love the Arctic, and Canadians have a deep attachment to the Arctic. News of tensions or problems in the region always meets with strong reactions from Canadians coast to coast to coast, whether they live in Vancouver or Newfoundland, regardless of their language or preferences. The vast majority of Canadians care about what is happening in the Arctic, and that must be taken into consideration. That's also the case in Russia.
Thank you, sir, for joining us today. We're pleased to have you here to present your views.
I'm interested in your notion of cautious continentalism, which is the catchphrase that struck me. We do cooperate, of course. It's important for us to cooperate on an international level with the United States. We have the larger land mass. We have the largest country in the world and the longest coastline.
How do we maintain the level of cooperation that we need with this superpower, with all of its assets and probably military planning well ahead of what we've even conceived, and at the same time maintain our independence in that relationship and not be overwhelmed? Is there any formula for that? Are there any words of advice you would offer? Obviously, you've thought about this, which is why you are cautious. Could you give us a little bit more in terms of a framework?
:
Sure. There are two arguments I can raise here. The first one is historical.
If you look at the history of Canada-U.S. relations, that imbalance between the powers of the two countries has existed since the end of the nineteenth century. Canada is still there and still independent. It still has it's own politics and is still different from the U.S. From the historical point of view, we should balance or mitigate that fear of the U.S. The risk to Canadian sovereignty from being close with the U.S. is less important than people usually think.
Second, what is the solution for this? In my view the solution, and again I'm looking at the history of Canada-U.S. relations, is institutions. The more we make clear to the Americans what we want and don't want and the rules between them and us, the better it is. Usually, the record of Canada-U.S. relations within the institutions is quite well.
Sometimes my American colleagues are frustrated, because they are looking at the dynamics of Canada-U.S. relations and saying, "You Canadians are winning much more of the game in the negotiations than we are", which indicates that institutions are protecting Canadian sovereignty or Canadian freedom.
:
How do we achieve that balance?
One question is, where do you draw the line? What you're saying is that there should be a line, that it's important that there be a line, so people know what the rules are.
We could have a situation, and DND might be one example, where one country is perhaps more concerned or more fearful or more willing to put resources into something that's a very slim risk. We may be drawn into it because they think it's a good idea and because they are our partner we have to go along. Do we see that? Are there any elements of cooperation that have that aspect to them?
North Korea, for example, is the alleged threat requiring missile defence—not the Russians.
In fact, my question might allow you to answer it. Is it your view that institutions protect in advance the interests, particularly, of smaller countries, such as Canada, and that we can move our priorities to those institutions, particularly with the U.S., whether within NATO, NORAD, or a free trade agreement with the United States?
Perhaps through that question, you can also respond. How would these institutions bring American priorities into line with what Canadians would like in the north? You could do that perhaps by also referencing some of the documents Mr. Harris just referred to as well? I'd like to hear more of your thoughts on institutions and our using those to advance our interests with the Americans.
:
I have a couple of points on this.
First, about the U.S. strategies regarding the north, and the different documents mentioned, the first thing that strikes me about the Americans regarding the Arctic is that they are absent. It's very difficult to find somebody in Washington who'll pay attention to the Arctic. Usually, it's the representatives from Alaska who bring the issue to the table and make noise to attract their colleagues' attention. So these documents represent, I think, a marginal view, in a certain way. It's hard to say that the president is really paying attention to what's happening in the north. That is the first element of my response.
Secondly, Canadians, as far as I know, haven't tried very much to bring the Americans into their game. For example, one of the missing opportunities we had over the last two years was to create a North American chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Canada is now chairing the Arctic Council. Have you hear about this? There are a few things coming out in regard to it, but one, among many things, I think we've missed on this one is to talk with the Americans, because the Americans will be the next chair of the Arctic Council. We need to try to do the same thing that the Scandinavians did in coordinating their chairmanship as a Scandinavian one for over six years, or perhaps it was only two years.
With the Americans we could have done the same, by saying, “Okay, let's try to figure out what could be a North American approach to the north within that.” I spoke to people in Washington, and they told me, “No, we didn't hear anything from Ottawa.” So the fact that Canada is not mentioned in that document is not really surprising, since Canada is not engaging the Americans on this. We should be more proactive, I think, on this issue.
That brings me to the idea that I put on the table before, that maybe we can engage in a discussion with the Americans on creating a binational committee to debate Arctic issues.
:
My first reaction is that probably the grand strategy is the better. The broader your view is, the better it is. The problem that we have is that historically it's very difficult to do it. The example we have is the Martin government's approach to Canada's international politics in 2005, which was an attempt to have a very broad view of Canadian international relations.
It's very difficult to make such a strategy, it because you have to reconcile a lot of different interests and different views in it. For sure, in the ideal world this is what we should aim at, but it is very difficult.
Ms. Joyce Murray: Sometimes you have to make a decision as to whether something is ideal but impractical, or whether it is practical but less than ideal. Where would you sit on that?
Mr. Stéphane Roussel: In the practical world, we should have different white papers. Foreign affairs white papers could be independent, to give us an idea of how the government is viewing the world, what the fundamentals are in international relations. I say this because there are different philosophies and approaches to it. As long as we don't know exactly what the fundamentals are--who is the threat, what are the threats, what is the most important challenge that the governments thinks will happen in the coming years--as long as we don't have that data, there's nothing we can do. So we need to at least have some reasonable mid-term assessment of the priorities for Canada, in both defence and foreign affairs.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to mention that our previous party, one of our historic parties that came together with the Conservatives, the Reform party, when they were in opposition, started asking when the Liberal government of the day was going to start preparing and issue a white paper. I think that was as early as 1997.
So it's interesting that once we formed government, we did come out with the Canada first defence strategy, which is our white paper and an ongoing evolution. I know that the member is fairly new to this committee, but it was under the Liberal government that we started in the joint strike fighter program. So they initiated the process of Canada being a part of the whole F-35 research effort and what came afterwards.
Our witness mentioned the Arctic Council rotation. What I'm curious to know is how the eventual chairmanship of Russia may impact the defence of North America.
:
Thank you kindly, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Roussel, let me start by thanking you for a most informative presentation. I'm delighted to welcome a fellow colleague from the École nationale d'administration publique.
I want to give you an opportunity to follow up on what you were saying about Canada's tone and attitude when it comes to the Arctic. In fact, you mentioned during your presentation that military threats aren't an immediate threat or, at least, aren't something we should be overly concerned about right now. Previous witnesses have expressed similar views to the committee.
In fact, Mr. de Kerckhove, of the CDA Institute, told us that the Arctic is one place where stakeholders have no choice but to cooperate, on search and rescue missions, in particular.
What I gather from your comments is that Canada's aggressive position on the Arctic could hurt that cooperation going forward. Is that a fair assessment of what you said?
The Americans will tell us—and their representatives have told me—that they don't believe in the militarization of the Arctic. We've been told that there's no military threat in the Arctic, not only by you but by the deputy minister of defence also, or the assistant minister of defence for policy.
Yet, you're complaining that we have a reputation for being militaristic in the Arctic. Is it possible to separate out the need for infrastructure, which we just talked about? Also, Mr. Carmichael talked about the need for icebreakers, the need for capability or presence, and a stance or posture, if you will. Is it possible to separate out those two and say the one is important and that we should pursue that, but that the other may lead to unintended consequences?
Professor Roussel, I appreciate your passion for the defence of Canada's Arctic and cooperation with our American allies.
I'm struggling with your comment that we don't have access, that whenever we go down to Washington, the doors aren't open for us. Yet every time we travel as a committee, as parliamentarians, when we're reaching out and talking to our American colleagues, they're telling us that the doors are open to us because of our commitment to the war on terror in Afghanistan.
I thought that we had built up quite a bit of goodwill and cooperation between our two governments because of our doing the right thing. On May 9 we're honouring everyone who fought and those who fell in Afghanistan. So I'm somewhat confused by what you said, that the Americans don't seem to care, because we keep getting told that the doors are open for us. We definitely have their attention and their appreciation for our military efforts.
:
In general, yes, Canadians have a very good reputation in Washington. But it's in general.
The problem is when you try to use it in terms of strategy for something very specific. Then you must be sure that someone in Washington will pay attention to what you're doing, and people in Washington must be aware of what you're looking for. If you want to use it on a tactical level, in negotiations for example—I'm using a very big example here with the pipeline negotiations—if you want some concessions from the U.S., if you say, “Let's be nice to the Americans and they will give us what we want”, it won't work for various reasons, even if we have a very good reputation. Yes, having a good reputation makes people say, “Okay, yes, it's nice to meet you. It's nice to talk to you.” But it doesn't necessarily mean they will give you exactly what you want in terms of concessions on the military side or elsewhere.
Another thing is that Canadians don't usually realize that you cannot expect to have a good reputation on the military side and expect a concession on the trade side. There's a compartmentalization between issue areas. We should not cross these lines, because in the long run Canadians will lose, for sure. So we have to keep that—
:
We see that now with Keystone and everything else, such as country of origin labelling.
The one thing I want to touch on is the whole threat assessment related to North American security. We heard when we met with officials from NORAD that our airspace is tested by Russian military aircraft all the time—on a consistent basis, and not just from an Arctic perspective, but on the Pacific coast, along the Atlantic coastline, and in both American and Canadian airspace. That, I think, is somewhat of concern to the committee and should be to all Canadians: the Russians have always been at the forefront of seeing how engaged we are and whether or not we are asleep at the switch.
We have a proliferation of cruise missiles now around the world; just about all the major players have them. While most countries with leading economies have shown fiscal restraint on military spending, the Russians have increased spending by 92%. They have in recent times re-opened two Arctic naval bases that were left over from the Cold War, and they have definitely increased financing to build more vessels for the Arctic.
I wonder whether this should be sending some warning signals to us that Russia has a more aggressive stance in relation to the Arctic and to overall North American security.
:
Thank you for your testimony today.
The committee will be going in camera for committee business, but before we do so, the chair would like to bring up a couple of items.
Mr. Carmichael, with unanimous consent you may remain during the in camera meeting. With the consent of the committee, Mr. Harris's son would like to sit in, and that will require unanimous consent.
The chair is at your disposition. Do we have consent for both gentlemen to remain?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: That being the case, we will adjourn and reconvene in two minutes in camera.
[Proceedings continue in camera]