NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

• 1532

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the meeting to order.

We are running a little behind schedule because of some votes that were held in the House of Commons. Perhaps, Major, if we could, we'll get a quick presentation, perhaps a ten-minute presentation, on the new equipment. We'll allow about five minutes for questioning, and then we'll proceed to our witness. I think that would be very helpful.

Major, you have the floor.

Major Doug Palmer (Project Director, Clothe the Soldier, Department of National Defence): Good day, sir. I am the project director of the Clothe the Soldier Project. I was asked to come here today to give the committee a brief on how the Canadian Army is changing its clothing and equipment.

The Clothe the Soldier Project is a capital project of $287 million to provide land force personnel in the Canadian Forces, those individuals conducting land operations, with new clothing and equipment.

I have with me today three soldiers who are wearing various configurations of clothing and equipment. What I'll do is walk through those configurations for you quickly to show you how we're changing.

I'm of course dressed in the current clothing and equipment that is on issue to Canadian soldiers. The helmet has been in service since 1998. It is a Kevlar-derivative ballistic helmet designed for use against fragmentation from artillery mortars and grenades. The shirt and pants are currently on issue to soldiers. We are in the process of changing the shirt and pants and will eventually change the webbing harness you see on me right now, which is our basic load carriage for fighting in the battlefield.

Beside me is Captain Greg Poehlmann. He is wearing the same helmet and the same fighting-order harness, but he is wearing the new Canadian Army disruptive pattern. The pattern is digitally derived and is based on a number of scientific trials we conducted. It provides the Canadian soldier a specific advantage in terms of detection range and probability of detection for various detection devices on the battlefield. The difference is that Greg, with his uniform on, has about a 45% advantage over me in my monochrome green uniform. That is the reason we are shifting to the disruptive pattern.

Sergeant Mathieson is also with the Clothe the Soldier Project. Sergeant Mathieson has a slightly different configuration. He is wearing the load-bearing vest that is currently worn by soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It provides a slightly different way from the webbing I am wearing to carry ammunition, water, and battlefield supplies that are required for immediate operations on the battlefield. He is also wearing the shirt and pants. In fact, the battalion that was sent from May through July to Bosnia-Herzegovina is now equipped with the shirts and pants, and they wear that load-bearing vest.

• 1535

Beside Sergeant Mathieson is Captain Mike Percy, also from the Clothe the Soldier Project. He is wearing the next generation of load-bearing vest and the fragmentation vest. The vest will be 25% lighter than the current one worn in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the load-bearing vest he has on will provide easy access to ammunition, water, and first aid equipment to the soldier on the battlefield. We expect to see that tactical vest in contract in the next 12 months and fielded within the next 18 months.

That concludes my briefing, sir. I as well as the soldiers I have here today will be more than pleased to take any questions.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, do you have a question?

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, gentlemen.

How many of the new uniforms and vests have been issued to date? Is this something that is still in the early planning stages, or are they being distributed? If so, how many have been distributed?

Maj Doug Palmer: Sir, the first contract for 72,000 sets of uniforms was placed earlier this year. We're in delivery from the manufacturer, Peerless Garments of Winnipeg, Manitoba. We have received about 80% from that first contract, and we are fielding garments to soldiers in Edmonton, Petawawa, Gagetown, Kingston, and Valcartier.

The Chair: Thanks.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): First of all, thank you very much for coming. You're all professional models, I know, and are doing a great job.

The current rotation in Bosnia is out of Valcartier, is it not?

Maj Doug Palmer: Yes, sir.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Do they have these new uniforms—completely?

Maj Doug Palmer: Yes, sir.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Does this one have a backpack on it? Could you stand up and turn around? It has a backpack, okay.

Maj Doug Palmer: That particular rucksack or small pack system is in final development, and we expect to be in contract within the next 12 months. The soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina don't have that yet, no.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I just wondered because I hadn't seen the backpack. I believe this one has a backpack on it. Is that the old one that has the backpack?

Maj Doug Palmer: This is the vest they're using, and the small pack I have is one of the ways we carry our additional equipment.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Do you feel this is adequate to...?

Maj Doug Palmer: When we bring in the small pack system, the soldier will have quite a bit of versatility in his ability to carry additional combat supplies when he's doing his job.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay. Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Anders and Mr. Wood.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): I'm going to be out trying to sneak up on some furry critters this weekend. My question is, you create the digitized pattern based on computer simulations of European and North American situations, but how do the animals in the environment react to it? Has there been any chance to test that? How exactly do you evaluate that it's 45% more effective? Is it done based on the human eye? Is it done based on a computer's ability to pick things out? How is it done?

Maj Doug Palmer: There are essentially two aspects to the answer to your question. First of all, it is the unaided human eye of soldiers and also the various image intensification devices that are on the battlefield I'm trying to protect myself against. There are a number of them on the market. This particular uniform has a coating on the uniform that provides protection against image intensification devices.

The Chair: Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The only thing I don't see here is the wide-brimmed combat hat. I looked over everything else. How come there's not one on display? Do you have one? I guess you do. Here comes one. Is there something significant? Is it a better type of headwear?

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Maj Doug Palmer: The hat is specifically an enhancement to provide additional precipitation protection as well as ultraviolet light protection for the individual. Should the individual require additional protection, there is a neck screen in the top of the hat that can be attached to it at the top.

Mr. Bob Wood: There are little things around it. What are these little things?

Maj Doug Palmer: At the back you'll see the fluorescent tabs. They're there so I can see the guy in front of me at night in pitch darkness. They're flourescent.

Mr. Bob Wood: Do the helmets have those?

Maj Doug Palmer: There is a strap that goes on the helmet. We don't have any here today, sir.

Mr. Bob Wood: No, that's fine. What about these little...? Are these for carrying anything?

Maj Doug Palmer: The loop system allows me to attach artificial and natural foliage to my hat so I can be protected at night or during the day.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Let's keep these questions short, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for the presentation. I couldn't help but notice you stated that the undergarments come from Nova Scotia, so that's a good one for our province.

This is what you would have for forests, obviously, and certain other situations. What about the Arctic and something for the desert, for example?

Maj Doug Palmer: There is a desert pattern that has been developed. We are now working with Canadian industry to put it on the textile. This pattern, the arid regions pattern—or the desert pattern, as you call it—is a technical challenge. It is a computer-designed pattern, and the inks are difficult to put on various textiles. Canadian industry has met the challenge and has done an excellent job.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: And the Arctic?

Maj Doug Palmer: For the Arctic we have an overgarment the soldier would just simply put over his parka. It's white, completely white.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Dromisky.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.): I have a very short question. Is there any significant difference between the uniform the male wears wears versus what the female wears?

Maj Doug Palmer: No, sir.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Thank you.

The Chair: Ms. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): First and foremost, I want to thank you for coming.

I have to say that having had the opportunity to try that helmet on, I can't get over how heavy it is. Just how much weight are they carrying when they have all the backpacks and everything else? When you put stuff in it, have you...?

Maj Doug Palmer: Mike, if you would, stand up, please. The tactical vest Mike has on at the moment weighs approximately 20 pounds or 10 kilos with the ammunition, water, bayonet, and various other items of combat stores he has to carry. That's separate and apart from the fragmentation vest he's got on underneath and the actual clothing.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That is unbelievable. Mr. Chair, I did try the helmet. I'm going to try the other hat too. Okay, just a minute now.

The Chair: Mr. Plamondon, do you have a question?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Tell me which one you like best, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: I think that's very fetching, Mrs. Wayne.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon (Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, BQ): I would like to ask two questions. First of all, do our Armed Forces now have clothing that is comparable to other NATO forces? As far as uniforms and equipment are concerned, are we on a par with them, ahead of them or playing catch-up?

Secondly, what percentage of the equipment content is Canadian? You said that the equipment is manufactured in Canada, in Winnipeg. Has the material been imported from the United States or is it manufactured here, in Canada?

[English]

Maj Doug Palmer: Sir, if I may, I'll answer the question in English.

As to the first question, to compare this new uniform to those of other NATO countries, this is a state-of-the-art uniform textile with the print, and I would suggest that the Canadian soldier has the best in the world at the moment in terms of protection in a digital pattern. In the context of Canadian content you asked about, the material is fabricated here in Canada, in the province of Quebec, and it is also cut, sewn, and put together in Canada.

The Chair: Are there any further questions from members of the committee? Actually, I think we're out of time at this point, in any event.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you very much for being here today. It was good to see you and good that you were available to answer questions for the members of committee. We really appreciate your presence here. Thank you very much.

• 1545

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Chair: I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the main attraction, Vice-Admiral Maddison. He's accompanied by Commodore Forcier and Brigadier-General Patricia Samson, who are no strangers to this committee. Welcome again.

I know we're running a little late—we apologize for that—as a result of some votes in the House of Commons. Let's get the questioning underway with Mr. Benoit for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You have no presentation today?

Vice-Admiral G.R. Maddison (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): I do have a presentation to make, if you would like me to make the presentation first.

The Chair: I'm sorry, I'm getting ahead of myself here. We've had a few too many things happening today. Vice-Admiral Maddison, please proceed with your presentation. My apologies.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I can go to questions now and then give the presentation afterwards.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Sometimes it doesn't make much difference, but please proceed.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and committee members. First of all, I'd like to say thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today and to permit an exchange of information during what has really been a most challenging period of time for all of us.

In my responsibility as the deputy chief of the defence staff, I am the chief operations officer for the Canadian Forces. I'm responsible to the chief of the defence staff for the planning and the execution of the many and diverse operations in which the Canadian Forces are involved, both overseas and here at home.

Today, in fact, there are about 3,000 Canadian servicemen and women deployed on 14 different missions worldwide, including our substantial contribution to the campaign against terrorism and our ongoing commitments in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa.

[Translation]

Joining me today are two senior officers within my group: Brigadier-General Pat Samson who is the Director General for Intelligence, and Commodore Jean-Yves Forcier, who is the Director General for Military Plans and Operations.

Let me now provide you some thoughts on intelligence and counter-terrorism at an unclassified level. The events of September 11 have certainly focused the attention of all Canadians - as it has the citizens of all nations.

Since the attacks we in the Canadian Forces have been busy developing responses as directed by government.

[English]

As background to this discussion, I would like to provide you with an overview of the role of the deputy chief of the defence staff group in the planning and in the execution of Operation Apollo and, for that matter, operations in general. The key to this issue is, I believe, an understanding of the difference between force generation and force employment.

Force generation is conducted by those individual commands who have the day-to-day responsibility to ensure that Canadian Forces units are maintained at the appropriate level and degree of readiness to carry out the wide range of defence tasks as directed in the annual defence plan. This is primarily the job of the three environmental chiefs of staff, but other group principals also have some force generation responsibilities. For example, I am responsible for generating the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group, which is situated in Kingston, as well as other specialized units such as the Joint Task Force 2. However, the primary force generators in the Canadian Forces are the commanders of the navy, army, and air force.

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On the other hand, “force employment” is how we make operational use of the forces that are generated. For routine operations, the environmental chiefs of staff or the commanders of the three services employ their forces. However, I am responsible for the conduct of contingency, or non-routine operations—operations dealing with contingency events in support of Canadian interests both at home and abroad, requiring the application of military force or the provision of military assistance.

The Canadian Forces contribution to the campaign against terrorism—Operation Apollo—is a contingency operation. As such, my staff and I have been fully engaged in all aspects of our contribution. Since the operation was announced, we have focused on developing the overall Canadian plan, in conjunction with our coalition partners. We have also provided direction to those forces presently in theatre through what is called a national command element, co-located with other coalition command elements at the United States Central Command Headquarters.

It is important to note at this point that although Canadian Forces will be integrated with the forces of our allies, they will remain under Canadian command and in compliance with Canadian law. They will also operate under Canadian rules of engagement, those directions that delineate the circumstances and limitations within which armed force may or may not be applied.

[Translation]

I would now like to provide you with an overview of our intelligence capabilities. I must first tell you that I am not a professional intelligence officer. Much of my background and experience is as a sea-going officer - in other words I served aboard, and commanded warships and groups of warships. In my 33 years in the navy I have not normally been a producer of intelligence and information, rather I have been a consumer of the products from our intelligence services. As such, I can certainly speak to you about the criticality of these products.

History shows that information superiority is a key factor in the success of any military operation. The need to provide analyzed information or intelligence to military and civilian decision-makers in a timely and accurate manner is as important today as it has been throughout time. The primary goal of the Canadian Forces military intelligence organization is to provide intelligence to commanders at all levels, whether deployed or in headquarters, and to government before, during and after deployment. This helps ensure the protection of our military forces and the achievement of our operational missions.

[English]

In the context of the post-September 11 world, the primary goal of military intelligence is to obtain information to assist us in the campaign against terrorism, and to support, therefore, those government departments that have a responsibility for tracking and analyzing the terrorist threat. Such information is, of course, shared with the appropriate agencies, from whom we also obtain information that may be useful in the successful conduct of our own operations.

The defence intelligence program is guided by the intelligence priorities established by the government. The gathering of information to meet these requirements is done in a number of ways—through open and human sources as well as signals intelligence, imagery, and geospatial information, including information received through our partnerships with other government departments and our allies. The analytical products resulting from the acquired information enable us to provide what we call situational awareness to decision-makers. In other words, having the right information, at the right time, to allow the right decisions to be made.

Let me expand on some of our collection capabilities as well. In this regard, I cannot overemphasize the importance of partnerships with other departments in government and with our allies. No intelligence organization in the world has the capability to collect, by itself, all the desired intelligence on every matter of national interest. No one can go it alone, especially when we consider the current terrorist threat. All of our partners help us satisfy the Canadian Forces operational and intelligence requirements. In return, we help them meet their requirements, and I must stress that this is a two-way street for all partners. This collaboration with our allies is key to our and their intelligence functions.

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[Translation]

With regard to signals intelligence, the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, is mandated, as you know, to collect, analyze and report on foreign radio, radar and other electronic signals. The Canadian Forces Information Operations Group supports CSE in its role.

[English]

The objective of supporting commanders in precision manoeuvres and delivery of weapons could not be achieved without geospatial and imagery information obtained from the mapping and charting establishment and the Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre, respectively. The charts, maps, and imagery products merged together provide another tool in support of our navigation and weapon systems.

The last category of intelligence is that of human intelligence, information obtained either directly or indirectly from an individual or group of individuals, and while deployed, all Canadian Forces personnel have the capability to critically observe and report on activities around them.

Information derived from intelligence forms an important element of Canada's participation in all our international operations, such as United Nations, NATO, or NORAD operations. Any bilateral cooperation in which Canada is involved almost always includes the sharing of information and the analysis of topics of mutual interest. An example of this is the cooperation we had with the Netherlands in the joint United Nations operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

It must be stressed that the Canadian Forces and Canada in general derives great benefit from these cooperative relationships. The Canadian Forces intelligence community is very conscious of the need to pull their share of the load, within the limits of our resources, and we know our allies are appreciative of what we bring to the table.

Once the information is collected, a variety of intelligence organizations analyze it and produce various intelligence assessments. Military intelligence analysis is chiefly the responsibility of the Director General Intelligence, General Pat Samson, at our headquarters here in Ottawa. There are also intelligence elements within the operational-level headquarters of the navy, army, and air force, as well as tactical intelligence units with deployed forces. Together, all these organizations provide a broad range of support and a multitude of products. This two-way sharing of data and intelligence products within the Canadian Forces, with other government departments and with our allies, is facilitated through a number of classified computer networks.

The use of technology to collect information has grown immensely in the last decade, but it cannot function alone. We are looking at how we could be even more proactive in the area of human intelligence, for example. Although we have had considerable success with our present human arrangements, we are looking at enhancing our military's human capability by training more military members in the collection of information from human sources.

Another area of enhancement centres on our analytical component. Although it is very good at present, the analysis capacity we currently have may not meet requirements a few years from now. The continuing changes in technology will enable more and more information to be collected and communicated in a quicker fashion. This glut of information will not be able to be handled by current capabilities and practices. We must therefore ensure that our analysts are more than good computer operators who can use the “cut-and-paste ” method of analysis. They must become even better at piecing together clues, facts, and the psychological, political, and human traits of any potential adversary. This is when intelligence products can be fully optimized for decision-makers.

• 1600

One crucial area of our intelligence capability that requires further enhancement is our information fusion capability. Intelligence involves receiving information from multiple feeds and then analyzing the raw data to provide relevant information and display it to decision-makers. At this point the vision is that of a system that would merge technical capabilities with our doctrine and projects into an integrated whole. We feel this type of approach would provide enhanced situational awareness within any area of operations. It should be noted at this point that the solution to this concept has not yet been finalized, but we're doing a lot of work in terms of trying to get to what should be the final solution.

Nonetheless, enhanced situational awareness means more effective decision-making from the tactical right through to the strategic levels, and this is in keeping with the vision articulated in Strategy 2020 of a highly capable and globally deployable force.

I would also like to stress that intelligence is also about understanding how people think, feel, and react to certain situations. No matter how many assessments we produce or how we wish to engineer for tomorrow, there will always be an element of risk, an element of uncertainty. The true work of intelligence is to reduce that risk and the potential for surprises. This will continue to be an ongoing challenge. Toward this end, it is vital that the intelligence community continue to provide analysis gathered from all sources and to provide assessments to decision- and policy-makers in a timely and useful manner. However, as I've learned from experience, the best intelligence in the world does not eliminate the burden of making difficult choices; that is the responsibility of leadership.

At this point, I would like to very briefly highlight the counter-terrorism capability of the Canadian Forces. I trust you understand that the nature of the activities of our counter-terrorism unit is such that tight operational security must be maintained. Although counter-terrorism is actually the overall responsibility of the Solicitor General and the RCMP, the Canadian Forces is mandated, as described in the 1994 white paper, “to maintain a special task force that provides an enhanced capability to respond to any such act immediately and effectively”. As such, the Canadian Forces are ready to respond as a force of last resort to terrorist events or major disturbances affecting national security.

[Translation]

The origin of this role dates to cabinet direction in the 1992 budget where authorization was given to transfer the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) role from the RCMP to the Canadian Forces. Accordingly, responsibility for certain counter-terrorism operations was assumed by DND on April 1st, 1993. The Canadian Forces replaced the SERT with a specialized response unit which we call Joint Task Force Two, commonly known as "JTF 2".

[English]

Counter-terrorism responses are guided by the national counter-terrorism plan issued by the Solicitor General under the authority of the Government of Canada. The plan establishes lines of communication and policy direction to guide officials in resolving a terrorist incident. The plan describes the authorities and responsibilities of the federal departments and agencies in counter-terrorism situations and outlines the legislation, conventions, and agreements to which Canada is a party. Authorization to engage a military unit in a counter-terrorism situation is detailed in the national counter-terrorism plan.

[Translation]

The people who comprise JTF 2 are exceptional members of the Canadian Forces, worthy of the responsibility they hold. Before they join the unit, they must submit to a rigorous selection process, which tests their maturity, psychological make-up, responsibility, fitness and tactical abilities. They train extremely hard and make many personal sacrifices to ensure that they are ready to serve Canada's interests. I take great pride in knowing that these people are world-class counter terrorism experts.

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[English]

This expertise is key, as the nature of counter-terrorism action is very different from the normal day-to-day operational business of the Canadian Forces. As we have seen, terrorists do not behave like a conventional enemy. If Canada is to effectively defend itself against terrorists, we must vigorously protect these types of capabilities.

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you very much for your attention. We're quite prepared to answer your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Vice-Admiral Maddison. I'm glad we decided to hear your presentation.

Let's start with Mr. Benoit for seven minutes.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and welcome Admiral, General, and Commodore.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you.

Mr. Leon Benoit: We're pleased to see you here this afternoon.

I have some questions, Admiral, on the sustainability of the task group in the Indian Ocean and on the naval commitments generally. There have been concerns expressed by many experts, including the Conference of Defence Associations. They said the manpower shortages in the navy may not be as evident as those in the army but exist nonetheless and have a negative impact on operational readiness. Would you agree with that statement?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, I wouldn't agree with that at all.

We have, right from the very outset, recognized that this was likely to be a long campaign. We certainly planned for a six-month campaign, but at the back of our minds, in terms of prudent planning, we recognized we would have to likely go past six months. In doing so, we put together plans that would allow us to make a commitment that perhaps may go past six months.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Admiral, I wasn't only talking about this particular commitment. I'd like to remind you that early in 2001 the navy found it necessary to tie up one of its destroyers and close down half the coastal vessels—because of crewing difficulties in all cases. With this closing down of a destroyer and the majority of the frigates at a lower level of readiness—in fact I've heard we're having to draw people from headquarters in Ottawa here to staff the next rotation—with these things happening, how can you say the number of personnel, or manpower shortages in fact, haven't reduced the operational readiness of the navy?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: First of all, no one has come to Commodore Forcier and me to ask if we would volunteer to go back to sea.

Let me answer your question simply by stating this. We do have some challenges in terms of some shortages in specific trades within the navy. That's been recognized. It's one of the reasons why there's been a tremendous push involving the recruiting and retention program, about which you'll have seen a lot of advertising, I'm sure, in the last number of weeks. We're seeing some tremendous successes as a result of it.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But recruiting, Admiral, takes years to get people ready to fit into an operation like this. If this operation has to be sustained for years, to get them ready for this operation down the road, two or three years will not ready many recruits for many positions.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There will be some who will be ready in a relatively short period of time. But to answer your question, there was a decision to take one of the ships on the west coast and put it into what is known as extended readiness, which means it would take at least another 180 days to bring that ship up to what we would call a standard level of readiness. Having said that, I would add we've got a task group involving about four ships. That still leaves us a significant number of frigates and all the maritime coastal defence vessels—and I have to tell you, it isn't half, in terms of maritime coastal defence vessels, that are alongside.

The concept of operations we've always operated under is to have ten of those twelve operational, and ten of the twelve are operational. The other two go through a rotation involving maintenance. We have three of the four destroyers, of which one is obviously deployed now.

One of the decisions the navy took—I was the head of the navy when we took it—was to look at what level of readiness we really need to have for the entire fleet. We needed to have a significant number of ships at high readiness that can deal with all sorts of conflict situations—have all departments on the ship fully manned and fully trained at that elite level. We didn't necessarily need to have at that level some ships that are going out doing fisheries surveillance roles and so on. You could have them at a standard level of readiness from which it only takes you about 30 days to get back up.

• 1610

Mr. Leon Benoit: But let's look at some of the—

The Chair: Your time is expired. You're well over your time, so I am going to go to Mr. Plamondon.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Welcome. Thank you for coming.

There is one question of particular interest to me. I have nuclear power plants in my riding. I am the member for the riding of Bas-Richelieu—Nicolet—Bécancour, and in the town of Bécancour, in Gentilly to be more specific, there is a nuclear power plant. City council, chaired by Mayor Richard, wrote me last week in order to get assurances that every step had been taken to provide this nuclear facility with special protection. I am referring to this particular facility, but there are others in Canada and Quebec.

In order to reassure this city council and this mayor, as well as the people who live in this part of the riding, I would like to know whether or not you have a specific plan with respect to nuclear facilities. Is there any agreement with the Sûreté du Québec? Is there also an agreement or have there been any discussions with the people in charge of the Gentilly plant? Do the Armed Forces have a special strategic committee? In other words, is there a specialized response team in the event of...? I will pay close attention to your answer and I am presuming that Mayor Richard, the Bécancour city council and the entire population will be listening to you as well.

Vadm G.R. Maddison: Thank you for your question, sir.

[English]

Let me say first of all that I am sure the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, ever since September 11, has been very much engaged in looking at their security, and it's one of their responsibilities, obviously.

It's also a responsibility at the municipal level and at the provincial level to respond should something occur with any of the facilities across the country. There's a new capability within the department. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has been very much engaged in talking to all government departments concerning what sort of arrangements and what kinds of discussions need to occur and have been occurring to respond to the sort of question you've just raised, sir.

I will also tell you that from a Canadian Forces perspective, as the force of last resort within the country, we have raised our level of alert and of vigilance. I will refer to one particular area. Within the North American Air Defence Command we have tripled our effort in terms of the number of aircraft ready to respond in a very short timeframe to anything that might come along the way, where some of our facilities may look like they are in danger.

So we have certainly increased our vigilance and we have certainly increased our discussions with all sorts of other government departments to make sure the security is at a level we can be comfortable with, so that at the end of the day, if we have to respond, we will be able to respond.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Have there been any discussions between the various government levels or jurisdictions in order to minimize the number of planes flying over these nuclear plants so as to avoid the possibility of a surprise attack?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The first thing I would say is that at the moment the assessment of any threat to Canada is extremely low. We have no indication any facilities at all are being targeted. I would also take a look at it in terms of where some of these plants are located and where we have our assets located. We will be able to and can respond in a very quick fashion should something occur—as low a possibility as that is.

So at the moment we believe the security is, in terms of our response, quite good, without having to put exclusion zones or restricted areas around any facilities within the country at the moment.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Thank you. That's fine.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Plamondon. Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and speaking through you to the Admiral, again it's a pleasure to have you here.

• 1615

Admiral, our job as policy-makers is not to be generals. Some of us would like to be generals, I think, but obviously it's a different line of work. So when we ask these questions, we are obviously looking for you to tell us what we believe will be the type of information that will help us determine if we're making the right policy decisions.

In terms of Strategy 2020, we talk about developing a highly capable and globally deployable force around the world. At the same time, since September 11 we have also seen the need to look at homeland security issues as well as be involved in peacekeeping operations in theatres of conflict. Can you tell me what elements or tools you think may be additionally required to achieve this 2020 strategy, given the events of the last two months?

Secondly, with the upcoming budget, if additional dollars were to be applied to the Canadian Armed Forces, what would be the immediate needs? We hear a lot about you not having this yet and not having that. On the other hand, we understand there is new equipment being delivered. We've talked about the LAVs, the Coyotes, the new frigates, etc., but in terms of the public image, we still have the view out there that somehow we are behind the times. Could you suggest to us what, from an operational standpoint, you would like to see if in fact additional dollars were to be granted?

VAdm. G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much for your question, Mr. Wilfert.

I would like to make the comment that it is unfortunate if that image exists, that we don't have the capability that in fact we really do have. There has been a lot of work and a lot of investment over the course of the past ten years to modernize right through all three services—army, navy, and air force—but warfare evolves. Things change. And we've certainly seen that since September 11.

There are a number of areas we are focusing on, not the least of which is the whole issue of people. It's all very nice to have a certain level of equipment and capability, but if you don't have the right number of people with the right skills to operate that equipment, it becomes a significant challenge for us. We are below the level we want it to be, which is around 60,000, from a regular force perspective. We have put a lot of effort into bringing that capability up in terms of numbers, and as Mr. Benoit said, it does take, in some areas, about two to three years to build up those skills, so we need to put a focus on that, and we are.

In terms of being globally deployable, one of the areas we want to improve our capability in is the whole issue of lift. How do we get our folks, our equipment, into a scene faster than perhaps we've been able to do in the past?

There is a significant program in terms of the airlift side of the house to assist us in that regard. Secondly, there is one from a sea-lift perspective, which is to replace the replenishment ships within the task group ships, like the Preserver, with a capability that not only replenishes the task group but also has a lift capability where you could put as many as 300 vehicles, for example, on board. You could actually have an enhanced command and control capability as well. So that's the second area we focus our activities on.

Thirdly, it's very important for any operation to have what we call situational awareness or battle-space awareness of what's actually happening. An area that can really assist us in this regard is our ability to conduct surveillance from space, so we have a program out there that will eventually provide us the capability to assist that synergized picture that will provide you, whether you're in the field or at sea, a better understanding of what's actually happening in your operational area.

Those are three key areas we're focusing on.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, through you, yesterday the CDA was before us. My question was with regard to the peace dividend, that we've gone from a strength of about 90,000 since the end of the Cold War to below 60,000. The suggestion was made that we need to go back up to 75,000. What would be your comment on that, and if in fact we went up to 75,000, what role would you see these additional forces playing?

• 1620

VAdm G.R. Maddison: What it would do is provide us a lot more flexibility in terms of the manning of our battalions, our ships, our air bases, and so on—more than we currently have. I think any commander would say they would want to have the flexibility to be able to do that. It increases the quality of life for your people in terms of the rotations when folks are going out into the field, and so on.

Having said that, if you do go to that kind of level—about 75,000 folks—and you still are under the same resource allocation we currently have, something else has to give. So some of that modernization, which is also very important, is likely to have to go by the wayside or get put out farther to the right, because you can't do both, given the allocation we currently have. The real trick for us is to try to find that right balance among the number of people you have, being able to modernize so you continue to be very effective in your theatre of operations, and being able to provide the folks with the right level of training and so on, and that's a very tricky balance.

So if it's 75,000, that would certainly be quite optimal for us, but it would probably mean more resources to allow that to happen.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: So you can't have one without the other.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, for seven minutes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you Madam and gentlemen for coming today.

Sir, you mentioned the 1994 white paper, and you referred to it in your brief. A lot of people are telling us—not only in committee, but outside as well—that maybe it's time to completely overhaul the 1994 white paper because of September 11, or come up with a new white paper for the so-called effects you mentioned in terms of terrorism. Would you agree that it's time to either overhaul the white paper of 1994 or create a new one?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The white paper, of course, is not our white paper. That's the government's white paper on defence, and that will be a decision taken by the government, obviously.

What we are doing is conducting our own analysis of whether the white paper continues to be relevant. We think it does in terms of its demand for a multi-purpose capability, as articulated.

Does it change after September 11? Some of the elements may very well change, and that's one of the things we're doing right now, Mr. Stoffer, taking a look at that and asking what has changed since September 11; what we need to do, if anything; and whether the white paper—in terms of what we have been asked to do—still makes it clear to us where we should go. And that work is being done in the department itself.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Through you, Mr. Chairman, on Monday, Senator Colin Kenny had an article in the local Hill Times saying that people of your rank—not you specifically—should be advising the politicians more strongly—in his opinion, anyway—on what they need in order to meet the needs of the military, and not await answers from the political world. How would you respond to that comment? I don't know if you've read it. It was in Monday's Hill Times.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I haven't read the Hill Times.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'll read it now, since you've mentioned it, though.

My response to your question is that over the course particularly of the last four years, in the amount of work the department has done to try to articulate a strategy for 2020, we've been fairly open as to the sorts of things we think the department needs to do to prepare us for the environment in which we'll likely be operating in in 15 to 20 years. That's very open, from my perspective.

Each of the environments puts together their business plan in terms of the missions and tasks they've been assigned, their ability to meet those missions and tasks, and what challenges they have in terms of meeting those missions and tasks vis-à-vis the resources they've been allocated. I think in those sorts of documents, and in forums such as this, the points are being made in terms of what it is we think we need to do for the future.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You had mentioned as well rotation of our troops. How is the morale of the crew over there now, in Operation Apollo?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's absolutely great.

• 1625

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Pretty great, is it?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's absolutely great right across the board, because the sailors and the airmen recognize that they have the tools that allow them to do what we are asking them to do. They recognize how important this particular campaign is to Canadians and the global community. They feel they are making a difference.

When that happens and they have support, in terms of things like the family resource centres and what all the commands are doing in supporting our men and women who are deployed, they feel good about themselves. They don't like the fact that they're going to be away for a long period of time, as anybody would expect, but they have a job to do and they're doing it.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: May I ask another question, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Yesterday we heard from General Belzile, I believe, talking about having to rob Peter to pay Paul. If Operation Apollo goes on for an extended period of time, say for a few years, they may have to rob troops from other arenas in order to facilitate a rotation, and he mentioned grave concerns over that.

Would we be in a situation where we'd have to rob Peter to pay Paul, more or less?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I wouldn't categorize that at all. I was trying to respond to Mr. Benoit's question along those same lines at the beginning.

We are designed, and it was mandated by the 1994 white paper, so that a vanguard—a vanguard is roughly 4,000 folks—can be deployed on missions and do that indefinitely. If you take a look from the army perspective, for example in terms of the Balkans, that rotation is planned to continually have our folks do those important missions in the Balkans.

We're now taking a look at how to do that with the navy. From our assessment it looks like we're going to be able to sustain that indefinitely,, and in terms of our commitment from an air side of the house, it's the same thing.

So we will be able to sustain that for quite some time.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Stoffer.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Vice-Admiral, you stated you hadn't read the Hill Times, but there is another two-page article by an expert in intelligence and security from the University of Toronto. He writes about intelligence failure in the U.S. and Canada. He talks about gathering, analysing, and disseminating information.

How have your resources expanded since September 11 in this process to allow you to carry on what has to be done within this?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I may ask Brigadier-General Samson to add a few things here when I finish.

We have a capability from an intelligence side of the house that is quite high-tech. It enjoys an excellent relationship, in terms of the professional products our people put on the table with our allies and for our own needs, that involves literally hundreds and hundreds of folks.

Before September 11, we were focused on a number of areas, from a global perspective. After September 11, we have taken a vast majority of these folks and focused them on the specifics of this current campaign against terrorism, primarily the al-Qaeda networks and related networks, the Taliban regime, and so on.

They are the people who actually take the products, whether they're imagery products or signals intelligence, from whatever different types of sources, and do the analysis of what they mean: what are we hearing; what does it really mean; and what do you as decision-makers now need to make decisions on? They have been working extremely hard at that.

There is another group, and they are the folks who belong to the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group. They are the technical support to the Communications Security Establishment—the CSE. Again, many hundreds of folks are supporting that particular endeavour.

So a large proportion of our people are very much focused on that particular intelligence construct as a result of September 11.

Is there anything else you want to add, Pat?

• 1630

Brigadier-General Patricia Samson (Director General, Intelligence, Department of National Defence): As the admiral mentioned, I'm responsible for the analytical aspect of the information that's collected. We have not expanded any, from where I sit. We're using our resources wisely to make sure we can sustain what is going on now, from an analytical point of view. We're not doing as much overlapping any more.

We've set our priorities. As the admiral said, areas that are not key at the moment, we're not focusing on as much. We will focus on them maybe once a week instead of every day. But we're making sure the number of people we have can provide the information and the analytical product to our decision-makers.

At the moment, we are doing very well. If somebody came and gave us extra people, of course, we would take them. But at the moment we can sustain what we're doing.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I had major concerns when I was told that CSIS reported in 1999 that they knew there were about 350 terrorists in Canada. When they asked for an increase in their budgets because they needed more staff, they got a dramatic decrease in their budgets instead.

So I've been concerned because you said, Vice-Admiral, you don't believe any areas in Canada have been designated with regard to this. As you know, in my city we have the nuclear power plant, Point Lepreau, and the largest privately owned oil refinery in Canada.

On Sunday night I received a call from a person who works in Saint John, telling me they were looking at Saint John, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, and I think the other one was Calgary. They said your people should be very cognizant of that. It was a major concern when I heard this on the phone.

I know you people would stay on top of that; I wouldn't expect you to tell me. But do you work closely with CSIS, the RCMP, and all of the—

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Very much so.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. I just have one other question.

Because of the creation of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, OCIPEP, one of your responsibilities as the deputy chief of defence staff is to oversee emergency preparedness on behalf of the deputy minister. I'm not sure how they word this, but they're telling me it's the deputy chief. You're either the deputy chief or the deputy minister, but I think you're the deputy chief.

Have the responsibilities of the deputy chief of staff, with regard to emergency preparedness, changed as a result of the creation of OCIPEP?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think it's important to understand that the deputy chief—which is what I am—has always had the responsibility, if the defence department was called on to respond and provide assistance, of taking a look at the situation. Where are our assets? Where are our resources? What capabilities do we have locally? If we don't have them locally, how do we get them in to respond to a particular incident or series of events right across the country?

Emergency preparedness was part and parcel of the defence department until OCIPEP, which is a much broader umbrella for coordinating all government departments. One of the great beauties of the current arrangement is that Madam Purdy and her office is co-located with us. Every single day, when we're doing our daily assessments and so on, a member of her staff feeds us information, and we feed them information. So if something occurs, we work very closely together.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's good.

The Chair: Your time has expired, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. I'll get it on the next round.

The Chair: Mr. Anders, five minutes.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to quote from the Canadian Defence Association. It says the combat capabilities of the Canadian contingent are reduced because of the shortcomings in operational readiness:

The size of the naval task group, some 50 percent of available ships... (...and manpower shortages) will make it very difficult for the navy to sustain that level of commitment....

• 1635

It goes on to say that deployment beyond six months may encounter serious problems.

So I want to pose this question to you, Admiral Maddison. When will the HMCS Huron be staffed and fully operational?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I don't know the answer to that question. I'm not sure exactly what it is the navy is studying at the moment, although I know they are looking at their whole readiness in terms of what number of ships they need to keep at the highest level of readiness to sustain for a period of time past six months, what number of ships they need not to keep at that level of readiness, and whether or not they ought to be diverting some of their folks in staff positions and in other jobs to actually go into Huron. I know they're looking at that. But I don't know what the answer to their analysis is, because I don't think it's complete yet.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

Now, you have been heavily involved with the navy. That's your background. That's your career.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Right.

Mr. Rob Anders: You're part of the senior service. And if you don't know the answer, I would assume—and I've heard many times when I've been out in Esquimalt that they can't staff the Huron. Therefore, with that quote from the Canadian Defence Association that deployment beyond six months may encounter serious problems, you can't staff the Huron. Isn't that a pretty fair assessment?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, I don't think that is the bottom line here. If it is concluded that we really need to have that ship available, then I think there is flexibility in the navy to be able to move some people around to man that ship. It will be extremely difficult. It's going to be a real challenge for them to do that, and some other things they are doing are likely to be impacted as a result.

But our commitment at the moment is a task group, and you only need one flagship for that task group—one of the four destroyers that has that command and control and communications capability, that has that arrière-defense capability in terms of the standard missile system. You only need one of those to provide that area defence for your task group. I think the flexibility in terms of making sure they have one of those ships to sustain the task group is certainly there. Whether it's Huron or not, I won't say that's irrelevant, but they'll be able to have a 280-class ship to do that job.

Mr. Rob Anders: Would you like to see the Huron fully staffed and operational?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I would like to have as much flexibility as we possibly could have.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay.

Referring to intelligence, you mentioned during your speech “analyzing the raw data”. It's on page 8 of the 10 pages. What exactly do you mean by “analyzing the raw data”? Is that phone transmissions? What exactly is that?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I've got to watch myself here in terms of what I can and cannot say. We get data that is raw in the sense that it hasn't been analyzed yet. We get signals intelligence. We get imagery products. We then analyze those and a number of other different inputs to determine what this really tells us. What does this really mean in terms of dispersal of units? What does this really mean in terms of capabilities vis-à-vis weapons systems that are out there and so on? We get a whole host of what I would call first-line raw data. This is the input we have now. More importantly, what does that mean? That's the analytical part of it.

Mr. Rob Anders: You also make mention on page 4 of your 10-page presentation about “human sources as well as signals intelligence”. I know the United States particularly has been hamstrung with political involvements, in terms of the CIA and whatnot, to actually go out and hire spies per se and people who are involved in various activities in order to get at others. Is that what you mean by human sources—the hiring of spies?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, that's not what we're talking about at all. We're not talking about a covert James Bond-type of capability here at all. What we're talking about is being able to train better, if you will, folks who are deployed in operations, to be able to see some of the indicators, to be able to get out and talk to folks in the local communities and so on, and to be able to ask the right questions that would allow us to have better information in terms of what is happening in the areas we're working for.

• 1640

We have attachés, for example, who are able to talk to people in the local areas and the local theatres and so on. Because they are trained in being able to ask the right kinds of questions, they are able to provide us certainly a better analysis of what's happening than perhaps we would have had otherwise. That's what we're really talking about here.

Mr. Rob Anders: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Plamondon, five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

An anti-terrorism bill has just received second reading in the House of Commons. This bill has been referred to a committee and will come back to the House of Commons for third reading in about two weeks.

My remarks do not concern the Armed Forces in particular; this is more of a general comment on security. From what you know about this anti-terrorism bill, how will it help you as members of the military and what particular features will help you the most?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Well, it's certainly not within my realm of responsibility, as you quite correctly said, sir.

The one area that I do know that is part and parcel of the legislation is in terms of what the Communications Security Establishment can and cannot do. From that perspective, in terms of being able to—perhaps when it's passed—monitor traffic by terrorists that's originating or ending in Canada, I think it is something that is really going to be very, very useful to Canada, indeed, if that were to occur.

Other than that, I have no other comment to make on that, Monsieur Plamondon.

[Translation]

Mr. Louis Plamondon: I expected you to refer to this part. In your opinion, do the provisions proposed in the bill go far enough, or would you like to have even more electronic monitoring powers and believe that the provisions will not change your role significantly?

[English]

VAdm G.R. Maddison: My response to that, as far as I understand it, based on what I just said, is that would be very, very helpful indeed, if that were to occur.

Mr. Louis Plamondon: Okay.

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Plamondon.

Mr. Wood, five minutes.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maddison, nice to see you again.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you.

Mr. Bob Wood: I think you probably have a better attendance record here than half of the people at the table.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Bob Wood: You seem to be here all the time.

The Chair: Mr. Wood, now that you're finished making new friends, could you get on with your questions?

Mr. Bob Wood: Oh, we've been friends for a long time. I can say that.

On page 3, a couple of paragraphs tweaked my interest, because you say you're focusing on developing an overall Canadian plan, and the coalition command is under U.S. Central Command. In the next paragraph you say that “they will remain under Canadian command, and in compliance with Canadian law. They will also operate under Canadian rules of engagement”. Isn't that a little bit cluttered up? Or is it not?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Actually, I think it's real simple.

Mr. Bob Wood: All right. Explain it to me.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Every time any unit goes out and is deployed in an operation, the chief of defence staff maintains full command over that unit, meaning there's nothing those ships, assets, or whatever can do without his personal authority that has been agreed to ahead of time.

What he does then is he delegates what's called “operational command” to a joint task force commander, who happens to be a commodore Canadian, who is in CENTCOM at the moment, who is responsible for making sure the assets that have been assigned to him in fact continue to be ready, that they are supported in terms of the missions and tasks they're doing. He has discipline authority over the folks who have been assigned and so on. So he maintains that level of operational command over those assets.

We then delegate what's called “operational control” to the local theatre commanders. In this particular case, somewhere within the Arabian Sea area, one of our ships is deployed, working with the coalition and under the operational control of an American commander, who can assign that ship tasks and missions that have been previously agreed to by Canada, under the full command of the chief of defence staff.

• 1645

At all times those ships, those assets, whatever, that are involved are under Canadian rules of engagement. There are specific directions as to how much force can or cannot be applied in certain circumstances. No one's telling us that you must apply this level of force or whatever. That's our decision to take, which I think is a very important position.

Mr. Bob Wood: But do we have somebody at U.S. Central Command headquarters?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: We have somewhere in the vicinity of about 35 people down there.

Mr. Bob Wood: All working.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: All Canadians working there. They're very much integrated into the overall coalition headquarters where this is being run from.

Mr. Bob Wood: I have another question in a different area, and maybe General Samson could answer this. With the rapid advancement in technology, how secure is the Canadian Forces communications system? Everything is changing fairly rapidly, so how secure is it?

BGen Patricia Samson: That certainly is an area outside my scope of responsibility.

Mr. Bob Wood: I thought you might have known of it, but somebody else can answer it.

BGen Patricia Samson: I assure you we have absolutely no problem passing the information we get from our allies back and forth to them on the information systems we currently have. So we find it very secure.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: One of the main responsibilities of the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group is the security of our computer systems in terms of what we would call the departmental Internet system, in terms of communicating with all of our various outstations and so on, including our allies, up to and including at a top secret level. We certainly have taken some significant steps in the course of the past number of weeks to make sure those computer systems are in fact secure. We obviously focused in on the highest security ones first, and we have migrated that down to the unclassified level. Quite a number of the folks I was referring to at CFIOG are making sure that that is indeed the case.

Mr. Bob Wood: Mr. Benoit brought up earlier the issue of recruiting, getting up to a higher complement of people, and taking the time to train these people. I thought I read or heard somewhere that in the recruiting end of it now, sir, you are offering bonuses for certain skills from the high-tech trade. Is that correct? If you are, does this help put people back into the army or into the field a lot quicker when you hire these people who are already maybe trained out on civvy street or whatever?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's an excellent point. You're absolutely right. We started this recruiting campaign somewhere about six months ago, and we were very much focused in on a number of trades, a number of classifications we were looking for. As this particular campaign went on we discovered we were doing really quite well in some trades but not in trades such as engineers, computer analyst skills, and so on.

We have just recently had the authority from Treasury Board to have a series of bonuses, if you will, for people who have some significant skills who can come right in, and with a certain amount of training at the beginning in terms of recruit training and so on, because they're already skilled and trained in those specific areas, we can plug them in fairly quickly. That part of it has just, within the last few weeks, been authorized. We have yet to see whether or not we're getting a significant number of folks. But the bonuses are anywhere between $10,000 and $20,000, depending on what kind of training you've had before you would join the forces.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is again on the intelligence question. CSC was before us and told us they have agreements with four countries, Australia, the U.K., the United States, and New Zealand, in terms of sharing the information. I asked them about NATO, and they say they have information sharing with NATO but nothing on a formal level like we do with the other four.

I ask this question out of ignorance: would it not be advisable to move towards an agreement such as we have with those four countries with all of our NATO partners in terms of that type of information?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: We do. We have very good agreements with our NATO partners.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: But on the same level as the four we have now?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Historically there's been a very strong relationship between what's called AUSCANUKUS, which is, as you say, those five particular countries. And between those five countries we have been able to look at various geographical regions that one country may be responsible for in terms of trying to determine various intelligence information and so on. But we also have similar arrangements with France, with Germany, with a number of the NATO allies, and in fact we actually have a NATO net in which information is passed at a highly classified level amongst our NATO partners.

• 1650

Mr. Peter Stoffer: For those that are non-NATO or non-allies, let's say, for example, a country like China, or another country of that nature, where they have information and we would like to have access to it, or they would like to give it to us because of the threat of terrorism—they did come out and condemn it—do we have the capability in terms of people with the various languages concerned? How would that process happen, if a country that is not normally what would be considered our ally shares that type of information with us?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: In some cases, we have different agreements with nations. Some of them are just bilateral agreements at various levels. One of the things that we certainly recognized post-September 11 was the requirement to have as much linguistic capability, linguistic skills, out there as we can, and I think some of our recruiting at the moment is trying to increase and enhance our capability in that area, particularly in signals intercept work and intelligence work and so on. Certainly the attachés I talked about previously, who are in about 38 different countries around the world, give or take a few, and are accredited to a number, develop some strong relationships with those countries and are able to provide us with information that is very useful indeed.

So there are a number of different ways to be able to do this.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I throw this, my last question, out to either one of you. If you were writing a report to give to the Minister of Finance for the budget, of all the priorities you'd like to see, what would be the number one thing you could advise this committee to advise the Minister of Finance? That's an open question, so it's anything you like, and remember you're televised.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm probably going to repeat myself here, but I think the area we're already putting a fair bit of resources towards in terms of trying to attract more and more people is the whole issue of recruiting our folks, of being able to have the resources to allow us to increase the number of folks we'd like to have. It would be that.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, five minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Deputy Chief, I have to say, because you come from the maritime provinces—

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, that shows me he's doing a great job. He really is. It's one of the best presentations I've heard. That's because he comes from the Maritimes.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm sure that's because of my two colleagues on either side.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right. They help.

As you know, some of us have been fighting for a shipbuilding policy for the navy, and having the most modern shipyard there is in Canada sitting right there idle at the present time in Saint John, it really worries me. We don't feel you should be saying, we're going to have a contract for six or eight frigates, or what have you, but we feel that on a rotating basis there is a need for us to have a shipbuilding policy and to build our ships right here in Canada.

I say this, and I feel very strongly that it's not just because of the shipyard being idle and because we have the qualified people to do it. But I really feel that for the navy we should have this, and I want to know what you think, sir.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Our role, of course, is to be able to articulate what is the requirement from an operational perspective, and then obviously decisions outside my realm will be taken in terms of either meeting that requirement or not. I can tell you, obviously wearing this uniform, that the product that came out of Saint John Shipbuilding, i.e., the 12 frigates, or the nine frigates and three elsewhere, all of them, were world-class frigates.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, they are.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There's absolutely no question about that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The workers in that particular shipyard did an absolutely fabulous job.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, they did.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: And it is the reason why, when we decide to deploy forces in terms of this particular campaign, Operation Apollo, we have a tremendous amount of confidence that our people have the tools to allow them to do that job. At some point in time, well into the future, there will be a requirement to replace those frigates.

We recognize that there is a requirement, and that's why there is a project at the moment to replace the AORs, the three replenishment ships. If that gets approved, then they're going to have to be built somewhere.

• 1655

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, and Saint John is the spot, I have to tell you, just so you all know.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Halifax.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, darling, Saint John.

I also mentioned to you that we have the nuclear power plant, Point Lepreau. In a nuclear emergency, including terrorist incidents within Canada, you, as the deputy chief of defence staff, through the chief of staff J3, are responsible for the strategic command and control of the response by the forces. So to what extent can you count on the nuclear emergency response teams in Halifax, in Esquimalt, as well as in the section in Nanoose, to back the efforts of the NBC response team anywhere in Canada?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: As you quite correctly pointed out, Ms. Wayne, we have some tremendously well-trained folks in the nuclear emergency response teams on either coast, who, in an emergency, will obviously be looked at in terms of their ability to deploy somewhere.

We have the NBC response team, which is mostly based in Borden, a small team of about 29 folks who are part and parcel of the RCMP response team. If we were called in to support the local or provincial authorities, we obviously would do that.

One of the things post-September 11 that we are very seriously looking at, as I think the minister and the chief have actually already stated, is to enhance that kind of capability. We're looking at perhaps having a number of four or five teams stationed across the country that would be able to be available to respond, if they were asked to do that.

One of the things we're also taking a look at is having a team that would have maybe as many as 100 or more folks with very specific training who ultimately, again as a last resort, could deploy. So we're looking at a number of those things very closely indeed.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Dromisky, I understand you have a short question, and I understand as well that Mr. Wilfert would like to share some of your time, if there's any left over.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: I'll give him 30 seconds. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In the past few days we have received a very rational and logical defence for maintaining the Joint Task Force 2 in one physical, permanent location within the country. But there have been other people who have suggested or recommended that we could possibly double the number of people we have in the Joint Task Force 2 and possibly locate another base some place in western Canada. A suggestion was even made over the western side of the mountains, probably near Vancouver or somewhere in that region.

In light of the comments I've made, can I get some kind of response regarding doubling and establishing a second base?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Thank you very much for your question.

Once again, post-September 11, one of the things we looked at is should we increase our capability in terms of responding to an incident that would be a counter-terrorist incident. We are very much looking at enhancing our capability. It's early days in terms of being able to make any decisions as to what level we might enhance that to, if you will.

It is important to recognize that these folks are extremely specialized individuals. The amount of training they do is significant in a whole host of different areas. It's not just the physical fitness side of the house, but it's their ability to have the right psychological makeup to make decisions very quickly in extremely stressful situations. Not everybody has the ability to do that. We recruit from within the Canadian Forces for that particular capability, if you will.

For us to enhance significantly the numbers we currently have, it would take some particular period of time. The specialized training they do requires a whole host of different types of facilities. We've always kept it in one place because it is significantly resource intensive. To do this somewhere else, and having two, would be very costly indeed. So this is an issue we would have to take a look at.

• 1700

To answer your question, sir, we are certainly looking at our ability, how quickly we could do it if we had to, to increase our JTF2 capability.

Mr. Stan Dromisky: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dromisky.

Now we go to Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to the admiral.

I'd like to see clarification on an earlier comment of yours. In response to one of my colleagues on the other side, I believe you said this is not our white paper; it's the government's white paper. Can you explain that?

It's my understanding that it was the armed forces who put on the table their requirements, their needs, in a post-Cold War period. Yes, the government eventually released this paper, which presumably had tremendous input from the armed forces.

Could you explain what you meant by that comment?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I wasn't trying to be at all negative with that particular comment. I meant to say that this is a government document, the government's white paper on defence. A tremendous amount of input was given in terms of developing the white paper back when it was published in 1994, and certainly in 1993 I in fact was one of the individuals who put some presentations forward for folks to consider. It is the fundamental document upon which the defence department operates.

My comment is basically that it's a government document. It's not Strategy 2020, which is a departmental document. The white paper is obviously a government document that had a tremendous amount of input from the defence department.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I raise the question, Mr. Chairman, through you to the admiral, simply because in some quarters, from time to time, we have heard that the reason some people think the military is in the state it's in is because the government decided in the end on certain things that the military may not have agreed with at the time. Obviously, I would hope—and it's my understanding—the military contributed significantly to the document.

The other question I might ask, Mr. Chairman, through you—probably one you're not going to be able to answer, or you might like to answer—is on the issue of base closings. In light of the changes that have happened since September 11, I would identify the base at Chilliwack, British Columbia, for example. It was a state-of-the-art base and now all the operations come out of Edmonton. From an operational and logistical standpoint—and I wasn't around when the base was closed, but I certainly have a relationship there—I'm concerned. Are we able now in the post-September 11 environment to respond to the same degree?

At the time there were issues with regard to natural disasters, etc. This is probably one for the minister, but is there any thought on whether we should revisit some of these issues surrounding base closings, or, as Mr. Stoffer would like to say, maybe we should be more prudent before we close any more, given the current state of affairs?

The Chair: Could you answer very quickly, Admiral?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: You're right, I'm not the right person to answer that question.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: I knew that, but I wanted to put my comments on the record. Thank you, Admiral.

The Chair: Now Mrs. Gallant has the floor for five minutes.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to share my time with Mr. Benoit, if there's any left over.

Who is the overall Canadian commander of Operation Apollo—not just for the navy, but for anything going on on the ground? Who would that be?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The individual who has full command of all Canadian Forces is the chief of defence staff.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: So there's not a general in charge specifically, a commanding officer for the troops?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There is a task force commander at the operational level, who is a flag officer, a commodore, actually in charge, and he is located down at the central command headquarters.

In terms of the naval task group itself, there is another commodore commanding all the ships assigned to him in theatre.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Who would that be?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I'm not going to tell you his name.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay. So if something goes wrong, who has the oversight? Who do we go to?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: What do you mean, if something goes wrong? I don't think I understand the question.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: If there are questions called into play, who is in charge at that level?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The chief of defence staff is in charge.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Maybe I'm asking the question incorrectly.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: He then delegates a certain amount of authority and responsibility to his various commanders at different levels.

• 1705

The next individual in that chain, if you will, in terms of the command responsibility, is called the commander of the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. He is located in the central command headquarters. It is his responsibility to make sure of the various missions and tasks assigned, whether to the air side, the naval side, or the land side—if ever a land component is involved—that the folks have the right level of readiness and are doing the things that have been assigned to them properly. He does this within the coalition network that's in central command.

One of the people who works for him is the commander of the naval task group who is actually employed at sea. He works for the commander in central command, who works for the chief of defence staff.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: For example, in Bosnia the overall commander was General Hillier, and for our area of operations we had Colonel Corrigan. So who is the equivalent for this operation?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Colonel Corrigan would be working directly for the chief of defence staff. General Hillier was in a NATO command. He was working for the NATO chain of command.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: So who are the equivalents for this particular operation?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Well, the equivalents.... First of all, we don't have a NATO operation per se, so take General Hillier out of it.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay, so we've got the coalition.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: The coalition equivalent is Commodore Thiffault, who is in Tampa, Florida, in central command. He is the equivalent to Colonel Corrigan, if that puts it into perspective for you.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay, and is that an American in Tampa?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No, it's a Canadian.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Were any of our troops on board either of the U.S. helicopters that crashed?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: No.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: There were absolutely no Canadians.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: There were absolutely no Canadians.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Those are all my questions.

The Chair: You have one and a half minutes, Mr. Benoit. Use them wisely.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm sure you would agree I always do—or maybe not.

Admiral, I want to pursue this whole issue of sustainability of our operations in connection with the war against terrorism in particular. I want to carry the question of whether we have the people available just a little farther.

You said back in a May meeting here that we were 400 technical personnel short in the navy. Has anything been done to fix this up? Are we still 400 short, or more than 400 short now?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I don't know exactly what the number would be now, since I'm no longer the head of the navy. My understanding is there have been some improvements, but certainly not anywhere near to actually take the majority of this out.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have been told that even at this first deployment we had to rob some from the army in some of these technical positions, and I know that goes on, but what about the second and third rotations, if we go to another year beyond this one?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Our assessment is that we are able to sustain a level of capability past the six months. This will mean in some circumstances—I'm just speculating here—that some folks who were in staff positions may actually be posted to ships to help out, but it's not something that's going to be so significant as to become a real problem in this regard.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But there may be some awful tight deployments, I would think, for some of these technical people.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It's going to be a challenge. There's no question about it.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Do I have time to get into...he's not paying attention, so I do.

The Chair: Yes, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. To carry on a little bit more in terms of equipment, you were asked a question earlier by my colleague about destroyers and you said we can rotate with the three and manage, probably, although you'd like the additional flexibility.

What about supply ships? That's probably the most obvious shortage. We have only two supply ships. With one overseas, it only leaves one in Canada, which means we don't have one on one of the coasts.

Without considering at this time homeland defence and security, how are we going to manage with just two supply ships without some very tight rotation?

• 1710

VAdm G.R. Maddison: We haven't come to a conclusion yet in terms of how that aspect of the task group is going to unfold at the end of the day. But I will say that there a number of other AORs of other nations who are out there in the theatre and with whom we have operated for years, if not decades. If there is a period of time in which we are not going to be able to have an AOR in the theatre, there are a whole host of others we can use.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So there are others that can provide the function of the supply ship?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

We're going back and forth now, folks. It's Mr. Wilfert and then Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, I will ask a question I know the admiral can answer.

Admiral, we're the only G-8 nation that doesn't have a foreign intelligence agency. It has been suggested by some individuals, including Keith Coulter, that we are in fact receiving and benefiting from more intelligence information than we are providing.

Given the fact that we don't have a foreign intelligence agency, do you think it would be an asset for the armed forces if we had one abroad? Given the fact that much of what we are receiving from others—and granted, from the Americans, as an example.... I am sure they are sharing information, though whether some is being screened or not I'm obviously not in a position to know. But it seems strange that we don't have one.

The issue would then be, should it be under CSIS, should it be under DFAIT, or should it be stand-alone? I wonder if you would like to comment, through the chair, to that.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: First of all, we're talking about military intelligence here. I can safely say that in terms of the information we receive and need from a military intelligence perspective, we get the information we need to allow us to do proper analysis. We need to know what the capabilities are of the folks we might be going against out there and what their plans are. We need to analyze their intent to use their capabilities. By the way, this feeds into our own future requirements as to what we need in terms of our weapons, sensor systems, and so on.

At this particular point in time, I'm not sure, from a military intelligence perspective, that we need a foreign intelligence service per se.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, through you, you talked in your comments, Admiral, about an information fusion capability. In your comments you talked about merging these technical capabilities into an integrated whole at the same time you're dealing with projects. Can you elaborate on that in terms of what that will mean for the armed forces and in terms of future operations?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think the best way to do that is actually to look at it at a tactical level, and then I will try to extrapolate that to the strategic level.

At the tactical level, if you ever have the opportunity to go into what are called the data fusion centres in either Halifax or Esquimalt, the two fleet headquarters, you will see in there a capability where the operators and the intelligence folks are actually working together and getting data from a whole host of different sources out there. Some of it is unclassified and some of it is classified at various levels. All that information, including what we can get through access to a number of government departments, to Lloyd's shipping lists, etc., is then brought into this particular fusion centre. It is fused, if you will, and displayed on a screen so that the admiral on either coast knows on a real-time basis what activity is happening in his area of responsibility.

Being able to build and maintain that picture allows him, if there's a pollution incident, a fisheries violation incident, or a drug operation going on, to get information from his contacts and then be reactive by putting in Auroras or ships to support the RCMP in bringing the incident to a successful conclusion.

What we want to be able to do—we have it to a certain extent, but we need to enhance it—is to have that same sort of ability at the strategic level here in our headquarters in Ottawa. We recognized this about two years ago, in fact, that this was something we really needed to have to allow us to have that real-time information to better enable us to know what is going on in order to make decisions.

As a result of September 11, we have really accelerated that process to allow us to build this data fusion centre from a strategic national perspective. That's what I'm talking about.

• 1715

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Thank you, Admiral.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll be very quick, sir. If in your review it is decided that another JTF2 force should be put in, for example in the Fraser Valley in B.C., you wouldn't get much argument from this quarter.

As a final remark, sir, let me say that anything you can do along the way to save our Shearwater would be greatly appreciated.

At this time I'd like to pass my remaining time over to the chairperson, as I know he probably has some very valuable questions to ask you.

The Chair: Did you want to comment on Mr. Stoffer's remarks, Admiral Maddison?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: It was noted.

The Chair: Thank you for that, Mr. Stoffer, but I am going to pass my time to anybody on this side who wants to ask a question.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood: I have a quick question. I was just sitting and thinking, after everything that has gone on since September 11, Admiral...it's just an incredible experience. But what I want to ask is, how better a force are we going to be when this is all over? To my mind, we're going to be a hell of a lot better.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's a really good question. I guess my professional sense is that we are really going to be much more effective in terms of targeting where it is we really need to put the resources and capabilities we currently have. As tragic as this was—and obviously it was—if ever there was a scenario that supported the need for a multi-purpose capability and flexibility in terms of the capabilities we have in the forces to react to this sort of thing, it is this. In terms of the naval component, in terms of the wide variety of air assets we're going to be able to put on the table, and in terms of special operations vis-à-vis JTF2 and what they can do, it has certainly proved the importance of having that multi-purpose capability.

Mr. Bob Wood: I suppose in your case, and in the case of a lot of your colleagues, this is the first time you've been in a situation like this.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I think it's the first time the world has been in a situation like this.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's true. But I was referring to the people who are in the Canadian Forces at a command level.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Well, it is obviously a unique set of circumstances, one that none of us ever wanted to happen. But we do have a fair number of people across the Canadian Forces who have been involved in some very difficult operations, in particular over the course of the last ten years. They were in the Gulf War, for example, and in some of the things that have been happening over the course of time in Croatia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the Balkans.

The navy was particularly focused on what was called Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea against Serbia-Montenegro in the middle of the 1990s. Our operations continue in the Gulf in terms of enforcing the sanctions against Iraq. There was the Aviano business for the air force. We have been in a number of operations that have been very complex and much more sophisticated than what we've had in the past, never mind the domestic crises we've had from time to time within our own nation. We have a lot of people in the Canadian Forces with a tremendous amount of experience.

One of the great things I have seen in the past six weeks was our ability to react to the horrific circumstances on September 11 in a calm and measured fashion and be able to put people out there to do a good job.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Let me ask a very quick question, Vice-Admiral Maddison. I'd like to pick up on the questioning Mr. Wilfert asked you earlier in connection with the whole business of a foreign intelligence agency for Canada. You indicated that you didn't see any need for a foreign intelligence agency for Canada, based on the fact that you felt you were getting all the information you needed.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: That's from a military intelligence perspective. General Samson may have another view here, and I'll ask her to speak in a moment.

From the purely military intelligence side of the house, with our agencies and the strong links we have with a number of nations out there, I'm not entirely certain we would be making the best use of our resources if we were to develop that type of capability.

At a another level, in terms of CSIS and so on, there is from my perspective a different argument.

• 1720

The Chair: I would like to ask you a more pointed question in that regard. I don't mean to be overly cryptic here, but in the intelligence world, is it not a truism to say that you don't know what you don't know?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Sometimes, yes.

The Chair: And other G-8 countries must have some reason for a reliance on a separate foreign intelligence agency. It begs the question why we don't have an agency out there to provide some balance in terms of the information we're receiving. If we're getting this information from our allies, and there's no Canadian spin on it, if it's not being provided by Canadian sources, either foreign or domestic, then perhaps we're not getting a truly independent picture.

We're getting what our allies would like us to hear. They're close allies. They have been our best friends for many years, but at the same time they have their interests as well.

I go back to this old quote from Lord Palmerston, I think it was, who said, “Britain has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies, only eternal interests”.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I don't disagree a capability in that area would be useful. I'm trying to look at it from all the other things we would want to focus our activities on. I'm just not sure that's at the top of the priority list.

I will make one comment, however, and that is that we don't rely on our allies to do the analysis and come to the conclusions here. We do get a significant amount of raw data. We do our own analysis in terms of what does this mean, notwithstanding what some of our allies think it means. We have, on many occasions, come up with our own separate assessment and our own separate analysis, and we have been quite correct, in actual fact.

Let me ask General Samson what her view is.

BGen Patricia Samson: What the admiral is saying is quite true. When we have troops deployed, whether it be in Bosnia or wherever, we have people on the ground. They can get the information we require to be analysed.

From an intelligence point of view, and this is a good part of my own personal feeling, I do believe we need a foreign intelligence service.

Tomorrow I'll perhaps be looking for a new job, but that's beside the point.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

BGen Patricia Samson: I'm going to go to Shearwater.

The Chair: I should tell you, General, frankness is always rewarded by this committee.

BGen Patricia Samson: Where it should be, the options—with CSIS, with DFAIT, on its own—I have no real opinion on that. Do I believe the information we can get from that kind of agency is important? Absolutely. Do I think that's the kind of information we require to fight terrorism? Absolutely.

One of the things we learned from this whole issue of September 11 is that these terrorist cells have to be penetrated. We need that type of information.

So that's where I stand.

From a military point of view, we get the information we require for our operations, but over and above that, yes, I believe we need it.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I have Mr. Benoit and then Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You said, Admiral, at the committee meeting in May that the navy requires at least three and possibly four new support ships. Now you told me today that we may well have to borrow the use of supply ships.

What would the cost be? How does that work? Is it an exchange type of thing or do we have to pay? Will it come out of the military budget to rent the use of a supply ship? And do you see any way we can accelerate the procurement of new supply ships?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Certainly, when we were looking at the statement of requirement to replace the AOR, we recognized that we needed to have a little more flexibility than we currently have. This was because we were going to try to put three different missions in one type of vessel. The actual support to the task group is in terms of replenishment support, passing fuel, ammunition, and that sort of thing, as well as having that lift capability in terms of supporting, for example, the vanguard of the army, with all its equipment and the like, and having the command and control capability to operate a joint force at sea.

• 1725

When I was in the navy we were arguing for three, possibly four, ships for that particular program. I think that requirement still exists and it is currently being articulated for that.

In terms of your first question, we have so many arrangements, MOUs, and agreements with our allies. We're not going to rent vessels per se. If in fact we go alongside and take some fuel, they note that Canada took this amount of fuel, and when we fuel American ships, for example, we note it. It's a quid pro quo kind of thing. No cash is passed around at all. We support one another in that regard.

What was the third part of your question?

Mr. Leon Benoit: It had to do with procurement. Cabinet hasn't agreed to this procurement yet. The in-service date, I understand, couldn't possibly be before 2006, but won't we need these ships much sooner than that? Is there any way of speeding up this procurement, that you know of?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Yes, I know the procurement folks and the navy are actually taking a look at that very question in terms of how feasible it is to try to accelerate this particular process. One thing that is happening is the whole issue of lift.

It has been really reinforced in the last little while. We have been asked to take a look at that.

I don't have any simple answers for you, other than the fact that we are looking at it.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay.

We have twelve frigates. Some are at a lower state of readiness. You said that usually we have two in maintenance and refit; some have said three. It depends. It takes three on station, three having just returned, and three preparing to deploy. We have them all tied up. Yet if they are at a lower state of readiness and if we don't have the people to boost that, aren't we going to reach a real crunch here sometime, perhaps after the next rotation?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: When ships are preparing to deploy and when they've actually come back, they don't stay alongside the wall for long periods of time. They are continuing to be used from a domestic perspective, very often and very frequently. They may go out for two or three days, come back alongside for a couple of days, and go out again. They may go off for a couple of weeks in terms of a fisheries mission on the east coast or on the west coast. Unlike the army's rotation, where they come back and then they're in garrison for a long period of time, the navy doesn't necessarily have those ships alongside for three, four, five, or six months before they go and deploy them again.

So from a domestic perspective, the resources are certainly there to provide that level of domestic security we need, even if we have three ships deployed.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you see no restriction in terms of homeland defence and homeland security resulting from the extra demands put on from this war against terrorism?

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Our ability to be able to meet both the campaign against terrorism and our domestic needs will be maintained.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Mr. Chairman, through you, first of all, I won't revisit the foreign intelligence issue, but, Admiral, if I were casting a vote, I'd be voting for the general.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I have an open mind, I must tell you.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: Okay. Glad to hear that.

General, my father was what we call a foot soldier in the Second World War. He always told me that it's really foot soldiers who win the wars. No offence to the navy or the air force.

The fact is that we see in the current situation in Afghanistan the use of advanced technology. We see the use of smart bombs and all of this weaponry. In the end, we are now hearing that probably the land forces will be needed in order to do the job. Certain types of special land forces, obviously, are playing a critical role.

In terms of JTF2 and its current strength and its current role, although designed domestically as well as in foreign conflicts, would it be your recommendation that this is an area we should be visiting in terms of resources? We talk a lot about the technology side, but in terms of having the type of personnel required, might that be an area we should be visiting...increasing the numbers?

• 1730

VAdm G.R. Maddison: One of the things we are in fact studying fairly significantly at the moment is our ability to increase the numbers of people within the JTF2. Obviously, no decisions have been taken at all at this particular point in time, but how feasible is that?

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: It would seem, Mr. Chairman, through you to the admiral, that when we are looking at the capabilities and the needs of the military, clearly, although we put emphasis on modern technology, it still seems we come back to the issue of troop strength, the issue of having the needed people to do the job.

You talked about the issue of rotation, and I certainly couldn't agree with you more. We want to cut down the number of personnel who have to go over and come back and go over...and obviously, the impact on their families. We want to strike that right balance.

Again, I go back to the question of budgeting. We as a committee have, in my view, a golden opportunity to hopefully influence the Minister of Finance's budget. I realize that money is not abundant, but I can't think of a better time to provide the right signal for the armed forces by providing the kinds of dollars....

On the types of questions that are being asked around here, to me, it's important to get the kinds of answers that I'm hearing in terms of where we should be looking at those allocations. It is critical not only in terms of capabilities, but also in continuing our fight on the home front in terms of the quality of life indicators. Although we are heading in the right direction, in my view, we still have some way to go.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: I wish you every success in your endeavours in this regard. We all recognize within our department the incredible amount of work and the success this committee has had over the past number of years, particularly as it relates to things like the quality of life work.

So we very much welcome the opportunity to try to put our views on the table for your consideration.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: And we thank you for that.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wilfert.

We are past our time, as a matter of fact, in terms of questioning. And we do have an item, by the way, members, that I would like to deal with very quickly in camera, if we could.

Before doing that, I would like to thank you again, Vice-Admiral Maddison, for your testimony today, and as well, Brigadier General Samson and Commodore Forcier. I appreciated your comments here. I think we had some very good comments with respect to particular issues related to intelligence, and we thank you for those and for all of the other details you provided us with.

On behalf of the committee, we look forward to seeing you at some point in the not-too-distant future.

VAdm G.R. Maddison: Our pleasure.

The Chair: I would ask members to stay around for a few more minutes. We would like to have an in camera meeting relating to the committee's interim report.

This meeting is adjourned.