Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and committee members. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed amendments to Canada's Aeronautics Act, the backbone of our aviation regulatory infrastructure here in Canada.
For the most part, Canada's airports support the proposed amendments. This is good legislation. In the attached brief that we will be distributing to committee members, we have outlined some comments and concerns, but today I would like to highlight two important areas in which we believe this legislation can have a tremendously positive impact on the continued safety and importance of aviation in this country: the continued promotion of aeronautics as a mandate of the minister; as well as the promotion of safety management systems and the designation of organizations to shepherd these systems.
Aviation plays an essential role in Canadian society and our ever-increasingly trade-dependent economy. For that reason, we believe it is important that the promotion of aeronautics remain a mandate of the minister, as it is currently in the Aeronautics Act. The proposed amendments would eliminate this, but we believe that would be a mistake.
As Canada and our economy continue to grow, the country's aviation sector grows with it. This requires airports to be more nimble and quicker to adapt to change. Canada's airports believe several of the proposed amendments represent a fresh and welcome approach from the government to achieving this goal.
Safety is the number one concern for Canada's airports. Safety management systems, or SMS, represent a proactive approach to the safety of aviation in Canada by extending a voice to those closest to the action, the thousands of men and women who make our aviation system work every day. Who else is in a better position to identify risks and tender possible solutions than those in the field?
It is important to note that Canada has an extremely safe aviation sector today, and Canada's airports have an excellent safety record. The designation of organizations for regulatory stewardship is a natural evolution of a more mature SMS approach. It will create a more responsive approach to safety in which industry is able to more quickly identify risk and implement changes to mitigate it. Naturally, it should only be available to industry segments that have demonstrated an outstanding safety record and the ability to manage the delegated responsibility.
The designation of organizations will require a change in culture—there is no doubt about that—but it is a welcome change that will allow us as an industry to capitalize on identifying potential problems before they result in a safety incident. We're talking about real, tangible improvements to safety.
At airports each and every day, our men and women see potential problems, problems of which only they are aware. For example, there may be an intersection at a particular airport that pilots or ground workers know to be hazardous. What we have today is a system in which we need to wait until the regulator approves of changes to fix the problem, and it could take months for the necessary changes to airport operation manuals to be approved by the department. It is an inefficient system in which unnecessary delays represent unnecessary safety vulnerabilities and inefficiencies. Yes, regulations in the current system can obstruct safety. Under SMS, which Canada's airports have been working steadily to adopt, we have a system being put into place in which people can report such safety problems without fear of reprisal.
Airports know their businesses and are best placed to know what will improve safety within their organizations. Today they often find themselves constrained by the regulations from implementing safety-related improvements. Surely this is not the government's intent.
Very recently, for example, certification standards for apron marking, signage, and lighting are being removed from Canada's airport certification standards. This has allowed the CAC to develop a best industry practices document on the subject to replace them. They reflect the very best standards available from a variety of airports across Canada.
In time, we could do similar things with other areas of certification standards and with areas of the Canadian aviation regulations. A natural evolution in the SMS approach, the designation of organizations to manage safety standards then allows industry to move much more quickly to plug safety vulnerabilities long before they need to have a safety incident.
The vulnerabilities identified through SMS programs could feed regulatory change. The designated organizations represent another layer of safety oversight, while the minister would still retain the right to audit and inspect the organization and the affected certificate holders.
In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the primary commitment of Canada's airports to safety. We believe that many of the proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act under consideration today will contribute greatly to ensuring Canada's aviation sector continues to enjoy one of the best safety records in the world over the busy years ahead.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Honourable members, good afternoon.
I'm very pleased to be here as president of the Air Transport Association of Canada to speak to you on the very important matter of Bill . As you may know, ATAC represents the commercial aviation sector in Canada. Collectively our members account for over 95% of all commercial aviation revenue in Canada.
Nothing unites our members more than our absolute commitment to the safety and security of our passengers. It is the most important thing we do. That's why we're here today to ask you for your support in the passage of Bill . As many of you will recall, this bill has been up for consideration previously under different numbers, but always with the same content. Why? Because this is one of the few examples of legislation with broad support.
ATAC has supported passage of this bill each time because it improves the efficiency and effectiveness of how air carriers manage their safety protocols through safety management systems. The same holds true in the case of Bill . ATAC supports this legislation and urges members of this committee to support it as well.
Safety management systems provide an additional layer of assuredness to the way aviation safety is managed in Canada. They work for carriers and their passengers alike, because they imposes a standardized accountable discipline on the way companies manage their safety protocols. In short, it's a risk management type of approach.
Carriers are mandated to submit SMS plans to Transport Canada for approval. These plans are scrutinized against a very rigid set of criteria to ensure the performance plan is both comprehensive and deliverable. In fact, all of Canada's major carriers routinely use SMS today to manage their safety protocols. Bill would simply recognize and codify a safety management system that is largely in place today and working quite well.
Having briefly addressed the merits of Bill and why we think it deserves your support, let me turn to a few areas that could stand improvement. I want to start with the fundamental principle of fostering a climate of open, non-punitive reporting. This is central to the ultimate success of SMS regimes. For this reason we are concerned about the lack of protections in the bill for the integrity of safety data provided to Transport Canada.
While protections are provided to the individuals making initial reports, it is not entirely clear if those same protections are extended to carriers. In this regard, members may want to consider amending proposed section 5.39 to be clearer on this point. After all, we are most interested in identifying and mitigating safety risks as soon as possible. We must encourage companies and individuals alike to be open and transparent about their reporting. This is relevant, not out of concern that real safety issues might get buried, but that eventually over time marginal issues might start to not be identified, especially if a given operator has recently been signalled out for issues that ultimately turn out to be insignificant.
We want all operators from the biggest to the smallest to be as forthcoming as possible about all issues. We don't want to create a situation where individuals may choose to not report, out of concern that it might be held against them.
More broadly, we'd also like to see stricter definitions in this bill. That same proposed section 5.39 refers to integrated management systems. The following provisions chart a very clear and prescriptive course for managing a safety management system. For that reason, integrated management systems should be changed to refer to safety management systems. Bill is designed to deal with safety management; why not just say so?
We would also like to comment on the recent debate surrounding the prospective lack of inspections. Let me assure this committee that rather than using SMS as a means by which to avoid inspections, ATAC is proposing that the data collection provisions called for in Bill be amended to require on-site gathering by Transport Canada inspectors.
Provisions that require carriers to submit SMS reports to the department by methods such as email are simply not acceptable. In our view, it compromises the integrity of the data and adds an unnecessary and non-value-added layer to the reporting process. Our members welcome and encourage the direct involvement of Transport Canada in this respect.
Again we encourage members of this committee to consider amending proposed section 5.39 to require on-site data inspection by Transport Canada, rather than requiring carriers to submit it electronically or otherwise. Such a move would ensure the integrity of safety data and foster a direct working relationship between carriers and the regulator.
This issue of data integrity is also the basis for another concern we have with the legislation, namely the lack of clarity surrounding the relationship between this bill and other regulatory frameworks. These include the workplace occupational health and safety regulations, the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board, and even access-to-information laws. In short, we want to ensure that safety data is used by and for safety professionals for the express purpose of improving aviation safety and that the use of such data is consistently applied across government departments.
Again, our perspective on this issue is grounded in our desire to foster a climate of fulsome, open reporting. Safety information must be given priority and protection. For that reason, we're asking members to consider amending the act to exclude the use of aviation safety data for any purpose other than aviation safety. From the perspective of the Access to Information Act and the relationship with the Canada Transportation Accident Investigation Safety Board, we must stress that we have no concern about final reports being made available following a full investigation. However, this has to be undertaken with proper care to avoid needlessly implicating individuals or companies involved.
Indeed, full, fair, and frank investigations are in everyone's interest. What is in no one's interest, however, is to have piecemeal, unaudited information being put into the public domain. This has the potential to cause inappropriate and needless worry among the travelling public and to discourage front-line staff from fully disclosing safety concerns.
If SMS is going to be as effective as possible in fostering a climate of non-punitive open reporting, we must ensure the integrity of the information. The theme of protecting the integrity of the safety data is also broadly applicable to many provisions of the act that give the minister too much discretion in the use of the data collected by operators. Proposed paragraph 5.392(1)(c) allows the minister to disclose any data that he deems relevant in the context of a licence suspension. Proposed section 5.394 allows the minister to enter into any agreement with operators without the use of data from flight data recorders or for general aviation safety purposes. And proposed subsection 5.397(1) allows the minister or his designate to use any aviation data for any purpose they consider necessary for aviation data.
In each of these cases, we think it appropriate for Transport Canada to define in the legislation the circumstances under which aviation data will and won't be used. If, for instance, carriers are assured that commercially sensitive competitive information will be excluded from such uses, these clauses become much more palatable.
In short, the best way to foster a spirit of openness and cooperation is to provide assurances of the integrity of information being requested from carriers by the regulator.
Finally, let me return to the issue of non-punitive reporting. I think we can all agree that it is much better to identify problems and get them fixed than to engage in a game of “gotcha”. From that perspective, we should be concerned about the limits imposed on the use of immunity provisions specified in section 5.396. The waiving of immunity should be based on conditions more specific than the number of times an individual uses protection within a given period of time. I would hate to see a potential safety risk go unreported because an individual has already claimed immunity for an unintentional violation within the last two years.
Let me end, Mr. Chairman, where I started. As much as we are concerned about some of the provisions in the bill, on balance it is good legislation which ought to be passed by this Parliament. This is the third incarnation of this bill, and it is time we moved forward with this important modernization of the Aeronautics Act.
With that I thank you for your time and welcome your questions.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and honourable members, thank you for allowing me to comment on Bill C-6. Before I do so, allow me to introduce the Canadian Business Aviation Association.
We've been in business for quite some time; in fact, we've been an effective advocacy organization since 1962. We currently have well over 400 members and speak for 272 companies and organizations that operate more than 500 aircraft domestically and internationally. In addition, another 150 companies are members of ours in the manufacturing and support sector of the aviation industry. The CBAA is the voice of business aviation in Canada.
We've been actively engaged throughout the extensive consultation process of amending the Aeronautics Act and have helped lead a wide-ranging group of representatives from government and industry to craft a progressive and modern document. The amendments to the act incorporate proactive and proven management practices, organizational flexibility, broad-based accountability, and a non-punitive reporting system, all of which are designed to improve aviation safety and efficiency.
Of particular interest and importance are the safety management concept and its explicit and comprehensive process for managing risk. The safety management system, or SMS, embeds organization-wide accountability and actions to preclude accidental losses and establishes proactive management tools to identify and control risks prior to their occurrence. It is a documented process that integrates operations and technical systems with the management of financial and human resources to ensure aviation safety.
In conjunction with Transport Canada Civil Aviation, the CBAA has helped lead the aviation industry in the design, development, and implementation of safety management systems, and the creation of performance-based standards for aircraft operators specifically under Canadian Aviation Regulations part VI, subpart 4. To break that down into another more meaningful definition, perhaps, it captures those operators or owners who are operating turbine-powered pressurized aircraft and carrying passengers that are non-commercial.
The CBAA program is supported by all of the 272 CAR section 604 operators. Its recognized advantages are greater organizational participation in aviation safety, increased operational flexibility and effectiveness, and improved administrative efficiency.
CBAA members have more than four years' experience using safety management systems and collectively endorse this method of managing risk. In our assessment, the CBAA program and the use of SMS has enhanced aviation safety for business aircraft operators, eliminated red tape, and reduced administrative costs. During this same period, it should not go unnoticed that business aviation in Canada has grown at an annual rate of 15% to 18%; that is, in the last four years, we’vet doubled our size.
The Canadian aviation community is a world leader in advancing safety initiatives, and Canadian officials, at least in part, have successfully influenced the International Civil Aviation Organization and other national aviation bodies to endorse and implement the concept of safety management systems. SMS will become an international tool in the identification and management of risk.
It should also be noted that 11 national or regional business aviation associations worldwide, representing more than 14,000 business aircraft operators, have sanctioned the Montreal-based International Business Aviation Council's program called International Standards for Business Aircraft Operators. IS-BAO mirrors the CBAA program. It is founded on a safety management system and uses performance-based standards. Such widespread use and recognition of SMS clearly demonstrates its value.
Mr. Chairman, in all respects the CBAA supports the proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to all.
Teamsters Canada is a labour organization with more than 125,000 members. Teamsters Canada represents workers in many sectors, including all areas of transport, air, rail, road, and ports, and also in other sectors, such as retail, motion pictures, breweries, soft drinks, construction, dairy, warehousing. We're also affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which has 1.5 million members across North America. We thank this committee for allowing us to participate in the review of .
Most of the bill appears to be housekeeping or updating of the current legislation, bringing it up to current requirements. Though there may be some need for improvements, our comments will be limited to those areas of the bill that in our opinion may overreach the goal of the legislation, affecting the safety and security of the industry.
The management systems proposed by the bill, one would think, are best corporate practices that do not need legislative approval. As a vision, however, we have concerns that proposals are not inconsequential and may lead to unsatisfactory results. The management system legislative framework will be fleshed out by regulation, a regulatory process that is heavily influenced by both the transport department's policy promoting efficiency and the economy, and the application of a so-called “smart regulatory process”. This legislation may lead to effective deregulation, self-regulation; if that's desired, then the legislation should clearly state it.
It has been claimed that the airline industry would never do anything to compromise safety and security—the legislation regulatory process under this bill will certainly test that premise—and claims the industry does not need prescriptive rules. Indeed, the pressures of the market and the bottom line would never produce a car that blew up, tires that blew out, materials that caused illnesses, prescription drugs that did more harm than good, or companies that push workers beyond what biology allows.
We have prescriptive rules in place because it is a company's job to make money and the government's job to govern. One does not let the fox look after the chicken coop. Canadians deserve to know that the government is responsible for the safety and security of the public. No matter what the legislation, if an incident occurs, it will not be the CEO of a company or representative of an industry association who will bear the brunt; ministers do, because that's what members of Parliament demand, and that's what the Canadian public demands.
Paragraph 4.9(v) would permit fatigue management procedures. Again, one would expect that management of fatigue involves best corporate practices that do not need legislative approval. Clearly, fatigue is not just another safety and security risk that can be managed. Each sector in the transportation industry may have different processes or needs to function in their market niche. However, the biology of workers does not change, nor does the need for prescriptive rules to ensure that minimum standards apply. Standards that comply with sleep science, not the needs of the industry, are the bottom line of companies.
Hours of service of flight attendants was derailed under the existing regulatory process. The science is being ignored and minimum safeguards are not in place now, and we feel it may be more difficult to achieve if the legislation passes unchanged. The issue of hours of service for transportation workers was dealt with in the Arthurs report on part III of the Canada Labour Code. We agree with the recommendations that Labour Canada should participate or take the lead for setting hours of work for transportation workers. Flight attendants and all workers in the aviation industry deserve the same rights as any workers—health and sanitation breaks, breaks between assignments, time to eat.
Rotational shifts and fatigue are not just safety and security risks to manage. The current regulatory process examined how it affects the planes in operation, and not how it affects workers' lives and their health and safety. We disagree with that approach. These issues are fundamental health and safety workplace issues governed by the Canada Labour Code, and it should not be that if one chooses to work in the transportation industry, they do not apply.
We leave it to the committee to imagine where will take us. We're not always comfortable with the current regulatory process, though we will admit at times it does make sense and outcomes can be achieved that are mutually satisfactory to all in the industry. We are certain Canadians will not be comfortable with where Bill C-6 may lead. Teamsters Canada submits that this bill needs some work before it is passed.
Thank you, and I'm ready for any questions you may have.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I start, there's something I want to put on the record, if you don't mind.
There was a story in The Canadian Press last Thursday about a Transport Canada official trying to restrict committee witnesses. In it, Mr. Julian and Monsieur Laframboise are quoted, and that's fine. I was also interviewed for that story, yet what I said does not appear. I don't know if it was the reporter or an editor; however, whatever that may be, I thought it should be on the record. It wasn't very newsworthy, I recognize that, but what I said was that the allegations that were made vis-à-vis a senior Transport Canada official were just that. This committee had indicated that it would ask that individual to appear again, and until that appearance before committee and the chance for that individual to give his side of the story, I thought best that we should hold off on our judgment. That is what I said to the reporter. That was not reported.
I thought it was important enough to be put on the record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your indulgence.
Before I go to questions, there are two requests. There are many requests outstanding, Mr. Chairman.
First, I'd ask for a note on what are the current legal and regulatory underpinnings of the SMS. I think that information might be timely if we could get it soon, before the break, for sure.
Secondly, Transport Canada was to offer us the bill as it is, the law as it is, plus the bill, and how they overlap. We still haven't seen that. Now, when the witness committed to giving us that, it wasn't that they had to prepare it; it was a document they already had. So I'm just wondering what's taking so long to get it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barone, you made a series of suggestions and expressed serious concerns on amendments to the bill before us. In the preparatory work that has gone on for a decade, I gather, for this version or previous ones that may or may not be the same—I haven't verified that—I presume you've been consulted by Transport Canada officials, or you've had a chance to discuss with them your concerns. Is my presumption correct?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, sirs, for joining us today.
My first question is directed to you, Mr. Facette. I'm not opposed to the safety management system. In my view, the industry needs to take responsibility for its operations and this is one way to achieve that end. However, I do have a problem with one thing, and that's the whole inspection system in place to ensure the efficient operation of the safety management system. It's a matter of balance. I'm surprised to see that you are in favour of the safety management system. Things are going well for you.That's the solution.
The Canadian Federal Pilots Association had this to say about the situation:
In March 2006 Transport Canada killed the National Audit Program which covers the 8 largest airlines, the 5 largest airports and the 3 largest aircraft manufacturers in this country. The reason? To allow for regulatory oversight resources and funds to be redirected to the administration of SMS programs.
That is what has me worried. We've had our safety problems with Montreal's Trudeau Airport. Reporters are now doing the inspections to ensure that requirements are met. We've learned that since March of 2006, oversight resources at the five largest airports—and I'm assuming Montreal's Trudeau airport falls into this category—have been redirected to safety management systems. I'm not at all reassured by this revelation.
I hope you understand what I'm saying. I would have liked you to talk a little more, as Mr. Barone did somewhat, about the need to maintain an adequate surveillance and oversight system, while administering at the same time safety management systems.
Would you agree with me?
:
Thank you for the question.
It's a difficult leap to make, to go from one's perception of what an airport's responsibility is in securing the environment today to that of a safety management system. You need to compare apples to apples. I don't know that the comparison is quite there just yet.
The airport responsibility of security is not 100%. What we're talking about here is an evolution of aviation safety and taking it to a whole new level where people on the ground who are working at an airport have a system in place that they can trust, that they can provide information into that can improve the system. So we're also talking about an additional way of making the regulatory environment improve safety over and above where it is today, at a quite high level.
We're confident that the people who work on the front lines at airports have the ability to participate in that kind of system, to ensure that airports are safe, when the proper regulations and the proper environment exist. Comparing it to security at an airport today where the lines are at varying points, they're drawn very differently than they are in anything else, because an airport is not responsible for all measures of security. There are certain things that an airport authority can and cannot do for airport security, so it's a difficult leap to make.
So we would argue that while there are some improvements that need to be made, including to this bill—and we've outlined some very specific improvements in our detailed submission, which will be distributed later—the parallel to security is a little bit difficult to make at this time.
:
Thank you very much for taking the time to be here, gentlemen.
Bear with me; my first question is quite long, but I think it describes what might be happening. I'll ask Mr. Benson initially to respond and also get your comments.
We have seen how Air Canada Jazz mechanics have exposed dangerous practices that have put the lives of 80,000 Canadians at risk over the last five years due to near misses. The airline has allowed an average of one flight a week to take off, even with serious mechanical problems. We have also seen how four Air Canada Jazz mechanics were suspended last year for highlighting dangerous practices by the airline concerned, after their complaints to Transport Canada yielded no results.
At their last press conference, Canada's aviation inspectors released a Pollara survey indicating that two and three aviation inspectors believed that Transport Canada's SMS system supported by Bill will increase risk to the system, and 80% of Canada's most experienced inspectors say it will prevent them from correcting safety problems before they happen. They have also exposed the fact that a lack of whistle-blower protection in Bill will not provide protection to whistle-blowers from a punitive environment and will increase the safety deficit.
We're assuming the inspectors know their trade. What they said is common sense. By handing oversight exclusively to industry associations and airline companies and leaving the determination of appropriate risk levels in the hands of the airlines, inspectors will no longer be able to assess if what they see on paper is reflected in reality, on-site. As we have seen, workers will have even less protection if they blow the whistle.
Do you agree with what the inspectors are saying? If so, what would you propose as counterweights as part of a balanced approach to fix the problems? Mr. Benson, you mentioned you have other recommendations of what needs to be done. Gentlemen, please feel free to comment on this.
I can't comment on the media reports, other than what is in the media reports. Obviously, we're always concerned when the safety of an operation is questioned, as our members fly those planes and deal with them, and of course we like to minimize it.
The major issue with the bill is the process by which the regulations are set. At the end of the day, if we have a process whereby the regulations are set because companies want it, we end up with a situation where they are self-regulating. There are a whole bunch of issues for which we would not have a concern. I agree if it's a silly regulation, something is green, not black, or not blue, it's irrelevant. But when it comes to affecting the health and safety of workers, when it comes to issues or the assumption that companies will always do what's best for everybody's safety, the reason we have prescriptive rules is that this has proven not to be the case.
In this case, prescriptive rules surrounding health and safety concerns of workers, safety in the workplace, and the safety of the travelling public, we have no confidence at all that a proper box is going to be built around these rules to ensure that the government and the transport department have the necessary oversight to ensure that indeed the travelling public is safe, and that our members are safe.
On the issue of the health of workers, the Arthurs report was quite clear about that. Currently, Transport Canada's goal in efficiency and economy, basically the corporate bottom line, means that the scales are not balanced. Under the Canada Labour Code, when it comes to workers and their needs, it is balanced. We have to look at what's good for the economy and the efficiency of corporations.
We're all for companies making money, but at the same time we have to balance both social concerns and the health and safety concerns contained in the code. We're not convinced at all under these particular proceedings or these particular processes. In fact, our experience has been exactly the opposite, that it has not been dealt with properly and adequately. If we roll forward, our concern for the travelling public and also for parliamentarians is we're not sure the minister is going to maintain the oversight they should. We do not have total confidence in the process and we take part in it every time we can.
Thank you.
:
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I would just say, Mr. Chairman, to the committee member, that you should be careful about the use of the word “exclusively”, because nowhere in the act does it say, in our reading of it, that the powers would be given exclusively to anyone. As we outlined earlier, there is still an opportunity for the minister to intervene at the appropriate time, and the proper mechanisms are in place to do so. So that doesn't go away. That is just as a point of clarity.
I'd also like to make it very clear that we have put forward a position that this is going to enhance safety. It will provide for the ability of people to make things safer.
We agree, and we outline it in detail in our presentation, that there are some issues, and changes need to be made, in the whole area of confidentiality and information so you can ensure that the information can be provided and that people on the front line can make things safer. But you should be careful to characterize in the debate that designated organizations cannot do things as safely or better than they are done today, because that's just, honestly, misrepresenting what is the intent of the act.
:
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I want to clarify for the committee that this is not a back-of-the-envelope approach we have here. Aviation SMS are well established throughout the world, and they're carefully designed to look at the realities of our industry in terms of how we do business.
Moreover, we are very proud of our safety record. Even according to Transport Canada's safety data, we're among the best in the world, and it's getting better. We're not asking for anyone's trust when it comes to safety. We actually welcome the scrutiny, Mr. Chairman. We are, as an industry, one of the most tightly and highly regulated industries in Canada and in the world, and when it comes to safety, rightly so. Bill simply introduces better discipline. It codifies and entrenches, actually, the concerns about punitive and non-punitive reporting, and we want that codified.
Moreover, for us as an industry, safety is not a cost, it's an investment. Right now, we are using SMS. What we're saying is that this bill codifies it in a cost-neutral way. It also codifies some other concerns that the honourable member has brought up, Mr. Chairman.
:
That's not the issue. I'm not raising that; what I'm raising is simply that fatigue is a safety issue, fatigue is a security issue, but fatigue is not just another safety and security issue to be managed by a management process.
There is biology; there is science. There are diktats that say there are rules that cannot be broken. Within those rules, you can set things like hours of service and how people work—so, yes, it is a safety and security issue.
When people are fatigued, if they're sick, if they're ill, it is a safety and security issue. When one of our members is lying on the floor, hurt, on a plane, the question going through from the pilots, because of the 9/11 rules, is whether they should go back to help her or not. The Canada Labour Code says if you get hurt on the job, you're supposed to be able to get aid. Under the security rules, the question becomes whether there is any potential damage to the plane.
Well, this is part of the process we're talking about that creates these rules. There is need for not having a wide-open box. We say prescriptive rules—and as you know, Teamsters Canada is not obstructive at these meetings. We're quite open to changes that make sense to our employers so that they can be more efficient and create more work, but there are lines to be drawn, and this bill doesn't take it into account.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm always a little concerned about how SMS programs are monitored. By the way, I want my colleagues to understand that I am in favour of such systems. The problem lies in how to improve oversight.
Mr. Gage, you stated in your presentation that SMS programs would eliminate bureaucracy and reduce costs. That worries me because Transport Canada did the very same thing. It cut costs. Consider Mr. Watson's graph. Since 2004 , Transport Canada has reduced staff levels and the number of inspectors. If we follow the curve, we see that the number of inspectors increased after September 2001, but is now dropping.
Earlier, Mr. Barone said that the number of inspectors on staff had remained steady. You may think that's true, but in reality, there are fewer of them on the job right now. Transport Canada's goal is to reduce the numbers further. Our job is to ensure that your operations are closely monitored.
Earlier, Mr. Gage, you didn't answer my colleague's question. He wanted to know how often members of your association were subject to an inspection. You told me that your organization had been inspected once, but that another inspection was scheduled to take place soon, within the coming days or months. You told me that you were scheduled to undergo a real inspection.
A voice: An evaluation.
Mr. Mario Laframboise: An evaluation, an audit. That worries me, because evaluations were supposed to be done more often, at shorter intervals. You issue operating licenses to pilots. That's cause for concern, Mr. Gage. I want you and my colleagues to clearly understand what I'm saying. The department is buying tanks, aircraft and helicopters and cutting inspection budgets for civil aviation. I have a problem with that.
:
First of all, Mr. Chairman, I think we're mixing some of our responsibility with Transport Canada's responsibility. Airworthiness is solely the responsibility of Transport Canada. We're not issuing any airworthiness certificates at all.
Our role is purely on the operational side. We provide operational certificates. Operators operate the aircraft within the bounds of the operating parameters. It's nothing to do with airworthiness, nothing to do with maintenance, and nothing to do with other parts of the Transport Canada regulatory structure and Transport Canada's oversight. Our role is limited to that.
I would suggest that two assessments over a four-year period are reasonable for Transport Canada to consider what we're doing and how we're doing it. This is new ground for everybody. This is a cultural change we've embarked on.
In addition to the more informal inspections, there has been routine communication with officials at Transport Canada, at both the staff level and at the president and CEO's level. In my view, there is more than adequate oversight on what we're doing, both from a formal and an informal perspective.
But in terms of the airworthiness activity, that is not our responsibility whatsoever. That is purely a Transport Canada function. They will continue to provide that function the same way they did before.
My response, though, to the efficiency issue is that there are two pieces of red tape here. There's the government element, which I'm not going to respond to; someone else can. But in terms of us delivering service to the members, there's certainly an improvement over what it was when government provided that service. In terms of service to the membership and service to the operator, there are efficiencies.
:
Thank you, Mr. Laframboise. I think it's an excellent comment.
My friend just stated that there are executives and boards of directors, and their presentation made it clear that part of the reason we have some of these prescriptive rules, whether there are too many in here or not, and the reason we have a box around almost everything that happens is this. At the end of the day, it's not a CEO, it's none of my friends—and they are all colleagues here from the various associations I deal with on a regular level—it's the minister, it's you, it's this House of Commons. We're not convinced there's enough box or enough envelope around this particular process and structure that they put forward so that this is in fact going to happen. We have concerns as well. Perhaps they'll be able to address them or deal with them, perhaps not, but that's the question we raised. It's the simple concern, at the end of the day, that our members have a right to travel safely—they're the ones who would get hurt initially—that the public has a right to travel safely, that we have a right to security. The people of Canada have to know that it's not associations or the head of a company, it's the government, it's the transport department, it's the minister. It's the way our Parliament works. We're not totally confident that this bill will in fact ensure that this continues.
Our further concern is that the goal is to roll out the SMS and SEMS systems throughout all the transportation industry. Rail—we know some of the problems there. In some ways, my message to members of Parliament is that we're not opposed to this going forward with the correct box around it, but it's the importance of getting it right, because if this is rolled out wrongly, it might roll out wrongly for a whole bunch of the transportation industry. Therefore, it might be worthy of the members to take a bit more time with the bill to really ensure that it is going to do it properly, sufficiently, to address your concerns.
Thank you for the question. I think that was very helpful.
Before I start, too bad he's gone, but my honourable colleague Jeff kind of made light of my last question, and I'd like to say that this is safety—serious business. And we're not in question period. All of our questions are valid.
Ed mentioned self-regulation, and I'd like to pursue this with Mr. Gage.
Your association is a leader in SMS. You're blazing new trails in aviation. You've been working with Transport Canada for some time, studying a new approach. According to information posted on your website, you've been working with Transport Canada on this since before the year 2000.
There's a very interesting report on your website, co-sponsored by you and Transport Canada. It's called “Self-Regulation of Business Aviation in Canada: Analysis of the Feasibility of Adopting a Self-Regulation Model for Business Aviation in Canada”. It would seem to be the launch point for your association to assume responsibility for licensing and safety oversight.
Would you characterize business aviation in Canada as being self-regulated? Also, would you say that the SMS system approach was one of the foundations at the start of business aviation self-regulation?
The study was initiated in 1998-99. It was a feasibility study. The terminology “self-regulation” was used for a period of time, but as a result of that feasibility study, and then a second-phase study, it was quite clear that it was not the terminology we should be using, nor was it the process toward which we were working. We were certainly working toward an administrative and management responsibility, but it certainly wasn't self-regulation. Some two or three years after that feasibility study was initiated, we in fact changed the terminology and have not used “self-regulation” for at least five or six years.
The safety management system is the foundation of the concept by which we help manage our community. It's a system that emerged as a result of the work we were doing through the feasibility study. It was something that James Reason and others have academically put together. I would suggest that our work is probably one of the forerunners of actually implementing a safety management system. There's a lot of academic material out there, but we have some first-hand experience with that.
As with any other management process, it continues to be a work in progress. To this point, we would be complimentary of the system but recognizing that it is cultural change and recognizing that there's a fairly substantial amount of training that is required. In fact, one of our new initiatives is to conduct training such that our community is better trained, more knowledgeable about SMS, and therefore more capable of actually using it to its full extent.