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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Health

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, February 12, 2003

1535

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.))

Mr. John McKay, M.P. (Scarborough East, Lib.)

1540

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ)

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay (Madawaska—Restigouche, Lib.)

Mr. John McKay

1545

1550

1555

The Chair

Mr. Rob Merrifield (Yellowhead, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

1600

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

1605

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain (Guelph—Wellington, Lib.)

Mr. John McKay

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. John McKay

1610

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Réal Ménard

Ms. Hélène Scherrer (Louis-Hébert, Lib.)

Mr. Réal Ménard

Ms. Hélène Scherrer

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. John McKay

1615

Ms. Hedy Fry (Vancouver Centre, Lib.)

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

The Chair

Mrs. Carol Skelton (Saskatoon—Rosetown—Biggar, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. John McKay

Mrs. Carol Skelton

Mr. John McKay

Mrs. Carol Skelton

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. John McKay

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. John McKay

Mr. James Lunney

Mr. John McKay

Mr. James Lunney

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

1620

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mrs. Hélène Goulet (Director General, Tobacco Control Program, Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch, Department of Health)

1625

The Chair

Ms. Hélène Goulet

The Chair

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Denis Choinière (Director, Office of Regulations and Compliance, Tobacco Control Program, Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch, Department of Health)

1630

1635

The Chair

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Ms. Marta Caris (Director, Consumer Product Safety, Department of Health)

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. Denis Choinière

1640

Mr. Rob Merrifield

Mr. Denis Choinière

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.)

1645

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mrs. Judi Longfield

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mrs. Judi Longfield

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mrs. Judi Longfield

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mrs. Judi Longfield

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mrs. Judi Longfield

The Chair

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

1650

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

1655

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. John McKay

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Denis Choinière

The Chair

Mr. James Lunney

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. James Lunney

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. James Lunney

Ms. Hélène Goulet

1700

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

Ms. Hélène Goulet

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

Mr. Denis Choinière

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. Denis Choinière

1705

The Chair

Mr. Denis Choinière

The Chair

Mr. Denis Choinière

The Chair

Mr. Denis Choinière

The Chair

Ms. Hélène Goulet

The Chair

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

1710

The Chair

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain

The Chair

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

The Chair

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain

The Chair

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain

The Chair

Mr. Réal Ménard

The Chair

Mr. Rob Merrifield

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

1715

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Health

NUMBER 020

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Wednesday, February 12, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.)): It's my pleasure to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on Health to order.

For the information of the members, this meeting will have two parts. In the first part we'll consider Bill C-260, and we will hear from witnesses and ask them questions. Part two of the meeting will be on the internal business of the committee. We have two motions tabled and another one for which we have received proper notice. Then we have a future planning session for which the researchers have prepared some material for your consideration. So we will put all the internal business of the committee off until part two, and right now we will move to Mr. McKay.

Mr. McKay, on behalf of the committee, may I apologize for delaying your presentation, on two separate occasions, because the bill from the Minister of Health was in the House and most members wanted to speak to it. So may I give you a triple welcome today. We await your remarks with anticipation.

Mr. John McKay, M.P. (Scarborough East, Lib.): Thank you, Chair. It does feel a little strange to be sitting at this end of the table as opposed to on my side of the table.

Thank you for the opportunity to talk about Bill C-260. This has been three years now in the making and it has had several incarnations. I'm very pleased to be here. I'm very pleased to see the support of members around the table and in the House in getting us here. As you know, the success rate of private members' bills is fairly low.

[Translation]

First of all, I would like to thank you for your support. I would also like to thank both the minister and his department for their useful interventions.

[English]

This is a bill that can save lives and reduce injury and property damage. There is needless devastation, each and every year, that happens to Canadian families due to “careless smoking”. I think we need to address that right up front. It's “careless smoking”. In fact, it's part of, shall we say, a “blame the victim” mentality.

It's been a success of cigarette manufacturers to indicate to Canadians at large that it's careless smoking that causes these fires, when they've known for years how to make a fire-safe cigarette--or, as it's known in the trade, an LIP, low-ignition-propensity cigarette.

The focus of our work as a committee will be to force the industry and the department to develop for the committee a set of regulations that will significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the ignition propensity of cigarettes.

[Translation]

I'm going to use part of my time to show you an excerpt from a CBC program entitled Smokes and Fire. As the program shows, the devastating impact of cigarettes could have been prevented.

[English]

I think you'll find this video clip to be very instructive on what we're trying to do here as a committee and as members of Parliament. We tried to extract about eight minutes out of what is a 25-minute segment that appeared on CBC.

I'd ask you to tee it up.

¹ (1540)

Mr. Réal Ménard (Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, BQ): Is it in French or English?

Mr. John McKay: En anglais.

Mr. Réal Ménard: No problem.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay (Madawaska—Restigouche, Lib.) The images are bilingual.

[Audiovisual presentation]

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I've watched that video a number of times now, and each time I wonder about the people, particularly Davina Ragoonanan, and what's happened to her life.

I hope in the course of our hearings we'll be able to hear from Davina. I hope we'll also be able to talk to the lawyer, Doug Lennox, and to other lawyers who talk about their frustrations in starting class action lawsuits on this and about the implacable defences that are put up by the tobacco companies.

You'll also, I hope, hear from a variety of organizations such as the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, the Non-Smokers' Rights Association, and the Canada Safety Council.

I was just handed a brief by the Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada. Hopefully they will articulate for you the devastation that's visited on people's lives in the absence of fire-safe cigarette standards.

And then, of course, as well, you'll hear from the cigarette companies.

¹ (1545)

¹ (1550)

Last night I tried to go through the brief of Imperial Tobacco. I have to admit it's a very thorough brief, with something in the order of 163 paragraphs. It seems to me it goes in about 150 different directions.

It starts by saying that Imperial Tobacco supports Health Canada's goal of reducing fires that may be caused by smokers carelessly discarding their cigarettes or leaving them unattended. Imperial Tobacco Canada is committed to working with public authorities as well as others toward a resolution of the issues that have been raised in the proposal, as well as all other issues concerning cigarette smoking.

I made note of the “blame the victim” part...that it's smokers carelessly discarding. But during that period of time they've always known how to make these cigarettes. Then there's the phrase “committed to working”. Beware of those who are committed to working with you. It just makes you nervous.

You'll notice they say “a resolution of these of issues”, which is kind of an interesting way of phrasing it. They're committed to working toward a resolution, not manufacturing safe cigarettes. They say “share the goals, but”--that's not an intended pun, by the way--“we must regrettably oppose the bill”. So you kind of get the drift fairly quickly that they're going to work with us but they're going to oppose the bill.

You kind of get the feeling you're in big trouble if the talent that tobacco companies are able to put together is amassed against a private member's bill. So I am urging members to realize that this is a strategic step and an important step in the evolution of standards for fire-safe cigarettes.

If I can group the arguments that are put forward by Imperial Tobacco, the first argument is that changing the composition of cigarettes may make them more toxic. Basically you have three or four choices. I have a cigarette here. You can essentially reduce the circumference of the cigarette, and that helps a bit. You can reduce the tobacco density, and that can help a bit. You can change the paper so there's a difference in the porosity. You can also eliminate the use of citrate additives, which essentially is what keeps the cigarette burning even though you may not be puffing on it.

By incorporating one or more of these characteristics, it's possible to get the cigarette to generate less heat and/or self-extinguish in a shorter period of time. So you have paper, circumference, length, and additives. It doesn't seem like rocket science.

We know that cigarettes are already highly toxic. Low tar or light cigarettes are no less toxic. It is a kind of strange argument to be put forward by a tobacco company that they're worried about the toxicity of a cigarette. A cigarette is toxic, period, end of sentence. It kind of strikes you as “How much arsenic would you like in your coffee, and would you like it by way of a lump or would you like it by way of a tablespoon?”

The amount of arsenic, the amount of toxicity in a cigarette, really doesn't change. There may be some chemical properties and there may be an argument to be made with respect to the citrate additives. But the paper, the density, and the circumference--frankly, I don't see that argument at all. So I'd ask the committee to really question the argument that it may in fact be more toxic.

The second argument is this will actually lead to more careless smoking. The consumers of cigarettes will know they have fire-safe cigarettes, so they can fall asleep on the couch watching TV. This is sort of like Yogi Berra and déjà vu all over again. Car manufacturers said that about seat belts, that seat belts would lead to more careless or reckless driving because of the very existence of the seat belts. I won't say that's nonsense, but it's awfully close to nonsense.

¹ (1555)

The third argument is what about the ignition propensities of other tobacco products, pipes, cigars, roll-your-owns, and that kind of stuff? Well, this argument is kind of taking you off into the wild blue yonder, and it's really quite irrelevant. If you talk to any lumberjack, he'll tell you that in the forest it's all roll-your-owns because they don't start fires. I'd compare it to an Iraqi colonel leading Dr. Blix and his merry band off into a munitions depot and saying “Oh, look over here, these are our keenest peashooters”. Meanwhile, they have weapons of mass destruction in the other corner. This argument just doesn't work.

As to grouping the arguments, my suggestion would be that the committee focus on the issue of toxicity, which will be mind-numbing enough.

Again, if I could, I would encourage you as a committee to recognize that this initiative, were it proclaimed today, would have an impact on Canadians' lives in three months, because that's the manufacturing span of cigarettes. Basically, there's a three-month inventory, so if you did it today, we would have fire-safe cigarettes in 90 days. Now, that's not going to happen.

There are some problems with this bill, which I'll be happy to deal with in the course of my comments. Essentially, what I'm asking this committee to do is to put some spine in the department, to insist that the department, in whatever fashion it chooses to, create a body of regulations that achieve the end. I don't much care whether it's under my bill and the Hazardous Products Act or under other initiatives, under the Tobacco Act, with legislative and regulatory changes. I don't much care, nor should you. What we want, I hope, at the end of the day is fire-safe cigarettes, where lives will be saved, property damage will be greatly reduced, and people can get on with their lives.

I invite you all to join us in this enterprise. This, as I say, has been three years getting here. I'd be very disappointed if we as a committee let that initiative go, and I'd be happy to answer questions as you see fit.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. McKay.

We'll begin with Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield (Yellowhead, Canadian Alliance): First of all, you have to ask the question, why hasn't this happened long before now? We understand there's legislation in the United States, I think it's in New York, as well as in New Zealand. Could you give us an update as to what has happened or is happening there with regard to fire-safe cigarettes?

Mr. John McKay: New York has proclaimed the legislation, and there's a curious little political story there. The New York legislature passed the legislation and the governor vetoed it. Then a few days later the governor apparently saw the light of day and rescinded his veto, so that legislation is proclaimed. I may stand to be corrected here, but I believe July 1 is the day on which the standards are to come into effect. I'm not quite sure whether in fact there has been a set of standards agreed upon between the legislature and the manufacturers of the state.

With respect to New Zealand, it seems to me that they have sort of backed away on this point. Again, I'm not clear on that.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Is there any country in the world anywhere with fire-safe cigarettes on their shelves?

Mr. John McKay: I may stand to be corrected, but no, I don't think so.

º (1600)

Mr. Rob Merrifield: That leads us to the question, why would there not be? And the opposition from the manufacturers...I hope we have them here, and I'm sure we will, to ask them directly. But from your perspective, why is there such a strong reaction coming from them?

Mr. John McKay: You have, as I have, read the brief from Imperial Tobacco. There are a number of issues that get raised in there. Clearly, it's not an item of tremendous political will, it's from a rather minor subset of people. You get led off into a variety of, as I say, different directions that leave people arguing about the standards themselves, and then they argue about how these standards should be applied. You end up with this kind of mishmash of arguments, everything seems to get lost, and no one seems to be able to push the ball over the goal line.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I've briefly read the submission from Imperial Tobacco, and I hope to have them here so we can ask them directly. Nonetheless, your comments in your testimony were that their response was that it's more toxic, number one, so it's not as safe as the cigarettes we have on the shelf right now. Other products, such as roll-your-owns and so on, might be misleading and might not be covered.

You've explained your views there, but normally the issue comes down to dollars and cents. I just fail to understand, is it that cost-prohibitive to change the porosity and the density of a cigarette?

Mr. John McKay: I don't think it has as much to do with the changing of the cigarette itself as it does with how it would impact on the market share. The arguments I've read--and I expect that the tobacco companies will make these arguments--are that it may lead to more tobacco smuggling, to contraband cigarettes. Here we are, where contraband volumes would increase as smugglers have access to international products.

They talk about the Merit cigarette from the United States, a cigarette that is apparently fire-safe, and it has actually lost market share vis-à-vis other cigarettes. In some respects these are almost irrelevant arguments. If all cigarettes were required to be fire-safe, then however you manufactured them would be more or less an irrelevance.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I suppose there would be a smuggling problem, but we have already had that with the cost problem between the United States and Canada anyway; it wouldn't just be with fire-safe cigarettes. I would imagine that would be the argument.

Mr. John McKay: The irony there is that, as I understand it, many of the cigarettes that are smuggled back into Canada are actually manufactured in Canada, so this bill would at least catch the ones that are manufactured in Canada.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: The other point is, you mention in not-so-flattering terms the department in the sense that you wish that we would encourage them to “spine up”, if I can paraphrase. You obviously must have talked to the department, so what perspective are you getting from there?

Mr. John McKay: Their first argument is that this bill is improperly cast because it addresses the Hazardous Products Act, the reasoning being, when I went over it with the legal counsel, that this was a safety initiative as opposed to a health initiative. After some amendments to the Tobacco Act and, I believe, a Montreal case, the argument is now that tobacco is both a health and safety issue, and therefore the bill should properly apply to the Hazardous Products Act.

To try to cast it as favourably as I can for the department--but they can speak for themselves on this--I could point out that they initiated this request for proposals on how to create fire-safe cigarettes. They haven't really moved on this issue for a lot of years, until this bill started to move along. Now, that may just be a happy coincidence, but this bill has been in the pipeline for three years, and only now does the department appear to be interested in the issue.

I can show you a particularly unflattering clip on that video of one of the officials answering a question when a CBC reporter asked him directly. That question is probably best directed to the department. I think this committee can play a significant role in putting a little spine into the department, because they're going to have to duke it out, if you will, with the tobacco companies, and the tobacco companies are not interested in this.

º (1605)

Mr. Rob Merrifield: We may be able to do our job, and I'm sure we will, and we'll listen to both sides and bring forth a fair assessment of the piece of legislation. Forgive me, but since you obviously have the Minister of Health in your caucus, someone who can put some spine into the department, I'm wondering what her comments are on this piece of legislation.

Mr. John McKay: No, the minister has been terrific, absolutely terrific.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: You don't hear that every day, but that's good.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain (Guelph—Wellington, Lib.): Well, you're not saying that.

Mr. John McKay: I want to recognize that she has been very helpful in getting us to this point. This is clearly within the minister's interest. There are a lot of things that go on in this place. I just want us to do our piece, that when this comes up, we give all the support we can to the minister and to the department so that we end up where we want to be at the end of the day.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Let's be clear about this. If the House of Commons were to adopt this bill, that would result in radically new manufacturing procedures for the cigarette manufacturing companies, including Imperial Tobacco which, I hope, will have an opportunity to appear before this committee. What would that involve? Health Canada does not manufacture or produce cigarettes. Although Health Canada can dictate the regulatory procedures, it is the manufacturers that will in fact be manufacturing the cigarettes. I have not read all of the briefs, but I did read the ones submitted by Imperial Tobacco. The manufacturers appear to be saying that the research and development that would enable them to produce this new product is not yet really available. You are saying, however, that the problem lies in the regulations, that all cigarettes available on the market should meet the proposed requirements and that the tobacco companies can in fact produce such cigarettes. Is that really what you are telling us?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: If the House of Commons chose to pass this bill today, the minister would have six months in which to develop a set of standards. The normal process is almost like a tender process, if you will. The department puts out a paper that says we're thinking about doing standards on x, y, or z,--in this particular case, fire-safe cigarettes. Then the industry people come back and say we can do that, or we can't do that, or it is going to cost you so much, or whatever. By lighting that fire--not to put too much of a pun on it--you will force that process to get moving along.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: So that I understand properly, I would like to know whether or not you have any clear indications as to whether any of the manufacturers operating in Canada have the know-how or the technology required to produce fire-safe cigarettes. I know that the department is not going to get involved in that. The department can state, through a legal instrument, namely the Dangerous Goods Act, that it would like all cigarettes available on the market to comply with such and such a standard. According to your information, can the manufacturers produce such a product, or are there any other players in the system that are going to do this?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I don't think it's an issue of technology. All we're doing is playing with three or four components of this cigarette. It is an issue of standards. The tobacco companies, if you will, reject the standards that have been developed primarily in the United States and argue with the standards. So that will probably be where the argument lies.

As to the market, it may be that the consumers don't like fire-safe cigarettes as much as they like their current brand. That might be a possibility. But if you legislate right across the board that all cigarettes manufactured in Canada will have to meet fire-safe standards, then it's just a matter of marketing.

Actually, it's kind of like Volvo, if you will, which used to say their cars were the safest. Now all the other cars--

º (1610)

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine. According to what you're saying, we know how to attain the objective of marketing fire-safe cigarettes. We know what the dose needs to be and what components are involved. So you are rejecting the arguments put forward by Imperial Tobacco and other companies stating that there is not any conclusive evidence available elsewhere. You are inviting us to take a look at what has been done elsewhere and are saying that, basically, consumer preference is what is at stake and that, in examining the issues of consumer preference and public safety, you are hoping that this committee will come out in favour of public safety. You are refusing to say that no conclusive evidence exists elsewhere and you reject the idea that the tobacco manufacturing companies are unable to make fire-safe cigarettes. You are saying that we should make it mandatory for these companies to manufacture such cigarettes, and that we need to be coercive. A liberal man such as yourself, liberal in the sense of the type of relationship one should have with the state, accepts to dismiss that and to impose a more coercive set of regulations.

I'm not against this approach, but I would like to understand all aspects of the debate.

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I don't think the issue is whether they can or they can't make it. They can make it. That's not the issue. Whether they want to market it, or whether they're worried about losing market share, or whatever, that's of significant concern to Imperial Tobacco and all the other manufacturers and their shareholders.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: We understand that right now you have strong support from the minister. So if one day the minister were to rise in this House... You know that the minister can be evasive. She's an endearing woman, but she can be evasive. So if the minister had...

Ms. Hélène Scherrer (Louis-Hébert, Lib.): That's getting personal.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The minister may be evasive, but the parliamentary secretary is not. If the minister were to rise in the House, she would vote in favour of the bill. So this may become a government position, if I understand correctly.

Ms. Hélène Scherrer: I did not say that he was not charming; I said that he was not evasive.

Mr. Réal Ménard: As for being charming, he is charming. But I do not want to embrace him with our words.

[English]

Mr. John McKay: We have an extremely capable minister and an extremely capable parliamentary secretary.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Can we have a vote on that?

The Chair: No, your time is up now.

Is there anyone on this side who would like to question Mr. McKay? Would you rather wait till the health officials come to the table?

Dr. Castonguay, would you like to ask a question?

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Basically, if I have understood correctly, the companies do have the technology required to produce this type of low-ignition-propensity cigarette. What are the main arguments put forward by the companies? Are they afraid of losing market share? Why would they be afraid of that? Why would they be against that, if they really do have this life-saving technology? I would like to understand why. Can you provide me with an answer?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I wish I had as good an answer. Frankly, there are points at which the reasoning of the tobacco companies is very difficult to follow. I'm stuck with the same brief as you are. You get into diversionary arguments.

We talked about the “roll your own” stuff. They're worried that they're going to lose market share to “roll your own” and other forms of tobacco consumption. They're worried about the “toxicity”, where, by changing the paper, changing the glue, or changing various other things, you'll somehow create a more toxic product.

º (1615)

Ms. Hedy Fry (Vancouver Centre, Lib.): It couldn't be more toxic than it already is.

Mr. John McKay: Dr. Fry is probably better able to answer that question than I am.

I'll leave it to you to press them on this issue, but I don't see it.

I think there's one manufacturing technique that puts little “stop rings” along the cigarette. It will burn to this point and then extinguish it without a puff. Then you have to puff it and it will burn down again. All of those things have been patented. There's a lot of work that has gone into producing fire-safe cigarettes.

It would require a change in manufacturing standards, but so what? Everybody would be stuck with the same problem. It would be Rothman's and Imperial. I can't remember who all the other manufacturers of cigarettes are. This would be a federal standard.

That would be one of the advantages of this bill over the New York bill, which is a state standard, as opposed to a federal standard. That was the objection of Philip Morris. If there was going to be a standard, it had to be a federal standard. I think it made perfectly logical sense.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Do their documents make mention of people who have died as a result of fires caused by the cigarettes that we have today? Does this seem to be a source of concern for them? Or do they simply ignore this problem?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: I haven't discussed it with him, so I'm in the realm of speculation as to whether they would be concerned.

At one level, how can a company not be concerned about people dying and being injured and millions of dollars worth of fire damage? They're never going to say--

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: “We agree with you, but...”.

Mr. John McKay: Yes, exactly. It's like my opening points: beware of people who say that they're going to cooperate with you. I think it's a pretty significant issue.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Okay.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Castonguay.

Ms. Skelton.

Mrs. Carol Skelton (Saskatoon—Rosetown—Biggar, Canadian Alliance): I'd like to ask you some questions.

There have been a bunch of strategies going on by Health Canada to reduce fires and things like that over the years. I know our fire department at home had some Health Canada information that they were giving out about cigarettes and everything. Do you have the results of those?

Mr. John McKay: No.

Mrs. Carol Skelton: There have never been any results obtained from those strategies that they were putting together?

Mr. John McKay: There may be, but I'm not familiar with them. Probably the department would be best....

Just on that education point, we all love education. It's a terrific thing. But sometimes it's just used as a diversionary tactic. We'll educate the public not to smoke carelessly. Well, 99.9% of the public don't smoke carelessly, or there's no fire caused by their cigarettes, but that 0.1%, education or no education, results in a lot of damage and a lot of injured people.

Mrs. Carol Skelton: That was just one thing I was very interested in, to know if there had been anything.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Skelton.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Madam Chair.

John, we appreciate your interest and work on this file.

Mr. John McKay: Well, that's a bad thing.

Mr. James Lunney: No, we do appreciate that.

While you're here, the question I'd ask, since you probably know more about it than the rest of us here, is probably a question better directed to the companies themselves. Are Canadian cigarettes exported a lot? Are they concerned about losing international market? Is that a big issue?

Mr. John McKay: I would be speculating on an answer such as that. I believe--well, I know--there are exports, and I know those exports sometimes seem to make a big U-turn and end up coming back into Canada as contraband cigarettes.

Mr. James Lunney: I see some heads shaking behind you there.

Mr. John McKay: They would know better than I. I'm not an expert on that kind of thing.

Mr. James Lunney: I just wonder if that is an issue. So you're not aware that it is.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

I think Mr. Ménard has one more short question. We're getting near the point where we need the officials.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: One brief question, Madam Chair. If you had just one example to give us, an example that you would want us to retain for educational purposes, what model would you want us to follow in terms of marketing low-ignition-propensity cigarettes, so that we would have some chance of success?

Secondly, you said that we cannot understand the reasoning of the tobacco companies. When we read their brief, we can understand their reasoning, although we may not agree with it. They talk about two issues. First of all, they stated that the product will no longer taste the same, leading to weaker sales and reduced market share. Consumers will look for cigarettes that have not been modified, which will result in contraband.

We may agree or disagree, but I think that this argument has been developed thoroughly in their brief. The committee will determine whether or not it is in agreement, but you have led us to believe that the argument was not clear, and I find that this was a breach of the rule of audi alteram partem, a rule which, as a lawyer, you have treated with some disregard. So, we do understand their arguments although we may not share them, but we know what concerns them.

I am favourably inclined toward your bill, but we will hear what the witnesses have to say. Did you base yourself on the New York model, or is there a particular reference?

º (1620)

[English]

Mr. John McKay: Interestingly, where this comes from is kind of one of these strange coincidences that happen in MPs' lives. I think I had seen that video on CBC one night, and lo and behold, somebody phoned me up and said they wanted to have a meeting with me. That somebody turned out to be Doug Lennox.

I didn't know Doug Lennox at the time. He was describing to me the difficulties he was having getting a class action started, and what could I do about it? Frankly, I didn't think I could do anything about it. Anyway, one thing led to another and to another, and we ended up at this point.

What are MPs all about, when you ask yourself--

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: My question pertains to the model. I have had the opportunity of seeing that you are a dedicated MP. To your knowledge, is the State of New York the only place where low-ignition-propensity cigarettes have been successfully introduced, or are there other successful foreign models we could look to?

[English]

Mr. John McKay: The best answer will probably come from the department, but from what I understand, at this point there's no legislated and regulated set of regulations that mandate the manufacture, production, and sale of fire-safe cigarettes. So I can't give you a direct answer to the question.

I don't know what they chose. Did they choose a stubbier cigarette or a longer cigarette, less dense tobacco or different composition of citrates? I don't really know.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Fine. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ménard.

Seeing no further hands, I will thank Mr. MacKay on your behalf for his work, his patience in coming to us, his explanations, and the video, which makes very clear the purpose behind his bill.

I will now invite those officials from the Department of Health who have been recruited to talk about this issue to come to the table. Thank you.

We have Marta Caris, the acting director of the bureau of pharmaceutical assessment; Hélène Goulet, the director of strategies and systems for health directorate; and Denis Choinière, acting coordinator, regulatory and compliance program, office of tobacco control.

Will those three persons come forward and have someone indicate who is going to be the first to speak? Are you going to speak, or just answer questions?

Mrs. Hélène Goulet (Director General, Tobacco Control Program, Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch, Department of Health): We're going to speak, but that's up to you, of course.

º (1625)

The Chair: We would like your response to the bill we have before us.

Hélène Goulet.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Thank you.

We are handing out binders for the committee members with a lot of information about reduced ignition propensity cigarettes.

I'd like to start by introducing the people at the table, because you have old information. I don't know how that happened. You had the right names, the right people, but the wrong jobs.

I'm Hélène Goulet. I'm the director general of the tobacco control program in the healthy environments and consumer safety branch. With me today are Marta Caris, director of consumer product safety; and Denis Choinière, director of the regulations and compliance division of the tobacco control program.

[Translation]

First of all, I would like to talk briefly about what we do. The mandate of the Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch is to help Canadians conserve and improve their health. We fulfil this mandate in two ways: by promoting healthy life, work and leisure environments and by reducing the harm caused by tobacco, alcohol, controlled substances, environmental contaminants as well as dangerous consumer and industrial products.

I am pleased to be here with you.

[English]

The Chair: Do you have an extra copy of the text? You are reading rather quickly and the translator can't keep up.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: I was just briefly giving an overview of the branch to which the three of us belong.

I am happy to be with you today, because this is an important piece of legislation.

[Translation]

We are going to talk to you about the number of fires caused by careless smokers and we will tell you that, by reducing these fires, we will save lives and prevent many injuries.

[English]

My colleague, Denis Choinière, will now provide you with some of the details on this issue.

Mr. Denis Choinière (Director, Office of Regulations and Compliance, Tobacco Control Program, Healthy Environments and Consumer Safety Branch, Department of Health): How big is this problem in Canada? In 2002 Health Canada commissioned a report from the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs. This report, which is included in your package at tab 3 in your binder, showed that cigarette fires cause the highest number of fire-related fatalities, result in more property damage than fires ignited by other sources, and often impact the most vulnerable members of our society: children and the elderly. The report shows that in the five years between 1995 and 1999, at least 14,000 fires were started by smokers' materials. These fires killed 356 people, injured over 1,600, and resulted in more than $200 million in property damage. On an annual basis this translates into almost 3,000 fires, more than 70 deaths, more than 300 people injured, and more than $40 million in property damage.

In short, lit tobacco products are the leading cause of residential fires and fire-related deaths in Canada. If that were not enough, the victims of these fires are often children and the elderly, who are less able to escape from the fires, or the firefighters who are trying to save them.

Health Canada has been aware of these risks for a long time, and has undertaken a number of fire prevention efforts over the past twenty years to address this issue. These have included educating the public about the dangers of carelessly handling lit cigarettes; banning or restricting flammable consumer products, such as some materials used in mattresses, bedding, and textiles; regulating ignition sources, such as matches and lighters; and working with the Canadian Council of Furniture Manufacturers to implement voluntary standards to reduce the flammability of upholstered furniture.

Although these efforts have been important elements of the strategy to prevent fires, none of these elements focused specifically on the main source of the problem: cigarettes. With this in mind, we have started looking at the possibility of mandating that cigarettes be designed and manufactured in such a way that they would be less likely to cause fires. This type of product is called reduced ignition propensity cigarettes, a bit of a mouthful, but you get used to it. But in order for Health Canada to mandate these types of cigarettes, we needed two things to be in place: a suitable test method to measure cigarette ignition, and appropriate pass or fail criteria related to the test method in question.

In the United States the Consumer Products Safety Commission and the National Institute of Standards and Technology are doing work in this area. In 1993 the National Institute of Standards and Technology proposed a method to test the ignition propensity of cigarettes, and a couple of years ago a U.S.-based organization that develops standard testing methodology, called ASTM International, started working on the proposed test method in order to adopt it as a consensus standard. I'm pleased to report that this test method was adopted as the standard by ASTM last year.

Now that this test method has been recognized and published, Health Canada is in a position to move forward with the development of a regulatory proposal to reduce the ignition propensity of cigarettes.

As part of the development of a regulatory proposal, Health Canada has been following similar developments in the State of New York. Back in August 2000 New York State became the first jurisdiction in the world to enact legislation dealing with reduced ignition propensity cigarettes. On January 1 of this year the New York Office of Fire Prevention and Control proclaimed its ignition propensity standard and testing methodology, which is based on the ASTM test. Soon all cigarettes sold or offered for sale in the State of New York will have to meet this standard. The date is currently set as July 2003, but we understand that this deadline may be extended.

º (1630)

[Translation]

In early December, Health Canada released a consultation document which proposed using the ASTM test method and mandating a pass mark of 75% for brands tested. The document asked stakeholders for input on two of the main concerns that have been raised by the tobacco industry. The first is that reduced-ignition-propensity cigarettes may be more toxic than regular cigarettes to smokers. The second is that making cigarettes less fire-prone will lead people to be more careless.

Stakeholders were also asked whether Health Canada should regulate the ignition propensity of other tobacco products, such as fine-cut tobacco used in hand-rolled cigarettes, kreteks, which are also known as clove cigarettes, and cigars. The consultation document is included in your package, at tab 2.

Health Canada is currently in the process of reviewing the 37 responses received to date. In general terms, they are supportive. They come from 25 firefighter organizations across the country, six non-government organizations, and six tobacco companies. Some of the key suggestions are to require toxicity testing in addition to ignition propensity testing, and to include a public education campaign as part of our strategy.

At the same time, we are working with the National Research Council of Canada to test cigarettes sold in Canada, using the ASTM methodology. By mid-February, and hopefully in the next two weeks, we should have the preliminary results for the top 10 brands sold in Canada.

Once these steps are completed, we may need to undertake the analysis of a broader sample of Canadian cigarettes to measure their ignition propensity. Another significant upcoming step of our regulatory process is the conduct of a cost-benefit analysis. This will include a consultation with the tobacco industry to assess expected compliance costs. Information collected will be used to develop the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement required for all governor-in-council regulations. Furthermore, our regulatory process requires that proposed regulations be tabled before the House of Commons.

As you may know, section 42.1 of the Tobacco Act requires that any proposed regulations tabled before the House be referred to the Standing Committee on Health before being approved by the governor in council. This means that the committee would be in a position to review any proposed tobacco regulations aimed at reducing the ignition propensity of cigarettes.

Let us now turn to the proposal before you today, which is to use the Hazardous Products Act to regulate reduced ignition propensity cigarettes. Indeed, Bill C-260 seeks to amend subsection 3(2) of the Hazardous Products Act to add cigarette ignition propensity standards to its scope. The Hazardous Products Act was designed to deal with hazardous products in two ways: by regulating the products to make them safe, or by simply banning them from the marketplace. Unfortunately, tobacco products do not fit this model. They are inherently harmful, and will remain so at least for the foreseeable future. However, it is not practical or socially responsible to ban them, again at least for the foreseeable future, as the smoking prevalence rate is 21%.

Because of their uniqueness, tobacco products have their own legislation, the Tobacco Act, which governs their manufacture, sale, labelling and promotion. Subsection 3(2) was added to the Hazardous Products Act in 1997 to exempt tobacco and tobacco products from the scope of the act. This issue was discussed in December 1996, when Bill C-71, the proposed Tobacco Act, was before the Standing Committee on Health. At that time, a motion was brought forward to repeal subsection 3(2) of the Hazardous Products Act. Had the motion gone forward, it would have removed the exclusion of tobacco products from the Hazardous Products Act, therefore enabling future regulations to be made in this area. However, at that time, the members of the Standing Committee on Health dismissed the motion, recognizing that the unique nature of tobacco products required specific legislation, the Tobacco Act. Excerpts of this discussion are included in your packages, at tab 4.

º (1635)

As mentioned previously, this committee will have an opportunity to review any proposed regulations under the Tobacco Act, since they will have to be submitted to the House of Commons before they can be adopted by the governor in council.

Thank you again for this opportunity to present Health Canada's views on the proposed act to amend the Hazardous Products Act. We would now be pleased to answer your questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I don't see any hands.

You're slow, but go ahead, Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Let me speed the hand up, if that's the case.

I want to thank you for coming. It's interesting, I discerned very quickly you do have a spine and maybe I was unjustified in some of the remarks to the earlier witness.

If I discern correctly, what your presentation is saying is that perhaps the Hazardous Products Act is not the vehicle to bring forward legislation and that it should be under the Tobacco Act. Is that what you're saying?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Yes, we're saying that tobacco is a unique product and under the Tobacco Act we have the infrastructure that we need to test, measure, and to force industry to report to us. Everything is there to support a regulation under the Tobacco Act.

I'l ask Madame Caris to speak to the Hazardous Products Act.

Ms. Marta Caris (Director, Consumer Product Safety, Department of Health): Perhaps I might, as a matter of familiarity and background, explain to you what it is that the Hazardous Products Act has in its authorities.

Clearly the act does provide for prohibitions for bands of products that are hazardous, or potentially hazardous, for sale and importation into Canada. It does, by the same token, also provide for the restriction of products through regulations that would set out clear criteria and circumstances that would have to be adhered to in terms of the advertising, sale, and importation of the product.

This restriction or regulation of products is intended in order to make reasonably safe these particular types of products.

Tobacco is, as you know, a unique product, in that in its intended use it is rather unsafe, and clearly the information and the evidence to date suggests that it is an unsafe product. Given the fact that the intention of the Hazardous Products Act is to regulate products so that they are safe, clearly it conflicts with the intentions and interpretations of the act as it has been drafted.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I'm wondering about the smuggling argument that a past witness had suggested, and you talked a lot about what it would be like in Canada--the numbers of fires, let's say--and I want to get down to a question on that as well: how many forest fires are caused by tobacco. I know we have numbers of deaths in homes and the number of fires in homes, but I'm wondering if you have some statistics on the other side of it.

On the smuggling side of it, that seemed to be an argument that we would smuggle cigarettes in from another country, or from the United States, if we were to ban it here in Canada. I'm wondering if you have some experience as to whether they fear that same thing in the state of New York, where they obviously would have concerns along all borders with another product. Is that a concern with them there?

Mr. Denis Choinière: These comments have not been expressed directly to us by officials from the State of New York. However, their comments have been reported in newspapers, and that's certainly one of their concerns in the state of New York, because the other states right around it would not have such a standard or such a concern.

The difference with Canada is that Americans like American brands. Canadians typically don't like American brands. So if smuggling is an issue, it would be a more acute problem in the state of New York than it would be here.

º (1640)

Mr. Rob Merrifield: How about on forest fires?

Mr. Denis Choinière: We don't have any data on forest fires. Without going too much into the technical details of how cigarettes could be modified, it's likely that it would have little impact in decreasing forest fires.

Forest fires typically occur when it's very dry in the environment, so given the flammability of the material, you don't have to go to a very high temperature,. I'm not sure that even with the modifications to the cigarette it would make the burning temperature so low as to prevent igniting fires in forests.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: Even though you did not focus on the political aspects of the issue, I believe that Health Canada considers the objectives of our colleague to be commendable, but feels this is not the proper vehicle. In your opinion, Canada will one day have to adopt regulations that prohibit the sale of cigarettes, and that is not what our colleague aims to do. But we do agree that this is indeed a goal that Health Canada must aim for.

You state that the Hazardous Products Act operates by prohibition, and that we could not prohibit a product that has been freely sold for many decades. Again, this is not the right vehicle for that.

Then, you state that the industry must be consulted because you foresee the same kind of opposition that arose when the Tobacco Products Information Regulations were adopted. At the time, we were told that the regulations would bankrupt the industry. Yet after a number of years, we can say that—

One might say that I am the oldest member of the Health Committee, perhaps not in age—since I clearly look much younger than the other members—but in years of presence. I was here when we studied the Tobacco Products Regulations.

To put it in a nutshell, one day Health Canada wants to achieve Mr. McKay's objective, even though this may not the right vehicle for it. Can you tell us something about the status of your consultations with the industry? Who have you consulted, and what is your consultation process?

Mr. Denis Choinière: We are still at the first stage. You have a copy of the consultation document that was released in early December. We gave any interested parties 60 days to submit their comments. So far, we have received 37 submissions, and we are beginning to review them. We will compile those results and then gather comments from the industry.

This is just the first stage of a fairly long regulatory process.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The industry puts forward two arguments. First of all, what scientific evidence do you have to disprove the industry's statement, which states that a given cigarette is more toxic than another? We remember voting for an investment of $58 million for anti-smoking advertising. But if we end up with more toxic cigarettes, we will be no further ahead.

How would you respond to that? The second argument is that, since brand loyalty is declining, smuggling is on the rise.

Mr. Denis Choinière: At this time, I cannot tell you any more than what is stated in the consultation document.

Mr. Réal Ménard: There is not much there.

Mr. Denis Choinière: One of the questions in the consultation paper was about the impact on toxicity. At the moment, we have very little information. According to statements made by the American company, Philip Morris, its Merit cigarette, which, according to the company should be considered a potentially fire-safe cigarette, is no more toxic than its other products.

Mr. Réal Ménard: In other words, the industry's argument to the effect that it would be premature to adopt this bill, because the information available is rather sketchy, should be taken into consideration.

Mr. Denis Choinière: That is the one of the reasons we included this point in the consultation paper. In addition, we wanted to get as much feedback as possible.

Mr. Réal Ménard: We should repeat to our colleague, Mr. McKay—who despite his rather dry, lawyerly look, is never the less a philosopher—the old German proverb to the effect that speed is the enemy of intelligence. In other words, even though we want to achieve public health objectives, we should not proceed too quickly.

A final question? No. I will ask it later.

[English]

The Chair: Mrs. Longfield.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

My questions are very brief. I want clarification in as simple and plain a language as I can possibly get.

Do you support the intent of Bill C-260?

º (1645)

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Yes, we do.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: If you support the intent, then there should be no reason why you can't help the member craft legislation, or the minister craft legislation, be it under whatever act, to achieve his desired effect.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: That's correct.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: For the other question I have--and it's rather strange--I'm going to quote exactly from the material I have in front of me. You said that the Hazardous Products Act is designed to deal with hazardous products in two ways, and you talk about the ways. Then you say: “Unfortunately, tobacco products do not fit this model: They are inherently harmful at least for the foreseeable future.” And this is the part I'm a little concerned about: “It is not practical or socially responsible to ban them, again at least for the foreseeable future, as the smoking prevalence rate is 21%.”

Are you suggesting that we never ban anything that's prevalent?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: No, I'm not suggesting that. However, that question was raised by the Supreme Court in 1995, when the previous tobacco act was being contested. The court recognized that if you have six million people in the country using a product and many of them, probably the majority, would be addicted to that product, it would not be socially responsible to take it off the market. It would certainly cause a lot of social unrest and would certainly increase contraband at that point.

So what we're saying is that as long as prevalence rates are high, and 21% is over five million people in this country who smoke, it's not in the foreseeable future a good idea to ban the product from the market in this country.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Might the same argument have been used when we tried to regulate the use of seat belts?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Of what?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Seat belts.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: You're forcing people to wear them, but I think we're comparing products that are a little different. The cigarette is an addictive product. Nicotine is addictive. As we've seen with drugs, people who are addicted to cocaine or heroin will do a lot of things to get heroin or cocaine. So I think we can compare cigarettes to other drugs in that respect, in respect to addiction. And there may come a day in this country when that's a legislative debate we have as to whether we ban the product or not from the market, but it's not the intent of this regulation.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: I would hate to see this used as a reason why we didn't work on legislation to ban things that are so inherently dangerous.

Those are my questions, Madam.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Longfield.

Dr. Castonguay, and he'll be followed by Mr. McKay.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I was trying to follow your presentation as best I could. If I understood correctly, there was a consultation period that began in early December and lasted two months. You are in the process of analyzing the results of this consultation process.Once again, if I understood correctly, following that, you will begin the regulation drafting process on the substance of Bill C-260. Is that correct?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: The regulation process is the same, regardless of the bill involved. However, before we can publish a bill in the Canada Gazette or present it to the special cabinet committee that reviews regulations, there is a process that must be followed and documents that have to be presented to that committee. In order to be presented to the committee, a cost-benefit analysis is required to determine the costs for the industry, the benefits for society, and so on. An entire economic analysis is required, as well as a scientific and technical analysis to look at the toxicity of the product and the manufacturing process. Then we hope eventually to have regulations that will—

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: I see, but following your consultations, you will embark on the regulations drafting process. Is that correct?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Drafting the regulations happens more toward the end of the process. There are a number of steps that must be taken before that. The bill is presented and there is another official consultation period when it is prepublished in the Canada Gazette. Next, the bill goes to the House, then it comes here and you can review it. Next, it goes back... I am not sure. I am getting a little mixed up about the process.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: What is the period of time involved? That is really what I want to know. Will this be postponed indefinitely and come back in three years, or can we say that in six months, you will have something to present? That would help us take a position with respect to Bill C-260. If you are drafting regulations, and if you tell us that you will be back in September or October, then we could perhaps say that we would wait until we had the regulations before proceeding. Can you give us any idea about the scheduling?

º (1650)

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Yes, certainly. Being reasonably optimistic, we would like to have draft regulations by the end of the autumn of 2003.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: What do you call the end of the fall?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: November or December.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: So you mean at the beginning of November?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Yes, but I am not making any promises. This is a long, technical, and in this case also scientific process. As you said, speed is the enemy of intelligence. I believe that we have to apply the process intelligently and equitably to all parties, including the industry which will have to manufacture the product.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Frequently, establishing timetables makes it easier to accomplish the tasks needed to attain our goals.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: However, I would like to add that, regardless of your decision, if you recommend that the act to amend the Hazardous Products Act be adopted, regulations under the Hazardous Products Act will still be required. The regulatory process will still have to be initiated, only under another statute.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Basically, if you could make a formal commitment to come back before this committee in the fall with regulations, we, the committee members, would take a different approach. We would wait until we have the regulations and then review the bill, rather than considering whether or not it should be approved before we see the regulations.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: It would make it possible for you to review the bill once, rather than twice.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: This fall, in November.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Thereabouts, yes.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Castonguay.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: As I told you, Madam Chair, we have a very capable parliamentary secretary.

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: I was just asking questions.

Mr. John McKay: You stole one of my two questions. That was the concern I have.

I think it's fair to say that this committee doesn't want this to go off in the wild blue yonder. So why is it so complicated to develop a set of draft regulations between February and November? I don't understand that. The submissions are virtually in. You've established a standard. You're adopting the standard that New York used.

Tell me. I don't understand the delay.

Mr. Denis Choinière: Under the federal regulatory policy, there are steps we must conduct. The major one is developing what's called a cost-benefit analysis, which involves two major parts. The first is to do the cost assessment, meaning we have to consult with the most affected parties and get feedback from them on what impact the regulations we're proposing will have on them.

This typically takes several months. We had this experience with past regulations. We thought six months were ample time, but the concerned parties were of another opinion. They kept telling us that we were pushing at their backs. That's a matter of perspective, I would say.

The second part is costing the benefits, which in this case should not be too difficult to conduct, because we already have good data from the study conducted by the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs.

So again, the big piece that is missing at this time is the cost assessment.

Mr. John McKay: So the issue here isn't the standards, whether there's more toxicity or less toxicity or this or that; it's really how much it's going to cost the industry to make the adjustment.

Mr. Denis Choinière: That's one of the issues.

Mr. John McKay: That's the major issue.

Mr. Denis Choinière: In terms of timing, that's the one that will take the most time.

Mr. John McKay: And all the industry says is “Everything is terribly expensive, and these regulatory burdens are adding huge amounts of cost to our product”.

Mr. Denis Choinière: But we cannot discard the other issues we raised in the consultation document. They will need to be addressed. At this stage, it is too early for us to say whether or not toxicity is an issue and how we need to address it. That's why we consulted on this aspect.

The issue of taste mentioned by the industry is not a big issue for us. There is no indication right now that the taste would be better or worse. One internal document from our journal seems to say, according to their own test, that there was no change in taste. For us, it doesn't seem to be a big issue at this time, but again, we have to wait to see what happens when the Canadian manufacturers start changing their processes.

Mr. John McKay: What is the prohibition against this committee saying that on June 1 we want your regulations deposited before this committee?

Mr. Denis Choinière: It's difficult for me to answer at this time. Typically, in the past we have pre-published in the Canada Gazette part I before proposing regulations in the House of Commons. If you're asking for them by June, we may not be able to pre-publish in the Canada Gazette part I before coming to this committee.

º (1655)

Mr. John McKay: Do you have to pre-publish before you come to the committee?

Mr. Denis Choinière: It's procedural, I would say. If you make changes here before it goes to formal consultation in the Canada Gazette part I, if there are major changes made to the regulations after that consultation it would mean coming back again to the House of Commons to have your approval for the changes made.

Mr. John McKay: Are you of the view that you also have to accompany these regulations with an amendment to the act?

Mr. Denis Choinière: No, not at this time.

Mr. John McKay: So, really, we're down to hazardous product regulations versus the Tobacco Act.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Regulations, yes.

Mr. John McKay: So we're not worried about legislation?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Well, we're looking at all the mechanisms right now. We're at the beginning of this consultation process. We're going to evaluate the pros and cons of all the mechanisms that are available and we'll make a decision at that time.

Mr. John McKay: Just in defence of the lawyer who helped me draft this bill three years ago, he had a fairly detailed memo as to why hazardous products was a better choice than the Tobacco Act. Anyway, I don't really care. At the end of the day, I think we all know what we want.

Moving to my final question, on page 6 you say that soon all cigarettes sold or offered in the state of New York will have to meet this standard. You say the date is currently set at July 2003, but that the deadline may be extended. Can you elaborate on that a bit, what that actually means?

Mr. Denis Choinière: If you look at tab 8, you will see the proposed rule-making. I don't have the exact pages here, but depending on when the steps follow each other, it's possible that the date after which all manufacturers in the state of New York have to meet the standard may be postponed.

Recently there have also been reports in the press from the state of New York saying that the governor had asked that it be postponed for cost reasons. However, those comments were denied afterward in the same press, so we're not too certain. We're just flying it here as a possibility, as was reported in the press.

Mr. John McKay: I'm a little confused. This seems to be a little backwards here. Does New York claim their standards and then ask for notice of proposed rule-making?

Mr. Denis Choinière: There are two steps, similar to ours. They use different terminology. Their legislation was changed in the summer of 2000. In the legislation, they gave so much time to the commissioner--I forget his exact name--for fire prevention to adopt the rule by January 1. On January 1 they proposed their rule. There is a step that I'm not as familiar with as I am with the Canadian process, but until that's adopted, it sounds like the date by which manufacturers will have to comply is also floating.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Mr. Lunney.

[Translation]

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I have a very important question for the committee members and witnesses here today. Which of you has backache? Which of you is spineless?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: My children would be astonished to hear that comment about their mother. They sometimes think I have altogether too much spine.

Mr. James Lunney: Here we find solutions. There is a chiropractor among us.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: I see one regularly myself.

[English]

Mr. James Lunney: It sounds like a Friday question.

I have a final question on this side.

Why is it that everything is so slow in terms of making these changes? We have to consult. We have to decide with industry, or have models about whether there is toxicity in these products. Is there concern in the department that we're vulnerable to a lawsuit from industry if this doesn't go at a snail's pace? What's the issue?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Everything the government has done to legislate or regulate tobacco has been contested by the tobacco industry--every piece of legislation and every regulation. It is always something we have to think about.

The federal regulatory process is built in such a way as to ensure fairness for all parties and to ensure that all parties get heard and that all their concerns get heard. In a democratic country, that takes time. It's never as fast as we would hope for.

The charter has added another degree of complexity and analysis to all pieces of legislation and regulation, because a special committee of council has to be assured that this is reasonable under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

All of these things make for a regulatory process that seems a little long at times, but ensures fairness for all. The experience with health warning messages was that the end result was very good, and they are achieving their intended purpose. We're very happy with the results, but it does take time to get there.

» (1700)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

Mr. Ménard.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: I have two brief questions. First of all, I am sorry to see that tab 8 is in one official language only. I would have liked you to table it in French as well. I can read English, but when it gets a bit technical, then... Can you provide a French version?

Ms. Hélène Goulet: We do not have the French version of this because it comes from New York. However, we can have it translated.

Mr. Réal Ménard: Yes, but when you table documents before the committee... I know that you are not doing this in bad faith.

Regarding the ASTM methodology, which I would like to read about, it seems the committee will have to determine whether the technology that will make it possible to bring a fire-safe cigarette onto the market exists. If such technology exists, we would have to be assured that it is workable. Thus, someone will have to talk to us about the ASTM methodology. Perhaps this could be taken into account when we hear our next witnesses. Can the National Research Council of Canada provide some evidence that this is indeed an effective approach?

Mr. Denis Choinière: I would begin by answering your first question. There are two important types of government regulations in health and consumer protection: technical regulations and standards. Technical regulations explain how a device, instrument or product must be made. Standards do not focus on manufacture, but rather on the criteria the final product must meet. They do not state how a product is to be made, but they set out the criteria and standards with which the product must be in compliance.

In the second consultation document, we propose standards. ASTM standards do not provide information on how to manufacture cigarettes. They explain how to construct the device in which cigarettes will be tested. The acceptable score proposed at present is 75 p. 100.

If you don't mind, please remind me of your second question.

Mr. Réal Ménard: The second question dealt with the National Research Council of Canada. I support the objective, and I am certain that my party could also support it. But when the industry states in its brief that there is really no expertise or that it may be difficult to succeed in marketing a fire-safe cigarette, is their argument not plausible?

Mr. Denis Choinière: The idea is to get comments from the industry. Like you, we also recognize that this very comment was made. We do not manufacture cigarettes, as one of your colleagues just noted; we can only go by what is in the available documentation. The only example we have at hand is the Merit cigarette from Philip Morris which, apparently, is a low-ignition-propensity cigarette.

Mr. Réal Ménard: You understand that this debate is different from the one we had about labelling.

Mr. Denis Choinière: Exactly.

Mr. Réal Ménard: There was an expropriation aspect to the labelling issue. Even if the industry refused at the outset, we as parliamentarians were sure that this could be done. We should be strict rather than sensitive. Sometimes we should be both, but when there are objectives to be attained, we should be strict first and sensitive afterward.

Please take note that I am both a strict and a sensitive person.

Voices: Oh, oh!

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ménard.

I have one question. I'm worried about the length of time. I think the thrust of Mr. McKay's point is that we want to speed this up because we're afraid it could spin on and on.

At one point, when you gave the tobacco companies and others six months, they came back and said it wasn't enough. I would assume that it was the tobacco companies that said it wasn't enough, not the firefighters. Is that correct?

Mr. Denis Choinière: Yes.

» (1705)

The Chair: Yes.

What leverage do you have to say that this is a three-month process and we need your comments by then, with no extensions?

From what you said, I gathered that you did extend the six months to accommodate them. How could you do this one and not give any extensions? Do you have any powers to do that? What forced you to do it in the first place?

Mr. Denis Choinière: Let's say that the process that leads us to regulations is one where we rely on the goodwill of the stakeholders to some extent. That's for all regulations generally that we're dealing with under the Governor in Council regulations, to give proper and complete information to the decision-makers, a special committee of council.

We need the feedback from the industry. The requirement imposed on the departments is to go and get the data from the interested parties. In this case, I mentioned cost assessment as one big piece. We need to rely on the other party to provide this information to us.

The Chair: Don't you think that the tobacco companies, at least some of them, already have this information?

According to Mr. McKay's presentation, some of them have been working on this issue for eleven years and have been doing tests. Surely they have some information already that they could send next week if you asked for it.

Mr. Denis Choinière: I can only speculate at this time, just like you. We don't know yet. We're not at the stage yet, for consultation and cost assessment, on how readily available the information is.

The Chair: I guess I'm skeptical that an industry that is getting along fine without this is going to have much goodwill towards a change that might cost them money.

You say you rely on goodwill. What happens if you don't get the goodwill in other cases, say from a pharmaceutical company? Do you have any levers?

Mr. Denis Choinière: Last time when there was a lack of information, we had to make assumptions and come up with figures that we thought were reasonable, and that gave an opportunity for the industry to comment on whether or not the figures were close enough or acceptable.

The Chair: I suppose that's not desirable. On the other hand, if they're not forthcoming with the information they have, then it seems to me that the way to do it is to develop your own figures and tell them if they don't like it, they can comment. They won't like them, for sure.

Ms. Hélène Goulet: Of course, it's all part of the RIAS, the regulatory impact analysis statement. That would be known by the ministers and the special committee of council as well.

We've developed the documentation for ministers to be able to make an informed decision on whether to publish the regulation or not. Then you would be apprised of this information as well when you examine the regulation.

The Chair: Okay.

Are there any further questions? Dr. Castonguay.

[Translation]

Mr. Jeannot Castonguay: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I wonder if we could propose something like this: that the committee support the objective of Bill C-260 in principle, and that we resume studying this issue in early November 2003, to give those concerned the time they need to work out the regulations. We were told that this would take some time.

Mr. Réal Ménard: I think that we should hear more witnesses, with all due respect.

[English]

The Chair: I'm going to ask Mr. McKay to respond to that suggestion.

Mr. John McKay: As I indicated to the committee in my presentation, I wanted to use this committee as a pressure point--whether they have spines or not is another issue--to keep the feet of the department and the industry to the fire.

Again, not to pun this thing, but we don't want to be fiddling when Rome burns, Réal.

I don't mind the notion that hearings on this bill be postponed until the department is in a position to do it. I don't want to let the department get in a position where it's getting one excuse after another from the industry as to why it can't do this, why it can't do that, or the cost-benefit hasn't been done. The numbers of excuses will defy the imagination.

I think we have to report back to the House within 60 days. I don't know how you extend that time period. I'm quite happy to do it, because ultimately the regulations come back before this committee. All you would do is go over the same testimony all over again. This is possibly a matter the committee should discuss.

As to Jeannot's basic suggestion in principle, I have no reason as to why we wouldn't try to accommodate the regulatory timeline, but I will not be at all tolerant of excuses as to why the regulations haven't been put forward.

» (1710)

The Chair: Mrs. Chamberlain.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Madam Chair, I have a spring-off from this particular issue that I think involves a lot of other issues.

Last night I heard something that really bothered me a lot. I heard that Bill C-13 is going to be shelved. That was of quite some concern to me.

We had an issue here last week, the diabetes issue, that was extremely important. You talk about whether this issue is important or whether people's medication is important. I guess both are important, but which one is more important?

We've been covering a number of issues. As a committee, can we have some sort of a timetable as to when and where these things are going to be?

The Chair: Excuse me, Mrs. Chamberlain. At the beginning of the meeting I said that part one would be dedicated to Mr. McKay and the health officials because we had delayed them twice.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Yes.

The Chair: I would cancel twice part two of the meeting. We will move into the long-range planning.

On the issues you're referring to, I have asked the researchers to put together a potential calendar. You will see those things popping up on the calendar. It doesn't mean we can't revise it. This is their first draft, and it will be something we look at together.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Okay. Is it going to then address, for instance, when Mr. McKay would come back?

The Chair: Yes. I think they assumed that we might want to hear more about this bill when they put the calendar together. We may decide that we don't want to hear any more about it because there's a plan of action.

I can say, in response to you, that Mr. McKay has said he wants to keep the department's feet to the fire about this. It sounds to me like the recalcitrant people who might delay it by saying a certain number of months isn't long enough might be the tobacco companies. Maybe he'd like to use this committee to keep the tobacco companies' feet to the fire, in which case it would require at least one more hearing on this bill, unless you decide you want to shelve it all.

Mr. John McKay: Can I speak to this?

The Chair: Yes.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Can I finish my point?

The Chair: Yes, please.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: That's fine. I'm all for this, but we have some other issues floating out there that are most important to me also. So I want that tied up in a bag with a bow on it, instead of just floating around.

The Chair: Yes. Well, they're not. They will be before this session is over.

Mr. Ménard is next, and then Mr. Merrifield.

[Translation]

Mr. Réal Ménard: First, I believe that with regard to procedure, we cannot report to the House, unless we want to say that the leaders have reached an agreement, because your bill was sent to the committee. This is an order from the House. And this is what I think would be fair. Maybe we will not have to study this in depth, because we can wait for the regulations, but at least I would like to give a chance to the anti-tobacco groups and to the industry to be heard so that for the sake of fairness, all the main stakeholders would have been able to address the committee. We will thus have all the information we need to make a decision about the bill.

If the bill's sponsor agrees to wait for the regulations and if it is compatible with the work going on in the House, I agree to wait, but I would not want to interrupt our work after hearing only one stakeholder. The industry must be heard and groups like Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada and other anti-tobacco groups must also be heard.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. Rob Merrifield: I was going to make the same point. We've had witnesses from the department and from the mover of the bill, but we haven't heard the other side. I'm not prepared to make a recommendation to give the department authorization from this committee without hearing the other side of it. It's absolutely important that we do that.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Merrifield.

Mr. McKay, you can have one last kick at the can.

Mr. John McKay: My only point is to try to avoid redundancy by the committee. Having witnesses come and then come again on the same point is not a particularly good use of the committee's time.

I'm in the committee's hands as to what is the best procedure here, but bear in mind that a fair number of issues are playing on outside this committee.

» (1715)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McKay.

Thank you very much to the witnesses. We'll probably be seeing you again, but it was very helpful information you gave us.

We'll now have a five-minute break before we proceed to part two of the meeting.

[Proceedings continue in camera]