SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, April 10, 2002

¹

1535

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Manley

¹

1540

¹

1545

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

¹

1550

Mr. John Manley

¹

1555

The Chair

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur (Berthier--Montcalm, BQ)

º

1600

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

The Chair

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP)

º

1605

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

º

1610

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou--Antigonish--Guysborough, PC)

º

1615

Mr. Pratt

Mr. MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. John Manley

º

1620

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Peter MacKay

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

º

1625

Mr. John Manley

º

1630

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. John Manley

º

1635

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.)

º

1640

Mr. John Manley

º

1645

The Chair

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

º

1650

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Bellehumeur

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

º

1655

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. Peter MacKay

»

1700

Mr. John Manley

Mr. Peter MacKay

Mr. John Manley

»

1705

Mr. MacKay

Mr. John Manley

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. John Manley

»

1710

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. John Manley

»

1715

Mr. Richard Fadden (Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office)

The Chair

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CANADA

Sub-Committee on National Security of the Standing Committee of Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 003

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, April 10, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough--Rouge River, Lib.)): Colleagues, we're meeting today with the Honourable John Manley, who is Deputy Prime Minister. We've invited him, given his responsibilities for the special cabinet committee on security and intelligence. I believe the minister has an opening statement.

    Welcome, Deputy Prime Minister. We look forward to your statement. We will be addressing issues that are perhaps new to you and to the committee, at least in terms of the public record. We'll see how far we can get at today's meeting.

    Thank you for joining us.

    Hon. John Manley (Deputy Prime Minister, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to begin by thanking you and the members of the committee for the invitation to appear before you. I would like to introduce Dick Fadden, who is the deputy clerk, counsel and security intelligence coordinator for the Privy Council Office.

[Translation]

    I am here essentially in my role as Chair of the ad hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism. As such, I have been charged with coordinating overall elements of the government's response to the events of September 11th, but by no means all. Direct responsibility for agencies involved in the campaign against terrorism continues to rest with my Cabinet colleagues, and I would defer to them on questions regarding specific activities within their respective domains.

    Today, I would like to begin with brief comments about national security. I will then provide you with a progress report on the actions taken by the Government, including an update on the Smart Border Declaration with the United States, which goes to the heart of our public security and economic security interests.

[English]

    First let me say that I believe in practical definitions of national security—those that focus on protecting Canadians and safeguarding vital national interests. Canada's response to the brutal attacks of September 11 was immediate, coordinated, and reflected clearly the principles of our national security interests. It also reflected the values of the Canadian people, what we stand for as a nation, what we believe in, the type of society and world we wish to live in, and what we're willing to do in order to defend those things.

    On some of the immediate steps taken in the interest of national security, about 250 flights with 33,000 passengers were diverted from U.S. destinations to Canadian airports safely, compassionately, and essentially without incident. That in itself was probably the most vivid demonstration of the enactment of Canadian values we could have imagined. Ordinary citizens, principally in Atlantic Canada, but some also in the west and the north, acted spontaneously and with compassion. They took people into their homes, schools, and churches. They fed them, gave them shelter, and gave them tours of their villages for about four days, completely unexpectedly.

    Also, officials from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the RCMP went on a heightened state of alert at all border points. Security and law enforcement agencies went into a full-court press to investigate terrorism, in cooperation with their American counterparts. Ships were put to sea, aircraft were put on alert, and the military was placed on standby.

    Moving forward from these responses, the Prime Minister created an ad hoc committee on public security and anti-terrorism, which he asked me to chair, as a committee of ministers. The PSAT committee, as we called it, was tasked with ensuring a rapid and coordinated response to the new threat environment, which had become part of our reality as a result of September 11.

    The Canadian government's first objective, which I think is the same as that of any government, is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. This entails actions taken on a domestic level; undertakings within our particular North American context; and international cooperation through the UN, NATO, and numerous other bodies, and it includes humanitarian assistance.

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[Translation]

    We have kept the focus on five key objectives: keeping terrorists out of Canada; detecting, preventing, deterring, prosecuting and removing terrorists; facilitating secure and efficient management of the Canada-U.S. border; participating in international initiatives, including counter-terrorism; and protecting Canada's infrastructure, emergency preparedness and consequence management.

[English]

    Some of the most significant results of this work include the introduction in October of a package of short-term initiatives, namely about $250 million for in-year equipment purchases and a further $30 million for ongoing incremental staff for border-related duties.

    Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, was introduced and passed. Shortly afterwards, Bill C-42, the Public Safety Act, was tabled. Budget 2001 in December included $7.7 billion for enhanced security, for emergency preparedness, and improving the border infrastructure. A Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration with a 30-point action plan was signed, also in December.

    I'd like to go into some of these in greater detail and give you some update on where we go from here in practical terms regarding legislation, budget 2001, and the smart border action plan. The Anti-terrorism Act is an unprecedented piece of legislation and brings Canada into full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. It provides a comprehensive criminal justice response to the terrorist challenge we now recognize we are facing. The government continues to develop procedures for listing terrorist organizations. We're determined to ensure that due process is respected in these regulations.

    Officials of the Department of Justice and the Solicitor General are working with their provincial counterparts to develop a reporting mechanism for the two extraordinary powers in Bill C-36 that require it, namely the investigatory hearing process and preventative arrest.

    With respect to the comprehensive review of the provisions and operations of the act, it's up to both the House and Senate to determine the form and substance of such a review. Whether further legislation will be required in future will remain under active review.

    Budget 2001 provided $7.7 billion over the next five years to enhance security for Canadians. This includes $6.5 billion for security, including air security and Canada's military. It also includes more than $1.2 billion for border initiatives aimed at strengthening border security, facilitating the flow of goods and people, and improving border infrastructure.

[Translation]

    These funds are allocated to three areas: intelligence and policing; a new approach to air security; and a secure, open and efficient border.

    Over the next five years, $1.6 billion will go to intelligence and policing to help deter and apprehend terrorists, including $567 million to the RCMP, $334 million to CSIS (a 32%  increase for its budget), and $76 million to improve interagency coordination. Over the next five years, $1 billion will fund improved screening of visitors, immigrants and refugee claimants. The intelligence and policing area also provides more than $1.6 billion for emergency preparedness and military deployment.

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[English]

    On December 12, 2001, Governor Tom Ridge and I signed the Smart Border Declaration. Governor Ridge is the new director of the Office of Homeland Security, appointed by President Bush last fall. The plan we signed outlines a 30-point action plan arranged in four pillars: secure flow of people, secure flow of goods, secure infrastructure, coordination and information sharing.

    The governor and I agreed to review regularly the progress in implementing this plan and to encourage officials in both capitals to advance individual files as quickly as possible. We most recently met on March 8.

    Our actions are supported by numerous bilateral contacts between ministers and senior officials and their U.S. counterparts. These are a part of very active, ongoing bilateral challenges necessary to build on cooperation.

    The guiding principle of the Smart Border Declaration is that public and economic security are mutually reinforcing. Our security is enhanced when we adopt a risk management approach that expedites the flow of low-risk goods and people, allowing us to concentrate our resources on higher-risk flows.

    There's been a lot of progress already in implementing the action plan. For example, the Vancouver In-Transit Pre-Clearance Facility was re-opened on February 14. Canada and the U.S. have joint teams of customs officials in the ports of Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax, Seattle, Tacoma, and Newark to target marine containers destined for either country.

    The NEXUS pre-clearance program for low-risk travellers will be expanded across the entire land border and it will be opening at three B.C. crossings by this summer. A new permanent resident card will be issued starting in June, which will be biometric-identifier ready.

    In addition to these announcements, we are making good progress on all of the other action items in the 30-point plan. Our objective is to have concrete deliverables for each item by June of this year.

    What I've done, Mr. Chairman, is to briefly review the variety of actions taken by the government to address public safety concerns that arose as a result of September 11 and to ensure a secure future for North American cooperation as we meet our broader international responsibilities.

    I'll endeavour to answer your questions. Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

    We'll now begin with questioning. We'll go to the official opposition, Mr. Sorenson, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Deputy Prime Minister, for coming to this committee today. Certainly we count it as a privilege that you're here.

    Shortly after the terrible attack on the United States, and on all of us, on September 11, you were appointed the chair of the special cabinet committee on security. I have a couple of quick questions that I think many of us are wondering about.

    Can you tell us who the other members of that committee are? Can you tell us the responsibilities of that committee immediately following the attack on America? Also, how have those functions or responsibilities changed in the last short period of time?

    Also I see that Mr. Fadden, the deputy clerk and coordinator for security and intelligence at the Privy Council, is with us today. One of the quotes that he gave shortly after the attack is that it was time to think about a formalized capacity to collect foreign intelligence. In the wake of September 11, many intelligence experts have said that any Canadian offensive against terrorism would require new money and a reform of the country's security and intelligence capabilities.

    There are some differences of opinion with regard to the way we go about gathering some of this intelligence and how our capacities are developed. But many experts believe that CSIS is limited by law from taking an offensive stand with overseas espionage and must rely constantly on the help of other countries, the friendly help of other spy or intelligence-gathering agencies. They therefore recommend that the government establish a formal office of national security headed by a single cabinet minister to coordinate all the intelligence services and sources, and to analyse the information that would be collected. It's believed that a national security minister could better focus the disparate information gathered by the Departments of Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and possibly CSIS in that mix as well.

    To the Deputy Prime Minister, in mid-October of last year, you reportedly said that rather than expand the foreign intelligence capabilities of CSIS, you would prefer that perhaps a separate agency be established for foreign operations within your department, which at that time was Foreign Affairs, much like the CIA did and what the United States does. Suffice it to say that part of the mandate of this subcommittee is to determine exactly that--to make recommendations on ways we can best assure Canadians that our security is indeed the guiding principle of this government.

    So my question is, should a separate foreign intelligence agency be established? Also, if you stand by the statements you made in October 2001, do you think an agency within your department, or within the Department of Foreign Affairs, should be established, and why?

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    Mr. John Manley: I'll see if I can remember all those questions as I work my way through it.

    The members of the committee are the Ministers of Finance, National Defence, Transport, Foreign Affairs, the Solicitor General, Justice, PCO and Intergovernmental Affairs, National Revenue, Citizenship and Immigration, and Health.

    “Who's not on it?” Is that what you said?

    We don't meet on a regular basis; we meet on a frequent basis as required. The mandate continues to be to address the immediate challenges the government faces in the area of public security. The committee, as you know from its title, is an ad hoc committee. It will continue to meet as long as it is necessary.

    We did seek to provide very rapid advice to the Prime Minister, and to cabinet, which we did prior to the budget in December, but we continue to meet, dealing with ongoing issues. Quite frankly, I'll be asking ministers who received funding in the budget, and in the early funding I mentioned in the course of my remarks--the $250 million--to come back and talk to us about how they are actually using the funds that were allocated. That process, although it is a little unusual for an ad hoc cabinet committee, is one I intend to pursue.

    On the issue of foreign intelligence, I certainly pointed to the fact that foreign intelligence was one of the things we needed to have; that we needed the capability of delivering it. I never actually drew a conclusion as to where it should be, although there are those who have an opinion on it. I think the Prime Minister will be interested in members' views on that, both of this committee and I think of our caucus, where there are members also asking the same question who might be forming views on it.

    Quite frankly, I think the key thing in this environment is to build on our cooperation with other like-minded countries. As you will know, we have a very strong level of cooperation with many of our allies. I don't think, in looking at issues related to terrorist threats, we are well served by expending the resources to duplicate what others are doing. But I do think we need to have our own sources to be able to contribute to the exchange of information among allied countries.

    There is no legal geographic restriction on CSIS activities, so the question really becomes how we should structure a foreign intelligence-collecting resource. That really is simply a matter of machinery of government. What is clear is that in collecting foreign intelligence, both our foreign policy concerns and our defence policy concerns, as well as our police and other security concerns, must all be taken into account in order to make the proper decisions. I see it as more of a requirement of horizontal management than necessarily something that ought to exist on a stand-alone basis in one department or agency.

    I have not drawn, personally, a final conclusion on what it would be best to look like, or where it should be, or whether that capability needs resources incremental to what has already been provided in the 2001 budget.

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    The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur, for seven minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur (Berthier--Montcalm, BQ): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Minister, since the events of September 11, Ottawa has been very quick to take spectacular measures, that is, to pass James-Bond-style legislation giving more powers to the police and ministers, authorizing electronic eavesdropping, and more. But seven months after the events—it will be seven months to the day tomorrow—Canadians are finally waking up to the fact that their passports cost much more than before, and that there are excessively long delays, that there are armed policemen patrolling departure areas in Canadian airports. Furthermore, Canadians—and this is a fact—have noticed that there also is a problem at customs. On January 31, 2002, a series of contracts for Quebec customs officials were not renewed. I've even heard that these contracts are being given to students or to others. Of course, the students won't have the same equipment or authority as customs officials.

    You throw around figures on the order of a billion dollars and tell us about all kinds of things that are being done, but in fact not much has changed since September 11. A special Cabinet Committee on Security was created... I even wonder, in light of the events of September 11, why such a committee was not established earlier. We have the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I imagine they knew something was brewing. Perhaps they did not know exactly what was to happen in the United States, or when it would actually happen, but the Canadian Security Intelligence Service should have had some inkling that people in Canada or people crossing the border intended to commit terrorist acts.

    I have to say in all honesty that it appears you are coping well. You are an image-conscious government, that is, you're good at putting on a show. But as for security per se, I really don't feel much safer with whatever it is you have done. What exactly is being done? For instance, Mr. Minister, is it true that a group of customs officials did not have their contracts renewed on January 31, 2002? Isn't it true that customs officials received a directive indicating that they should let person flagged for surveillance, armed and dangerous people, into Canada, indicating that these people would be caught once they were inside Canada? The directive was dated March 26, 2001. According to our research, it is still in force. Wouldn't you say that's a problem? That's not very comforting, Mr. Minister.

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    Mr. John Manley: Mr. Bellehumeur, what happened on September 11 last was not an event anyone could have easily predicted. We all knew that there were risks, that national and international discussions were being held on risks that are difficult to assess, but until September 11, I don't believe anyone could have predicted what happened.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: But you didn't do anything.

    Mr. John Manley: We certainly took measures to ensure that security was tightened. Today, most Canadians—I don't know—may feel that it was an exceptional event, a rare case that will not be repeated. Some people may also feel that the measures we took were not necessary, but it is a government's responsibility to protect its citizens and to ensure their safety.

    I am not the Minister of Revenue. So, I don't know whether those people resigned or not. I am not familiar with the situation, and I do not want to enter into that debate.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: No, no, they were fired; the officials did not resign.

    Mr. John Manley: I'm not familiar with the facts. This is not my area of responsibility, but what I can say is that we have tried to develop a series of measures to increase security after september 11, including the very important issue of economic security. Given the fact that 87% of our exports go to the States, Canada's economic security depends on an open border. Therefore, we had to make sure that the security measures we implemented at the border also satisfied our American neighbours. For now, let me assure you that the Americans, according to Mr. Ridge, are very satisfied with what we have done.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You are the Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Security, and you're telling me that you don't even know what is happening with customs officials. You boast that you spent $30 million to create new permanent customs positions, when it was revealed that on January 31, 2002, the federal government fired customs officials. They did not resign. You don't even know this. You don't even know what's going on.

    Mr. John Manley: I chair the Committee on Economic Policy and I don't know everything that's going on in the Departments of Industry and Finance. I chair the Committee on the Social Union, but I am not the Minister of... [Editor's Note: Inaudible] ...with regard to policy. You have to understand what the responsibility of the minister is.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: But, Mr. Minister, you are the Chairman of the special Cabinet Committee on Security. I think you must be made aware of such things when customs have been said to be... And as we speak, there are still serious problems in terms of who is getting in. Amongst other things, you no doubt know that—well, perhaps you don't—that a Senate study has revealed drugs are still catering the country with ease.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur, I have to interrupt. I'm sorry. Your time is up. If you could quickly put your question, we could move on.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Mr. Chairman, I tried to ask a fairly specific question in order to elicit a fairly specific answer, because it is easy for a minister to evade questions and make speeches, as the minister did earlier. If we want to make any headway, members will have to ask specific questions, as I did, and the minister will have to provide specific answers.

[English]

    The Chair: I understand, but unfortunately we each only have seven minutes in which to put those questions. If there is no further response from Mr. Manley, we can go to the next questioner. If there is a response that you feel--

    Mr. John Manley: I don't think there is a further question.

    The Chair: Okay, thank you.

    Mr. Blaikie, are you ready to proceed?

    Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg--Transcona, NDP): Yes. I have just a couple of things for the minister.

    You referred to the fact that we will be reviewing Bill C-36 and that the nature of that review will be up to the Standing Committee on Justice. I appreciate that, but you also made some allusion to oversight of the implementation of Bill C-36 just before you talked about that. I'd like to know more about the relationship between your committee and oversight of Bill C-36. Perhaps you could just clarify that briefly. Then I have a couple of other things.

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    Mr. John Manley: I think you're referring to the specific provisions, which are rather unusual.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: The two things, yes.

    Mr. John Manley: The oversight is judicial. In other words, it's not committee oversight; it's judicial oversight with respect to those two measures that were particularly sensitive in Bill C-36.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: What is the relationship?

    Mr. John Manley: Ergo, there's no relationship. Our role would be to review whether legislative change is required as a result of experience with the legislation, and that would be part and parcel of the parliamentary review.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: Would you be engaged in your own review or ongoing monitoring of it? Is anybody reporting to you that we have preventatively arrested somebody a week ago, or something like that? Is that something that comes to your attention? I don't want to put you in the spot of the Minister of National Defence, where you have to know everything as it happens, but is there such a mechanism?

    Mr. John Manley: No. In fact, I'll tell you that I've asked the question and I have been informed that it hasn't been used.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: With respect to the permanent resident card, I wonder if you could elaborate on that. Who is going to have to have this biometric permanent resident card? Is this something for everybody, or is this just something for people who are using the borders frequently?

    Mr. John Manley: No, no. There are two things here that you might be confusing in your mind. The permanent resident card is the identification card issued to persons who have been granted permanent resident status in Canada. In other words, they are not citizens; they are immigrants. There has in the past been essentially a piece of paper that they were given. It was easily imitated or forged. The former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the creation of a more sophisticated identity card that would be given to permanent residents. Obviously, once you become a citizen, then you're entitled to a Canadian passport or citizenship card, which is a different document for identification purposes. It is a more secure document.

    For frequent travellers, what you are thinking of is the extension of the system we call NEXUS. It was in existence on a trial basis as something that Revenue Canada operated at the Sarnia-Port Huron border crossing, prior to September 11. It was then suspended. As part of our operation with Ridge, it's been re-opened at Sarnia and it will this summer be continued as a further pilot in British Columbia.

    The object here is that people who frequently cross the border, people who live in Canada and work in the United States, for example, and people who have frequent business interests and cross more often will be able to apply for a card. Their identity and so on will be confirmed. They'll be interviewed. They'll be given a card, which will have a biometric identification capability on it, and they will then be able to cross essentially without stopping.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: The confusion wasn't so much in my mind with respect to the card. I have had constituents and others who hear that phrase, “permanent resident card”, and think that's a precursor of an ID card for everybody. I think it's important to clear that up.

    I was wondering if you could tell us whether or not your committee has any role with respect to security for the G-8 meetings in Kananaskis. As you know, there was controversy in the past about political interference in the security arrangements for APEC, and I won't go into that because this is not the time or the place, but you're aware of the controversy. Now you have a committee that is set up for the specific purpose of concerning itself with security. I wonder whether or not the security arrangements for Kananaskis and the G-8 come under the ambit, if you like, of your committee. And what kind of oversight or relationship does your committee have to that event, or does it have one?

º  (1610)  

    Mr. John Manley: No, we have no role with respect to that. Cabinet, as a whole, of course, will have to approve the expenditure of funds necessary to provide security, but the security arrangements themselves are in the hands of the RCMP.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: How do you make a distinction between that particular event and the obvious nature of your committee, which is to give political direction to the security policy of the country, which is implemented by its various security forces--RCMP, CSIS, etc.--or is this event carved out of the overall security policy in some way I don't understand?

    Mr. John Manley: Surely one of the lessons of APEC is that security issues are not determined at the political level. They are determined by the people who have the competence to make the decisions.

    We know the mission. The mission is that the meeting be held safely, that participants are safe and return home and there is no problem of that nature, but it is for the RCMP to decide how to deliver that. As I said, cabinet has to approve the expenditure of funds, because it will be beyond the normal resources of the RCMP or National Defence or others who would be implicated--which could include local police forces. The city of Calgary, of course, has asked for support. Those funds have to be allocated by cabinet, but the decisions about how you go about securing the site are things the police will decide.

    The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

    Mr. MacKay.

    Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou--Antigonish--Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for being here as well as Mr. Fadden.

    I also want to begin by saying that we appreciate your mentioning the extraordinary efforts that were taken on behalf of Canadians, Atlantic Canadians in particular, to accommodate passengers in the aftermath of September 11. I think it was an extraordinary thing, and we can't mention it enough. It was very indicative of the kindheartedness of Canadians who rose to the occasion.

    I want to touch on something you mentioned early in your remarks about practical definitions of security measures. One of the things that came to me out of your remarks was the idea of information sharing. It's been a difficulty in the past between various levels of our security forces, whether they be military, RCMP, or CSIS. A recent example of that involved an associate of Mr. Gagliano's, Gaetano Amodeo, who was in this country and was wanted for murder in Italy and Germany. RCMP, Immigration, and CSIS were apparently not sharing the necessary information that would have resulted in his early apprehension. There are concrete, practical examples of where information sharing has been a hindrance, when it should have enabled us to react quicker.

    I'd like to hear more from you, if possible, about what specific steps have been taken to address the shortcomings. One of these, I would suggest to you, that has been borne out stemmed from cuts your government has made in the past to security spending. You gave us a rundown of the budget over the next five years of over $7.7 billion, yet the reality is there were significant cuts made to our security forces, whether they be RCMP or CSIS. You may disagree with that. It's borne out in past budgets.

    There have also been, I would suggest--it leads to another question--significant cuts to things such as the Coast Guard. When you speak of the need to protect our borders and the smart border program, I would strongly suggest that our most vulnerable point of entry is our seaports. I know this has been a focal point for you, and for cabinet, I suspect, and yet the concrete examples we've seen of your government's record are that the ports police were disbanded; Coast Guard has undergone significant cuts; we're still waiting for the helicopter procurement project that would enable us at least to have a flyover--and that leads into another problem, of overfishing, which is for another committee--and yet on the security side of it, there is a lot to answer to, I would suggest, about what your government has done recently compared with the lead-up to September 11.

    The Coast Guard is in shambles. We don't have any ports police any more. The Americans are in fact moving toward what closely resembles what we used to have, a specific police force aimed at port security.

    I would ask if you would address some of those specific issues, and particularly in the light of--this may be perceived as a political shot--in terms of priorities, not replacing helicopters, when the Chief of the Defence Staff, as has been widely reported, came out with a report very recently that said the Challenger jets are fine.

    In fact, I am quoting from his report:

Given that there are no identifiable trends or problems with this fleet and given the high dispatch reliability of the Challenger, it is recommended that remedial action such as fleet modernization or replacement is not warranted at this time.

    This is from a report of General Henault of January 8. It talks about the fact that they're in excellent condition to fly the government VIPs, which includes you.

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    Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I fail to see what this has to do with Minister Manley's responsibilities.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: With the greatest respect, Mr. Chair--

    The Chair: There's been a point of order raised.

    I think the matter Mr. Manley is here on is security issues.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Helicopters wouldn't relate to that, or security, whatsoever? Security spending would not be related to a government priorities decision?

    The Chair: I don't want to get into debate.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: No, you had your say.

    The Chair: The issue of passenger jets for transport of military and government officials may or may not be related. But Mr. Manley, I'm sure, can handle anything that's—

    Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm sure he can.

    The Chair: —relevant or irrelevant.

    So carry on; we've used about half of your seven minutes.

    Mr. John Manley: I'm just concerned there won't be time to answer all these questions.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Take your time. We've got all afternoon.

    The Chair: Mr. MacKay, you have about three minutes left.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: We've got all afternoon. Please!

    Mr. John Manley: Well, where to start?

    I don't know whether budgetary restraint in the past created difficulties in information sharing within our agencies. You can state that as a hypothesis, but there's no real evidence of it.

    What I'd suggest to you is that in my discussions with Governor Ridge he has acknowledged that the U.S. has a similar problem. Now, I don't know; maybe they cut their budgets too. The truth is that in many of these areas--and it's not just true of Canada and the United States, it's true of other countries as well--the various operations have operated in different kinds of silos. You don't need a better example of that in the United States, I suppose, than the fact that the INS issued the student visa to Mohammed Attah a couple of weeks ago.

    Things happen if you can't find convenient ways to get the pieces of information exchanged between the appropriate agencies in a timely fashion and actually identify. I think we've learned a lot about that because of September 11.

    In looking at what measures were going to be necessary--and this is where the committee had an important role to play--we heard from each of the departments on the kinds of things they needed to do. That's how we had a role to play with the December budget.

    We particularly allocated resources to ensure that information sharing and coordination was enhanced, and built into the cabinet decision is a requirement that departments demonstrate they are in fact doing that. So I think we are in the process of addressing some of those particular concerns.

    But the truth is, while we live in an information age, there's a lot of information out there. The challenge is to devise the tools that get it into the right hands at the right time in order to enhance security.

    That doesn't go into the whole question of what equipment we need surveilling on the border. On ports, we've particularly set aside money in the budget for maritime requirements. I'm not the minister responsible--I have an oversight and coordination function as chairman of the committee--but it's not clear to me at this time that the answer to the particular problem of security in the ports is a renewal of ports police. Clearly there's a police issue. The Senate report recently points that out. It also points out that our ports are probably not as bad in that respect as U.S. ports. So there are issues there, and there's no point in denying them, but we need to make sure we allocate the resources we've got so that we address them in the most effective manner.

    Currently, I think that's an issue on which not only do we need policy advice, but the RCM Police need to be involved directly in dealing with order at the ports.

º  (1620)  

    Mr. Peter MacKay: [Editor's Note: Inaudible] ...my point is that it's priority spending. Others may take issue with it, but I think Canadians have to ask themselves, do you need Challengers more than you need air surveillance on our coast? Do you need Challengers—

    The Chair: Is that a question then?

    Mr. Peter MacKay: It is a question.

    Mr. John Manley: It's not exactly a choice between the two.

    Do we need Challengers? Well, you've been on a Challenger... Never? You've never travelled with the minister? I'll try to take you somewhere.

    It's not a luxurious way to travel, but it does in fact enable us to do a lot of things that would otherwise be impossible to do. With a lot of respect, they have not been problem-free. I mentioned in the House yesterday the fact that the Prime Minister had to have an emergency landing in Stockholm when the cabin depressurized. Now, theoretically, according to the doctors, he ought to have stayed on the ground in Stockholm for 48 hours before he flew again. He took a chance and got on a plane and went on, only to be met by ambulances at the other end. There were no ill effects.

    I was trying to do visits to Islamabad, Delhi, and Afghanistan in January, only to have the plane, I think for the third time, fail me. And we had to find the last-minute arrangements that enabled me to complete my program, but without a night's sleep. We can't fly on the existing planes to Europe non-stop. This imposes a time burden.

    Now you might say maybe the Canadian government doesn't need to be represented by ministers at a lot of these meetings and things, which certainly as foreign minister I'm still overcoming the jet lag from. But I don't think that's true for a G-8 country. I also think we should be flying in planes we're proud of. They're made in Canada.

     Was it a valid expenditure?

    First of all, it was not a choice between putting more money on the border or replacing the Challengers now. That was not the choice.

    It's not always a choice.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: It's always a choice. You have to choose your priorities.

    The Chair: Order.

    Mr. John Manley: It's not always a choice when you're dealing with the available resources and spending them in ways that are appropriate. We have put a lot of money aside for appropriate spending on the issues we've identified in the committee. At this point, however, as I've just told you, we haven't allocated all those resources because in fact it's not immediately clear what each and every dollar of those resources ought to be spent on in order to do the most effective job for Canadians.

    The Chair: Mr. Pratt, for seven minutes, and then we'll begin with alternating five-minute rounds.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I, too, would like to thank you, Minister, for being here today with Mr. Fadden to answer our questions. I would like to take this opportunity as well to thank you for the work you've done in this area.

    If we think back to the period immediately following September 11, some of the comments you made were very reassuring to Canadians. We have made a substantial amount of progress in our relationship with the United States. Certainly the relationship you've struck up with Governor Ridge has gone a long way towards improving our border relationship with the U.S., and that has been absolutely critical in terms of our economic prospects.

    I would like to follow up on some of the questions Mr. Sorenson began with about the possibility of establishing a foreign intelligence agency for Canada. I'm sure this will come as no surprise to you. I noted in your comment about the need for our own sources of information in terms of foreign intelligence. Do you see a foreign intelligence agency for Canada as an issue of sovereignty? I mean this in the sense that the foreign intelligence we rely on is provided to us by our allies, the British, the Americans, the Australians, and New Zealanders—with whom we've had great relationships on this issue—but the information they provide, while it may be in our best interest, is in their best interests as well. Some people believe that making key foreign policy decisions using other people's information potentially present a problem.

    A second aspect of this issue I'd like to ask you about pertains to the fact that the idea of the Government of Canada creating an agency such as this has been around for a long time. If you go back to the Macdonald Commission in 1981, which I think was responsible for the eventual establishment of CSIS, you will note that Mr. Macdonald said something to the effect that sooner or later in this country we're going to have to have a debate on a foreign intelligence agency.

    Obviously this is not something our constituents are writing us a lot of letters on. It's not something you'll see people demonstrating on the Hill about, the need for a foreign intelligence agency. But it's one issue that people who are concerned about government, security, and intelligence issues certainly have to address at some point.

    Finally, on the issue of restructuring, to which Mr. Sorenson alluded, we haven't really had a significant reassessment or restructuring of our security apparatus since the Second World War. Instead, we've largely relied on institutionalized ad hockery—not that this has failed us to any substantial degree. Obviously there was a huge intelligence failure on September 11 and the Americans are trying to deal with that. By and large, though, we've been able to meet our needs.

    But is it time we started to rethink how we do intelligence in this country, how it's organized, which departments are responsible for what agencies? For instance, the fact that we have our signals intelligence under the Department of National Defence and our security intelligence under the Solicitor General's department raises some issues with respect to how the information is generated, how it's processed, and how it's distributed to other arms of government.

    Those are my questions, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

º  (1625)  

    Mr. John Manley: Thank you. I acknowledge the interest you've shown on this issue and the work you've done on it over a long period of time.

    I think there is a sovereignty issue here, but I'm not sure it's a critical one at this point. To a very great extent, the kinds of information we're dealing with—particularly in the context of public security and anti-terrorism—is information we can reliably share with our allies.

    The concern is that we need to be generating a quid pro quo for what we receive from our allies. At some point, if we fail to do that, the information we're going to glean from them will perhaps decrease in its importance and significance.

    I'm not aware, at this point, that there are any complaints of that nature from our allies. On the contrary, we've had extremely good cooperation, and the aftermath of September 11 provided the opportunity for a very strong cooperation between Canada and the United States as we helped step in on it.

    I think there are things we can probably already do better with existing structures. It may be a matter in part of how we direct our embassies and consulates abroad, the kind of information we ask them to gather and to report on. I don't think this is all cloak-and-dagger stuff, where people are dropping John Le Carré-type operations off in the forests outside Vienna. There's a lot of information available. Our challenge is not so much getting the information as it is recognizing information that is of significance and relevance, and then making sure it's properly channelled so it becomes not just information but real intelligence.

    I think we also ought to be thinking about whether there are some particular Canadian niches we could pursue, again as part of our role in contributing to a more secure environment with our allies.

    Finally, I wouldn't disagree with you that at any point it's worth rethinking how we do these things. I quite acknowledge your point that it's now almost 20 years since CSIS was created; that there are other operations we do, including through CSE, which was referred to in Bill C-36; and there are other things we obviously could be doing through our embassies and posts abroad. We could be talking to visitors; we could talk to business people who have experience in other countries. They learn things we don't necessarily need to hire people to hide behind parked cars to find out.

    So I think there are a lot of things we can do productively with existing resources before we decide there is, for one thing, a need, but also an appropriate application of additional resources, that we should pursue.

º  (1630)  

    The Chair: That's it. Thank you. Now we'll go to five-minute rounds.

    Mr. Sorenson for five minutes, and then Ms. Jennings.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thanks again, Mr. Chairman.

    I think some good news here that you've brought forward—that brought your head up in a hurry—is in regard to Bill C-36. As I understood it, you said as far as you were aware there have been no preventative arrests over the last six months, despite, as we all recall, the onslaught of witnesses who said it would be misused by the police and would be a huge infringement on our rights.

    I want to go to another federal study that has concluded that Canada needs these overseas anti-crime units. The idea of these would be that they would work with foreign police and would have a mandate to help prevent criminal figures from coming to Canada, or they would prevent their activities, or even the commodities they had, from reaching Canada. Part of what was reported was that the moneys that would be spent on the initiative to send those units over to work with foreign police would almost be self-sufficient, in that the money saved would pay their way, so to speak; that there are legal bills, and medical, social, or administrative costs that could be saved by preventing certain individuals or commodities or activities from reaching this country. I guess I would question that.

    Also—realizing that these are only three-minute rounds—while we were on a break last week the National Post reported that the RCMP were placing law enforcement officers in five more Canadian missions abroad to aid in the fight on global organized crime and terrorism. I'm wondering if you could give us an update—not necessarily the specifics, but whether or not any success has been gauged yet. Was there a drastic need you were aware of that sent these over, or was this preventative in nature?

    Mr. John Manley: I think the first part of your question, if I have identified it correctly, deals with what we call immigration control units. The idea here, Mr. Sorenson...and this is why I think there are some who speculate that they'll pay for themselves. As you know, because of the legal requirements that exist in court decisions, it can take us quite a while to process a refugee claim in Canada.

    I think the government as a whole believes that Canada has a responsibility to take a certain share of real refugees who are seeking asylum. And the numbers of those, of course, on the planet are increasing, not decreasing, and it becomes a serious problem.

    However, that being the case, we also get a lot of people who are really economic refugees, and they show up at our borders usually by aircraft and they claim asylum. As you know, it takes us rather a long time before we're able to determine through all of the processes whether these people are legitimate refugees or not.

    So by using immigration control units abroad, it gives us the opportunity to determine before people board an aircraft, for example, whether they have proper, verifiable identity information, whether they are known to us as people who are likely to be false claimants. Very frequently we have people emerge from aircraft who don't have identify documents. So we're trying to reduce some of that, and that, in itself, will reduce costs of the rest of the refugee determination system.

    Another key part of that strategy, of course, is in the 30-point plan with Governor Ridge, which includes seeking with the United States a “safe third” agreement that would enable us to return asylum seekers who come into Canada from the United States, back to the United States. That would amount to more than 40% of our current refugee claims, I'm told by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. So those are both measures that we think would relieve some cost pressures on the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

    On the RCMP abroad, first of all, I'm giving you the policy direction. I don't know any of the details about how many they've sent or where, or any of that kind of thing. That would be a question to put to the Solicitor General, but essentially, this is part of our—

º  (1635)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Would he be able to answer that?

    Mr. John Manley: Well, he's the appropriate minister to whom you should put the question.

    Mr. David Pratt: Doubly reject the premise...

    Mr. John Manley: We can never be all-knowing.

    This relates to Mr. MacKay's question as well. There's certainly been an increased awareness that not only within countries has there been a difficulty in exchanging information among or between agencies, but also that that's much more difficult sometimes internationally. So we've asked our agencies, particularly the RCMP, to make every possible effort to ensure that we have effective information sharing with other countries.

    You know, whether it's terrorism, which is what we're currently talking about most often, or criminal activity, which was more of our preoccupation prior to September 11, they're not inseparable; they're often related. And the more information we have, the more likely it is we're going to be able to prevent criminal or terrorist activities from occurring.

    So that's the purpose of those.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mrs. Jennings, for five minutes.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.): Thank you.

    I'm sorry I missed the first part of your presentation, but I'm sure it was really interesting. The part that I did hear was very interesting.

    I have a couple of questions. One has to do with NEXUS. NEXUS appears to deal only with our common border with the United States. Is there any movement, in terms of Mexico and the United States, so that Canadians who are frequent travellers to the United States and Mexico, but who may have to, on their way back to Canada, hit the United States before they come to Canada, don't get hassled there?

    I'll give you an example. It concerns a colleague of ours. The Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development went to Colombia on its study on the human rights situation in Colombia. I was not part of the group. They hit Miami, and a Canadian parliamentarian, Antoine Dubé, who was travelling with all of the other parliamentarians, was stopped by the American immigration and customs at the Miami airport. He was pulled aside, searched, and detained for several hours, notwithstanding the fact that he had his little green passport, in which it's clearly indicated that he's from the House of Commons, Government of Canada, Parliament of Canada.

    So there's a problem with the American agents on the Mexico-U.S. side who don't know that there's a country to the north called Canada, that it's a parliamentary system, a constitutional monarchy, that “member of Parliament” means the equivalent of congressman, and that the green passport is actually a special passport—it's not diplomatic, but it's a special passport. He was part of the delegation.

    There's a real problem there. That's one.

    So with this 30-point plan that we signed with Governor Ridge, is there any plan to try to improve the access of Canadian frequent travellers, not just to the United States, but coming back from Mexico into the United States?

    That's the first question.

    The second one is on the immigration side, the safe third country. I know back in the mid-nineties, Canadian immigration officials were attempting to negotiate an agreement with the United States, with the INS. The INS didn't want to hear about it. We dropped the negotiations. We're now, as part of that 30-point plan, trying to renegotiate.

    How serious—and if you don't have the answer, maybe you can just send it on—is the INS about negotiating that, given the fact that you yourself acknowledge that 40%, at a minimum, of our refugee claimants come to Canada through the United States? That means they're going to get loaded back onto the United States INS, their detention centres—because they detain—and they're already overcrowded. I have serious doubts that the INS has any interest in having a real negotiation and agreement with Canada on that, because that's just going to overload their already overloaded detention system. We don't detain when we're hearing a case. They do.

º  (1640)  

    Mr. John Manley: First, with respect to Canadian citizens entering from other countries, in particular from Mexico, to tell you the truth, that's not part of what we're trying to do at the moment. The NEXUS system doesn't only include the personalized card, which will be capable of carrying biometrics on it. It also implies that there is the technology capable of examining the card and comparing the biometrics. That's not going to be available at other borders. It will be for Canada-U.S. land travellers.

    We are looking to create a similar system that will be available for airline passengers that would include iris identification so that Canadians going from Canada to the U.S. or American citizens returning home who are part of this system would have that accelerated access.

    Quite frankly, for several reasons I've avoided including Mexico as part of what we're trying to do, simply because the Canada-U.S. border is rather different from the Mexico-U.S. border in a whole range of considerations. My view--and I've explained this to my former counterpart, the Mexican foreign minister, Castañeda, so I'm not revealing anything that I haven't told him--is that to try to do a three-way negotiation on border issues would probably slow down the results we hope to achieve on a bilateral negotiation. Mexico is certainly watching it closely and following it closely, and I would hope that at some point in time the NEXUS card might be a NAFTA card.

    I've only just gotten a pilot project in British Columbia. I haven't gotten NEXUS all the way across the Canada-U.S. border yet. I'd rather do Nova Scotia before I do Mexico, if you know what I mean.

    On the safe third, how serious are they? I can say we have had to work very hard to ensure this remains an advancing file. We've made considerable progress, though.

    This isn't the first time we've tried to do border things with the United States. There's a series of things going back a number of years. The most recent was the Canada-U.S. partnership. In my first meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell, I gave him a copy of it so that he was aware of it. He would have been the person with whom we would principally deal on border issues. As you know, Secretary of State Powell, who I personally have a lot of respect and admiration for, is preoccupied this week with trying to get a ceasefire in the Middle East. So to call him on border issues would probably not get all of his attention.

    Because of the creation of the position of director of the Office of Homeland Security, we have now an opportunity of having a counterpart who has responsibility for pulling the various agencies together. In a way, Governor Ridge is in the same situation as I am. That's why I can't answer Mr. Bellehumeur's question. I'm not the Minister of Revenue. He's not the secretary of the treasury responsible for customs in the United States, nor is he the Attorney General responsible for INS in the United States. He's in a position, as I am in, of trying to provide broad policy direction and coordinate the different departments and agencies that are relevant. It's there in our 30 points. So that's achievement number one.

    There have been ongoing discussions. That's achievement number two. I'm not announcing today that we've entered into a safe third agreement. You're perfectly right to be skeptical about it. The next time I talk to Governor Ridge, I'm going to tell him that Canadian parliamentarians have been reacting very skeptically about whether they are sincere in seeking it. Perhaps that will help move it along a little bit. I have every reason to believe in the good faith and the determination of Governor Ridge in helping to deliver on all 30 points.

    Ms. Marlene Jennings: Some of the congressmen are ignorant.

º  (1645)  

    The Chair: That's time.

    I'll go back to the opposition side. Monsieur Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Thank you.

    Mr. Minister, I will finish what I was saying during my first intervention. I realize that you cannot know everything and cannot read everything. However, you have a number of people working for you. I would invite them to read the Senate report, which was released last March—fairly recently, in fact—and which concludes that Canada's border points are still sieves. The report contains several recommendations.

    A little earlier you said that you did not know how all that money would be spent. The report contains suggestions, such as building mesh-wire fencing around certain areas; controlling the movement of people, something which is not currently done; using magnetic cards; conducting background searches of the people you hire; and, most of all, rehiring the people you laid off since the Liberals came into power. I feel these are fairly important solutions.

    You also talked about the Communications Security Establishment. Does the chairman of the Special Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism have a role to play with regard to the Communications Security Establishment? If so, what is that role?

    Mr. John Manley: None.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: None. Within the Privy Council Office there is a group that coordinates intelligence security. Do you have a role with regard to that organization?

º  (1650)  

    Mr. John Manley: Not directly. I don't have any responsibility with respect to the office. However, I do have a role to play in my capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Privy Council Office. For instance, I have access to Mr. Fadden, who is the coordinator.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: But that's where your role stops.

    I listened to you very carefully and heard you ceaselessly repeat "I'm not aware of that," "I don't control that," "I don't know," and so on. You chair a committee that was established to meet our obligation to respond to a specific situation, and event. Though there were indications that something was brewing on the international scene, nothing was done before September 11. On September 11, an extraordinary event occurred, an event that shook everything. People were concerned about security and a committee was established, a committee you were appointed to chair.

    Since then, you have been everywhere and spoken to all kinds of people, as you are speaking to us today, but it still seems that you do not know anything or control anything. You are not the Minister of Defence, you are not the minister of this, you are not the minister of that. That's all well and good, but I feel that, since a committee was created to pool information and provide advice on improving national security, we could expect, Mr. Minister—and this is what I was expecting—to receive real answers today and to meet with a minister who takes things more seriously than you do.

    Mr. John Manley: This is all a political game to you. If you want information, ask the right questions. Only once did I reply that I did not know something.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Oh, no! You gave the same answer in response to certain questions by Mr. MacKay: “I don't know”, “I am not the Minister”.

    Mr. John Manley: No, I don't know exactly what goes on in the Department of Revenue on a daily basis. I also don't know whether someone from the Minister of Defence's office was fired today. That's not my responsibility. Ask reasonable questions and I will attempt to answer them.

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: You chair the Security Committee, Mr. Minister, and you don't even know what is happening at the border. You are not aware that a Senate committee has said that the border is a real sieve. You may be the Committee Chair, but in reality you are nothing but a Canadian prop. That's what you are.

    This is why we are working on a private member's bill. All you do is appear before committees and tell everyone that the government is managing the situation well, that we don't have to worry about security because it is being looked after. However, when you come right down to it, you really don't control anything. Each department will apply whichever sections of C-36 and C-32 fall under its jurisdiction. Once the legislation is adopted, departments will be able to apply it. But it seems that you don't control anything in this at all. Each department will act on its own terms. You don't have a handle on anything, you don't coordinate anything.

    Mr. John Manley: It's unfortunate that you seem to understand so little about how government and Cabinet work. Perhaps at some other time, it will be possible to...

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: It's unfortunate that we have a Deputy Prime Minister as arrogant as you, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister.

    Mr. John Manley: It's too bad that you...

    Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: It's too bad that we have a Deputy Prime Minister as arrogant as you.

[English]

    The Chair: You've placed your question and your statements to the minister. We could allow him some time to respond. I think that's only fair.

    Mr. Manley.

[Translation]

    Mr. John Manley: I did not realize there were any questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bellehumeur just doesn't understand that a Cabinet committee chairman is not the minister of each department whose ministers sit on the committee. I don't understand why he doesn't get it. Perhaps he could learn.

    Frankly, I try to provide specific information with regard to security policy, which is the purview of this committee. I know that I was invited to appear to answer questions on policy and not on the daily operations of a government agency. If Mr. Bellehumeur wants that type of information, he could ask the clerk to invite the ministers responsible for daily operations. That would be the normal way of proceeding.

[English]

    The Chair: Your time is up, Mr. Bellehumeur. It's very unfortunate. Time flies when you're having fun.

    Now I'll look to the government side.

    I have a couple of questions. Maybe I'll go ahead with those.

    Do you have something related to what has been previously dealt with, Mr. Pratt?

    Mr. David Pratt: No. As you haven't spoken yet, I was just going to say please be my guest.

    The Chair: There are three short areas. Number one, following the implementation of Bill C-36 and the possible implementation of Bill C-42, is the government contemplating any other legislative or non-legislative steps in response to the September 11 scenario?

    Mr. John Manley: There may be other legislative steps that some ministers may want to contemplate in their own areas of responsibility, but in the sense of an omnibus-type bill, which both Bill C-36 and Bill C-42 are in that they include elements from different ministries, no, nothing of that nature is contemplated. Other bills would be brought forward one by one by appropriate ministers if, as, and when they were required.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I received a piece of correspondence from the Toronto Police Service, and in that letter they indicate that they seem to be on the front lines in terms of local emergency response. They're thinking in the context of September 11. The question, which was not directly put in the correspondence but which could easily be inferred from the three-page letter, is, what is the federal government doing on a policy basis to connect to local emergency service responders, police, fire departments, etc., in terms of a national overview of response to September 11? I suppose they also have their eye on possible funding or something like that. But on the policy level, is there a connection that your committee has looked at or may look at?

    Mr. John Manley: First of all, their response is one that does need to be coordinated with local agencies as well. We know that from past experience.

    The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, fondly known as OCIPEP, which is under the Minister of National Defence, is the agency that is responsible for coordinating in emergency situations. They have been given additional resources, which should enable them to do that more effectively, and part of that would be to coordinate with local agencies. They need to be part of the planning that is done by OCIPEP, if they aren't already, and I think they probably are.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Both Mr. Bellehumeur and Mr. MacKay have alluded to allegations that the Montreal container port is anything but secure. I had an opportunity to visit there within the last few months with another parliamentary committee.

    It is clear that the custody and loading of all the containers are in the hands of private organizations that appear to be heavily influenced or possibly controlled by organized crime. I am advised—and I stand corrected if I'm wrong—that the employees or groups working in these organizations have a criminal record rate exceeding 50%. Therefore, I put to you that this entry point into Canada is not in the hands of people whom we would class as security-safe or security-cleared. It's a big question mark, and maybe from certain perspectives it's a big danger issue. And I don't see an easy solution.

    It's very complex because we're dealing with labour unions, traditions, and organizations that usually don't belly up to the administrative trough when necessary. Could you just acknowledge this at least for the record?

    I take your earlier point that you're not the minister for everything, but I'd like to get that on the record and get a response if you have one to that.

    Mr. John Manley: Yes, and I certainly acknowledge, not only based on your observations but also on the recent Senate report that raised this as a matter of concern... As I say, I think at the first level it is a matter for the RCMP to investigate. Secondly, I think the Minister of Transport is already looking at whether there are measures that could enhance security in terms of the personnel who are involved in operations at ports.

    You'll know from the Senate report that the observation is that the situation in Canadian ports is not significantly worse than that in U.S. ports. In fact, it may be better. That's not of much consolation if there is a problem.

    The Chair: We have an additional round, colleagues.

    Mr. MacKay is back, so five minutes for Mr. MacKay. We'll be strict with the five minutes, if we can.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you. I'm back because I'm in another justice committee, as you know, that's sitting at the same time as there's a justice bill in the House. Given your responsibilities, I know that pales, Mr. Minister, but I have a question on this issue of ports. We can rehash the decision to disband the ports police, but this issue, as you've quite rightly acknowledged, is very serious. It's one of equipment, and there is increasingly sophisticated equipment now that is in use. But with that type of technology comes considerable expense, as you're aware.

    Different ports have different needs--the Port of Halifax versus Montreal versus Vancouver. Clearly there are different needs. There is a greater level of municipal police involvement on the east coast as compared to Vancouver, which the chair has referred to, where there are more private security firms involved. The idea of organized crime and the vulnerability of employees who have criminal records for all sorts of reasons increase that vulnerability.

    But there is also, as you are aware, given the events of September 11, given the increased amount of cruise ship traffic that's coming into ports, and given the American military presence in many Canadian ports, such as Halifax and Vancouver in particular, an international obligation that should be, and I'm assuming is, of great concern to the Canadian government. There is also, of course, this omnipresent trade issue where the feeling is that if there isn't security offered in ports, this may have ramifications in terms of the willingness of container ships to come into the ports. It's a huge problem. If one container with substances--anthrax or, God forbid, a nuclear weapon--were to come into a port, it's devastating to think of the ramifications of that.

    I guess the specific question is this. What is the government doing to address this in a very tangible way? In recent days, we've seen the appearance of American customs officials in Canadian ports such as Halifax. Are we reciprocating? Are there Canadian officials going to American ports? I believe that is the case.

    Perhaps I'll give you an opportunity to answer those questions.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. John Manley: First, I think clearly it's an important issue. I wouldn't want anyone to have the impression that the ports are not safe and that shippers should avoid them. In fact, the reality is, although there are concerns that have been appropriately raised, there haven't been any incidents of the sort we're right to fear. There haven't been any incidents of that sort either in Canada or elsewhere.

    I think, as I said earlier, the first level is to deal with the criminality issue, and that is, first of all, an issue for the RCMP. Secondly, given the massive number of containers that are moving on the planet at any given time, what we really have here is, as much as anything, a challenge for intelligence agencies to deal with, particularly when you're talking about serious terrorist threats, such as nuclear weapons or anthrax or things of that nature.

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Can I ask you, on that point in particular--and I apologize for interrupting. This issue of the containers and their ports of call is obviously our concern when they're coming to Canada, but when they're leaving, it leads to another important question. Given the fact that you inevitably have input into this issue about CSIS's ability abroad--that is, a foreign intelligence role outside of Canada and the ability to collect intelligence agency information outside Canada--do you personally favour expanding CSIS's role to deal with this in particular, and a myriad of other issues involving collection of intelligence, before it comes to our borders?

    Mr. John Manley: We've had some discussion. You know of Mr. Pratt's interest in that issue--

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Peter MacKay: Very much so, yes.

    Mr. John Manley: —which came up in your absence. What I'd say is, yes, we need the information. This is information to which we can contribute on a global basis. In other words, I don't think Canada is going to be able to use its own resources in order to be comfortable with all the containers moving across the Atlantic or the Pacific at any given time. This is an area in which we need to cooperate with our allies abroad. Yes, it's a matter of concern; it's certainly a matter of concern for other governments as well.

    For example, U.S. Customs Commissioner Bonner recently took Deputy Minister Wright with him to Europe to talk with the Europeans about how we are trying to coordinate in our ports between Canada and the U.S. This is part of an international response to what is certainly perceived to be a source of possible threat.

    On the narrow point of customs officials being in our different ports, yes, as of a few weeks back, there are U.S. Customs officials in three Canadian ports: in Vancouver, Montreal, and Halifax. There are Canadian Customs officials in two U.S. ports, in Seattle-Tacoma and in Newark. That was part of the 30-point action plan, these being ports from which there is a lot of transborder shipment. It's intended to do two things. One is to coordinate the inspection of containers. In other words, we share information about which containers ought to be thoroughly inspected, because as you know, not every container is inspected, and even to increase that percentage becomes problematic in terms of the flow of trade. Secondly, we want to be able to see as much of that traffic as possible move, without stopping, across the Canada-U.S. border, away from the port. The inspection is really an attempt to move the border out. Halifax, for example, is an important port of entry for containers moving into the midwest of the United States, across Sarnia and into Chicago or elsewhere.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Minister, I know you had some time constraints. Our meeting was scheduled to go until five o'clock. I'm going to allow two more bullet questions—

    Mr. John Manley: Okay.

    The Chair: —from members who've indicated they have questions. I'm going to take one from Mr. Sorenson and one from Mr. Pratt, and then we'll wrap up. These would be questions without significant preamble. That's the understanding.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I suppose the definition of “significant” would be what would be in question.

    You mentioned that what happened September 11 was nothing we could foresee. If you look at some of the Senate reports and also intelligence experts with their supports, they said the sophistication of terrorism is increasing, that there was an imminent concern that other terrorist attacks could happen at any time. We did know, according to Senate reports and RCMP witnesses at the Senate, that Canada was a country where fundraising for terrorism was very active.

    My bullet question to you is, as the chairman of the special cabinet committee on security, are you absolutely confident that there is no tie between the Hezbollah military side of the organization and the Hezbollah fundraising side of the organization?

    Mr. John Manley: No, I can't say that in that context, but let me put the answer to you in this way.

    Canada has, not the dominant role, but an important role to play in the context of the conflict in the Middle East. Because we maintain good offices and respectability with both sides, it enables us to be in a position to deliver sometimes unpleasant or difficult messages while being accepted and received as a friend.

    When I was foreign affairs minister, for example, on my last trip to the region, I was in Iran, Damascus, Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel. I can tell you I raised the issue of Hezbollah in both Syria and Lebanon. I pointed out that in our view, the occupation of southern Lebanon, which was the justification for the creation of Hezbollah in the first place, had ended and there was no remaining justification for the organization; and the activities it carried out against Israeli civilians were nothing short of terrorism.

    I left Damascus the day before Tony Blair was there. He delivered, I gather, a similar message and was somewhat criticized by the Syrian president. By the time I got to Lebanon it caught up with me, and I managed to make the front page news because the Lebanese didn't like that message.

    But quite frankly, I was also warmly received in Lebanon. Members of the Lebanese Parliament are elected. It is a democracy. It has come back literally from the dead, and they're rebuilding their economy and their society. There are elected members of Parliament who are members of Hezbollah.

    We're not unique in our positioning on how we have designated that organization. We have adopted exactly the same position as the United Kingdom. I have to say also there's no indication that any branch of Hezbollah is raising money in Canada at the present time, but we have taken the position it's appropriate to make that distinction, as have the British. That is an element of ensuring that we maintain the principle-based even-handed approach to relationships in the Middle East that enables us to have some influential role to play.

    I'm sorry to go on so long at this, Derek, but I think it's important.

    There's a lot of talk in the House about whether we would be part of an international contingent, if one were to be considered. Quite frankly, only countries like Canada, which have maintained the confidence and respect on both sides of that issue, are going to be in a position to be able to make that contribution.

    I can tell you that in my time as foreign affairs minister, we were called upon by both sides to try to relay messages, when it was appropriate to do so. That's not just us or our government; that goes back to previous governments as well that have consistently maintained a policy in the Middle East that has given us the ability to use those good offices. You trade that off very carefully.

    We're constantly criticized by one side or another about how we vote on the United Nations resolutions or in the UNHCR, and that's because we never toe somebody else's line. We have consistently tried to keep a balanced position.

    I would argue that this is an example of that same approach. We need to make that distinction. We have made that distinction. No evidence has been provided to us to suggest this is in any way enabling terrorist activities to be financed out of Canada. If those facts were available, it certainly might cast the situation in a different light, but to date, that's the basis upon which we've reached that conclusion.

»  (1710)  

    Sorry to go on so long.

    The Chair: That's quite all right. Your chairman is going to give up on compressing questions, but I did allow a bullet question to Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. David Pratt: I'll try to be very brief, Mr. Chair, and I thank the minister for staying with us.

    As you know, Minister, this committee is fairly new, thanks to the work of the chair in getting it up and running not long after September 11, and I think it has a critical job that way.

    You've had the opportunity to see some of these security issues from a very high level. I'd be interested in knowing, and we may or may not take your advice, but as far as fruitful areas of investigation for this committee in the future are concerned, some of us are interested in the issue of a foreign intelligence agency, and obviously some are interested in the issue of intelligence coordination, both within government and with other governments. I'd appreciate any observations you might have in terms of where we should be developing a work plan.

    Secondly, there are two secretariats within PCO: the Security and Intelligence Secretariat and the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat. Maybe Mr. Fadden can answer this question: Did they get more resources in the last budget?

    Finally, I'm interested in knowing, and maybe Mr. Fadden can answer this question as well, whether we're still processing intelligence for the United States, communications intercepts.

    Mr. John Manley: I will let Mr. Fadden take the second two questions.

    In terms of what a parliamentary committee could usefully do, I think, first of all, the series of questions today has opened a whole range of things that really constitute follow-up to actions that we've taken after September 11. As I indicated, I intend to ask ministers to come back to the cabinet committee. I think it's entirely appropriate that questions be put to the ministers who are responsible for the component parts of the response to September 11, and I don't think any one of them would hesitate to accept an opportunity to explain what we've been doing and then answer questions on it. So I think that's useful in the short to medium term.

    But there's continued need for us to look at what is known as asymmetrical threats, and I guess September 11 is the classic example of its occurrence. Mr. MacKay referenced other possible asymmetrical threats, in containers. I think a better understanding of the nature of those threats and what, if any, possible responses governments could take in order to prevent them would be useful.

    I think we need to understand better the linkages between terrorism and crime, organized crime for other purposes. Terrorist activities are frequently funded by criminal activities. Understanding that relationship might be helpful to us as well, and it's an area that the committee might want to investigate.

    Overall what's important is that we have, from a parliamentary oversight point of view, an understanding of how some of the tools we put into place as a result of September 11, and even before that, are functioning in a liberal, open democracy that we want to preserve. I think all parliamentarians were seized with this question when we dealt with Bill C-36. Certainly cabinet was. It goes to the essence of what we're trying to do. We want to preserve the liberal, open society that we all enjoy, and yet we know that people have to use force sometimes. They have to use muscle in order to give us the protection to enjoy that kind of society.

    So finding the balance is really at the essence of how our society functions between ensuring that we have protection and security, and at the same time ensuring that we have freedom and openness. I don't think too much can be said or written about that, and parliamentarians are at the very core of it because they are elected to represent the values of their people.

    Dick, did you want to respond to those other questions?

»  (1715)  

    Mr. Richard Fadden (Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office): Mr. Chairman, with respect to the first question, the S and I Secretariat and the IAS did receive some temporary surge funding last year. In fact, one of my current activities is to access that reserve that the minister referred to for permanent increased funding.

    With respect to your second question, the answer is yes.

    The Chair: Okay, that's great. Those are good answers.

    I want to thank my colleagues for providing some focus to our rather open-ended subject matter here today, and in particular, I want to thank the minister and Mr. Fadden for their good-spirited and very competent responses in dealing with a subject that can be quite wide ranging. Thank you, Mr. Minister and Mr. Fadden.

    We are adjourned until Monday, when we will meet with justice officials.