:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to appear before the committee.
As Canadians we find ourselves in the midst of yet another so-called Arctic sovereignty crisis, this time precipitated by climate change, an alleged international race for resources, and uncertainty about boundaries and sovereign rights. Of course, we've been down this road before, with defence projects in the northwest during the Second World War, then the DEW Line, the Manhattan voyages, and the Polar Sea crisis of the mid-eighties.
Historically, political interest surges when Canadians perceive their sovereignty to be in jeopardy. Accordingly, promises were made to invest in the Canadian Forces to ensure Canada's stronger presence in its north. When the immediate crisis passed and Canadians realized sovereignty was not a clear and present danger, the commitment to invest in military capabilities, and in the north more generally, seemed to pass almost as soon as it began.
I do not share the same sense of alarm as some commentators who suggest that Canadian sovereignty is in dire straits and is melting away with the sea ice. From a legal standpoint, I agree with Alan Kessel's presentation a few weeks ago.
As a first pillar, I think we have to recognize that our sovereignty is not in serious jeopardy. This is thanks to the quiet diplomacy that has historically balanced continental security priorities with our national interests. I strongly believe the problems in the Arctic will not be resolved by a return to Cold War rhetoric and a reactive crisis-based mentality.
At the same time, we can't afford to be apathetic as a country. We have to invest in functional capabilities now to deal with the probable challenges we will encounter in the changing north, such as a major air disaster or an emergency such as an avalanche or an oil spill in our internal waters. The Russians are not likely to invade, nor are the Danes or the Americans. There is no conventional military threat to our Far North, nor will Canada solve its boundary disputes with a force of arms.
Given the mandate of this committee, I'm going to focus my comments on the role of the Canadian Forces in the evolving Arctic. I argue in my submission that a “Canada first” strategy is politically sound, but “Canada only” expectations are unrealistic. We have allies and we should be working with them in reinforcing security and stability in the region.
Furthermore, continuous talk about the need for a stronger Canadian Forces presence could undermine Canada's sovereignty. Suzanne Lalonde brought up the issue of the need for effective presence to bolster Canada's legal case, but I don't think anyone in the world, except for some Canadian commentators, is suggesting that Canada does not have sufficient presence in the north from a legal standpoint.
If possession is nine-tenths of the law and boots on the ground are important, then we're wise to acknowledge that we already have these elements in place, thanks to the Inuit and other northern residents. Presence is not the issue; it is capability. And as Dr. Lalonde said, it's about control.
The key to attaining a realistic level of control in northern waters, in my mind, is for the government to deliver on its announcements over the last few years. I have gone into more detail on specific elements in my submission, but the various CF platforms and infrastructure in which the government has promised to invest are reasonable and proportionate to the threats we're likely to face. The danger is that in an economic downturn these sorts of initiatives may be abandoned unless they're supported by the parties in opposition.
The difficulty is compounded by the simple fact that to date these individual announcements are not tantamount to a strategy. Furthermore, as Admiral McFadden alluded to in his presentation, a whole-of-government approach to the north is essential. Despite all the political emphasis on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, they are not the lead agency in most domestic incidents and do not have a standing mandate to enforce the laws of Canada. The CF's mandate is to play a supporting role to other departments and agencies, even in scenarios such as terrorist incidents, escorting nuclear-powered vessels, and fishery patrols and boardings.
Certainly, investment in military capabilities is required so the CF can operate in all parts of the country and can develop a more coherent, intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance network, which other witnesses have discussed in detail. I also suggest in my submission that establishing an Arctic marine security operation may help to improve Canadian Maritime Command awareness.
In terms of bilateral agreements, I don't think it's realistic to expect the U.S. to formally recognize the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters. Indeed, I fear that pushing for international clarity on the legal status of the passage may place Canada in a lose-lose situation. We can talk about this more during question period if the committee wishes.
Instead, we might envision the possibility of creating a combined Arctic command to coordinate Canada's Joint Task Force (North) with the U.S. Northern Command surveillance and response efforts. Perhaps this could include a Canada-U.S. joint operational planning group with access to NORAD planning staff.
Most importantly, I think, northerners must be the key participants in any assertion of Canadian control. The Inuit line that it should not be “use it or lose it” but “use us” that guides Canada's northern strategy is right on the mark.
The military is very fortunate to have a positive image in northern communities, thanks to the 4,343 Canadian Rangers we have in this country. More than half of these Rangers serve in the territorial north or in Nunavik and Nunatsiavut. These men and women are representative of their communities, perform important military and civilian functions, and are an incredible success story.
Understandably, when you have something good, you want to invest in it and make it better, so the government has promised to expand and enhance this component of the CF reserves. This is admirable, but I also want to emphasize that it must be done in a realistic and sustainable way or this important community-based asset will be set up to fail.
First of all, there have been commitments to increase the number of Rangers in the Arctic and thus expand Canadian surveillance. We might consider how realistic it is to expect much expansion in the Arctic, given that every community along the Northwest Passage that can sustain a patrol already has one. Northerners already serve in the Rangers at more six times the rate of Canadian service in the CF more generally. Can we really expect more of northerners?
A recent Fisheries and Oceans committee report recommended that the Rangers be given a marine capability, and media coverage spoke of the potential for a more combat-oriented role, including boarding foreign vessels. In response, several Rangers reported they would resign if these new roles were assigned to them. This fits with what I've personally heard from Rangers over the past decade.
Instead, the government should stick to the basics: deliver on promised uniforms for the Rangers, as well as replacement rifles; increase the amount of money they receive for wear and tear on their personal equipment during training and operations; and provide more support for training and administration by increasing the number of Ranger instructors and headquarters staff. The whole purpose of expanding and enhancing should be to reinforce success, not to reinvent the Rangers to carry out tasks for which they are ill-suited and that they are not intended to provide.
They are not, and never will be, an interdiction force. They are lightly equipped self-sufficient volunteers who are not required to undertake annual training. They are, at the core, a very positive example of a constructive relationship between northerners and the federal government. The Rangers are not “broken” and my simple message is that the key is to not break them.
I'll wrap up by saying that a northern vision has a potential to unite us all. Following through on promised investments in the CF and implementing a long-term northern strategy will certainly contribute to a stronger Canada.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to the 24
th meeting of the standing committee.
I am professor of oceanography at Laval University and scientific leader for the research icebreaker Amundsen, which you are perhaps familiar with, as well as scientific director of ArcticNet, Canada's Network of Centres of Excellence, which studies the impacts of climate change and modernization on the maritime Canadian Arctic. I am certainly no geopolitical specialist like my colleague, but I follow closely and even participate in the debates and works of my colleagues who are experts in this field.
[English]
ArcticNet brings together about 110 Arctic specialists in 27 Canadian universities and six federal departments and agencies. A central objective of our network is to inform policy and adaptation strategies to minimize the negative impacts of change in the Arctic and, if possible, maximize the positive outcomes of those changes.
One of the main tools of ArcticNet is the research icebreaker Amundsen, which enables our international teams to reach the Arctic seas and their shores. Through its regular presence in the Canadian Arctic and its visibility in Canadian and foreign media, the Amundsen contributes substantially, I would say, to asserting Canadian sovereignty over these remote maritime regions.
Within the ArcticNet scientific program, we have several projects that address the issue of Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic seas.
Let's recall first that Canadian sovereignty over the islands of the Canadian Archipelago has been recognized by the international community since the 1930s. As experts in international law have explained to you with much more competence than I possess, the major issues of Arctic sovereignty for Canada concern the Arctic seas, not the lands or the islands.
For me, there are essentially two issues. The first is the status of the straits of the Canadian Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage. The question is, are these straits Canadian internal waters on which Canada has full control over the traffic--that's the Canadian position--or are they international straits linking two international bodies of water and therefore open for what is called the “innocent passage” of surface vessels? That's the American and European position.
The second large issue of sovereignty in the Arctic is the claim by Canada to a fraction of the Arctic Ocean beyond the present 200-mile limit within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
These two issues are fairly separate. They're not linked in any specific way.
[Translation]
These are two issues of strategic importance, the outcome of which will affect Canada's standing in the international community and, potentially, redefine the missing Arctic dimension of Canada.
[English]
Concerning the Northwest Passage, Canada has been reactive rather than proactive for way too long. If a clear position had been expressed 50 years ago when the passage was choked with ice, the situation would likely have been resolved to the advantage of Canada. Thus, our group, ArcticNet, and our investigators fully support the recent initiatives of the federal government to strengthen the Canadian presence in the Arctic.
Among other things, there have been the announcement of the building of a research station in the High Arctic; the announcement of a polar class icebreaker, the Diefenbaker; opposing the selling of RADARSAT-2 to American interests; and also the very firm position on the Arctic taken recently by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
As for the expansion of Canada's jurisdiction beyond the 200-mile limit in the Arctic Ocean, it must be emphasized that the interest of this expansion is essentially strategic, not economic. It is often believed that Canada will gain exclusive access to vast mineral, petroleum, and fisheries resources.
However, such resources are distributed primarily on the shallow continental shelves over which we already have sovereignty--and recognized sovereignty--so this sovereignty is not challenged except for minor border skirmishes with the U.S.A. on the western Arctic front. We know that fisheries resources in the deep basin are insignificant. We also know that whatever petroleum or mineral resources are available there, it would be technically impossible to exploit them.
The strategic importance of this offshore region should nevertheless not be neglected, since a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean with its new marine routes would likely play the same role as the Mediterranean Sea played in antiquity. It's going to be of extreme strategic importance.
If we come to the role of the Department of National Defence in asserting our sovereignty in the Arctic, the first evidence is that Canada does not possess the means, military or other, to monitor the immense maritime territory that is at stake. Beyond simple surveillance, our capacity to respond directly at sea to military or security situations is extremely weak, especially during the winter months.
Without attempting to give a full overview of the situation, let's just mention that the 18 Aurora aircraft that are deployed by DND to monitor the entire Arctic territory provide very little capacity to act in the Arctic seas if something happens there. The two heavy icebreakers that we have and the four medium icebreakers of the Canadian Coast Guard are deployed in the Arctic for the summer months only and leave the area by early October. We can compare this with the Russian fleet of icebreakers, which at this time, although declining, still comprises about 12 heavy icebreakers that all surpass in size and power the most powerful Canadian icebreakers.
[Translation]
As early as 2005, ArcticNet recommended the building in Canada of at least two polar-class icebreakers. The recent announcement of the Diefenbaker, to be delivered by 2017, partially fulfils this recommendation. On the other hand, to give the new frigates of the Canadian Navy some limited capacity to break ice is generally considered a poor decision. Experts doubt that the ships will have much utility in the Arctic except in the summer months, while the structural modifications allowing them to break ice will greatly reduce their performance in open waters.
[English]
In conclusion, taking into account that Arctic sovereignty is first and foremost a maritime issue, I have the following general recommendations to consolidate the role of DND.
First of all, we need to augment progressively the country's airborne and satellite capacity to monitor its Arctic seas by expanding and upgrading the aircraft fleet and by supporting the development of the Arctic remote sensing program of the Canadian Space Agency.
Furthermore, to provide a suitable capacity to act on the ground, if you will, in our immense Arctic maritime territory, Canada needs at least two polar class icebreakers that can operate for 9 out of 12 months in the area. So in addition to the Diefenbaker, I would recommend that we start building a second icebreaker. Of course, as long as I don't have to pay personally for the bill, it's okay with me.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
Prof. Louis Fortier: It's urgent for Canada to plan and execute the replacement of its fleet of medium-class icebreakers by much more powerful and versatile ships. The building of these new fleets, now scheduled to start in 2020, should actually begin now. It's also important that these new icebreakers be given a multi-task role, including escort, de-icing, research and rescue, sealift, national security and surveillance, and military operations, but also including support for scientific research and the implementation of fisheries and shipping regulations and policies.
In general, analysts and stakeholders agree that the development of this new fleet of icebreakers is unnecessarily slow. It should be much faster. It could be substantially accelerated, which would provide new economic incentives in several regions of Canada.
National Defence and the Canadian Coast Guard already collaborate on several fronts in the Arctic, so I think the military expertise of DND and the navigational expertise of the coast guard in icy waters should be combined to implement Canada's strategic goals and policy in the Arctic, rather than giving the mandate in total to one or the other of these two agencies. There also is a need to move up the Arctic in the priorities of DND headquarters, from my personal experience.
That's my message to you this afternoon.
Again, thank you very much for inviting me.
I'll split my time with Mr. Bagnell.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. Both of you emphasize capabilities and presence in your remarks. Some commentators and some witnesses have indicated that, really, a lot of what the government has announced so far is more bravado than real action and that in fact there is no real strategy.
The Senate, in their report, announced that they would like to see an Arctic strategy advisory committee with many more tools than the present northern sovereignty committee, and that in fact the government's measures have been hit and miss in trying to deliver on some of the points you indicated. There have been criticisms of the icebreakers, as an example.
Regarding the need to really develop a clear, coherent strategy to deal with the issues of climate change, sovereignty, and coordination with aboriginals, Inuit, and the coast guard, could you comment briefly on the fact that Indian and Northern Affairs is the lead agency but that in reality there has been little effective cooperation in developing a strategy to achieve the goals you gentlemen have pointed out?
:
On the absence of an integrated strategy, since 2005 there was a strategy being unveiled. It hasn't.... There have been promises have been repeated over the last number of years that one was going to be coming out. We're still waiting. I heard rumours that it was to be as early as this April, but that has come and gone. So I know it has been worked on.
What are some of the mechanisms that could be developed?
I've put forward a suggestion elsewhere for maybe revitalizing or resurrecting the advisory committee on northern development, which used to exist in the heady days of the late 1940s, through the DEW Line, and right through into the 1970s. Taking it up to that level, you would have senior civil servants at the DM level, and with involvement, at this point, of aboriginal organizations.
There are also proposals about a domestic Arctic council, which would perhaps be called an Arctic Canada council, with representatives coming together from the federal government, provincial governments, and land claim governments, as well as various aboriginal international organizations.
I think all of this points in the direction of the need for a dialogue, once we get past the idea there's an urgent need to deal with a military crisis that in my view is just not there. We need to recognize that we have the time to sit down and talk and actually come up with a sustainable policy or strategy, something that we perhaps haven't seen since the days of the 1950s. But we all know that Diefenbaker's version was blurry when it came to actually implementing his great vision. I hope it's different this time around.
:
I think you're raising a number of important issues. Certainly, in terms of the timeline, I think partly it's.... I'll tie this back to the issue of rhetoric. We have to be careful not to get ahead of ourselves in political grandstanding vis-à-vis the Americans or the Russians. We haven't yet even submitted our claims, so really, a lot of the bluster is about potentially losing something that we haven't even claimed yet. To me, this seems to be putting the cart before the horse.
I'm a bit concerned. Let's wait and see. When the Russians submitted their data and it wasn't as rigorous as the commissioners wanted, the United Nations sent it back and said, “Come on, give us better data”. So I think a lot of the alarmism surrounding this 2013 deadline is sometimes overplayed.
You asked important questions about submarines. On some of the références or comments about the need for subsurface acoustic rays, or whatever the modern technology is, at choke points, I think it is important, but I still think it always comes back to the same common denominator: we have allies who are submarine-capable and who are gathering data. As for whether we have some sort of arrangement that goes back to the 1960s with them to share that information on an agree-to-disagree basis, I can't know, and I wouldn't want to know, because it would prejudice that agreement.
If we don't have some sort of arrangement with the Americans, rather than thinking that we need to gather all this intelligence ourselves, this, to me, seems a good pretext to sit down and say, “Look, we understand that for geostrategic reasons you're not going to acknowledge that these waters, this Northwest Passage, are internal straits.” It has little to do with the Arctic, and it has everything to do with the Strait of Hormuz and other strategic straits around the world.
We acknowledge that as Canadians we're confident in our sovereignty. We can sit down and negotiate as equals and figure out ways of sharing information under the auspices of NORAD, thanks to its expansion into the maritime domain. I think there are opportunities here for creative diplomacy on the part of Canada when we get out of this need to grandstand over Arctic sovereignty issues and sit down and do the diplomatic work that's needed to come up with lasting resolutions.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, both of you, for your excellent presentations.
I guess I could say that I'm hearing from both of you a sense of urgency about certain matters. If I may paraphrase not only your evidence, but that of others, we don't really have a lot to worry about with respect to the land issues or even the continental shelf issues. It's a matter of doing the homework, of getting the data together. I don't know if you mentioned this outright, but the issue of the Americans in terms of the boundary is something that's manageable and perhaps should be settled, but there is still some uncertainty about the Northwest Passage.
We were told by Professor Byers that we ought to be ready to deal with possible issues as early as next summer because of the rapidly changing patterns in the extent of summer sea ice. I also want to bring to your attention the fact that Professor Pharand has referred us to a paper of his in which he has 12 things that Canada ought to do--and you've mentioned some of them, Professor Fortier--not to be pushy about our position on the Northwest Passage, but to bolster our claim by action in terms of navigation, making NORDREG mandatory, and some of the things you have suggested, such as having additional radar capacity, etc.
Concerning the sense of urgency that I'm sensing from you and the issues that need to be dealt with, how can we deal with something as early as next year if we're talking about a ship that seeks to go through the Northwest Passage, not respect Canada's issue of sovereignty, and not want to comply with our navigation and our Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, for example?
:
Again, we have commentaries from Michael Byers and Rob Hubert, who are always coming up with worst-case scenarios. This is what they thrive on. The media absolutely love it.
I'm not sure what evidence there is or what the probability is that we're going to have some sort of foreign incursion that's going to seek to undermine us next year. In terms of investing in capabilities, I think we're both certainly making the case to say that things are needed.
In terms of the need to bolster our claim by action, I really appreciate the question and the tenor of the question. Part of my concern is that individuals like Michael Byers are always talking about our claims. This isn't about our claims; it's about our sovereignty. We do possess sovereignty in this region and we're out to exercise it in various ways. NORDREG is a step that the government has proposed to take.
I'm perhaps more cautious than others in suggesting that there is a downside to making NORDREG mandatory, in that foreign nations, once we declare it mandatory, will come to us and say, “Here's a letter of protest because we don't agree with you.” They haven't done that to date. The more of those protest letters we have building up over time, the less we can say that there's been foreign acquiescence to our claims, and that's partly served by just lying low on these things.
So there's a downside. Assertiveness may be appropriate in some situations, I guess. I'm not sure the threat is so acute that we need to be worried about what's going to happen as early as next summer. I think that's perhaps getting overly alarmist. As for having the steps in place, certainly there have been a lot of suggestions about what we might do.