We're here to talk about the Canadian Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education. We're known as a partnership, and we're a national association of public and private organizations with an interest in educating Canadians about safe food-handling practices. We're committed to educating Canadians about the ease and importance of safe food-handling and preparation activities in order to reduce the risk of microbial food-borne illness. Our message helps build confidence in our food system. In the brief I provided your clerk there is a list of our members at the end.
Our history. We were formed in 1997 with the purpose of developing and implementing a national safe food-handling public awareness program focused on the important role the consumer plays in keeping food safe. This is because both government and industry recognized that consumers have a role to play when it comes to food safety. In a recent campaign we were able to reach over 12 million Canadians with our safe food-handling messages over a one-year period. That was during the 2005-06 fiscal year. Our most recent project has been launched in partnership with our sister organization in the United States called Be Food Safe. This campaign is targeted to the main food preparer in Canadian households and offers a colourful platform of graphical icons and detailed safe food-handling messages.
These materials are tailor-made for all members of the partnership, including government, retail, and health care professionals. The Be Food Safe platform is suitable for information brochures, posters, websites, and food product packaging. The Be Food Safe icons and messages were featured in March of this year on a Government of Canada full-colour insert distributed to 54 newspapers across Canada. Canadian Council of Grocery Distributor members have seasonally supported the partnership by providing FightBAC! and now Be Food Safe messages in their flyers, which go to households all across Canada.
The partnership serves and engages critical consumer education intermediaries in the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. The partnership provides a forum for all members to share and harmonize their safe food-handling communication strategies and tactics with other members and to receive feedback and expert advice. Where possible, members coordinate the delivery of their individual programs to achieve maximum reach for resources invested.
Canadians are looking for more information on food safety. According to recent Canadian population studies, Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada estimate that 11 million to 13 million cases of food-borne illness occur each year, costing Canadian health services, industry, and society as a whole an estimated $12 billion to $15 billion annually.
According to research, consumers think it's very important to follow safe food-handling practices at home. That same research also reveals that despite the fact that the majority of adults feel confident that they understand and follow safe food-handling procedures, a sizeable number do not consistently follow them. For example, only 15% of people consistently use a food thermometer. Using a food thermometer is important. You can't tell if food has been cooked to a safe temperature by how it looks. Over half of people say they defrost meat and poultry at room temperature at least “sometimes”. This practice can allow bacteria to grow on food. Only 50% of consumers reported washing their hands for 20 seconds before and after handling food. Clean hands and surfaces often lead to the reduction of the risk of food-borne illness.
Research conducted by the Government of Canada has confirmed that consumers want more information about food safety, including safe food-handling practices. The consumer is an important part of the food supply chain, and the partnership and its members help raise awareness of the four core steps consumers can take to reduce the risk of contracting a microbial food-borne illness. The four core messages are a proven platform to raise awareness of the important role the consumer plays in Canada's food safety system.
As mentioned above, the partnership's four core messages to the consumer are the following: clean--wash hands and surfaces often; separate--don't cross-contaminate; cook--cook to proper temperatures and use a food thermometer; and chill--refrigerate promptly.
The partnership helps to keep food safety top-of-mind with people when they shop for and prepare food at home. Therefore, it is essential that consumers receive frequent reminders of the importance of safe food handling to reduce the risk of microbial food-borne illness.
We have ongoing public awareness initiatives. The partnership offers consumers access to information on safe food handling at home, in both official languages, through our online website, www.canfightbac.org, the French site, www.abaslesbac.org, and our new websites, www.befoodsafe.ca and www.soyezprudentsaveclesaliments.ca.
Our messages are proactive and ongoing. We're not crisis communicators. Rather, we have a consistent message year-round for consumers; that is, there are four core steps to keeping food safe at home, and if implemented consistently, your risk of contracting a microbial food-borne illness is reduced. These messages empower the consumer and build confidence in the Canadian food system. The message doesn't change with the situation. The messages may be ramped up prior to a seasonal event, such as Christmas, New Year's, Victoria Day, July 1, and Labour Day back-to-school, because long weekends are key periods when consumers may be more likely to be receptive to hearing safe food-handling messaging.
In a crisis situation, the partnership plays a support role, referring media and consumers to the most appropriate organization or association that can provide the scientific and factual information on the issue. On that note, the partnership relies on Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada for science-based research.
On our list of improvements are the following:
First, food safety initiatives must include a focus on the consumer.
Second, communication briefings need to include organizations, such as the partnership, to help flow information back to consumers.
Third, communication must be harmonized, integrated, and planned between industry and government.
Fourth, ongoing investment is required to deliver food safety messaging to consumers. Behaviour change campaigns can take 20 to 30 years to gain significant traction in the marketplace, as demonstrated by farm business management initiatives and the anti-smoking campaign, just to give examples.
Fifth, we believe that the partnership model makes effective use of financial resources. Rather than inventing a new model, the Government of Canada should invest in the existing one--the partnership--that has served the Canadian consumer well over the past 12 years.
In 2009, everyone in the Canadian farm-to-fork continuum needs to do his or her part to keep food safe. A great deal has been invested, from farm through to retail. Let's place appropriate investment in the consumer end of the continuum moving forward, because from farm to fork, the consumer is the last, but equally important, link in Canada's food safety system.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, members of the committee, for allowing us to be before you tonight. I will be succinct. You won't have to call me on that.
By way of introduction, I'm the CEO of the CCGD, and Jackie Crichton is our vice-president of food safety and labelling and a member of the staff.
The folks we represent are both the large and small grocery distributors, both on the retail side as well as on the food service side. In terms of statistics, we have about half a million direct employees, and we supply about 85% of all grocery products to about 12,000 stores across the country.
To state the obvious, food safety is the highest priority for our sector. Specifically, we think food safety is a supply chain responsibility. We think both industry and government should take a continuous learning approach to this, and that this learning be shared among all so that best practices are part of continuous improvement. We will never be so arrogant as to think we've figured out all the solutions.
In short, we also know as retailers and distributors that we are in the consumer trust business and you ignore that at your peril. Consumers expect us to sell safe food all the time, every day. If a problem occurs in the supply chain, the entire industry wears the impact of that. So we take the subject seriously. We take an open and shared approach in discussing the issues and due diligence within the industry.
Tonight, Mr. Chair, I have some summary comments on our approach and four recommendations that we have provided recently to the government.
In terms of our approach--I mentioned it's a first priority--we don't compete on food safety. We share what we know and what we think through a very active industry committee, which Jackie Crichton chairs. As an association, we also share what the committee produces in terms of manuals, templates, best practices, and training programs with the industry. Our approach is continuous learning and, through that, increased due diligence.
However, despite the Canadian food safety system being recognized as one of the safest in the world, and even having the best inspection in place, with industry implementation of HACCP and HACCP-based programs, there is still the potential for food safety outbreaks, and there's no such thing as zero risk. Therefore, a critical tool for food distribution and retail is having an effective and efficient recall system, one that immediately links the industry to CFIA decisions. If you check with store managers or their department heads across the country, everybody knows when you receive a recall, your sole and immediate focus is to remove that product from sale, no questions asked. That action is triggered by a CFIA recall notice, which is a one-to-many electronic system, with information distributed real time.
What has the industry done since the Maple Leaf recall to support what I said? We've played an active role in the consultation process around CFIA's proposed changes to listeria inspection strategies, recommending a rapid test methodology for the test-and-hold policies being considered, and also to look at high-risk products first.
Second, we support Health Canada's move to permit the use of sodium diacetate and sodium acetate as an option for processors who feel they need preservatives in meat, accepting the scientific evidence that it can provide better control of pathogens.
While grocery is an exceedingly competitive sector, when it comes to food safety, we all work together with one goal: sell safe food. As an example, we worked with the Canadian Federation of Independent Grocers operating as one retail sector to develop manuals, and we have provided a copy of our HACCP-based retail food safety program to Health Canada. This program is being implemented across all CCGD retail members. We are also supplementing that with food safety one-pagers, with more reference material on issues such as vacuum packaging at retail and labelling.
In the fall of 2008, CCGD, along with Food & Consumer Products of Canada and CFIG, took the lead in bringing together an industry association working group to review and update the Supply Chain Food Product Recall Manual. This is a bible within our industry. The CFIA “Food Emergency Response Manual”, commonly referred to as FERM, is included as a section in this industry document.
A number of suggested enhancements to FERM have been provided to CFIA. These include consistent application of a standardized investigation template for use by both government and industry, and consistent use of recall notice templates that provide retailers and consumers with the required information.
Mr. Chairman, there is nothing that could have been done in distribution or retail to prevent the Maple Leaf listeria situation from happening; however, we have been actively working with the regulators and with the government bodies to share best practices and our lessons learned to help strengthen the Canadian food safety system.
Here are our recommendations, in conclusion. In an effort to draw learnings from last summer's outbreak, CCGD has identified four recommendations, which we believe will help strengthen the food safety framework.
First, government and industry must work from a mutually understood template for gathering information at the time of a recall. This will enhance and speed communication by assisting in gathering consistent, complete, accurate, and timely information, while avoiding differences from region to region, inspector to inspector, and company to company. Such a template should also include a clear list of questions about secondary products that were implied in the recall.
Second, consumers must be provided with complete and accurate information in a timely manner in recall notices and advisories issued by CFIA and in communication to media from government. In a rolling recall, things can get complicated and confusing, and therefore specific information must be provided early on. What I'm really saying is that we need to have consistency, clarity, and accuracy as soon as we can.
Third, to protect consumer confidence, which is paramount for all those in industry, and to protect safety, media must not be provided with information ahead of the industry. To keep consumers safe, retailers need to know as soon as the risk is identified, in order to remove a product from sale. We react from CFIA; we do not react to media. At a minimum, news releases issued by government departments must be accessible to all parties at the same time.
And finally, the fourth point—and we live this every day—there must be a credible third party to provide food-borne illness information to consumers in a contextual and timely manner. Often, consumers are hearing about things they don't understand on which they're given some directives. I think all of us need to work together to help provide context to maintain consumer confidence. In a time of crisis and fear, consumers want to know that there is a single credible voice they can rely on to provide them with accurate, science-based facts. This individual should be responsible for telling Canadians what the pathogen is, where it is found, who is most likely to be impacted, what the symptoms are, and what to do if they are experiencing the symptoms. We recommend that this information be made available in a generic manner, at all times, not just in times of crisis, for each food-borne pathogen.
To conclude, Mr. Chair, thank you again for allowing us to be here. While there is nothing we can see that could have been done at distribution at retail, we appreciate the opportunity to put these thoughts forward in the hope of helping to strengthen the Canadian food safety framework going forward. We are absolutely committed to doing that, day in and day out.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. You have a copy of our presentation. It is not my intent to go through that entire presentation, but just to hit the highlights, if I could.
Chicken Farmers of Canada is a national organization funded completely through farmer levies. Chicken Farmers of Canada plays a key role in developing, partnering, and managing programs that augment the quality, safety, and competitiveness of Canadian chicken.
Through such on-farm programs as the food safety program “Safe, Safer, Safest!”, the animal care program, and the biosecurity initiatives, CFC works closely with government partners and industry stakeholders to keep the industry innovative and responsive.
Food safety has been and continues to be a critical priority for Chicken Farmers of Canada and the Canadian chicken industry. The foundation of our success story and a successful industry is the consumer confidence we have built and maintained in the safety and quality of Canadian chicken.
By taking a proactive approach to food safety, we contribute to the health of Canadians and reduce health costs associated with negative food safety issues. For this reason, we jealously guard our competitive advantage and actively challenge policies and actions or inactions that jeopardize it.
Without high food safety standards, the credibility of our products in the eyes of the consumers would plummet, and Canada would not have the benefit of a thriving industry that it enjoys today.
Chicken farmers across Canada have taken their responsibility for food safety at the farm level very seriously, by implementing an on-farm food safety program, by funding research directed at food safety, and by being actively involved in industry-government initiatives and committees addressing food safety.
Food safety, however, is not something that can be controlled solely on the farm. It is a joint effort among all parties in the supply chain, from farmers, processors, transporters, retailers, governments to consumers. The government plays a large role in providing confidence to Canadians that their food supply is one of the safest in the world. Government involvement in the process of ensuring consumers an equally safe supply of domestic and imported food cannot be taken for granted and cannot be compromised.
The federal government needs to complete the federal-provincial-territorial on-farm food safety recognition program. It needs to conduct an avian influenza incident post-mortem to address outstanding issues and improve current protocols. It needs to harmonize meat processing codes in Canada into a single federal standard. It needs to ensure that imported product meets the same high standards as Canadian chicken. It needs to maintain CFIA's pre-marketing label registration process. It needs to promote the strength and integrity of Canada's food safety system to the media and to the Canadian public. It needs to maintain the government presence at the federally inspected poultry processing plants. It also needs to increase investment in poultry research that delivers on society's priorities and educates consumers on their roles and responsibilities in food safety.
In 2001, federal, provincial, and territorial ministers agreed to a framework for the recognition of HACCP-based on-farm food safety assurance programs. These programs would be audited and their credibility assured through an FPT recognition process.
Chicken Farmers of Canada was a strong proponent of the FPT recognition process and has led the charge in developing and implementing CFC's on-farm food safety assurance program, “Safe, Safer, Safest!” CFC was the first to receive technical recognition for its producer manual in 2002 and the second to receive technical recognition for its management manual in 2006.
To date, more than 93% of chicken farms in Canada have been audited, and more than 83% are certified.
The third and final step of the recognition process, prior to receiving full recognition from the FPT, is a third-party audit of the chicken food safety system. CFC is preparing for this third step. Our organization is deeply concerned, however, that the government finalization of the criteria for the FPT recognition process has been stalled. Without FPT recognition, a decade of work will be put in jeopardy. This recommendation must become a higher priority for the government so that Chicken Farmers of Canada can achieve full implementation of its leading program.
Under animal health, the benefit of CFC's “Safe, Safer, Safest!” program is not just restricted to food safety. CFC has used its program as a platform to deliver enhanced animal health and animal care on Canadian chicken farms.
Since 2004, CFC has worked in partnership with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to develop protocols where there were none and to enhance those that already existed. This included government and industry disease preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery, such as enhanced biosecurity provisions, a pre-cull program, and an AI low pathogenic surveillance program.
Recent experiences with AI have demonstrated just how far Canada has come. But we can still do better. It is important for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to conduct a post-mortem of the 2009 incident with industry in B.C. We need to assess the effectiveness of our new protocols. We also need to address issues such as fair compensation for farmers that have remained unresolved since 2004.
Under animal care, much like the food safety program, CFC has developed, through consultations with industry stakeholders and experts in the field, an animal care program that has been supported for implementation by both the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association and the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies. This program is being distributed to farmers and will be combined with the food safety audit in the coming year.
Food safety is a partnership. It is not enough for chicken farmers and the Canadian chicken industry to do their part. Food safety is a shared responsibility, provides a shared benefit, and therefore the cost must be shared. A key responsibility of government is to provide a consistent and comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure consumer confidence.
In Canada there are at least eleven different standards for processing chicken: one at the federal level and ten at the provincial level. As there is only one consumer, there is no reason that meat and meat products sitting side by side at the meat counter should meet different standards.
There have to be efforts to harmonize the meat code. In the past there have been efforts to harmonize the meat code with no success. Because past efforts have failed to establish one standard, it is critical that all parties, federally and provincially, commit to a new process of developing a single, acceptable federal meat processing standard in Canada.
One concern with a process that has different standards is that there are products that come into this country from outside of Canada. Those standards need to meet the same Canadian standards the Canadian chicken farmer has to meet, and today that is not happening.
Under labelling requirements, for both domestic and imported product, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has in place a pre-marketing label registration process. However, this valuable program is being terminated in favour of one that would only investigate problems as they arise. This is a move from prevention to reaction, something that goes against the food safety principle of HACCP. Switching to a reactional mode is not a progressive step. Canadian consumers assume that the Canadian government has done everything possible to ensure products on the shelf are safe.
I'd like to finish off with research. The CFC believes it is important to conduct research on food safety issues so that the chicken industry can pursue science-based programs and policies. In this regard, CFC is a founding member of the Canadian Poultry Research Council. The council is only six years old and it has been able to leverage $1.2 million from industry into $5.1 million of research funding.
Currently, research money under the Growing Forward program can only be allocated to projects that fall within the innovation and competitiveness outcome. Funding needs to be made available for such areas as food safety, which fall within the “contributing to society's priorities” outcome. Research funding under the Growing Forward program should not fund innovation to the exclusion of other very worthwhile research projects.
My final comment, Mr. Chairman, is that while CFC spends a significant amount of time and resources on food safety at the farm level, CFC is also involved in consumer education programs. CFC is a founding member of the Canadian Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education, a national association committed to educating Canadians about the ease and importance of food safety in the home.
The Canadian government should focus more attention on safe food handling. There are significant side benefits to appropriate food safety measures, and government should consider education programs on an ongoing basis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
And I apologize for not having anything prepared for the group to follow along with. It was just confirmed on Monday that I was coming here today. At the time I was at a conference in Kananaskis, Alberta, so I wasn't at my office.
Anyway, I was asked to come here to provide comments and our views, from a provincial viewpoint, regarding our communication and how we work with the CFIA. Neither I nor our department was directly involved with the listeriosis outbreak or the investigation of the plant. We certainly were involved in the recall and in helping ensure the product was removed from the shelves.
I'm with the BCCDC, the BC Centre for Disease Control. It's an agency of the Provincial Health Services Authority. My department specifically is food protection services, and our business is to prevent food-borne illness.
I'll just give a short introduction of what we do, just some of the things we do in our department. We provide inspection services to provincially licensed processing plants, such as dairy, meat, fish, etc. We provide technical support to the regional health authorities, in terms of food safety and policy guideline development for the province. Where we start to work with the CFIA, from an outbreak or a recall viewpoint, is that our department participates in and coordinates outbreak investigations. Often there'll be an outbreak before the food is identified. In fact, that's the more usual route.
The other thing we do is liaise between the CFIA and the regional health authorities, the folks on the ground, the public health inspectors in the field.
So when the province works with the CFIA, there are really two areas we work in. I'll just divide them up into non-recall outbreak-related work and then everything else.
On everything else, operational programs, we actually work really well with the CFIA. This is day-to-day work we do. There's overlap, say, with the dairy program. Plants may be federally registered, but they're also provincially licensed, so there's an overlap there. And we work extremely well with our CFIA colleagues in those operational day-to-day operations. As well, even with the folks in Ottawa, we're involved in federal-provincial-territorial committees. Again, we have a very good working relationship.
Now, turning to food recalls and outbreaks, during routine food recalls—these might be allergens or outbreaks where there are no illnesses involved—again, we have a good working relationship, good communication with our CFIA colleagues. Where things seem to go off the rails is during recalls where there are illnesses involved, or potential for illnesses, or potential adverse publicity, or even prior to a recall, when we as a province are doing an illness or outbreak investigation. This is the point, in those kinds of examples, where the CFIA becomes very reluctant to share information openly and freely.
To illustrate why this is important for us, as a province, doing these investigations, I'll just explain quickly what happens during an illness investigation.
Typically, what happens is that a patient is sick and they go to their doctor or to the emergency; they present themselves. The doctor examines them, diagnoses them, suspects that it might be food-borne illness, and may take a stool or blood sample to confirm the illness.
I want to back up a little bit. Almost all outbreaks are first identified in the field by public health officials; they're not identified by lab tests or results of plant inspections. That's not where they're identified. They're identified in the field by identifying these cases. So the people submit stool samples or blood samples, they're tested, and an organism, species, might be identified. If an organism is found, it'll be genetically fingerprinted.
At the same time, after the organism is confirmed, the patient will be interviewed. We'll do a case history on the patient, get a food history, and find out what they ate, because at this point we have no idea what it might be. It's an investigation that really starts in the dark.
Now that, in itself, is problematic, because you're often interviewing people and you have to find out what they ate two weeks ago, three weeks ago, because there's a time delay in lab tests. In fact, for a lot of organisms—what they ate—the symptoms don't present themselves for several days. With listeria monocytogenes, it can be as long as 70 days between the time the person eats the food and begins to present symptoms.
We do the case history, and then what happens is we start to find clusters. All the results from all of these case histories are gathered provincially and we look at them. We start getting clusters, where maybe you'll see a blip in the number of cases of salmonella and they all have the same genetic fingerprint, so you realize there's potentially a connection.
So you go to their food histories. You look at what commonalities there might be. If you're lucky, you find commonalities. If you don't, you have to re-interview the people. At some point, hopefully, you get similar foods that were consumed by the different people.
If it's a food that was produced in a processing plant or if it's an imported food, this is the point at which we would contact the CFIA. It's the point at which we need additional information in order to be able to confirm or identify what food made them sick, because sometimes you might get more than one hit, and it might be that more than one food is related between people.
You want to get information like distribution patterns. Was that food distributed where your patients lived? Was it distributed with a certain lot number or code number? Was it distributed at the time when the person would have been buying the food?
Other information that's useful is information about the processing plant that it might have come from. Are there any test results from that processing plant? Or were the results from the inspection quite poor? This is just additional information that we need as a province and as outbreak investigators in order to be able to identify and confirm a food.
This is the information that the CFIA is often reluctant to give and to share with us. Not sharing that information makes it very difficult for the province to confirm or identify the contaminated foods.
I'm almost done, but I will say that an outbreak investigation is a lot like putting together a puzzle. You start out with just a very few pieces. As you're going along, additional pieces to that puzzle keep getting added. If you don't get all the pieces of the puzzle, it's very hard to finish the puzzle. That's part of the problem that we sometimes have with the CFIA. They are sometimes reluctant to freely and openly share that information we need at the beginning of an outbreak investigation.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to make just a few brief comments and then turn it over to Dan Ferguson.
I would say that the situation among cattle producers is very similar to what Mr. Fuller outlined. Food safety is something that producers take very seriously. We're keenly aware that consumers insist that the food they purchase is safe--and so they should. At the same time, the things that producers can do are fairly limited.
That said, Canadian cattle producers are committed to ensuring that the beef they produce is safe for all consumers. Keep in mind that this includes their own families, so they have a personal interest in making sure that food is safe.
At the same time, beef production in Canada also operates in a competitive environment, so we have to be aware that beef purchasers in both the domestic and the export market will want to choose beef based on a number of factors. We're going to want to make sure not only that they have confidence that what we produce is safe, but that we produce it at a competitive price so they will choose that Canadian product.
We have developed a number of things. In fact, we've developed an extensive on-farm food safety program. We call it “verified beef production”. Under that program, we provide training to producers so they have all the latest knowledge to produce wholesome and healthy beef.
Dan delivers that program in Ontario so he is going to outline some of the aspects of that verified beef production program.
:
Thank you for having me here today.
The program I'm involved in is the verified beef program. It's a national HACCP-based program that has received CFIA technical review on a national basis.
I've been delivering the program to farmers in a workshop format for five years. So my level of expertise is from meeting directly with the farmers at the workshop level.
Nationally, we have the same program delivered right across the country. What is delivered in Ontario is also delivered in Alberta. That's very important for this group to know.
Nationally, we have over 12,000 producers who have been through our workshops, with the majority of those in Alberta, of course. There are financial incentives there to encourage producers to go through the program. There are 4,500 producers in our program in Alberta, with 2,500 here in Ontario, followed by Manitoba and Saskatchewan. As I said, certain provinces have extra financial incentives to encourage uptake of the program. Obviously, beef is not a supply-managed commodity, so to get the producers to come to the workshop you sometimes need a little carrot.
The VBP program participates in and shares program developments with other commodities through the Canadian On-Farm Food Safety Working Group, and it looks at solving common challenges with those other commodities. A recent project compared our program with similar ones in the United States and Australia and pointed to some advantages, such as the standardization of our national program in terms of both producer requirements and conformance assessments.
On the farm, producers continue to point to the immediate benefits they see from taking part in the program, such as improved efficiency of animal health product use. Whether they are large or small operations, reviews of their practices seem to yield a small analysis showing them what they can do better on their farms. That's a bit surprising, because most of the early adopters of our program are considered to be the well-run facilities, which are out there trying to be at the front edge of the program.
We go through five different standard operating procedures when we're delivering the program at these workshops. It's a proactive HACCP-based format that we're using, and it's producer-driven. We're trying to identify potential food safety hazards, such as chemical residues from animal health use, and physical hazards from possible broken needle fragments at processing time.
We cover these five operating procedures in that workshop format, and we go through animal health management, feeding and watering, cattle shipping, pesticide control, manure management, training of staff, and communications.
I think most of the group has heard how that works through some of the other commodities, so I won't draw you into each of those SOPs, because they're specific to on-farm programs. But by using these operating procedures and the record templates we set the farmers up with, we have a higher level of assurance that the food safety measures are being met on farm.
I think that's how I'll conclude.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good evening to you and to members of the committee and speakers and guests. I'm certainly pleased to be in attendance to present to you on the importance of food safety.
I'm the Keystone Agricultural Producers vice-president. As well, I'm an active member on our livestock and traceability committee.
Keystone Agricultural Producers is a general farm policy organization representing the interests of a wide variety of agricultural producers. In relation to food safety, KAP sees its responsibility as aggregating the concerns common to all agricultural producers as well as specifically supporting and promoting the needs of all commodities, including the smaller sectors, in Manitoba.
Food safety remains a top priority for Canadian agricultural producers. We have a responsibility to deliver healthy and safe products to consumers. As well, our livelihoods depend on our ability to guarantee the safety and quality of our product to domestic and international consumers. Proper programs and systems need to be in place to deal with the realities of food-borne illness, animal disease outbreaks, and other food safety problems in order to maintain the confidence of our consumers.
My presentation today will focus on some of the general issues related to agriculture as a whole, what producers are doing to address these issues, and where the industry needs increased government support.
Producers address food safety through three broad and related systems: on-farm food safety programs, biosecurity programs, and tracking and traceability programs.
On-farm food safety programs are typically industry guarantees of product quality. Commodity groups are responsible for developing and administering these programs, and you've certainly had some of the commodity groups bringing that forward.
An example I want to give you is CQA. That's the Canadian quality assurance program throughout Canada. One of the things that happened with CQA was that when we did the CQA on-farm for pork, we had hoped that once we did this food safety program, there would be a premium, plus market access. We've had the market access, but unfortunately the premium has dried up.
Producers are willing to prove that the food they produce is safe through these programs, but government must know there is an economic cost to producers to do so. Safe food is a public good that government bears some responsibility for. While industry is willing to lead the way, there is a need for cost to be offset by government on behalf of society, possibly through tax credits or incentive-based programs.
Certain groups of consumers have shown that they're willing to pay for food that complies with specific certification, be it organic or locally grown. These foods are differentiated from non-certified foods and command a higher market price. Because there is the expectation that all food sold in Canada is safe, there is no price premium paid to Canadian producers who pay the costs associated with providing safe food, yet they compete with international producers who do not always pay the same costs. David did bring up that point.
One of the questions you have to ask is whether the imported food meets the same food safety, environmental, and labour standards as ours. My answer would be that it does not.
Further, smaller sectors such as sheep and goats, which do not have the financial resources of the much larger commodity groups, require additional help to develop on-farm food safety programs. The smaller livestock producers do not have the required human resources to develop the programs on their own, but they are no less important because of their smaller market share.
Biosecurity programs are again commodity group-led initiatives to protect animals and prevent the spread of disease. As has been highlighted through the H1N1 situation, the Canadian pork industry is a leader in biosecurity measures and disease control protocols, but government help is required in developing biosecurity programs for commodities that currently lack programs. These are commodities that do not commonly operate in controlled environments, as the pork and the supply-managed sectors do. Non-confined animals pose a much more difficult situation for biosecurity. Government must work with these commodities and organizations to ensure that proper biosecurity measures are developed.
Further, non-agricultural government organizations and the general public must be properly informed and trained about biosecurity and disease prevention. Some of us have heard of instances where people have entered a farm site without checking to see what biosecurity protocols are in place and without the consent of the farm owner. In Manitoba, Keystone Agricultural Producers acted quickly, working along with the provincial government to put together a workshop to train those government inspectors and others frequenting farms about the importance of biosecurity and what to expect when they do on-farm inspections.
Finally, tracking and traceability programs are intended to provide government and industry with a responsive capacity to deal with a disease outbreak when it occurs. Product can be traced back to the farm. When the origin is identified through a premise identification system, other products delivered from that source can be followed the other way through the chain and recalled. Further, in the event of a contagious animal disease, the origin can be isolated quickly and the incident dealt with.
The critical work that needs to be done with this system is to develop national standards for all commodities. Programs can be administered in partnership with provincial governments and commodity groups, which will interact with producers at the grassroots level. But national standards are crucial. If provinces have competing programs for market access, it will create a difficult situation for exporters in all provinces. Sellers would be unable to provide clear information about food safety programs to foreign buyers.
The federal government also bears responsibility to ensure there are national guidelines in place. When there is a failure in one province, it is the entire country that suffers from closed borders and lost market opportunities.
In summary, Canadian agricultural producers and government agencies have some of the tools and programs at their disposal to ensure that the food they produce is safe, their animals are healthy, and in the event of a food safety incident, the source can be isolated and dealt with in a timely manner. There are some gaps in these programs that need to be addressed. Some are commodity specific, where one industry lags behind another; some are universal to all commodities.
The federal government has three critical tasks in front of it. One, it has to develop national guidelines for tracking and tracing food safety and biosecurity, with enough flexibility to be adapted to each province without being compromised. Two, it has to ensure there's producer participation in these programs by providing proper incentives for voluntary participation. This will not only encourage active participation in the system, but compared to a regulatory regime, producers will be more likely to comply if their efforts are compensated. And three, a strategy needs to be developed by the federal government on how to move the entire food industry forward on the issue of food safety, with targeted resources to ensure that the Canadian industry remains and grows more competitive internationally.
The provision of safe food is the responsibility of all Canadians--producers, processors, retailers, consumers, and governments alike. We need to work together towards this common goal for the health and safety of Canadians and our foreign consumers, as well as for the economic well-being of our food production system.
Thank you.
:
When you sit on this subcommittee, you hear all kinds of things that make no sense.
I'm going to tell you about something that occurred and you will tell me if you have ever experienced a similar situation. On April 20, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the Public Health Agency of Canada, and the Deputy Minister of Health Canada wrote to Dr. Williams, Ontario's Chief Medical Officer of Health.
I mentioned this to Mr. Butler-Jones, who heads the Public Health Agency of Canada. He did not clearly remember whether he wrote such comments.
The blame was laid squarely on Ontario, not necessarily for what happened, but for the delay in confirming the contamination source. Ontario was being blamed for that, because the Toronto Public Health Office had sent samples to the wrong laboratory for analysis. The samples should have been sent to the Agency's regional laboratory in Scarborough, but instead were sent to the Listeriosis Reference Service at the Health Canada laboratory in Ottawa. Thus when others were asked questions, we were told that the Agency's laboratory in Scarborough was not certified at the time the Listeriosis crisis occurred. So there are contradictions there.
I'm wondering if that isn't the way the Agency goes about things—trying to offload any potential problems onto the provinces.
Have you ever been in a position where you were told that, in fact, it was you who had done the wrong thing? Given what I have just told you, is there a specific procedure that the province is required to follow in the event of a crisis like this, or is the procedure somewhat random?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to everyone who has come.
My first statement is actually more of a request of Mr. Fuller, Mr. McLean, and—I'm sorry, I can't see the gentleman's name. Ferguson? Okay. You all referenced the HACCP plans you have in each of your individual industries. What I'm going to ask you to do is send the committee copies of those, if indeed you can. If that's available, I'd greatly appreciate that—and indeed from Mr. Jennery as well, because I believe you mentioned that. Mr. De Valk, if you have one as well and you want to send that in, we'll be glad to take that one too, just to make it easier for me than having to track it down. Sometimes I don't get things in a very quick manner. Perhaps I'll get it quicker this way.
Mr. Jennery, you made an interesting comment, I thought, as part of your response to a question. You said Dr. Evans was the lead spokesperson on BSE, when that tragedy occurred, and Dr. Butler-Jones was indeed the spokesperson...and is at this present time for H1N1, and you said he was doing a terrific job—I'm using your words, of course. I would tend to agree with you. He tends to be the public face. The question really isn't for you, sir; I'm just simply referencing what you said.
Yet, when it came to listeriosis, the public face was Michael McCain. In two other serious incidents in the past six years, we saw Public Health and CFIA. Now we see the industry. The only thing I see different between the three is that in the first two—at this point in time, at least, under H1N1—we haven't had a serious illness leading to death. But in the case of listeriosis, we saw 22 people die.
I want to thank my colleague for his non-point of order.
The simple case is that Mr. McCain, in his testimony before us, said that he was the public face of this particular illness. The public, according to the media reports, also said that. Notwithstanding the government side's belief that they did some things, and clearly the minister was out and spoke a few times and CFIA spoke a few times, Ms. Swan said in testimony—and my colleague on this side has already said it—that she believed industry was responsible for food safety. It seems quite obvious, then, that Mr. McCain should be the lead spokesperson.
Mr. Wilcott, sir, there is this whole sense of information sharing, because we're talking about public safety and ultimately public health in the food system. If we're to have real security in the sense of truly believing our food system is as safe as it humanly can be, what do we need to do to open up the channels of communication? What do we need to do to ensure that when you're sending things to the federal agency, we're indeed getting things back to us at the provincial level so that you can actually help the public get to the place that it needs to be, which is either to a physician or to safe practices, or to all of those things you're seeing? I hear what you're saying about how difficult it is. It's a little bit here, a little bit there. How do we put the puzzle together? It's like building a puzzle, it seems to me, without one of the corner pieces, which means you really can't get it done.
How would you want to see the information sharing change?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I thank our witnesses for being here today.
What I've heard from each of you, either directly or indirectly, is that food safety is indeed a shared responsibility because there are so many different key players involved in the food process. We've heard from producers about systems and processes they implement at the farm gate and right through to processing. We've heard about food preparation and the impact it can have on food safety. Then of course it flows right through to consumers, who end up doing the final food preparation if they happen to be consuming it at home.
Mr. Wilcott certainly described well the challenges that are present when trying to define whether it is an outbreak. I appreciated your point that it's usually first discovered in the field. Then it's a matter of trying to piece the problem together from there by interviewing people: “Is more than one person ill? What did they eat two weeks ago? What is the source of the problem?” It's a complex problem and there are many interfaces.
One of the things that concerns me--from some of the questions my colleagues asked--is that I sometimes think their mission is to lay blame. They want to nail somebody for this. When my colleagues and I voted on establishing this committee, its working hours, and the kinds of witnesses we wanted, the aim was not to lay blame. The aim was to find out what happened, who the different players involved were, and what the interfaces were and how to better manage them. To me that's key, and we all need to work together to move things forward.
The lessons learned reports will help move things forward. They have been tabled by different organizations, and we certainly need to communicate better. I appreciated Mr. Jennery's comments on communicating key information to industry and the public. Again, interfaces between different governmental organizations need to be improved.
Let me follow up on one of the comments Mr. Jennery made on communication. You said that industry should find out before the media, and I'm wondering what your thoughts are on the practical application of that. Given the society we live in today--especially since we're all interconnected on a high-speed communications network--there's often a lot going on at once, but the media, industry, and the public must be finding out at the same time. Maybe you could elaborate.
I'm concerned that if we start putting a step-by-step process in place to share information, it will become more bureaucratic. Then people will say, “Listen it broke down here, and that's why the public didn't find out. It broke down there, and that's why industry didn't find out.” I'm wondering if you can comment on what you mean by this flow of information and who should find out first.
:
That's great. When I looked up, I just saw the vacant chair.
Mr. de Valk, it's good to see you again.
In terms of the Canadian partnership, Canadian food safety, your education, what we're talking about here--aside from Mr. Easter, who is trying to find blame--is about actually moving ahead. How are we going to prevent something like this from happening?
When I listened to Mr. Wilcott, I think we got a pretty clear understanding of the complexities and the issues around getting to something like listeria, which you can't actually taste, you can't smell, you can't feel, you can't find, hardly. In fact, had we not done things that Mr. Easter and his government had cancelled, we still might not have the answers for that. We want to keep moving ahead with steps in place to prevent it.
Ms. Watson talked about how in a recent campaign you were able to reach over 12 million Canadians with our food safety handling message over the year. One of the things that's in here is that there is a considerable number of people who actually do just the basics. You and I, likely, at our homes don't do what we should do. And if you're going to change the culture of Canadians.... You used the example of how bad it is in terms of smoking, how bad it is in terms of drunk driving, to get that message actually out.
When you talk about reaching over 12 million Canadians in terms of trying to promote the food safety issue, how do you benchmark that in terms of its success? Do you have any ideas?
We certainly did not want you to feel that we left you out.
I really want to talk more to Ms. Crichton about the sense of the supply chain. It can be a rather extensive one, from a geographical perspective, as well as very intricate, from all perspectives, because of the different places, the different hands, and the different systems that actually move it from place to place, whether it comes, indeed, from a farmer or a farm somewhere through the processing chain to, eventually, the fork.
To paraphrase Napoleon, he once said that the army marches on its stomach. He ultimately lost the Franco-Prussian War because he basically starved his army to death.
Not to be misunderstood, my sense is that there isn't anyone in the chain, from the farmer to the fork, who is trying to do anything other than provide the best quality food and the safest quality food we possibly can. I want to ensure that folks don't understand from the metaphor that somehow we're trying to do something to folks around the issue of food.
Could you sort of walk us through some intricacies here, in the sense of the food supply chain we now have? It is much different than it was, I would suggest, 30 years ago, and is changing, it seems to me, on an annual basis in terms of how intricate it truly gets when it comes to the things we consume. They literally travel thousands upon thousands of kilometres.
We don't grow papaya in this country, yet you can find it. We don't grow oranges in this country, but you can buy them. There are numerous other products we find on our store shelves that we don't necessarily produce, nor do we grow them here. But things we used to grow here are now disappearing, like canned peaches, for instance. In my neck of the woods, in the Niagara Peninsula, when the last canning factory, CanGro, left, it meant that there were no canneries east of the Rocky Mountains for fresh peaches, or fresh fruit for that matter. That means that the local source of canned fruit for Canadians is now gone. In fact, flip the label, and you'll find that it is probably a product of China. Flip the product of frozen fish over and you may find that it's a product of China. It might be caught in the Grand Banks, mind you, but it might be a product of China.
If you could, and I know you don't have a lot of time, could you try to give us a sense of where you think the system isn't up to snuff? And where you don't have controls that you might want, because clearly you can't be in all places at all times when you're sourcing product far away, how sure are you and how comfortable are you that those regulations we see here for our farmers and our processors are actually being followed there? What is your sense on that?
Ultimately, the subsequent question would be why, if you're not sure they are as good as what we have here, we are selling them. I'll finish with that and let you take the rest of the time.
:
Yes, that's certainly the one that's biggest in our minds as being a disease that perhaps has a reputation it doesn't deserve, and how countries and trade and emotions react to it. That's perhaps instructive for what the pork industry might be going through right now with the H1N1 virus.
With BSE you had a new disease that started appearing in Europe and the U.K. in the late seventies and early eighties, and people didn't know what it was. Animals were just getting sick, and people didn't know why. They started to do some research to learn more about it and found out that people were also getting sick. As the years went by and the research was going on, trade barriers went up and people stopped trading with the U.K., which became the way people and countries dealt with it.
Science moved on, and they learned what it was and how it was spreading and how to control it. But countries—including Canada—still put up trade barriers. Perhaps we were somewhat guilty, too, and had to taste our own medicine, because when we discovered it here, that's also what happened to us. We immediately lost all of our markets in other countries, losing to the tune of $11 million per day, because we do export about 60% of our production.
With that happening, and with the U.S. then getting in the same boat as us, we did manage to address it from the point of view of knowing what to do. We changed regulations in Canada. We made sure that our feed ban was stopping the spread of the disease from animal to animal; it was not contagious, but it was through feed. We adopted some changes in how beef was processed to make sure that the risky parts of the animal containing the agent were not going into the food supply.
So we've done everything to assure the safety of the beef, and we've done other things to ensure the health of the animals. But we still continue to suffer from the economic impact. I think that's the real message here, which is to identify what are the things.... Some of the things we've talked about are real food safety concerns, and you have to make sure you're preventing those and controlling them.
Some of the other things we've talked about are extremely important issues—animal health issues, biosecurity, and disease prevention, and perhaps country-of-origin labelling in terms of marketing—but a lot of these things aren't food safety issues. So we want to make sure that when we're talking about how we respond to these things and what lessons we learned, we're really getting at what the objectives are. If there's a food safety objective, we need to ensure we're addressing it from that perspective.
In terms of the poultry rejection project, what you've got is CFIA inspectors off the line, and these are birds that are identified to be pulled off the line, and you're determining what can go back on and what's salvageable in that.
In fact, the CFIA inspector will watch the line. These people are taking the product off. The inspector could let them all go, but they're looking to say “Does it meet our quality? Does it meet that?” As it comes in, if it's got a broken wing or something, that gets taken off, and the farmer doesn't get paid for it. He doesn't get paid for because CFIA regulations state that's not a sellable product. If it comes in broken, it can't go on.
We've always had CFIA inspectors who have said, “Okay, these are CFIA regulations. We're employing them; we're saying that comes off the line.” That means the farmer doesn't get paid for the weight of that or the whole bird. We now have CFIA inspectors off the line, in terms of doing that, which is not a food safety issue because you're just taking the stuff off. You're not saying what can go on the line; you're saying what's coming off.
Now you have a plant employee who is going to determine whether it is something that happened as a result of being in the plant or something that is the result of the farmer doing something wrong in the transport there.
Now you have the person who's buying the product using federal legislation to determine whether they're paying for it or the farmer is paying for it. Instead of having that third party there who was essentially adjudicating using federal legislation, the buyer is determining who's paying for this—the farmer or the processing plant.
That's why we say it's not a food safety issue, but it does become an issue in terms of a transactional nature between farmers and the processing plant and who pays. CFIA had that third-party role before when they were doing it, and now we've put it in the hands....
We agreed, partly, to do this because then the CFIA vet would come back and sign off an attestation. They would review the work done. We've since learned that now the vets do not want to sign that attestation because they didn't inspect that product, even though they're supposed to go down and look at it. So now we're worried we have no control whatsoever in this process.
Mr. Dungate, Mr. Fuller was the one who made the opening statement, but I would image that you agree with what he said. Could you provide clarification or a comment about his remarks concerning the federal government? According to him, the federal government could act with greater conviction to protect the industry's credibility and the national inspection process by emphasizing effective communication with consumers. This is pretty much what other witnesses have told us, both this evening and ever since the subcommittee began its study on food safety and the Listeriosis crisis.
In your opinion, what should be done? The recommendation is to ensure more effective communication with consumers, but shouldn't we also be talking about more effective communications with the provinces concerned and the other agencies? Everyone must have the same information, everyone must know what direction we are going in and everyone must understand what we are doing. I've already used this expression at other committee meetings, but all the same, I have the impression that some people are on the side roads. As Mr. Wilcott said, and he put it very well, the result is that we are not as effective as we should be.
This is the year 2009, and we have already dealt with other problems. We are reviewing all these difficulties, and we think that these things must be understood. Unlike Mr. Shipley, I don't have the impression that most people have learned from their mistakes, be it the agencies, the departments or other institutions. Mr. Fuller tells us that communications must be improved, but how could that be done?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My friend Mr. Shipley raised the issue about a witness who was here earlier this week, Mr. Charlebois, who used the analogy of the hospital and an abattoir—I think erroneously so, to be honest. I think he does a disservice by doing that, because the assumption is that somehow food safety should be considered less than a hospital stay.
I don't agree with that, because ultimately a hospital is about sanitation and looking after those who are chronically ill. They're unfortunate to be in that situation, but it's still about sanitation. Why should we suggest that somehow the food system should be less sanitized than the hospital situation? More folks died last year than died in the average hospital, when you think about it. Ultimately when we're thinking of sanitation, I think to use the analogy sets up, as Mr. Wilcott said, this sense in people's minds that you are inferring that it's harder to run an abattoir than it is to run a hospital. Well, first of all, an abattoir doesn't have surgeries. We don't confine the hogs or cows to a ward. It's a processing plant. So I think that analogy was flawed from the get-go.
Nonetheless it raises an interesting point when people repeat it, because it assumes we should think about food safety differently than we do about the health care system, and somehow that's here and this is here. I don't think that's true when it comes to sanitation. It should be on par. One of the things we did learn and that I'm hearing from all of the witnesses is that the system needs to be, from producer to fork, safe. One of the things that does happen all the way through the system is handling. Everyone's handling the product all the way along.
Whether it be the farmer, who is doing an excellent job, whether it's the trucker or the stocker of the shelves, whether it's in the abattoir or in the poultry processing plant, everything's being handled. So why aren't we saying that their sanitation standards should be equal to the standards for those who are handling patients? They're simply transmitting different types of pathogens one way or the other. I think we do a disservice when we do that. I'm not suggesting, Mr. Dungate, that you did that. You didn't, just to make that clear.
You talked about the regulations and the burden. I would suggest to you that there are producers in this world who are looking at us and saying that we raised the bar and kept them out. We're saying to them, “You raised the bar some other place and kept us out.” But here's what the industry has said to us so far during this committee. Whether it was Michael McCain or some of the other bigger producers, they are saying in testimony that the voluntary standards in their plant are higher than what the CFIA requires.
I may be wrong. Maybe I'm hearing it wrong, Mr. Dungate, that somehow the CFIA's standards are higher than what the plants feel they should be doing. Was I being misled when I heard that? Was it spin or is it factual?
:
There's a number of things. I heard the debate about hospitals versus slaughter facilities. I don't know anything about hospitals, but the point on slaughter facilities might be moot, because nobody wants to build a slaughter facility in Canada.
Mr. Brian Storseth: Exactly.
Mr. John Masswohl: In fact, it's the opposite. We're worried about the ones that we have built over the last few years and that are closing down because they're not competitive.
For a long time, we have been an advocate of regulatory harmonization. Regulatory harmonization is not all about food safety. A lot of it is about competitiveness. What would top my list would be the enhanced feed ban, the SRM removals. Canada needed to enhance our feed ban and we did it. I think we went a little far on it, in that we've basically oversold it.
The Americans are starting to catch up. They're implementing their enhanced feed ban. In fact, they have technically implemented it. It is in force, but they're not enforcing it for another six months, I believe, and even when it is fully enforced, they don't have to remove all the materials that we do, and they can still use them in fertilizer.
One of the requests that we have made is for the minister to work towards harmonizing with the U.S. and to give us the ability for fertilizer to come back. We're not convinced that there's going to be a lot of transmission from people who are spreading the fertilizer they buy at Home Depot on their backyards in Toronto. It would be very valuable to have that back.
There are issues related to veterinary drug approvals. I think one of the witnesses talked about veterinary drugs that can be used in other countries, but not necessarily here. There are a lot of veterinary drug companies that don't bother to apply for approvals in Canada because of the length of time and the cost to get them approved in Canada. For the size of the market that Canada is, it's sometimes not even worth the bother of applying.
It doesn't mean that those products aren't safe. Our competitors are using them. If we had a regulatory system that could facilitate or streamline that approval process without sacrificing.... I'm not talking about making any concessions or doing anything to jeopardize safety. But if other countries have approved certain products, maybe we don't have to start at square one all the time.
Another issue is user fees, for example, to have food safety officials in Canadian slaughter facilities. They're providing a public service to do that food safety inspection, and those slaughter facilities in Canada pay the cost of those food safety inspectors back to the government, whereas in the U.S. that is deemed as a public service and the U.S. government provides that service. So again we have a cost imbalance.