SRID Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, May 6, 2003

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1535

The Chair (Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.))

Mr. Marcus Pistor (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

The Hon. Denis Paradis (Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie))

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1540

¹

1545

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1550

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1555

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1600

Mr. Marc-André Brault (Special envoy for the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

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1605

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

Mr. Marc-André Brault

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1610

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

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1615

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1620

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Denis Paradis

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Marc-André Brault

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1625

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Marc-André Brault

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1635

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Denis Paradis

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.)

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1640

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1645

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

Mr. Denis Paradis

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1650

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Denis Paradis

Mr. Marc-André Brault

The Chair

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Marc-André Brault

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1655

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Marc-André Brault

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.)

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1700

Mr. Denis Paradis

Mr. André Harvey

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1705

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.)

Mr. Denis Paradis

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1710

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Denis Paradis

Mr. Robert Peck (Director General, Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

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1715

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Marc-André Brault

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

Mr. Marc-André Brault

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1720

The Chair

Mr. Marc-André Brault

The Chair

Mr. Denis Paradis

The Chair

Mr. Marcus Pistor

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

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1725

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Beth Phinney

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

Ms. Beth Phinney

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Deepak Obhrai

The Chair

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CANADA

Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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NUMBER 007

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, May 6, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

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[Translation]

    The Chair (Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)): I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Honourable Denis Paradis, Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, and La Francophonie, and to our witnesses today, Marc-André Brault, who is a special envoy to the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, and Robert Peck, Director General, Africa.

[English]

    I just want to say that today is the last meeting of the subcommittee on human rights on the particular issue of the humanitarian catastrophe in Africa. We will be continuing and moving on to the Sudan, but this will be our concluding meeting of the series of hearings we have held on the humanitarian catastrophe in Africa. Therefore, I want to bring to your attention

[Translation]

that the researchers might benefit from our advice concerning the content of the report and the recommendations.

[English]

    We are going to be preparing a report with recommendations. It's going to be prepared by Marcus Pistor. We will be addressing that report at the meeting on Wednesday, May 28, so I would urge you to get your recommendations to Marcus as soon as possible to give him sufficient time to prepare the report, so that it can properly reference your concerns and recommendations.

    Marc, do you want to make any comment?

    Mr. Marcus Pistor (Committee Researcher): That's fine.

[Translation]

    The Chair: All right. I'll give the floor now to the Minister, the Honourable Denis Paradis.

     The Hon. Denis Paradis (Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie)): Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to come here to discuss the humanitarian catastrophes in several African states. Some senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency told you last month about the progress made in recent years in the resolution of conflicts in Africa, while pointing our that unfortunately there remain many humanitarian disasters to be resolved.

    I am particularly happy to be with you today and I recall with joy the fine days I spent on the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. I am here out of concern to share information, of course, but also to get your point of view and your suggestions, because I very much believe in even greater and more active participation by parliamentarians in Canada's foreign policy.

    You have expressed a particular interest in the most important political and humanitarian crisis in Africa, the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. So I thought I should concentrate today on this terrible event.

    In this connection, I have invited Marc-André Brault, our special envoy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the Great Lakes region of Africa, to come with me. Mr. Brault has twice been assistant deputy minister for Africa in the department and ambassador to South Africa, when the very first democratic elections in this country were held. Mr. Robert Peck, Director General, Africa, from the department, also joins us. We will willingly answer all your questions about the Great Lakes region of Africa and other subjects pertaining to Africa following the presentation I am going to make.

    First of all, let's talk about the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The conflict in the Great Lakes region and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is quite complex. There are actually several conflicts, which are all partly related one to another. We've brought a map and later, if there are any questions, we can refer to it to have a better idea of the region as a whole.

    The civil war in Uganda, which saw President Museveni overthrow the brutal dictator Obote, the civil war in Sudan, which eventually led to the war between Sudan and Uganda, the genocide of the Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda and the aftermath of that catastrophe, the civil war which is still going on in Burundi, the one in Angola between Savimbi and the MPLA government of Luanda, the civil wars in Congo-Brazzaville and in the Central African Republic, all these conflicts have a strong Congolese tinge.

    Their chief characteristics are first that these conflicts have nearly all unfolded in part on Congolese territory or with Congolese players, because the Zaire of the time, which is now the Congo, was and still is a failed state, as they say in English. Everyone could come and do what they felt like.

    The second characteristic is that these wars caused atrocious humanitarian crises in the country itself and also devastated populations all along the Congolese border, finally spilling over into the entire Congolese territory.

    The great war of the Congo began in the mid-1990s. Rwanda and Uganda were dealing with an unsustainable problem: rebels and génocidaires were hiding in the Congolese jungle and everyday were attacking the border villages. To settle the problem, Presidents Kagame of Rwanda and Museveni of Uganda decided to recruit a certain Laurent Désiré Kabila, who for the past 20 years, has wanted to overthrow Mobutu. By looking at the map, we can see better what took place.

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    Kabila had to leave his hideout in southeast Zaire and go back towards the north, opposite Burundi and Rwanda, up to the edge of Uganda, eliminating rebels and génocidaires along the way. He started the job he was supposed to, but changed his mind along the way and decided instead to march towards Kisangani. Then he went to Kinshasa. Two weeks later, he overthrew Mobutu and declared himself president in his stead.

    In 1998, allying themselves with two important Congolese rebel groups that wanted to overthrow Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda invaded the Congo to eliminate the génocidaires. Within a few weeks, these four armies were at the gates of Kinshasa. Kabila, somewhat disturbed, asked for help from his friends. Armies from Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Angola came to his rescue. To improve his odds, Kabila even recruited the infamous génocidaires as mercenaries, and with the help of all these people, Kabila saved his régime. So in all, in the Congo, there were: six foreign armies, two large rebel armies, the government army, two armies of génocidaires and several small rebel and nationalist groups. It was a fairly complicated situation. The 13 main belligerents were then in a balanced situation, the battles continued, but with less intensity. The humanitarian disaster still went on.

    The Organization of African Unity took advantage of a lull and in 1999 negotiated the Lusaka Agreement, which in its military provisions established a ceasefire and organized the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo. In its political provisions, it instituted a dialogue among all the Congolese in order to get the rebels, the government, civil society and politicians to sit down and organize a transition and eventually elections in the Congo.

    Six months later, Laurent Désiré Kabila was assassinated in his office. His son, Joseph, took over from him a few days later. Namibia and Chad withdrew their troops, as provided under the Lusaka Agreement. But the Rwandans said they wouldn't withdraw until the last génocidaire in the Congo had been eliminated. Uganda said the same thing about its rebels. It was inconceivable for them to return to their country without having settled the problem that had brought them to the Congo. Angola and Zimbabwe consequently said they were obliged to stay where they were. The international community was deeply divided at that time. The United Kingdom supported Rwanda and Uganda, and asked Kabila to stop supporting those responsible for the genocide, promising that once that happened, they would ask Kagame and Museveni to withdraw their troops from the Congo. France felt on the contrary that Rwanda and Uganda had illegally invaded the Congo and that they should first withdraw, and that the génocidaires and rebels would be taken care of later.

    That is when Mr. Brault was appointed Canadian special envoy. His mandate was to work with the representatives of half a dozen foreign powers to find solutions that would lead the Congo to lasting peace. By the way, I wish to congratulate Mr. Brault for the outstanding job he has done. He then felt that Canada could help resolve this conflict by ensuring that there was better coordination within the international community. Mr. Brault visited his colleagues in Washington, Europe and New York City. At Canada's instigation, the United Nations organized, in summer 2002, a special meeting of experts in order to reach a more coordinated international approach. A few weeks later, the Secretary General of the United Nations and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa invited Kabila and Kagame to sit down at the table and negotiated an agreement whereby Rwanda undertook to withdraw its troops in the next 90 days, while Kabila undertook to stop supporting those responsible for the genocide.

    One month later, a similar agreement was concluded by Presidents Kabila and Museveni, whereby Uganda undertook to withdraw nearly all its troops from the Congo. With the withdrawal of troops from Rwanda and Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola no longer had any reason for being in the Congo and also withdrew their troops. Finally, the Congo was rid of foreign troops.

    In fall 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien decided to involve Canada more substantially in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Canada would provide large financial resources to the facilitators of the Dialogue, would open an office for its people in Kinshasa, help various Congolese groups to define positions and pay transportation costs for them to attend the various Dialogue meetings.

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    In February 2002, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue met in plenary sessions in South Africa. The Congolese had to agree on a constitution, on transition institutions and the sharing of power. The meeting was a success, since 37 agreements were concluded there, but agreement could not be reached on two crucial points: the formation of an integrated army and the division of power, each one wanting too large a piece of the pie.

    Our special envoy asked the Congolese, his colleagues and the United Nations to make an extra effort to settle these two issues in order to reach an overall agreement. With the help of the United States, they got the Secretary General to make the former Prime Minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niasse, his super special envoy. Niasse got negotiations under way again, and on April 2, an overall agreement was passed, thus ending the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

    President Kabila proclaimed the transitional constitution on April 4 -- you see that it is quite recent -- and was sworn in on April 7. The transitional government should be in place within a few weeks. But there's still a lot to do.

    First, all hostilities must cease, and bandits and armed groups be disarmed. There are still several conflicts in the east, conflicts between ethnic groups or between rebel movements. There's fighting because there are still génocidaires in the Congo that Rwanda wants to eliminate. There's fighting because there's rivalry between Uganda and Rwanda. There's also fighting because people want to illegally exploit more natural resources. We know that the Congo is very rich in natural resources.

    Second, we must continue to help the population. According to the United Nations, the war has taken, since 1996, the lives of some three million Congolese. It's a real humanitarian disaster, and we are still facing this huge humanitarian disaster. There have been no hospitals, no dispensaries, no medicine, no food supplies, no clean water -- since 1998. In some regions, over 50% of the children under five have died for lack of care. And I'm not even talking about all the Congolese who have been tortured, beaten, robbed, raped and been given AIDS.

    Third, the Congo must also be rebuilt. There's no longer anything. There are no more roads, no more bridges, no more telephones, no more electricity in most of the country. There are no more schools, hospitals or departments that work. There's no more police, no more national army. There's absolutely nothing left.

    Fourth, the transition government must decide on its priorities, the National Assembly and Senate must adopt dozens of laws, and everything has to be got under way. Departments and a public service must be created, and public servants trained and hired to enforce these laws.

    Fifth, money will have to be found, lots of money. Although the Congo is a rich country, there's no money in the bank anymore. It has enormous debts, and what I've just explained will cost several tens of billions of dollars. There's no doubt that it will eventually have enough tax revenue to meet its needs, but it will take many years before it gets there.

    Sixth, free and democratic elections must be organized within the next 30 months. That will also be quite a challenge. the Congo is the second largest country in Africa, right after Nigeria. It's a huge country with some 50 million inhabitants, two-thirds covered in jungle and, as I mentioned, without roads, telephones or above all actual election experience. Organizing elections is therefore quite a challenge.

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[English]

    I'll try to speak a little bit about Canada's role.

    Canada's involvement in the resolution of the Congolese conflict is motivated by a number of considerations. Certainly there are foreign policy considerations, including international security and medium- and long-term economic potential. But above all, there are humanitarian factors. We must try to alleviate the suffering of these Congolese people, and promote measures through the United Nations to improve their human security.

    Canada has the expertise and means to help resolve this type of conflict. Mr. Brault has been working toward this goal for 18 months now. He has been using Canada's influence with the international community, including our relationships with the Europeans, the Americans, and the Africans. And he has been bringing together the department and Canadian non-governmental organizations active in the Congo.

    Our small mission in Kinshasa maintains a policy of open communication with the Congolese. Canada has shared, and will continue to share, its expertise with the Congo to help it rebuild and become one of Africa's principal economic forces.

    The Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA, has already invested a substantial amount in the new Congo. Since 1998, CIDA has spent close to $80 million, largely in humanitarian aid. While this aid has primarily targeted the eastern part of the country, it has also been used to support certain specific projects--for example, the resolution of political problems within the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and for assistance in the areas of economy and health. In light of the forthcoming return—in a couple of weeks, not the long term—to peace and to a legitimate government, the Minister for International Cooperation recently asked her officials to study the most efficient way possible by which CIDA could help, along with the Congolese and the main donor countries, in the country's reconstruction.

    I also want to reaffirm Canada's commitment to Africa as a whole. Since the summit in Kananaskis, Canada has been implementing the G-8's Africa action plan in response to NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development. The Prime Minister has stated his commitment to doing all that he can to ensure that world events will not eclipse Africa's needs. At Kananaskis, we promised the Africans that we would help them resolve certain conflicts, including the current crisis in the Congo. We said that we would help the Africans who are ready to help themselves.

    Through the success of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the Congolese have demonstrated that they are tired of war and the violation of human rights, and that they want to reconstruct a functioning country for themselves, with democratic institutions and a government free from corruption.

[Translation]

    This is the spirit in which we want to help the Congolese quickly resolve their humanitarian crisis and in which we want to help all countries in the region to develop in a favourable political and economic environment. Thank you very much for your attention.

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    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your analysis, your observations and your recommendations for our committee

[English]

as well as your references to Canada's role with respect to the conflict in the Congo.

    We'll now begin with questions. I'll ask my colleague, Deepak Obhrai, to begin the questioning.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Minister.

    Could you quickly outline the situation of who controls the diamond trade in Congo right now? I think the Zimbabweans came over there to control it, but who really controls it? Is it the rebels? The blood diamonds are one of the causes fuelling the war there.

    Secondly, you have claimed that, overall, the foreign armies have left the Congo, but I keep hearing reports that both the Rwandan the Ugandan armies still have a presence in the Congo, and that they haven't actually left. So that is one of the issues to discuss.

    You concentrated on the Congo and the steps that have been taken already. The Congo is a big issue, and I'm not denying the crisis that has taken place there, especially as it has been terrible. But I think we are on a road map to peace for Congo, which I hope will succeed. But at the end of the day, we need to look at the other factor, which is Zimbabwe. If you're not very careful there, we're going to have a humanitarian crisis of bigger proportions taking place in Zimbabwe.

    As of today, can you tell us your latest information, minus what's in the papers? What has happened and what is the progress of the peace mission to Zimbabwe by the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, and Malawi? As quickly as possible, what is the latest information on how the problems in that region are being resolved?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I will first start with a few comments on Zimbabwe, and after that I'll ask Marc-André Brault to respond to your other two questions. He has been in the Congo for the last 18 months.

    As you mentioned, there was a meeting in Zimbabwe with South Africa, Malawi, and Nigeria. The meeting was with President Robert Mugabe, and with the leader of the opposition as well. The international committee represented by those three countries was trying to get the opposition to talk with Mugabe's regime. From what we heard, there were good discussions and it went well.

    The whole international community is certainly looking at Zimbabwe and seeing, just as you mentioned, the deterioration of the economy and of everything in Zimbabwe. So we have to find a means.... There will be CMAG meeting on Zimbabwe next December. As you may be aware, we're pursuing our policies regarding Zimbabwe with the Commonwealth until that time, when there will be a re-evaluation of the situation. In the meantime, we certainly applaud the presence of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo and the President of Malawi in trying to arrange things in Zimbabwe. But we'll see what's going to happen, or the improvement, until December. You are right that we have to do it fast, because of the deterioration of the situation over there.

    On the two other points, diamonds and the presence of the Ugandan army in the Congo, I'll ask Mr. Brault to make a few comments, if he wishes.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Marc-André Brault (Special envoy for the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you, Mr. Minister.

[English]

    First, on the diamonds, there is an excellent report on the illegal exportation of natural resources in the Congo written by a UN panel, a group of experts, and deposited by the Security Council on October 16, 2002. It deals with everything--gold, diamonds, coltan, woods, and it is good reading. I encourage everybody who is interested in Africa and pilferage to read that report. It's excellent.

    At the same time, there are some areas where the report is not very clear, and there are some companies who have been accused of this or that, and they contended they were not given the fair chance to defend themselves. Therefore, the panel has been given another six months by the Security Council to clear this up and come back with new conclusions. Diamonds are dealt with extensively in that report.

    If you look at the map, I'll point out the main diamond areas. You have some close to Uganda, some in the south, and some in this area here. In fact, there are three groups.... This area is controlled by one group of rebels in Uganda. There's another group of rebels, the RCD, in Rwanda, and here it's government and to some extent Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was very extensively involved in diamonds.

    When Zimbabwe came to the aid of Laurent Désiré Khabila, it was a pretty expensive operation. At that time, Désiré Khabila signed agreements with Zimbabwe whereby they could have access to some very good mining areas and mines that were already operating, so Zimbabwe got a lot of diamonds in exchange for its help.

    Again, the best way is probably to go through the report; it's pretty long and extensive. There are groups of probably foreign politicians, army generals, rebels, all intertwined, and all get access to some of these diamonds. To some extent they need money, they need revenue to wage war, and as usual, diamonds, gold, and other natural resources are being used.

    There is no direct control by one group, one set of criminals, or one general. There are at least three. One is legitimate--now the government--although some people are saying the government was not legitimate because even though Laurent Désiré Khabila came to Kinshasa before the others, it's still a rebel group like the others. They were all using these diamonds one way or another.

    If you look, for example, at the statistics, Rwanda claims it is producing diamonds, but it is minute. If you look at the statistics, a substantial amount of diamonds have left Rwanda. The Central African Republic, Uganda...a lot of diamonds are going that way. And to some extent, in the past diamonds were being traded in Kisangani. There was a major fight between Uganda and Rwanda over control of Kisangani because of the control of the diamond trade. Finally, Rwanda, to some extent, got a little bit of the upper hand in Kisangani, but they destroyed that diamond-trading route and diamond trading is now done across the borders, to some extent, in the Central African Republic.

    But as long as there is war, it will be very difficult to control. Even now, with that war almost over, with this government coming into place, until the government has a national police and a national army and until everybody around agrees to play by fair rules and keep the diamonds of the Congo in the Congo, instead of using their borders to pass them across and sell them, and en passant take a good chunk of the profit, it will continue forever.

    The solution to this diamond and gold trade, the illegal exportation and trading, is a government in the Congo with institutions, good mining codes, and good trading rules.

    I don't know if this answers your question enough.

    An hon. member: It gives a good picture.

    An hon. member: The other point is to get an army.

     Mr. Marc-André Brault: The point is armies.

    First, let's take Rwanda. Rwanda is in pursuit of the genocidaire. They went through--

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    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): They say that.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Well, they say that. I can't correct that. But the main purpose of the war started in 1996 and 1998 was to go after the genocidaires. The genocidaires were not beaten everywhere, they would disappear somehow in the bush in the jungle. And because the genocidaires were there and the government in Kinshasa would not or could not do much about it, because they didn't have a real government to go after these people, they stayed there.

    Now, in an agreement called the Pretoria Agreement, in 2002, there was agreement that Rwanda would pull its troops out of the Congo on the condition that Khabila, the government of Kinshasa, would stop supporting the genocidaires, who, you'll remember, Laurent Désiré Khabila used to defend himself in Kinshasa, as mercenaries. Since then the government of Kinshasa has always supported the genocidaires. In this agreement, for the first time, the government of Kinshasa accepted and agreed publicly to stop supporting the genocidaires, therefore confirming that they had been helping these people for quite a while.

    Rwanda pulled all its troops out. Khabila turned over two leaders of the genocidaires to justice, to the international court, but didn't do much about the others. Again, it's not necessarily because he didn't want to, although even if he was all that keen to do it, in fact he could not really do so, especially since the genocidaires were in rebel-held territory. To go there he had to beat the rebels, and then try to beat them. So it was rather complicated.

    Since that happened, people are saying there's still trouble there, and constantly we hear about Rwandans still being there. Rwanda pulled back, but then on the side they sent their troops back, and civilians and all that. The UN, MONUC, which is present everywhere, has never found any evidence of that. Also, South Africa, which is part of the mechanism of the Pretoria Agreement with the UN to observe and check and all that, has not found any evidence of Rwandan troops being there.

    That's not to say there are not Rwandans in the Congo. I personally believe, although I cannot prove it, that Rwanda has some strategy, people in the Congo, to ensure that these genocidaires--who by the way have said it will take them fifty years, but they will go back to Rwanda and finish the job.... So Rwanda is very concerned about ensuring these genocidaires don't come too close to their border. Therefore, as I said, I suspect they have some people with the RCD, the Congolese rebels, allied to them, some people there to check and ensure that they know what's going on with the genocidaires. So Rwanda's troops are out, but they might have some people in strategic places.

    As far as Uganda is concerned, by the Luanda Agreement, a couple of months after the Pretoria Agreement, Uganda had agreed to pull its troops out of the Congo. But this was in the northeast, with all kinds of conflicts there--ethnic conflicts and a lot of conflicts over natural resources, people stealing and all that.

    So Khabila at the time of the agreement with Uganda, which said all Ugandan troops out, asked them--or the Ugandans offered--to leave a few people there, a few battalions, because there's no law, no order, nothing, and there are plenty of arms and munitions that have been sent by all parties. To some extent, some people are saying, it's like sending the wolf among the lambs.

    Uganda was there. People were saying Ugandan generals were filling their pockets. If it was too calm, they would create some problem somewhere by sending more arms to one side than the other. It would flare up again and then they'd say, “We have to be here. Look at all the trouble going on.” So Uganda was there.

    After a while the international community said enough is enough. We talked to Uganda. We talked to Kinshasa, and said it cannot be worse, with what is going on, so why don't you slowly ask Uganda to get out.

    While you have peace now, don't forget that in the middle here, you have the MLC rebel group, and Kinshasa is here. To go into the trouble area here, you have to pass through rebel territory. Now that there is agreement under the dialogue, these rebel groups are part of the government. So now you can send, whenever you are ready, police, army, or whatever you have. You can send them there and try to bring order.

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    The idea was that Uganda would send its people out. Kinshasa would send some police. Then UNOC, the UN mission in Congo, would also send more people there.

    Uruguay has agreed to send 500 people, and probably South Africa as well. So Uruguay and South Africa, with some police from Kinshasa, are just going to ride the roads over there to ensure that everything....

    So that would provide an opportunity for Uganda to go out. I think Uganda has pulled one battalion and a half in the past week. They still have some to do. It's slow, because to some extent it is true that they're getting good return on investment there. So it will take probably another couple of weeks or a month before they're completely out. During that time, well, abuse of human rights is rampant everywhere.

    When they'll be out, will it be completely quiet? It won't. These tribal and ethnic conflicts have been going on for years. It will take years to solve them, as well, but the only thing we all ask for is to turn the volume off. Then eventually, with the central government in Kinshasa, formed of everybody, we should address these two conflict zones, one in Kivu and one in the northeast, for the long term.

    To answer your question, there are a few officers, a few Rwandan strategic officers, and some Ugandan troops in the Congo, but the troops are moving out. As far as Rwanda is concerned, I think publicly they'll be very, very careful, now that there is a central government in Congo, very careful about leaving some people there, leaving some cat paws everywhere. So I think it should resolve itself.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Excellent. Thank you.

    The Chair: Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you. My colleague Yves Rocheleau was supposed to be here, but he's in another country in Africa, where he's working to prevent the problems from becoming worse. He's in Ivory Coast.

    In the report you read to us, Mr. Minister, I detect a contradiction. Mr. Brault, who was special envoy, will certainly be able to enlighten us. I'm quite familiar with the United Nations report mentioned and I have used it, notably in our work on the diamond bill. This report is really worth reading.

    I say there's a contradiction because in the United Nations report, when they talk about the area controlled by Rwanda, they say this, for example:

Rwanda justified the ongoing presence of its armed forces with security reasons, whereas their real long-term objective consisted, to use the terms employed by the Congo Bureau of the PRO, to "acquire goods for themselves." The Rwandan leaders managed to convince the international community that their military presence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was intended to protect the country against hostile groups found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who according to them are actively preparing to invade Rwanda.

The Group of Experts has plenty of evidence to the contrary.

    They add a little later: "The contribution of the Congo Bureau to the military expenditures of Rwanda may therefore have been about $320 million," whereas the official budget of Rwanda itself provided $80 million, thus 20% of military spending. It's just an idea. I continue: The "area controlled by Uganda..."

    Forgive me, but you give one explanation that I find a bit simplistic of the génocidaires and others, when we can see that the presence in the Congo was largely motivated. In the introduction, they even say:

The departure of their forces will hardly reduce the economic control they exert or the means they have for exercising such control, the use of the national armies being only one of the many tools to which they have recourse.

    It seems to me that the report should be subtler. If we want to settle problems, Mr. Brault, the causes have to be clearly identified, as you know. You could have pointed out that Kagame, when he invaded Rwanda or decided to come back, left Uganda too. The story, as you clearly said at the beginning, is very intermingled.

    So I find there's a contradiction. You say in your report, Mr. Minister, that there are two theses, that of Great Britain and the United States, and that of France and others. It seems to me that you opt outright for the American thesis, though without enhancing it with what is found in the United Nations report. That's one thing that worries me because history lasts long a long time. My first career was in history.

    Second, there's the importance of reconstruction, if I may express myself in this way. This is going to take place in a context of domestic instability, and you said it. We hope that finally this plan will work -- we'll keep our fingers crossed -- in spite of the size of the forces inside that have an interest in its failing and their being able to go on acting as before. Among these forces are no doubt the Canadian companies that are named. If you have any news about that, let us know. It's worrisome, since over 3 million people have died in the most dreadful conditions because, as you pointed out, there is nothing.

    In these circumstances, I'd like to know what portion of the $500 million that Canada has announced will go towards the reconstruction of the Congo.

º  (1615)  

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Before giving the floor to Mr. Brault, I'd like to make a few general comments. Things need to be put into a broader context. In that region, natural resources are extremely abundant; it's unbelievable. Even though they say there are 50 million people and there's nothing, there's nevertheless a lot of natural resources. There are so many that everyone is grabbing onto them to get as much as they can and fill their pockets. This is the first thing I'd like to say about the context.

    Second, you raised the issue of the United States' position in relation to that of France. As I mentioned a little while ago, we saw the positions were different and we didn't take sides. Mr. Brault was appointed special envoy and he recommended that we try to unite the whole international community so as to avoid people squaring off against one another. This is sort of Mr. Brault's role, which was to work with half a dozen countries, as I said earlier, to work towards reaching a solution there. As I mentioned, at one point, he put pressure on the Secretary General of the United Nations for there to be a special envoy with special status, because there remained two points to be settled in this agreement. I think that Mr. Brault did an excellent job.

    There's also the matter of reconstruction. I'm going to deal with three points quickly and then, I'm going to let Mr. Brault add to this answer. It's true that there were 3 million dead, and that's abominable. We were talking about reconstruction costs, which might rise to tens of billions of dollars. As I mentioned earlier, we'll never have enough money. And where are we going to get this money? I'll come back in a few seconds to the $500 million dollars, but we'll need billions and billions of dollars.

    I can think of situations like the one in the Congo where they need hospitals, roads, telephones, water, sewage systems, etc. If we want to rebuild Africa, we need all those things. Uganda is one example, but there are other African countries that also have huge needs. There's also one closer to us that I can't help but mention, and that's Haiti, which needs all kinds of resources to rebuild itself.

    I think that, overall, we need to work on finding new methods. Even if the international community tried to get together as much money as possible, it would still be short. I come back to the $500 million that we parliamentarians approved here a year ago. In Africa, south of the Sahara, there are 700 million citizens, half of whom do not even earn a dollar a day. You will understand that with $500 million we can't go very far. We can easily give them a dollar for one day, but afterwards, we won't have any more money, and that's just one day.

    We really have to come up with some new ideas. There's a lot more innovation and creativity when it's a matter of funding war than when it's a matter of funding peace, or reconstructions, or anti-poverty struggles. So I think we should adopt a sort of overall approach to try and find new methods. Allow me one last comment. When we had to finance World War II, in which we wanted to take part but didn't have the money, people invented the "Victory bonds," a new method at the time.

    I'll stop there to let you talk, and Mr. Brault may then wish to add to this answer.

º  (1620)  

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: I'd like to add something. I talked about Canadian companies whose ways of operating are openly criticized. I asked Minister Axworthy, and then the other two ministers after him, as well as John Manley and Bill Graham, if they intended to amend the Special Economic Measures Act in order to have some leverage in relation to these companies, which must most certainly do damage to Canada's reputation. What we have seen in this regard is clear. I'd like to know whether you have considered measures in this regard.

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Of course, as we've seen in Sudan and elsewhere, we encourage Canadian companies to abide by the international code of ethics of Canadian companies. They are strongly urged. You suggest we should go further, but if we go further, we have to do it along with the entire international community. If Canada acts alone in one place, it won't have the necessary impact. If you take away one Canadian company because you're stricter than someone else, there'll be another one coming in the back door. So these are things that have to be carried out along with the whole international community.

    Perhaps Mr. Brault would like to add something to this answer.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Mr. Chair, there are three relevant points.

    There has been talk of contradictions and it was said that Rwandans were present in the Congo to illegally exploit the country's resources.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: That's what the report says.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Rwanda, of course, says it's false, and this is one of the reasons, moreover, why the Panel of Experts had another six-month period to prove its allegations. It's very difficult to do, but the Panel affirmed that Rwanda had waged war in order to steal resources from the Congo. It's not so simple as that. You have to understand the context. Put yourself in the place of the Rwandans. The Hutus killed 800,000 Tutsis in two weeks. The Tutsis then took control of the situation and pursued the Hutus. The Hutus then hid in the jungle, on the other side of the border, and promised to reorganize and come back, saying that the job was not over and that they'd come back to finish it.

    Every night, they attacked the little Rwandan villages along the border. Certainly the Rwandan government could not allow this to happen. It tried all sorts of things. We talked about Laurent Désiré Kabila. Nobody said so, but the Rwandan government, seeing that Laurent Désiré Kabila wouldn't do what he'd promised, tried to overthrow him and kill him in Kinshasa so as to be able to appoint someone who would settle the issue of the génocidaires. Laurent Désiré Kabila learned that a coup d'État was being mounted against him. So he chased away lots of people from Kinshasa to ensure security, and two weeks later, Rwanda decided with Uganda to penetrate the Congo to settle the issue of the génocidaires, particularly since they'd asked the United Nations to settle the problem. At the United Nations, nobody had responded to their request, not Canada, not the United States, not Europe. Nobody was interested in sending troops into the Congolese jungle to do battle with the génocidaires. There's really no doubt that the purpose of the Rwandans, by waging war in 1998 in the Congo, was to pursue the génocidaires. For Uganda, it's another story.

    The United Nations report says that they took the opportunity to pillage the Congo's natural resources. Rwanda is a small poor country, that has almost no money. Everyone knows what it costs to operate an army outside its country. It's hard to know whether there were 30,000 or 50,000 Rwandan soldiers in the Congo. In any case, the money had to be found somewhere. The Rwandans and rebels that controlled this region therefore took advantage of the chance to pick up what they could. They emptied all the mining companies' shelves of gold, diamonds, etc. and when there wasn't anything left, they pillaged machinery left and right, and continued drilling and forced the Congolese living near the mines to dig to find other diamonds because they had to finance their troops.

    This is a good question. If there hadn't been any natural resources, would the Rwandans have stayed as long? Obviously not. They couldn't have, because they couldn't afford to. Of course, the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo meant that the conflict went on and on. It was the same thing in Uganda and it was the same thing in the Kinshasa government, which used Zimbabweans, Angolans too, but to a lesser extent, to defend itself. It told them to use natural resources to pay themselves, specifying that there was enough for everyone in any case.

    The Panel claims that the primary purpose pursued by Rwanda was to pillage the resources, but certainly not at the outset. It's still there. Could it have left before? Probably. In any case, if they were really after the resources in the first place, why would they have used so many soldiers, especially since it is said they can achieve the same results by other means? One of these other means would be to do like all the companies, that is, sign agreements with the government in place in Kinshasa, pay the royalties and taxes. They would have had access to the resources this way, but legally.

    I could go on, but I'll stop, because I think you get the idea. As the minister pointed out, reconstruction is extremely important. The minister responsible for CIDA asked her staff to see what role Canada could play. This will be a gigantic operation, not only for Canada, but also for all OECD countries. We're all going to take part. What can Canada do better and more effectively than others? What's the best way to spend our little bit of money? All the countries are going to have to answer the same question. Some countries are better where health care is concerned, others education, others telephone systems, and so on. Everyone will help the Congolese in one area.

º  (1625)  

    Probably everything will be coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme, the UNDP, and the World Bank and all the donors, in cooperation with the Congolese in place, of course.

    In the Experts' report on the illegal exploitation of resources in the Congo, they say, in Appendix 3, that some companies have breached the OECD guidelines respecting multinational businesses. But these guidelines are voluntary. People do not have to put them into practice; people do so if they want to.

    The companies that are breaching these guidelines are not illegally exploiting resources in the Congo. Nothing in the report indicates that they are doing so, but what's unfortunate is that this is a report that deals with the illegal exploitation of natural resources. At the end of the report, an appendix is added in which are indicated the companies that have breached the guidelines of the OECD.

    Of course, the first thing the government asked us to do when the report was issued was to contact the Canadian companies to find out what was up. Not only were there no illegal actions involved, but also most of them had done nothing wrong.

    Companies that had exploited natural resources as of 1998 in the Congo were listed. Some of them were not even there. They had had concessions up to 1996 or 1998, but with the start of the war, their concessions were stolen because they were located in areas occupied by the rebels. Money was demanded of others, and they refused. Some of these companies don't even have any activities in the Congo anymore.

    For example, it was explained to one of the companies that funds were passed into government hands at some point, but even in that case, the Panel of Experts did not conclude that this company had done anything illegal. It included the company in Appendix 3 among the companies that hadn't followed the OECD guidelines.

    In our opinion, these companies did not do anything reprehensible. We asked the Panel of Experts if they had spoken with these people. They said they had, but in a vague sort of way. We asked them whether they had brought any charges, and if so, whether they had allowed the accused companies to defend themselves. We also asked them whether they had asked these companies for their version of the facts; the answer was evasive, both affirmative and negative.

    For these reasons, we -- and nearly all the countries that have companies involved in this business -- asked the United Nations to have the Panel of Experts re-examine the list and that, should they wish to bring charges or reveal evidence, they give the companies the opportunity to defend themselves. That's what's happening at present. Out of the seven companies, five have gone to meet with the Panel of Experts. I don't know what the results are. I don't know what's happened or what's been said, but at least it's clear that five of the seven companies were sure enough of their facts to go and meet with the Panel of Experts and explain their case. One of them, which is in operation, demonstrated that not only did it comply with the guidelines, but surpassed them by far.

    The next report by the Panel of Experts will be final; it will probably be presented about mid- or late July. It's their responsibility to clear the name of any companies that shouldn't have figured in their report.

    Meanwhile, we're in touch with the Canadian companies, not only in the Congo but here and there across the country, to make sure that the OECD guidelines, which indicate how multinational companies should conduct themselves in a region of conflict, are disseminated better and adopted by more Canadian companies.

    In Canada, we already have a system that comes pretty close to these guidelines. Canadian companies overall conduct themselves quite well abroad. I know that in the Congo, from having been there and talked to numerous people, nobody is pointing a finger at us.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Unlike Talisman.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Indeed. Let's suppose that you are a company operating a mine in a country in conflict, where there's a civil war, rebels and so on, as is the case in the Congo. You exploit resources, you provide jobs for people in the area and you have an agreement with the central government; you pay taxes or royalties to it and this money is used to buy arms, to pay employees or to do something else.

    Because there's a conflict, must all economic activity stop and must the population suffer even more? It's an extremely difficult moral issue to decide.

º  (1635)  

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: It remains that Mr. Axworthy had a lot of trouble with Talisman; it was established by his adviser that the company got war to resume by funding...

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: I'm not talking about Talisman in particular but about the general situation. Everyone, including the OECD and the United Nations, are asking themselves whether in areas of conflict, multinational companies that have the means to invest and hire lots of people on-site should stop all activity as soon as a conflict begins or whether, on the contrary, they should continue their activities in accordance with the guidelines, as cleanly as possible, making sure that the local community doesn't suffer more from the situation.

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I'd like to add, concerning Talisman, that from what I know, activities are continuing, but Talisman is no longer there. That confirms the example I gave earlier, namely that when one pulls out, another one replaces it.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes, but still...

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Yes, I know.

[English]

    The Chair: Madam Kraft Sloan.

    Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Minister, I've looked at the lists of challenges that you have identified, and they're quite overwhelming. As a new member of this committee and to this particular issue area, I have to tell you that what we've been hearing from witnesses is indeed very overwhelming, particularly when we're talking about an entire continent.

    You have identified a number of solutions, and I applaud you for the work that you and the government have been doing on these solutions. However, in looking at solutions, I do have some concerns that we don't replicate the historical patterns that have led to some of these crises that we're now trying to deal with in other countries, as well as the Africans.

    One of the things you pointed out in your presentation was that we're talking about huge costs. There are huge competing problems around the globe, particularly in your own portfolio. So how can we begin to afford to address some of the problems?

    You have talked about partnerships and trying to be creative. Certainly I always laud anyone who can be creative in solving problems. However, as I stated, my concern is that we do not replicate some of these historical patterns. While I understand that there must be increased participation with the private sector in addressing some of the fundamental humanitarian issues, I do have a concern when I see private sector companies involved in the provision of public sector goods, including water and other kinds of similar infrastructure, for example.

    Mr. Chair, I'm trying to think of the study we undertook over the past few weeks—and indeed, it has been a few weeks. I'm also thinking about making recommendations in a report on some of these dire humanitarian crises that are upon us, and about looking at ways of us approaching a longer-term vision for dealing with these problems.

    One of the things I'm thinking about is the concept or principle of environmental justice. I'm being a little unwieldy in my comments here, because I'm trying to understand what we're doing in terms of the report that will be before us very shortly—although I know that you've come to address very specific concerns.

    On the one hand, you have these insurmountable problems for which you are looking for creative solutions. You will be looking at the private sector as part of that partnership. My concern is that when the private sector has been involved, particularly in the old days of colonialism, and just after the colonial period, local peoples have sometimes not had the economic benefits from the exploitation of natural resources, which is one of the underlying concerns of environmental justice. With that in mind, you would want to encourage a more equitable distribution of economic benefits, and local peoples also have to bear disproportionately the environmental risks and hazards.

    When I talk about these things, these are what lead to starvation and hunger and famine. We're talking about some of the conditions that encourage the spread of HIV/AIDS, etc. So it's not the environment in a very narrow or defined sense that some people think of—that we're going to go out and save a couple of trees. No, we're talking about the very fundamental relationships that human beings have with the natural environment, because I think a lot of the problems in Africa can be seen within that particular dimension. Certainly there are other things as well, such as conflict and the military actions that you have to deal with right now.

º  (1640)  

    I apologize for this very unwieldy question, but in your broader and longer-term thinking, I'm just wondering how you feel the concept of environmental justice could support some of the work you're doing. Does it inform some of the work you're trying to do in Africa, and in the Congo more specifically?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Thank you very much for your question.

    First, I'll talk a little about NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Africa is the poorest continent in the world, where poverty keeps increasing, and life expectancy is going down year after year, to something like 39 years right now. So something had to be done, which is why the Africans themselves or the whole continent proposed a plan, which they've called the New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD.

    In this plan, the target concedes that with all of the help we can get from around the world, we will never get out of the misery we are in unless there is investment. I was giving you the example a few minutes ago of $500 million, which doesn't go too far with the 700 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who are completely starving. They say that we need investment. To get investment in Africa, I would say that we need improvements in three sectors. First is democracy, in which the Congo is coming along pretty well, as Mr. Brault was explaining; second are human rights; and third is good governance. When we talk about good governance, there's one word that comes to my mind—corruption. There should be other ways of getting a permit than by giving the most money to various levels of government. The Africans themselves say that “To get out of the misery, we need investment, and to get investment we have to improve in these three sectors”.

    So I think it's a wonderful step that they've been taking—but it's not going to be done overnight, for sure. It's a plan for the next 10 or 15 years.

    As I mentioned, we decided about a year to ago to vote for $500 million to help Africa. Right now, I would say that we're looking at a different allocation of money within that $500 million. I'll just give you an example. The first $100 million is going to be used for partnership. So out of the $500 million, we put aside $100 million, and we'll ask the private sector to put in another $100 million. So I would say it's going to be a portfolio of $200 million, which should be used to create partnerships between Canadian companies and companies in different African countries. I'm talking about lot of small and medium-sized business. What we've seen until now in Africa are companies who seemingly go there for the targets of diamonds, petroleum, and gold only. But there is much greater need than the extraction of natural resources.

    On our part, I would say that the Canadian government's special $200 million fund should be in effect, or its rules will be known, by next December, or something like that, so that the applications can be made to it.

    Another point is that the Africans themselves have decided who's going to get that special money. The Africans have decided to have a peer evaluation. So the African countries will together decide which countries have made most progress in those three activities of democracy, human rights, and good governance. Having seen the factors to be used in choosing the countries that have improved the most on those criteria, we could not have done better. So that's surely a good thing.

º  (1645)  

    You were talking about HIV/Aids. I happened to go to Ethiopia a few months ago. I'll just tell you about that experience. We were in Ethiopia and I visited a truck company there. There were a thousand truckers working for that company. There is a road between Ethiopia and Djibouti. On that road the trucks go every day to deliver the goods to the port, and there are I don't know how many prostitutes on that road.

    We have a small project there with CIDA. I was meeting with the truckers, and CIDA said they have a project where they inform the truckers first that there is something called HIV/Aids, which is dangerous and can kill them, and then that there are some methods of protection--those two things.

    It worked wonderfully and it didn't cost much. We should really have more and more of those projects. But it's not that easy, either, because the trucker doesn't know how to read, so it's not a good idea to have a pamphlet for him. He doesn't know how to read. They tried different means to make them understand how important it is.

    Another experience I had, I went to different countries with the Prime Minister when we were preparing the Kananaskis summit. At one point the President of Botswana came to me and said, “Mr. Paradis, can you help? I have a 25% rate of HIV/Aids in my country, Botswana. I have the hospitals, I have the equipment, but I have no more doctors, no more nurses. Please help.”

    There is a lot to do, especially with a continent that has 800 million people, of whom 700 million are in the sub-Sahara and live on less than a dollar a day. So there is a lot to do.

    It's why I think we will have to find some new ways--I don't know what--and anybody who would like to contribute.... Cash money is not enough now. Let's contribute all the cash money we can, but it will not go as far as it should, the cash money we have available.

    The Chair: Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you very much.

    In your opening remarks you said that Canada has the means to help resolve this type of conflict. It's on page 5 of your brief. What do you mean by that?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: In what context did I make that remark?

    Mr. Bill Casey: It is under “Canada's Role”, in the second paragraph.

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I've been to many countries in Africa. Canada is not the French. We're not the British. We didn't colonize any people over there, so I would say we're pretty well received everywhere. We arrive there with open minds, with generosity, and we don't do it to get something out of them. We do it because of our nature.

    Another thing, just to give you an example, is what Mr. Brault is doing over there as the special envoy to the Congo. We've seen the deadlock they were in at a certain point, and Mr. Brault made the necessary representations with 600 countries, with the United Nations, to make sure there was another special envoy from the UN to settle the two last points.

    Canada is quite well accepted--not only accepted, but appreciated, I would say, especially in Africa, where maybe I did concentrate my efforts since my nomination. I am doing Latin America, too, and the Francophonie, but there are 29 countries out of 53 in the Francophonie in Africa, so at a certain point they combine.

    We're really well appreciated everywhere, and the fact that we didn't colonize anybody--and maybe that we were colonized, too--is surely.... And we're coming there with our help, our money, and we've been congratulated for that.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Bill Casey: You say the goal is to have free and open democratic elections in 30 months. Is that realistic?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I'll ask Mr. Brault to comment on that.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: If I may, Minister, just on the last point, can I just add two words?

    The Chair: Okay, go ahead.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: We have the expertise. We have the means. We obviously have the language; everybody in the Congo speaks the language. We have a very good reputation in Africa with everybody, with governments and with rebel groups. I went into the jungle and met the groups with some of my colleagues who are there in the back. Everywhere we were extremely well received and protected.

    We're not a country that can come and bang on the table and say you will do this and do that, and if not, we will cut you off. We're not like that, but we have influence. We are part of the Commonwealth, the Francophonie, the UN, the OECD--we're part of everything, and we know everybody, so we can talk to all these people and say why don't we together pass a nice message to president so-and-so in this country or in that country. And we do. And it works.

    When I say we have the influence, it's not all by ourselves. It's because we know where our friends are and how we can get.... And these are noble issues. It's easy to get people to join you on noble issues, and we do. So that's all I wanted to say, because the minister said all the rest.

    Now, 30 months is correct for the Congo. The agreement in the dialogue says 24 months. If, for logistical reasons, six more months are required, this period can be allotted to it, but only once, which means it's 24 to 36 months, period. Now I'm speaking personally, but when you look at this huge country--the Congo is the size of western Europe--

    Mr. Bill Casey: How far is it across, north and south, east and west? How many kilometres?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Well, as I say, it is the size of western Europe. I would say about 1,000 miles by about close to 2,000 miles. It's big. It's huge, and there are no roads.

    But at the same time, MONUC, because of military activities, is extremely well organized and has helicopters, vehicles, and people just about everywhere. They were a little bit deficient on the east side, but they are now getting more resources to have more people there.

    We're all dreaming that maybe we can ask the Security Council to ask MONUC to change its mandate, to allow it to play a leading role in the elections, whereby they could go by helicopter and bring a team with cameras to take pictures of people. For them it's extremely important to go around with their pictures because they've never had a picture. They've never seen a picture in their lives before. Now it will be them.

    And then get the team out and go to the next place, the next place, and the next place, getting the most people registered in this way. Then they can return again for the election in this place, and this place, and this place, and then fly away with the box to the next place and all that.

    It is doable. It's a major organizational challenge, but it's doable if all the major donor countries get together to do it with the UN. It can be done. Now, it will not be a perfect election, but it will be a first democratic election. And to me, even if it's only 75% good, it's better than they've ever had before. So 75% the first time; 80% the second time; 85%, eventually--in four or five elections, we'll be at 100%, but we have to start somewhere.

    So although it's tight, I think we all have to pull and push and ensure that it happens. If we don't have it, the war will start over again. There's no other way.

º  (1655)  

    Mr. Bill Casey: Does President Kabila support this?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Oh, very much so. And it's interesting, if you look at the division of power, President Kabila's group has now established a political arm because they have to go for election, and his group is more interested in government in social issues. They want to be ministers of health, education, development--close to the people. They're thinking election.

    Others are interested in minister of defence, the economy. So, yes, President Kabila would go to an election tomorrow if he could because he knows he can win very, very easily; so for him, the sooner the better.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Is he pretty popular?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Well, he is popular if you're going into the main centres where they know him because of the press. There's pretty good press in the Congo. If you go into the jungle and all that, they don't know him. They don't know anybody.

    Mr. Bill Casey: How old is he?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Joseph is 27, 28, around there. Let's say, at the top, 30.

    So he is popular, to some extent because when he came in, replacing his father, there was nothing moving. He said, “We will push the Lusaka Agreement, whereby all armies have to get out and whereby we Congolese have to sit around the table. That will be my only priority.”

    And against all odds, he did it. He really did it. And everybody thought he would get killed two or three weeks later, but he managed it, and the Congolese know that he did it. And because of that, he and his people....

    Also, in the panel report on the illegal exportation of natural resources, there were some very high-up, tough political ministers in his government and he brushed them aside because of the report. The report blamed these people, and he pushed them off. Again, we thought, “Oh, my God, what will happen tomorrow?” Nothing happened because now, more and more, he has the support his people, and now it would be a risk to try to eliminate him because of that.

    So, as I say, he's very much in control. Again, in Africa, anything can happen; but right now I'm a lot more confident, optimistic about Kabila lasting there, about elections being held in the next two, two and a half years, than I would have been a year and a half ago.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Who are the génocidaires?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: They're Hutus who have been in the area and also in Burundi, next door. They did not commit a genocide there, but there was a civil war in Burundi, which was to some extent the same thing: Hutus against Tutsis. It has been going on for years, something to do with land.

    Land is extremely important in Africa. If one group has more land than the other.... Also, to some extent the colonial powers used these people a bit. The Tutsis, to some extent, were a bit more receptive to the attitude of colonialists and all that, so although they were less numerous, they received better educations, better jobs, and all that. When the colonial powers left, they gave power to the Tutsis, while the majority are Hutus, and they didn't get much.

    Don't forget that in many countries in Africa there aren't enough resources for everybody. You have a group in power who grabs a resource and there's nothing left for the others. The others may take ten years to organize, but one day, poof, they push back. What do they do? They grab everything and leave nothing to the others. Then it starts again. Ten years ago it started, and it's a cycle. There's not enough.

    And that's what we're talking about at Great Lakes, the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes, where it will take 50 years, 75 years to get the Great Lakes region unified somehow, to some extent, starting with free trade, going eventually to free labour, free movement of people, going into unions, sometimes getting to a confederation of some kind. We're starting that now in the UN, and African Unity is very involved.

    As soon as this thing is solved in the Congo, we'll try to solve the problem in Burundi as much as we can. There is peace, so let's jump at the opportunity and try to get this thing going. Then you can distribute resources. The Congo has many resources. They can help a lot of countries around them, but you have to have friendly ties instead of war.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Harvey.

[Translation]

    Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Allow me to thank the Minister, who has come here to meet us with the staff from Foreign Affairs and International Trade, who are doing their utmost to answer all our questions and who say very clearly that they are not able to answer all our questions, given that the challenges are so great.

    I think that in the past few months, in the area of international cooperation, we've been making a significant shift in collaboration with the OECD member countries. The Minister explained very well, and remarkably, all the NEPAD objectives set by people in this area, etc. Notably it involves good governance, an important parameter enabling us to collaborate in the countries where there is talk of the emergence of the private sector and where we want to target key areas. This even leads to identification of the countries in which we wish to invest and collaborate further.

    With our experience and the action of our Minister, who is doing his utmost in his area of activity, what difference do you see between the traditional interventions, which seemed to be more ad hoc, and future actions that we hope to make more structurally?

    I'd like you to explain this shift in connection with international aid, which was confirmed at the Summit in Kananaskis, where, as the minister pointed out, an announcement was made of $500 million dedicated exclusively to Africa -- the first budgets have actually started to appear -- as well as an annual increase of 8% of the budget, which will enable us to double our investment in international aid.

    It's not so much the 0.7% of the gross domestic product that interests me as having even more appropriate assistance. We have to be more concerned with the quality of assistance than its quantity. The two are not incompatible.

    I'd like you to give an appraisal of the strategy that is quietly developing among the donor countries and to establish a comparison between the traditional method and what is taking shape for the future. If you had a dream, Mr. Minister, what would it be?

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Dreams often take a lot of money.

    Mr. André Harvey: Not just money.

    Mr. Denis Paradis: You're quite right: not just money. Actually, allow me to congratulate you on your work as international cooperation parliamentary secretary, and then get back quickly to your last point. When talking about the $500 million awhile ago, you rightly mentioned the additional 8%. The present international cooperation budget, which is a few billion dollars a year, will increase by 8% a year so that it can be doubled -- if my compound interest studies work -- in about eight years. Of the 8% increase a year in the CIDA budgets, there will be 4% dedicated to Africa. I think that's important. Furthermore, we asked other sponsors, other countries, etc. to target Africa more when there are budget increases. Prime Minister Chrétien was very involved in ensuring that Africa be the priority at Kananaskis. Once, it was never the right time to talk about Africa. The G-8 countries' agenda was always too full and the issue would be postponed to the next meeting, etc., but this time, the Prime Minister -- and I take my hat off to him, said that this issue was important since this continent was literally dying and that this had to go to the top of the list of priorities for the G-8. That worked well. Furthermore, President Chirac assured us that at Évian, in early June, the African continent would also be a priority issue at the meeting of the G-8. I'd like to come back to a point you mentioned, that is, good governance. We need a place, in the three areas where we talk about democracy, human rights and good governance... At a meeting attended by the leaders of a number of countries, I myself was surprised to hear the president of one country, I won't name which one, say to the other participants -- I think it was in camera -- that his country was the most corrupt and that he no longer knew what to do. I couldn't get over it. I thought I must have misunderstood or heard incorrectly. But he was actually talking about his own country and not someone else's. This is a problem. From the time a problem has been identified and admitted by the people in place, we can at least try to find some solutions. There's plenty of room for progress in this regard, to my mind. Everyone has repeated that we need to establish the rules of the game, the rules of law, that a constitutional state was needed, public notices of tender, etc. All sorts of means are necessary to counteract the underground economy and corruption. It's only then that these countries, and that's really what they're looking for, will be able to attract investment. They themselves say that, for this reason, good governance must necessarily include anticorruption measures. It's important, in my opinion, and that's why I raise this point in connection with what you said a while ago. As I mentioned earlier, we will definitely require new approaches, instead of just sticking to the traditional methods. I think that CIDA, with this fund of $500 million, with the increase in funding for Africa, by targetting its aid, having made public the names of nine countries in which there will be a concentration of efforts in this area... The overall budget of CIDA has increased by 8% and half of this increase will be dedicated to the African continent for all humanitarian needs, while the $500 million fund is focused more on the countries that have made progress towards democracy, human rights and good governance. So there's a little reward at the end. Who can say whether progress has been made? Only they can, among themselves. I think that it's an excellent system and I definitely encourage international cooperation to ensure -- and this is already the case -- that Canada is extremely present in all places, in the right way. To repeat the words of Mr. Brault, I'll say we are everyone's friends.

»  (1705)  

[English]

    The Chair: Minister, we have one final question by Beth Phinney. You've been very generous with your time and very informative with your responses, and we appreciate that very much.

    Ms. Phinney.

    Ms. Beth Phinney (Hamilton Mountain, Lib.): It's all overwhelming. To solve the problems seems almost like a fantasy. One would like it to be real, but you wonder where you could start. If you don't even have a road to go from there to there, how do you do anything? If you don't have telephones to communicate from here to here....

    I have two things I want to know. I don't understand quite how the partnership is going to work. I think you said that by next year sometime they would be ready to start forming these partnerships and giving out the money. Is this to build roads? Is it to build offices? Is it to maybe start having a police force? What are these contracts for? Are they to build houses? Who is going to decide the priority for this whole big area and what's going to happen? That's the first question

    The second question, which I wonder if Mr. Brault could answer rather than you as a minister, is what would you like to have the most? What would you like us to tell our government to do besides just give money? This isn't enough. You like money, but what would you like us to ask our government for?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: The first question relates to the $500 million I referred to, of which there is $100 million already allocated to partnership. Then after that there's going to be some money in technology, some money in health, some money in water, some money in different fields of activity. This money should be targeted more on those countries that did perform, according to their own criteria, better than others in matters of democracy, human rights, and good governance.

    What kind of partnership? It should work the following way. Right now the government is saying that we put $100 million out of the $500 million I referred to and we'll ask the private sector to put in another $100 million. So normally it's going to bring into the pot $200 million.

»  (1710)  

    Ms. Beth Phinney: So what are you going to do with it?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: The rules of the disbursement of that $200 million are that it should be oriented towards creating partnerships. For example, if I have in my own riding small and medium-sized businesses and they want to do a partnership in such and such a country in Africa.... I met some businessmen, for example, in Senegal during a prior trip I made, and these people were saying to me, “If I want to invest with a Senegalese company, for example, I'll go to my bank manager, and he says, 'Shouldn't you pay your margin of credit before going to Senegal and investing there?'” It's always a question of money, and risk money that is missing somewhere. It's supposed to be a fund to help a partnership between mostly small and medium-sized Canadian businesses and African businesses.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: To do what? Is it to build houses? Is it to dig for water? Do I just arbitrarily decide that I have a company, I'm just going to go over and build some houses over in the Congo? I don't understand how that works.

    Mr. Denis Paradis: It could be to build houses, it could be to build some computers, it could be in different fields of activities.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Is there going to be an agency that is going to suggest what is needed?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: Right now CIDA and Foreign Affairs put up advertising around the world saying that we're looking for somebody to administer the fund. Apparently they got many CVs from around the globe. It's done in cooperation with CCC, the Canadian Commercial Corporation. They're building that fund right now, and the first job of the new director of the fund will be to get the other $100 million from the private sector. When that is done, and everybody expects it's going to be at the end of 2003, the beginning of 2004, then the criteria to apply are going to be known. There's going to be advertising there and people can submit a proposition to create some partnerships.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: If I build small houses or something, and I say I'll put $100,000 in it, am I going to get the contract to build those houses? Why would I put the $500,000 in?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: You'd probably get a partnership with a company in one country in Africa.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Would a small company invest if they're not going to be the one to get the contract?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I didn't get it.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: You want a partnership. You want somebody else to come up with some money here. Why would I put some money in the pot here if I didn't know that I was going to get a job out of it, or get work out of it, or get something out of it?

    Mr. Denis Paradis: If you want to build some houses--maybe the Congo is not the example to start with--in Senegal, for example, you make an association with an entrepreneur in Senegal and say “I'm a Canadian, and I have a few funds here, what about you Senegalese?” And they get together on a fifty-fifty basis and have a project to build computers. That exists already on a small scale but with almost no help from the government.

    We say that it could be one of our contributions to help to create those partnerships between Canadian and African companies. And it's going to be done mostly in the countries where they've made progress in--I'm repeating myself--democracy, human rights, and good governance.

    Mr. Robert Peck (Director General, Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Perhaps I could add, in regard to the African Investment Fund the minister referred to, with $100 million from the Canadian government, $100 million to be matched by the private sector, really the genesis of the fund is to try to encourage private sector investment in Africa.

    For a variety of reasons, the image of Africa is often one that's very negative. The challenge of working and doing business in Africa is often a problem. Many companies that would like to do business are not able to secure the capital to be able to take those risks.

    This fund will allow private sector companies in Canada to actually engage in partnerships with African businesses where there are identifiable needs to allow the private sector, if you will, to be more ambitious and to work more easily in Africa.

    Earlier in one of the questions we talked about the need for partnership in Africa, and I would underscore the need for private sector partnership. Minister Pettigrew led in November the first African trade mission the Canadian government has ever undertaken. It was one of the largest, with more than 100 companies. An eight-day trip resulted and it led to more than $220 million in contracts and memorandums of understanding.

    All this is to say that there is interest in Africa. Often the means for Canadian companies to do business is limited because of the difficulty in securing private sector capital. This fund will be a catalyst, if you will, to allow the Canadian private sector to be more engaged on the African continent. It's a tool that the private sector can use, if you will, to be more engaged in African business, in African investment.

    I hope that clarifies things.

»  (1715)  

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Now, what about your wish list?

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: I don't think I can suggest how you can put pressure on the minister, but at the same time, I would look at where we can make a difference, in which sector. Where can we make a difference?

    Everything is there, you can do everything, and we are not alone. The Americans, the British, the Germans, the Dutch, everybody will be there. So we will have to negotiate, and we cannot do that alone. We do that with the Congolese. Personally, I don't think we should be pushing the Congolese into we will do this, we will do that. We have to do it with them.

    They agree that we're the best for this or that reason and then we do it, we make the difference, which means also that we have to be very effective. If we're not effective in that let's not do it. We know how to run a country. We know how to do mining, we know forestry, we know health. We know a lot of things. How can we pass this know-how, this knowledge we have, to Africans who need it?

    At the same time, you have to have a recipient on the other side. You have to have people who can receive that and use it. For example, in my case, I used to be a civil servant, so you need a civil service to be able to administer whatever legislation and whatever means you give them. So all this we're extremely good at. We know what are provincial governments. They will have provincial governments over there. We know how to react with provincial governments. These are things that take, as I say, know-how.

    We are saying that we pay taxes to the government because the government can use that money better than we can ourselves. Now, what can the government do better than individual Canadians in the Congo? That's what you have to find, where we can make a difference, where we can be effective, and how can we show Canadians that we're much better at it than if you were to try to do it yourselves.

    In some areas we're saying we cannot be as effective as you are, so we will join with non-governmental organizations and we will do it together. This is the sort of thing we have to be working at.

    There are two points. In the Congo, we will have to be very careful with governance and corruption. We put a lot of money into the previous system of Mobutu and all that--not we, Canada, but Canada and all countries in the world--and we don't see any results from that any more, because a lot of money was run around and also because in some areas we put money into physical things that disappeared.

    I like to leave grey matters with the Congolese. If something happens, if Joseph Kabila gets killed, then at least three or four years later these people will still be there. If they're policemen, if they're running this mining, they're running this portion of the law, these people hopefully will still be there and will get the country running again, instead of starting from scratch. So I like that.

    Again, I think in all that we have to work with the Congolese. Let's not try to do anything unless the Congolese say this is their priority. If we in the international community find the priorities are extremely wrong, let's talk with them and let's try to explain. And if we can succeed--and we have done so in some countries where some people were not very reasonable; we were able to talk with them and explain and eventually, yes, we came to middle terms--then we can go ahead, but again, we have to do it with the Congolese. We cannot do it all.

    The Chair: I understand that you have a point of order in terms of--

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Mr. Chair, could you or the clerk or somebody make an effort to get the report you were talking about that was presented to the United Nations about the--

    The Chair: The illegal exploitation of resources.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Unfortunately, I have only the French version. It was presented to the Security Council on February 15, 2002.

    A voice: But maybe we can send you a copy.

»  (1720)  

    The Chair: You can send us a copy.

    Mr. Marc-André Brault: Yes. That's probably the best. I'll do that. It's the “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.

[Translation]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Minister, I'd like to thank you warmly, as well as Marc-André Brault and Robert Peck, for your testimony.

[English]

    I think it's been a very informed and very effective presentation of views on your part, an exchange of views. I appreciate your coming. I know you had another commitment and that you have perhaps overstayed the time you had intended to be here. We very much appreciate it, Minister, and we thank you and your colleagues for being with us.

[Translation]

    Mr. Denis Paradis: I'd also like to thank you and all the members of the committee. If you'd like us to discuss other human rights or other topics, you may rest assured that we are always available.

[English]

    The Chair: Merci.

    I'd like the members of the committee to remain for a moment.

    This is an important, sort of procedural approach. I'd like Marcus to make some reference to the report, the timeframe in which we have to draw it up, and how members here can be helpful and make sure that their concerns find expression in the report.

    Marcus.

     Mr. Marcus Pistor: The next meeting of the committee is on May 28, which is a Wednesday, in just over three weeks. That's when the report will be discussed. We will be drafting it and will try to get it out on the Friday before the meeting.

    Next week the main committee is travelling and there's no meeting scheduled. The week after that is an off week, so we have that meeting. Then we have one meeting in early June that was planned to restart our Sudan study.

    The goal would be to try to get through the report in one meeting. In order to be able to do that, I would very much appreciate any guidance you have, suggestions for recommendations, and so on.

    We've had a relatively small number of hearings. Part of it will be to point out the immediate issues that need urgent attention, but also to look at some of the longer-term issues that might be involved in providing solutions in the long run with regard to development in Africa.

    The Chair: Deepak.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: One thing that I would like is for the report we asked for today to be attached and be part of that report. It is one of the major issues due to the blood diamond issue. It fuels the war, creating a humanitarian crisis.

    The other point is that because Zimbabwe is facing a crisis, it will become a humanitarian crisis if nothing is quickly done. I think we would like what is happening right now in the political movements with the Africa leaders and their success.

    I think by the time you prepare your report, they may have failed. Do not forget Zimbabwe and the trial of the situation that is one of the major causes, including, since you're touching on a humanitarian crisis, HIV/AIDS. I think it's an overall picture of HIV/AIDS.

    The Winnipeg Institute has done a tremendous job in Nairobi in Kenya. I think that needs to be mentioned, to see how we can go. I think we've touched on three major points on the humanitarian crisis out in that region.

    The Chair: Okay. I'm going to close by sharing with the members of the committee what I'm going to share with Marcus, very quickly. There are some thematic headings that I think should be addressed in the report. It takes in what Deepak said.

    Number one is the whole problem of armed conflict, and what has been referred to as the fourth world war that has been going on in Africa. You have the Congo as a case study.

    The second, of course, is the pandemic of AIDS that Stephen Lewis highlighted for us, which you mentioned, Deepak. I think that has to be a centrepiece of our concerns in terms of a humanitarian catastrophe.

    The third is the question of food shortages and the politics of hunger, which come together.

»  (1725)  

[Translation]

    Ms. Lalonde, I'd like to say that we're now going to make suggestions and recommendations to Marcus Pistor for the preparation of this committee's report.

[English]

    The fourth would be the issue of human rights, democracy, and good governance. It has been highlighted today by the minister as to how that contributes to the problem, as well as to the possibility for a solution with the humanitarian catastrophe.

    A fifth thing would be, because it was a trigger for us, how Zimbabwe is a case study of these three concerns, if you will, of the pandemic of AIDS, the politics of hunger and food, and a repression of the rule of law.

    A sixth thing would be the whole problem of the illegal exploitation of material resources. Madame Lalonde referred to it. We heard about it today. The UN report is important in that regard. Perhaps a sub-text of that, or maybe a separate thing, would be not only corporate complicity in the illegal exploitation, but Canadian corporate complicity in that regard, if it can be properly evidenced as well.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I think we have to wait until the second report comes out, don't we, rather than attach the report that he has already said is wrong and that the United Nations allowed another six months to correct.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Another six months, that's a long time.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: It's up in June, he said. The six months is up in June, I think, and it's named companies that he claims are not responsible, have not done these things, don't even exist and--

    The Chair: That's why I added the caveat “where it can be evidenced”. But I think there has been an issue of corporate complicity. One doesn't go into naming unless it's evidenced. But as to the thematic aspect of the illegal exploitation of the resources, of that there's no doubt. That will not change in the six months, nor will the problem of corporate complicity. What may change will be the specific evidence of where the complicity has been.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: So we're not going to name any companies until the second report.

    The Chair: Well, we can see if we have any evidence. As I said, the question will be the evidentiary--

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: The naming of a company could open us, if we don't have evidence, to a libel.

    The Chair: No, that's what I said. I'm using the caveat of evidence as a prerequisite. That was my whole point.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Mr. Chair, if I may?

    The Chair: Yes.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Deepak suggested we add that report. Did you not suggest we add the report to our report?

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Yes.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Well, you're asking us to add a report somebody has just commented on, a report the United Nations said there are a lot of mistakes in and they're going to take another six months to correct them. So I don't think we should add that part that names the companies. Do you see what I mean?

    The Chair: Yes. I didn't understand that we were to add that report to ours. I understood that he wanted the government--

    Ms. Beth Phinney: I think that's what Deepak wanted. Deepak asked you to add the report.

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Mr. Chair, I agree with your point. We'll take those names out.

    Ms. Beth Phinney: Yes, I think you have to take the names out until the second report.

    The Chair: Yes, that's right.

    And the final thing is, and it's a problem that has to do with a NEPAD peer review and human rights, to what extent is there really peer review and accountability in that regard and NEPAD fulfilling its responsibilities. Those are about seven or eight, and there's also the environmental justice issue I mentioned to you that was raised by Karen Kraft Sloan. So we have here a cluster of thematic issues that could form the basis for a report, both in terms of immediate short-run recommendations that we may want to make of an urgent nature and some longer-run perspectives that would relate to these matters.

    Madam Lalonde.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: Forgive me, I was talking with Mr. Brault. What are the first three points that you noted?

    The Chair: The first point was the issue of African conflicts, which are referred to as the fourth world war, and the Congo as a case study; the second was the pandemic of AIDS; and the third was poverty,

[English]

politics of hunger

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: All right. Thank you.

[English]

    Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you, sir.

    The Chair: Okay, thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.