:
Thank you, and good morning, everyone.
Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, meeting number 36. Pursuant to our orders of the day, the order of reference of Tuesday, October 26, 2010, we are studying Bill .
Joining us here today, from the Ligue des droits et libertés, is Dominique Peschard; from the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, Roch Tassé; and from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Micheal Vonn.
We welcome you, and I've been told that you have been advised as far as the time limits for presentations are concerned, after which we'll go immediately to questions and answers.
I'm not sure if anybody has decided who wants to start first.
Ms. Vonn, please begin.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the committee for the invitation.
I am appearing on behalf of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to express our opposition to Bill . Commissioner Stoddart has already done a commendable job of outlining the privacy concerns of Bill C-42, and stressing that once released, Canadian information will be broadly disclosed for a variety of purposes.
As important as the privacy issues are, I suggest that they are something of a red herring. In following the discussion on this matter, we have been dismayed that the subject of U.S. secure flight itself and the grave rights violations involved in the overall program have been so little touched upon.
The committee has heard, we suggest, endless iterations on the theme of the rights of U.S. sovereignty to its airspace, but disappointingly little about the rights of Canadian citizens. It is our submission that in enacting Bill C-42, Canada will be complicit in a no-fly regime that does not comport to the rule of law. We say that the U.S. secure flight program violates international law and that subjecting Canadians to the secure flight regime through the mechanism of Bill C-42 violates the Canadian charter.
What is proposed under Bill C-42 is that Canada supply passenger information to the U.S. in order that passengers may be granted or denied permission to transit U.S. airspace on the basis of unknowable and unchallengeable criteria. Every country in the world is, of course, sovereign over its airspace, yet the innovation that is being contemplated by the U.S. is, to our understanding, without precedent and essentially stands to completely subvert the current practice of global traffic and trade.
As Monsieur Caron from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner alluded to, the freedom to fly over sovereign countries is enshrined in international conventions. It is indeed possible for sovereign states to make rules regarding transit, and U.S. secure flight rules to deny travel permissions on the basis of their watch lists may be one of them. However, the analysis does not stop there. Travel watch lists are an increasingly important discussion in the international community.
The B.C. Civil Liberties Association recently published a paper on the United Nations Security Council's resolution 1267 regime, which is a watch list for individuals and entities subjected to international travel bans and asset freezes. The B.C. Civil Liberties Association says that the UN watch list violates international law and the Canadian Constitution for failure to provide due process, also known as natural justice.
There is some variation in the requirements of due process in different contexts, but it typically involves the right to an independent and impartial arbitrator, the right to know the case against you, and the right to be heard. These are familiar elements of what is called due process and are understood by virtually everyone as elements of basic fairness. Such rules are at the heart of our own charter and of instruments of international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, to provide one example, states that:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
The 1267 watch list is created--and these elements will be familiar to you--on the basis of secret evidence. An individual listed has no opportunity to make the case before the 1267 committee prior to being placed on the blacklist, there is no mechanism to review the accuracy of evidence, there's only very limited ability to participate in a delisting request, and there is certainly no opportunity to present one's defence or assert one's rights.
This regime is under a strident attack, ranging from a resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe harshly criticizing this regime to the striking down by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom of domestic legislation implementing the 1267 regime in that country for--exactly as we put it--failure to comport to the principles of natural justice.
In our opinion, Canadian implementation of the 1267 regime is likewise a violation of both the Canadian charter and the Bill of Rights. This is relevant to our discussion of U.S. secure flight, because that program is even more devoid of due process protections and the rules of fundamental justice than the 1267 regime is.
Let me attempt to bring some clarity to this matter. I'm reading some of the proceedings, and there appears to be some confusion.
Canadians attempting to travel to many destinations in Europe, the Caribbean, and South America will be prevented from doing so on the basis of a secret watch list of a foreign country, which provides absolutely no form of process or redress. The highly unsatisfactory process, which attempts to provide some recourse to the scandalous number of false positives on that list, is not a mechanism of redress for people who are “correctly listed”. Some of these “correctly listed” people will be familiar to you as Canadians who have no criminal record and have been exonerated of any links to terrorism or terrorist organizations. My colleagues will be discussing those in more depth. For such people there is no redress, no process, no remedy.
As I listened to questions regarding how Canada will assist Canadians who are denied boarding by secure flight, I have heard no credible plan for repatriating and protecting Canadian citizens who will be denied permission to return to Canada and endangered by the smear of terrorism involvement while vulnerable in a foreign country.
In short, a bill that is being touted as a safety measure not only enables a program that quite frankly can nowhere provide evidence--
In short, a bill that is being touted as a safety measure not only enables a program that can nowhere demonstrate evidence supporting the claim that it demonstrably improves aviation safety, but it will also clearly be actively endangering the security of Canadians abroad.
As the Supreme Court of Canada has said in the Charkaoui decision, a process that may bring with it the accusation that one is a terrorist could cause irreparable harm to an individual.
We say that Canada must not be complicit with a program that defies the rule of law. The argument that purported security trumps all other constitutional considerations has no merit. There will always be a necessary weighing and balancing. The Supreme Court of Canada again said, in Charkaoui v. Canada, that “...security concerns cannot be used to excuse procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the section 7 state of the analysis”, meaning the section 7 analysis in the charter.
Fundamental justice is not an enemy of security; in fact, there is no security without fundamental justice. We urge Canada to work with our international partners to come to an agreement on aviation security programs that respect the rule of law.
Countries the world over are grappling with these issues. Secure flight represents what we believe is an unprecedented alteration of global travel, with vast implications for travel, trade, and tourism. The international community needs to be engaged.
As you will recall, Canada was not supposed to be in this position. We were harmonizing our security measures, and the development of our own no-fly list was supposed to prevent the imposition of the U.S. list. The pattern is very clear: the exemptions do not last. Obviously the next exemption will be to rescind the exception of Canadian domestic overflight.
The time to act is now.
Thank you very much.
:
First I would like to thank committee members for inviting us to discuss our concerns about Bill . If this bill is passed, it will enable the authorities of a foreign country to decide in an arbitrary and discretionary manner who may board an aircraft, and to do so for the majority of international flights entering and leaving Canada.
In view of the many comments by travellers who have been prohibited from flying since the Secure Flight program has gradually been put in place in recent months, we can expect that, with the passage of Bill , we will be seeing an increasing number of Canadians and visitors to Canada literally grounded, with no recourse or remedy, even though they have no intention of travelling to the United States.
[English]
Under the final rule of the international component of secure flight published in late October of 2008, airlines are required to transmit all passenger information to Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection 72 hours before departure for all flights to and from the U.S. as well as for all flights that overfly U.S. territory. This includes not only basic API information, such as name, gender, and date of birth, but also all information contained in the reservation system known as PNR, or passenger name record.
After running a risk assessment for each passenger using data mining technology, Homeland Security in turn issues a boarding pass result back to the airline. The result instructs the airline to issue a boarding pass, deny permission to travel, or issue an enhanced screening requirement. These regulations give the U.S. access to a whole subset of information on air passengers who are not entering the U.S. but merely overflying its airspace. Furthermore, this information can be shared among at least 16 U.S. agencies and with foreign governments. The program gives the government of a foreign country a de facto right to decide who gets to travel to and from Canada, since the vast majority of Canadian flights to and from Europe, the Caribbean, and South America overfly American airspace.
Let me quote from an internal Public Safety Canada document obtained by The Canadian Press and dated January 26, 2009:
There are a number of concerns that the Secure Flight Program poses for Canada.
Secure Flight affects both passengers and airlines. Airlines will be compelled to share personal data with the U.S. government—an act that is currently prohibited by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. It is possible that Canadians overflying the United States could be denied boarding based on U.S. No-Fly lists that were developed based on lower U.S. risk tolerance. There are also no guarantees how the U.S. will use the information it obtains from carriers overflying its territory.
During debate on second reading, Liberal MP Joe Volpe said, “This bill is a total abnegation of our sovereignty responsibility.” He is absolutely right. None of us in this room, even respected members of the Canadian Parliament, will be allowed to fly virtually anywhere in the world without the explicit consent of the United States. It creates the very real possibility that the charter rights of Canadians and their right to privacy will be violated by the legislation of a foreign country without Canada's being able to defend those rights.
We know that Maher Arar is on the U.S. no-fly list. Several other cases in which Canadians have been denied boarding by the U.S., even for domestic flights in Canada, have also been reported. Those cases include several individuals who have been deemed by Canadian courts and commissions of inquiry not to pose a risk to the national security of Canada. They include Abdullah Almalki, Adil Charkaoui, and others I could talk about later. If Bill is adopted, even the rulings of Canadian courts won't be able to be enforced.
There are other concerns related to Canada's sovereignty. For example, half the cabinet members of the Bolivian government are persona non grata in the U.S., so if Canada were to invite one of those ministers for a diplomatic meeting in Canada, the U.S. could bar this minister from boarding a plane to attend the meeting at the invitation of Canada. The same could apply to refugee claimants, who, even if admitted by Canada, could be denied the possibility of leaving their country by the U.S.
Other impacts on refugees and immigrants include the possibility of mistreatment abroad by third countries with whom the U.S. might share travel information. By adopting Bill , Canada could become an accomplice in the U.S. rendition program, which is already responsible for the torture of Canadians in Syria and Egypt, among others. At the very least it would support Canadian complicity in a foreign government's program that violates due process and the principles of natural justice.
Disclosure of personal information to the Department of Homeland Security on passengers travelling to certain destinations, particularly Cuba, could lead to unpleasant consequences. For example, this information could be used to identify Canadian companies that do business with Cuba or to penalize travellers who have visited Cuba by subsequently refusing them entry into the U.S. How will Canada ensure that the U.S. will not use the secure flight program to apply its Helms-Burton act, which imposes penalties on foreign companies doing business with Cuba?
There are also serious concerns related to the huge number of passengers who are intercepted on false positives and who have no redress mechanism other than being told to change their names.
ICLMG has received testimony from many Canadians who have been intercepted as false positives on the U.S. list in Canadian airports and who have been told by Homeland Security that the redress mechanism known as TRIP could not apply to them because the incident did not occur on U.S. territory. Even if TRIP did apply, there is still no redress mechanism whatsoever if you are the real person on the no-fly list.
As you can see, the U.S. secure flight program will have a very harmful impact on Canadian travellers and on visitors to Canada. We call on you to oppose these measures. Canadians expect their government to protect the sovereignty of their country and uphold their rights. The rule of law and the charter of rights of Canadians cannot be sacrificed at the altar of short-term commercial interests.
:
First I would like to thank committee members for this invitation to testify on Bill . The Ligue des droits et libertés was founded in 1963 and is a member of the International Federation for Human Rights.
I would like to begin this presentation with two examples that clearly illustrate the consequences of a traveller monitoring system such as the Secure Flight program. My first example is that of Hernando Calvo Ospina, a Colombian journalist living in France. On April 18, 2009, Mr. Ospina was travelling to Nicaragua via Mexico for Le Monde diplomatique. Five hours before Air France's Paris-Mexico flight was scheduled to land, it was diverted to Fort-de-France, Martinique. The captain informed the passengers that the United States had not authorized the aircraft to fly over the country because one of the passengers constituted a threat to national security. Unknown to him, Mr. Ospina was on the United States' no-fly list. Mr. Ospina is a regular contributor to Le Monde diplomatique and has written a number of articles criticizing U.S. foreign policy and the CIA's role in Latin America. Mr. Ospina's prohibition has nothing to do with air security. The flight's co-pilot even went to see Mr. Ospina during the flight to verify that he was indeed the person targeted by the prohibition. In Mexico, Mr. Ospina was briefly questioned by Mexican authorities before taking another flight to Managua.
Another case I would like to discuss is that of Paul-Émile Dupret, a Belgian citizen who is an analyst for the European Parliament and who has conducted a campaign opposing the transfer of European travellers' personal information to American authorities. As his flight was on route to Mexico—his final destination was Sao Paulo, where he was travelling to attend the World Social Forum—the aircraft had to circumvent the United States because U.S. authorities were not authorizing Mr. Dupret to fly through American airspace.
These individuals clearly do not represent a threat to air security, and individuals like Mr. Ospina and Mr. Dupret could very well have been Canadian journalists or public servants travelling to Latin America.
As my colleagues before me mentioned, the Secure Flight program could have even more serious consequences. A number of Canadian citizens, such as Messrs. Arar, Almalki, El Maati and Nureddin, have been deported to places where torture is practised, or have been arrested and tortured in Middle Eastern countries based on false information transmitted to those governments. Canadian citizens who are originally from countries like Syria will, if their aircraft fly over the United States, be completely at the mercy of information that those countries would be able to forward to their destination country.
Lastly, with regard to the personal information that will be disclosed under the Secure Flight program, it is an illusion to believe that the information gathered will be protected and used solely for air security purposes. In July 2010, the Washington Post published a series of articles that painted a striking picture of the security structure that the United States put in place after September 11, 2001. The Washington Post surveyed 1,271 government agencies and 1,931 companies operating in the fields of counter-terrorism, intelligence and territorial security. Of that sample, 850,000 persons, 265,000 of whom work in private enterprise, have access to information that has a "top secret" security rating.
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The main purpose of that office is to improve intelligence sharing and to integrate it into the national intelligence program framework, which comprises 17 U.S. agencies operating in the intelligence field. The best known are the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the NSA, the armed forces, the Coast Guard and on. This enormous structure operates like a black hole that sucks in all information available to it but from which nothing can escape. It is an illusion to think that the information provided under the Secure Flight program will be protected, that it will be destroyed or that it could be corrected in the event of any error. On the contrary, that information will be added to the data bases of the U.S. intelligence agencies and will be compared with information held by all the agencies I've just mentioned to determine whether such and such a person should be prohibited from flying over the United States or even placed on another list.
Experience with the anti-terrorist surveillance list, which consists of approximately one million names in the United States, and with the no-fly list, which contains tens of millions of names, has shown that the names of thousands of innocent persons appear on those lists, and there is no recourse mechanism.
The United States has an insatiable appetite for new control measures that it wants to impose on the entire planet. In January 2010, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, addressed the International Air Transport Association. She called for greater cooperation by airlines and public authorities in four areas: information gathering and analysis, an increase in shared training, greater cooperation in passenger screening, higher security standards and the deployment of new technologies such as body scanners. Ms. Napolitano has made the same requests to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Since September 11, 2001, numerous measures have been put in place by regulation in Canada in the name of security, such as the Passenger Protection Program through the Smart Border agreement. These measures were taken without public or parliamentary debate and have had the effect of undermining Canadians' rights and freedoms, without the individuals whose rights are violated having access to any recourse mechanisms.
Justice O'Connor's investigation of the Arar affair has shown to what extent the ill-considered sharing of information can have harmful effects. Four years after Judge O'Connor's report was tabled, we are still waiting for implementation of his recommendations for the introduction of a mechanism for monitoring security intelligence activities in Canada.
Bill raises some fundamental issues about Canada's sovereignty and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms. The Parliament of Canada has a duty to defend those rights, rather than submit to the United States' endless demands allegedly in the name of security. Canada should play an international leadership role in putting in place air security systems that are consistent with the rights recognized in the Canadian charter and international law.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank the witnesses for their thoughtful presentations.
The committee is deliberating on two very important issues. One is the essence of preserving privacy while at the same time ensuring commerce, the well-being of the economy, and the ability of citizens to make informed consent. I'd like the witnesses to comment on this, Mr. Chair, if they could.
We're competing with an idea here. Citizens are aware that certain aspects of their personal information will indeed be conveyed to a foreign jurisdiction, yet they willingly choose to take that flight, knowing that it is a matter of law and a matter of a requirement by a foreign state exercising its rightful sovereignty. We've heard as a committee that it is indeed the sovereign right of the U.S. to require this information before allowing access to their airspace. In the interests of the Canadian citizens who would be involved, if they knowingly make this decision to board an aircraft knowing that this information will be conveyed, doesn't that imply informed consent? How does that meet with the tests or standards you described?
Ms. Vonn, could you begin?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your presentations.
Earlier this week, on Tuesday, we met with Nathalie Des Rosiers, who submitted some proposed amendments to the committee.
I'm going to ask you three for some quick answers to my question. Even though you don't expressly say so in your presentations, I don't believe you're recommending that the committee amend the bill. Am I mistaken in thinking that you're simply asking that Bill be withdrawn?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While listening to the testimony, I was sort of writing down a summary, and this is what I've written down.
Bill , if passed, will restrict our citizens' travel rights; it will offend Canadians' rights to privacy; it will quite likely contravene Canadian court decisions, including those of the Supreme Court of Canada; it will violate democratic principles, as Canadian citizens have no way to influence U.S. government policy to which we will effectively be subject; it will effectively cede to a foreign government, namely the United States, Canadian control over where Canadians can travel; it will violate our sovereignty; it will conceivably impair our diplomatic activities and conduct of foreign affairs.
Is that a fair summary of what you would see as the effects of Bill if it were to pass?
:
I can answer that. This is something that the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has also alluded to. There is no empirical evidence that no-fly lists advance aviation security at all. There is no evidence of that.
If you think about the logic of this, what you're suggesting is that some people are too dangerous to fly, but simply are not too dangerous to arrest, even on the grounds of conspiracy or anything else.
It's a deeply problematic notion, and there has been no evidence that it actually does what it says it does. We've raised this issue, and various other people have raised this issue, time and time again.
When you ask yourself what this kind of program is good for, it's good for surveillance and control of where people may go, but there is no evidence anywhere that we have been able to find or indeed that anyone who we've asked has been able to find--and that includes the Government of Canada relative to its own no-fly list--that this substantially increases aviation security.
:
Yet you said in your presentation--and I think I'm quoting you correctly--that Bill C-42 violates international law. To me those two statements are diametrically opposed. On one hand, you agree that America has the right to govern its own airspace, yet you present to the committee that Bill , which is complying with what the United States has the right to ask, violates international law. To me that seems like the two are diametrically opposed.
You also said that it violates the Canadian charter, and you're dismayed that there are grave violations, yet you say the U.S. has the rights to its own airspace.
I know that my colleague earlier was talking about the history of Canada, and that we've been able to fly over the United States for 50 years. But regardless of the history we have--and it's been a good history with our American neighbours--laws change and circumstances change. Since 9/11 we have seen America doing what it needs to do in its own airspace, in its own territory, to protect its own citizens. They have the right to do that, do they not?
:
Well, hold on just a moment. I want to read something here. In 2001, we had a then Liberal minister of transportation. It was Minister Collenette. I want to quote him. He said:
...[U]nder the Aeronautics Act, carriers are obliged to operate under the legislation of another country once they enter its airspace. Any sovereign state, whether the U.S., Britain or anyone else around the world, has a right to know who is coming into its country, whether by land, sea or plane.
In 2008, we learned, as did the rest of the world, that the United States was going to require this same information of anyone flying over its airspace, which we agree they have the right to do, because they govern their own airspace.
If I could just go to Mr. Tassé, if I may, you said that visitors to Canada will be stuck on the ground. I don't understand why that would take place. If someone flying from Europe enters Canada, and they want to return to Europe, I don't understand what the challenge would be. Why would they be stuck on the ground?
:
Mr. Chair, if I may ask, could our witnesses present those numbers through the chair to the committee? I think that's very important to this discussion, and I would appreciate receiving that kind of information.
The other comment that was made, Mr. Tassé, is that it gives a foreign government, and I think I'm quoting you correctly here, the de facto right to decide who can fly to and from Canada. Why would that be the case? If people from Britain want to fly to Canada, how does that impede them? They're not flying over American airspace to get to Canada. How would that impact someone coming from any other jurisdiction, particularly Europe?
I understand that there's airspace over Hawaii and there's airspace over Alaska that belongs to the United States, so coming from that direction could be a challenge. But how is that going to impact them? How many people travel to the U.S. every year from Britain or other places, and how many of them fly through Canada?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank the witnesses for coming today. I'm very interested in what you have to say.
I have had an opportunity to listen to what you said. You talked about rights, that mobility around the world is a right, and sovereignty. You also mentioned the right to mobility, the right to fly, that fundamental justice is infringed upon, that the rights of Canadians are violated, that there's no form of redress, that it violates aspects of international law and fundamental freedoms, and that the rights of Canadians are violated.
I mean, wow, that's amazing what you're saying, but I don't agree with you.
I'm a lawyer, and I notice, Ms. Vonn, that you're a lawyer. You were called to the bar in B.C. in 2004?
I agree with my colleague Mr. Byrne, for the good and simple reason that, when the witness invited is an expert witness, we have to examine his or her expertise. These people are testifying and sharing their experience and interests with us. This could be a Canada volleyball champion who is interested in civil liberties and is working at her association.
I was letting Mr. Jean speak and ask his questions. He was putting his remarks in context. However, following Mr. Crombie's point of order, he said he was assessing whether she was actually an expert. And yet we didn't invite her as an expert witness.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
One of the witnesses mentioned a scandalous number of false positives. I know Ms. Brown did talk about that, and I'm looking forward to the numbers. I understand there are about 10 billion travellers a year to the United States. Now, 10 billion is a lot of travellers and a lot of entries, and I'd like to see the percentage ratio between the scandalous number of false positives versus how many people are travelling.
As I was saying, I did have a chance to study international law in Australia, and I did the Jessup Moot, an international mooting competition.
When you were talking about the rule of law, you said this violates international law, and I asked my staff to get a definition for me.
The definition of the rule of law states:
That individuals, persons and government shall submit to, obey and be regulated by law, and not arbitrary action by an individual or a group of individuals.
I don't see how this particular law that is going to be put in place by the United States violates the rule of law and the definition.
It goes further to say:
In a political system which adheres to the paramountcy of the rule of law, the law is supreme over the acts of government and the people.
It goes on further to say:
That people should be ruled by the law and obey it.
I go further to say:
The law in our society is supreme. No one - no politician - no government - no judge - no union - no citizen is above the law. We are all subject to the law. We do not get to pick and choose the laws we will observe and obey. Each of us must accept the rule of all laws, even if we have to hold our noses when complying with some of them.
I want to refer you to the charter. I have a copy of it in front of me that talks about—
:
Certainly, I'd be more than happy to.
As you know, subsection 6(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms says:
Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.
Of course, that's what you're referring to, but international law is such, with Canada—it's different from the United States—that when we sign a treaty, it actually becomes domestic law. As you're aware, we signed the treaty of 1944, the Chicago convention, which actually gives other countries supreme right over their airspace.
Section 6, if I might paraphrase, should read that “Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada”, as long as the sovereignty of other nations is respected and obeyed. That's really what the law means when you take it into context with the Chicago convention, which as Canadians we have to, because international law applies, once we ratify it, as Canadian law. It's different in the United States.
Now, my questions.
As you can tell, I don't agree with you. I think the U.S. has sovereignty over its airspace, just like Canada does. In fact I think this actually strengthens Canada's sovereignty over our own airspace.
Do you know why I say that? You said it weakens it. Well, of course it strengthens it. There is no question that the foundation of international law is based on the sovereignty of state. There's no question that's what international law is all about: the sovereignty of each individual state.
With us ratifying and giving the ability for the United States...and confirming that they have the ability to control their own sovereign airspace, certainly that gives Canada the same ability to have sovereign rights over its airspace. I just wanted to talk about that a bit.
I appreciate your coming here today. And I appreciate your concerns, but let's say we've had negotiations with the U.S. for two to three years. We've got some exemptions--the only country in the world to get these exemptions, is my understanding, of having that ability to fly over their airspace. What would you recommend we do? We're at the end. The U.S. has said they're not going to negotiate anymore. What else would you suggest we do? That's my first question.
My second question--because I know I'm going to be cut off and I won't have enough time--is have any of you three individuals travelled to the United States in the last three years? Have you provided everything the customs officials at the border have asked you for?
:
That is simply a dizzying array of matters to address.
If I could first address the reputational point, I certainly did not bring myself before this committee as an international law expert. I specified that I was drawing upon our report in the UN Security Council's 1267 regime and the rule of law in Canada. This is the report. I'm happy to table it with the committee. I can give that to you. As I say, I made no representations along those lines.
The point about international law being founded in sovereignty, I suggest, is deeply problematic. If we're going to discuss this notion of what constitutes the rule of law, the leading case in Canada is Roncarelli v. Duplessis, which says, simply put, that the law cannot be arbitrary. The way we ensure that is by having due process. This is iterated throughout the international instruments and our own Constitution.
I can appreciate that we have a disagreement about this particular legal point. By the way, I won the Wilson Moot, which is about the equality provisions of the Canadian charter. I'll just put that on the record. If we're having this dispute...this matter has come up before Canadian courts previously and is going to come up in a very analogous case, as I say, very soon.
The point here is, relative to what we must do and how we must do it, what do you suggest? We have been iterating time and time again that we need to work at an international level with our international partners. We're under tremendous economic pressure. That has been stated.
It would have been much preferable to have had this work undertaken some time ago. The argument that the exception is going to last in Canada is certainly problematic if we consider the track record thus far of the security harmonization between the two countries.
So we're deeply concerned that Canadians are going to have to deal with this either through domestic courts or, now, through diplomatic channels, which would be preferable. I think that's a quick scoop of the various issues that were raised, which could possibly be addressed in this forum.
I want to say first, Ms. Vonn, that I was not attacking your credibility. I heard a lot of references to international law, and I was trying to understand where that information and expertise came from.
I understand your reputation. I saw some other interesting things. In an interview on August 27, 2010, you expressed concerns about data mining. I think that's part of your expertise. In fact you said:
The federal government and many provincial governments have been busily creating a privacy Chernobyl in-waiting with their relentless push for database “interoperability”.
What did you mean by that? Did you mean they're collecting information like driver's licence information, and social insurance number information, and it's creating a long-term problem? What did you mean?
:
Thank you, and welcome back.
Just before we move to the motions of Mr. McCallum, I would ask members to get out their pens and pieces of paper.
We discussed some alternative times for the committee to meet in regard to Air Canada issues, airport noise, and the maintenance contracts. Based on the information we've received, the dates available to do this would be Wednesday, December 1, from 3:30 to 4:30, and Tuesday, December 7, from 3:30 to 5:30. So with the committee's endorsement, I will send out the invitations and hope we can respond.
I know, Mr. Guimond, you have provided a couple of names that we'll contact as well, in regard to the noise issue.
I also want to advise the committee that the minister's office has reported back to me that the way his schedule is, he can offer to be here on Monday, December 6, from 3:30 to 4:30, for the supplementary estimates. Now I know that time didn't work for everybody when we sent the list out, but I would ask if you could respond back to Bonnie and advise us if you can or cannot make it, and then we'll advise the minister whether we have enough people, first for quorum and second for the minister.
Mr. Jean.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You talked about Air Canada's issues. I'm listening to you live and, perhaps as a result of my level of bilingualism, I couldn't follow you.
The noise—that isn't necessarily Air Canada. You mentioned Air Canada's issues, noise and maintenance. A distinction has to be drawn between the two. Even if the committee meets in camera, I wanted everyone to draw the distinction.
As I've had occasion to mention, I was expecting—
To answer Mr. Jean's question, I think we should start on December 1, by having a meeting of...
At the briefing session on Wednesday, December 1, from 3:30 to 4:30 p.m., the officials could brief us separately on both subjects. Personally, I think that, if we invite officials, we won't have enough time in one hour for two briefing sessions.
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I don't know whether we'll start debate on Mr. McCallum's motion right away. We may not have time because I have a meeting that starts at 1:00 p.m.
I also have an availability problem for the meeting on December 8.
However, my question was about a completely different matter. Are we going to try to schedule another visit to Bombardier before the holidays?
I know we have no control over the weather or the roads. Until I got the call from Ms. Pelletier, I drove from home and the roads were in very poor shape. I understand that no aircraft could land at Rivière-du-Loup airport. I know the Bombardier people were disappointed, but we can't control winter or the weather.
Do we plan to go there before the holidays?