:
Good afternoon, colleagues.
This is meeting number 8 of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan on Wednesday, May 5, 2010.
I'd remind everyone that we are televised today. We would ask as a favour that you adjust your communication devices, BlackBerrys, and telephones.
This afternoon we continue our study of the transfer of Afghan detainees.
As our first witness today, from Washington, D.C., we have Andrea Prasow, senior counsel for the terrorism and counterterrorism program with Human Rights Watch.
We certainly thank you for appearing here today. I understand that you will initially have some brief comments. I'm not certain whether you've ever seen the proceedings of a parliamentary committee, but we will take questions from the members of this committee. We'll look forward to your answers.
If you wouldn't mind, you could give us your opening comments.
Welcome back to Canada. Welcome to the Parliament of Canada and to this committee.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify.
It means a great deal to me to be here both as a concerned member of the human rights community and as a Canadian. Human Rights Watch has been investigating and documenting human rights abuses in Afghanistan since 1984.
I personally have been to Afghanistan twice in the last year, most recently in March. While there, I had the opportunity to meet with members of local human rights groups as well as international bodies. I have also visited the prison known as the Afghan national detention facility, or Block D at Pol-e-Charki prison, as well as the U.S.-run detention facility in Parwan that has replaced the former detention facility at Bagram airfield.
Based on first-hand interviews with former detainees and their family members, as well as on information provided by Afghan non-governmental organizations and other international organizations working on human rights, Human Rights Watch has developed a good understanding of the problem of detainee abuse in Afghanistan. We are particularly concerned about the torture and other ill treatment of detainees by the National Directorate of Security, or the NDS, the Afghan intelligence service that most frequently takes custody of persons captured by NATO forces. Put simply, the transfer of detainees by Canadian Forces to the NDS, even under memoranda of understanding that include diplomatic assurances, violates Canada’s obligations under international law.
NDS torture and ill treatment of detainees in its custody has been well known for years. In 2002, 2003, and 2004, Human Rights Watch issued reports citing concerns about torture and other abuse by Afghan detention authorities. On many occasions we have directly relayed our concerns to the international forces in Afghanistan and their governments. In mid-2006, Sam Zarifi, then deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, met with NATO officials, including Canadians, in both Brussels and Kabul and described our concerns about NDS abuse of detainees.
In late 2006, Mr. Zarifi met with the Afghanistan desk at DFAIT here in Ottawa and described our concerns about NDS abuse. In November 2006, Human Rights Watch issued a public letter to the NATO secretary general describing our concerns about NDS abuse. In that letter, Human Rights Watch noted that it knew of at least one instance in which the NDS hid from the Red Cross a detainee who had been handed over by NATO forces.
You are all aware of the credible allegations that detainees handed over by Canadian troops to the NDS in 2007 were mistreated. Detainees transferred by Canadians to Afghan custody reported being beaten, whipped, starved, frozen, choked, and subjected to electric shocks during interrogation by Afghan government officials, including soldiers, police, and NDS officials.
In 2009 the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, or AIHRC, published a study on detention facilities that concluded that “torture is a commonplace practice in Afghanistan’s law enforcement institutions”.
Many former detainees held by the NDS will not discuss their treatment for fear of retaliation. Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch has obtained detailed recent information about NDS’s treatment of detainees that makes clear that the problem of torture persists. On December 7, 2009, an Afghan man named Abdul Basir died in an NDS detention facility. The NDS told Basir's family that he had committed suicide by throwing himself out of a window. Photographs obtained by Human Rights Watch show small, dark circles on the deceased man’s forehead, blackened cuts on his back, bruising in several places, and a large cut to his shin. These injuries are consistent with severe physical abuse.
NDS Department 17, the intelligence service’s investigatory branch, had detained Basir for approximately one month prior to his death. Basir's family members reported that they were warned by the NDS not to seek an autopsy if they wanted Basir's father and brother, who were also in NDS detention, to be released.
Human Rights Watch has also obtained written interview memoranda prepared by the Afghanistan Justice Project describing the abuse suffered by NDS detainees. For example, one man described an NDS raid on his home in January 2009 in which his parents were beaten and his home was searched. His brother was taken to NDS detention, where, he claims, he was beaten and tortured for 18 days. He was allegedly beaten with a cable and rifles, subjected to electric shocks, and deprived of sleep. He was then transferred to Department 17, where the torture continued.
I will refer you to my written remarks for a more detailed explanation of recent allegations of abuse in NDS custody.
International law absolutely prohibits torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Not only are states prohibited from engaging in torture, they are equally prohibited from transferring someone to the custody of another state to face torture. This fundamental tenet of international law must be the guiding principle in your consideration of Canada's role in the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. The requirement that states not transfer people to other states to face torture is known as the obligation of non-refoulement. It is found explicitly in certain treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture, and is implicit in other major human rights treaties. It is also a part of the laws of war. Again, I refer you to my written testimony for a more detailed explanation of the relevant international law. I note that Canada is bound by protocol too--the Geneva Conventions--which apply during non-international armed conflicts, such as the current conflict in Afghanistan.
The memoranda of understanding, or MOUs, between the governments of Canada and Afghanistan, which contain so-called diplomatic assurances against torture, do not satisfy Canada's legal obligation of non-refoulement. The current monitoring provided for in the MOUs is inadequate. While we have received anecdotal reports that the conditions of recently transferred detainees have improved, we have been unable to verify these reports. Further, these reports pertain only to specific detainees who have been identified as having been transferred by the Canadian Forces. The nature of the NATO mission, as well as the number of joint Afghan-NATO operations, provide ample opportunity for detainees who have been effectively captured by the Canadian Forces to be formally taken into custody by other NATO allies or by the Afghans. Those detainees who may subsequently be handed over to NDS custody fall outside the terms of the MOUs and are not subject to any form of monitoring or reporting other than the limited monitoring the AIHRC is able to conduct.
Individualized monitoring may place detainees at risk, since they remain in the custody of their torturers. Individualized monitoring may also fail to detect torture. System-wide monitoring alone may also fail to detect the scope of the problem, including the fact that some detainees may be hidden from international monitors. This government is familiar with the brutality of torture from the Maher Arar case. The current MOU regime does not provide a way for the Canadian government to intervene if it believes that a transferred detainee has been tortured.
The path for Canada is clear. Because of compelling evidence that the persons transferred to Afghan custody face a real risk of torture, Canada should immediately cease transferring detainees to Afghan custody.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that barring transfers to the NDS, the effective recipient of most detainees in Afghanistan, does not resolve the question of what to do with persons taken into custody. Indeed, when Canada previously suspended transfers, there were reports of summary executions of alleged insurgents who had been captured by Afghan forces operating jointly with the Canadian Forces. These practices should not reoccur. Canada must at all times adhere to its obligations under international law. Practical difficulties in meeting those obligations never justify violation of the law or complicity in violation by other parties.
NDS facilities are not the only places in Afghanistan where national security detainees are held. The ANDF, or Block D at Pol-e-Charki prison, also holds people captured in counter-insurgency operations. It's operated by the Afghan ministry of defence and offers humane living conditions, including access to health care and regular family visits. These are due, in large part, to the extensive training, supervision, and mentoring provided by the U.S. military. While there remain significant problems concerning due process for detainees held at the ANDF, as of today, Human Rights Watch has not received any reports of mistreatment of detainees. Canada could explore entering into a similar partnering relationship with the ministry of defence or another agency of the Afghan government.
The detention facility run by the U.S. in Parwan, at Bagram air base, represents another possible approach. While Human Rights Watch continues to oppose long-term detention without charge by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, our current concerns relate largely to shortcomings in due process rather than to detainee treatment. The United States is engaged in training and mentoring Afghans to ultimately take over the operation of the detention facility. The target date for handing over the facility to Afghan control is January 2011. Once the facility has transitioned to Afghan control and operates within the Afghan justice system, it may be a reasonable alternative site of detention for persons picked up by the Canadian Forces.
A significant motivation for torture by the NDS and other Afghan justice and detention institutions is the belief that criminal convictions can only be secured through confessions. A study by the AIHRC released in 2009 found that only 21% of law enforcement officers used documents and evidence collection to build a case.
Here again is an opportunity for Canada to actively engage with the Afghans and other nations working on rule of law to build the Afghan government's capacity for detention and trials that comply with international standards.
The torture of detainees handed over by Canadian Forces to Afghan custody is a tragedy. But it also presents an opportunity to help reform Afghanistan’s treatment of prisoners. I do not suggest this will be easy, but it is certainly necessary. The training of Afghan military, police, and intelligence services on proper detention practices will promote the rule of law in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. It will also provide a real and lasting service to the Afghan people.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for your time. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here today to speak to the role that CSIS plays in Afghanistan in support of Canada's national security interests.
CSIS has publicly confirmed that it is present in Afghanistan and has been there since 2002. And although we generally keep our overseas activities very quiet, we decided to make an exception on Afghanistan in an effort to ensure that Canadians are as informed as possible about our country's number one foreign policy priority.
CSIS is in Afghanistan to support the Canadian mission in that country and to gather intelligence that alerts us to terrorist threats against Canada and Canadian interests. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the Government of Canada would call on CSIS to play a role in supporting such a large, complex and ambitious project as the Afghan mission.
Our work in Afghanistan assists in all facets of the whole-of-government mission. Intelligence collected by CSIS personnel in theatre has led to the disruption and dismantling of insurgent networks planning imminent IED and car bomb attacks against military and civilian targets. At the same time, we collect intelligence to support Canada's overall strategy and posture in the broader region.
In addition to supporting the Afghan mission itself, the service is also mindful of the direct threat from extremist elements operating in the region whose goals are more ambitious than simply ridding Afghanistan of foreign interests. Here, of course, I am referring to terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda, which continue to attract aspiring and violent extremists from abroad, including Canada. Canada has investigated and continues to investigate individuals who are suspected of having traveled to the region for the purpose of training or engaging in insurgent and terrorist activity, and who may ultimately return to their countries of origin, or other Western states, as combat-trained and experienced terrorists.
[English]
We are aware that Parliament has been seized with issues surrounding suspected insurgents held in detention and their alleged mistreatment at the hands of Afghan authorities. On this matter, CSIS has looked into our own activities in Afghanistan as they relate to the transfer of detainees.
I can confirm that when requested to do so by Canadian Forces, CSIS interviewed a number of suspected insurgents captured by, or in the custody of, the Canadian Forces prior to their release or transfer to Afghan authorities. All of the interviews we conducted took place under a structured process administered by the Canadian Forces, primarily in order to assist with the identification of detainees.
At the time, the Canadian Forces looked to the service for our cultural knowledge and experience in carrying out effective interviews for intelligence purposes. The decisions to transfer detainees to Afghan authorities, however, were not made by CSIS.
[Translation]
CSIS has not conducted any interviews of any suspected insurgents in Canadian Forces custody since 2007, partly because the Canadian Forces themselves have built up their own capacity to conduct interviews.
[English]
It is important to point out that in Afghanistan, as in Canada and everywhere else the service operates, our personnel are bound in every instance by applicable laws, ministerial directives, and internal policies. Our activities are also subject to the full review of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, and the inspector general of CSIS. Both report regularly on our activities, either to Parliament in the case of SIRC or to the Minister of Public Safety in the case of the inspector general.
[Translation]
In closing, I would simply wish to impress upon the committee the importance of the service's contribution to the success of Canada's and NATO's overall mission in Afghanistan.
As parliamentary and public deliberations around these important matters continue, I would like to remind everyone that CSIS personnel are proud to serve our country professionally and with great dedication both in Canada and abroad, and willingly assume the varied risks involved in the type of work that we do.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I will be happy to take your questions.
:
The discussion by Mr. Harris and our previous discussion about SIRC has raised a couple of questions in my mind.
I note that you have confirmed that your policies do not permit the transfer of individuals for the purpose of interrogation by unlawful means. I'm just concerned.
I'm not trying to put Mr. Rae on the spot here, but here we are with SIRC.... He was with SIRC from 1998 to 2003.
You were collecting information from 2002 to 2007, so there's obviously an overlap there. I would think that Mr. Rae would be interested in possibly verifying the kind of position...when we receive information from an organization like SIRC. You have said in your testimony that your activities are also subject to the full review of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, and the inspector general of CSIS, both of which report regularly on the activities, either to Parliament, in the case of SIRC, or to the Minister of Public Safety, in the case of the inspector general.
I would really think that with the verification, particularly, of somebody who sat on SIRC, the veracity of the kind of information you're giving to us would be of the highest possible value to this committee. We have received an opinion by the previous witness and we've received an opinion by Mr. Colvin and others--and they have been valid opinions, I'm sure. To put that opinion on the same level as someone like yourself, testifying on behalf of CSIS, particularly with the support you have, the absolute total control of the Canadian people through SIRC and through the inspector general.... This is of the highest value.
I just wanted to make a comment. I find it a little frustrating that when we receive opinion from people, which is totally valid opinion, that's fine...but then we have a tendency, or some people in this room have a tendency, to take that opinion and not put your position at a significantly higher place. I just wanted to underscore that, because I think the comment, the testimony, that we have received from generals, from the chief of staff, and from generals who have been on the spot, from top civil servants who have years and years and years of history and training and dedication to our great nation, has never received the value against the other testimony and opinions of other people. I simply wanted to put that on the record.
My friend Mr. Obhrai has some good questions for you, but I did want to make that statement. I don't know that you would necessarily want to comment on my statement, but you're welcome to, I'm sure. I did want to put that on the record. It is not a question of equal value to testimony. Your testimony and the testimony of people like the generals, in my judgment, is of a significantly higher value and carries far more weight.
Thank you.
Let's go back to the question that I was bringing over here—the whole Government of Canada approach. You are not in Afghanistan by yourself. Foreign Affairs is there. Canadian soldiers are there. CIDA is there. Everybody is there. Collaboratively, you're all working together toward meeting your mandate.
In this whole collaboration that you're doing over there, naturally we all work together to ensure, as you stated, that Canadian Forces and the Canadian people all work for the international law, international rules, and whatever is prescribed down here. Nobody--and I want to make this very clear--has accused any of the Canadians or anybody else of not working within the laws that they have been mandated for. Witnesses have come and stated that very clearly, all of those who are on the ground, including yourself. That must be made very clear to all Canadians.
Having worked with all the individuals together collaboratively and everything, your opinion on.... And we are going to go on with this detainee issue because that is the issue this side over here is seized with, or obsessed with, as my colleague says, and not other issues. But within your context, and I know it's tough--I don't know if it's national security or not--you have felt that all of the Government of Canada's approaches, including soldiers and everybody else, including you doing your part of your work in talking to detainees, in working with NDS and everything.... I want your impression. In your opinion, have we done an excellent job and maintained our international obligations and laws? Did you feel at any given time that there was deficiency in the Canadian approach?