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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, December 11, 2002

1530

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence)

1535

1540

1545

1550

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Leon Benoit

1555

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

1600

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

1605

Mr. David Price

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

1610

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

1615

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Robert Bertrand

1620

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

1625

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

1630

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

1635

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1640

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.))

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

1645

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

1650

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1655

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

1700

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

1705

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1710

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 006

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, December 11, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

On behalf of all members present here today, I'd like to welcome Lieutenant-General Lloyd C. Campbell, the Chief of the Air Staff.

General, as I'm sure you are aware, you're the final player of the three different heads of the various environments. We're very pleased to have you here today to share your comments with us on issues relating to the budget and the state of readiness of the air force. Without any further delay, I'm going to give you the floor to make your statements, which will be followed by questions, of course.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. You're saving the best for last, one might say, with the air force appearing at the end of the day. It's a pleasure to be here to follow up on the comments of my esteemed colleagues General Mike Jeffery and Admiral Ron Buck, in order to give you a bit of a perception of the operational readiness in the air force.

[Translation]

If you will allow me, I would like to begin by giving you an overview of our present operations, of our plans for the improvement of our forces and of the challenges we foresee for the coming months and the coming years.

[English]

Since the last time I appeared here was just eight months ago, I don't intend to go into a full explanation of where the air force is and where it's going. Things have not changed that dramatically since the spring. However, I thought it would be useful to talk a little bit about where we've been since that period of time.

I'll start with operations, and begin by affirming something that I would expect all of the folks at this table would understand. The performance of our air force personnel—and our Canadian Forces personnel in general—continues to be exceptional. There is a tremendous amount of skill out there, along with great dedication and loyalty to this nation of ours. The feedback that I get from our allies shows that, and the results that we see in the operations we're doing certainly show it as well.

With regard to operational specifics, things have not changed substantially. We're continuing to do Operation Noble Eagle, which is the NORAD bit here, with elevated levels of readiness at both Cold Lake and Bagotville, and at North Bay as well.

In Operation Apollo, we have the same basic commitment we had in the spring in terms of Sea Kings supporting the navy ships, plus our Auroras and the Hercules deployed to the Middle East. Again, in terms of feedback, we had a recent presentation at National Defence Headquarters from Commodore Eric Lerhe, who was the previous commander of the Canadian task force in the group. The feedback from him and the feedback from the allied naval commanders and others out in the field is that our aircraft there—in this case, particularly the Auroras and the Sea Kings—are really doing a superb job in supporting the overall coalition program.

The third operation that I'll mention is Operation Grizzly, which was the support to the G-8 program last spring, out in Kananaskis. This was a very significant effort from the point of view certainly of the army and the air force. The air defence portion of it involved CF-18s, Griffin helicopters, AWACS from the United States, KC-135 tankers, our own tanker support, tactical radar deployments, and so on. Although it was of a relatively short duration, it really allowed for an opportunity to watch both the army and air force bring together a variety of capabilities, to good end.

The final one I'll speak about is Operation Palladium, which is our Griffin deployment over in Bosnia. I was there last Friday and Saturday. I spent some time with our folks, unfortunately not flying because the weather was rather grotty while I was in theatre. Again, the feedback we're getting from Colonel Peter Atkinson—the current commander of Task Force Bosnia-Herzegovina—and from our allies in Multinational Division Southwest is that our Griffins over there are doing a great job not just for us, but for the allies in general, in some pretty difficult conditions of weather, with wires and mines around the area, and so on.

I found the morale there to be absolutely exceptional. Although they're not Hilton-like standards, those of you who have visited Velika Kladusa will know that the accommodations and the messing services and so on are quite good. Certainly, when I bumped into a British army officer in London when I was there, he said the Canadians are the envy of everybody, which I'll hold somewhere to talk to General Jeffery about at some point if I need to. But we really are seen as being well equipped, well set up, and doing a great job in the theatre.

From an air force perspective, I think part of the reason that morale is good is our adoption of the variable tour length policy, which I think I talked to you about last spring, when we were just introducing it. Instead of the standard six-month deployment for everybody, it allows a deployment length of 28 days to 56 days for at least part of the detachment. I'd be prepared to address that if somebody would like further information, because we're actually introducing a similar program for our long-range patrol aircraft and our tactical airlift folks who are deployed in the Middle East, for similar kinds of reasons.

Not everything is happening overseas, of course. Here in Canada, the SAR units, the search and rescue units, have been busy. In fact, so far this year, about 8,000 incidents have been dealt with by the rescue coordination organizations. The new Cormorant has already been involved in a couple of significant rescues, the first one three days after it declared initial operational capability in Comox, and the most recent one just last week, when an aircraft from Gander did a 1,650-kilometre offshore mission, taking about nine hours to rescue an individual out there. That really points to the capability of this aircraft in comparison to that which it's going to replace.

¹ (1535)

In terms of modernization, I talked to you about it before, so I'll run through it fairly quickly just to update you on where we are. In regard to our two CC-150 Polaris airplanes that we're going to convert to strategic air-to-air refuelling, the contract was announced in October and the first airplanes will go in next year. Our first two CF-18s from Cold Lake actually have been modified and are in the verification and validation program now, down at China Lake, California. The modification for the rest of the 78 airplanes that we'll modify actually starts next month in Quebec, at Mirabel.

In addition to the radar displays, missiles, and all the rest of the associated things that will be involved in that program, it also deals with radios and things like Have Quick—which has had lots of press coverage in the last little while—data link capabilities, and so on. Parenthetically here, to clear up a bit of confusion about Have Quick II, there has been a lot of, I wouldn't say misinformation, but misunderstanding of what this capability is.

Have Quick is not a secure radio, it's an anti-jamming radio. It's a frequency-hopping system that is used by some of our allies, and will be in use here once our planes go through the system. To be clear, though, the CF-18 does actually have an encryption capability and a secure voice capability that is not well understood, based on many of the press commentaries that I've heard.

In terms of new precision guided munitions—PGMs—and next-generation air-to-air missiles, those are also now on order. While they won't be available immediately, we do have a pretty good stock of air-to-ground munitions and lots of current-generation air-to-air munitions, and I'm assured by discussions with those I've needed to discuss this with that if we need some extra stock, we can get it.

The Aurora program is also continuing. Of course, you recently heard the announcement by the minister with regard to the maritime helicopter project. I'm sorry Peter Stoffer is not here, but I'm delighted to see where we are and where we're going. We're looking forward to having the request for proposals going out for that early next year.

Finally NFTC—NATO flying training in Canada—is another area that has been in the press a bit since we last spoke. The key issue when I spoke to you last spring was still centred on the Harvard, the propellor-driven first part of that program. We were having some significant difficulties with it. I'm pleased to report that it is now running very well. The Hawk, the more advanced program flown there and in Cold Lake, continues to perform exceptionally well.

On the marketing side, Hungary has now signed on to the program, and at least a couple of other nations are also looking at joining in the spring. The feedback I have received in terms of quality, in my discussions with the chief of Singapore's air staff, who I met in Washington not too long ago, and from the chief of Denmark's air staff, is that the product is absolutely superb. In fact, it's already now starting to pay dividends because they're able to shorten some of their follow-on training at the operational level, based on the fact that they're getting a higher-trained calibre out of the training mill.

Everything is not good news, of course. If it was, we wouldn't need people to run stuff at the senior level, I suppose. There are lots of warts. I suspect you've heard most of them from my colleagues General Jeffery and Admiral Buck, but you've also heard it from the Chief of the Defence Staff and from the minister in some of their discussions as well.

From my perspective, from an air force perspective, the biggest issue is people. We have great people and they're doing a great job, as I described earlier, but there just aren't enough of them at the moment, or at least not enough of them who are fully trained. The recruiting is paying off, particularly with new technicians, but it takes a lot of time to put people through the training mills and get them up to speed. In fact, to train a technician from the time you recruit him through to when he is a fully capable technician who is fully capable of doing the full job, it probably takes four to five years. It is a challenging effort for us, and it takes a lot of work.

So these are problems. The personnel issues that we're facing are not problems that will be solved overnight, and they're not strictly amenable to throwing more dollar resources at them. Experience takes time to get.

¹ (1540)

Compensation is an issue, and we're looking at that with regard to our people. We obviously have to be an employer of choice. We have to be competitive in the marketplace, particularly when we're talking about people like pilots and aircraft technicians, who are in significant demand out there. And this all applies to many others as well. Particularly in this period when there's a bit of a downturn in the airline industry, we're working to ensure that there are people out there who are actually interested in coming back in. We're working hard to actually do that and to streamline the process.

Many of you will have heard about the challenges of re-enrolment or changing from reserves to regular forces. These are critical issues, and when we're talking about people who are very expensive, who are well trained, and who we want to bring back, we have to make sure we streamline the process to make that happen. We actually are doing that by dealing with them as a more civilian-oriented recruiter would, one on one, to make sure these folks are not sitting at the recruiting door, waiting to come in.

That's the people dimension. On the kit side of things, I mentioned the good side of the Cormorant. It's a great aircraft doing a great job, but like many other pieces of new equipment, it has had its teething problems. The main issues with the Cormorant have been a lack of spare parts, unexpected failures of components, things like display units burning out faster than they ought to, and excessive maintenance man-hours per flying hour. These are all things I don't get dismayed about. They're frustrating, particularly down at the coal face, at the squadron level, because they make it challenging to continue to put out serviceable airplanes, but they're not unusual either with modern, complicated weapons systems. We're working very closely with the contractor to resolve all of these issues. In fact, I met with them in London when I was there, in order to make sure they fully understand how seriously we look at this issue. I think they do, too.

With regard to funding in general, the main concern that I find is the funding for spare parts, overhauls, and things like those. Parts are in really short supply, which means aircraft are often not serviceable when they could be. The technicians obviously experience a tremendous amount of frustration because they either don't have the parts to fix the airplanes they're working on or they're having to rob parts from one airplane to put them on another. In some cases, this is just a dollar issue. In other cases, for those of you who know the airline or the aircraft industry, the time it takes to acquire new components in the system is excessively long, but that's just the way it is. Even for things as simple as fasteners or seals, it may take six months to a year in order to get them, because the demand is high and there's only a limited production. So that is, I suppose, the biggest funding issue.

I also mentioned the modernization programs that we have going on, but I think it's important for Canadians and this committee to understand that while that's good news, that modernization is a wonderful thing, it will also have a negative impact over the course of the modernization period, because we will be taking airplanes—particularly aircraft like the Aurora—out of service in order to put them through modernization lines. That will have an impact on our operational capability. We can't avoid that, but we're making sure we work through every element of the transition program with very painstaking detail, including the people side of things, the equipment side of things, and our operational commitments.

We're doing this so that we can keep as much harmony as we can between all of the elements of what is quite a complex series of things that need to be tied together. To make sure we can do that, I'm working very closely with the operational-level commander, General Marc Dumais, as well as with people like Alan Williams, who is assistant deputy minister for matériel, and with others. In some cases, though, it's going to be a fairly interesting juggling act over the next three, four, or five years as we bring on this new kit.

We've received a bit of good news in the last little bit. We've had some new funding come into the budget for spare parts via some internal reallocations within the department. That funding is going to significantly help us at least through to the turn of the fiscal year. I've been pressing hard with General George Macdonald and with the deputy minister and others to ensure that we have that same level of funding next year, because it's very critical. Yes, it's important that we introduce new equipment into the organization, but it's critical that we maintain the equipment we have in a way that makes it available for operations as well, so this is an area that has a lot of focus.

¹ (1545)

Let me conclude by saying that in the short term, it's going to be tough to keep doing all the things we have been doing over the last little while. Indeed, as I just mentioned with regard to modernization, in some cases the operational output is going to have to be lower simply because the number of airplanes in the modernization program at any one time will limit their availability. It's more so the case with the Aurora than it is with the CF-18, because with the CF-18 we have some spare capacity in terms of aircraft that we'll be able to feed into the system. We can therefore keep operational numbers up a little higher with that aircraft, but there will be an impact.

Having said that, and given some infusion of new resources that I suppose we all are hoping for, I would say the future actually still looks quite good. I believe I concluded last spring by saying I'm an optimist in this regard. We have an excellent modernization program, and the equipment thing for the air force looks exceptionally good in the medium term.

The personnel situation is more tenuous, although I believe in the fact that we offer a great place for people to work. As we modernize our equipment and make the resource envelope more reasonable for people, I believe our retention problems will become less of an issue in the months ahead.

That concludes my opening comments.

¹ (1550)

The Chair: Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

Thank you for being here, General. Since I have Cold Lake in my riding, I just want to say that I've certainly come to learn that we have very good people at every level in the air force. They're doing incredibly good work, yourself included, sir.

I have a lot of questions, but I'm only here for one round of questioning. Unfortunately, I have to run, so I'm hoping we can have short answers where we can.

My colleague and I, and actually a couple of other MPs, went to NORAD headquarters about a month and a half ago, and both General Ken Pennie and General Ed Eberhart, the American head of NORAD and NORTHCOM, explained that there has been a fundamental change to NORAD since September 11, in that NORAD used to look at outward threats but now it looks probably more at inward threats. I'm just wondering how much of a change that has caused in terms of Canada's role.

Secondly, we were told in one of the briefings that a radar site in the Arctic had been out for about two years, and some concern was expressed that it hadn't been fixed. I'm wondering if you could tell us if any progress has been made on that, and then I'll get on to some other questions.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: With regard to the latter area, yes, one of our radar sites had a fire. It's an unattended site. In fact, that was back when I was commanding the Canadian NORAD region at the time.

We have increased the range technically of the adjacent sites, so coverage is being put in there. In the longer run, though, our desire on the operational side would be to see that radar replaced. A number of issues need to be dealt with, including everything from environmental kinds of things to who pays the dollars at the end of the day. But I'm confident, Mr. Benoit, that we will in fact replace that in the not-too-distant future. In the meantime, operationally, I'm happy that we're covering off the program with the adjacent two sites.

With regard to the change of focus in NORAD, clearly you've categorized it exactly right in your sense of pre-September 11 and the outward focus. Post-September 11, that outward focus hasn't gone away, but there's certainly a much greater need to look internally, and a couple of things have been done, obviously. One has been the deployment of aircraft around the country on a regular and routine basis, to ramp up our alert capabilities throughout the country rather than just focusing on the externally based threat. The second has been a look at ways in which we can ensure that our radar coverage and other sensor coverage internally is better. NORAD is taking the lead on a study to try to do that and to make sure that we're very much connected with our civilian counterparts at NAV CANADA to make sure we use their facilities as well.

So there are a number of issues in that regard, some of which I know you were briefed on when you were at Colorado Springs.

Mr. Leon Benoit: These committee meetings were set up to discuss what Canada could contribute in the event that we become involved in a war in Iraq. I'm not going to ask you specifically to respond necessarily only to that possibility, but to any deployment in the next few months.

One of the concerns that I've heard about is, first of all, whether or not we've had the ordnance replaced. You talked about that. You said that either you do have a lot of it on order or some restocking has taken place. Are you satisfied that we're going to have what we would need in case of a deployment?

We were told by someone at our briefings at NORAD headquarters that as our CF-18s are right now, Canada couldn't be involved in combat missions in Iraq. We would be involved probably in protection of the base rather than in combat missions, due to some upgrades that aren't in place yet. Could you just let us know about that?

My third concern is about maintenance and parts. When I was at Cold Lake, I looked at the chart on the wall for the one squadron. On the particular day when I was there, I think only one-quarter of the CF-18s could get off the ground that day due to just the inability to get the parts or to do the maintenance. If that's a problem here at home, is that a problem that could be dealt with in an overseas mission, in a deployment?

¹ (1555)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me see if I can get all of those. You were very kind to allow me off the hook in terms of not commenting on Iraq, because it is an issue of sensitivity. However, I think Mike Jeffery put it fairly well. We are force generators and force providers, so I'm quite happy to answer the question in the sense of what I would be able to offer to the fray no matter what came up.

If we look at the Aurora fleet at the moment, then as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have aircraft already committed to Operation Apollo. Those airplanes could be redirected to other missions, and they could also be augmented if we needed to do that. Likewise with the Sea Kings.

The Sea Kings have actually been stressed pretty hard—and I'm not talking about the airplanes here, I'm talking about the people. In that organization, we're only manned to put out about nine helicopter air detachments on an annual basis for deployments. We have already far exceeded that, so I need to give them a little bit of respite, a little bit of a break. We're going to do that in the next rotation by sending only one helicopter air detachment out.

Having said that, if there was a need for a short burst that was critical—short being even six months or longer—we certainly have the capability of bucking up that number as well. Really, the only limitation there is quality of life. We don't want to keep rotating people into the Middle East theatre on a routine basis; we need to give them some respite. So that could certainly be increased.

The CF-18 obviously is very busy already here in the NORAD environment, and that is a significant issue for us. Depending on what situations prevail here and what the commander-in-chief of NORAD determines his requirements to be, those are issues that would impact on the availability of aircraft for any other kind of mission. But certainly, I've told the chief that we could make further resources available if we needed to do that, particularly for a relatively short duration of time. Again, though, if you are planning on being in a theatre for a longer period—say, if you're talking about two years or three years—the sustainment issue becomes the critical or long pole in the tent, as I think Mike Jeffery probably talked about the other day. If it's a relatively short duration, it's not too difficult.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Is that any less of a problem in the air force than it is in the army?

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, your time has actually expired here. I'm just allowing the general to finish his comments.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me just address the issue of serviceability and spare parts, because it is a significant issue and a very frustrating thing for folks at Cold Lake. I'm aware of that. The interesting thing is that in deployed operations, we find it is generally the opposite. Because you focus your attention on that area, you direct most of your resources to make it happen, and we can do that. However, it has an impact back at home base again, and it's something that is difficult to sustain in the longer run. In the short term, though, we can certainly turn the resources there to make things happen.

I would like to get at a couple of the other questions, but perhaps someone else will pick up on them.

The Chair: There may in fact be time for those.

Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here, General. I'll follow up a little bit on Leon's questions, particularly in regard to NORAD.

I was with Leon at NORAD. When he talked to us, one of the interesting things that we heard from General Eberhart was that once we have the upgrades done in our planes, they're going to meet or surpass any of the fighters that the Americans have. That was quite surprising. But he did come back on it and say that one of the reasons was the increased sorties that the U.S. is having to fly for top coverage of their cities. In doing those sorties, they're really beating their airframes pretty heavily.

We're flying a little more too, so are we also shortening the life of our airframes? To follow up on that, does that mean that, in your opinion, maybe the Joint Strike Fighter project would be moved along a little faster?

º (1600)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: First of all, those of you who have met General Eberhart know that he's a very gracious man. He's also a very good friend and a very perceptive guy. I perhaps would not quite agree with him that once it's modernized, the CF-18 will be as good or better than anything they have, because as they bring on airplanes like the F-22 in particular—a totally new generation of supercruise stealth capability—it will be of a wholly different league. But what he was saying and what is absolutely true is that the upgraded CF-18 will be at the very top end of aircraft capabilities here, so it will be an outstanding machine.

The question of fatigue life for the airplane is an interesting one, and I think I may indeed have mentioned this in some discussion here. One of the good things about the CF-18 is that it is instrumented from front to back in terms of strain and stress sensors, so we have a very good capability of monitoring everything happening in the aircraft. We're going through a destructive testing program with airplanes here in Canada and in Australia, and we actually are causing airplanes and/or airplane components to be destroyed so that we actually know the point in their fatigue life at which problems will show up, and we will therefore be able to fix them.

The interesting thing, though, is that this fatigue life is measured not in hours of flight, as we used to do it, it's actually measured in very precise applications of G and stress. Low-level flying, for example, is very difficult on airframes because of the low level turbulence that takes place. The kinds of missions we've been spending a great deal of time on, the NORAD-type missions of the last while, while not exactly exciting from a pilot's perspective, are actually quite easy on the airframe. While we're using a fair number of hours and that translates into dollars for gas and spare parts that still wear out, the wear and tear on the aircraft is nevertheless actually not bad at all. My expectation, then, is that even this higher operational tempo that we've been flying here will not have an impact on when we replace the CF-18.

In terms of the pure business case, if we're going to spend a significant amount of money on the CF-18, it's not just the investment in the main program—which is called ECP-583 and is the radar and avionics program—but a significant amount of money being spent on other parts of the system, like new targeting pods, new missiles, and new capabilities that go with the aircraft. If there is to be a business case for doing that, for making that kind of decision, we clearly need to maintain this airplane out into something around the middle of the next decade. It's logical to do that, because it won't be until something like the Joint Strike Fighter comes along, in our case, that we'll be able to move to a totally new generation of capability.

From an airframe perspective, buying a new CF-18 today would be not any different from the upgraded one that we're going to do. That being the case, I wouldn't see a decision for JSF coming earlier, either from the point of view of fatigue life or of aircraft availability, for that matter, because JSF really won't be available for squadron service until probably the 2012 to 2015 timeframe in any event.

The Chair: Did you have anything further, Mr. Price? You have two minutes.

Mr. David Price: Two minutes? Okay.

How about the upgrades on the Hercs, the C-130s, in Edmonton? I was there about a year ago, just at the time when Spar was changing hands. With that change of ownership, have there been any changes in that? Are the upgrades still going along on schedule?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: No, there has been no change in the level of service that we've had from Spar, and now L-3. At least, I think that's the company, but I may be wrong on that.

Our only problem on the C-130 side has again been this need to carefully manage the resources that we have available for spare parts, repair and overhaul, and so on. These are not inexpensive programs, and there have been some delays associated with funding.

The good news is this recent influx of money that I just talked about. It's relatively modest, but it's still there. My sense is that those that were waiting at the door to go in for repairs will now go ahead, so we'll do that on the C-130.

º (1605)

Mr. David Price: One was sitting there when I was there. It was going through a rather major upgrade, but they said at the time that it was basically experimental. They weren't sure if that part of the program was going to go ahead. Has there been any movement on that?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: I'm not 100% sure, but I think what you're talking about is probably the prototype for the hawser program, which is a replacement of the electronic wiring bundles in the airplane. We're talking about airplanes that are thirty to forty years old in some cases—but not all of them—and wiring bundles are starting to become brittle and in need of replacement. That's where we're going to need to make some significant decisions in the next short while about what we want to do with the C-130 fleet.

There's a much broader question here about what airplanes we use in the search and rescue role. We're currently using the Hercules for that. My modernization plan would see a smaller fixed-wing, twin-engine airplane being used for that role. If we were to move ahead on strategic airlift, that would offset a certain number of the C-130s that we're doing today. We would then be able to simply keep the more modern, newer C-130s, and we would probably avoid some of the cost of doing these major refit programs.

This is part of an overall view that we're working through. As we get a better sense from the government with regard to what its desires are in terms of things like strategic lift and in regard to what funding envelopes will be available and so on, we'll be able to start making some critical decisions. We need to do that, because we don't want to spend money on a system that we may not keep over the longer run. If we're going to keep the Herc, though, then we're going to have to make those expenditures, and they're fairly healthy.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too would like to thank the general for his presentation and for his presence here today. I have several questions for him, dealing in particular with the CF-18.

I would like to know, Mr. Chairman, how many operational CF-18s there are at present in Canada.

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: Mr. Bachand, we have between 48 and 60 airplanes that are operational at present. They are with the fighter squadrons in Bagotville and Cold Lake. Each one of the squadrons has approximately 15 planes at the present time, for a total of 60 airplanes, plus 20 or 25 with the operational training squadron in Cold Lake. Lastly, there are three or four of them with the test squadron which it too is in Cold Lake.

Mr. Claude Bachand: That gives me a total of approximately 90 airplanes that could be operational.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Yes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: A refit program was undertaken about one or two years ago.

How many of these 85 airplanes have been equipped with a completely up-to-date system?

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: As I said, we have refitted two of them, and they are presently being tested in California by American marines. In January, in Montreal, we will begin work on the other CF-18s.

Mr. Claude Bachand: When do you plan on finishing the refit of these 80 airplanes. Only two of them have been modernized, which means that there are 78 left. In how many years from now will the entire fleet have been refitted?

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: The plan is to have the work finished for 2006.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Two airplanes have been modernized, which means that the computer system has been completely updated. I would nevertheless like to know if, in the context of operations as aggressive as those in Afghanistan, Irak and Kosovo, the 78 non-updated airplanes would be of any use.

º (1610)

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: I feel comfortable speaking with some assurance about Kosovo. The CF-18s over there were among the first airplanes in the field, along with our American, British and other allies. I therefore can confirm that this airplane has tremendous potential right now and is very effective. We obviously have a refit problem because our planes are not at the same level as those of our allies.

Modern airplanes certainly have some capabilities that CF-18s do not.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, when we talk about modernization, are we talking mostly about the computer system or are we also talking, for example, about carrying guided bombs?

Could you explain to me what you really mean by “modernization“? Is that limited to the computer system?

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: It is certainly more than that, but it nevertheless remains that the modernization of the CF-18 computer systems is critical. These planes do not at present have the necessary power to be equipped, among other things, with more modern weapons systems. We know that the CF-18s were designed in the 1970s and purchased in the 1980s. You need only think about the PCs that were available at the time. Clearly, we must update the data processing systems, but the effort is not limited to that, given that we must, among other things, update the radar, the navigation systems and all sorts of other mechanisms.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I would now like to move on to the issue of bombs. We recently learned, following the Kosovo campaign, that Canada no longer has guided precision munitions. I am aware that you have since negotiated a contract for bombs [Editor Notn's: Inaudible] and that that involves the purchase of approximately 1,000 bombs. At least that is what I was told.

Have the first bombs of this type been delivered? Is that not the way of the future? As a matter of fact, I asked you if traditional weapons were not a little bit outmoded. We could now use bombs with much greater precision, which greatly limits civilian casualties.

How many of these bombs have been delivered to date? Would they be available for future military operations? I would also like you to give me an idea of their cost.

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: I cannot comment as to the number of unmanned precision weapons, but I can say that we have a few that we kept after the war in Kosovo. We have also ordered others. These bombs are made up of three main elements: the bomb itself, a remote-control system and another part. We therefore have in the system a certain number of such parts, in Cold Lake, in Bagotville and in our warehouses. We have ordered others, but this takes time because there is only one place in the United States were remote-control systems can be ordered and purchased. There will soon be another place, but...

It is a problem because, as I said, I have discussed all of this with my colleagues in the United States and if ever we needed to have something, my hope is that we would be able to get it.

º (1615)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, General.

Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

Monsieur Bertrand.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Lieutenant-general, in this morning's National Post, I read in an article that we are thinking of selling 15 CF-18s to the Czech Republic. Is that the case? Are we planning on selling CF-18s to that country?

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: This morning's newspaper article is not quite right. As I said, we are planning on refitting 80 airplanes, which means that 40 could be used for something else. We are going to set a certain number of these planes aside for parts, etc. We are therefore going to be keeping them here. But there will probably be a few airplanes available for something else.

Obviously, there is some interest on the part of Boeing as well as of other companies in the purchase of these airplanes. We have discussed, à un niveau très inférieur, de certaines possibilités de ce faire.

[English]

at a very low level, some possibilities of doing that.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: According to other information we have received, we are also thinking about reducing the number of Griffon helicopters. I believe that we have 98 such helicopters at the present time. There is talk of reducing this to a total of 85 and of selling the remaining helicopters to the government of New Zealand. Is that the case?

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: Yes, that is in our assets planning, with our tactical helicopter squadrons, approximately 85 airplanes on top of our search and rescue squadrons in Bagotville, Cold Lake and Goose Bay. As for the others, in other words, approximately 13 or 14 planes, the decision has not yet been made. We could use these planes for training, as replacements for our training planes. [Editor's Note: Inaudible]. Another possibility is to sell these planes, but there are no such negotiations under way at present. I have not discussed this matter with my counterpart in New Zealand, for example, nor, indeed, with anyone else.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I do not know if it works the same way as when we sell land, but if we sell CF-18s to the Czech Republic or helicopters to New Zealand, for example, would the money be put into the general accounts of the Canadian government or handed over to the Department of National Defence?

[English]

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: That depends.

[Translation]

That is a rather complex question. If we sell these planes, our hope is that we would be able to use this money for the refit of the CF-18s. There are internal negotiations with Treasury Board for each of these initiatives.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much for this information.

You mentioned earlier that you had a lot of repairs to make to the new Cormorant helicopter. I believe a good many systems burned. Who pays for these repairs? Is it National Defence or Augusta?

º (1620)

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: It is a combination of the two. We pay a part of the work, because it is normal, after a certain amount of wear and tear, to have to replace certain parts, etc. However, if a system presents an abnormal problem, I am sure that we would negotiate with the company and obtain a replacement or some other solution. As far as some of the challenges we are having at present go, there will certainly be very tough negotiations with the company.

[English]

I'm not sure of the description in French, but the display units, for example, are failing at a rate that is significantly more than what was forecast. That shouldn't happen, so there's clearly a problem.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: The replacement for the Sea Kings was announced last week. I guess everybody is pretty happy about that. When do you figure the first helicopter will be coming online? Are we talking about two or three years down the road?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Mr. Bertrand, that is difficult to know without knowing who has won the competition, because I think each of these companies will have slightly different circumstances that prevail at the time, in terms of how many airplanes they're delivering elsewhere, where we would fit into their production line, and so on. So it's a bit difficult to say.

If the program goes well, I would hope we would start to see aircraft in the next three years, at least in a prototyping stage and on the test and evaluation side of things. Again, though, it first depends on the process and how it unfolds, and secondly, on who wins the competition.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, sir.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: It's nice to see you.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: It's nice to see you as well. I apologize for missing your presentation. I have a couple of questions based around the Sea King.

First, congratulations to the crew who flew the search and rescue mission that great distance out into the North Atlantic just the other day. I thought that was absolutely terrific and a great example of what crew and machine can do in the rescue of someone's life. I know the papers are talking about the price of that rescue. Well, as far as I'm concerned, it was well worth it. If we can rescue someone, then it's well done in that regard. So congratulations to the crew.

Sir, I don't have my graphs here with me, but next year will recognize the 40th anniversary of the Sea Kings. We know now that the process to speed up its replacement is happening. I do know that, in 1963, the Sea King was done on the basis of a 3-hour flying time with a 30-minute reserve. Unless it changes, the RFP is asking for an initial duration of 2 hours, 50 minutes, with a 30-minute reserve time, if I'm not mistaken in that regard. I'm just wondering if you can answer why the government or the RFP process would indicate a new helicopter that actually has less duration than the one done in 1963, or why the request is for that one.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: First of all, my thanks for the kind words with regard to our folks at 103 Squadron and the rescue. I'll ensure that they receive those.

On the Sea King–MHP statement-of-requirements comparison, it would not surprise you, at least from our perspective, that there's perhaps a fair amount of misrepresentation out there. I must tell you that I was around in 1963, although I wasn't around in the Canadian Forces in 1963. I must say, however, that in all of my work, I have not personally seen any statement of requirement from 1963 that actually gave some time, so I can't answer the question. If somebody can tell me that the statement of operational requirements produced by the Canadian navy for the Sea King back in 1963 called for a 3-hour duration, it would be interesting, but I have not seen that.

I have seen some documentation suggesting that the current Sea King capability is as good as or better than what we're asking for in the new maritime helicopter. It's also suggested that a number of other elements that the current Sea King has are in fact better than what we've asked for in the maritime helicopter project. I can assure you that is not true. For example, in terms of range, when you put the armaments on it—and that's what we're asking for in the statement of operational requirements; it's not just the airplane flying, but the airplane flying with its full armament load—the current Sea King capability is the 2 hours, 50 minutes. In some conditions, the Sea King today can't get airborne with the same armament load. If it can, its duration is limited to about a couple of hours.

To those who are saying we're demanding a lesser requirement than we even have today, I would say that simply isn't the case. The operational requirement—we've talked about it before, both personally and in this environment here, I think—for the maritime helicopter was built by us and was based on a clear analysis of all of the scenarios that we felt we would be involved in. I can state categorically that we have not adjusted the statement of operational requirements to meet anybody's needs in a slow process. So I'm comfortable—as I think Ron Buck is—with where we are in that regard.

º (1625)

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

Sir, I was in Goose Bay a few months ago. Of course, we found out that the Dutch government is pulling its troops out of Goose Bay. That leaves the four other countries left behind, so the people in Goose Bay are quite nervous about the future of the base. You're probably aware of that. Can you please tell us—and the people watching in the Labrador area, for that matter—what that means for the future of the Goose Bay base?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: We certainly are aware of the issue, and we've very much been talking not only with the Dutch, but with all of our allies who contribute resources and who participate in training there. Obviously, the entire environment in which we live today is different from what it was in the 1980s. When the Cold War was on, low-level flying was a significant element. Tactics have now changed, and we need to make sure that the products we're offering—the training facilities and the kinds of resources that are there—actually continue to meet what our allies need.

I wrote to all of the allies who participate in Goose Bay about two to three months ago, asking that they come together at the two-star level—at a high enough level so that decisions can be taken—to work with us and to tell us what their requirements are as they see them out into the future; what kinds of commitments they need to have; and what things we need to do or should be doing collectively with the province and with other stakeholders here in order to make this a long-term, viable program.

For a number of reasons, that will not happen in the fall, but I can tell you and our watchers in the Labrador area—for whom this is a very significant issue, as it is for us—that we will meet in the winter to do exactly that: to find out from our allies what their intentions are; how they would like to proceed; and what we can do to make things better in terms of electronic warfare training and other aspects of things that Goose Bay can offer. We can then put together a viable plan for the future.

I know the province is very keen to be involved in that. We're also keen to have them involved in the right areas in terms of moving this forward and making sure that we market Goose Bay to other nations out there as well.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Sir, can you tell us the role you'll be playing in the cooperative agreement with the Americans that was signed by or announced by the minister late Monday or Tuesday on, I think, coastal surveillance or coastal defence?

º (1630)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: We're talking about the planning group that will be in NORAD or in Colorado Springs, I assume.

Mr. Joe McGuire: I don't know. I think the head is coming out of NORAD.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Yes, okay, it's the Canada–U.S. planning group that will be looking at a variety of different cooperative issues.

From an air force perspective, as you know, we have the NORAD environment, which for the past 45 years or so has allowed us to be able to coordinate air activities quite well in terms of talking about air defence. But the cooperative measures that exist on the land side, the maritime side, and I suppose in terms of natural disaster issues, is not quite so clear. That's the focus of the planning group, and General Pennie, who is currently the deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD, will be the individual who will be the initial head of that organization.

As an environmental chief, as one of the force providers, I don't see a direct participation in that at all. For those who are charged with the responsibility of doing maritime surveillance, for example, what it will do is allow them to be able to coordinate some of those efforts and make sure that we're working with the resources we have to best avail.

Mr. Joe McGuire: So we have NORAD, we have the American Northern Command, and now we have this planning group. How does it all fit together? Who is on top? How does it flow from there?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: This is a question that could be handled with a long answer and a short answer. I'll try to do it in a medium way.

Northern Command is easiest understood by actually not thinking of North America, but by looking at Europe. The United States also has a European Command. That European Command has the responsibility for looking over, from an American perspective only, things that are happening in Europe, things that are happening in Russia. They have a defined environment in which they have responsibility, but they have no command over forces in the region. For the most part, those forces are commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who actually has the responsibility for commanding forces that will do things in the region.

NORTHCOM is exactly the same as European Command. It has the responsibility for looking over this area, for being wise and making sure that intelligence things are dealt with, so that the United States has a better judgment of what's happening in the region.

NORAD is actually a binational force employer. They have an obligation to both the Prime Minister and to the President of the United States, to carry out operations using the resources that we provide to them. They do that, of course, through the three NORAD regions, including the Canadian NORAD region.

The planning group is just that. It will have no forces. It will not be part of either of the other two groups, but it will be an organization that will allow us to bring the right kinds of people together to look at the issues and to try to figure out the areas in which we need to better coordinate from the military perspective and, to an extent, in areas like civil disasters and so on.

That's the best I can give on the relationship between the three. They're interconnected in the sense that they're in the same location, but they have quite different responsibilities.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you.

The Chair: Anything further, Mr. McGuire?

Mr. Joe McGuire: No.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, for seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

General, as our ships have been returning home from Operation Apollo, numerous articles have been written about the great work they've been doing. One thing that has become apparent through these articles is the fact that these men and women deployed in the Persian Gulf are operating in temperatures well in excess of 35°C. As I understand it, the specs for the new maritime helicopter state that in temperatures of 35°C or higher, the new helicopter will only have to fly for 2 hours, 20 minutes, an endurance DND's own documents show put it at the very edge of mission failure. Why is DND only asking for a helicopter with a 50% chance of mission success?

º (1635)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: These are interesting questions that you raise, Mrs. Wayne. Going back to my answer to Mr. Stoffer, though, the development of the statement of operational requirements for the aircraft was based on our best analysis of all of the conditions in which this airplane will operate. One of them is certainly the Middle East, and others are in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. The kinds of conditions that exist in 35°C temperatures are also based largely on a zero wind condition, as I recall from the statement of operational requirements.

As a rule, when aircraft are operating off a ship, they are operating with a ship underway. I'm not a helicopter pilot, I'm a fighter pilot by background, but I have operational helicopter pilots who have been my greatest advisers throughout this period. In conjunction with the navy, they have developed the requirements and they believe those requirements are robust. I'm not prepared to question those.

I think it certainly would be a significant increase in capability from what our Sea Kings are doing today. From having been out there in the operation and having watched them, I can assure you that in temperatures that are 35°C or so—not every day, but they're certainly warm—our Sea Kings are doing a great job.

You also have to be careful with the figures that are in a statement of operational requirements, because those need to be precise enough to drive companies to be able to respond. But as an operational commander, I can also assure you that when you get out there and actually are doing something, you adjust your fuel load and you adjust your weapons load to be able to do the mission that you're going to do. In the case of an airplane like a CF-18, you don't always take off with the maximum fuel load or weapons load that the airplane is capable of. If range is an issue or endurance is an issue, you make adjustments to what you're carrying on board. The SOR is a kind of worst-case scenario in every case.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: At the present time, there is no strategic air-to-air refuelling capability, but I believe you stated earlier that it will be next year before you're in that position, is that correct?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: In fact, it will be 2004 before we're in a position to have the actual aircraft.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If I didn't ask my next question, you'd wonder why.

When the government purchased its new search and rescue helicopters to replace the aging Labradors, it was done on the basis of best value. You purchased the best helicopter available for the budget you had. Just last week, one of those same search and rescue helicopters performed a rescue—I think that's the one Pete was referring to—that the pilot said could never have been done in a Labrador. That's the benefit of best value: the ability to do more than you could before.

General, your department is now trying to replace its Sea King helicopters, but it's on the lowest-price-compliant approach. You're looking for the cheapest helicopter that meets the minimum operational requirements. That really worries me. I ask why you are not trying to get more than you had before. Why not the best? In this room here, we usually take the politics out. We really and truly do when it comes...some who have left don't, but the majority of us do.

º (1640)

Mr. Peter Stoffer: No names.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, and I wasn't referring to the chair.

Right now, there is a need...I was told that with the way this is going at the present time, the replacement will probably be a helicopter that has one engine. Of course, if that engine stops, the helicopter goes down. But the EH-101 has three engines. If one stops, you have two more. I'm just wondering why we're not going for the best in order to give our men and women the best tools to do the job.

I know you can't say anything about what's happening in the United States, but it looks like there could be a war, so we need to give our men and women here in Canada the best tools to do the job. We require that for them to look after not only us, but others around the world as well, and for them to work with our friends across the border.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: I'm not sure whether there was a question there or not. Do we want good equipment for our people? Yes, of course we do. We want equipment that can carry out the job, that can make things happen from an operational perspective. I can't get into the contract part, because it's not my part of the ship. From an operational perspective, though, what we can do is make sure that the operational requirements of what we're asking for meet the need, meet the capability. The requirement designated in the operational requirements will mean that any one of the airplanes can meet those needs and capabilities, and any one of those airplanes will be an exceptional piece of equipment in that regard.

We don't yet know exactly who is going to bid for the contract, but we're starting to get an idea that the Cormorant or EH-101 may be one, that a Sikorsky may be one, and that the NH-90 may be a third. If they meet the operational requirements that we've laid out, all three of those aircraft, from my perspective—except the Sikorsky, I suppose; it's newer and is in its production or development cycle, but the company has a great reputation for helicopters—will give us an airplane that will be the kind of thing our men and women will want to fly and will want to operate, and they will meet our needs. My sense is that this is important.

In everything we do, cost is an issue. There is no doubt about that, because it's not just how much we spend in this area, it's how we find the resources to outfit our army folks who need equipment as well, and how we find the resources to upgrade our airplanes that we're going to upgrade. In all of this, then, I think we do have to find ways in which we can get what you could call best value. I would just say we're making sure we're investing the right amount of money in what it is that we're doing, in order to provide safe and effective equipment. But we have lots of things on which we have to spend, much in the same way that politicians in general have to deal not just with the issue of defence, but with health care and all of those other things that are exceedingly important for investments.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I think we've moved you up into first place.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: I like to be there.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I think we've succeeded in that.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)): Thank you very much, Elsie.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, General.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: General, in your presentation, you talked about the CF-18s and about a good many other things, but you never talked about the space issue. I believe it too falls under your jurisdiction.

Lgén Lloyd C. Campbell: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. Claude Bachand: You could nevertheless give an answer.

º (1645)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Perhaps, but that does not really come under the air force. In our shop, it is Admiral Maddison who takes care of that.

Mr. Claude Bachand: In that case, I will refrain from asking my question, because it is a rather pointed one and I do not want to waste time.

I would also like to ask a question with regard to strategic airlift. I know that this is something that you are directly responsible for. There are a lot of companies in the lineup at present. As a matter of fact, I do not know if you are like me, but I often get invitations. This evening, I have been invited to Airbus; last week, I was invited by Boeing. These days, we are much sought after.

A lot of people have told me that General Campbell is completely sold on the idea of the Boeing C-17 because he knows that the planes are ready and that we could get them quite quickly. I would like to know your opinion with regard to strategic airlift.

Since we are entitled to a supplementary, I would like to ask you what you think of the idea of a NATO pool to which the various countries would contribute in order to rent or to purchase a certain number of strategic airlift planes. Could Canada participate in such a pool? I know that there are a lot of people who are beginning to have doubts about this, saying that the different countries will all need planes at the same time.

I therefore would like to know if you have any preference as to the three companies that are offering their services and I would like to know what you think of a NATO pool.

[English]

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me start with the overall requirement for strategic lift. That quite clearly is a government decision that, to some extent, we thought might come from a defence review. As a committee, you have clearly made your position known on this. You believe it's required. My sense is that it is too, but not for the air force. We don't need strategic lift to move the air force, we need strategic lift to move the army, to deal with humanitarian issues, and so on.

My sense is that, yes, for a nation like ours, given the distances that exist, strategic lift is important to respond to issues both nationally and internationally—both airlift and sealift, because the two are complementary, one to the other. If we think that's so, and if we want to deal with it on a relatively near horizon, then only one aircraft is currently available with the capacity to do that job, and that clearly is the C-17. The A400M is a longer-term possibility, but the A400M does not exist yet, so it will be some time before it becomes available.

So the airplane issue is really just a question about, firstly, whether or not the nation thinks we need the capability; and secondly, in what timeframe. If the timeframe is relatively near, then that's really the only viable product that exists on the market, simply because of its size.

The pooling issue is one that is very important. Obviously, the development of a position with regard to the German proposal that there be a NATO pooling of resources was one into which we had input. I am a strong supporter of NATO. I've spent time there. From my perspective and from a Canadian perspective, I certainly think pooling would be a good idea. It would be a way by which we could make a contribution to the broader NATO alliance. But if we did that and if we were going to make a sizeable investment in it, then I would see that, first of all, we would need to have some of these airplanes in Canada rather than having them stationed in Europe—as the NATO AWACS is, and to which we also contribute.

A certain number of airframes would have to be here in Canada. We would have to have the ability to have first call on them. If we're going to make an investment, we can't be at the bottom of the list for who gets to use them.

And thirdly, I would see that we would have to also have the requirement to be able to detach them from the NATO pool in order to be able to use them for national purposes, whether it's to support a humanitarian operation—an earthquake, an ice storm, or whatever it happens to be—or to participate in a coalition operation that may not be sanctioned or under the umbrella of NATO.

So, personally, I think those are the kinds of criteria we need to apply to this program. If we can apply those criteria, if we can make an investment, and if it can serve as a contribution that Canada makes to NATO, where our excess capacity can be used—after our own purposes are met—for moving particularly some of the smaller and newer members of NATO in order for them to participate in various things, then I think it's an idea we really need to look at.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much, General.

[Translation]

Thank you, Claude. You have no time left.

Mr. Stoffer.

º (1650)

[English]

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you again.

Sir, I want to thank our researcher for the next question. If it's too difficult, you can blame him.

I've always been a big supporter of our Snowbirds. I understand that any new aircraft for the Snowbirds has been postponed. I assume that's because of other spending priorities within the military. Are there any indications at all about when we may hear that there may be a new replacement for the Tudor? If there won't be in the future, will the particular aircrews that are practising now on the Tudors have the ability to make or any difficulty in making the transition to the old Tudors?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Thank you very much, Mr. Stoffer.

On the issue of why we are not proceeding with the Snowbird replacement, it's certainly an issue of dollars. There's no question about that. But it's also a question of staff capacity at the present time as well. The same staff I have working on the Snowbird project are also working on the CF-18 upgrade project. I've told them their number one priority obviously is on the operational side of things.

We have looked at the Tudor in the Snowbird operation to see, from a safety perspective, what the reality is there. It's quite clear from the engineering analyses that have been done—one by us and one by Bombardier independently for us—that the Tudor will last out to about 2020 if we want it to last that long.

My personal sense is that if this nation decides—and I think this is not an air force decision, and not even a military decision, but a national decision—that this kind of capability is something that serves national pride and identity and that we want to keep it, then the nation simply decides to invest in it and we will find it.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Hear, hear. Thank you.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: My own sense with the Tudor—and this is a personal opinion that is not shared by all of my own staff, by the way—is that we need to replace the airplane. I do believe we need to be out there demonstrating modernity, good capability, and the excellence of the nation. But others say it's not necessary to have a new aircraft to do that, that the skill and capability of the crews who operate the airplane also demonstrate a lot of the capacity that exists within the Canadian Forces, land, sea, and air. I understand that perspective, but my own sense again—and it is my opinion—is that we really need to look at replacing the Snowbirds' aircraft, and that we need to do so within a timeframe of about 2006-07 or sometime in there.

I have encouraged companies that may have a product to provide to us to continue their efforts to bring those forward and to find cost-effective ways that we might be able to present to the Canadian government. We can then make a proposal to the government, and it can consider that proposal and decide whether we want to keep the Snowbirds or not.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Well, sir, I can't thank you enough for that. I've seen the Snowbirds at about ten different air shows in Canada and the States, and I've always been very proud of them when I see them do their magnificent routines. I think everyone at any air show, and especially the great air show at Shearwater, knows what a great job they do.

Sir, my last question is not really a question, but a chance to provide you with an opportunity, just as I provided one to Admiral Buck yesterday. Since this is televised and widely watched around the world and we have our troops around the world, this is an opportunity for you to offer a Christmas message to all your troops overseas. Please go right ahead.

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Thank you very much for that. I would be very pleased to do that. We will be doing that on an Internet broadcast in a short while as well.

Let me reflect to them what is even more important than my words, and that is the support that I know they get from the people at this table from all parties, and those you represent, Canadians. I've said this to our own folks when I've been out talking to them in the last while, but I have never in my entire career seen such a level of solid support across this country for the military, and it actually makes me feel very good.

Thank you very much.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Peter. That was very nice of you. And I did notice that you did get Shearwater in. We were wondering when you were going to do that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I got Shearwater in no problem. It's saved, so that's the big thing, eh? It was that touchy-feely Shearwater air show debate.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Elsie.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I just have one question. We had a retired general in to make a presentation to us. I'm just going to read you a little paragraph of what he said, and I'd like you to give a comment. He stated:

The most critical limitation faced by the air force today is the lack of trained and experienced personnel. Aircraft holdings have been reduced from over 700 to fewer than 300 over the past decade. More reductions could be in the offing as there is insufficient money to upgrade existing holdings of fighter, maritime patrol and transport aircraft.

He then mentions the Sea Kings, but I won't get into those, as we have already discussed them. He continues:

The air force cannot airlift army units overseas without help from allies or foreign civilian agencies. There is no strategic air-to-air refuelling capability, and electronic warfare capability is next to non-existent. Flying hours have been cut to reduce operations and maintenance costs, further complicating the critical training and experiential gaps. Also, sovereignty patrols over the vast Canadian Arctic have diminished just as climate change raises prospects of the need for expanded patrolling.

That was what he stated about our air force. Could you comment on that, please?

º (1655)

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Let me address the airplane numbers part first—and I don't disagree with much of what is there in its very basics.

With regard to airplane numbers, a lot of the airplanes that we refer to as having been gotten rid of were things like Tudors, Cosmopolitans, and other training aircraft. They were airplanes that did not add to the combat capability, to the core capability, of the organization, but they cost us a lot of money. We're now doing that in a different way, and in a way that I think is much more beneficial to Canadian taxpayers in the long run, because it's not costing us as much.

On trained and experienced personnel, as I said in my opening remarks, that is absolutely a significant issue. And it's not just a dollar thing. Dollars are associated in terms of compensation and benefits, but it's really a time element. It takes time to build experienced people, and we have embarked on trying to do that.

On the airlift and SAR, I think we have addressed the airlift in the strategic air-to-air refuelling thing. Again, it will take us some time to get that. I agree with this committee that I think strategic airlift is a critical element of that.

With regard to flying hours, this is the most interesting part of this, and I allude to a comment I made earlier. Right now, we are working very closely with the air division to examine every one of our capabilities, whether it's maritime patrol or fighters, to examine how many people we have in the system, what the maintenance program looks like, how many airplanes are there, and what our modernization program is going to look like, so that we can harmonize all of these things. Part of that is a look at flying hours. If the flying hours don't allow us to rebuild the operational expertise as quickly as we'd like—or as quickly as is possible, I would say—then we'll up that.

General Dumais and I are working on that. I've asked him for input into it no later than about the February timeframe. This will be built from the bottom up so that all of those people you know out at the wing levels—the wing commanders and others—will participate in making sure that we can remedy it if we've shortchanged someone in the context of how many flying hours they have available in order to produce the product we need in the time we need it. That's the commitment I would give to you.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The only thing left there was that the “sovereignty patrols over the vast Canadian Arctic have diminished just as climate change raises prospects of the need for expanded patrolling.” Is that right?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: That's always one point of debate. As I said while talking to someone the other day, one soldier on a promontory on the east coast may be seen to be a sufficient sovereignty patrol if nobody invades or nobody does anything bad.

How many flights is enough in a country of this size? I don't know the answer to that. What I do know and what I've said to others is that we have the capacity within our long-range patrol program, for example, to be able to increase the amount of surveillance if we feel there's a need—or we will have it when it's fully modernized.

I think the key there is that, because of the size of the nation, we simply can't afford to have airplanes doing this kind of surveillance on an hour-by-hour basis. We need to make sure we're using intelligence queueing; that we have other ways by which we can provide sovereignty; that we increase the capacity we have for space to provide some of the queueing that takes place; and that we're there to respond when we need to. But given the size of the nation, we'll never have enough resources to be able to do much more than have a presence in the Arctic.

» (1700)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Elsie.

Thank you, General.

[Translation]

Claude, would you have one final question?

Mr. Claude Bachand: General, it would seem that in the upcoming budget, there will be an increase in the National Defence budget. At present, a budget of approximately 2 billion dollars is provided for the air force. If there were 500 million dollars more, what would your first three priorities be for spending this money?

[English]

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: The key requirement for us in the near term is this whole business of spare parts and repair and overhaul. We have to make sure the investment that we have put into buying these pieces of equipment in the first place is not lost by not properly maintaining them. That has an added benefit because if we can put those kinds of resources there, the spirit of the technicians working on the airplanes and of the aircrews flying them obviously is increased, since we're now talking about having the kinds of resources needed to allow them to actually get the job done. So I would say the number one thing is making sure we have the right level of investment in maintaining the equipment we have.

The second element is continuing to invest in the modernization of our various fleets. That's something we've tended to mortgage a little bit. As we've increased our personnel numbers, we have had to take money away from modernization. We need to put that back. They're not vast sums of money, but we need to put them back in order to allow these programs to move forward more rapidly.

Thirdly, it comes back to the issue that Mrs. Wayne talked about. We need to make sure we're investing the right level of money in our operations and our training activities in order to give people a proper quality of work, and also to make sure we're allowing them to develop experience as quickly as people possibly can. That can be inhibited if they're not flying enough or if they're not operating enough.

So I would say those are the three elements we would look at.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

[English]

Thank you very much, General.

I do have a couple of quick questions just before we finish. I do get a chance to get a little bit in myself.

Is that okay?

Mr. Robert Bertrand: You're the boss.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Well, you were looking at me there, Bob, so I didn't know.

General, on the refits for the air-to-air refuelling on our Airbuses, when are they scheduled to start? Do you have a starting time?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: The first airplane should be inducted into the program in the fall of 2003 and should be out in early 2004. The second one is actually scheduled immediately thereafter.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

We've lost a lot of our pilots to the major airlines. Since then, the major airlines have had a lot of layoffs. Have we gotten some of them back? Has there been a flow the other way?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Indeed we have, as I mentioned briefly in my opening remarks. These are very valuable people. We spent a lot on them—$4 million or $5 million, I suppose, if you think about all of the components that go into building them. They are out there, and we have embarked on doing that.

I have a team within my own headquarters staff whose job is nothing but retention. Part of their effort is to make sure we have our people out finding out who those individuals are and who may be between jobs or are looking to come back in. They then have to make sure those people don't have to show up at the local recruiting organization and go through the difficulties that sometimes come with that. We want to bring them here to Ottawa, hand-walk them through the process, and make sure things like medical and security clearances and so on are handled in a way that's efficient, because if there's too much bureaucracy in the way, they'll change their minds.

So we really do want to get some of them back, because they're great people.

» (1705)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): They're a very valuable asset.

On the problems that you have had with the Cormorants, did you have the spare parts? Were they fast to come in once ordered?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: I'm sorry, but can I have the question again, sir?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): In terms of the replacement parts for the breakdowns that you talked about on the Cormorants, are they stock items that you have as replacements, or do you have to order them?

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Some of them are stock and some of them have fairly long lead times, but we've entered into a program with the company to make sure we do in fact move those as quickly as we can. We're not alone in this regard, by the way. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, which both operate the EH-101, are facing exactly the same challenges that we are, and they are equally concerned.

When I met with the company in London last week as part of my visit to our exchange officers there, we had a very frank and useful discussion. They have committed themselves to identifying every one of the parts that we need not by specific number but in terms of the types of things we need, and they have committed to making sure everything is done to supply those parts.

As I alluded to earlier, the aircraft industry in general is such that it's not easy always to get things in a hurry if they haven't been forecasted. Sometimes it can take six months even to get things like fasteners. It's quite incredible. But partially because the company is obviously interested in sales—and not just sales to us, but sales south of the border; I made the point that the Americans are close enough to us that they sometimes notice how a particular airplane is brought into service here—how the airplane is supported may be something they want to give some thought to if they're thinking of selling it down south. The point was not lost, so I'm expecting some pretty good support out of them.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I'm sure they're also looking at long-term maintenance and upgrades and everything else that comes along. That's where the money is really made. Let's face it. It's not the contract you make the money on, it's the extras.

I want to thank you very much for being here, General, and...go ahead, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sorry. I was rather rude. I forgot to wish a very Merry Christmas to all of you and to our clerks and researchers, our translators who make us sound good, the button man, and everybody else who helps us out. So to all of you good folks,

[Translation]

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Are you done yet, Peter?

An hon. member: Oh, oh!

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I'm all done.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]...Mr. Chair, and I would especially like to mention to the member from Saint John that I would like to congratulate her on the excellent colour she has chosen for her sweater.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you. That's very fitting, Mr. Bertrand. We'll take note of that for sure.

Anyway, as I started to say, General.... Actually, just before I get into that, I did want to mention something about our trip to Cheyenne Mountain. I have to say how very proud we were as we walked through that mountain and saw all those Canadian shoulder flashes. Both the way they are working and the integration with the other force there are quite incredible.

Also, you mentioned General Pennie. I think it's important, too, that we mention the fact that General Eberhart is great guy. He has an awful lot on his shoulders, so he unfortunately has to be on the road an awful lot. As a result, everyday operations are really run by our own General Pennie. He runs that show down there, and he does an excellent job at it. Of course, he and General Eberhart work hand in hand together. It's really a team effort, and it really makes you proud when you see that. I just wanted to mention that.

I think it's important that we keep talking about this. Canadians do not realize how well we work together with our American counterparts. That's one place, but I know it happens all over the world.

I also wish our forces the very best this holiday season, wherever they are, and I extend the same wish to you and your family, General. Let's hope we have peace on the other side of this Christmas.

Thank you very much.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

Lt-Gen Lloyd C. Campbell: Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Peter has already done it, but I would also like to wish it to everybody at this table, as well as to the staff and the people in the booth.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll wish you a Merry Christmas tomorrow, David. Do we have any further business?

» (1710)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): No, this meeting is adjourned.