NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, October 28, 2003

À

1010

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Á

1115

Admiral Ken Summers (Retired) (President, Naval Officers' Association of Vancouver Island)

Á

1120

Á

1125

Á

1130

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance)

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Adm Ken Summers

Á

1135

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Á

1140

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Claude Bachand

Á

1145

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Claude Bachand

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Adm Ken Summers

Á

1150

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Á

1155

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Joe McGuire

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

Â

1200

Adm Ken Summers

Mr. Bill Blaikie

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Â

1205

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Â

1210

Adm Ken Summers

Â

1215

The Chair

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Adm Ken Summers

Â

1220

The Chair

Adm Ken Summers

The Chair

Adm Ken Summers

Â

1225

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.)

The Chair

Â

1230

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Â

1235

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Â

1240

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 040

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, October 28, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

À  (1010)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

    We have, as our witness today, someone who has been certainly no stranger to defence issues over the last number of years. He's here in his capacity as Naval Officers' Association of Vancouver Island president, but Retired Admiral Ken Summers has a tremendous amount of experience in the Canadian Forces. He's a former commander of Canadian Forces in the first Gulf War, and has been a commentator as well. You've probably seen him on television on a number of occasions, providing colour commentary on various defence issues.

    Admiral, it's with pleasure that I welcome you here to the committee. You're no stranger to this committee. You've been here in the past. On behalf of members of the committee, I'd like to extend a warm welcome to you. As you know, we've been dealing with our study of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation, and issues surrounding that.

    So without any further delay, I'm going to give you the floor. We very much look forward to getting your comments.

Á  (1115)  

    Admiral Ken Summers (Retired) (President, Naval Officers' Association of Vancouver Island): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First off, let me say that it really is a pleasure to come back and talk to the committee about a subject that really is near and dear to my heart. It's a pleasure, in fact, to see so many people around the table, familiar faces, from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Some of the meetings, I think, were instrumental. The Bucharest one was the first one behind the Iron Curtain, as you might recall. There were subsequent meetings in Warsaw, and a very pleasant one in Edinburgh as well. So it's very nice to see these friendly faces.

    I also will take the opportunity to thank the members of the assembly at the time for adopting me, to a certain extent, seconding me almost to the delegation and certainly including me in all of the social activities in the various restaurants in those capitals. So it's nice to see the familiar faces.

    I note that you've had some recent appearances from General Pennie and General Daigle, army and air force officers, and at times I think you end up talking about army and air force programs. I am prepared, even though I'm not in uniform, to talk to those types of programs on the naval and maritime side, particularly if you want to get into gulf-type operations and Operation Apollo, where the navy was so deeply involved. But I made the assumption that the committee wished to explore the future of Canada-U.S. defence relationships and cooperation. Thus, my opening comments are in that particular direction.

    I do so from an involvement over the past decade, quite a deep involvement, with the United States, following my time in the gulf with the commanders there. I then was posted to the embassy in Washington as the defence attaché under ambassadors Burney, de Chastelain, and Chrétien. Interestingly enough, a lot of the U.S. commanders who were there in the gulf were then back in the Pentagon, so I had a very close continued association with them and with the way they operate.

    My last posting appointment was in Norfolk, Virginia, for four years as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, on the NATO side, but concurrent with SACLANT, my boss was also the head of the U.S.A. Command, changed to U.S. Joint Forces Command, very much involved with the security of the continental United States. So I'm very well tuned to what they were doing. And it's from that type of background that I feel I can give you some insight.

    In terms of the relationship between Canada and the United States, I think “intriguing” is probably the best word of all. A number of politicians have tried to capture it. I would draw your attention to John F. Kennedy in 1961, when he made that famous statement, “Geography has made us neighbours, history has made us friends”, a quote that everyone seems to know. But it's interesting that in 1963, Lester B. Pearson came back with, “We worry when you look hard at us but we are also touchy about being overlooked.” You can think of a number of occasions in the past where that has been very true.

    I was going to include a third one, not from a politician but from a warrior, who made a statement in 1878 about the meat of the buffalo or something like that, but I understand you've heard that one recently.

    I hope you can use that one down in the States, because it's a very effective one.

    That one struck me, because it's on a rather benign subject, the meat of the buffalo, but when you really think about that, deeply, there's a lot more behind that than just the simple words by Chief Sitting Bull.

    In my approach today, I want to address four questions. One, what does the U.S. seek from the Canada-U.S. defence agreements? Two, what should Canada want in return out of those defence agreements? Three, what can we additionally provide or contribute to the defence burden sharing? Finally, my own thoughts on what steps Canada should take in the next few months in light of the above.

    Although Mr. Pratt indicated that I was here as part of the Naval Officers' Association of Vancouver Island, I would offer the caveat right now that a lot of these comments are personal comments based on my experience, and certainly not something you can take the Naval Officers' Association of Canada to task for.

    First, then, what does the U.S. seek from Canada-U.S. defence agreements? I think we should realize that Canada is more important to the United States today than it was a while back. We're more important to the United States post-September 11 than we were before. If you think back to the 1960s, to the Soviets, the threat was the manned bomber coming over the pole, which led us to establish the NORAD arrangement with the United States to counter that particular threat. Well, as things developed, the manned bomber was replaced by intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. developed a response to that, their own ballistic missiles, and therefore Canada's importance was somewhat reduced, even though, of course, some of the missiles may have been taken out over Canadian territory.

Á  (1120)  

    But post-9/11, with the threat coming from across the Great Lakes, across the border, something that could affect both Canada and the United States, all of a sudden in this new post-9/11 world Canada is more important to the United States when it comes to defence and mutual defence security arrangements.

    I think we underestimate the impact of 9/11 on the average American. It was a disastrous event, and it was horrific, and we all felt that up here north of the border, but then we slipped back into our normal way of life. The average U.S. citizen did not. Every American citizen was affected by 9/11, and the security ramifications of that is something that affects everyone.

    To draw an analogy, Pearl Harbour was something that defined the United States back in 1941. Well, I would suggest and submit that the bombing on 9/11 will have more of an impact on the United States than Pearl Harbour did. I think it's been felt about ten times more deeply than Pearl Harbour. That's the extent to which 9/11 is affecting American policy and American thinking.

    In light of that, they really don't understand why we're not more concerned with security and defence. They just don't understand that, and why we're not putting more into those particular areas, given the common threat, because they see that threat as being something that's shared by both nations.

    Above all else, then, what the U.S. is looking for is a high-level sign by a Canadian government of a commitment to defence and security, and especially defence burden sharing. Specifically, the U.S. is looking for, in my estimation, a substantial and directed increase in defence and security funding. They're looking for a comprehensive defence review, not an update, that addresses the new post-9/11 threat. They're looking for a real commitment to continental surveillance and operations coordination involving air, sea, land, and federal agencies. They're looking for a government commitment to move forward in BMD planning talks, notwithstanding that there are certain philosophical differences between our countries. Involvement does not imply complete commitment.

    I guess the bottom line is that if we don't get involved in the above, the U.S. is going to do it unilaterally, and Canada won't even be in the tent, let alone at the table, on matters of national security that are vital to all Canadians.

    Well, if that's what the Americans seek from our agreements, what should we be seeking? First off, I would submit, joint involvement in the protection and reaction to traditional continental and post-9/11 threats. We certainly want an active, respected, and equal voice in consultations on continental and global defence issues.

    You would note that we were not in the contact group. You would note that we have not been involved in the discussions on the Middle East, and not on Iran. I think Canada wants to be at the table. We're a member of the G-8, so coming out of these types of agreements, I would expect that we would be seeking an active seat at those tables.

    We want to ensure that between the two of us we have a mutual, robust, rapid response to disasters, be they natural, like the ice storm, or otherwise. We should seek from them assistance, advice, and guidance and understanding as the Canadian military evolves under a transformation to a more modern, more effective threat and mission-oriented force.

    Most importantly, what we should be looking for from them is a quid pro quo in economic issues. In the U.S. government prioritization, security trumps trade. Trade with a nation depends on its willingness to get involved in security. This I can't emphasize strongly enough. It follows, then, that mutual support in defence and security should bear economic dividends to Canada, especially in the R and D community and I would think in access to defence contracts.

    So what can Canada additionally contribute to defence burden sharing? Well, actually, quite a bit. We could participate actively and energetically, with strong government-wide support in many departments, in the planning team's efforts at NORAD with an expectation of near-term decisions on air, land, and sea mutual cooperation, to be followed by subsequent national assignment of forces, albeit separately, and resources to counter continental threats.

Á  (1125)  

    We could increase coordinated surveillance. In addition to today's NORAD surveillance, we could accelerate Canadian space programs to complement or augment the projected U.S. systems and programs.

    Today we could integrate the recognized maritime operational picture on both coasts, including the modern high-definition surface warning radar, which extends well beyond Canada's economic zone on both coasts, and in actual fact is a blind area to the United States right now. This is already being done between the navies. How easy it would be to fuse that with the NORAD picture in Colorado. We could designate air and maritime forces as available, at appropriate readiness states, to respond to any threat when directed nationally to a continental threat. This would be essentially dual-tasking national forces that right now are ready to respond to a national contingency or emergency.

    Finally, if and when additional soldiers are provided to the army, we could or should reorient the militia to be primarily an aid to the civil power force, with residual capacity to augment the land forces when needed. They could then specialize in the militia units across the country regionally to responsibilities such as the disaster assistance response team or elements thereof, the teams we have down in Kingston, DART teams, the ones that we sent to Turkey recently and elsewhere. That's a common requirement in the post-9/11 world.

    We could orient them towards nuclear/biological/chemical monitoring teams that could be brought around and used when required. We could orient them towards command and control, the ability to communicate, and coordinate and assist the local authorities, whether they be national, provincial, or indeed federal.

    This is not unlike what the naval reserves are doing today, I might add, where in terms of port security, the naval reserve divisions have dedicated teams for the control of shipping, harbour defence, mine warfare, and diving teams. Essentially, we're talking about doing that with the militia. This reorienting of the militia, in my estimation, would make it similar to the U.S. National Guard, and perhaps we can even go so far as to consider making it directly responsible to the provincial governments, and in return funded in part provincially.

    In light of those, what steps should we be initiating right now, in the near term? Most importantly, I would urge that a high-level, well-publicized delegation, perhaps even bipartisan or tripartisan, be sent to Washington with a message of commitment: a commitment to undertake an immediate and comprehensive defence and security review in light of 9/11; a commitment to substantially increased defence funding, directed toward prioritized capabilities consistent with that review; a commitment to seek the advice and guidance of U.S. authorities on continental and other defence issues; a commitment to indicate willingness to progress, as a priority, planning team discussions, Canadian Forces transformation, and ballistic missile defence or theatre missile defence talks; and a commitment, at the same time, to subtly acknowledge to the United States the link between security and trade.

    They should be accelerating the planning team's efforts in NORAD to commit to early implementation decisions even while more detailed planning continues, and initiate a forces-wide transformation process, as I mentioned earlier, in parallel with a defence review. If necessary, we could enact legislation not unlike the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in the States to foster the adoption of forces-wide jointness in the Canadian military, and signal willingness to move forward on BMD and TMD.

    Perhaps I'll close my comments with another quote, if I may, and this one also came from JFK: “We share common values from the past...and common aspirations for the future of all mankind.”

    With those comments, gentlemen, I'd be pleased to answer any questions you might have on any of the points raised or anything else.

    Thank you very much.

Á  (1130)  

    The Chair: Thank you again, Admiral Summers. We appreciate your comments before us today. There are lots of things we can chew on in terms of the ideas and suggestions you've made there.

    On a very brief item of business, I would like to alert members to the fact that at the end of this meeting I would like to spend perhaps ten minutes to deal with the future business of the committee. We have a decision by the liaison committee to restrict our travel to Washington to ten members. That is rather unfortunate, from my standpoint, but maybe we could talk about that at the end of the meeting. I just wanted to make members aware of that fact in the event that members have to leave before the end of the meeting.

    Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Admiral Summers, for appearing today and for your well-thought-out presentation and recommendations or suggestions.

    I don't find myself in dispute with your observations and thoughts as you've laid them out today--not at all--so I don't have a lot of questions. However, I was kind of intrigued by your thoughts about restructuring the militia, sort of along the lines of the National Guard. I haven't taken much time to really research exactly the role played by the National Guard. I think I understand it sort of superficially, the role that it plays in the United States, both domestically and when they serve abroad, but I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit more. I sense that you probably have done some research into this.

    If we were to restructure a militia along those lines, would it affect the traditional role they've evolved into, where they work side by side with our regular forces in deployments such as they currently are involved in, such as in Afghanistan?

    Adm Ken Summers: Thank you very much for the question.

    Yes, I am familiar with the National Guard. What I'd be proposing is somewhat down that direction but certainly not a carbon copy. I guess when I look at Canada in a post-9/11 scenario, and I look at the militia, I find that they are totally devoted essentially to augmenting the regular force. That's the way it has been set up. Indeed, I think you would probably find that around 20% of the forces that are deployed abroad are indeed militia. That's significant, and important.

    While they're doing that, I think they're not necessarily being utilized in an important way in the “new world order”, as I call it, post-9/11. So first off, make sure there are more soldiers for the army so that they don't have to rely on the militia to give them another 20% for them to be able to conduct operations. Assuming that more soldiers are given to the army, you could then reorient the militia to something that would be more responsive to threats in continental Canada and the United States. You've got the air force being able, in NORAD, to do things on protection, coming in, and you've got the maritime forces being able to protect, coming in. It's what's happening on the land. And where we have need for the DART team that we've sent abroad, I could see elements being set up of DART teams in Toronto, in Edmonton, in Calgary, in Victoria--or in Vancouver, more importantly--or in Halifax, in the maritimes. So you have four of them across the country that--

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): And Montreal.

    Adm Ken Summers: Okay, Montreal, there we go, or Quebec City, or Trois-Rivières--someplace where they could respond rapidly to a threat that's going to happen in any of those cities.

    There could be elements of that, or any sort of nuclear response. There might be a requirement for monitoring of the radioactive, chemical, or biological, and they could have teams trained in that. Those are functions that would be very useful in that post-9/11 conflict.

    As well, when something goes wrong, such as the ice storm, there is a requirement for someone to come in and provide the means of coordinating and communicating. Again, I just see it as a natural response for Canada's militia to be able to provide that glue to assist local authorities, be they the police, the provincial police, or whoever, to be able to deal with the situation. That's almost always a requirement in a situation like that.

    So that's the type of role I would see for the militia. I think it would actually be even more cost-effective, and more useful overall to the Canadian people.

Á  (1135)  

    The Chair: Any further questions?

    Mr. Jay Hill: Perhaps just one quick supplementary for a bit more elaboration, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

    So if I understand you correctly, Admiral, what you're proposing then is that this would be quite a dramatic change from the traditional role of the reserves in serving side by side with our regular forces. My understanding is that the U.S. National Guard does perform that role as sort of a backup, or as supplementary troops. Well, not just troops; obviously they have their Air National Guard as well in the United States.

    So that's where you would differentiate, and increase the regular forces to whatever the proper number would be so that they can do the roles assigned to them by the government of the day, but keep the reserves for other purposes.

    Adm Ken Summers: That's correct. I suppose one of the advantages they can do in the United States as far as the National Guard is concerned is that they have legislation, so if they second a national guardsman to go to Afghanistan, or Iraq, or wherever, their jobs are protected for up to a year. We don't have that type of legislation. We could always do that, but it would seem to me we don't have to go that far.

    What we really need, and what we are missing.... In my estimation, there's a gap in our capability in the future to be able to deal with issues or problems on Canadian territory, such as I've mentioned. To me, it's just a natural to be able to bring that together under the militia umbrella.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Merci beacoup, Monsieur Président.

    I had written a question here, while you were speaking, which you've answered. However, I wonder if you would like to go into it more deeply.

    In your opinion, what would be the first act the Canadian government could perform to send a positive signal to Washington? You brought up a point about this committee going down, and making sure it's well publicized. I wouldn't have thought of that, but it's an excellent idea.

    Adm Ken Summers: Thank you for that, because this is one of the most important points I wanted to get across. There's no doubt in my mind that the U.S. follows us more closely than perhaps we think, and I certainly would expect that there would be an invitation to the people shortly after perhaps any change of government, of Prime Minister. But more importantly, they want something, not just a little visit. They're going to be looking for something. Is there any change in the approach Canada is taking?

    I think that's why it's important to have high-level people from various government departments--Foreign Affairs, National Defence, the Solicitor General, perhaps, and others--going down to Washington, led by a very senior member of the government, with a very clear unequivocal message that we understand the security dimension and will be making some commitments.

    That's the message they're looking for. They're looking for a commitment in this whole area.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have just a couple more small questions on the new militia.

    First, who would be empowered to call out this new militia? And second, the National Guard is financed by the state, I believe. Would you see a role for the provinces in this new militia?

Á  (1140)  

    Adm Ken Summers: I think there could be, and this is why I sort of threw it out that perhaps even the provinces could fund part of it. Right now, of course, for aid in terms of the civil power, the provinces have to request it, and then the federal government responds. Having the militia with certain capabilities right there would be attractive, and I would think any provincial government would recognize the utility of having those capabilities in province.

    As to how much we go down the model of National Guard, I suppose it's with some trepidation that I use the National Guard...and I'm not advocating going all the way down the National Guard route. But it's heading down in that direction, where there is perhaps more involvement of the militia with the provincial governments.

    I could see a scenario whereby the provincial governments would be able to call upon the militia in their particular province, and perhaps later on look to the government to get militia from adjoining provinces, and I can also see the provincial governments, if it were approached properly, being willing to fund some of the tasks of the militia.

    So I guess that's what I was getting at. I was not advocating a rubber-stamping of a U.S. National Guard blueprint on Canada, but rather the orienting of the militia away from augmentation of the regular force to something that is more appropriate to internal crises and assistance to aid the civil power.

    The Chair: Monsieur Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

    I think you'll need your translation device. Do you speak French?

[Translation]

    Adm Ken Summers: RAdm Ken Summers: I come from Victoria and I do not often have the opportunity to speak French. I will try to speak French, but if I do so, I am sure that I will make a lot of mistakes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: On your ideas about the militia, I probably support a lot of what you are saying. I cannot get into a big debate about funding with you, since I think that right now the provinces are faced with a big funding problem, while Ottawa is racking up big surpluses year after year. So I feel it would be a non-starter to ask the Quebec government to fund a militia. Something you must understand, Mr. Summers, is command and control. So I really do not see a situation where the provinces would be funding the militia and Ottawa would have control. In any case, there is a long way to go before an agreement in that area would be possible.

    You raised some interesting points earlier when you talked about what the Americans expect from Canada. You said that they wanted more security and more defence, which leads me to the 1994 defence policy, which I believe you talked about too; the most recent white paper dates back to 1994. Everyone knows today that resources are limited, that the Canadian Forces cannot do everything, whereas the Americans can do anything they want.

    We sometimes have the impression that there is no connection between the various decisions that the minister makes, such as replacing the Sea King helicopters. We bought submarines, based on the 1994 defence policy, but does it make sense to buy four submarines today that do not have the systems needed to go under the polar ice cap? The government decided to replace the Iltis jeeps after two soldiers were killed, and the minister quickly announced that those jeeps would be replaced with Mercedes Wolf vehicles. But the soldiers in Afghanistan are saying that those vehicles are not that great, it would seem. And there are a lot of other examples like that.

    The minister has just decided that he will direct $600 million to the army. Is it not a bit arbitrary to say that priority will be given to the army? It may be a good decision, but it is not part of a national defence policy. Do you not think that it is time to give Canadian taxpayers a say and ask them what kind of armed forces they want?

    The way to do that is through a white paper, beginning with consultations. The position in the end might be that it is not possible to do everything, but that what we do should be done well. It might be the DART teams that you talked about earlier. That is a choice that will have to be made. We can no longer keep finding partial solutions to the overall problem.

    So what do you think of my party's position, which is that we should come up with a new national defence policy as soon as possible? Do you agree with that idea?

Á  (1145)  

    Adm Ken Summers: I think that I understood pretty well everything you said, but you have raised a lot of points. You said that the provinces already paid for military operations. If a province asks for help from the armed forces for something, then it has to pay the federal government for that help.

    Regarding consultations with the United States, I feel that it is very important to participate in discussions. We cannot go it alone, in today's world. In North America, all future discussions should involve the United States, and perhaps even Mexico. That is fundamental, in my opinion. Moreover, since the Americans are like an elephant, it is more important for us. In fact, on the economic front, the United States is our... I will continue in English.

[English]

    We make the point that the United States is our biggest trading partner, and that the trade deficit is in our favour, not theirs, which we say is really good. The problem is, I think, we rely more on trade with the United States than the United States relies on trade with us, even though we're in a favoured position right now. So if push comes to shove economically, they could make it rather difficult for us, and a lot of the problems we're facing right now are perhaps a result of that.

    I'm moving away from the one point you made, but I do see some quid pro quo on the economic side if we recognize that security is important on a continental basis.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Don't forget about the national defence policy. I want to hear about that also.

    Adm Ken Summers: Yes. The policy that was created in 1974, and has been updated since, is something that a number of organizations, including academic organizations, have been calling for a complete defence review of. I certainly support that. Personally, I think it's long overdue, particularly in light of 9/11. I think certainly enough time has passed that this is something that should be pursued on a priority basis.

    I am convinced, from the many discussions I have had with people down south of the border, that they want to see that type of thing. This incremental updating, essentially by perhaps the Department of National Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs, to the defence policy is not what they're looking for. They want a fundamental, blank sheet of paper: Let's go back. We have a new world. Let's start again. What's required? What's required for continental defence going out, Canada out, and then once you've done that review, that should lead you to a number of capabilities that you would then be having to fund.

    On how you would go about achieving that, you could probably achieve a number of them through cooperation with the United States, for example, rather than having to pursue it and buy it yourself. But it's not a one-way street. It has to work both ways. So if we do that, they're going to be looking for things from us as well. And we have things to offer.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Merci.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. McGuire, any more beefy questions from you--or shall I say “meaty”?

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): You can say meaty.

    He doesn't know what we're talking about here.

    Adm Ken Summers: Actually, it was going through my mind....

    Are you not from P.E.I.? I was thinking of George Proud. You must be George Proud's replacement, then.

Á  (1150)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: No. Who can replace George Proud?

    An hon. member: He's irreplaceable.

    Adm Ken Summers: That's very true, yes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you, Mr. Chair,

    I was just wondering about the timing here. We're talking about 9/11, 2001, and you want a review, which will take another year. And then you want a high-level committee to go to Washington with plans in mind about how we can cooperate on continental defence.

    Isn't that sort of a long period to go by before we get down to brass tacks on continental security?

    Adm Ken Summers: It could be. If the bureaucracy wants to make it a long time, it certainly can do that. We have a long-standing tradition of doing that. “Paralysis by analysis” is the phrase that has been used, I think. But it doesn't necessarily have to be that way.

    An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]

    Adm Ken Summers: Yes, and I was part of it, I guess, at times.

    So I think a delegation going down, with a very strong message of commitment--

    Mr. Joe McGuire: What year are you talking about here?

    Adm Ken Summers: I'm talking about a matter of months, before an election.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Before an election and before a review.

    Adm Ken Summers: Before review--just a commitment that we're going to undertake this, and get serious about it. I think that would be the start.

    Following up from that would be a requirement to discuss with them their views and seek their input. There's no harm in seeking the input from them on it. We can disregard some of the points they make, but we could also perhaps learn a few things. We don't have to wait for the review to be complete before we can start doing things.

    I'm sure that right now the planning team that's down in Colorado--and I'd be very surprised if General Pennie didn't allude to this--is already working on a number of issues there. There's no reason why we have to wait until they put the whole package together and have it approved by every government department. There are things that are no-brainers that really should be done. There's no reason why those elements can't be pulled out and decisions made, in my estimation, in very short order, because they're in both nations' best interests, particularly ours. We can go ahead and start implementing those ones right away. So it could be a long time, but there are lots of things in there that could be done right now.

    For example, as a very simple thing, I mentioned the recognized maritime operational picture. I'm convinced that in a very short period of time, there's no reason why that picture can't be integrated into--

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Is this the expansion of NORAD into coastal surveillance?

    Adm Ken Summers: NORAD, of course, looking at the satellites and all the other systems they have, looks primarily at the aerospace environment. The recognized maritime picture is looking outward from the coast and includes subsurface information as well. This high-definition surface warning radar talked about, going out beyond the economic zones, that's in literally blind spots. The Americans don't have things up there other than satellite passages on both coasts.

    That picture could be brought into NORAD, in my estimation, in very short order. It would be a complementary picture, a confirmation of things out there when it comes to tracking, from satellites and from the other systems we have. That's just smart business when you're looking at trying to put a surveillance shield around North America. And that can be done overall, easy.

    In terms of assigning forces, we talked about a national guard for NORAD a few years ago. The U.S. reaction to NORAD was international guard units. We had fighter squadrons from Canada whose raison d'être was in fact the response to threats coming in. We can, on the maritime side, very easily designate ships that right now are sitting at both coasts, ready duty, ready to respond to a situation. There's no reason why they can't be dual-tasked to go and conduct surveillance, or check out vessels of interest on others coasts.

    So we can do things like that.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Are people actually considering these plans right now?

    Adm Ken Summers: I would assume that the planning team...and I haven't talked with them, but General Pennie probably would be the one to do it, There's absolutely no reason why, in fact, they are not doing that. Admiral Fraser is heading up the planning team, I think, in Colorado, and he, having just come as commander of Maritime Forces Pacific, is well aware of the information that's exchanged between the navies on both coasts on a regular operational and ongoing basis. Marrying up the operational maritime picture with the aerospace picture to give a recognized picture overall is easy to do, I think, and important.

    You have to recognize, too, that the aerospace side has changed since 9/11 from something that was looking outward primarily, in all the approaches to continental North America, to something in addition to this that is now looking internally. They are now starting to track all the aircraft flying in the aerospace above the continental United States, for the very reason of what happened on 9/11.

    So I think the military should be trying to come up with an overall recognized picture--air, sea, and land--of what's going on over continental North America. That's of interest, of concern, to both nations.

Á  (1155)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: To get back to the timing of the initiatives, how much do you think has to be implemented before the review, or during the review?

    Adm Ken Summers: Certainly a visit to Washington, in my mind, would be a signal, and I think the signal is the most important thing Canada can give to the United States right now. I believe that is important to give, and it has to be given by high-level people, with a commitment that would be understood and recognized by the appropriate authorities in the United States.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Do you have any idea of what increases in spending would have to happen before the Americans would say, “You're serious, Canada, and we appreciate it”?

    Adm Ken Summers: I would fall back and say “substantial”. All of the studies undertaken by the Conference of Defence Associations, by Canada 21, and by academics outside are indicating somewhere between an additional $1.5 billion to $4 billion annually in the budget.

    Now, I know you're all probably well aware of this, but from 1992 to the present day, the defence budget has been essentially reduced by 30%. It was at $13 billion in 1992-93. It went down to $9 billion, and it's just gotten back up to $13 billion. So that's a decade of essentially 30% less funding. Moreover, inflation comes into play, and when you start looking at that 30% in terms of inflation, the loss is probably greater than 30%.

    That explains why we've had to go from forces that in 1993 were 85,000, if memory serves me correctly, down to something in the vicinity of 55,000. It explains why we have so much money now going into keeping the equipment operating, why we're having to pay so much money to buy spare parts to keep older equipment going. That 30% reduction over a decade is not something that is going to be made up easily.

    What is needed in defence spending in the future, again, is a commitment to a sustained increase in funding, I would say, in the order of $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually, above what we're doing right now, obviously consistent with the defence review, and targeted, I would also say, toward capabilities that are most important in a post-9/11 world. That's the type of funding that's required, a substantial increase.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Blaikie.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    It's good to see Admiral Summers again.

    I have just a few questions. That's an interesting proposal with respect to the militia. Certainly I take the view, as I think some committee members know--I've said this before--that it's always strange to me that the militia and the reserve have difficulty getting resources, because it's the one thing that all political parties and all politicians agree on. Where's the resistance? It's not in the political realm. It's somewhere within DND itself, and in the regular army probably, even though they are seen as an aid to the regulars.

    In that respect--and this is not something that Admiral Summers can answer--I'm hoping that the rumour about John Fraser's committee, the monitoring committee, that it somehow is going to be shut down, is not true, and that the committee will continue. But that's something we can pursue elsewhere.

    Are we still in camera, Mr. Chairman? No?

    Okay. So it's an open session.

    I take it from what you've already said...and I had a note here to ask you about this idea of expanding NORAD to include supervision of the coastal waters, etc. You see that as kind of a natural fit, so you've really answered that question.

    You've obviously done a lot of work with the Americans, and there are varying degrees of concern within Canada. Some people are more concerned about it than others, but I think everyone is concerned at some level about Canadian sovereignty and the extent to which it is more or less at risk when we enter into various forms of cooperation with the United States in terms of defence and security. It's a debate that's been going on since before I was born, so it's not something that has been invented of late. It's an ongoing debate.

    For someone like you, who has had an awful lot of experience working with the United States in these matters, and obviously you're in favour of various levels of cooperation, what would you say are the kinds of things we have to be on the lookout for, that in your view are appropriate things to be sensitive about?

    Sometimes people, including people on the left in Canada, get accused of being oversensitive about sovereignty issues, and that cooperation, by its very definition, suggests some kind of abdication of absolute sovereignty. But surely...and I've talked to people before, and generally speaking, sometimes retired people are a lot more willing to talk about this than others. What are the things that we should be concerned about, that we all should be concerned about, when we're engaged in this kind of cooperation with the Americans?

  (1200)  

    Adm Ken Summers: Thank you, Mr. Blaikie. In fact, it is a boon to be in civilian dress in that one can say a bit more than one would have been able to say in the past.

    On sovereignty, we're more sensitive in Canada to sovereignty issues than perhaps we should be. I've been using lots of quotes, but one that springs to mind is Mr. Manley's recent one, that getting involved in the United States is an exercise of sovereignty as opposed to an abrogation of sovereignty.

    I guess to a certain extent, I agree with that, although that can be taken out of context, or taken too far one way or the other. But I'll go back to the point that if we don't do something, then our sovereignty is lost. So I think the key is to get involved, and to get involved responsibly.

    Canada has never been shy about saying we don't agree, and quite honestly, the United States, in my experience, has never been reluctant to accept when Canada has objected. And it's right to object if we don't feel solid about something. We're a member of the G-8, and we're an important country in the world. We can be even more important, and I think the Americans respect that. At times, though, I've had the feeling that we're like a little brother who pesters them, and they finally get ticked off. But they treat us well. I've always been amazed at that. No matter what happens, they always treat us at times like that little brother: “You'll understand when you grow up.”

    And that's what I find I don't particularly care for, because I think if we go at things responsibly, the attitude in the States would be that they would accept that. Canadians are well thought of. They think of us as Americans. They don't see us any different. The meat of the buffalo is the same on both sides of the border, and that's they way they look at us, that we are Americans, of the northern variety, perhaps, but still Americans. We have a relatively common culture in so many ways.

    So in terms of sovereignty, I think it's something that could be overplayed. And I think everyone should be careful in discussions like that, when you look at a proposition, not to let the emotion of sovereignty...because here in Canada it can become a very, very emotional subject, and it perhaps can be taken beyond the area of rationality.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Blaikie.

    Monsieur Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    The American government has seen fit to maintain an army, the National Guard, but also an army reserve. I'm just wondering why you would say that we should change the mandate of the militia. We would be left, for instance, without the possibility of augmenting troops that have been sent overseas. You mentioned at the beginning of your statement that most of the troops that we send overseas are augmented, some of the groups, by at least 20% from the militia. I'm just wondering why the Americans think it's important to have a reserve, and yet you're advocating that we change the mandate of our militia.

  (1205)  

    Adm Ken Summers: I guess the difference in the States between the reserves and the National Guard is who controls them. The National Guard is controlled by the states, whereas the army reserve is controlled federally by the U.S. government. The reserve is more integrated into the regular force than the National Guard, which tends to be kept separate and then put together as a unit into crisis. For instance, they'll take a unit from the 134th group, or whatever it is, in Texas and go on a mission. The group will go on a mission, not individual people.

    But again, I don't think we should get mesmerized by army reserve and National Guard in the States. Essentially, both the reserve and the National Guard are call-up forces that can be used to augment or replace regular force units in operations abroad.

    Where I was coming from, and I obviously didn't make this clear, is that our militia, in my estimation, a simple sailor's estimation, of necessity has had to assume the role of augmenting the regular force. Indeed, because we didn't have enough people in the army, we've had to use the militia to provide that 20% so that we could have a half-decent rotation of our people abroad.

    I would be arguing, in the big picture, in a post-9/11 world, that while we're meeting that requirement, we're leaving some gaps back here at home. If I had a clean sheet of paper, I would be saying to you, give the army the 20% additional people they need so they can maintain the level, and then whenever the defence review comes out and says we need more or less of the army, then so be it, but give them now so that the militia doesn't have that requirement to augment the regular force. And they always can, in the final analysis, but take that reserve force, the militia, and orient it toward those tasks that I see as being missing in Canada across the country. We're 4,000 miles across this country. Why don't we have regional set-ups where we can react to an incident--an ice storm, a chemical disaster, or something like that--with a team that's, if not in the province, next door? That's the type of thing I've been saying, that this, to me, is a natural use of the militia.

    Mind you, they also would have to provide the money to buy specific equipment for disaster relief--water capability, power capability, this type of thing--and the monitoring equipment for nuclear, biological, and chemical. But that's going to be resident and required anyway someplace in the country.

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bertrand.

    Admiral Summers, I wanted to ask you a question with respect to this defence and foreign policy review, which we're likely going to be bumping up against in the not-too-distant future.

    Based on what I've heard from a lot of people, they felt that the basic tenets of the 1994 white paper were certainly very solid for the period we faced--that is, the old multi-purpose, combat-capable model. There is a recognition, at the same time, that the types of operations we've been involved in, the changing geopolitical situation, and the shift out of Europe and into areas outside of Europe in terms of operations, are fairly significant in terms of the equipment we may need and the capabilities we may need.

    If you could speculate and forecast what sort of white paper we should come up with to anticipate the process a little bit, what would you offer up in very general terms? Would it be something that's quite similar to the existing white paper, or would you want to go more down the road of specialization, let's say? Because specialization is certainly out there as a possibility that some people have been suggesting for various reasons. And depending on who you talk to.... For instance, our American colleagues were in front of us this morning, talking about specialization and how certain countries had gone certain routes. They mentioned the Slovenians, for instance, and their mountain troops.

    Personally, it's been my view that a country of Canada's stature, importance, and economic power in the world should have quite a range of capabilities. Just speaking personally, I would not want to see us necessarily go down that route of specialization in any significant way, because I think what that does is that it may augment.... We may provide value-added, for instance, to certain types of coalition operations, and typically we do operate within coalitions, but ultimately, if you bring yourself down to too much specialization, if you limit yourself in that way, you also limit the types of operations you may in the future be engaged in. As well, in the final analysis, you may find yourself not getting much in the way of political credit or having much political clout when people are talking about peace arrangements, and when big-picture plans are being made or discussions are being made to either deal with peace issues or talk about the future direction of a particular region of the world that has been the subject of conflict.

    I don't want to belabour this, but I think back to the end of the First World War, when Canada had significant capabilities on the ground, where we made a huge contribution, as we did in the Second World War. We had the concomitant political clout as a result of that in terms of dealing with peace issues in the Treaty of Versailles and also the foundation of NATO and the United Nations.

    I know there's a huge menu there to talk about, but can you provide us with your thoughts on that general issue?

  (1210)  

    Adm Ken Summers: It is a broad area, and your comments, by and large, I agree with 100%.

    There was nothing wrong with the 1994 white paper--in 1994. The problem was that it became very quickly outdated. While they would make minor changes in the updates to try to stay current, when you look at it grosso modo, it basically is very outdated. It's a decade out now, and it needs a comprehensive defence review.

    Mr. Bereuter was talking about specialization. I know the U.S. is looking to some countries to specialize in given areas. That's almost a “speak”--military-speak or U.S.-speak--for, “We don't think you're pulling your weight, and therefore, rather than try to go across the board, why don't you turn around and go into a little niche that we might be able to tuck into?” As a Canadian, I would agree with your premise that our country is too big. We are a member of the G-8, and we should not be looking at going into niches or little specializations to be called upon. What that also argues for, then, is a comprehensive, across-the-board capability, a general purpose capability, which we have always somehow maintained in all our services over the last little while.

    That said, what differs from 1994 is that probably the type of forces and the control mechanisms within a department need to be quite a bit different from what they were in 1994. Jointness is something that I see south of the border. I've lived south of the border, in the United States, and to me, I don't understand why we don't go further down that particular road. The heads of the army, navy, air force here in Canada are essentially force generators. They control the policy for their individual maritime operating procedures, the procedures and processes they use at sea and in the air and on land, but they're essentially force generators to be provided elements for a solution.

    A joint force down in the United States.... The head of the army, navy, air force does not go and control a war somewhere. They have these commanders-in-chief, or CINCs, who in fact conduct the operations in various theatres throughout the world. When they have a mission to accomplish, they look at the menu they have and they say, okay, I need this, I need that, and I don't need that. And depending on who are the force generators for those capabilities, they are then called upon to provide it, after which it's used in a joint manner. Any of those CINC headquarters are not manned by, “This one's navy, that one's army, that one's air force, and this one's marine corps.” Across the board they're all joint.

    So the head could be any of the services, the deputy could be any of the services, and the heads or chiefs of staff could be any of the services. It's that type of jointness that they bring, and the expertise they bring together, that after awhile provides them that broad perspective of how to go about conducting an operation.

    They had to do this by the Goldwater-Nichols Act that was passed, which basically told them to become joint. That's something that perhaps we need to think about here in Canada.

    So jointness is one area that I would think we'd have to look at, along with the type of operation. It's not just defence. The security is a broader area. I see more amalgam with some more aspects of the security side than we perhaps have done in the past, be that on border security or exchange of information. The whole of defence is security, and security is defence. They're interwoven, and have to be looked at.

    I think the policy overall, where we fit into the world, is something that obviously will be a precursor to the defence review and setting the stage for where we want our defence forces to go.

    We have things that we can do better than, say, the United States. When the United States--and I admire them--want to go in and win a war, they win a war. They go in with the John Wayne capability and they sort it out. But they're not very good at nation-building. From our experience on the peacemaking, peacekeeping side--or the peacekeeping, peacemaking side, the way it's going now--I think we have a better feel for doing nation-building than perhaps the United States, inherently, the way we go about conducting our operations.

    So there's another area we perhaps should be looking at when we go abroad. Those are areas that we could specialize in.

    Again, there's the coordination of things that need to be done. In the United States, even before 9/11, one of the biggest problems they faced was how to coordinate the input and the efforts of 23 or 25 different agencies in bringing together a package. In drug enforcement or some other type of operation you get many departments involved. So they've had a real problem in trying to do that.

  (1215)  

    I would think that we could go a long way here, under the umbrella of security overall, looking at how we would coordinate, in a new world, the inputs of all the agencies in Canada--federal, provincial, and otherwise. And that's not easy to do, because each of them have their own rice bowls. It's something you have to work at very hard, but it's going to be an important factor when all of a sudden the rubber hits the road and you have a real catastrophe that you somehow have to deal with. That's not the time for the various agencies to be running around trying to figure out how they need to operate together.

    The Chair: I think you've hit on a very important point on this issue of jointness. Some people would say that we were well ahead of the pack back in 1968, in terms of unification of the forces, but that over the last number of years we haven't really brought that to its logical conclusion in terms of having the various forces work together in the manner that they should. And I think we've recently seen a manifestation of that with respect to the comments by the army commander.

    Could you provide us any thoughts on how that relates to the whole issue of potential competition for resources, rather than cooperation?

    Adm Ken Summers: Let me go back to hit the integration versus what I'm calling for, jointness, because they're not the same thing. Back in the 1960s, the integration was meant basically to solve a logistics problem. I think in many ways the integration that Mr. Hellyer put forward had some good points to it. Perhaps we just swung the pendulum a bit too far at the time, and that caused a lot of the problems. But to say that the jointness approach is like integration back in the 1960s would be incorrect. The focus on the jointness here is operational jointness as opposed to support-type jointness.

    The Chair: I don't mean to interrupt you here, but was that not part of the original intention, to encourage more jointness?

    Adm Ken Summers: Well, it may have been in words, but it certainly never was in being. From my perspective, as a naval officer going through it, nothing changed, and nothing changed down in maritime command headquarters, other than eventually a bunch of disgruntled navy pilots were told to wear a light blue uniform, to start working in naval headquarters, and to shave off their beards, too, because you don't have beards in the air force. So it was not jointness.

    Indeed, in the United States and elsewhere, the operational jointness we're talking about today, that wasn't even envisioned. They didn't operate that way. They didn't really start figuring that out until the Gulf War, when they looked at harmonizing. General Horner with the air force, Admiral Arthur with the navy, General Schwarzkopf with the army--they all had their inputs, but they did it essentially sequentially. They looked at that whole thing afterward and said, well, this is kind of dumb. To be more effective, the aircraft from the navy and the aircraft from the air force should be working out of the same air-tasking order.

    So then the outcome of that was to force them all together, and that was the Goldwater-Nichols, to really looking towards joint operations. That's really only about ten years old. The Brits have bought into this with their permanent joint headquarters. When they start sending forces abroad, they are controlled in a joint manner. There are a lot of lessons we can learn, perhaps, in that particular direction.

    So that's why I would be talking about jointness in that particular area.

    I'm sorry, there was a second part.

  (1220)  

    The Chair: Yes, on the budgetary aspects of jointness, and the fact that there is, or certainly appears to have been, a fair bit of competition for resources by the three services.

    Adm Ken Summers: I guess there always has been competition, because the bottom line is that there's not enough money in there. All services are hurting. To that extent, I always find it regrettable, when you have an incident like that, because then it turns around and you end up....

    If I were still in uniform as a naval officer, it would be hard to sit down beside Rick Hillier after he just sort of said to take all the money from the air force and army and give it to him, because they needed the money. Now, he said he didn't really mean it, and I honestly do believe he didn't mean it the way it came out, but essentially, that's what now is there.

    That does not do anybody any good. The problem is that there's not enough money to go around. I don't think you would find too many naval officers or air force officers who wouldn't agree that the army is hurting in the short term, and that something needs to be done there.

    But I would also point out...and the budget aspect is interesting. It's just because there's not a lot of money. I've said this before, but if you go back to the budget of 20 years ago, you will find that the amount of money the army has received and the amount of money that the navy has received are almost identical. Through vision, I think, and planning--and this was forced by a number of admirals, not me, onto the staff to plan ahead and to be thinking of the future--at the end of that 20 years you've got a smaller navy than we had, but one that in fact can work with the best, with the most complex, technologically advanced navy, and in fact go and control them.

    So you have to have the right vision and you have to have the right planning to be able to spend the dollars correctly.

    The Chair: Mr. Hill, do you have a question? No?

    I have another question for you, Admiral, with respect to your time in Washington. You spent an awful lot of time down there, working with the Americans, and one of the organizations you came in contact with periodically was the PJBD. I'm just wondering if you can talk to whether or not we are using the PJBD the way we should be, in terms of it being front and centre with respect to Canada-U.S. defence relations.

    It has been described to me as a hollowed-out institution, one that really is not coming anywhere close to meeting its potential as a valuable tool for Canada-U.S. defence relations. Can you provide any comment on that?

    Adm Ken Summers: I don't think I'd agree with that. The PJBD has been a cornerstone from square one. You may be able to have a good argument that it has not lived up to its potential, and I would perhaps agree with that. It could be made just that much better. They've gone a long way in the last few years, through giving the military cooperation committee, a subset of the PJBD, a broader agenda and more problems to tackle. The MCC is far more responsive through the PJBD than they were ten years ago, say.

    So I see the PJBD as a very useful organization. If it's not used to its potential, then that to me says there's more room to make it be used to its potential. There are lots of issues, things we've talked about today, that are right up there at the policy level, and the really difficult stuff. That's where you could get a....

    The attitude around the PJBD is refreshing, the way people can work together, and around the military cooperation committee as well. You have people who are, I think, really good and dedicated, who are ready to tackle this and spread the word through the nations' capitals. I think that's something where we could take advantage of the PJBD far more than we are right now.

  (1225)  

    The Chair: All right.

    Admiral, I don't have any other questions from members here, so on behalf of the committee members, I'd like to thank you for being here today and for sharing your comments with us. You've obviously had a tremendous career with the Canadian Forces, and it's provided you with a lot of insights that are, I think it's safe to say, certainly very valuable for us at this point in terms of our study of Canada-U.S. defence relations.

    Again, on behalf of the committee members, I thank you very much for being here.

    I now would like to turn the attention of the committee to the issue of our travel to Washington over the course of the month of November, if that comes to pass. I think all of you should have received, at this point, a copy of the travel budget request summary.

    What has happened is that we have been reduced to ten members and four staff members with respect to this travel. We don't have all of the committee members here at this point, and I'd be more than happy to accept suggestions from members on how we proceed with this reduced contingent that has been, I would say, forced upon us by the liaison committee.

    One possible option we have is to revisit the issue of the level of interest that members have in going to Washington and participating in this study, asking them by way of a memo, perhaps, if they are still interested, understanding that we have to reduce our numbers.

    Personally, I think this is a very unfortunate development. I was certainly hoping that as many members as wanted to go could go on this trip. This was a budget that had been approved by the liaison committee last spring.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: What's the rationale for cutting us back to ten?

    The Chair: The rationale, according to the liaison committee staff, is that committees have overspent their budgets at this point, that there has been more in the way of requests than there are resources available.

    That said, many of these committees will travel, but they won't travel with all of their members. Typically, they send money back to the liaison committee once they have completed their travel, and whatever unspent portions of their budget are left get returned to the centre, as it were. We are relying on other committees not to spend as much as they had originally anticipated and as a result return some money. So that's what we're relying on, at this point, for our travel.

    Personally, I find this unacceptable, as a committee chair, but I don't write the rules over there, either. We're basically in a situation where we have to play the hand that's been dealt to us. We are—and I made this point—one of the committees that has travelled the least over the last number of years, but quite frankly, that doesn't register with anybody.

    Dominic.

    Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.): David, I'm just wondering, when I spoke to you a few days ago, there was the issue of whether the money sort of lapses, and whether there will in fact be enough money. At what point on the calendar will we know if even ten people can go? How certain are you that, if we wanted, ten people could go? I don't know how this process works. I'm just worried about what happened to us before, where we set up meetings and so on, and then it was, “Oh, gee, sorry, the bills were higher when this other committee travelled”.

    At what point does the whole thing either go ahead or get flushed down the toilet?

    The Chair: Committees can't be in a position to overspend, based on what's been allocated to them. They do keep pretty tight control that way. However, there are situations where members drop out at the last minute and money is turned back.

    I fully expect, short of a prorogation, that we would be able to travel. At this point I'm operating under that assumption, and I think it's a realistic one, that there will be enough money for us to travel. Money is turned back in on a fairly regular basis. At the same time, there are other requests coming in. However, we essentially got as far as we could to the front of the queue by doing our budget as quickly as possible after the beginning of September, and getting it before the liaison committee, which has only had a couple of meetings since September.

  (1230)  

    Mr. Jay Hill: I just want to make one point for people to mull over. Obviously, we're not going to be making a decision on this. At any rate, I've already brought this to your attention.

    Given the reduced size of the contingent that would be allowed to travel to Washington on this trip, I made it known to you privately, so I want to make it known to the committee, that I think an appropriate number out of the ten would be five Liberals, including the chairman, and five from opposition, including two from the official opposition and one representative from the other three parties.

    That's my official position at this point in time. I guess we'll see how things unfold. I'm not sure that I would resist agreeing to the travel based upon that, but I think that's fair. I know that, traditionally, the committee likes to travel the same way they like to sit, with a majority of government members, but I don't think that would be an appropriate argument to use in this particular case. Obviously, we're not going to be passing any motions or doing anything of that sort while the committee is travelling, so I don't think it's necessary that the government have a majority of members on the trip.

    All of that said, I think, as the chairman has indicated, at this point in time we're not sure, (a), whether we're going to go, (b), what our agenda is going to be once we get there, and (c), who would be available to go in any respect.

    I just wanted that on the record so that everybody could mull it over.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: How many were subscribers? Were 16 prepared to go previous to this?

    The Chair: Sixteen was the number, yes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Did they sign up?

    The Chair: At this point, 14 have expressed interest. So somehow or other, we have to reduce the number by four.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Given what we're trying to do here, I would think you'd need as many members as possible from the committee. A lot of us haven't seen any of the facilities in the U.S. To do a proper job, I think ten would be a pretty miserly number of people to be going down and trying to do the job.

    The Chair: Look, I couldn't agree more, but over at the liaison committee they seem to have formulas for how many people should travel, and it's one size fits all.

    Frankly, as I'm telling you, I think it's inadequate for this committee based on the importance of the work we're trying to do and based on the frequency with which we travel in the first place.

    Mr. Jay Hill: But I don't think we're going to get that enlarged.

    The Chair: No, I think you're right.

    Mr. Jay Hill: So talking about it is a waste of time. We have ten, and realistically, I think our decision is whether we go with ten or we don't go at all.

    The Chair: Well, I don't think you can't do a study of Canada-U.S. defence relations without going to the United States.

    Mr. Jay Hill: No, but I'm just saying, realistically, if we're going to be discussing anything here, that's the only thing left open to discuss--how to divide up the ten, if we do go, or not to go at all. We can't talk about sending 16 when we're not allowed to.

    The Chair: That's right. But it's important as well for members to understand the background of how this transpired, and hopefully, maybe, to try to convince our colleagues in the future to have some elasticity as far as the rules are concerned, some flexibility on the rules here.

    But I made the suggestion earlier in terms of perhaps circulating a memo to all of the members of the committee to see if anyone is interested in dropping off of the trip's roster. If members are agreeable to that, then we can proceed with it. Obviously, you'd like to do this voluntarily to the greatest extent possible, but if that's not possible, maybe we'll have to look at some sort of a lottery, based on equality of the opposition and the government, in terms of attendance.

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    Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, from my view, I guess obviously the best way to proceed would be voluntary. I think it would also be helpful if we had a firm idea of when this is all going to take place, the exact dates.

    The Chair: The dates are there, November 16 to 21. They've been known for awhile.

    Mr. Jay Hill: So that's...because for a long time, it was changing.

    The Chair: No, that's solid at this point, or as solid as these things can be.

    Mr. Jay Hill: If some individuals of the committee have a conflict, for example, and they know for sure--

    The Chair: That is in fact what happened with Mr. Blaikie, and he has indicated that he's not able to attend. Monsieur Plamondon as well has indicated that he can't attend.

    So if we're looking at the opposition contingent there, in terms of what you had expressed, about two Alliance members, that seems to be shaping up pretty well on the opposition side. It's on the government side that I suspect we're going to have a little bit more difficulty, quite frankly.

    But if I can proceed on that basis, then maybe it will be up to us on the government side to sort this out in terms of who goes and who doesn't.

    Mr. Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Out of the 16 who originally were set to go, did we have some people from the PC Party, people from the Bloc, and people from the NDP? Had they all said that they were going to come?

    The Chair: Yes, all except Mr. Blaikie and Monsieur Plamondon.

    Mr. Jay Hill: If I can just interject, originally, I think, the 16 was the committee as a whole. That's where the number 16 came from--everybody who sits on the committee. Subsequent to that, two indicated that they weren't going to be going, which dropped it to 14.

    The Chair: Yes, that's right.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: But just coming back to what Jay was saying about the five Liberals, two Alliance, one Bloc, one PC, and one NDP--

    A voice: The NDP are not coming.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Well, they'll probably send somebody else, the NDP? No?

    The Chair: Well, I don't think it's fair that they send somebody else who has absolutely no background with respect to what the committee has been talking about over the last year.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: So they're not one of the five any more.

    The Chair: Yes, that would be my submission to the committee.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: So a sixth member of the Liberal Party.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: The other question there, Mr. Chair, is that of pairing. Will the whip let us...?

    The Chair: Well, there's the issue of whether or not we're even going to be sitting at that time, as well.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: But if we are, will the whip let us go with one extra Liberal member?

    The Chair: I can't answer that question. I can't speak for the whip. That's something we're going to have to look into.

    Shall we begin the process with a memo to the members?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: Okay. We'll proceed on that basis.

    Yes, Dominic.

    Mr. Dominic LeBlanc: Mr. Chair, just as a technical question, if Parliament actually prorogues, then all this dies anyway, does it?

    The Chair: That's right.

    Mr. Dominic LeBlanc: And we don't know if there's a prorogation--or whatever the term is.

    So we risk losing the trip if that's ultimately what happens, is that right?

    The Chair: It's quite possible, yes. Timing is everything in politics, and sometimes, as far as committee travel goes, you can't hit the timing right. This may be an instance where that will occur, and we'll have to wait to finish this travel, and to finish this study, until after Christmas. It's quite possible.

    Jay.

    Mr. Jay Hill: I just want to raise this concern once more. We've talked about it and talked about it.

    With that uncertainly hanging over us, given the fact that we've already disappointed--I'll use that term rather than “upset”--our American friends with the cancellation of the trip in the spring, I just cannot see how we can go ahead and plan this, make commitments to set up meetings in Washington, and then say to the Americans, again at the eleventh hour, “Oh, well, the outgoing Prime Minister decided to prorogue the House.”

    It would make us look like fools, and I think we probably should be cancelling this thing unless we, or you, can privately get a commitment that it isn't going to happen. I'm not saying you have to share that with us, either.

    So I just don't see how we can proceed with that hanging over us. It's like a guillotine hanging over the committee.

    The Chair: Jay, you're giving me credit for power that I simply do not have in the process here--

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    Mr. Jay Hill: No, but wouldn't you agree that we'd have a serious problem with the Americans' perception of us if we proceeded?

    The Chair: That would be a problem, there's no question about it. However, the Americans are involved in their own committee issues as well, and I've heard from the American delegation here today that it's extremely difficult for them to travel as well. I think there's some recognition of the constraints.

    Yes, they wouldn't be...but it's not just the Americans. I would suspect it's more the Canadian embassy people, who are making the arrangements, than the Americans themselves who wouldn't be happy about this. It is not going to create an international diplomatic incident, I can assure you, if we're not able to travel down there, but I think we have to make a best-efforts attempt at this point in order to bring this together, and hopefully we'll have a happy conclusion at the end of it all. But there are just too many x factors right now that we're dealing with, and sooner or later those factors are going to become known. We'll deal with them just as soon as we can and just as soon as they're known.

    That's about all I can suggest to the committee at this point. It's not a happy situation, but we don't necessarily deal with happiness all the time.

    That said, I'll take direction from the committee as discussed, and I'll keep the committee posted just as quickly as possible in terms of any news I have as a result.

    Thank you very much. The committee is adjourned.