FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, October 28, 2003

Â

1205

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance))

Dr. Osman Tastan (Professor of Islamic Law, University of Ankara (Turkey))

Â

1210

Â

1215

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day)

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

Â

1220

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day)

Dr. Osman Tastan

Â

1225

Â

1230

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day)

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

Dr. Osman Tastan

Â

1235

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.))

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Â

1240

Dr. Osman Tastan

Â

1245

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

Dr. Osman Tastan

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

Â

1250

Dr. Osman Tastan

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

Dr. Osman Tastan

Mrs. Karen Redman

Dr. Osman Tastan

Â

1255

Mrs. Karen Redman

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Dr. Osman Tastan

·

1300

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Dr. Osman Tastan

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

Dr. Osman Tastan

The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll)

---

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

---

NUMBER 052

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, October 28, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

  (1205)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)): We'll call our meeting to order.

    We're very pleased to have with us, as our guest today, Dr. Osman Tastan, a gentleman we met just recently, some of us, when we did our recent tour. We met today's presenter when we were in Ankara, Turkey.

    It's a pleasure to have you with us today, Dr. Tastan.

    Dr. Tastan is currently at Ankara University. You may be interested to know that he has also served at the University of Exeter in England, with a PhD in Islamic Law, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies. He's also to served at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Cornell University in New York, United States.

    So you have an interesting and important background, Dr. Tastan. You've already been briefed and are aware of what we're doing and what our study involves.

    Some of you may be interested to note that Dr. Tastan is widely published, and a sought-after conference speaker. He has covered in his publications a wide range of topics, from the food laws of the Koran to the idea of civil disobedience in Islamic law, from the controversy and the penalty for adultery in classical Islamic law to population policy in Islam, and to jihad in Islam, of course a topic of high interest.

    Dr. Tastan, we're so pleased you have the time to be with us. We know you're probably a little fatigued from your recent transatlantic travel. Thank you for being with us.

    Please take your time now to make your presentation, and then members of the committee will have questions.

    Dr. Osman Tastan (Professor of Islamic Law, University of Ankara (Turkey)): I thank you very much for inviting me here.

    Distinguished members of the committee, Mr. Clerk, I feel honoured to have the chance to address the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the House of Commons of this extremely significant and prominent country of North America, which attracts appreciation and admiration from around the world for its achievements in democracy and pluralism.

    I shall start my speech by expressing my gratitude to His Excellency the clerk, Mr. Stephen Knowles, for inviting me to address distinguished members of the committee on this issue of relations with Muslim countries.

    As you mentioned, Mr. Chair, we met in Ankara, and I was very pleased that you as Canadian authorities were interested in viewing a real version of Islam in place, in the region. If I'm correct, you were going to follow with a visit to Iran and Saudi Arabia. With Turkey, these three countries are very important, I believe.

    Turkey, being constitutionally secular, retains a strong Sunni Islamic culture. Iran, being constitutionally religious, has a strong Shi'ite Islamic culture, while Saudi Arabia is known to have a traditionalist Sunni Islam in terms of both establishment and religion, as it also harbours Mecca and Medina, which are the two holiest shrines of Islam.

    I believe that a true understanding between the west and Islamic countries is subject to various impediments, and on that I have two sharp and quick points. First of all, there is a political memory of both Muslims and Christians that still retains elements of prejudice and religious rivalry from medieval times, and the religiously motivated, somehow hostile, encounters. Second, the west, in the minds of modern Muslim masses, is both technologically “superior” and “the other”. Thus, it is appreciated for the quality of living and the technology it offers to humanity, and at the same time resisted--as the other--because of its global cultural domination. On the other hand, the west reflects a memory of perceiving Muslims in stereotype images, with its traditional dress against modern man's fashion, and with limited women's rights, polygamy, and harsh penalties in criminal law, etc. Moreover, Islam, in terms of contacts with non-Muslims, is closely related to the concept of jihad in the sense of war and violence.

    Amid these prejudices deep down in socio-political cultures and memories of both sides, the west's relationship to Islamic countries is more directly maintained via governmental organizations and international trade and economy, while the Muslim world's relationship to the west in a sense is somehow more diversified in terms of sending students overseas for education in advanced western institutions in order to gain modern and liberal elite access to the politics and society of the Muslim world, importing technology, and adopting better standards of living for the citizens of Muslim countries.

    Additionally, the west is a destination of hope of better living standards for a good number of individuals who feel dissatisfied at home. Also, broad and permissive limits of western democracies for human rights and freedom of expression provide a possible route to move for a culture of intellectual and political opposition from the Muslim world. In this way, internal politics of the Muslim world could easily arrive in the Muslim diaspora in the west. Thus, a constructive dialogue taking the socio-political Islamic culture into account becomes ever more important as a prerequisite of establishing sustainable, positive relationships with the Muslim world.

  (1210)  

    However, for the reasons mentioned, an undercurrent of distrust of the west among Muslim societies continues to exist, and remedy is sought in efficient cooperation with the modern Muslim elite. As against this point, in Islamic societies there is similarly an undercurrent of distrust stemming not only from medieval-time religious rivalries but also from the recent history of wars and colonization. Thus, any possibility of socio-political change in the Muslim world is very easily interpreted as linked to western-related external dynamics, and met with suspicion.

    Therefore, the very change that is needed for a more modern Muslim society is somewhat denied the level of social legitimacy it needs. It is almost an everyday event to see columnists and live TV commentators explaining socio-political events in and around the Muslim world by conspiracy theories.

    In order to establish and maintain better relationships between generally the west and particularly Canada, the aforesaid ground of historical prejudices and distrust should be replaced by viable, positive approaches and contacts. I believe that Canada, as one of the economically most leading countries with an advanced democratic society and one of the least politically sensitively perceived western countries, has a unique chance to pioneer a positive relationship with the Muslim countries. For this purpose, the following points may be considered as supportive to a sustainable, better understanding of the Muslim world.

    One, Islam should be studied and understood not only as an ideology, jihad, religious laws only, but also in terms of social culture, traditions, and experiences that Muslims have been living with in their capacity as part of human society. This should also give a legitimate chance to Muslims to have the right to change further within their own societal context should they feel and realize that they need further socio-cultural change.

    Indeed, such changes do occur in Muslim societies, although within certain limits. For example, Islamic penal laws are very rarely given exact application. Polygamy is not as popular as in history. Women's rights are being advocated. And the Koran is the focus of attention throughout Islamic studies in order to develop new interpretations of the holy text as against the historically accumulated and time-bound traditional cultures.

    Point two, politically non-sensitive areas of cooperation should be advanced. For example, academic cooperation in the form of student and staff exchanges should be supported through a working plan, such as the Socrates/Erasmus project, which is applied between the EU member states, and the Leonardo da Vinci project and other European extensive educational programs that encourage cooperation between different segments of society, from each side, in different careers. The whole point behind this effort may be taken as the significance of intersocietal and intercultural understanding to form positive grounds for international relationships.

    Three, inter-religious studies should be encouraged beyond the fashion of comparative religions. This area should be given a deeper task of comparative civilization studies. The merit behind this point is that differences between the civilizations and also the history of civilizations could provide both understanding and appreciation of the diversity between the people of different religious affiliations. This culture of difference and diversity is itself the potential source of pluralism and tolerance in human society, which is needed.

    Four, Islam should particularly be noticed as being a pivotal element of identity for Muslim individuals and Muslim societies as well. Thus, cooperation and international relations with a more positive intention for peace and reconciliation between societies of different faiths may be achieved through appreciating the religious and cultural values of the other. In this way, the politically and popularly prevailing sense of reactionary attitudes may be replaced by a rational approach and consideration for social and political change towards a more democratic and human rights-based world society.

  (1215)  

    While the above-mentioned points are taken into consideration for a more positive perspective on international relations with Muslim countries, my fifth point is that Islam as religion, culture, politics, and society may be studied in historical and modern contexts. In this direction, I believe a series of conferences, starting with aspects of Islam as religion and politics, should have particular significance for developing a better understanding between the west and Muslim countries, as such events provide a unique opportunity for bringing scholars from both or all sides together, with the particular task of comparing and analyzing different points of view and reaching points of synthesis and reconciliation.

    To put what I have been speaking about--namely, the different aspects of how to understand the Muslim world in better terms, and how to hold and maintain better relationships with the Muslim countries--into a conclusion, I suggest that international relations should be perceived, conceptualized, and contextualized as intersocietal and intercultural relationships.

    Thank you very much for listening to me.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day): Thank you, Dr. Tastan.

    We will move to questions and exchanges.

    In Canada we show great deference to our opposition parties, at least as far as questioning goes, so we would move first to the Bloc Québécois for their first question.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Welcome, Mr. Tastan. In Canada, we have two official languages; that is why I speak French in the House of Commons. Thank you very much for that summary. As you know, we have just returned from a trip which began in Turkey and continued in Iran, then Saudi Arabia, and ended in Egypt. We are very pleased to have you here with us. Thanks to your introductory remarks, we have enjoyed a kind of general overview.

    I would have several questions for you, but there are two in particular I wish to ask. The first has to do with Islam, democracy, and human rights. We understood in the various countries we visited that many people are involved in the democratic process and in defending human rights but do not want to have this imposed on them by the West. For our part, we have to understand that the Koran, the Islamic law, and democracy are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

    Secondly, you stated that in order to diminish the mistrust that exists with regard to the West, we need to establish effective cooperation with the Muslim elite. But will that be sufficient, in light of the fact that in several countries, the elite seemed to be cut off from the general population?

  (1220)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day): Dr. Tastan, just to inform you, when we move into the questioning portion we allow about 10 minutes for each question and the response. So you have about seven minutes or so to respond on this round of exchange.

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Okay.

    Thank you very much. It was great seeing you in Ankara, and I'm also glad that you invited me here for live discussions.

    You had two questions. I'll take the second one first, before I go to the Koran issue.

    On cooperation with the Muslim elite, I mentioned in my speech, yes, cooperation with the elite in the Muslim world, but I did not say, or I tried to avoid saying...but I suggest that it is very important to cooperate with the elite, because that is the only intellectual and modern channel with which you can reach the traditional societies. In that way, yes, it is positive to cooperate with the elite, but I take your point that the elite, particularly the political elite, are cut off, and somehow academically isolated from the society.

    My point, which I followed this with--if I had time, this would be a more elaborated response--actually reinforced what you suggest, that the elite are somehow cut off...that the only relationship through the elite, in order to reach the community, would be quite a sterile point, and usually it would be difficult. That's why I appreciated Mr. Clerk and the delegation being in Ankara, touring through Iran and Saudi Arabia, trying to see the real people, the civil society organizations and the people who do not come from official governmental channels. They could see more of the prevailing real culture in this society and get better ideas on forming more positive relationships.

    So on this point, I totally agree. We do not have a difference of opinion.

    To return to your first question, on Islam, democracy, and human rights, this issue is of great interest. It is true, the people who said, in the region, that there was no contradiction between the Koran and democracy...as far as I understood. In the history of Islam, human rights are very old. Prophet Mohammed, before he was given the duty, or given the revelation in a sense, when he was just a young man in his society, had a background of joining a human rights society at that time in Mecca. That was just pre-Islamic. In Arabic terms, it's an alliance of the people, virtuous people, in a sense, who would support human rights in the city of Mecca.

    Later, the true Koran Islam began to appeal, and the Koran as a text includes certain concepts of Shura. The concept of Shura is a council. How this in practice is understood is another matter, but theoretically, Shura gives a good base for a democratic culture, because it means that you would bring all scholars together for a free discussion, and try to compromise to reach some joint conclusions or agreements.

  (1225)  

    We have some scholars who have studied this matter. One of them is Fazlur Rahman, who taught at Chicago universities for many years. He originally was from Pakistan. He argued that the concept of Shura was not properly practised in history, because it was very much given no power, just the idea of it. A sultan had these scholars around him, and consulted them, but he never felt bound to follow the results of the consultations.

    Of course, this is not a positive point, but in a sense, what is positive is that there are bases of democratic culture in the Koran--for instance, Shura, and the fact that the majority is given a mandate in the Koran. If you give a majority, like a stagnant culture, something that is very slow to change, that doesn't give us very much of an idea on how to proceed. But if you give the majority an interpretation that you could put on a ballot before the people to vote on, and you make public opinion, research, and so on, then obviously we could interpret this majority mandate of Islam in a more democratic way. It is quite possible.

    However, the text of the Koran itself is a matter for discussion in Islamic study circles, because the text is part of the historical development of Islam. So when there was a war during early Islam, and the Koran was still coming down in pieces, in verses, to Prophet Mohammed, this obviously would mirror this war and it would influence with some difficult, severe statements. But there also are very tolerant statements in the Koran that could lead you to a democratic culture.

    So if the Koranic text is actually taken as something literally understood only, it will be this way, but if it is something that you could interpret through historical circumstances and contextualize it and bring it forward to today, then you could actually reach some democratic notions in there. It is possible.

  (1230)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. Stockwell Day): Thank you.

    We'll move to Ms. McDonough, or Mr. Casey.

    And these will be five-minutes exchanges, not ten. My mistake.

    Thank you.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): First of all, let me say welcome, Dr. Tastan. I was scheduled to be with my colleagues in Turkey, but to my great disappointment, I was unable to be there after all. So my questions will be far less informed than theirs as a result of their recent exposure to Turkey and neighbouring countries.

    One of the things that I think we struggle with a great deal--perhaps it's human nature, in part--is that there very often is a failure on the part of all people in distinguishing and discriminating between and among various forms of religious expression. Within the Christian faith, for example, there are many different denominations, many different religious institutions and practices. In other words, Christianity, as an example, is extremely diverse, and yet, sitting as part of a committee looking at the question of Canada's relationship with Muslim countries and Muslim communities, I think we sometimes suffer from a notion that Islam is a monolith.

    With respect to Turkey--and I ask this question partly out of ignorance--I think there often is a sense that we may more easily understand and establish democratic relationships, collaboration, and cooperation with Turkey, because Turkey basically has a secular state. Its dominant religious group is Islam, but that's not dominant in the political culture.

    I'm wondering if you could just comment on that, and on whether there is any basis for our seeing Turkey as possibly not representative or reflective of many of the other middle eastern countries where, in the majority, they are in fact not secular states.

    Are there insights or revelations that you can share with us to increase our understanding in terms of that reality?

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Thank you for your question.

    Turkey and other Muslim countries are and are not comparable in different respects. They are comparable in the sense of Islam as an identity, as I commented in my introduction. As an identity, in Turkey, when you look at the community, Islam as practiced as law is not in place, but as an identity it is very sensitively there.

    When it is details of Islamic law, large masses will not be interested, but when it is Ramadan, Islam becomes individualized--for instance, whether you want to fast during the month of Ramadan. On an individual matter the level of Islam is more apparent in Turkey. So it is easier or more proper to say that Islam in the public sphere in Turkey is not very much a reference. Thus, in accordance with this, the constitution and the legal of system of Turkey are totally without Islam, with no references to religion, in a sense. But when it comes to individual practices, such as going to the mosque on Friday, or fasting, then Islam is strong.

    What Turkey shares with other Muslim countries is a sensitivity about the Muslim identity. If the Muslim values are somehow disturbed, theoretically, then reactions would be similar, but legally and institutionally, this is totally different. Society through Islamic values works differently. For example, you cannot easily see the Muslim masses walking into the streets of Turkey, but this can happen in other countries.

    My personal view is that this is deeply rooted in the system of education, because the traditional Islamic education comes from the madrassas, old-style Islamic institutional colleges. These colleges, in a hereditary way, replaced teachers by the students, and then again, so that the chain of teachers would be the chain of Islamic leaders as well, at the same time.

    This educational system was actually removed altogether, and new school education was introduced. Madrassas were banned at the beginning of the twentieth century in Turkey. In this way, there are religious teachers, but no more can we say these are religious leaders who could mobilize masses in Turkey. This makes a difference in that Islam stays more individual in Turkey, but in the rest of the Muslim world, in educational institutions, there are prominent teachers also, and their leaders are in place.

    One more thing. Turkey is more in touch with Islam through Sufism as well, in the popular sense, in popular culture. This is very much a silent attachment to Islam's practices in personal, private rooms and so on. This is different from a sharp textual understanding of Islam, which could very much appear in the gulf, for example.

  (1235)  

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.)): Thank you, Dr. Tastan.

    I agreed to replace Mr. Day as chair only if I were allowed to keep my name on the list of questioners. I received that permission, and I am now going to take advantage.

    I, like my colleagues, am very grateful for your coming. There is much that we all would ask. As Ms. McDonough said, she unfortunately missed the visit, but for others, we have been there. Now we have the opportunity to speak to you through that lens, which makes this rather special.

    I would like to raise a question that we were discussing so much and hearing so much about, and that's the question of the hijab and the dynamics that are swirling around that issue in Turkey. One morning, we had two women come before us to make presentations. One woman was a lawyer, and I believe she spoke for an association of lawyers--am I correct, Ms. Lalonde?--or women's groups.

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: A federation of women--and she was a lawyer.

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Okay,

    The other was a woman whose husband is a member of the parliamentary assembly. She had also wanted to run but declined to do so, because she was not, as you know, permitted to wear the hijab in any of the government buildings in Turkey.

    They presented two very different perspectives on that issue, and I would like to hear your views on that, not just on the Islamic roots for the wearing of the hijab but how it's playing into both the political dynamics of life in Turkey right now, perhaps mentioning how their--hopefully--membership to the EU may be impacted by that, but also from the perspective of women. Because one professor who came before us said, look, you western women ought not to look askance at this issue, because this represents conservative families allowing their daughters to go to university who in the past would not have considered doing so, and they are being barred because of the current status of the law regarding hijab.

    I as a western women probably have some difficulty with that. But we're not here to hear my difficulties, we're here to hear your insights. Would you mind discussing that issue?

    Thank you.

  (1240)  

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Thank you very much.

    It's a difficult question, I first have to say. I'm also glad to be here so that we can have more direct talks. It's nice to be in Canada.

    The question of hijab is politically very sensitive. The Turkish establishment is very much identifying itself. It has been doing that distinctly, being secular, with no references to religion in law and constitution. This question of hijab, I believe, many decades ago was not very much apparent, because certain parts of communities, particularly the Sunni majority, which is more traditional in Islamic culture, were not sending daughters to school for traditional reasons, so there was no question of hijab appearance. But in the post-fifties, when a conservative centre-right party came to power, for many terms a success, the Sunnis began to feel interested in having their daughters study as well.

    In this sense, this traditional Islamic dress came into conflict, and ever after the Iranian revolution, this question was increased, in a way, because it was feared that if the Iranian influence came, it would come through political symbols. Thus, the head scarf, or hijab, was understood to be a political expression of Islam rather than the point that I have just mentioned, an individualistic point. But nobody got anywhere. And this has been in the schools particularly. After school, eventually you are going to have to work, to look for a job, so if you study with hijab, and move into the public area where you cannot work with hijab....

    So the hijab in time has always and also been a tool for political popularism, with certain parties promising they would bring freedom and more permission for hijab, and getting more votes, but in time those parties who were supportive of hijab also began to feel less about it. They thought it was a problem, a minor detail, and they didn't want to deal with its full weight. That includes the current government, which is also known, to some degree...Islamic, but they are not also willing to make it a main issue.

    Turkey has never reached a conclusion about this. The hijab, with its Islamic root, is not a very defined shape. Some people say that Islam appears to say there is no shape for hijab, and some say it does. The government, or the establishment, plays on the point that hijab is not necessarily a head scarf; it's like a western-style women's dress as well.

    So this has been a part of politics always. In Turkey, there are no religiously independent schools, so it is also difficult to say, ”If you want religious dress, then go to another school.” That is also another point.

  (1245)  

    In any case, this is a controversy, and there are two views, as you've just mentioned. One view says that you'd better send ladies to school, because if they don't go to school because of hijab, they will be without education altogether, and that is not good. The other view says that if you send them to the school with hijab, this is what it means for the future, so it's kind of....

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bergeron, do you have a question?

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

    As opposed to most of my colleagues here, I did not have the pleasure of meeting you in the course of our mission, since I was part of the group that visited Southeast Asia and South Asia. I appreciated your presentation concerning the Shari'ah very much, wherein you said that everything depends on one's interpretation of the Koranic texts. Unfortunately, we note that very often that interpretation is very stringent, and from the occidental point of view, it gives rise to sanctions and punishments that do not appear to us to be in agreement with the most fundamental tenets of human rights.

    That said, I would like to ask you a question on the issue that always overshadows discussions about relations between Canada and the Muslim world, that issue being the United States. Why do I refer to the United States as an issue that overshadows relations between Canada and the Muslim world? It is because on the one hand it is very difficult as North Americans to establish a foreign policy that would totally ignore the importance of the role the United States plays in our foreign policy. Moreover, both of us know full well that the United States plays a very large role in maintaining a certain number of regimes in the Muslim world.

    We have understood that there is not just one Muslim world, but several Muslim worlds. In our conversations with the people we met, we endeavoured to show that the reverse is also true: there is not just one western world, but several western worlds, and all western countries cannot be considered identical with the United States. However, we must live with this ubiquitous power, the United States, on our doorstep, and take it into account in our policies.

    So from the point of view of Turkey, which straddles both the Muslim culture and the western one, how can a country like Canada define its relation with the Muslim worlds, in light of the ubiquitous American presence in our foreign policy and in the policy of almost all States where there is a majority of Muslims?

[English]

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Thank you very much.

    I understood you to say that there are many Muslim worlds, not one, and then you asked a question. If possible, could I have the translation of it repeated?

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Would it be possible to repeat what you said?

[English]

    Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: It might be easier just for me to ask the question in English.

    What I was asking for is how, from a Turkish point of view, with your roots in both the Muslim world and the western world, you would see the possibility of Canada having a distinct relation with the Muslim “worlds”, if I may say, when we know the importance that the United States plays in our own domestic affairs, in our own foreign affairs, and the role the United States plays within the internal affairs of most of the Muslim countries.

  (1250)  

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Thank you very much for this particular question.

    I actually had one sentence relevant to this in my introduction speech, but I somehow took it out at one stage. Perhaps I should return to it. The United States, it's true, has a dominating influence globally, and as you are so near, it's not a surprise that it has an influence here too. In the Middle East it is even more so, as we all see.

    What role can Canada play? I believe Canada has a unique chance, because the United States, being physically in the region and also having quite a dominating influence...and in the EU, yes, there are Muslim minorities more active in EU. Thus, it's a part of even the internal matters of the Muslim world.

    From the EU, if we talk about the U.K. and France through the century, and the First World War, so many people in the Muslim world believe that all the questions the Muslim world has are related to the First World War arrangements and so on, and the era of colonization.

    So I would come to the point that, yes, there are major powers like the U.S. and perhaps EU, when compared to Canada, and they are more influential in the Muslim world. But their image is somewhat met with suspicion. Canada is more neutral, and it still has a chance to play a positive role, because the Muslim world is not reactionary to the same extent when it comes to Canada; they are even positive, perhaps. So I think if this psychological point is caught by Canada, they could play perhaps not a sharp and immediate role but maybe an ongoing policy role that could have positive results in the middle run, I think.

[Translation]

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Mr. Bergeron, did you want to ask another question? Does anyone else have any questions? It is up to you, we have enough time.

[English]

    Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

    I apologize; I've been called out of the room a couple of times. Like Ms. McDonough, I was unable to make our field trip. I'm sure it was very valuable, so I look forward to being debriefed by my colleagues.

    In your view, what's the most “impactful” thing Canada can do as we go forward to improve relationships with countries of the Muslim world?

    Dr. Osman Tastan: In which particular sense, I'm sorry...?

    Mrs. Karen Redman: We've just talked about Canada's relationship vis-à-vis the United States. What's the most effective thing that we as a nation can do to improve relations and understanding with the Muslim world?

    Dr. Osman Tastan: I believe the best way is through context--for instance, arranging conferences that bring scholars together, or things they can join in, things that are not politically perceived in the Muslim countries but socially positive.

    I can give you an example. The United States in Ankara has an embassy but they have a library, too, and an English teaching centre. The library and the English centre are considered very much by the people like a school that is so politically not perceived.... It is something more naturally understood. But when there is something officially there, then people think it is something else. It is a bit different.

    So I would suggest that, of course, international relations cannot be without embassies, without international trade, without diplomacy. It is not possible. This is the only channel. But apart from that, there could be some plans to do some scholarly work, libraries, arranging conferences, bring scholars of Canada and other Muslim countries together, sometimes in Canada, sometimes in the region.

    As I mentioned in my introduction, I think at least through the educated elite, the Muslim world knows about the west, in places, but as for western authorities, only diplomats and journalists know about the Muslim world--less from academic fields, less people. I wouldn't expect very much that people would be interested in studying in the Muslim world, because institutions are less developed, but some temporary, short-term work and study, such as research projects, could be set up to join us together, I think.

  (1255)  

    Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you.

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Ms. McDonough, on my list I have Madam Lalonde as next.

[Translation]

    Ms. Francine Lalonde: She did not come, so I will let her ask her questions.

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Fine. Proceed.

[English]

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Madam Chair.

    I have just a very brief question. I don't know whether this was raised by the delegation with you or others in Turkey. I realize it's a sensitive question. This foreign affairs committee, a multi-party committee of the whole Parliament, adopted a motion many months ago to urge our own government to officially acknowledge the Armenian genocide. Our government has been unprepared to do that, has been reluctant to do that, has not been willing to acknowledge that a genocide took place, and that in order to put that behind the world and allow people to heal and move on, it's an important symbolic thing to do.

    One of the speculations as to why the Canadian government has not been prepared to do that is the suggestion that this might interfere with its contemporary relationship, its relationship today and tomorrow, with the current Turkish government.

    I think for those of us who see this as an important thing to happen, we convince ourselves that what happened in the distant past was not an action or series of actions involving today's Turkish government, but something that's important to put behind us. I wonder if I could ask you to comment on whether you feel it would indeed introduce a source of tension or a negative factor in the relationship between Canada and Turkey were we to do this. And second, are you able to enlighten the committee at all on the current position of the Turkish government on the acknowledgement of these atrocities of the past?

    Dr. Osman Tastan: I think this is a very sensitive matter, and it's very difficult to actually speak about. If you're asking me whether it would cause tensions, and whether the Turkish government is anywhere near the point of, as you said, an “acknowledgement”, that is very far, and it definitely would cause very big tensions between Turkey and any country that touched this matter.

    So far, this question was put, I believe two years ago, to our president at the United Nations, and he said this was a question to be put into the care of history scholars for analysis. Actually, this question has not been studied enough, in my view, to....

    All I can say is that this is very politically sensitive, and nothing further. There is an Ottoman archives office in Istanbul--I think everybody knows enough about it--and that could be one source of information for anyone who wants to study this.

    This question, I believe, is also personally very complicated. As you go into the matter, there is an Armenian community in Turkey that does not feel happy about this matter being discussed. And in the Republic of Armenia, I am not sure, but I don't think they would feel easy about it either. For practical reasons, they want to develop better contacts--they don't have them now--with Turkey for trade and other recognitions of each other.

    As we all know, the Armenian diaspora, outside Turkey and the Republic of Armenia, are interested in this question, but in Turkey this is a very sensitive question.

    That's what I can say about it.

·  (1300)  

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

    Thank you, Dr. Tastan. Certainly you've been very accurate in your response, from my perspective, because it is also a highly charged political issue in Canada, there being diasporas here, too. Frequently politicians get involved from the political dimension, and you've been very good, putting up with all of our questions and certainly adding a lot more insights, from my perspective, to what we heard.

    Dr. Osman Tastan: Thank you.

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): As I mentioned at the outset, it's just a great opportunity to have you here, as we all came back very much impacted by what we heard. The opportunity to sit quietly with you and ask further questions has very much added value to our journey, and I thank you very much for your time.

    Dr. Osman Tastan: I also thank you all very much for this very good opportunity you provided when you invited me here. We had a very good exchange of views, I believe, and I benefited a lot as well from your questions and comments.

    So thank you very much. I hope we'll meet again.

    The Acting Chair (Ms. Aileen Carroll): I do too, Professor.

    I thank Madam Lalonde very much for taking the initiative in this regard.

    We're adjourned.