:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Marc Grégoire, and I am the ADM of safety and security at Transport Canada.
I'm accompanied today by my directors general: Merlin Preuss from civil aviation; Luc Bourdon from rail safety; Bill Nash, acting DG for marine safety; and in case you would like touch on TDG matters, I also have John Read with us, who is the DG of transportation of dangerous goods.
I'm here today as a follow-up to your discussion a few weeks ago with the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities. Our minister has a broad mandate with one common thread: a commitment to safety, security, effectiveness, and the sustainability of our transportation system.
We know that the global environment continues to change and evolve. While we cannot ensure 100% safety, we can manage risks at acceptable levels to enhance the transportation system on a continuous basis--an essential element towards protecting the health and well-being of Canadians.
[Translation]
Canada has always had one of the safest and most secure transportation systems in the world, but the dramatic growth of new markets is putting tremendous pressure on that system. Bottlenecks are beginning to develop at key ports and there are concerns about the ability of our rail and marine systems to meet current demands, let alone future growth.
The transportation system is becoming more integrated and multimodal with increased expectations that cargo and passengers move smoothly between modes and across borders. The BC cruise ship industry that sees passengers moving between the airport and port facility is a good example of this trend.
[English]
Accident statistics in recent years show an overall downward trend in all modes. The problem we're facing today is that the rate curves are almost flat. You may also be surprised to hear that even the rail statistics for accidents have been improving since the beginning of 2006.
Going back to the curves, with the traffic growth predicted, the number of accidents could increase, unless the department starts looking at different ways to improve safety and therefore reduce the rate of accidents. In other words, if we can't find ways to reduce the rates themselves, the absolute number of accidents could increase as the traffic picks up in the future.
[Translation]
We have studied this issue in recent years, and we have determined that one of the solutions was safety management systems. We need to build upon our existing regulatory frameworks and focus on risk management practices. The safety management systems, or SMS are part of the solution.
SMS is very much based on a partnership between the operator and the regulator, and this partnership is essential in further strengthening our program over the coming years. SMS takes a systems approach to managing risk in an organization by integrating safety into the daily operations of a transportation company. A greater share of responsibility for safety is placed on the transportation service, facility and equipment providers. This means changing the way we all do business—from safety at an operations level to a systems-wide level.
[English]
Companies will be accountable for day-to-day operations. This is more about integrating the processes that already exist in most organizations and less about creating new ones.
We all know that quality risk management is based on quality information. Information must be free-flowing within an enterprise and between the enterprise and its safety partners. The reporting system must encourage and accommodate both the proactive reporting of hazards and the reactive reporting of incidents and accidents.
SMS is not about eliminating our regulatory framework. On the contrary, it's an added layer, where Transport Canada will intervene at the system level, given that the consequences of system failure are more dramatic.
This cultural change must begin at the top of an organization, at the level of power, leadership, and ultimate accountability in the various operators.
In aviation, the new safety policy makes the person with the power to impose a new policy lead its implementation, fund and sustain it, and be accountable for the safety performance of the civil aviation organization. The accountable executive is likely the owner or chief executive officer of the enterprise. For all intents and purposes, it's the person ultimately responsible for the profitability of the enterprise. From a Transport Canada perspective, it puts a face on the certificate.
[Translation]
Canadian aviation organizations that have embraced SMS have found they have not only enhanced safety, they have also enjoyed the benefits of SMS for business, because risks are identified before they become an incident. Small problems are fixed before they turn into big ones. Reduced risks also mean reduced insurance rates and higher confidence, not only in the public sector, but within the industry as well.
[English]
Safety performance and economic performance can be linked, and that link can help drive a new era of aviation safety and security around the world. Accidents cost money—big money—and there are also the indirect costs of loss of business and time lost by injured persons. The bottom line is that better safety means better business for all our stakeholders.
In marine safety, the adoption of SMS in all modes of transport is a priority for us, so I want to touch on marine and rail as well.
I'll start with marine.
[Translation]
Safety management systems were mandated for Canadian international shipping through the 1998 Canada Shipping Act Safety Management Regulations. These regulations were developed to ensure that Canada met its international obligations. In 2002, they were expanded to cover most vessels over 500 gross tons making international voyages.
Canada has, on average, 60 ships and more than 20 companies engaged in international shipping that have obtained full statutory certification for their safety management systems. While Transport Canada does not have mandatory application of these SMS regulations for Canadian domestic shipping, we have successfully promoted voluntary adoption.
[English]
Today, there are approximately 15 Canadian companies and 155 ships operating domestically that have voluntarily adopted and obtained certification for their safety management systems.
The marine safety directorate continues to support the adoption of the International Safety Management Code and is examining ways to increase the code's implementation within the Canadian marine industry. This code provides an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. It does this by addressing the need for a commitment to a safety culture at all levels of the company or organization, including management, masters, and crews.
[Translation]
Similarly, the Railway Safety Management System Regulations came into force on March 31, 2001, requiring all federally regulated railway companies to implement a safety management system.
Safety management systems provide the railways with a formal framework to integrate safety into day-to-day operations. Safety management systems also provide Transport Canada with a consistent basis to monitor safety performance and compliance with regulations through auditing and analysis of performance indicators and other safety data.
Furthermore, Transport Canada has a regular inspection program in place as well as a mechanism to audit railway infrastructure, equipment and methods of operation to determine the level of compliance with established regulations and standards as set out in the Railway Safety Act.
[English]
Transport Canada investigates all rail concerns raised by stakeholders and the general public to determine whether or not the concern constitutes a threat to railway safety or non-compliance with the Railway Safety Act and associated regulations.
[Translation]
Following the increase in Canadian National Railway mainline track derailments in 2005, the department took immediate action to address this upward trend. This resulted in a number of initiatives by the railway including increased track inspections that has brought about a significant reduction of track-related derailments in the past few months.
[English]
In closing, Transport Canada is working closely and diligently with the Transportation Safety Board, whom you met on Tuesday, as well as stakeholders and labour to continue improving the safety of Canada's transportation system.
[Translation]
Transport Canada is, first and foremost, a safety organization, and Canada continues to be internationally recognized as a leader in transportation safety, and we want to maintain this reputation.
[English]
In practical terms, that means a safe transportation system where everyone involved works together on the regulations that impose rules focused on safety results and are designed, where appropriate, to give industry the flexibility to be innovative in meeting those safety outcomes.
[Translation]
We would now be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Flight attendants play a fundamental role for safety on the aircraft, especially in case of an accident, and they play their role very well. There's no evidence, to my knowledge, that having 10, 20, or 30 flight attendants will help to evacuate the aircraft. In that case it was an Airbus A340, and to evacuate the aircraft, le pays, la France had determined that for this aircraft you needed six flight attendants, but there were more.
In Canada today for an Airbus A340 carrying the same number of passengers, you would need eight flight attendants under the 1 in 40 rule. If we were to move ahead with the 1 in 50 rule, and if the airline was to choose that, because they would have to choose between one or the other, not by aircraft, not by flight, but for the whole fleet, if they chose to go there, you would still have eight. Our proposed 1 in 50 rule is not only the number of seats divided by 50, but it's also accompanied by a number of mitigating factors. For big airliners like the Airbus A340, one is to have a flight attendant for each emergency exit door. On this aircraft there were 297 passengers. So if you just take the pure ratio of 1 in 50, you would get six, which is the rule in France, by the way, and in a large number of countries. All European countries, the U.S., most Asian countries, to my knowledge as well, Japan, Singapore, China, and Korea are all under the 1 in 50 today. You would have had six. With our proposal, you would have eight flight attendants.
So this rule, depending on which way the company chooses to go, may in fact on some occasions bring more flight attendants into their fleet than what they have today. On some other occasions you may see a very slight reduction, but the slight reduction does not meet the reduction in safety at all.
:
Mr. Julian, I think it's a very good question, and it comes up repeatedly. If you're to make a safety management system work, if you're to be able to find out what's going on in a particular operation, you need, as Marc has said and you've repeated, to have a free flow of information.
Frankly, one of the reasons why we need to provide some protection is that the first pass of this information has a lot to do with the associations that represent pilots and flight attendants, and they would very much like some protection from retribution. If there's any hint there's going to be retribution as a result of some report, then, fundamentally, the report will dry up. You won't get that information. Neither the government nor the company, nor for that matter the associations, will get that information. So we are asking for protections to be put in place for that purpose, to actually promote that free flow of information.
Now to the question of the public's right to know. I believe they do have the right to know and they will have access to that information, but only after it's met the privacy concerns. In other words, if I were to make a report and for some reason I'm culpable for something, and the company is going to take care of business, and the government knows how the company is going to take care of business, then the information that's about me should stay to the side, so that I will be encouraged to provide that information on an ongoing basis, and so will my confrères and my co-workers.
Once all that process is done, with the name removed, if you wish, all this information is available, and we'll be there to demand it on site with the people involved. But as far as the public goes, those things are reportable after the fact.
:
If I may, I'll answer those questions, which I did answer, by the way, when you were away.
On the first question on SMS, SMS implementation is a cultural change. As I explained before, we cannot expect to see major shifts or major safety improvements from one day to the other. We're trying to implement this, and we're trying to instill cultural change throughout the transportation industry in Canada, but it could take years before we see the benefits of that implementation. I could come back later to explain more about this.
On the proposal that we now have for flight attendants, first of all, we are convinced it does not affect the level of safety. If it did, we would not propose it. We're in the safety business, and we're there to maintain or improve safety, not to reduce it. You may hear or you may have heard different points of view on that issue, but we are pretty much convinced that we are not reducing it.
There was in fact a proposal made in 2001 to change the ratio of flight attendants, and we rejected it because we felt it wasn't safe. The proposal that's now on the table has nothing to do with that proposal. The 1 in 50 that we're now proposing is accompanied by a series of mitigation measures, which make it equivalent to the 1 in 40 rule that we have now.
You talked about Australia. We know that the ratio is different in Australia. We also know that in all European countries, in most Asian countries, and in the United States, an approximate percentage of 90% of all the travelling public in the world is using a 1 in 50 rule. We have no evidence in any of those countries that the lack of flight attendants has been the cause of death for people.
I would like to start with a comment. We have agreed on having a briefing. You are, in fact, telling us that a 1 to 50 ratio, combined with mediation measures, would be equivalent to the current 1 to 40 ratio. I think that we should discuss this again.
I would like to come back to what I was telling you earlier with respect to safety management systems for air transportation. Obviously, civil aviation is not only Air Canada, which is a small domestic company. In Quebec, there are over 100 aviation companies. There are small ones, medium-sized ones, and large ones.
I was telling you that the safety management system that you want to establish in every company will also affect the smaller companies. On the other hand, your inspection systems will ensure that they are safe.
Your previous minimum has become your maximum, for example, in terms of the number of hours of training for inspectors in Quebec. I would like to add, in passing, that they are the ones who have the least flight training in Canada. Therefore, in terms of what you are spending on training for your inspectors, the minimum has become the maximum. It is as you are telling them that from now on, they will conduct their inspections in a different manner. You said yourself that you will be checking more than anything else, but these are small companies.
The public must rest assured that these inspectors will have the same training as previously. In small companies, your inspector will have to take the plane in order to ensure that it complies with standards. That is what is currently done.
If you restrict budgets or if you make minimum training for inspectors become the new maximum, you will end up with what we have in Quebec. Look at this because that is what is currently happening in Quebec. The minimum that you require has become the maximum in terms of the number of hours of training for your inspectors, and so on. It is as if you are saying that you are going to provide your inspectors with less training because you have greater confidence in the private sector.
You are telling us today that the private sector must take more time, etc. I do not think you should do that. I think you should maintain an inspection system for all sectors so that the public can rest assured that inspection in all sectors is still effective and that there are people conducting those inspections. I know that the training for your inspectors is costly, probably even more so in aviation than in the rail sector, because flight hours are involved, but this is necessary for the purpose of reassuring the public.
Earlier you spoke about people. We are working for the people. I am telling you that I do not think the people will feel reassured by what you have done.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a comment and ask some questions.
First, M. Grégoire, you stated that it will take years before we see the benefits of the safety management systems. That worries me. Since 2005, the number of rail accidents has been the highest in 10 years. If we have to wait for years before seeing the benefits, it dangerous to establish systems that can lead to this type of situation. We might see the benefits in a few years, but the number of accidents will be higher in the beginning. That was my comment.
I will now ask you some questions.
[English]
When we talk about the flight attendants, I share the concerns of other members around this table about the implementation of a reduced ratio of flight attendants. I'm particularly concerned about the impact on seniors and on people with disabilities. It almost seems to be a self-managed evacuation system. And I don't think that is in any way a responsible way of approaching flight safety.
My question previously was whether there have been studies about other jurisdictions. My question to you really is this. What kinds of studies exist within the department that might show that the danger, the increased danger--which is undoubtable during evacuations and in taking people off aircraft, particularly people with disabilities--is somehow justified by advantages somewhere else? So if you have those studies, we would like to see them.
Finally, for the civil aviation data-reporting systems, I would like to know how the public accesses that. Mr. Preuss, you said very clearly that there are privacy issues, but that once those privacy issues are dealt with, this is accessible. How then do I, as a member of the transport committee, access that reporting system?