Senators, members of Parliament, ladies and gentlemen, it's my great honour and pleasure to be a guest speaker of one of the pivotal committees of the upper chamber of the Canadian Parliament.
Actually, I might have started with the traditional British small talk about the weather: sunny--it used to be--but a bit chilly, and hopefully it has nothing to do with the subject we're discussing today.
As for the episode that gathers us today, one might characterize it in pretty different ways. You might use the words “misunderstanding, misapprehension, misinterpretation”...[Inaudible--Editor] whatever. Let us analyze the whole story, but let us not over-exaggerate it; at least we don't.
I'll start with what happened. On February 18, 2009, two Russian long-range strategic aircraft, Tupolev 95MS, took off from Engels Air Force Base in Saratov region, in the Russian Federation, and flew over the Arctic up to the Beaufort Sea, where they turned back home. The approximate vicinity to the Alaska-Yukon border was about 200 kilometres. It was a regular preplanned flight in international airspace. The flight was undertaken according to Russian Ministry of Defence regular military training and air patrol plans in the northern latitudes, and all the international flight regulations were strictly respected.
Nine days later, a press conference in Ottawa took place and the respective comments of both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Minister of Defence Peter MacKay ensued. The only public comment from the U.S., since as you mentioned.... I started by saying that it was in the vicinity of two borders and two states. So the only public comment from the U.S. was that of U.S. General Gene Renuart, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, which was this: “The Russians have conducted themselves professionally; they have maintained compliance with the international rules of airspace sovereignty and have not entered the internal airspace of either of the countries.”
As far as I can see, there are several aspects to analyzing the whole case. First and foremost, we should view it from the international law perspective. As you will understand, relations among states in the 21st century are, first and foremost, based on international law. When it comes to international flights, particular rules should be derived from the relevant international treaties, either multilateral or bilateral.
Number two is the specific issue of notification, which is partly a legal issue, but mostly it's an issue of mutual confidence, which on its own part should be based on the balance of interests, which in actual terms means something very simple: reciprocity.
Point number three is a very popular and very widespread question nowadays: Is there any hidden agenda? In other words, why do Russians do that?
Point number four is the issue of political rhetoric, which seems to be on the radar screen of both the media and the public but which might be quite detrimental. I might remind you that America-bashing or, generally speaking, west-bashing used to be extremely widespread in the former Soviet Union, while Russia-bashing appeared to be extremely popular on the other side of the hill. The Cold War has been over for many years, but regretfully, that Cold War mentality is still there, which is deplorable. All that rhetoric about “the Russian Bear in the air” in the Commons and in the media--that's from not even yesterday but the day before yesterday. Besides rhetoric being useful for domestic purposes, if there are any, it can hardly be of any help for interstate relations. Anyway, I should have stated that the only bears that really matter today are those that are responsible for this slump in our stock markets, whether it's in London, New York, Toronto, or Moscow.
Last but not least, while analyzing the whole case, we should not forget about the background. We should not forget about our bilateral relations. We should not forget about what the Germans call the zeitgeist, or the spirit of the times, which, as far as I can see, is pretty much not in tune with what was going on and what was said.
Naturally, I guess, most of you remember by heart that famous speech of Lord Palmerston in 1848, made before the British Parliament, when he reminded everyone that Britain had “no eternal allies” and “no perpetual enemies”. All the British interests are “eternal and perpetual”, he said, and “those interests” we are “to follow”. It's a very simple and very basic thought.
We should take into consideration, while analyzing any case like that, where are the real interests of Canada and where are the real interests of Russia. Where are the interests and the pace of our bilateral cooperation, which is undoubtedly mutually beneficial, whether it's in Afghanistan, where we prop up Canadian efforts in all the various ways we can, in the last while by sharing intelligence with Canadians, which in many cases was of great help? That is not saying a word about all of our cooperation in the Arctic, which initiated this Arctic bridge from 2007, while we are extremely important partners when it comes to international cooperation in Afghanistan, international terrorism, international disarmament, regional conflicts, or whatever.
The latter reminds me of yet another thing. Last November I took part in a debate at Ashbury College: “Canada should strengthen its military in preparation for the next Cold War”. The keynote speaker was one of the most prominent Canadian military men, General Rick Hillier. His answer to the question was crystal clear. Should Canada strengthen its military? Yes. Should that be in preparation for the next Cold War? Sheer nonsense. Naturally not. That type of Cold War Russian threat has gone. The real threat is, as he defined it, not a bear anymore; it's a barrel of snakes. It is the combination of international terrorism, drug trafficking, regional conflicts, piracy, and whatever. The list is very long.You know it by heart as well, as far as I can see. I can't agree more.
Actually, from the very beginning, I was informed that I wouldn't have much time for the introductory statement. It's my understanding that we will have approximately an hour for a question and answer period. I thank you for your attention and am now open to your questions.
To start with, let me clarify several legal issues along with the issue of notifications and your direct question, with your permission.
Very briefly, first, from the point of international law, the only issue was the correlations in the definitions of international air space and national air space. So all the notes that in most cases might be applied with regard to flights of military aircraft, for instance, do respond to the so-called Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, with all its regulations regarding national air space.
National air space, I might remind you, covers the air space over national territory, which is the land block with the adjacent territorial sea, which, according to the UN 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, is up to 12 nautical miles, or 22.2 kilometres--if I'm not mistaken, but that's an approximation--which means that whatever happened in the zone of approximately 200 kilometres from the coastline of either Canada or the United States has nothing to do with the regulations of this particular Chicago Convention of 1944. Naturally, it has something to do with the international space regulations, which are also applicable to the Chicago Convention, but only when it comes to civil aircraft.
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention indicates that there are special but pretty different rules. One applies to so-called state aircraft, and that is aircraft that are used for the purposes of the military, the customs, and the police. That's exactly the case, and there is not a single article in either the Chicago Convention or any other existent international conventions that might cover the flights of military aircraft when they are in international air space.
There are several special cases like the one that deals with the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which is purely for demilitarized zones, but that's pretty different.
So if we're talking about the Arctic, there is nothing we might use as an obligatory international obligation with regard to either behaviour if it is just an air training flight--naturally I'm not speaking about military activity--or when we're speaking about notifications.
With regard to notifications--and I'm speaking about the period of the Cold War--as early as the process of detente starting in the early 1970s, both sides realized that there was really a grey zone in international law and something should be done to regulate, one way or the other, the flights of military aircraft, which eventually made a start for different multi-layered confidence- and security-building measures based on a variety of international and bilateral--actually, Russian, or Soviet and American at that period of time--and multilateral treaties. One of those is the so-called Stockholm Document of 1986--
:
I have to interrupt you, because I will not be able to ask my questions otherwise. I am going to ask them one after the other, and, if you do not have time to answer—the chair is telling me that I have two minutes left, in fact—I would appreciate a written response. Is that possible?
It is said that Russia is spreading its wings internationally at present to show its military capabilities, not just in the air and in space, but at sea as well. People say that Russia wants to demonstrate its great military prowess, that its period of decline is now in the past and it wants to be seen as a world power once more. I would like to know your views on that.
For my second question, I would like to know if, in your opinion, the fact that this incident took place on the day before the American president's visit was a coincidence, and if so, why? If it was not a coincidence, I would like to know what Russia's intentions were.
Finally, some Canadian political commentators are telling us that the Conservative government wants to increase its military presence in the Arctic and that, in order to do so, it has to show that a formidable adversary is periodically testing our borders. What do you think of that statement?
Thank you very much for appearing at our committee today. We appreciate your time.
In your opening comments, you mentioned, and your own military sources have been quoted as saying, that these flights are routine training missions and that Canada is routinely notified in advance. As you also mentioned, the American general from NORAD said they were notified. But Canadian sources, including a member of this Standing Committee on National Defence, have disputed this and have said that Canada was not informed in advance. I'm rather perplexed by this contradiction. It seems to me that it's a matter of fact and we should be able to straighten that out. It's kind of concerning that there's such a breakdown in communication between Canada and Russia at the diplomatic end or at the military level.
Could you tell us the process that occurs on your end, the Russian end, to notify the Canadian government before one of these flights occurs, in terms of how far in advance this notification is sent, from what department it's sent, and from what level of that department the notification is sent? What form does this notification take? Also, what steps, if any, are taken to ensure that the notification has been received at the other end?
I have another question, so I'd appreciate it if you'd give me enough time to give you that question as well. Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Trofimov, for being here. I'll try to be brief.
In August 2007, then President Putin stated that air patrols would resume, signaling they would become more frequent. He also stated, quite correctly, that international law does not stipulate obligatory norms for states to inform other states about the flights above the international waters bordering upon their territory.
There are two kinds of airspace, international airspace and national airspace. There's also a third kind. We have, as you do, what we call air defence identification zones, where aircraft operating in those zones are matters of interest to our particular countries. In 2007-08 there were 30 penetrations of air defence identification zones in Canada and the U.S. There were 28 NORAD intercepts of those penetrations, eight of which were conducted by Canadians. On only three of those cases was there notification given. So I would question a little bit the assertion that notification was given. And this is from NORAD documents.
Our interests in the Arctic are quite clearly, I think, economic, environmental, and security/sovereignty. Recently Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev of the Russian Federation stated that the Russian Federation was prepared to use submarines to enforce what they saw as Russian sovereignty in the Arctic. Could you elaborate on Admiral's Burtsev's statement?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll share my time with Mr. Payne.
Thank you for taking part of your day to share your insights through the questions the committee has asked you. In that vein, I have a couple of questions.
First, what is the purpose of these kinds of flights, as you see it? Is it to teach pilots navigational skills, or is it for some sort of tactical operation? When we look at countries, we know that Russia has a massive amount of northern area, as Canada has. Why would an aircraft have to get close to an international line? I'm not sure why that would happen.
Second, if there is no communication link today, do you not think it would be a good idea to start to make a communication link with Canada and the U.S., similar to the American linkage, so that we don't have incidents turning out very badly and things happening that shouldn't happen simply because we haven't talked to each other?
The first question is why. If you have a racer, he should run. Otherwise, there is no reason to have a racer. If we approach this problem from a different angle, it would be about the prospects for disarmament. Let's do it. Let's not have a single bomber or nuclear submarine over there in international air space or on the high seas. That is a pretty different thing. We inherited that--the Russians, the Americans, the British, the French--from the Cold War period, so it will inevitably take some time for eventual radical disarmament to be over. I don't know...[Inaudible--Editor]...sanctuary whatsoever. Within this period of time, we are, first, to guarantee operational efficiency and reliability to prevent the different submarines from colliding like those of the French and the British.
We should prop up and enhance additional confidence- and security-building measures. Actually, if it hadn't been, for instance, for the fact that the Americans lapsed, during the period of the administration, from the ABM treaty in 2002, we would now have both START II and START III instead of just START I, with much more detailed leverage for notification. That would eventually benefit not only Russia and the States but all other countries, Canada included.
The remedy is very simple. Let's reset the whole process. We've already done it symbolically with the Americans during this recent meeting between Sergei Lavrov and Hillary Clinton. That's all I'll say about where we should go. That is very basic or general advice, although it's really complicated.
As for the communication link, that is a grey zone; I do admit it. That's a problem, and somehow that's deplorable. But the best way to discuss it is at the bargaining table through normal diplomatic channels. As a matter of fact, I should have made that--
:
To start with, I will not comment on the official comments made here in Canada. I would rather draw your attention once again to the fact that since this particular flight incident took place in the very vicinity of two states, and we haven't had any comments or reaction, either official statements or from the public, from the States, it speaks for itself. That's point number one.
Second, I imagine there is yet another grey zone--the problem of interoperability of different international and national legislations, while mentioning those self-declared air defence identification zones that several countries have, like the States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. From the Canadian perspective, as far as I can understand, the limit of this zone is up to 300 kilometres, if I'm not mistaken, but you should consult your own military; I'm not an expert. But it definitely stretches over the region where this particular incident--or episode, to be more precise--took place.
So from the point of international law, absolutely nothing happened. It's pretty much the same thing as happened when American or NATO aircraft flew along the national air space of the Russian Federation. Nothing happened at that time. We did not make any comments, any statements. We were probably not quite happy, but that is what we inherited from the Cold War period. We could not, regretfully--we would love to--be fair to traditions and practices in one day. It will take decades--probably less, but it depends on the politicians. Naturally, those politicians should demonstrate more flexibility and readiness to use normal diplomatic working channels to discuss all those issues.
Thank you.