:
Colleagues, I'd like to call the meeting to order and at this time ask that the cameras leave. Thank you very much.
Welcome, everyone. Welcome, witnesses. Welcome, members. Welcome, members of the public.
The matter today is chapter 11 of the November 2006 report of the Auditor General, “Protection of Public Assets—Office of the Correctional Investigator”, a report of the Auditor General of Canada.
We're very pleased to have with us today the Auditor General, Sheila Fraser. She's accompanied by Jean Ste-Marie, assistant Auditor General and legal advisor. As an individual, we have Mr. Ron Stewart, accompanied by his solicitor, Peter Doody. From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness we have Suzanne Hurtubise, the deputy minister. From the present Office of the Correctional Investigator, we have Mr. Howard Sapers. From the Treasury Board, we have Charles-Antoine St-Jean, the Comptroller General of Canada. From the Privy Council Office, we have Mr. Marc O'Sullivan, the assistant secretary to the cabinet, senior personnel and special projects secretariat.
I want to welcome each and every one of you.
I understand that several of you have opening statements. I would urge you to keep them as short as possible.
Members, we're going to conclude this portion of the meeting at 5:15. Then we're going to go to motions that we had before this meeting, the first one at 5:15.
Without any further ado, I'm going to call upon you, Mrs. Fraser, for your opening comments.
I thank you for this opportunity to present the results of chapter 11 of our November 2006 report entitled “Protection of Public Assets—Office of the Correctional Investigator”.
The Office of the Correctional Investigator acts as an ombudsman for federal offenders. It is a small, independent agency that investigates complaints of individual offenders and tries to resolve them by making recommendations to Correctional Service Canada.
Our audit identified a series of abuses and wrongdoings at the Office of the Correctional Investigator. These related to personal leave, absences, cash-out of annual leave, and travel and hospitality claims.
[Translation]
Before continuing, I would first like to address statements made that may cause committee members to question our conduct of this audit. I want to assure the committee that we rigorously followed our audit methodology, including allowing the entity and individuals concerned the opportunity to review and comment on our findings.
While our audit dealt with only the Office of the Correctional Investigator, it served to highlight some broader, more fundamental problems. I would like to focus today on the underlying issues and on how such abuses could be prevented in the future. To this end, my remarks will centre on three concerns highlighted in our chapter.
[English]
First, to maintain the public's trust and confidence in government, agency heads and senior management are required to discharge their responsibilities according to the highest ethical standards of integrity, objectivity, and impartiality. Their conduct and their actions are expected to exemplify the values of the public service.
In order to do this, Governor in Council appointees, such as the Correctional Investigator, and other senior officials need to be advised and informed about their expected standards of conduct as holders of public office. Responsibility for this orientation and training rests with the central agencies, the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board Secretariat.
We raised this issue in our audit of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in 2003. To our knowledge, it has still not been resolved, even though the public accounts committee made a recommendation about the training of Governor in Council appointees in its 2004 report on the audit of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.
Second, our audit found that poor human resource management and financial management practices contributed to the improprieties of the Office of the Correctional Investigator. Appropriate comptrollership and management are essential in any federal organization to manage financial risks and protect against fraud, financial negligence, violation of financial rules or principles, and losses of assets or public money.
In our audit, we found there was some confusion about who was assuming the position and functions of the senior financial officer of the OCI. We recommended that the Treasury Board Secretariat ensure that every small, independent organization have a formally designated senior financial officer who is appropriately trained to carry out his or her responsibilities and duties.
We also found that Public Safety Canada did not properly fulfill its responsibilities as a provider of financial and human resource management services to the OCI. Public Safety Canada officials failed to report concerns or suspicions to appropriate government officials. Instead of challenging questionable and inappropriate transactions of the OCI, they simply processed them.
[Translation]
The third concern arising from our audit was that these abuses continued over such a long period of time, and that while senior officials were aware of some of the improper activities, they took no action to stop them. It is important to reinforce the responsibility of all public servants to take action in such cases.
The audit once again points to the issue of accountability in independent or quasi-judicial bodies. An independent agency such as the Office of the Correctional Investigator must maintain its independence while discharging its mandate; at the same time, it must act in accordance with government policies and the public interest. The challenge for central agencies is to provide adequate oversight while respecting this independence.
I would like to take this opportunity to inform committee members that we are planning to undertake audit work, in the near future, looking at the governance of small entities in general.
The Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and Public Safety Canada have agreed with all of the recommendations in our audit. The Office of the Correctional Investigator has also agreed with those recommendations directed at it and has indicated that it is taking action to address deficiencies.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. We would be pleased to answer the committee's questions.
Thank you.
:
Yes, I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was appointed the Correctional Investigator of Canada by the Governor in Council in November 1977 and held that position until I retired in October 2003. I was reappointed three times. The Correctional Investigator's office does very important work, and I was proud to lead that office for over 25 years. I tried to do the job to the best of my ability.
I am 72 years old and my memory is not good. On April 13, 2006, before I was questioned by the Auditor General's investigator and lawyer, my lawyer, David W. Scott, spoke to the present Correctional Investigator, Howard Sapers. Mr. Sapers told Mr. Scott that he and the executive director had been instructed by the Auditor General's investigators that no one at the office was to speak to anyone about the audit or the things under investigation. As a result, I could not speak to anyone in the office about these matters.
Even after I received a copy of the Auditor General's draft report, none of the people in my office would speak to me or my lawyer. Although I was given copies of some documents, my lawyer and I were not allowed access to many important documents from the office to refresh my memory before I was questioned.
Although I had kept a lot of documents at my home, which would have helped me to remember some of the things I was asked about, my wife and I destroyed them long after I retired. My lawyer has asked the Correctional Investigator's office and the Auditor General's office to provide him and an accountant I have retained with relevant documents to allow them to determine the true facts. None has yet been provided.
The result is that I do not have an adequate memory or the ability to respond completely today to many of the accusations brought against me, but I intend to have my lawyer and my accountant review all of those documents.
I want to tell this committee and the people of Canada that if I have received money or benefits that I should not have received, I intend to pay them back to the best of my ability. I promise you I will do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Members of the committee, good afternoon. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the public accounts committee and, through you, to report to Canadians on the actions the agency I lead has taken to implement the recommendations of the Auditor General in her report to Parliament.
I will use my brief time to update you first on recovery efforts and then on how the financial management systems within the Office of the Correctional Investigator have been improved to prevent the abuses and wrongdoings reported by the Auditor General from happening again.
At the request of the Minister of Public Safety, my office is leading the process to confirm and recover funds that have been, or may have been, improperly paid to the former Correctional Investigator. During the last four months, my office has established an advisory committee, co-chaired by the Comptroller General of Canada and me, to guide the office in its recovery efforts. We've retained the services of a senior litigator to support the recovery process, and we've begun the verification process of the audit's findings and conclusions.
The due diligence legally required in this instance is a separate validation process to ascertain any amounts that may be owed by Mr. Stewart. This must be done independently from the analysis and conclusions of the Auditor General. My office is also fully cooperating with the RCMP.
While this recovery process may seem slow and frustrating, the need for swift and clear action following apparent breaches of trust must be balanced by the need for reliable due process.
I was concerned when first briefed on the findings of the initial audit, upon my appointment in April 2004. That's almost three years ago, and long before the Auditor General's final report was tabled, I initiated the strengthening of the financial and human resources management practices within the office.
Following the release of the Auditor General's report in November, my office worked with the Office of the Comptroller General to secure the services of an interim senior financial officer. He was contracted to review and further improve the new management policies and procedures already in place and to advise on how best to respond to the Auditor General's broader recommendations.
Today, our interim senior financial officer confirms that the processes now implemented at the Office of the Correctional Investigator represent prudent and effective practices for a small agency.
My office is also working with central agencies on the development and application of appropriate government-wide policy or procedural changes aimed at strengthening agency accountability. I'm proud of the commitment and diligence with which my office has responded to the Auditor General's report, all the while continuing to perform the important work legislated to it by Parliament.
In addition to investigating individual complaints, the Office of the Correctional Investigator also addresses broader systemic issues and corrections to improve the outcomes for inmates and ultimately to contribute to public safety. Since April 2004, the agency's work in this regard has focused on improving health services for inmates with mental illness, closing the outcome gaps for aboriginal inmates, and better accountability in women's corrections.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Sapers.
Madame Hurtubise has a brief opening comment, which is being circulated and will form part of the record.
Statement by Mrs. Suzanne Hurtubise (Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the issues relating to the Department of Public Safety raised in chapter 11 of the Auditor General's report.
While Public Safety Canada and the Office of the Correctional Investigator are part of the same portfolio, each is a separate agency headed by a deputy head, who is also the accounting officer. In view of its relative size--approximately 30 employees--it would not be practical or cost effective for the Office of the Correctional Investigator to provide its own core administrative services.
Since its establishment as a separate agency in 1992, the Office of the Correctional Investigator has received from the former Department of the Solicitor General and from Public Safety Canada some services in the area of financial and human resources management.
As the accounting officer of the Department of Public Safety, I am responsible for the quality of the services provided by officers of the department to the agencies of the portfolio.
The report of the Auditor General identified some weaknesses in the way officials of my department have discharged their responsibilities over the years. The appropriate corrective measures have been identified and are being implemented. For example, we now have a memorandum of understanding with the Office of the Correctional Investigator, which clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization. We have also issued further guidance and tools to assist employees who have delegated financial and human resources responsibilities.
I would be pleased to respond to the questions of committee members.
The Chair: Mr. St-Jean, you have a few comments you want to make.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
I've got a few opening comments, which I'll shorten to give you more time for questions.
I'd like to thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee to discuss the November 2006 report of the Auditor General regarding the Office of the Correctional Investigator.
[Translation]
I would in particular like to discuss the actions my office is taking to strengthen financial management and internal audit in small departments and agencies. My office has provided advice and support to the Office of the Correctional Investigator in responding to recommendations.
[English]
For example, we've assisted the office in acquiring the services of an interim senior financial officer. We are also providing financial management and internal audit advice and support, and we've also worked closely with the Office of the Auditor General to review the audit material. I would like to thank especially Mr. Jean Ste-Marie and Mr. Neil Papineau for their ongoing assistance in this matter. I'm also co-chairing the advisory committee with Mr. Sapers to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive response by government.
Clearly, however, this case also indicates a need for broader efforts to strengthen internal audits and financial management across government as a whole. My office is leading this effort, and our work is well supported by the Federal Accountability Act that came into effect on December 12, 2006.
[Translation]
As part of the accompanying Federal Accountability Action Plan, which complements the act, the government also committed to implementation of the policy on internal audit. Let me say a few words about the internal audit policy, which came into effect on April 1, 2006.
[English]
Under the policy, the Office of the Comptroller General has a mandate to conduct horizontal and other audits of small departments and agencies. We are conducting our first horizontal audit of travel and hospitality in small departments and agencies and we will be reporting this in the next few months. My office expects to complete this work in the next few months.
In our next small departments and agencies audit we will review the use of delegation of authority. We're also exploring the possibility of conducting an audit of the financial management practices associated with overtime, leave, and taxable benefits. By conducting these audits we can support small departments and agencies in identifying problems and implementing solutions and we can resolve issues before they have a chance to escalate.
There is also a broader policy review under way that will support our efforts to strengthen financial management across government.
[Translation]
That review is near completion and the report will be presented to the President of the Treasury Board in the near future. Once the new financial policies are in place, everyone's role and responsibilities will be clearly defined, and accountabilities will be clear.
[English]
The Federal Accountability Act and action plan, the review of the financial management policies, and the policy on internal audit and the management and accountability framework are just some of the many actions we have taken to strengthen financial management, internal audit, and overall accountability across the government. These actions address many of the issues raised in the Auditor General's report.
No systems, measures, or sanctions can completely eliminate problems in an organization as large as the Government of Canada, but we can mitigate the risk.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll be very brief. I'll provide a quick overview of the steps taken by the Privy Council Office in response to the Auditor General's recommendations.
[Translation]
Prior to appointment, conflict of interest and expected standards of conduct are discussed with each proposed governor in council appointee. Candidates are provided with a copy of the Conflict of Interest and Post Employment Code and instructed to contact the Office of the Ethics Commissioner to discuss any concerns or queries.
Upon appointment, each new full-time governor in council appointee is contacted by the Ethics Commissioner to discuss their situation. A condition of holding office for all public office holders is compliance with the Conflict of Interest and Post Employment Code and each new appointee must sign a certificate of compliance.
Moreover, as you are aware, the new Conflict of Interest Act will enact stronger compliance measures, including the power for the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to initiate formal investigations and to levy monetary sanctions for administrative breaches under this act.
[English]
We are also updating our guidebooks for Governor in Council appointees to reflect changes in the conflict of interest regime and other changes brought about notably by the Federal Accountability Act.
To ensure proper orientation of new appointees, we are proceeding with one-on-one briefings for newly appointed heads of agencies that cover terms and conditions of employment, conflict of interest, and standards of conduct. We are also providing a session covering standards of conduct in the orientation program for heads of agencies offered by the Canada School of Public Service, which has also become compulsory. The next session is on April 3. Finally, we are issuing more fulsome guidance to deputy heads on the approval, usage, and reporting of their leave.
In summary, we take every opportunity to emphasize ethics and values in both our guidance and training initiatives to ensure that public office-holders are aware of their responsibilities and their obligations with regard to standards of conduct.
I'd like to make a few points. I will not repeat the niceties.
I simply make the point that while Public Safety Canada and the Office of the Correctional Investigator are part of the same portfolio, each is headed by a deputy head who is the accounting officer for that body. Since the establishment as a separate agency in 1992 of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, the former Department of the Solicitor General and now Public Safety Canada does provide services in the area of financial and human resources management to the Office of the Correctional Investigator.
Mr. Chairman, the report of the Auditor General did identify some weaknesses in the way officials of my department have discharged their responsibilities over the years. I can assure the committee that the appropriate corrective measures have been identified and are being implemented.
For example, I referred the Auditor General's report to the RCMP. We developed a work plan to implement the recommendations made in the Auditor General's report. I can confirm that most of the corrective measures are already in place. For example, we now have a memorandum of understanding with the Office of the Correctional Investigator that clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization. We have also issued further guidance and tools to assist employees who have delegated financial and human resources responsibilities. I, and others in the Department of Public Safety, have worked closely with the Correctional Investigator, Mr. Howard Sapers, to address the issues raised in the Auditor General's report.
I would be pleased to respond to the committee's members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
:
Thank you, Madame Hurtubise.
On behalf of the committee, I want to thank all witnesses for their presentations and their attendance here this afternoon.
Before going to the first round, I want to make a few brief opening comments.
We have here what I consider to be a breakdown in the system of checks and balances that we as parliamentarians would normally expect to see in the federal financial administration.
Some of the facts are titillating, but I hope that in the dialogue that ensues here we get answers to the basic questions of who was responsible for financial comptrollership within this agency and did that person understand his or her role. What were the role, duties, and responsibilities of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness? Did they have any mandate for financial oversight? Where was the Treasury Board?
This is not a situation of a snatch and grab in the middle of the night. This went on for 13 or 14 years. Where was the Treasury Board, in particular the Office of the Comptroller General? That may be an unfair comment because it was just reinstituted since this event. But where was the Treasury Board, and did they provide any oversight at all to this particular agency?
Does the Office of the Auditor General have any responsibility for going in at any point in time to audit a small agency like this? If they did, it would have caught the situation.
Hopefully we can get to the answers of these particular questions. I urge all members to keep their questions brief and relevant--we don't need long preambles. I urge all witnesses to answer the questions as succinctly as possible.
Having said that, I'm going to start the first round. The first round will be seven minutes, and then we'll see how we get along after the first round. We are going to adjourn at 5:15 sharp.
Mrs. Sgro, seven minutes.
Everything you just said is exactly what I was feeling while I was sitting here listening to the heads of various departments that we rely on to make sure things are running right. It seems that everybody brings in more rules after.
To get to the point, Mr. Stewart, a couple of things concern me just in looking at the audit findings--things like receiving unearned salary. You were absent for 319 days from OCI premises from 1998 to 1999. You were paid for that time and generated little work product. What did you do when you were working, and how can you account for being absent for 319 days, yet receiving payment for that?
And thank you, Mr. Stewart, for coming. We very much appreciate your being here.
:
There are about 60 federal institutions in Canada, and I would go on a needs basis, really. If we had a lot of complaints from Millhaven, I might have to go down there for a couple of weeks to see if I could clear some of them up. Sometimes you wouldn't get a complaint from an institution, but you would manage to get there...well, I can't say “once a month” or whatever. You'd have to go to see the person, or one of the investigators would go.
When I first took over the office, we had a staff of five people. I pretty well did everything. I would be contacted by the warden's secretary, who kept a list of the inmates who wanted to talk to me. I would arrange my office business. I would arrange the flight out there. I'd rent a car and drive to the institution. I'd meet with the warden, meet with the inmate. I did that for years. It was a kind of one-man show.
When I left the office, I think we had 25 people in place, and with more investigators to go into the prisons, I spent less time there and more time in the office in Ottawa.
:
Thank you all very much for your time.
I don't have a lot of questions of Mr. Stewart. I'm going to assume that the Auditor General has done her job, and obviously she's prepared to defend and stand behind the work her office has done and the conclusions they've reached.
So with the exception of one question, I'm going to focus my attention on the checks and balances as to how this happened. I'm also assuming that this is not going to end here. You can't make these kinds of allegations against people without expecting--unless you're completely and totally guilty--some kind of a response. So I'm going to assume this whole thing is going to work its way through other proper channels.
But I would like to know, Mr. Stewart, in the last full year that you worked, what was your pay for that position?
:
I think one of the first issues, as I mentioned in the opening statement, is the whole role of the senior financial officer within the organization. The executive director had signed many of the documents that require a signature from the senior financial officer as senior financial officer, but he told us that he didn't believe he was assuming that role; he thought it was someone in the department who was offering a form of transactional services.
That's why we recommended that the Treasury Board Secretariat should ensure that it is absolutely clear in each organization that there be a senior financial officer and that the senior financial officer be fully aware of their roles and responsibilities, so that there isn't this kind of confusion.
A second issue, and this points to a sort of breakdown in controls, is that the Correctional Investigator was able to submit and approve his own travel expenses and bills. I'm told that some of them actually went directly from him to the people doing the processing; they didn't necessarily go through.... I think that too is a kind of basic control, that people should not be able to sign their own. This again comes back to the senior financial officer role and the question of who would normally be approving this.
Then I think there's a role on the part of the processing people, which I believe the deputy minister agrees with. When they see transactions that appear questionable, they should ask more questions about them.
To pick up on what the Auditor General just said, the responsibility of the Department of the Solicitor General at the time—now Public Safety—is as a service provider with respect to some human resource services and some financial management services. Basically we process the bills, the accounts given to us by the Office of the Correctional Investigator.
The lacuna, if you like—what I do not believe officials of the department did correctly and what we have now corrected—is that people were processing some documentation directly from the Correctional Investigator without a third-party attestation.
I cannot sign off for myself before I get a cheque to be reimbursed for travel, say, or hospitality. I fill out my claim like anyone else, but someone checks it for me to ensure that everything is according to the rules and the guidelines of the Treasury Board. That's an example.
The clerks who were allowing this were not requiring this additional check, and that's where the check and balance wasn't working. But I must add that these were clerical functions, and I cannot explain why it was done that way. It's not appropriate; we've now fixed it. You need that check.
:
Where do I go, Deputy? Where do I go to get the accountability about who allowed this to happen? Help me.
It is important to keep this in mind, when we're having the other debate later, Chair, about deputies coming forward.
Please don't take any of this personally. You've done a splendid job here, but it's frustrating to no end.
How much time do I have left here, if any?
:
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I think there are special issues, if you will, or special concerns around many of the small agencies that perform quasi-judicial, ombudsman-type roles. In order to do that, they require independence from central agency direction of their mandate, but they still have to give appropriate accountability for their use of financial and human resources.
We have seen, unfortunately, a couple of instances where the central agencies have been hesitant to be seen to be interfering—and I suspect it would be the same thing with the Solicitor General with an ombudsman kind of person, in that the department would be hesitant to become too intrusive into management.
So we are starting what will probably be a couple of audits on the whole question of the governance of small agencies. First of all, how many are there? What kinds of roles do they fulfill, because there is a myriad of them? How do they maintain that professional independence while having proper accountability? There are a number of issues that will come up from those. We would hope to have a broad overview piece by late 2008, probably, and then have some specific audit issues that we can bring to the committee.
In your report, in paragraph 11.18, you state that the
...Correctional Investigator generated little work product in six years. Senior managers and employees who we interviewed could not recall ever receiving documents or other written information from the former Correctional Investigator about any meetings he may have attended off OCI premises during the audit period.
When you couple it with paragraph 11.38, where it states:
The former Correctional Investigator spent the majority of his time from April to October each year at his summer residence, located on an island more than one and a half hours' drive from Ottawa,
it seems to indicate that there's very little work that can be pointed to, never mind when he was at his summer residence. And it seems to be a misnomer, by the way, because it states that he was there most of the time, April to October. So I guess it was more of a spring/summer/fall residence.
You also seemed to indicate that there wasn't a great deal of work done during the rest of the year when he seemed to be in the Ottawa offices--in the winter, I guess.
:
I can tell the committee that when we began this we heard from a lot of employees and others that Mr. Stewart was not very present at work. It is a challenge to prove. It's easy to prove that somebody worked. How do you prove that somebody wasn't present?
The team went through a very rigorous approach whereby they used cellphone records, travel logs, and all the memos, e-mails, and documents within the office. Actually, if there was a telephone call, they credited that whole day. When we say 319, it's really because we found absolutely no indication of a telephone call, a travel claim, mileage, a signature on a report, or an e-mail.
The team, in the interviews, would have asked about this. If someone said, “Well, no, I was working on this big project and I didn't keep the drafts”, I think we would have accepted that. We found no indication of work for those 319 days.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Sweet.
Before we go to the second round, I just have a couple of questions from the chair to you, Mr. St-Jean. These questions aren't personal because you weren't appointed when these situations were going on.
You're part of Treasury Board, and it's my understanding that the role of Treasury Board is to provide financial direction, guidance, and oversight to these departments. Its role is to ensure that the departments and agencies have the capacity, that the people in there are trained, that they understand their roles, that transactions will be done in accordance with the Financial Administration Act, Treasury Board guidelines, that there is a properly functioning internal audit, and that the reports coming out of the agency are all in accordance with the Financial Administration Act. Obviously, in this case, this was not done.
I have three questions. Do you agree with me that Treasury Board failed Canadians? My second question is why? And my third question is, have steps been taken that this will never happen again?
:
Maybe I could start with the third question. There have been steps taken to prevent a recurrence of such events. When I took over the position of Comptroller General in June 2004, there were essentially two mandates I received. One was to assess and diagnose the health of financial management, and also to do the same with internal audit. There were issues with both processes, both functions, and we've taken steps to address this.
In terms of the clarity of the role, now the policy framework spells out the roles and responsibilities of the key players. Deputy heads, CFOs, ADMs--these are now being put in front of the President of the Treasury Board.
There was also the issue of internal audits that we see were not conducted in small departments and agencies. Until then, there was no authority for TBS to conduct horizontal audits in the small departments and agencies because of the difficulty of protecting the independence of those organizations. That particular authority was granted as of April 1 this year to the Treasury Board Secretariat, my office, and now we're conducting internal audits on some of those processes, including, right now, one in travel and hospitality. Another one that is coming up is delegation of authorities; another one will be coming up. So the steps are being taken to address that.
In terms of why these things happened, when I came out with these new policy frameworks I was very clear about the need for clarity of roles and responsibilities. That is now being addressed by the new policy framework. Some of them have been enacted and some will be shortly.
Maybe my colleague who's here from PCO could speak more about the upcoming guide in terms of the roles and responsibilities of the deputy head, which is now being updated, and say why those things happened. They were not clear, absolutely not clear. They weren't getting—
:
Okay. I have just one other question to you, Mr. O'Sullivan.
It's my understanding that to finance this particular agency, funds were appropriated from the general revenues. At the end of the year, if there was a surplus or if they saw a surplus coming, they would take the pot of surplus and divide it among all employees on an equal basis. They had to do a very complicated arrangement on a per-hour basis. If you were entitled to $2,000 and you were making $10 an hour, you would put in for 200 hours of overtime. If you were making $20 an hour, you'd put in for $100 an hour.
I have two questions. It seems to me that this is a fundamental violation of organizational values and public sector ethics. Are you as disturbed as I am? What has Privy Council done to make sure this will never happen again?
:
First of all, I think it's important to understand the almost unique context in which the Office of the Correctional Investigator exists. It's been given a very particular mandate by legislation that Parliament awarded to it, and it's been given a policy framework by government, including, through order in council, the delegation of all human resources-related material. So everything that would normally be done by the Treasury Board has been delegated to the Office of the Correctional Investigator as an independent agency and a separate employer, where the employees are not part of the core public service.
Secondly, when the office was created in 1977, it was created under the Inquiries Act. All of the other employees in the office were on personal service contracts to the Correctional Investigator at the time. That didn't change until 1993, so those relationships that you were talking about had been long-standing.
When it comes to those awards of extra payments, it is clearly within the authority of the Office of the Correctional Investigator to make awards for extra payments, as it is in the general public service, either at the executive level in terms of performance bonuses that we've heard Mr. O'Sullivan speak about or other kinds of awards that can be made.
The Auditor General was quite correct in coming to the conclusion that those particular payments you referred to were not properly documented and were mischaracterized as overtime. However, they were payments that were made in terms of resolving long-standing issues in the office, and they were payments not just for overtime but also for extra services that were performed above and beyond the level and scope of the work that most of the employees were ordinarily involved in.
They took place over three periods, and the financial flexibility the office had at the end of those particular years was a factor in the decision to make the awards at that time. That flexibility wasn't available in the office, in my understanding, prior to those years.
Let me just say that as endlessly fascinating and interesting as it is to continue to query a senior public servant about how they worked from home without electricity or a phone, I want to get to the accountability on this.
But something just came up and I want to ask about that. Mr. Stewart just said that somebody in Finance or somewhere told him he didn't have to pay back this computer. Do we know anything about that? Can I get a commitment from somebody, an undertaking, that it will be looked into and reviewed and that we'll get an answer as to whether that happened, and if it did, was it appropriate, and if it isn't--
I have to say again, Chair, it has been interesting to play around with some of the details, but I really don't feel that we have any better sense of accountability as to who didn't do their job that allowed these things to happen. The infractions, the concerns, and the allegations are one thing, if they're true, and for working purposes they are at this table, but I still don't, as a member of this committee, have a sense that we know who dropped the ball. And it's incredibly frustrating.
So I'm going to ask again. I'm going to ask the Auditor General. Maybe I'm just not getting it, but where in this process is the first place that somebody should have caught this?
Previously, Mr. Poilievre noted that you had been in the Grey Cup cities over the weekends of the last five Grey Cups while you were still in your office. You basically said it was coincidental. When he questioned whether or not there was any documentation of having visited correctional facilities, you said, and I quote, “You don't have to go to prison to deal with inmate complaints”.
Now, I understand that a number of your flights and hotel reservations were made by Football Canada and the Canadian Football League. Were you discussing inmate complaints with Football Canada and the Canadian Football League?
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Then I have a comment for the deputy minister.
I understand that as an accounting officer you're answerable before this committee and before Parliament. I suggest that this quasi-judicial, independent, sub-agency thing is a loophole that you can drive an eight-ton truck through, let alone a three-ton truck, as far as making deputy ministers responsible for what goes on in their departments. This is a concern to me because we run into too many of these situations.
Mr. Stewart, when you started your job you had five people in your department. When you left you had 26. Are the Clifford Olsons of our world being better served today because we have 26 people in this department rather than the five you started with?
I don't understand why we don't entertain the motion that Mr. Sweet provided to invite discussion with the . We are publishing a report without hearing a single solitary witness, other than the author of the report, which is very unusual for this committee. Normally we do hear from other witnesses to hear conflicting viewpoints, and then we allow the committee to be the judge of what we heard. We usually do that by reviewing clause by clause, instead of just taking the entire document, passing it whole, and sending it off to Parliament. It seems as though we've paid a consultant to do our thinking for us, and now our goal is just to get it out as quickly as possible, before it can be scrutinized in any way whatsoever. I find the process to be very unusual.
I know, Mr. Chair, that perhaps there's a desire to flex muscles and wave fists and show a sign of strength, but this is not the way to do it.
At the same time, I have always believed in ministerial responsibility. It's the cornerstone of our democratic system. It means that ministers are responsible to Parliament for their actions and that they can't scapegoat public servants for their behaviour. There are aspects of this report that would allow politicians to scapegoat public servants rather than take responsibility for their own behaviour.
Normally it's the opposition demanding that ministerial responsibility be upheld, but in this situation it's the government that's trying to defend ministerial responsibility and the opposition, through this motion, is taking it away and assigning that responsibility to bureaucrats. Mr. Chair, the reality is that the accounting officer is not accountable to this committee; the accounting officer is accountable before this committee. It is the minister who is responsible. There's nothing you can do, Mr. Chair, to--
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The only intervention I really want to make is that I have a lot of arguments in favour of the report, but I don't know that the correspondence dealing with this report has actually been tabled before the committee. You can check with the clerk.
I'm looking at a letter from C.E.S. Franks dated February 23, 2007, and I'll just quote one sentence:
Though I have had the assistance of many persons in preparing this draft, the final decisions on its contents and form are mine, and I accept full responsibility for any faults in it.
When I look at the report, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Franks is noted as the consultant, but this is his report. Now, I would have thought this report would have been a one-page report from the public accounts committee saying we're pleased to table a report from Professor Franks, who has given us advice, and we've accepted his advice--rather than in essence plagiarizing his report, because we haven't given him any credit for it. With that editorial change--if it is an editorial change--I think we should proceed.
I share the views of my colleague .
I look at the letter from the President of the Treasury Board, dated March 13, and it seems to me the relevant sentence is at the end of the third paragraph on page 2, where it says:
Nevertheless, the purpose of the accounting officer's appearance is to support the Minister's, and ultimately the government's, accountability for the way departments and agencies are managed.
This is not a nuanced difference. That is 180 degrees different from what we're saying. We are saying something very different.
And in terms of sending Mr. Franks, I did not agree that the notion of sending a hired consultant to meet with a politician, to negotiate, was the right way to go anyway.
It seems to me, and I agree with , based on the argument that we've been dealing with this for months and months and months.... I think this was initiated not long after the class of 2004 came in, and probably can talk about times before, when this actually got its initial momentum. We're here now. This is not the time to suddenly get shy and to get caught up.
I understand where the government members are coming from. It would be interesting, if they were on this side, to hear what the arguments might be. I hear what they're saying, but I'm not hearing anything strong enough, Mr. Chair, in a non-partisan way, that suggests we should deviate from the course we've set with all-party support. All along we've been all but unanimous at every step. You've provided excellent leadership, Chair, since you've been in office, and did before you.
Now is the moment of truth. Now is not the time to back away. We're there. And the fact that the executive branch of government doesn't like it--too bad. It's just too bad.
Parliament speaks on this. Parliament decides what the rules of the game are at Parliament's committees. So I think, Chair, that it's time to close this in terms of work. It's no longer a work in progress. I realize you used that term.
We can always amend any policy. On the policy that is there in front of us, today is the day we adopt it and tell the government that this is the way it's going to be. And that's not about pounding tables and trying to get headlines. That's just about making sure we don't go through the nonsense we went through earlier, which happens over and over and over, where you start to get close to where you think you're going to get, where the accountability is, and somebody says, “Oh, I wasn't there”, or they start to say, “That was government policy and that's as much as I can comment on”. Now is the time. Pass this.
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Right. I want to clarify a few points here.
At one point we were going to have Mr. Franks meet with the Treasury Board people and try to iron out the differences. Now we're saying on this committee that it would be terribly wrong for Mr. Franks to meet with the President of the Treasury Board. I'm a little puzzled at the logic and the rationale of that position, with all due respect. They're not consistent whatsoever in any shape or form. That was Mr. Franks' strategy. He stated he was frustrated because he wasn't getting cooperation.
We're suggesting, before we plunge into this sort of thing and make it our report, to take that one little step and try that route. But for some unknown reason this would just be terrible and wrong.
There is another point I'm going to raise. There are some flaws with the process here. I've been on this committee for a long time. I've never had a third-party consultant file a report in a committee where we endorse it as our report and file it back to Parliament without going through the study of going clause by clause before we finally approve that.
There are some things in Mr. Franks' report that I don't agree with. I've looked at the legislation. It says, “accountable before Parliament”, not “to Parliament”. And if you actually read what Mr. Franks is proposing in some sections there, he's going well beyond just being answerable to Parliament. He's saying accountable in the full scope of it, which is beyond what the legislation is saying.
Furthermore, if you get into the history of this matter, one of the most important features of accounting officers is to have a mechanism to make deputy ministers accountable if they're put in an untenable position. The legislation is enacted that the teeth are in the legislation.
That's probably the key point about this whole accounting officer matter, which is to avoid the sponsorship thing and to put deputy ministers on the spot.
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Mr. Chairman, I put this motion before the committee today because I believed our pursuit was to make sure we knew how the new Federal Accountability Act and everything that had been discovered by the Gomery report would function in a new light of accountability.
Dr. Franks had previously wanted to meet on several occasions in order to have a more fulsome report himself. The people at the Treasury Board are going to be the people we deal with all the time. We're talking about having a more fulsome participation in this report so we can table it. Right now, all we have is the report prepared by the consultant that we hired, and we just put our cover on it.
So, as I did before, I'm suggesting that you send a letter directly to the insisting that he meet with Dr. Franks. I think that, frankly, Dr. Franks has a strong enough character to not be bamboozled or persuaded, as some people suggested in the last meeting, but rather to determine areas that he may not have fully investigated, where there might be some nuances, where there might be some additional text added to this report.
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I find it interesting that opposition members say we can't direct individuals who are not part of this committee on how they should behave, but that's exactly what this protocol proposes to do. It proposes to direct deputy ministers, who have no fiduciary relationship with this committee, on how they ought to behave. This is done without any collaboration with the executive branch of government, for which those deputy ministers work.
Make up your mind, friends. Either you think you can direct others by this committee or you can't.
Furthermore, we did direct Mr. Franks to meet with members of the government. He says he wasn't successful in obtaining those meetings. Well, I can assure you that the is ready to meet with them. He's also ready to testify in front of this group.
I suppose there are some people who do not believe their arguments will stand up against his and they have therefore avoided having him here in the first place. Now we're stuck with a protocol that will undermine ministerial responsibility, and opposition members will have to explain that to their constituents.
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You know, in my life experience, communication between people who have power makes a lot of sense. I think common sense would tell you that. There are things that were in the guidelines that I personally didn't agree with. The Treasury Board guidelines suggested this committee should be well behaved when we're dealing with accounting officers before us. Well, everybody on this committee knows you don't get before this committee without having stepped out of line somehow, and you're going to hear about it on this committee.
To me, there are things on both sides that I think would make the meeting constructive. We say it's an ongoing process. If our committee is going to be opposed to having the people who have power getting together to discuss things, how in the world are you ever going to get anything resolved? It seems to me it's a strange argument to say we do not want to meet with the President of the Treasury Board because maybe they might just resolve some of these differences. Some of the points, quite honestly, I think are words, and we're talking about how many angels are dancing at the end of a pin.
I think there could be a lot of merit in these two individuals getting together, and we could all save ourselves a lot of hot air in this committee. But if you don't want communications with government, so be it. You may have what Mr. Christopherson didn't want--a clash between what Treasury Board is telling their people and what we understand it to be here. I think that would be unfortunate.
So I think common sense should dictate that we should try to take that extra step to have the ongoing process in place to improve the guidelines we're using here.