:
We'll call the meeting to order, please.
This morning we are in public, pursuant to the order of reference of Monday, March 15, for a question of privilege relating to the mailings sent to the ridings of Mount Royal and Sackville--Eastern Shore.
Committee, if I can just share with you, from the start we have Mr. Walsh here for about the first hour of our meeting today to answer questions about the matter we're about to head into. Our second hour is committee business.
Mr. Walsh, it's very good to have you here today. We're going to let you give an opening statement and then we'll ask you a bunch of questions. I hope we can get all our answers in that hour.
Mr. Walsh, it's up to you.
I don't have a prepared statement to make, as I was not sure what approach the committee was looking for in asking me to be here, but let me offer this as a framework in which committees might want to approach the question before the committee. It's a breach of privilege relating to a ten percenter handed out in member's riding. He objects to certain statements made in that ten percenter. In his point of privilege, he indicated that they were offensive to him and his community, and impaired his ability to carry on his duties as a member of Parliament. That's the critical consideration here.
As you know, the Speaker, in his ruling, said that based on what was presented to the Speaker in the interventions made in the House, the mailing constituted
interference with [the member's] ability to perform his parliamentary functions in that its content is damaging to his reputation and his credibility
Of course, we have to remember that the Speaker's ruling is prima facie; that is to say, as he himself pointed out, I believe, in that ruling, he cannot examine representations made before him. He must take every representation at face value and determine, on a prima facie basis, whether there are the makings here or the basis here for a point of privilege warranting further consideration, in particular by a committee if the House so directs. And of course, that is what happened.
I mention it only to say that, in my view, the committee is not bound by the Speaker's ruling. It is simply an indication of the prima facie point that the Speaker, from what he heard in the House, thinks that prima facie there is a breach of privilege here.
The House, in due course, directed this matter to the committee. Now it's the committee's task to determine, on further inquiry, whether in fact a breach of privilege occurred here.
In that regard, I think members may be well served to read the O'Brien-Bosc text on breaches of privilege. In particular, you may recall that the Speaker quoted from page 111 of that text.
I would draw particular attention to that portion of the text at page 111 where the O'Brien-Bosc text points out that,
A Member may also be obstructed or interfered with...by non-physical means.
And it says,
If, in the Speaker's view, the Member was not obstructed in the performance of his or her parliamentary duties and functions, then a prima facie breach of privilege cannot be found.
Broadly speaking, at some point it would seem to me that the test for the committee is whether the member was obstructed in the performance of his duties as a member of Parliament by the ten percenter of which he complains.
So what constitutes obstruction? It would also appear from the material that establishing representations damaging to the member's reputation or providing misleading information would in and of itself constitute an impediment to a member performing his parliamentary functions. That, in my view, is a matter for the committee to consider. Do you need to hear evidence of the impairment or impediment to the member's function, or is it appropriate that you simply establish that there was a misrepresentation offensive to the reputation of the member and that, ipso facto, gives rise to an impairment to his ability to do his job as a member of Parliament?
There is a quote on page 111, not cited in the Speaker's ruling, from a ruling by Speaker Fraser. Speaker Fraser, in 1987, said the following—and I think it's worth reading this out for the record:
The privileges of a Member are violated by any action which might impede him or her in the fulfilment of his or her duties and functions. It is obvious that the unjust damaging of a reputation could constitute such an impediment. The normal course of a Member who felt himself or herself to be defamed would be the same as that available to any other citizen, recourse to the courts under the laws of defamation with the possibility of damages to substitute for the harm that might be done. However, should the alleged defamation take place on the floor of the House, this recourse is not available.
Well, this defamation, if it's that, did not take place on the floor of the House, so arguably there is an action in defamation available to the member relative to the misrepresentation of which he complains. However, it is also the case that this kind of communication can be the subject of a breach of privilege, so it has been brought forward by the member and accepted on a prima facie basis by the Speaker and the matter referred to this committee.
I read that citation from pages 111 and 112 to the committee because its reference to defamation gives rise to whether the committee wants to hear from me on the comparable situation between what you're looking at and what the courts do when they look at a defamation action and the kinds of requirements the courts need to see before they will find a defamation. I won't go into that now, because it may not be of any interest to committee members. If it is, I'm prepared to do that.
Let me summarize by saying there are two dimensions to a breach of privilege question. You might call it objective and subjective. The objective one is whether the facts are there to support the basis for a breach of privilege, and that's what I'm referring to here in Marleau and Montpetit, or O'Brien and Bosc as it's now called. The subjective one is along the lines of beauty is in the eye of the beholder. What is a breach of privilege at any time is what the House thinks is a breach of privilege in the circumstances of each case.
So while you're not bound by precedents, they can be persuasive. There's the case of Mr. Masse in 2005 that the committee may want to look at. The facts are sort of comparable to what you're dealing with here.
But really it's up to the committee, in a subjective sense. If the committee feels there was a breach of privilege, then that's the view of the committee and that's presumably how the committee will report to the House. If, on the other hand, the committee does not feel that, that's the end of the matter, I suppose. Objectively, some criteria that are available to you, as set out in O'Brien and Bosc, may offer some guidance to the committee.
I have no further statements at this time, Mr. Chair.
:
Well, no, but...I wanted to give you a different shot when I received the communication.
Mr. Walsh, I took a look at some of the definitions for breach of privilege, and I think that's what this committee is looking at. It really isn't looking at anything else.
The breach of privilege is an issue, in layman's terms, that impedes the ability of the member of Parliament to perform his or her duties in the context of the expectation of the public that there is an honourable and honest job being done. So when a communication comes out that says, or infers, or implies—I guess the word is “implies”—that this is not in fact the case with a particular member of Parliament, then the member's ability to address his or her duties is therefore impaired.
Is that the way you see this particular definition unfolding?
:
Correct, but even outside the House criticisms are made by one member of another about the person's suitability to perform his duties as a member of Parliament.
But I take your point seriously. I'll go to an example, which is purely hypothetical. If a...
I don't mean to make any comment on this particular householder, Mr. Chairman. It's not my place to comment on whether this householder is or is not a breach of privilege. This is a purely hypothetical examination.
Let's go to the question of inferences. The question of whether the facts stated are true or not you can look into and examine whether the statement is factually true or not. Even if it's factually true, you have the question of inference. Is there an inference by that statement of a kind that impairs the member's ability to do his duty?
Let's go to a different fact pattern. It's a silly example, I suppose, but it illustrates the point. You have a householder that says member so and so plays with little children. Well, hell, if he's a grandfather or a father, good for him. They're lucky to have grandchildren to play with. But if the next line is “Help stamp out child abuse”, clearly the inference from the earlier statement, which itself is quite true and rather innocuous, in my view would be that the member is part of the problem of child abuse.
The important consideration there, in my view, is that it's not a political statement about the member, it's a personal statement. It goes to the personal character of the member as a human being, whether he's a public office-holder or not. It goes to the personal character. And it may have the result that, if there's thought to be any truth to the inference, he's shunned by his colleagues in caucus, or he's shunned by fellow members of Parliament because he's a persona non grata in a moral sense, or, in an electoral sense, he's shunned by the constituents in his riding.
It seems to me there's an example of where a comment is made that is prima facie innocuous but context is not innocuous, and it reflects on the personal character of the member. That arguably, in some circumstance, could give rise to the inability of the member of Parliament to carry out his duty as a member of Parliament.
:
There are number of issues in what you have said there.
I don't want to comment on intents here, because that's a matter of self-inference as to what was or was not the intent. But it shouldn't happen that, with or without intent, an inference is available from what is said of a kind that reflects unfavourably on the member.
The legal approach is to ask whether that lessens the reputation of the individual in the mind of the reasonable thinking person. That's what the courts say themselves relative to a defamation. Does it lessen the estimation of that person in the mind of a reasonable thinking person? Everyone, of course, is entitled to their reputation in the public sphere—and the private sphere as well.
It depends on what you're saying. It depends on the nature of what is said or what is inferred as to what the impact is upon the individual who is being referred to. Is it of a kind that will make everyone think less of the member to the point where he is impaired in doing his duty, or is it of a kind that might be seen as a criticism that may be unfavourable but is part of the political debate?
In this context, I think you have to think in terms that there could be a political criticism arising in the context of a political debate and be hurtful of the member's position politically, or it could be that plus a personal inference of a kind that causes the member to be seen as disreputable or dishonourable or in some manner not to be trusted or unworthy of consideration in his community or in the House or at committee. Is it a lessening of the regard people have for the member, whether it's other members, or constituents, or private citizens? In other words, whoever reads this, do they think less of the member as a person--not less of him as a Liberal member of Parliament, but less of him as a person--as a result?
:
I know we have lots of questions on this. Let's face it, the determination of breach of privilege is a serious matter.
I want to go back to an examination, Mr. Walsh, of what you were talking about concerning the objective versus the subjective.
In the case of Mr. Cotler, if we're looking at the veracity of statements in the ten percenters in question, I think without debate—although I'm sure there'll be an attempt at debate here—all of those statements were accurate, and they're a matter of public record.
In the ten percenter of Mr. Stoffer, on the other hand, the statements made were inaccurate. So I think, quite frankly, on an objective basis there can be a case of breach of privilege to Mr. Stoffer, because the ten percenter contained information that was simply not true.
In Mr. Cotler's case, even though the information would be upsetting to him, there is nothing in there that I would contend. I can certainly verify the veracity of all these statements with articles on the public record. So if the statements are objectively true, then it would come down to the subjective. The statements, although highly critical of the Liberal Party, did not name Mr. Cotler personally in any of that literature.
It's your contention that if the committee found on a subjective basis that Mr. Cotler's reputation was harmed, or he found it difficult or was impeded in his ability to do work, this committee could then still find a breach of privilege. Is that accurate?
:
My question is, then....
It's a pretty thin line, and in a committee structure such as this, where we have the opposition parties, for example, outnumbering the government, it may simply come down to the fact that the opposition will vote one way and the government will vote the other. But it should really go beyond the partisan nature of this committee, because it is an entirely serious matter.
Let me frame it this way. If this literature were put out in the middle of a campaign, I don't think—this is my own personal view—that Mr. Cotler or anyone else, if it were directed to Mr. Volpe or anyone else, would have a case to sue for defamation, because all the literature does is point out accurately the position and statements made by members of the Liberal Party. But since it was not in the middle of a campaign, Mr. Cotler seems to have suggested—not suggested, but he stated—that this was injurious to his reputation and impeded his ability to do his job as an MP.
How do you square that circle? If one of his political opponents during the next campaign, whenever that will be, were to put out a campaign piece of literature exactly like this, with accurate statements, what recourse would Mr. Cotler have?
:
You raise an interesting question here.
First of all, breach of privilege, as you're probably well aware, or the rules of privilege don't apply during an electoral period. After all, Parliament has been dissolved. There is no Parliament, and the electoral period is a different situation; however, you can still sue for defamation for something that's said during the course of an election campaign. Now, you run into different issues, to some extent, because then the defendant will invite the court to consider whether what was said was a matter of fair comment on a matter of public interest. I can explain to you what that means.
The defendant typically might say, in any defamation action, that what was said was true, or, if it's not a matter of whether the facts were true but is a matter of comment, that it was a fair comment. You have to remember the distinction between facts and comment: there are facts, and then there's comment about the facts. The question with fair comment is whether the fair comment was made honestly and in good faith on a matter of public interest.
Saying something publicly about something that relates to a person's private life would arguably, prima facie, not be a matter of public interest. But certainly, if it's a public debate—let's say the recent debate regarding reproductive services to women—and all of a sudden there was a charge made against a member regarding his support for one type of service over another, and the charge had implications for that individual, given his riding and his religious faith and all the rest of it, then maybe there would be a basis for an action for defamation by the member.
But it also is a matter of public interest; it's a large public debate. In a matter of fair comment, the law says basically that there are five things that have to be shown. One is that it's a comment, not a fact; secondly, that it was based upon facts that are true; thirdly, that the comment was made honestly and fairly; fourthly, that there was no malice; and finally, that it was on a matter of public interest. If you establish those, you have a defence of fair comment, and in the context of an election, that may be available.
However, let me point one thing out to you. Recently—I think it was in the last election, or the election before—a member of Parliament went to court during an election campaign and obtained an order of the court, an interim injunction, to stop the distribution of a certain householder that had false representations made in it. Now, as the earlier member was saying, in a sense that householder was distributed, may have had an impact on the riding, and so on, but the court did accept that, in that situation, it was false, and would cause damages that would be irreparable. So an injunction was granted to the member, ordering not the pulling back of what was distributed but no more distribution of the flyer.
So there is legal recourse available to a person in the course of an election campaign.
:
I appreciate the clarification of that. What I'm struggling with is simply this: the first step in any determination of a breach of privilege or a non-breach is the Speaker's ruling of its prima facie character, which just says, basically, that there is some indication that something might have happened; then it's up to the committee to determine after that.
My concern--I think it could happen to any one of us here--is that we are obviously in a profession that encourages partisan debate and partisan rhetoric at times. We're certainly all guilty of it, if you want to frame it as such. But the problem I have and the concern I have is that if any member of Parliament sends out a householder that is completely accurate in its content into another member's riding, and that member says, “Look, this has embarrassed me. My constituents are now asking what the heck my party is doing, and if this is true. It's hurt my ability to do my job.”
I mean, any one of us could make that argument, and in fact a committee could say, yes, right, there's a breach of privilege.
Then where's that line? It would never happen in a campaign. We have determined that. So how are we supposed to guide ourselves?
Frankly, I'd like to come back to you on this, Mr. Walsh, because I think this is something that the committee needs to take very seriously. If accurate comments are made, and yet you could still be found in breach of privilege--
As my colleague Mr. Lukiwski just said, we need to recognize, on a prima facie basis, that the Speaker ruled on the question of privilege raised by the two members that there was a possible breach of privilege. The next step is to assess the evidence.
Mr. Walsh, I would like to hear your comments on this issue. Mr. Volpe's objection was along those lines. We have to separate the objective from the subjective. In politics, my truth and my beliefs may differ from those of my colleagues in the other parties. We are therefore going to have to review the wording of each sentence in the mailing, word by word, and look at whether, for example, the word willingly is accurate. We will never get through it.
I would like to hear your comments on the need to distinguish between what is objective and what is subjective.
:
You know that redress for libel is one of the principles of law. A distinction needs to be made. In French, the media sometimes use the words incorrectly and say, “He committed defamatory libel.” That is simply incorrect. Libel is written, and defamation is usually verbal.
Someone who commits libel is usually asked to correct it in the same way. That is why newspapers that have not investigated thoroughly enough and have received a formal demand from someone who felt that information about them was inaccurate regularly publish corrections on the same pages, in the same spot and for the same readership, if possible.
But I remember that when Mr. Cotler testified before this committee, he wanted more than an apology about this ten percenter. He felt that his parliamentary privileges had been breached and that this mailing had violated his privileges. He called for corrective action and for the printing costs to be reimbursed. But that is not the issue.
Suppose that I live in the Town of Mount Royal and I received this ten percenter from the Conservatives, signed by our Chair, Mr. Preston.
:
Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could respond in these terms. I don't like to repeat myself and take up the committee's time needlessly, but the question, I suppose, as suggested by the member's question, is this: Is what you're dealing with a statement of fact, or is what you're dealing with a comment about facts--or, God forbid, is it a mix of both?
Even when you go to a question of comment, the person pleading that it was a fair comment has to show that the facts on which it's based are true. If you characterize this as a comment, then you still have the question of whether the facts on which it is are based true. If you characterize it as facts, then--I hate to talk about the terms specifically, because we're getting into semantics--if we take the word “willingly”, which the member chose to identify, and you asked me to determine whether the use of the word “willingly” was true or not, my first reaction would be to ask if somebody was there under compulsion or force. You know they were there. We accept that they were there. I suppose we're able to accept that they were there, or that he was there. Was he there under compulsion or force? If not, then you might assume he was there willingly.
That's the way I would address the factual question. Now, that's not making any political comment; rather, are all of us here in this room willingly? Are we here under some compulsion?
I think we've gone down a path that's kind of sterile here in that I don't think 's defence of why he and the Liberals were at Durban has anything to do with whether or not they realized, post facto, that it had turned into an anti-Semitic hatefest. He's quite clear that he thinks it was an anti-Semitic hatefest. His defence is that he was asked to stay by the Israelis in order to help mediate that.
So the line that is going down I don't think is the defence that is going down at all. It's actually in complete contradistinction to it, and a contradiction of it.
But this raises the question, to me, that if it is the case that what has asserted is correct, and when he was here as a witness in this case he based his defence of his actions on the fact that he'd been asked to...and he drew attention to an article published by Rabbi Melchior from Israel, who asserted that he had asked the Canadians to stay there. That article was published on the very day that Professor Cotler was appearing. Therefore, that information could not have been available to the authors of the ten percenter at the time the ten percenter was put out, which suggests that it was put out as a good faith assertion of all the facts that could have been knowable to the MPs putting it out at the time.
Now, would that constitute, in a case before the courts as opposed to being a point of privilege, a legitimate defence, or would that be seen as not being relevant?
:
There are two parts to the question, Mr. Chairman. One is the link between the allegation of breach of privilege and the need to establish there was an impairment or impediment in the member's ability to do his function.
Certainly, if you look at O'Brien and Bosc, starting on page 108, where they talk about this matter, and you go to page 110, where they're talking about physical obstruction, assault or molestation, obviously the facts will speak for themselves, whether in fact what took place was of a kind that would impair the member's ability to do his function.
But then, as I mentioned earlier, they also allow that non-physical means could be used to cause an obstruction or interference. It would appear from reading the text and the rulings that I've seen—we don't have a lot in this regard—there's a presumption that a sufficient assault on the reputation of a member would impair their ability to do their duty as a member of Parliament.
As I said earlier, I suppose that's acceptable in a scenario where the allegation or the comment made about the member goes to the moral character or person of the member of a kind that he or she would find themself unable to carry on his or her duties, if shunned in their community, shunned in the House and committees, and so on. That's an obvious example where, clearly, the member is not able to communicate freely with their colleagues because of the declaration or comment made about him or her.
Is there something short of this that would be sufficient? Well, it's for the committee to decide what constitutes an impediment.
When you talk about something like defamation or, in this context, a misrepresentation or an assault on the character of a member, it's very hard, whether in a parliamentary context or the legal context, always to get hard evidence to show that in fact it really is causing an impediment to the member's ability to do his or her duty as a parliamentarian, or the individual plaintiff citizen's ability to carry on their life normally in the community. It's kind of hard to.... Sometimes the evidence is there, but sometimes it may not be. Yet what was said was defamatory, and a plaintiff will win the action. They may not get much in the way of damages, because, as I said earlier, part of the objective is to get the court to say that what was said was defamatory, and that's important.
Mr. Walsh, I am a relatively new parliamentarian, so I may need some clarification from you.
If, for example, I send a ten percenter to Maurice Vellacott's riding—a ten percenter congratulating Mr. Vellacott for finally being enlightened and now considering abortion as a woman's right to control her own body—he would have the right to say his privilege had been breached, given that he has announced publicly and repeatedly that he has found that abortion is linked to a greater risk of breast cancer. It would be his right to state that. This is similar to the example involving Mr. Stoffer, who publicly stated his beliefs about abolishing the gun registry.
In the case before us, as a member of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, I can say that this is the first time that I have actually seen the text. We are talking about it, but I am not in a position to determine if the privilege has been breached or not, because I do not know the Liberal Party agenda by heart, and I do not know if these positions are true or false.
Basically, I understand that in order to determine if the committee has the authority to decide whether a privilege has been breached, we would have to listen to many witnesses who would argue that one thing is part of the Liberals' opinions, and the other is not exactly, and so on.
I received a ten percenter last summer—I do not recall which Conservative member sent it to my riding—saying that I was against protecting children because we voted against a Conservative bill. The ten percenter was extremely demagogic in its wording and how it was done. It seemed similar to what I am reading here today, that is, using phrases that have been taken out of context, that are not explained or properly qualified to explain my party's position on a private member's bill.
So in order to prove that I do not oppose the protection of children—on the contrary, I have three children myself and I very much support protecting children and oppose the trafficking of children—I had to explain myself to my constituents. In any case, the mail out was so demagogic that it had no credibility. In fact, it allowed me to have some discussions that helped me understand how the Conservatives go about manipulating public opinion.
In this case, to the best of my knowledge, these phrases were taken out of context and were basically used to cause the public to question the viewpoint of a member who, as we all know, advocates for and is an ardent defender of the Jewish community.
Our role, if I understand correctly, is to gather information on this issue in order to determine whether the facts before us were taken out of context or if they show that Mr. Cotler was unable to carry out his duties as a member of Parliament, because he was harassed or he was pressured by the Jewish community, or if it affected his work. In my opinion, the only way we can fulfill our role is by hearing witnesses. Judging by the witness list we received, we will then be better equipped to reach a decision.
Ultimately, once this work is done and if we find that privilege has been breached, what will happen then? You said you were open to anything. Can you tell me what was the strictest sanction a member of Parliament has ever received for a breach of privilege?
Can you please explain this to me, especially since you have been here a lot longer than me?
:
Just before we suspend for committee business, I think there are two points that I think we would all consider before going in camera.
One was what the witness had just indicated, that is, the distinction between commentary that would be valid in a political forum and the facts.
Secondly...but is not here. He'll be able to defend himself when he comes back in.
To finish off with Mr. Walsh, that the most serious thing would be that we would eliminate the privilege of going into ten percenters, well, I think the House has already dealt with that. So the only issue left is whether there would be an apology directed towards or others.
The second thing is that , in his questioning, would appear to have admitted that there was an error, because he said that Rabbi Melchior's statement, if it had been available to those researchers and supported by the caucus, would clearly have had a different impact on the statement, thereby acknowledging the inaccuracy of the statement.
So I think perhaps it would save the committee a lot of time to simply move towards filing a report to the House. You've already dealt with the maximum penalty available, because the House has already said no more ten percenters in somebody else's riding--
:
I'll be very quick, Chair. I just don't want to let interpret words as if that's what he said; he was using a lot of hypothetical situations in a lot of his questions and stuff.
I think you were taking some liberties with some of Mr. Reid's questions. To assume that this is what he was saying, or to assume anything else, I don't think is appropriate.
In terms of malicious intent, if we're going to look at that, well, then every ten percenter that went into somebody else's riding would have to be looked at, I would think. You could argue...and I could probably make an argument, when a ten percenter came into my riding from the Liberal Party, that there was malicious intent.
So I think we have to get back to the facts. As Mr. Walsh stated, there are very strict rules on what it is.
:
I have now been able to get contact information for most people. There are still a few from whom I haven't been able to get a response.
These are possible panels for the committee to consider in doing their business this way, but it will depend on availability. Some of them, such as Anne Bayefsky and Judy Rebick, are available the week that the House comes back from the break, and some of them have other dates of availability.
I spoke this morning with Mr. Landy. He won't be available until April 20. It seems for most people it will be mid-April or May. Some of them are out of the country.
Some people have said their professional commitments don't allow them the time to appear before the committee. I have listed them at the bottom of the second page.
For Thursday, the only person who potentially could be available is Ms. Fry. She is on House duty, though.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess the issue is really whether we're going to proceed much further than where we already find ourselves, given that, as Mr. Walsh has indicated, the most serious remedy would be the elimination of a member's right to present these ten percenters in someone else's riding and that this remedy has already been addressed by the House.
The only other issue that would be present would be how this committee takes instruction from the Speaker about dealing with what has come down to a relationship amongst members, in their either impeding each other's ability to do their jobs, or their at least trying to be objective.
As I look at this list, I would want to do one thing, and that is address the issue of accuracy. I didn't want to characterize Mr. Reid's views in a way in which he did not intend; however, he did say that the information from Rabbi Melchior wasn't available to his caucus's research group, and therefore it would have had an impact on whatever statements were made.
Taking that as a point of departure, one would look at this list and ask which of these individuals can do the objective part. If we want to be professional, which of these individuals will make a contribution?
If you'll bear with me a moment, I divided this into a group of people who were actually there, or who had a direct impact on Durban I. As I go down further, I look at the list. All of page two, by the way—I've divided them into two pages, and just so that you know them, I'm looking at Anne Bayefsky, Khaled Mouammar, Mohamed, and so on. I ask myself, what could they possibly contribute to the facts—objective—of the matter at Durban I?
:
Obviously, all the witnesses on the list came from somebody at this table. They came through the chair and the clerk. The clerk and I have looked at the list and tried to put it together in reasonable panels.
At this moment I'm not trying to determine what testimony we'll get from any witness. Obviously when a witness gives testimony, through questions from members of this panel, we'll have the ability to say that we can't go in that direction, that it's not proving our point on privilege.
Mr. Walsh has given us the diagram, if you will, on looking at factualness and looking at objectivity. At some point, if those were found to be right, then we would move into the injurious part of the breach of privilege.
I'm just going to suggest that if a witness is giving us testimony that doesn't head us that way, then the testimony will stop. But at this moment, witnesses have been asked by members of this panel to be here. I think they have as much right as anyone to ask for those people to be here.
If the testimony goes south, well certainly, as I've done today a couple of times with you, I will cut them off and say that's not heading in the direction we need it to go, on the breach of privilege.
Regarding the notion of prevention, I believe that the Board of Internal Economy's decision yesterday to end the practice of MPs sending ten percenters outside our own ridings resolves the issue and prevents things like this from ever happening again. However, this does not mean we should not look at what happened in a specific case. That is my first comment.
Secondly, when considering a list of witnesses, we must look at whether, in Mr. Cotler's case, his privilege was breached. In his testimony before this committee Parliament was prorogued—and he may need to appear before us again—Mr. Cotler came to talk about the damages he suffered. He was forced to talk about it at his synagogue, on the street, at the supermarket, and it seriously hurt him. We must also consider that. That is why he raised a question of privilege.
We must also confirm whether the act was committed. Was the act committed? The answer is clearly “yes”. A ten percenter was sent, but no one is accepting responsibility. I am confused. Some say it was signed by Mr. Preston. Apparently it was signed by Mr. Toews, unless his entire riding was covered by 10 ten percenters. Perhaps that is the explanation.
I repeat what I said earlier: we must consider the malicious intent. Why was it sent specifically to Irwin Cotler's riding? First of all, because he is Jewish and secondly, because within his riding there is a strong—
I just want to respond briefly about the question of malicious intent. I think we all recognize that these ten percenters are called “targeted” ten percenters, and it would be foolish for me to target a Liberal when there wasn't a Liberal in the riding, or to target an NDP when there wasn't an NDP in that riding, as their sitting member.
But as it relates to the list of witnesses, I think we have to remember that we're dealing with this ten percenter. This ten percenter has factual information on it—
An hon. member: No.
Mr. Harold Albrecht: --I'm not finished—and it has information about the Conservative stand as well. I think these witnesses can confirm or deny whether those statements are factual.
For instance, “Led the world in refusing participation in Durban II”, “Insisted on banning Hezbollah and led the world in defunding Hamas-led Palestinian Authority”--these are statements that I think we can verify--
I want to come back to a statement that was made regarding this committee accepting the list of witnesses at the last meeting. I didn't hear it that way. What I recall hearing, and we can check the record, is that we had agreed that you and the clerk should examine the list to find out who might be available and when.
We had also discussed, and I don't want to get into the financial part of this, our hesitation in regard to a certain budget that had been presented.
Regarding Mr. Godin's call for Mr. Toews to be a witness, we all know, or at least I presume, that it was not Mr. Toews who sat down and wrote the ten percenter. But that's why, on the list of witnesses, if you'll recall, I insisted that we call Mr. Garry Keller, the executive director of the Conservative Resource Group, because these ten percenters originate out of the resource group of the Conservative Party. My understanding is that this gentleman should be in a position to tell us where he got the information.
Well, Mr. Volpe doesn't want any witnesses.
Anyway, the reason we're calling witnesses, as I understand it, is that sat here and suggested that some of these statements were inaccurate. In order to determine whether they are inaccurate, we decided collectively, as a committee, that we would call some witnesses to this committee and get some testimony on the veracity of these statements. So I don't see how we can go right to a report if we don't listen to the comments of the witnesses.
In most committees, we usually cooperate, relatively, when it comes to witnesses. Maybe there is somebody who is very controversial, but by and large, if somebody wants to add a witness—and wants to add a witness—if it makes sense to the committee, I think we should do that. Do we want to solve the problem or do we just want to sweep it under the rug? If we want to solve the problem, let's get it and then we'll have a decision once and for all.
At any rate, I think we're doing this almost at 's suggestion, actually.
Thank you.
:
--Joe is suggesting here that we vet witnesses. We've never done that before. He's saying we determine whether they're appropriate and that's why they should come. may not want to see some of these witnesses appear, for whatever his reasons, but the witness lists have been submitted.
We have never, at least in my memory, submitted witness lists and denied the Bloc, the NDP, or anybody the right to call the people they want to speak to. So I think we should do as you had suggested and get the witnesses here. If their testimony is not relevant, then you as chair, or others on a point of order, can get them out of here. But I think we have to hear these people.
My real question, though, is that there were apparently four names on the original witness list that don't appear here. I'm still waiting to hear who they are and what the plans are to--
:
There's no meeting on Thursday. On the Tuesday we're back from the break, the steering committee will meet during this time.
There's also been a request for private members' business to meet on April 22. I think that's after that, though, so we're okay.
So we're okay? All right?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Okay. I'm all right with that.
Is there a motion to adjourn?
An hon. member: Yes.
The Chair: All agreed?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: We're out of here.