:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Bon après-midi à tous. Good afternoon, everybody.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure, and Communities for its study of Bill C-6, proposed legislation to amend the Aeronautics Act.
This act establishes the responsibility of the Minister of Transport for civil aeronautical activities and responsibility of the Minister of National Defence for military aeronautical activities. The legislation, which completed second reading in the House on November 7, 2006, contributes to Transport Canada's ongoing commitment to enhancing the safety of the national transportation system.
I'll outline for you today some of the key elements of the legislation, the content of which is very technical in nature.
Canada is one of the safest aviation systems in the world. This enviable record is due in part to the safety regulations that focus on accident prevention. Transport Canada's role is to provide the sound regulatory base on which the system operates. The department has a responsibility to have the tools in place to actively improve upon the safety performance of the industry. The aviation industry is increasingly global, and while globalization creates new opportunities for air transportation users and providers, it also highlights the need for a competitive business environment, for greater harmonization of standards and regulations, and for smarter regulations. To remain competitive globally, the industry must continue to improve its safety performance.
Regulating smarter is a phrase that is often used and involves continually improving regulations, better managing the regulatory process, and recognizing the shared responsibility of governments, citizens, and industry in making the system more effective. The result is less prescriptive regulations that are in line with the rules of other regulatory agencies, both within Canada and internationally, and meaningful consultations with wide reach to both industry and the public. In practical terms, this means regulations that impose rules that are more focused on safety results, with fewer interventions and that are designed, where appropriate, to give industry the flexibility to be innovative in meeting those outcomes.
The changes proposed to the act are reflective of the new strategies being implemented to regulate aviation safety but provide explicit enabling authority for newly evolved safety and regulatory initiatives such as safety management systems, considered an important component of regulating smarter.
Safety management systems will make a safe system even safer, while at the same time strengthening partnerships with industries by clearly setting out roles, authorities, and accountabilities, while ensuring high standards for transportation safety and reflecting the evolving role of government. This bill is the work of leading safety experts and international bodies that have been advocating that greater attention be paid to aviation safety at the human and organizational factors level. This means that problems, hazards, incidents, and accidents are not only reported, but the associated risks are analyzed and appropriate actions taken to prevent their recurrence.
Canada is among the world leaders in this area. Our American counterparts in the Federal Aviation Administration have also recognized the need to dig deeper to change our culture from one of diagnostics to one of prognostics. What this means is that we are moving away from just being reactive following accidents to becoming proactive by anticipating potential problems before they evolve into accidents.
It's important to note that the enabling authority for the safety management system regulations is valid and authorized under the existing act. However, for greater clarification and to provide additional statutory protections, the department is proposing to expand the minister's authority under the act with legislative amendments.
The proposal also includes, amongst others, new regulation-making authorities such as those respecting fatigue management and increased penalties for administrative proceedings and summary convictions. It is important to bring the level of penalties in line with other current legislation, since these penalties were last reviewed over 20 years ago.
Amendments to the Canadian aviation regulations that came into force in June 2005 require aviation organizations to implement safety management systems as part of an approach to improving safety risk management in the aviation sector. This is not self-regulation,and it is not deregulation; it is actually an additional layer of regulation, i.e., more regulation, to enhance the work Transport Canada continues to do through its oversight program. With safety management systems, operators must still comply with all the current regulations and standards, and Transport Canada can, and will, continue to take enforcement action when necessary.
Transport Canada's team of over 800 inspectors works with Canadian air operators, aircraft maintenance organizations, manufacturers, airport operators, and air navigation service providers to maintain the safety of our aviation system. These inspectors are well trained through the department's robust mandatory training program with specified courses and on-the-job training.
In a safety management systems environment, the role of inspectors becomes even more important, in that intervention is at the systems level rather than at the operational level. This means that systems put in place to ensure personnel competency, sound maintenance and engineering, and safe operations will be subject to assessment and validation, and the consequences of systems failures will be more dramatic and will potentially result in suspension of the operating certificates.
This is a clear manifestation of the change in the accountability framework, whereby certificate holders will be required to take ownership of the safety of their operation and become more accountable for their activities. However, the capability of inspectors who intervene at the operational level will continue to exist. In fact, deficiencies discovered at the systems level would warrant intervention at the operational level through audits and inspections. This change of accountability framework does not alter in any way Transport Canada's ultimate responsibility for providing the safety oversight of all certificate holders operating in a national air transportation system.
The bill before you today establishes a legislative framework for a voluntary, non-punitive reporting program under the act, including the appropriate confidentiality and enforcement protections. Transport Canada, with the strong support of most stakeholders, is of the view that the establishment of a voluntary reporting program under the Aeronautics Act will enhance aviation safety. Through the program, the department will have access to aviation information that would not otherwise be accessible. The information will be used to revise regulatory requirements and to develop promotional and educational materials. Individuals and companies will benefit by having access to and receiving additional safety information, including that on best practices and lessons learned.
Consultation has been very important during the development of this legislation, as it is for the development of all aviation regulations. The bill before the committee today is the result of extensive consultations with stakeholders through the Canadian Aviation Regulatory Advisory Council, which began in 2000. The council's prime objective is to assess and recommend potential regulatory changes through cooperative rule-making activities concerning the full range of Transport Canada's civil aviation regulatory mandate.
Stakeholders, including all major organizations and associations, have been involved in this consultation and are generally supportive of the amendments.
I look forward to responding to any questions the committee may have. I'm at your disposal in this regard, as are my officials. Thank you.
[Translation]
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.
I am Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Laplante. I am the Chief Flight Safety Investigator at the Directorate of Flight Safety at National Defence and I thank you for allowing to make some introductory remarks to this committee on the proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act. I would first like to say that these amendments are critical for the continued success of the Canadian Forces Flight Safety Program and the department's Airworthiness Program because they will allow us to correct multiple deficiencies that presently exist.
[English]
The director of flight safety, Colonel Shelley, is responsible for maintenance and implementation of the Canadian Forces flight safety program. Colonel Shelley, my boss, unfortunately had to be away today on flight safety duties.
Our flight safety program is a very successful program that deals with prevention, safe behaviour, and protocols for occurrence investigation. It has been in existence for more than sixty years and has been used by several other countries as a model for the development of their own programs.
The sole purpose of the flight safety program is to identify aviation safety deficiencies in military aviation matters and to make recommendations to eliminate or reduce such deficiencies. It is very important to note that our investigations are not used for disciplinary or administrative purposes.
Recent changes to the way air force operations and training are supported have led to a serious gap in the legal authorities for the investigation of military aviation safety matters when civilians are involved. The amendments would fix this gap. As you may know, civilian contractors are becoming more and more engaged in our air operations and training, with activities ranging from major maintenance overhauls on our aircraft to the long-term lease of Canadian-owned aircraft at the NATO Flying Training Centre, in Moose Jaw. Those are two examples.
The National Defence Act provides legal authority in respect of persons subject to the Code of Service Discipline, and lawful orders may be given to ensure the cooperation of military personnel involved in military aviation accident investigations. However, the National Defence Act does not generally apply to civilians, and certainly not in this context.
I must also point out that the civilian Transportation Safety Board is prohibited, by its enabling legislation, from investigating military aviation accidents unless the situation involves a separate civilian aviation facility or a non-military airplane. The investigation must then be coordinated with the Department of National Defence.
While we are responsible under the Aeronautics Act for military flight safety investigation, military investigators have no legal means of obtaining information from civilians and civilian contractors involved in military aircraft accidents. This responsibility cannot be exercised by the Transportation Safety Board because the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act precludes them from investigating strictly military aircraft accidents.
Another related problem is our inability to obtain certain information critical to flight safety investigations, specifically from civilian companies and next of kin. Civilian companies provide a wealth of technical data and next of kin provide human factor data unavailable from any other source.
Ideally, we would also like to request that these organizations and individuals review preliminary draft investigation reports for their input. However, there is currently no penalty for unauthorized or premature release of information during the consultation process of the investigation. Since early release of investigation reports can compromise the investigation, we are very reluctant to conduct this kind of consultation, in fear of untimely release of incomplete or inaccurate information.
The lack of information can also be very traumatic for next of kin, because in complex investigations that last years in some cases, they do not receive timely updates on the investigation until it is complete. This, too, is based upon the possibility of untimely release of information.
These release problems will be solved by the provisions of the amendment that will make unauthorized release of investigation information contrary to the Aeronautics Act. This will allow us to share preliminary information during the consultation phase of the investigation process, with confidence that it will not be released.
The new part II of the Aeronautics Act will give military investigators appropriate powers to conduct full and proper investigations into military aircraft accidents that may involve civilians. Military investigators will be thoroughly trained in respect of all aspects of their new powers before being allowed to exercise these powers. As the new powers are similar to those currently set out in the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act for the Transportation Safety Board, the private sector involved in aviation matters in Canada should be very familiar with their application.
The amendments will also encourage voluntary reporting by protecting the identity of persons who report. And the amendments will also facilitate the sharing of information with the Transportation Safety Board, for coordinated investigations, since both offices will have the same obligations to protect privileged information.
Lastly, the proposed legislation will obligate the Department of National Defence to publicly release the final flight safety investigation, to ensure the public of an open, independent investigation process. We have been doing this on our own initiative since 2003, as a normal practice for all final investigation reports.
In conclusion, the proposed amendments are critical to improving the ability of the Canadian Forces to ensure the safety of the men and women in the military aviation community, civilians involved in military aviation, and the general public.
I will be pleased to answer any questions the members of the committee may have. I am also assisted here today by Mr. Alex Weatherston, our legal counsel at the Department of National Defence, from the legal services office, who has worked on the development of this bill.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
We're not in fact turning to the private sector. What we're doing is increasing their accountability.
As I said in my opening remarks, sir, on the safety management system requirements, those regulations are in addition to what is already there. In fact, I often say, when asked this question, that the first requirement of a safety management system is to clearly show how you're complying with the current regulations.
So it's a system that sits on top of everything that is there today. It is not a reduction regulation. It is not deregulation. It is not turning over oversight of the operations to the enterprises, whether that's Nav Canada, or the airports, or Air Canada. It's very much an additional requirement.
Our insertion point will be at the systems level so we can capture all of the issues, rather than pinpointing one or the other. If that doesn't solve the problem, we will be able to intervene in the same way we do today.
:
Okay. I haven't had a chance to speak with him, and to my knowledge he hasn't discussed any of the intricacies of the safety management systems with any of my officials. He certainly hasn't discussed it with me. So I'm not sure exactly on what basis he's making the comments he's making. But I'd be more than happy to speak with him if he wishes to do that, and we can go through it all.
The whole system, in our experience to date, is one where our impact and our integration into the company's operations is much more detailed, much more in depth than it ever was before. We are finding things through this process that were never evident with just the direct supervising of activities approach.
The whole business about more resources.... In fact, at the point of departure, when we started eight years ago to look at what was out there to improve the safety and performance, we realized...and this is also vouched for by specialists like Professor James Reason, who said to me personally that if you add more inspectors into the system without approaching the whole problem differently, the cost benefit just simply won't be there. You will not achieve a higher performance than you have right now. Our performance is second to none in the world, with the airlines as an example.
So how do you improve on our already very, very safe system? As I indicated in my opening remarks, you have to get into the human factors. It's not just the policeman on the corner who says to me, “Please don't speed, and if you speed, I will do something about that”, and then by reducing my speed, by punishing me, I will then maybe not do that next time.
:
The system on which we base our risk profile is one that's based on activity levels. So what you're referring to is that there has been an increase...well, there was a decrease as we went through the tragedy of September 11, and then an increase, and we're about back to the same levels we were at on September 11, through that period. I don't know exactly what the numbers are, but there has been no calculated reduction in personnel. So I would suggest that what you're indicating to me would be a perception that because we've had these consistent increases, somehow we haven't kept pace, and I think to a large extent we have.
Of course, when you take a look at what we're trying to put in place, and without losing the capability to deal with the individual operations, by approaching this at a systems level and actually having companies that comply—and of course, if they don't, we'll be back to where we are and we'll be demanding more resources to go at them in that other compliance-based way. But if their systems work, and we have all kinds of data that's available today and will be available tomorrow to determine whether or not that's happening, we will be able to deal with growth in a very important way, because if you're looking at a system that's in place to take care of 100 pilots and it grows to 110, there is no impact on the manpower at that particular point. But again, we have to be ready, as others have said, to go back in there and take care of the problems if we're finding some shortfalls in the system.
This industry has not done this before. It's in the nuclear industry. The power generating plants have been using this for a long time, as well as Shell Oil, the oil companies, to avoid the big spills, and it's the same thing with the chemical industry. So we're taking this step by step, using what their experience is and our experience and building on that.
As I mentioned, our friends to the south are now embarking on this, and so is the international civil aviation authority, as a regulatory requirement.
So, yes, we're a little bit ahead of some countries, but this is not a new idea, and it's certainly not one where the idea only sits here in Transport Canada and Canada.
:
We had a tragedy in British Columbia that you're aware of, of course, and that was with the ferries.
I have a document here, a sworn statement by the former director of safety, health, and environment at BC Ferries, Mr. Darin Bowland. As you are aware, BC Ferries has had a safety management system in place for some time. Yet, according to Mr. Bowland, BC Ferries was plagued by rampant safety problems. He believes these deficiencies led to the sinking of the Queen of the North and the death of two passengers.
In an era when Transport Canada has a hands-off sort of approach and air operators or regulators are now forced to rely on the good graces of airlines to police themselves or turn themselves in, the first question is, aren't you afraid that your plans to go back out of aviation safety oversight and rely on safety management systems, or SMS, with its self-reporting and non-enforcement, will create similar conditions in aviation?
Secondly, could you please tell me and the committee what kind of comparison Transport Canada has done with other safety management systems in Canada and around the world?
Lastly, how does the safety management system that Transport Canada is proposing for aviation stake up against the safety management system, for example, that BC Ferries operates?
:
As a general comment—and again I've said this publicly quite often—if I could roll the clock back eight years, I would never have used the term “SMS”, because it has now become a buzzword.
Comparing safety management systems quite often is a comparison of apples and oranges. So I have no knowledge of what BC Ferries' SMS looks like, but I will tell you that it may or may not be the same as what we have here.
The other thing that comes into play when you are talking about the comparisons of safety management systems and how we've compared them otherwise is, what exactly are the bases or the principles they're using? You will find some divergence there.
When we built this system—and as I mentioned, we started eight years ago with the experts at the time, such as Dr. James Reason, who came to our executive—we spent three days looking at all the options and then we built on that, looking at what the chemical industry has. They have a very good reputation.
I think the oil industry certainly has a good reputation. In fact, we've taken the advice of people who work for Shell, dealing with the SMS that Shell demands. For example, if you wanted to contract your aircraft to Shell Oil, you'd have to demonstrate a certain safety management system. Again, the requirements are somewhat less stringent than ours, but it would give you all the basic principles.
So we're quite confident that what we have is as demanding as anything that's out there. We believe we're taking a step-by-step approach to it, so that if we are picking up errors and problems with the system, we'll be able to correct them before there are any downstream effects. Even the regulations that were put in place a year and a half ago are not active. In other words, what we've done is to say, “Okay, this is your starting point”, and then we put in place an implementation of two or three years, again so we can watch what's going on. So far, the results have been positive.
I'm actually going to pursue pretty much the same line of questioning, just so I understand it. First of all, we have one of the safest, if not the safest, aviation systems in the world. Is that correct? And we're actually going to take that safest aviation system in the world and those regulations and leave them as is--actually, make some improvements to them--and then put another layer on top of that, this SMS system.
Coming from northern Alberta, I know that many of the plant sites in that area have a safety management system and an emergency response crew, etc. They seem to brag a lot about them, and they've had them for some period of time. So I was curious when you mentioned Shell Oil. I think they even have one in their Albion plant up there.
I understand as well that this act is going to bring in some more tools to force compliance or in essence more regulatory tools to make sure that they do follow the letter of the law. Is that correct? Everything from a letter of warning, more or less, to a restriction of operations is...
I'd like to shift gears a bit from a broad view of this legislation to something more specific. I was pleased to see that clause 17 of the bill addresses the whole issue of the removal of natural growth. I believe it's going to affect sections 5.82, 5.83, 5.84, and 5.85. This certainly affects my community, which is home to the Abbotsford Airport. They've raised the issue of trying to get the removal of trees and other growth that impairs air traffic movement done on a timely basis.
They raised three concerns.The first was having a legislative framework that actually provides a clear mandate to do that; the bill does that, and I'm very pleased with that.
The second is that it also gives clarity as to who covers the cost. Obviously the airports don't want to pay for it, but the legislation makes it clear that it's the airport's responsibility.
The third aspect is the issue of how we're going to actually get this done. We have a significantly large bureaucracy that is already probably somewhat overburdened and has some very serious issues to grapple with--security and safety. Are we now going to have federal bureaucrats continually monitoring and engaging in negotiating agreements with owners of properties that are adjacent to airports, getting those agreements signed, and giving notices where required? Is there a better way, perhaps by devolving some of those authorities by way of delegations or by way of a memorandum of understanding to the local airports themselves, so that when they have a problem, they've been given notice? That way, when they've got a problem, they can act immediately.
My experience has been, especially with some of the smaller and community-owned airports, that the members of the airport authorities have relationships with the property owners around the airport. They have relationships with the individuals who would do the tree-topping and the removal of trees. Is that something you have given some thought to--how we can make this more efficient and allow the local community to take some ownership in this and get it done in a timely fashion?
:
I want to go back to my initial question. I have nothing against the safety management system, but the problem, to my mind, is that you are creating an organized system that will apply to small companies. I think that it can work for large corporations, and I am convinced that you have the inspectors you need to show up any time at Air Transat or Air Canada and ensure that everything is in order.
The problem with this bill is that you are organizing smaller companies into safety management systems. If they are unable to do so themselves, you create designated organizations that will organize the sector. So you are creating an organized system.
To my mind, the dubious aspect concerns the monitoring of this system, which must always be done by Transport Canada. You say that you will be doing more inspections than in the past. We will see what other witnesses have to say about that. For the time being, that is what you are saying, and I am not sure that it is the case. I know that you have reduced your inspectors' training budgets. That is the problem.
I do not have a problem with organizing the system, with delegating to organizations that will take responsibility for a sector, but you must have the staff necessary to inspect any company, from the smallest to the largest, at any time. Having the industry organize itself and set up safety management systems is one thing, but if there isn't anyone I trust to ensure that they are meeting the safety standards as the population expects them to do, that is a problem.
You are organizing a system, but I am not sure that you have the staff you need to ensure that the system is better than the current one. As we speak, you have inspectors who may go, at any time, to any company to ensure it is meeting safety standards.
That is what I was saying at the outset. Because of the attacks in 2001, I would have preferred seeing a greater number of inspectors and not an organized system; let's allow, for example, Air Canada and Air Transat, through regulations, to have a safety management system, but not the smaller companies. Keep in mind that it was a smaller company that trained the pilots who crashed their aircraft into the twin towers in New York.
I have trouble accepting the idea of this system and leaving the issue of safety entirely in the hands of industry.
:
What I think has happened here is that a system is in place for the non-commercial operators. It is for the likes of Shell Canada and their flight department, for Weston Foods--for presidents in the private sector who have their own airplanes. We have a system in place now, a very successful system that has been running for more than three years, and they have to have a safety management system. In between us and the operator is an organization that has a designated authority to provide the infrastructure for the safety oversight. You're talking about the Canadian Business Aviation Association.
One of the reasons they've been so successful and have a very good safety record is the CEOs of the companies take the advice of their flight department, and they are knowledgeable of the operation. That's different from you or me buying a ticket, sir, because we basically trust in the system that's in place to assure our safety.
I've no intention to designate a company to go out to provide oversight over these small operators--not at all. That's not what's envisioned by anything in this act. That's not what we're talking about at all. We're talking about putting at least the basic principles in place at the smaller operations, the smaller airports, the smaller air operators, so that they too can start looking a little deeper into their problems to find the issues before they become accidents.
We've just completed a pilot project that included even something as small as a one-person maintenance organization to see the issues that would be coming forward if we asked for the SMS to be put in place with the smaller operators, and the results have been quite positive. The only thing that stands out in terms of the study is that, as we might expect, they're going to need more help from us to set these things up than perhaps Air Canada or Nav Canada or Pearson airport would need, because they simply don't have the expertise, the sophistication, and the infrastructure--but we would ask them to apply the same principles, albeit at a less sophisticated level in a less sophisticated process.
As I mentioned before, that's not law and that's not regulation yet in terms of the smaller operators. We're being very careful; we're not about to displace what has given us the record we have without some assurance and confidence that what we have put in place is going to do the job. This is not a tomorrow thing; this is three years or four years down the road, and with a careful implementation plan.
All I can tell you now, based on our experience--and we've been at it for quite a few years with Air Transat--is it's all positive.
There was also a question about intervention. We're not going to lose the ability to intervene as we have in the past; we just won't start there, because if the system works, then the little bits and pieces of the system will work.
Today we sample little bits and pieces of the system and we deal with that particular infraction, that particular problem with that particular person, or that particular procedure. Why not fix the whole thing? Why not develop a system through which the little thing never gets to grow, because it's identified and fixed?
That's the theory. The practice right now has been successful to this point.
:
You're referring to what you're calling a whistle-blower approach, are you not?
These provisions are far from being whistle-blower provisions. We considered a possible whistle-blower program but realized that under the safety management system we wanted a better cooperation and coordination between employers and employees, and to ensure a good safety culture and good working relationship we realized that whistle-blower provisions were not what was required.
What we're doing here is asking employers, under a set of regulations already in place, to have within their SMS system a voluntary reporting, with a non-punitive policy whereby people can report without fear of reprisal inside the company.
What we're seeing here is that if Transport happens to be auditing or assessing a company and happens to observe information reported by an employee to an employer, that information will be protected from use against either the employer or the employee for enforcement, and also under access to information, if there were....
Supposing we bring the information back to the office—and we are under the access to information purview—it's going to be protected by section 2 of the Access to Information Act. We want people to be free to report to their employer blunders they may have committed, little violations that may lead to a bigger problem. We want them to be able to fix them. That's why we say report it.
If we happen to view this when we examine and audit you, we will not use that type of thing against you and make it available. This is one part of the voluntary reporting.
Later on, in another provision, we are creating what we call a universal voluntary non-reporting program for those people who are not governed by SMS, mainly for the general aviation public or small “other aircraft” maintenance engineers or others, everybody who would want to report information of a violation that was not intentional or that is not something criminal.
There, we are emulating an American system—called the ASRS, aviation safety reporting system, in the States—that was considered very successful, to obtain safety data we would not otherwise obtain because people would not come forward to tell you they had committed a blunder and that some safety aspect was involved.
Now, with this process, the Americans have realized they are getting much information that they can put to good use. They identify it and put it to good use to help advance and improve the safety of the travelling public. That's another system.
So there are two systems there. The main purpose is to obtain as much safety data as we can obtain, because we're in a world where we need that safety data to go the extra mile. As we said earlier, it's not by giving more sanctions that aviation safety will improve.
We've been shown in the past that if you sanction someone and don't help them find the root cause for their having done something wrong, they'll never learn and will keep doing it again; whereas now, with our new systems, we want to give them the opportunity to find the root cause factor and take corrective measures themselves and not do it again. This is the way we are thinking about advancing safety.
:
The answer is that it's difficult to explain how the assessment process works. Frankly, when we go in and do an assessment, we are talking to individuals on the shop floor. We are talking to pilots in the cockpits. We are talking to flight attendants in the back. We will be asking them questions like, “How is this system working? What have you reported? What haven't you reported? Why? If you reported something, we'll follow the life cycle of that report to see if it has complied with the SMS. If you haven't reported it, that's a data point as well, but why didn't you? What's wrong? What are you afraid of?”
That's a basic premise in our assessment tool, in terms of how the reporting system or the front end of the SMS is working. There are several ways that I think that information will come to light.
Let's not forget that what we're dealing with here are the smaller issues. Once there's a major incident, this system is put aside. For example, once you get the coroner involved or the RCMP involved, or where you've hurt somebody when there's an accident, you have the safety board involved. But at that point, the SMS has failed, the whole system has failed, just as it has today.
All we're talking about here is the front-end stuff, to try to get at it before it turns into a Transportation Safety Board accident investigation or, worse still, something requiring the involvement of the coroner. That's where we see the meat.
:
For several years, a number of civilian companies have been involved in our flying operations. The situations vary greatly. In some circumstances, civilian organizations provide us with our aircraft. That is the case with Bombardier in Moose Jaw. These companies provide the aircraft and maintain it, whereas on our side, we provide the pilots and train them on the aircraft.
Other civil-military investigations can take place if, for example, a civilian company performs major maintenance work on one of our aircraft and following that an accident occurs. The civilian company is implicated in the probable causes of the accident. We must be able to investigate the civilian company to determine the causes of the accident.
In other cases, for example in Southport, Manitoba, we have aircraft that are subject to a contract between National Defence and a civilian company. They belong to the civilian company and are registered with Transport Canada. They are maintained in accordance with Transport Canada standards, and that department is responsible for certification.
However, use of the aircraft by National Defence is part of a long-term contract and, according to the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, National Defence is responsible for investigating an accident in which it is involved, provided that the aircraft are used in support of National Defence. So you have an aircraft that is completely regulated by Transport Canada but which is used by National Defence, who becomes responsible for the investigation. In that case, if the accident does not involve another civilian aircraft or a civilian airport, it can be considered purely a military investigation, and the Transportation Safety Board cannot be involved in our investigation. That is where we need to be careful. We do not want to end up with a civilian employee who is afraid of losing his job because he has provided information to the Department of National Defence. We must have the same authority as the Transportation Safety Board to be able to protect the individual. Our goal is not to punish the individual, our goal is always to find the causes of the accident to ensure that there won't be another accident for the same reasons.
:
Thank you, Mr. Laplante.
With that, we do have a few things that I want to close our business day with, so I thank our witnesses for attending today and I appreciate your comments. Perhaps we'll have a discussion later, as this bill moves forward.
Thank you.
While our witnesses are leaving, I would like to advise you of a couple of things.
Mr. Bélanger mentioned expert witnesses being available in regard to the other side of this story, I guess. We have Mr. Moshansky, who acted in the Dryden review. He actually wrote us and asked us if he could make a presentation to committee. He did the inquiry and made the final report and two interim reports, and I think based on what I'm hearing, he may present a very interesting, different position to what we're trying to do.
I am also advised that there are some people who could be made available through the ICAO, which is the International Civil Aviation Organization, who deal with those types of issues.
The last thing I want to bring to the committee's attention is that I received a letter this morning from Canada Post. I'll read the letter, and I'll just advise you as to what I've done with it and where we will proceed.
It's written to the clerk. It says:
The President of Canada Post would like to thank the Committee for their invitation to appear before the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities. Unfortunately, a scheduling conflict prevents her from appearing before your Committee this coming Wednesday, February 14, 2007.
The President wants to confirm her commitment to participate to any future appearance in order to address the important issue of remailing or any other Canada Post issues.
I will be contacting her office. Due to the timing of it, I felt I had to make a decision, and I've made a decision that we would defer her, with the idea that I'm going to get in touch with her over the next week and confirm a date. Something has come up.
We were able, for Wednesday's meeting, to confirm Transport 2000 to appear before the committee on Bill C-6.
Mr. Julian has advised the clerk, and therefore me, that he would be bringing forward his motion with regard to the National Marine Council on Wednesday. It's been tabled and he has the option of bringing it forward.
If everybody is comfortable with that.... Mr. Volpe.
:
I have no first-hand knowledge, but I understand that the witnesses who were coming forward on Wednesday had no problem with the issue that we discussed and the result of it. My understanding is that they were still coming at that time.
I do want to make mention of two things, though. The notice of motion that was put forward, I believe, if you read it, dealt only with the issue of remailers. The discussion we had also affected the rural mail, and we wanted some answers on rural mail as well. So I would say that the original motion didn't talk about rural mail; it just talked about remailers.
Also, to be fair to Ms. Greene, I've asked for her to be in attendance, including the committees, three or four times now, and she has always made time to see me, even about other caucus members' questions, from all parties.
She has a huge corporation of 70,000 employees to run. I'm sure that if she's asking to be excused from the committee, she has other business to attend to that must be of some sort of urgent nature. I would suggest at this time, and, quite frankly, we passed that motion fairly strongly, all of us did, and I think the reality is, let's get on to other business.
We have . I don't think the remailer issue is a major one at this time. Rural mail is an issue, but they have a directive. I did have a briefing from Canada Post on that particular directive and what they were doing, so they were going to come forward and report to us what they were going to do on rural mail as well as remailers. I think the directive is up in another 30 or 40 days. I don't think there's any rush in relation to that particular issue.
But certainly, we—and I think Ms. Greene—are open to another date.