JUST Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

• 1820

[English]

The Chair (Hon. Andy Scott (Fredericton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the 19th meeting of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to order. Tonight we'll be doing clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-24, an act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

We have, for the government, Richard Mosley, the Assistant Deputy Minister from the policy sector, Department of Justice. I recognize many other faces in the crowd, so I'm sure if anyone has questions and those at the table aren't the people to answer them, there are people waiting in the wings, as they say.

Unless the government wants to make any comment, we'll proceed directly to clause-by-clause.

Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.): Let's proceed, Mr. Chair.

(On clause 1)

The Chair: I have three amendments. The first is an amendment from the Bloc, one is from the government, and one is from the Canadian Alliance. It's been suggested that I should bring to the attention of the members that the amendment proposed by the Bloc includes the same lines as the amendment that is proposed by the government.

I believe the list contained in the amendment from the Bloc is included in the list put forward by the members from the government, except the government added “the Solicitor General of Canada or a Minister responsible for policing in a province”.

I'm advised, just for purposes of procedure, that if we pass the first amendment, that will rule the second amendment out of order. We'll get the first part of the list, but we won't get “the Solicitor General of Canada or a Minister responsible for policing in a province”.

Does anyone want to speak to their amendments? If not, I'll go directly to the vote.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur (Berthier—Montcalm, BQ): The first part is identical to my amendment, but I would like to know why ”the Solicitor General of Canada“ was added? He is a member of the House of Commons, I believe, and ”any Minister responsible for policing in the province“ is a member of a legislature. Why was this added?

[English]

Mr. John Maloney: In response, Mr. Chair, I think we've added the Solicitor General specifically for clarity.

The Chair: It could conceivably be the case that the Solicitor General could exist absent being a member of the House of Commons. I don't mean to suggest why that's there, but that is possible of course. He doesn't have to be a member of the House of Commons.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, it's in their capacity as minister, as the Solicitor General, as opposed to their capacity as a member of Parliament.

I want to make another point. We have “the Solicitor General of Canada or a Minister responsible for policing”. It should be “and” a minister responsible for policing in a province. The “or” should be “and”.

The Chair: Yes.

The Clerk of the Committee: The French also?

The Chair: I have a question to the government. Is that same change in the French text?

[Translation]

A voice: The same thing, sir.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Bellehumeur:

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I believe that the framer of the bill does not speak without meaning something. Am I to understand that you mean that a Solicitor General, for example, who is named in your electoral riding without being elected but who swore allegiance is not a member of the House of Commons?

[English]

Mr. John Maloney: It could cover that. You can be a member of the cabinet without having to be a member of Parliament. There have been exceptions. I think it's just for clarity, Mr. Bellehumeur.

• 1825

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: If one is a Cabinet member, is one not automatically part of the House of Commons?

[English]

Mr. John Maloney: Yes, for instance, Mr. Tobin in the last Parliament.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: In my opinion, as soon as Mr. Tobin took an oath, according to the rules of the House of Commons, he became a member of the House of Commons. He did not have the right to sit, but he was nonetheless a member of the House of Commons.

That does not change much, but I find it strange. In that case, why do we not add the Minister of Justice? Why do we not add the Opposition Leader?

[English]

Mr. John Maloney: We wouldn't add the Minister of Justice because she's covered as a prosecutor and as the Attorney General for Canada. The Minister of Justice, whoever that may be, is already covered.

The Chair: I think we've covered the waterfront here. First we're dealing with the Bloc amendment, which is identified as BQ-1.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: We won't play like children, the other is similar. Mr. Chairman, let's move on to the government.

The Chair: Agreed.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Really.

[English]

The Chair: We'll go to the government amendment, G-1.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: We'll go to amendment CA-1. Is there anyone to speak to the amendment from the Canadian Alliance?

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): I'll bring this motion forward. It is about the additional individuals who I think would fall into that same category of being in jeopardy in this type of a situation.

The Chair: Could I propose to the Canadian Alliance that they withdraw the second half of amendment CA-1, which says:

(xii) a provincial justice minister and a member of a provincial legislature;

It would be redundant to have another reference to the provincial legislature since we covered that in the first one. What we're trying to do is make sure we capture the new provisions here, if that's acceptable to the Canadian Alliance.

Mr. Vic Toews: Yes.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, I would suggest that we withdraw the whole clause because we already have the first part covered.

The Chair: Somewhere else.

Mr. John Maloney: I refer you to page 3 and the section above the definition of “serious offence”.

The Chair: Do we withdraw?

Mr. Vic Toews: Yes.

(Clause 1 as amended agreed to)

(On clause 2)

The Chair: We have amendment BQ-2 from the Bloc.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: One moment. Speed kills.

• 1830

I believe the amendment makes everything clear. The idea is to obtain the approval of a judge to ensure that everything is in order. I believe you heard the same witnesses I did. They all had reservations about the power of this law. To have a judge intervene would not reassure everyone, but it would reassure a great many people. I point out that the vote on amendment BQ-2 will also affect the votes on amendments BQ-4, BQ-5 and BQ-6. They need to be considered as a whole.

The government side seems to pay special attention to the Barreau du Québec. I hope it will not be selective and will listen to everything the Barreau du Québec said, including what it said about bill C-24. The Barreau du Québec, among other things, was very worried about the possibility of abuses by police officers because of this law. That does not meet its expectations completely, but it would be preferable, according to the Barreau, that the authorization come not from the political power but from someone on the outside, and choosing a judge would meet this criterion.

A few witnesses were there when people came. I act only as spokesman for Quebec in this matter, as I do in the case of many other bills. I warn the government about the possibility of abuse. Once the law is passed, it will be too late to intervene in certain cases.

Everything is before us, the amendments are there to make the law agree better with the wishes expressed during the testimony we have heard.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): Mr. Bellehumeur raises one of the central issues on this bill, and it's a troubling issue, as to whether the bill should be modelled on a judge-prosecutor model or whether on the proposal of the Solicitor General designation of police officers and on down the line.

I would take more comfort with a judge-prosecutor model, but I'd be interested in hearing members around the table as to what they think of this in general terms, because this is in some respects a philosophical divide. Once you solve this problem, a lot of the other amendments and parts of the bill will fall into place.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): I don't necessarily come at this in the context of a philosophical divide between a judge-prosecutor model or a Solicitor General designation, or whatever, but I do have problems with clause 2, and I think a number of members have in varying degrees.

It seems to me that clause 2 is the part of the bill that, if I understand it correctly, doesn't flow from the subcommittee report on organized crime. This is therefore an addition to what was recommended by the subcommittee, and it ostensibly flows out of the Supreme Court decision that many of the police delegations before us made mention of.

My own feeling—admittedly as a non-lawyer, but nevertheless—is that what we have in clause 2 now is somewhat of an overreaction to that Supreme Court judgment, and that some of what constitutes the overreaction might be ameliorated in some way by the amendments Monsieur Bellehumeur has moved.

I would say these are amendments that don't just address concerns in Quebec, but concerns right across the country, with the possibilities—and I stress possibilities, because obviously I think the police are very well intentioned, both in trying to get the kind of protection they need for their own members who are engaged in undercover operations and fighting organized crime.... But to the extent that this goes beyond organized crime to include the possibility of such designations in fighting crime of any kind, and to the extent that I think it goes farther than is required to meet whatever concerns were raised by the Supreme Court decision, I would certainly encourage the government to entertain these amendments if at all possible.

• 1835

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Toews, and then Mr. DeVillers.

Mr. Vic Toews: I can't support Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment. I think what we are seeing here is a legislative establishment of jurisdiction that clearly outlines what police officers may do and under what circumstances. Not only does it protect the police from possible criminal prosecution, but it also very clearly delineates the extent to which they may engage in acts that would otherwise be unlawful.

This is nothing new in the Criminal Code. I'm sure Mr. Mosley could elaborate on that a little more, but we have sections like section 43 of the code, which authorizes a parent or a person in authority to use physical force if it's reasonable to commit an assault, in fact a parent on a child, or the teacher on a child. So we have that excusing of an act, and that is not making it criminal but delineating the extent to which that can occur.

So I think this is a very important step, it is necessary, and it doesn't require the supervision of a judge in these circumstances. Not only does this make it more objective and transparent in respect of what the police officers may do, but it also takes a very powerful hidden discretion away from prosecutors to a great extent.

The prosecutors will probably still have that discretion, but, for example, today a prosecutor could excuse any criminal act done by anyone, up to the charge of murder. What this does is clearly delineate that within this context, this is excused from criminal prosecution. It stills leaves open the whole issue of whether a prosecutor could in any particular case say, well, we won't prosecute an individual for murder. They could still do that.

That's the law today, and it will be the law afterwards. But I think this is a positive step in terms of clarifying and making more public and accountable the powers of prosecutors. We also have to remember that a judge still has the overall discretion to review any particular criminal proceeding.

I know Mr. Blaikie has pointed out his concerns about perhaps inappropriate activities with regard to trade unions. A judge, of course, has the ultimate authority to determine whether there is any element of organized crime in such an organization, and it's not inconceivable that it could be. We certainly have that experience from the United States; organized crime did infiltrate labour.

But the other point is that they.... Well, I'll just leave it at that. I think that's sufficient.

The Chair: Mr. DeVillers.

Mr. Paul DeVillers (Simcoe North, Lib.): I think the bill is drafted in an appropriate way with the accountability left at the political level. By introducing the concept of the judiciary being involved, I think we're introducing something that I would imagine the judiciary might not be particularly keen to engage in, since they would be called upon at later stages to hear the trials of any alleged transgressions within the whole process.

• 1840

This is more than obtaining a warrant. It's not like going to get a warrant. The police and the prosecution would have to outline pretty detailed plans in the operation that they would be proposing to undertake. I don't think the judiciary, for purposes of its independence, would want to be part of hearing those sorts of details in advance. So I would prefer the system the way it's being proposed.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Allard.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard (Laval-Est, Lib.): I must admit that I was not impressed by the Barreau du Québec's presentation and by the witnesses we have heard here who represented civil liberties.

We talk about infractions that are allowed within certain limits and reasons during a police officer's investigation. I believe that the reality is that, for example, if one gets a warrant for a wiretap, it is a means of obtaining proof but it is limited in time and space in terms of its purpose. So we aren't dealing with saints here. There is the concept of immediacy here so that the officer does not have time to go and ask a judge's permission before acting.

So I trust the bill as worded.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chair, I don't want to prolong things, but I want to respond to what Mr. Toews said.

First of all, I don't believe I did raise the matter of trade unions, but it's a good point. The fact that this bill doesn't stipulate that labour unions would have to be associated in some way with organized crime.... This is power that is given to police to investigate anything they consider to be a criminal matter, whether it has to do with organized crime or not. That's one of the concerns people have with it.

Secondly, I would just want to again quarrel with the metaphor, which now Mr. Toews has used twice, that somehow the visions in the Criminal Code with respect to disciplining a child have some relevance to what we're discussing here. My understanding is that it's not a criminal offence to physically discipline your child; we've said it's okay. But we're saying that beyond a certain point, it's a criminal offence to discipline your child. At least, as the law is understood now, there are ordinary forms of discipline that are not regarded as a crime and have never been regarded as a crime. So it's not a question of giving a special dispensation to parents to commit a crime against their children. It's the fact that this has never been regarded as a crime, but beyond a certain point it is.

So I think it's apples and oranges here—two different kinds of concepts. I just want to put on the record that I don't accept the analogy Mr. Toews has put forward a couple of times.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Myers.

Mr. Lynn Myers (Waterloo—Wellington, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think it would be a huge disservice to justice in Canada to have the judiciary involved. I don't think you would ever want—certainly in our lifetime or any time after—the judiciary involved in this kind of a process. It would just be too much in terms of being part of the investigative side. I think it would not be in the best interest of Canadians.

The second point I want to make is this. The bill on this point, as it's written, I believe is a balanced one. On the one hand, you have the circumstances that outline what you can do; second, you have the limitations delineated; and third, you have the accountability. I think that brings together the kind of balance Canadians would expect from government, and more to the point, what they would expect us to do in this important area.

So I will be supporting it. I think it's an important point. I think the police require these kinds of measures, and I think Canadians support us doing it for them.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: The issue is not whether the police needs these tools or not. That is not the issue I am dealing with. I know that you, the Liberals, have the majority, and as to whether they will have those tools or not, they will have them; you will vote for that.

The question that we have to decide now is: do we want the politicians to supervise this or we would prefer to have the judges look at it impartially?

I don't know, but I trust the justice system, the judges, the judiciary, more than the government seems to want to. They intervene in issues of wiretapping and they do it very well. We see cases where wiretapping has been authorized that have been appealed and the appeal was rejected. The judiciary is able to control those elements. It is able, at the request of police who come before its representatives, to weigh the pros and cons and to grant or refuse authorization.

• 1845

I am intervening to prevent abuses and try as much as possible to bar any political intervention in such cases. Look at the past and you will see that politics and such judicial issues never made good bedfellows. They never have. Look at history. It is important to remember what happened in the past.

As for the inability to circumscribe that in time and everything else, it's not true. Given the way it is written, we would be able, coming before a judge, to specify the time, to say very precisely what we intend to do.

I repeat, the issue, especially for the Canadian Alliance, is not to know whether or not we are providing the police with those tools. It will pass. The question is whether we want political or judicial monitoring. Honestly and sincerely, I prefer by far that it be the judges who deal with that, even if they are not receptive to the idea.

I remember those debates. Look at the debates we had when we talked about wiretapping. I read the debates of that time. The judges were not receptive to that idea either. They are not receptive to the idea of authorizing similar acts because they know that somewhere we are infringing on the law or on certain rights. But they are being paid to do that and it is part of their function to do it, so have them do the work.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Just a brief comment, Mr. Chair.

I think Mr. DeVillers has set out the position succinctly.

Just a comment to Mr. Blaikie. The Supreme Court case you referenced didn't say that judicial authorization would be required. They didn't address that.

Just a comment to Mr. Toews. You keep using this word “excuse”. I think maybe the correct phraseology would be “justification”. I think there is a distinction in law that we should avoid.

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: Yes. I bring up section 43 more as an analogy, because but for that section, an assault by a parent on a child would be unlawful. So section 43 prevents that from becoming a prosecutable offence. Similarly, as I understand, what we are passing here, but for this subclause these would be prosecutable offences.

So I'm just bringing forward that analogy. I think the analogy is a correct one. We may not, in our understanding of morality or other issues, view it as an assault, but the law in fact does. But for section 43, that would be an assault. That's why, for example, I'm so opposed to the repeal of section 43.

The other issue—and I'm sorry if I appear to be putting words in Mr. Blaikie's mouth—is that I know that a witness, or at least one of the members at some of the other hearings, raised the issue about the trade....

Pardon me?

Mr. Lynn Myers: Mr. Borovoy.

Mr. Vic Toews: Yes, thank you, Mr. Myers.

Mr. Borovoy raised the issue about trade unions. I think the balanced approach that the government has taken to this and the fact that judges will still supervise proceedings, on an overall basis, satisfies me that this is constitutionally sound and appropriate.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Owen.

You're on the list already, Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Stephen Owen (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I find this, frankly, a very troubling exercise to be going through. I think probably all of us who are lawyers or civil libertarians or who have been involved with justice issues, either in prosecutorial, police, civil libertarian, or defence roles, find this a troubling issue. I'm glad Mr. McKay has asked us to each express our own views around this table, because I think it's a good opportunity for us to share our views and experiences.

• 1850

I start, in my troubling review of this bill, with the nature of organized crime itself. I do appreciate that this isn't exclusively targeted for organized crime, but it's the type of threat put forward by organized crime to our society that this is obviously aimed at, and for the most part it will be applied for that. I think we'll have to be reviewing that over time very carefully.

I wasn't on the subcommittee of justice. I wasn't a member of the House when you conducted your hearings.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: We didn't deal with this.

Mr. Stephen Owen: You didn't deal with this, but what you did deal with was the severity of the threat of organized crime for our society. You heard a lot of information, I hear, some of it very confidential but very chilling. I didn't have the benefit of that exercise, but I did chair the review of organized crime in British Columbia two years ago, which has led to the new organized crime agency of B.C. I was deeply affected by the nature and the depth of the threat of organized crime to our society.

I think that's a view that very few people in society who haven't worked directly with it have. It's extreme. It's hidden for the most part, and it's very, very damaging to individuals and to our society at large. So I don't think we should in any way believe that we aren't dealing with one of the most serious aspects of criminal justice that people in our position could be faced with.

Second, the Supreme Court of Canada has invited government on the legislative side to deal with this issue—not to forgive or excuse crime, but rather to bring a certain activity of police work within the law. I see this...and I think we have to test it as to whether it doesn't excuse criminal behaviour but rather properly defines behaviour that is not criminal so as to bring within the law what the Supreme Court has said, in fact, was outside the law. That's immensely important. It may seem like a thin distinction, but in fact it's one on which we have to be satisfied because on it rests the protection that we never allow our security forces, police or otherwise, to operate outside the rule of law. If there's any doubt about that, we have to work to bring them within it. This is an attempt to do so.

Third, it's the question of whether we...and Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment would place this responsibility on the judiciary. I've listened carefully to our colleagues, to the witnesses, and to prior testimony. I don't quite agree with my colleague's suggestion that it would be a dangerous thing necessarily to involve the judiciary in this type of investigative role, but that's a whole different system than we have in this country. Countries that have investigative magistrates and such have a well-defined and supported practice, which we don't have in this society. I think the jump to that in this case, in isolation, would be a mistake. That's a much broader question for us to ask.

I do accept that although there are some real similarities and overlap—and we've heard them described—between the part VI authorizations for wiretap or search warrants with judicial authorization, I think we're going to something quite different, in essence, in this type of activity being brought within the law to authorize police to act in this way. It takes the judicial role into something much more active than is contemplated or practised within those other sections.

Fourth, if we're going to proceed with this type of legislative authorization or making lawful this type of police activity, then accountability is the key. If not through judicial accountability, then how on earth are we going to ensure that the executive in the execution of this legislated authority maintains the proper accountability? That's a key question that we all have to be highly vigilant about. We are going to have to watch the implementation of this bill very carefully.

• 1855

We do have political accountability with the Solicitor General at the end of the day, I suppose, but that's only going to be as good as the regulations to this bill, the procedures, practices, training, reporting, and review of the practices under this bill. I think we, as legislators on behalf of the public, are going to have to remain highly vigilant on this whole implementation if this bill goes through.

On balance, therefore, Mr. Chair, I'm going to vote against this amendment and support the general thrust of this bill that this amendment addresses.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I was listening so intently to Mr. Owen that I forgot what I was going to say. I'll perhaps just leave it at that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Certainly I would agree with Mr. Owen that the implementation of this bill will have to be scrutinized very carefully. And I think certainly there is a government amendment coming forward subsequently that provides for a review of this legislation within five years' time, when Parliament can reconsider how the implementation has proceeded and whether any gross improprieties have to be addressed.

The Chair: Mr. McKay.

We'll come to Mr. Blaikie, but I'm afraid you may forget again, so write it down.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I wanted to thank Stephen for his comments because I think he was reading from my notes. First of all, I think it's important to let the record show that there is a level of discomfort in the committee about going this way. Generally, I would agree in that I would prefer a judicially supervised model, but I do agree that it would take us in directions of judicial activism that we have heretofore never seen and involvement in criminal investigations, which I think are qualitatively different from authorization of wiretaps and matters such as that. So I find myself sort of sliding to the model as proposed by the government, in part because I'm not prepared to see a judicial activist model. I just can't quite see how that is going to work.

I am, however, pretty concerned about whether this will effectively become police officers speaking to police officers, creating what in parlance is known as “cop culture” and convincing themselves that these kinds of investigations need to be done in this kind of way. So I'll be interested in whatever proposals the government, or anyone else for that matter, might put forward that will minimize the level of discomfort a number of us feel around this table.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Sgro, and then Mr. Blaikie.

Ms. Judy Sgro (York West, Lib.): I have a question to Mr. Maloney, or some of the other staff.

What other countries have given this kind of power to their police officers?

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. John Maloney: I'll call on my friend here, Mr. Mosley, to respond to that.

Mr. Richard G. Mosley (Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector, Department of Justice): That particular question was addressed in the material that accompanied the introduction of the bill and in the white paper that was tabled in June of last year. There is no precise model identical to this, but there are, in a number of other common-law jurisdictions, models that give in practical effect the same scope and freedom of movement to the police in similar circumstances.

In that material we pointed to some examples in the United States at the state level. We pointed to examples in western Australia, and there is a common law under the authority of a decision that was handed down by the U.K. courts many years ago recognizing that the police are entitled to perform, in the execution of their duties, acts that would otherwise be offences. It is that understanding that the police referred to when they appeared before the committee to testify about the status quo prior to the Campbell and Shirose decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. They were referring to that common-law standard.

• 1900

Ms. Judy Sgro: Would this be here in the bill if it wasn't for the Campbell and Shirose decision?

Mr. Richard Mosley: In a word, no.

Ms. Judy Sgro: And I go on to the existing issue that in the event that they have to do their duty, in spite of that decision and people's interpretation of it, the police appear to be able to carry out their roles and responsibilities anyway.

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I may, Mr. Chairman, the police told the committee that's not the situation—

Ms. Judy Sgro: I know they have.

Mr. Richard Mosley: —that they have not been able to carry out the undercover investigations, other enforcement actions—not just the police, but other public officers who enforce other federal statutes. They have been unable to carry on as they did prior to Campbell and Shirose as a result of that decision.

Ms. Judy Sgro: Since that decision.

Mr. Richard Mosley: Since that decision.

Ms. Judy Sgro: I have one more question, on the issue of reporting mechanisms and accountability.

Mr. Richard Mosley: It's an interpretation supported by the attorneys general of the country and the advice they get from their legal counsel.

Ms. Judy Sgro: What is the reporting mechanism? Mr. Maloney mentioned a report back, a review in five years. In this process are we going to get, or is the Attorney General or someone going to get, an annual report on how many times these particular powers were used?

Mr. John Maloney: Judy, there are reporting requirements in the act, and there is an annual report that has to be filed.

Ms. Judy Sgro: Okay.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I have just two or three things.

First, I was listening to Mr. Owen, and it seemed to me there was something in what he said that was somewhat supportive of the argument I was trying to make about section 43, that it's not a question of making the unlawful lawful, it's a question of describing what is lawful and what is unlawful. But that's something we could pursue another day.

In the matter of accountability, when you look at the list of things the Solicitor General either doesn't have to report himself, doesn't have to report, or that may not even be reported to the Solicitor General, because they might endanger an ongoing operation, etc., I have this vision of the accountability being the Solicitor General assuring us all that public safety is number one, and that's about all we'll get. If it's like the accountability we have now from the Solicitor General, or for that matter any cabinet minister, it's not all that reassuring with respect to accountability.

Finally, there are other amendments suggested here by the government with respect to clause 2, so would it be in order, Mr. Chairman, for the government, in making their argument for rejecting the Bloc amendments, to say what it is they intend to do by way of amendment that would address some of the concerns people may have? Because we're really debating the worthiness of these amendments in the absence of any comment from the government about what they intend to do after these amendments are defeated or dealt with. So it seems to me that would be a useful exercise.

The Chair: I think I heard a question.

Mr. John Maloney: Before we get to that, Mr. Chair, I'd like to refer the committee to proposed subsection 25.3(1), where the requirements of the annual report are stipulated and specified. That might satisfy some concerns as to reportability.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: I read that part.

The Chair: I think the question to Mr. Maloney or to officials was to the effect that the intent of the first amendment may in fact be covered later. Is there anything to suggest that, so that could be a part of the consideration on the first one?

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I understood the question correctly—and I'm not sure I did, Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry—clearly the motion before the committee at the moment and the related motions would substitute a judicial authorization scheme for that set out in the bill. If the motion is not accepted by the committee, the model set out in the bill would, of course, if the clause is carried, remain in place.

• 1905

The Chair: I think what Mr. Blaikie was asking was whether there is anything that has to do with subsequent amendments the government would like to add to this that would inform the decision on the first amendment.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: There are other amendments to the clause. They are on the concerns people have, and I ask if there's any way they would help people with how they vote on this. It's not that difficult a question.

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I may, there is a motion in relation to proposed subsection 25.1(10), which is in the package distributed to the committee, and there is an additional motion, which Mr. Maloney will be moving, to add subsections (10.1) and (10.2), to address a concern that was first raised in the committee proceedings by Mr. Owen and has also been raised by the Canadian Association of Police Boards. It goes to the extent of the authority given, the justification given to a police agent. That I think will have the effect of scaling back the scope of the scheme somewhat, insofar as it applies to agents. But the model before the committee is essentially one in which the conduct of the police will be subject to very stringent controls, and through the police the conduct of police agents acting within the scope of these proposals.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I would like to respond to Mr. Maloney, who says that each year there will be a report and that we will be able to follow this to ensure that everything is done legally.

When I see in subsection 25.3(2) what is excluded from the annual report, there is a lot of information and disclosure that will not be allowed under the act, and that is somewhat worrisome. This is what we will not be allowed to know in the end:

(2) The annual report shall not contain any information the disclosure of which would:

a) compromise or hinder an ongoing investigation of an offence under an act of Parliament;

That's fairly broad.

b) compromise the identity of a public officer acting in an undercover capacity, of a confidential informant or of a person acting covertly under the direction and control of a public officer;

That is also very broad.

c) endanger the life or safety of any person;

That's very broad thank you.

d) prejudice a legal proceeding;

e) otherwise be contrary to the public interest.

That's the cherry on the sundae, the broadest way possible of including things.

I know, from having seen reports, even if they are only those of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, that it is true that we get a report every year. But you know, between you and me, that those reports tell us absolutely nothing. It has to be done in camera and we have to really question those people to get them to explain the reports. Even then, we don't get information.

Therefore, when I see everything that is excluded, what you say does not reassure me. Things will stay between police officers and stay between politicians. It is important to know what is going on in there. It is important, given the possible abuses and the rights that will be adversely affected by the work of police officers. The police will be committing criminal acts. We have to know what they will be doing. We have to supervise that. We have to look at that very closely.

It's not the little audit and the little report that we will get in the House of Commons from time to time that will reassure me. On the contrary, when I see that, it doesn't reassure me at all. It really has to be...

If you have a solution other than the one I proposed, I'm open to it. My mind is not closed to that, but I quite simply want to get it out of the hands of politicians and the police. I want to be reassured that impartial people will work on the case and examine it. I mostly want to know what will happen when that is authorized. As of now, we won't know.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bellehumeur.

Peter MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am coming a little bit late to this. I picked up much of what Mr. Owen had to say, and Mr. McKay as well. Both indicated some reluctance, but in the end there was a passive acceptance that there were going to be sufficient safeguards.

If this hasn't already been asked—and if it has I apologize—is one of the major concerns the department would have in going to this particular process, having judicial oversight, the delay aspect? Is it that if we went down this particular route this would subvert the ability of the police to receive rapid authorization, as opposed to the current legislation, the way it is set up? If that is the case, I would like a little bit of detail as to how it would operate so differently under a judicially authorized designation.

• 1910

Mr. John Maloney: I'll just respond to Mr. Bellehumeur, and then we'll go to Mr. MacKay's question.

I think that, with practicality, there have to be some limitations on disclosure because of the operations involved. Certainly, we wouldn't want to jeopardize anyone's life, and we wouldn't want to jeopardize an investigation that may be taking years to in fact come to fruition. But ultimately I think the courts will be the final arbiters of whether their actions were proper or improper.

With respect to Mr. MacKay's question, I'll let my friend Mr. Mosley respond to that as well.

Mr. Richard Mosley: Thank you.

I think it's important to keep in mind that the precedents that we have for judicial authorization all relate to specific and very clear events for which the police are seeking authority, such as the entrance into a premises to install an electronic surveillance device, entering into a premises to conduct a search, and seizure of evidence of the commission of an offence. These are things that can be anticipated in advance, and the grounds for them can be laid out clearly in the materials presented to the court. The court is making a clear decision based on what's put before it.

In the environment that you've heard about, the environment in which undercover operations exist, there is no capacity. There's no opportunity to stop, to find a judge, and to say you want to do X and are seeking the authority to do it. These are fast-moving, complex, exceedingly dangerous operations. Delay is a factor.

I think Mr. Mackay has put his finger on a number of the reasons, but ultimately it comes down to this: In the view of the Department of Justice, it is inappropriate to ask a judge to play this kind of role in advance of the event. At the end of the day, the courts will be reviewing what took place. Having a matter proceeding before Judge A when that judge's counterpart had authorized the proceeding puts the court that is presiding over the matter in an untenable position. How can they decide whether the conduct of the police has been appropriate within the scope of the justification allowed by the law in those circumstances, when a...?

Mr. Peter MacKay: Mr. Mosley, can I just interrupt you for a moment?

With respect to the.... I understand completely the role that judges play in terms of authorizing an anticipated event. As I interpret this or understand it, though, what we're talking about here is a designation that's ongoing. Once the designation has been granted, once the officers have been deputized, they go out and they do their work. They go out into the field and they penetrate the organization they're trying to get into. So I don't completely follow or buy that argument that there would be some unreasonable delay.

It isn't a spur of the moment thing that results in an undercover officer going undercover. That is anticipated. What happens while they're in the field is completely different, I agree with you. But once they're given that designation, it lasts throughout the length of the operation, and potentially longer—but that's another question that we'll get to later on.

As for a judge somehow being compromised by having granted the designation, he simply disqualifies himself from that case. It happens all the time. It happens now with wiretaps and warrants. Judges don't very often hear the same officers and evidence that resulted in a case that comes before the courts and that they've granted a warrant on. We have enough judges out there now who certainly...in some cases, perhaps we have to go outside the immediate jurisdiction to have a judge make these designations.

Mr. Richard Mosley: Mr. Chairman, that's undeniable, of course. A judge would never preside over a matter that said judge had previously decided in this manner. But that judge would nevertheless be presiding over a matter in which another judge, perhaps of the same court, has authorized the activity that's in question before that court. And you're absolutely right on this question of authorization in the circumstances. You can't anticipate what's going to happen, so the court, which is asked to designate Officer X, is in no better position, and it is armed with no additional information and no extra ability to determine what might happen down the road while that officer is engaged in the undercover activity.

• 1915

It doesn't fit with our existing models of judicial authorization, in which we are saying to the court that we need authority to go in and conduct this search, plant that device, or do something very specific for which we can provide the particulars. The undercover officer is operating very often according to a plan, but a plan that can't anticipate what might happen.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'll give you that, but in terms of who has a better ability to assess what the officer is going to do in the field in regard to its permissibility or legality, it's arguable whether or not another police officer or a judge is in a better position to be impartial about that. It's all going to be examined after the fact in any event. In terms of assessing what took place during the mission or the operation, what we're talking about here is all after the fact.

I'm still struggling with why we would dismiss, out of hand, putting the power to make this designation into the hands of judges as opposed to leaving it all inside baseball...you know, having higher-ranking officers designating lower-ranking officers with this ability to do so.

I would suggest to you that a judge is not going to be in a diminished position simply because he or she doesn't know what that officer is going to go out and do. Presumably, they're going to make a judgment call, as they do every day as a matter of course in their duties. A judge is going to look at this officer, and the officer is going to have to make certain representations and present certain documentations and qualifications. That judge is going to be faced with the same decision that somebody else would be making. Why is it less appropriate that it be a judge? I haven't heard from you why it's less appropriate that it be a judge than it is that it be somebody within the existing police community.

Mr. Richard Mosley: The advantage to having the designations made at the political level is that the minister is accountable for having made that decision, whereas you do not have a suitable opportunity to question a judge as to why an appointment or designation was made by the court. In these circumstances, it may well be that the Solicitor General may have to answer questions in the House at some point in the future as to why he designated this officer or that group of officers and gave them this authority. You can't do the same with a judge, and you can't do it with a court.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Yes.

[English]

The Chair: You have time for one more, and that's it.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Listen, I want to respond a little to the public servants who just spoke. Mr. MacKay has already expressed part of my thinking about that, but I want to be understood clearly.

In the case of wiretapping, of search warrants, of various acts authorized by the judges, it has happened in the past that judges committed themselves in many other areas. Those judges do not abort procedures that way. If the case ever came before them, they would only need to recuse themselves. There are other judges who could handle the case and move it forward. The argument that the court must not compromise itself too much in a case is not valid.

In addition, let's take the case of operation Spring 2001 by the Sûreté du Québec and the RCMP; they had been on it for two years. The double agents and the agents on the inside had been known for a long time. There was no urgency, on 24 hours notice, to commit any act whatsoever. Everything would have gone well, would have worked very well, if they had gone before a judge to get a warrant or the authorization to launch an operation over six months or two years, depending on the complexity of the case. In terms of the speed needed to act, your argument does not hold up.

• 1920

You were saying a little earlier that it would be very worrisome if a judge had already authorized such and such an act. I want to tell you that it would be more worrisome if one or two police officers, by all kinds of acts or abuses that they allowed themselves, discredited an entire case or operation. It would be a lot more worrisome for the public servant, for the government, for the Solicitor General if, because of those acts, the entire operation were aborted. It would be a lot more worrisome if it came out during the trial for example. It would be a lot more comforting to have had a judge look at that.

You really don't have an argument that allows one to say that it is not up to the judges to examine closely the authorizations and the appointments; in any case you haven't convinced me.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I've heard the call for the question, and I would put it. All those in favour of the amendment, please so indicate.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I ask for a recorded division on this question, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: We're voting on the amendment that is numbered BQ-2, and if BQ-2 is negatived, that vote would apply to BQ-4, BQ-5, and BQ-6.

(Amendment negatived: nays 13; yeas 3—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: We'll go now to the second amendment, which is identified as G-2.

Mr. Maloney, do you have anything to say?

Mr. John Maloney: Yes, Mr. Chair.

This amendment would set out expressly some of the conditions that could be imposed on designations, including the conditions listed under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). By use of the term “including”, the amendment would make it clear that this list isn't exhaustive.

We've put this in because members have expressed concern as to the scope of the designations that would be given to public officers to authorize them to commit illegal acts. Proposed subsection 25.1(6) already provides that designations may be made only subject to certain conditions.

The Chair: Seeing no other comments...Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Am I to understand that proposed subsection 25.1(6) applies to emergency designations? Is this only for emergency designations, or am I missing something?

Mr. John Maloney: Perhaps we could look at proposed subsection (7), under the term “Conditions”: “A designation under subsection (3) or (6)....”

Mr. John McKay: What's confusing me is where you say, “That Bill C-24, in Clause 2, be amended by replacing line 28 on page 5 with the following:”, and then you have a (6) in parentheses. I don't understand why that (6) is there, because it takes you back to page 4.

• 1925

Mr. Richard Mosley: It's just the way the motion amends that line in the bill that begins with “(6)”.

Mr. John McKay: Oh, I see. Okay.

Mr. Richard Mosley: It replaces that complete line and then adds the (a), (b), and (c). So it applies to both proposed subsection 25.1(3) and proposed subsection 25.1(6).

The Chair: Understood.

Mr. John McKay: Where am I starting to read this? It says clause 2 on page 5. What line?

Mr. Richard Mosley: If you go down to proposed subsection 25.1(7), it says “A designation under subsection (3) or”. That remains. The next line is replaced, and you go to the motion where it says “(6) may be made subject to conditions, including”.

Mr. John McKay: Okay.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: I would then refer you to amendment BQ-3.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Yes. Listen, I'm starting to have very few illusions. Bill C-24 is supposed—and again those are remarks we have heard from almost all the witnesses—to be about organized crime, to be the government's answer to organized crime. The witnesses we heard are worried because this law is very broad and could apply to everyone.

I don't think that was the objective. At least the Bloc Québécois has long sought an anti-gang law, a law to fight organized crime, but not to fight against the Knights of Columbus and the Daughters of Isabella. But in the end this law is so broad that it could apply to all kinds of people.

The purpose of my amendment is therefore to limit it in order to better protect and reassure people, especially now that we have rejected the supervision of the illegal acts to be committed by the police. We have rejected supervision by the judges so let us at least ensure that it applies only to an investigation related to organized crime. I think that is the least we could do.

I imagine you are aware enough to understand that amendment, to judge it and vote for it in order to limit the damages as much as possible and reassure the people.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Sgro.

Ms. Judy Sgro: I'd like to hear Mr. Mosley's or Mr. Maloney's comments with regard to what impact Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment would have on the bill if we were to adopt it.

Mr. John Maloney: I would submit that it would make the justification provision unworkable. It makes reference to organized crime, for one thing, and there's no definition of that. It's a limitation of the scope of the clause. I don't think it's acceptable at all.

Ms. Judy Sgro: We have heard from the beginning that the intent here is to give the police the tools to deal with organized crime. The fact that we don't have a definition.... The police can always justify it as being part of organized crime, anyway. Who is going to challenge them?

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Is the expression ”criminal organization“ defined in the act?

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur...

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Organized crime [Editor's note: inaudible]

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur, it would be appreciated if you would get the chairman's attention before.... Ms. Sgro has the floor.

Mr. John Maloney: Judy, can you repeat your question?

Ms. Judy Sgro: The intent is that they're going to use these extra tools to assist them in dealing with organized crime. Just because we don't have a definition of organized crime, how is that going to deter them from saying that whatever investigation they were doing was part of a bigger investigation into organized crime?

Mr. John Maloney: Organized crime may mean something different to you than it does to Mr. Bellehumeur or Mr. Myers. I think the difficulty is that without a definition of organized crime, how can we limit it to organized crime?

• 1930

Ms. Judy Sgro: In drafting the bill, did we not think we should define organized crime since that seems to be what's driving this?

Mr. John Maloney: That's the whole issue. Is it definable?

Perhaps Mr. Mosley could comment.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: That is a very good question. It's a question that has bedevilled efforts to deal with the problem of organized crime for decades. There is no common understanding of what is organized crime, which is why the legislation in 1997, and again here, avoided trying to define it. There is no agreement on what it may consist of.

The practical effect of the motion would be to remove the references to

the investigation of an offence under, or the enforcement of, an Act of Parliament or the investigation of criminal activity.

That could be an offence under the Customs Act, the Immigration Act, or the Excise Act. Any number of federal statutes that govern conduct may be implicated by criminal activity that involves criminal organizations; for example, smuggling across the border.

There is no definition we're aware of that would encompass that under the rubric of organized crime. So what the bill attempts to do is to limit it to federal offences and to the investigation of criminal activity. Criminal activity by definition is a violation of a criminal offence. It doesn't extend to provincial or municipal ordinances. It's quite specific, but it's broad in the context of federal crimes.

I understand the reason for the proposal, but it would leave this legislation effectively unworkable. We would not be able to satisfy those terms by any means I'm aware of.

The Chair: Mr. John McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Let's buy your argument for the time being that there is no definition of organized crime, certainly not in the bill. What if you modified Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment to read “is engaged in the investigation of a criminal organization”? That would be the limitation. There you have a working definition, and there is a body of jurisprudence. There's a common understanding and all of that. So why not modify his amendment, instead of getting into what is or is not organized crime, with 18 people at the table having 18 different opinions? You'd have a definition that's already a working definition.

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I may, Mr. Chairman, when the investigation is commenced, they may not know it will lead to a criminal organization offence. To limit it in that manner would limit the scope and effect of this provision and exclude a substantial portion of the investigative activity of federal enforcement agencies.

Mr. John McKay: But isn't that the point, though, that these designations and authorizations aren't to go on fishing expeditions? You have to establish to the designated officer and through him to the Solicitor General that you are in fact investigating a criminal organization.

Mr. Richard Mosley: But at the start of the—

Mr. John McKay: I agree with you that at the outset of the investigation they don't know what they're getting into. But once they do get into it and they are reasonably satisfied they are investigating a criminal organization, then at that point....

Mr. Richard Mosley: Proposed subsection 25.1(8) applies at the point at which the officer is committing the act or omission. It's not at the point of designation. At the point of designation the Solicitor General or the relevant minister at the provincial level will be asked to designate Officer X because Officer X is engaged in undercover operations that will be directed at criminal organizations or at the type of offences that criminal organizations may well commit.

• 1935

But where proposed subsection (8) comes into play is at the point in time at which the officer in the field is doing the act, and that officer in the field may be at that point in time engaged in the investigation of an Excise Act offence, or a Customs Act offence, or a Criminal Code offence unrelated to a criminal organization. He may not know at that point in time that he's in fact dealing with a criminal organization and there may be, at the end of the day, no criminal organization offences.

So the difficulty is that you're leaving the officer in the situation of being unable to determine...he may be designated but when he's confronted with a situation in the field, how does he know what he's facing?

Mr. John McKay: He may or may not know what he's doing, and I suppose the level of discomfort is that when Officer X starts his investigation he has simply common-law immunity just like other officers. As the investigation proceeds, he forms the opinion that he is now investigating a criminal organization and at that point he seeks from the senior officer the limited immunity he feels he needs to continue his investigation. But as part of his obtaining that kind of authorization, that extra sanction, shall we say, he has to show to the person who's giving him the designation that he is now satisfied he's investigating a criminal organization.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: The authorization you've referred to would fall under proposed subsection 25.1(9) and would apply in specific circumstances that are described in that subsection. But proposed subsection 25.1(8) would apply to any designated public officer who was engaged in the normal execution of his or her duties in the field. So the opportunity to stop at that point and seek further authorization from a senior official may not present itself. It may; it depends on the circumstances.

Mr. John McKay: But it should.

Mr. Richard Mosley: The model here contemplates that, for example, the criminal operations officer is engaged in anti-smuggling operations along our borders. A certain number of them would be designated, those who are more likely to be engaged in undercover operations. When they are doing that work in the field, this would protect them if they were confronted with a situation in which they had to commit an act or omission, which might be as simple as signing their names into the registry of a hotel or motel, which contravenes the provincial innkeepers act. It would protect them from federal legislation that requires that you run a vehicle at night with lights on it, if they infringe that statute. It would protect them, of course, if they felt obliged in the circumstances, in making a decision where it's necessary, it's reasonable and proportional—and not in every circumstances—to commit the act or omission, to do something more serious.

Mr. John McKay: But, you see, all of those officers you use as examples can quite easily argue that they are investigating a criminal organization within the definition we have already.

It is another matter altogether, though, when one of the officers who's not so designated is doing an investigation that he believes to be in the ordinary course of police investigations and one thing leads to another, leads to another, and he's getting into some pretty risky territory—he feels he's in risky territory. Shouldn't he be obliged to go back to headquarters and say, I feel that my investigation has matured to a point where I should receive this kind of designation because I believe I'm investigating a criminal organization?

• 1940

Mr. Richard Mosley: In those circumstances, you're right. That is why the scheme provides for an emergency designation in those circumstances. That officer should go back to the senior officer who is specially designated for that purpose, to get the authority to do that act. You're referring to a public officer who is not otherwise specially designated. That's quite correct, and the scheme does provide for that.

Mr. John McKay: But there's kind of the A crowd and the B crowd. There's the A crowd, who are doing this on a regular basis, and then there's the B crowd, who have the emergency designation, shall we say. But the way the legislation presently reads, there is no A crowd and there is no B crowd, and it is not limited only to matters of criminal organization but to the whole panoply of criminal activity.

Mr. Richard Mosley: But there is an A and a B crowd. Clearly the legislation does not contemplate that every peace officer will have this authority. They have to be specially designated by the Solicitor General or his counterpart in the provinces as the competent authority. It's clear that the Solicitor General is not going to designate however many thousands of members of the RCMP there may be; it will be those officers who are specifically engaged in this type of enforcement work.

If I may come back to your main point, the difficulty is that engaged in that very important and crucial work does not necessarily relate to the criminal organization offences that the scheme would also create or amend, because it may be a sole entrepreneur. It may be somebody in the circumstances of committing a serious crime and the officer has to do something to prevent it, for example, to steal a car that is going to be used as a getaway vehicle, to move in those circumstances to commit an offence, but it's not a criminal organization offence that he's attempting to prevent or investigate. So adopting the amendment would effectively, I suggest, tie the hands of those officers, and the scheme that is being proposed would be of much less value to them.

The Chair: There are a number of names still on the list on both sides.

Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: If I understand correctly, if we don't adopt that amendment, criminal acts will be committed by police officers and those acts may well not be recorded in a file on organized crime or a given criminal organization.

Are we to understand that the police can commit criminal acts and that it could well be that these would not be in the context of an investigation into a criminal organization?

[English]

Mr. Richard Mosley: Yes, the bill does speak of an offence under, or the enforcement of, an act of Parliament, or in the investigation of criminal activity.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Well, Mr. Chairman, in that case I do not agree at all with the minister's opinion. I agree with Mr. MacKay that ”organized crime“ may not be defined, but I had ”criminal organization“ in mind when I prepared this amendment.

So if there is unanimous consent here, Mr. Chairman, I am willing to modify my amendment so that it read ”is engaged in the investigation of a criminal organization“ to make it consistent with the definitions in the act. Otherwise, it would not make sense.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur is seeking consent to amend his amendment. Does he have that consent? He has it.

So I understand it would now read:

is engaged in the investigation of a criminal organization

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

• 1945

The Clerk: In French, would it be ”l'investigation d'une organisation“?

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: ”Il agit dans le cadre d'une enquête relative à une organisation criminelle.“

The Chair: O.K. Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Peter MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I want to explore this a little further, because I'm getting more and more troubled the more I hear about this suggestion now that police officers with the designation can embark on an investigation.

I guess it comes down now to knowledge. They can investigate a matter that is not related to organized crime, avail themselves of the immunity, and I would suggest to you that this is immediately going to result in a court challenge, because a defence lawyer is going to stand up and say, you weren't investigating organized crime; therefore immunity doesn't apply, and all the evidence you obtained is gone.

If that's not the case, if the person who has the designation is investigating something they genuinely believe is related to organized crime, and it turns out that it's not, that's a different matter. They can justify that. They can say, based on the circumstances we had during the course of the investigation, we thought there were more people involved—for example, we thought this was an international crime ring dealing in narcotics and it turned out to be a grandmother in her basement who was growing marijuana for medical purposes.

I'm very troubled by this latest answer that you've given, where you're saying a police officer can now go out and investigate routinely and avail themselves of this designation and these extraordinary powers that Officer B doesn't have. But because they're on the A team, they can steal cars, cash cheques, sign their names, and so on. This is basically saying that once you have that designation, son, away you go; do whatever you like. It doesn't have to be related to organized crime at all. That's what I've just heard.

Mr. Richard Mosley: That does not take into account the constraints on the officer's decision-making that are part of the scheme. Clearly it's not a field day for the officer in those circumstances.

I think the difficulty you're confronted with is that there is no crime or field of activity called “organized crime”. It's a convenient shortcut that is used when people talk about the type of crime that's done for profit and involves a number of people.

What Parliament had previously attempted to do was to recognize that difficulty by creating a criminal organization offence. Quite apart from that legislative scheme adopted in 1997, the police were operating under a common-law rule, which had been in place for many years, that said if you need to break the law in the ordinary execution of your duties, then you're entitled to do that. They did so until Campbell and Shirose was handed down and they were told they can't.

Campbell and Shirose does not apply to criminal organization offences simpliciter; it doesn't apply to whatever conception or definition of organized crime you have. It applies to all conduct, all offences—all conduct of this nature.

Mr. Peter MacKay: That's not the way this bill has been presented. This bill has been presented as something that designates officers with extraordinary powers to be used to combat organized crime, not to investigate other matters knowingly unconnected to organized crime. It's one thing again that has to do with, to use the legal parlance, the mens rea of the officer during their investigation. We're flipping a criminal term back onto the police, but that's in fact what's happening. You're authorizing police to commit criminal acts, but now this is expansive. We're now saying you can break the law to catch those who are engaged in criminal activity even though it's not that nebulous organized crime element. I was of the belief that the police were only to do so thinking at least they were going after some form of organized crime.

• 1950

You're right to say we don't have a specific chiselled-in-stone definition, but what's going to happen inevitably is it's going to be examined in a court of law and it's not going to take the greatest legal mind to figure out whether it's related to organized crime or not. That's going to happen in this sterile legal environment after the fact. But the police officer should at the very least be of the mind that he's investigating something related to organized crime, which is what this amendment seeks to do. It seeks to put some constraints on the officers' intent when they're embarking on the investigation and when they're about to use these extraordinary powers.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I may, the principle of this part of the bill is set out in proposed subsection 25.1(2):

(2) It is in the public interest to ensure that public officers may effectively carry out their law enforcement duties in accordance with the rule of law and, to that end, to expressly recognize in law a justification for public officers and other persons acting at their direction to commit acts or omissions that otherwise would constitute offences.

There's not a word in there about organized crime.

Mr. Peter MacKay: What's the bill called? What's the title of the bill? I refer you to the first page, “organized crime and law enforcement”.

Mr. Richard Mosley: And law enforcement.

If I may direct your attention as well to proposed subsection 25.1(8), it's clear that an officer who is exercising this authority must do so in a manner that is:

reasonable and proportional in the circumstances, having regard to such matters as the nature of the act or omission, the nature of the investigation and the reasonable availability of other means for carrying out the public officer's law enforcement duties.

This is not open season for law enforcement. It is a limited and constrained set of proposals to, to a certain extent, restore them to where they were prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell and Shirose.

I suggest, Mr. Chair, that if the bill is limited to the investigation solely of organized crime offences, however that may be defined, that does not go nearly so far as to restore the situation before Campbell and Shirose, and would effectively limit the use of these provisions for the greater proportion of the investigative activity that they currently conduct, which may in fact involve organized crime but which they would not be in a position to determine at the time they wished to take advantage of proposed subsection 25.1(8).

You would put the officer in an untenable position. What would he know about what he was investigating at that point in time? If he's right, then he would be covered by a justification. If he's wrong, he's committing a criminal offence and is subject to the possibility of prosecution. Whether that would happen of course is another matter, but the potential is there, and as a result they will not take that chance, as they are not taking that chance today under the regime post-Campbell and Shirose.

The Chair: People are re-inquiring, so I'll just tell you I have Mr. Owen, Madame Allard, Mr. Blaikie, and Mr. Toews.

Mr. Owen.

Mr. Stephen Owen: Thank you.

My continuing disquiet on this is revived by this most recent discussion in this sense. First of all, certainly the bill has been presented in the context of the quite extraordinary threat to our society of organized crime and crimes committed through or by people assisting criminal organizations. I accept the fact that Campbell and Shirose had a broader impact than just on the investigation of organized crime. However, the concern expressed by the police was around and in the context of their feeling that they may be hobbled, particularly around criminal organizations and their activities.

• 1955

The trouble that's arisen in this discussion is that if we're to say we're actually going to try to solve a broader problem, then how do we know who to designate, because the designations are to be limited to those people...? We've all talked about what a restricted nature that designation would be, presumably to people investigating organized crime. Otherwise, if it was simply to be those who might, in the investigation of a crime, find it to lead to a criminal organization, then we'd have to designate wide swaths of the police forces, or otherwise we wouldn't be able to accomplish that purpose anyway if we were really just trying to put the police back totally to where we thought they were, or where they thought they were.

So it seems to me that an amendment such as suggested, and further amended in a way that would be workable towards the activities of criminal organizations, is more in tune with the objectives of this legislation—unless we're saying here, and I'd like to hear some response on this, that necessarily we would have to designate large numbers of police officers involved in investigation of any types of serious crime.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)): Mr. Mosley, do you wish to reply?

Mr. Richard Mosley: One way the scheme attempts to deal with the concern that is I think reflected in the motion to amend is in the necessity that the action taken by the officer must be reasonable and proportionate to the matter the officer is investigating. For example, if it is a minor criminal matter, then clearly the officer would not be justified in committing a more serious criminal offence in order to conduct that investigation.

The difficulty is that the officer, at that point in time, though, may not know whether the matter he or she is investigating is related to organized crime. It may well prove to be so at the end of the day and at the end of the investigation. It may not. The officer is confronted with the difficulty that in the course of the investigation of what could well be a very serious offence, some act or omission that the officer believes it essential to take in those circumstances would constitute a federal offence and bring the officer into potential liability. What does he or she do in those circumstances?

Prior to Campbell and Shirose they could make the decision in good faith, knowing with some comfort that the test the courts had upheld—the Waterfield test that has been in place for many years—would protect them from any potential liability that might otherwise attach. Today that's not the case. What this proposes to do is to put them back into that situation—not to give them greater authority or to put them further ahead, but to put them back in this situation so that when they are confronted with that very difficult choice in the course of their work, they don't walk away from it on the basis that they're not prepared to take the risk of being prosecuted and/or civilly liable. The—

Mr. Stephen Owen: Excuse me, Mr. Mosley, but does that not mean then that we must, to follow this logic, designate all police officers investigating serious crime?

Mr. Richard Mosley: I don't believe so, and in the course of our discussions with the law enforcement community, they've made it clear to us, and I think they've said the same to the committee when they've appeared, that they don't expect this will be an authority extended to most members, most public officers, peace officers, but that it will be those who are engaged in the investigation of offences that are normally associated with organized crime, but they may not be any form of organized crime that we could agree on by way of definition.

• 2000

The fundamental problem here is that if you are pursuing an investigation—we'll use drug smuggling, although that is covered by another statute and regulations—are you dealing with a single entrepreneur, or are you dealing with a criminal organization? They may not know that until the case is closed, the investigation is completed, all of the evidence is available, and charges are laid. If you tell them that you can only have this authority when you are assured, at the point at which you would exercise it, that you were investigating a criminal organization offence, then you effectively tie their hands because they won't know that.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Allard.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that I am a little ill at ease in this debate. Are we in a crisis or not? When we think of what happened in Quebec, the criminalization of bikers, the state of siege to which they have subjected the population, the bar owners who are killed with clubs in the middle of the night, I think we can all agree that in Quebec there is currently a crisis that must be abated.

This evening, we are wondering if we are going to trust our police? We want to impose limits on them. After taking one step forward, we want to take two steps back. I agree with my colleague Mr. McKay, if we limit this act, if, as the Bloc proposes, we limit ourselves to a criminal organization, are we not opening the door to having judges exclude all the evidence that could be obtained?

In other words, what happens? They will say that the evidence was not obtained in the course of a criminal investigation so must be excluded. For example, a police officer may be in a situation where he has to participate in a car theft. He is undercover and is asked to participate in a car theft. Is he going to say that he can't because... As Mr. Mosley says, he can't be sure that it is a criminal organization. He maybe facing a sole owner and not an entire organization.

It think we have to go back to what we heard when Mr. Roy testified. There are people who will authorize these acts, who have the responsibility of granting immunity in the context of a reasonable investigation related to... that is limited to a certain sector. I think that these are people who will be appointed by the Solicitor General.

If we are taking two steps back and telling ourselves that now we fear that our police will exaggerate, I think we have to remember that we are in a crisis. We are in a situation where organized crime, criminals get away with murder in our societies. How did that happen? Some will say that it is because of the Charter of Rights that was too permissive. However, at the stage we are at now, we have to stop pussyfooting. We have to ask ourselves if we trust law enforcement to restore order in our societies or if we don't.

I think that if we add the words ”criminal organization“ we are limiting ourselves, putting everyone in a choke hold, opening the door once again for judges to throw out the evidence and, once again, we are playing into the hands of the criminals, who will be able to get away easily. So I am against adding the words proposed by Mr. Bellehumeur.

”Criminal organization“ or ”organized crime“, I don't think it is necessary because I think the situation is much too serious. We have to trust the police. That's it.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

• 2005

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I really wanted to be convinced that this was okay, but I must say that the longer the conversation goes on, the less convinced I am. If you have to do something to prove yourself in an undercover situation, presumably there's somebody there who you have to prove yourself to, which means you're already part of a group. You don't have to prove that you're a crook to yourself if you're just a police officer out there working on your own.

It seems to me that there's already an assumption built in that somehow—at least with the kinds of examples that the police used when they came before us—they were dealing with organized crime or a criminal organization. It seems funny to me that we should have a lack of a definition of organized crime used against us when we raise questions, when that very term is used over and over again in the bill—in the title of the bill, in the summary of the bill, and in other contexts as well.

Now, I think Mr. Mosley is correct when he says, ah ha, it just says, “An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement)”. It doesn't say “law enforcement with respect to organized crime.” Well, perhaps the government should have been more honest with the public and with the House that they were actually trying to kill two birds with one stone with this legislation, because it was marketed as the government's response to organized crime. What we've really got here is that the government is actually trying to do two different things here, but it's been sold as one, and the other has just sort of been slipped in. In the course of the testimony and our discussions here, we're finally beginning, I think, to realize that there are two different projects here.

I would respectfully suggest that the project of responding to the consequences of Campbell and Shirose probably should have been a separate piece of legislation, because the more I hear testimony on this—and I don't say this critically, because it's more than just police who do this, sometimes, when they feel they need to have their work situation clarified—it almost sounds as if we have a work-to-rule situation on the part of the police.

They don't like the Campbell and Shirose decision. They think it leaves them vulnerable, and they may well be correct in that assessment. We keep hearing people say—Mr. Mosley said it, and we heard other witnesses say it—that police aren't going to do this kind of work unless they have more protection than they feel now. So that, it seems to me, is a separate issue that covers more than the government's strategy with respect to organized crime and all the other things that are contained in here with respect to fighting organized crime.

I think it's regrettable that we've been asked to deal with both of these in the same bill. And it's regrettable that we finally realized, actually, that we're being asked to deal with both of these in the same bill—

Mr. John McKay: We realized that a long time ago.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Pardon?

Mr. Paul DeVillers: We knew it a long time ago.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Well, maybe I'm just a little bit slow then, but I think it's becoming clearer that this is what is actually going on here, and it's part of the problem. All of us don't have any problem with giving the police more powers to deal with organized crime. I think the problem comes when we realize that, in the course of being asked to do that, we're being asked to do more than that. That's where the problem lies, and I think that's why people are as uncomfortable as they are. Regardless of how they might actually vote on the bill, that's where the discomfort comes on both sides of the House here.

The Chair: Thank you. Mr. Mosley would like to reply, and then we go to Mr. Toews.

Mr. Richard Mosley: If I may, just for the purposes of clarification, I'd like to note that the government did in fact announce its proposals to respond to Campbell and Shirose separately in the white paper that was released in June of last year. That work was the result of...it was, by then, I think, well over a year, maybe 18 months, from the decision. An enormous amount of time, effort, work, and consultation had gone in to try to come up with a suitable and appropriate scheme to respond to Campbell and Shirose. It was put forward in the form of a white paper, with actual draft legislation attached to the text that described the rationale.

It's not that there are two separate projects here. But the point was made to us time and time again by those responsible for law enforcement—not just the police, but the attorneys general of the provinces—that the effect of Campbell and Shirose was particularly hard felt in the context of the efforts against organized crime.

• 2010

The other work that was undertaken in relation to organized crime stemmed from, in part, a federal-provincial-territorial action plan approved by ministers in September of last year in Iqaluit, where a number of proposals for legislative action were put forward and endorsed by ministers, and the two processes were then merged.

But clearly this has always been presented as being part of the response to organized crime. It is essential as part of that response. Campbell and Shirose had a much wider effect. The June white paper last year made it clear that the government was proposing to respond, not just in the context of organized crime, but particularly in that context with proposals, which have had a broader effect. They've been in the public domain since June 2000.

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I note that members have expressed the concern that they're losing confidence in this bill, as we analyse it more and more. I think that's not an uncommon occurrence when one becomes absorbed in the detail and doesn't step back. I really appreciate the comments Mr. Mosley has just made clarifying the legislative background, the thought that went behind this, and the difficulty of creating legislation that you want focused on a specific issue, but recognizing that it's much broader.

I think we sit here as legislators and try to develop this perfect scheme. We aren't going to develop that perfect scheme because we're living in a real world. We have become absorbed in detail, I think in part because the courts have forced us to become absorbed in this kind of nonsense really.

The Campbell and Shirose decision is really the problem. This decision overturns 100 or 200 years of understanding of how police operated. By and large, police operated properly, within accepted norms. There were guidelines and parameters in which they operated. Suddenly the Supreme Court of Canada, doing another wonderful job of navel-gazing, sets us off into this kind of discussion. That's really unfortunate. It puts police in a difficult situation. It puts us, as legislators, in a difficult position, as though we can somehow come up with a perfect system in an imperfect world.

I've said this over and over again: step back, look at the problem. Ms. Allard has summarized my concerns, has summarized the concerns of police officers over and over again, and here we continue with this fascination over detail. Citizens in our cities are frightened. They want protection by our police, who they understand are governed by reasonable laws and reasonable conditions. I think this bill reflects that reasonableness.

I don't come out very often and praise Liberal bills. I'm beginning to wonder what's happening to me coming here to Ottawa.

Mr. John McKay: I'm beginning to get the shakes myself.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Switch sides.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Vic Toews: But this isn't like the omnibus bill—Bill C-15—where the Liberals dumped a whole bunch of things together to embarrass the opposition. This is a very different kind of thing.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: They were being so nice.

Mr. Vic Toews: I think this is really a genuine effort to deal with a difficult situation, the reality of the street, and the idealism, if I can be kind, of the Supreme Court of Canada. Yes, this is a compromise—

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Yes, and we get caught in the middle.

• 2015

Mr. Vic Toews: —-but it's a workable compromise. I think the majority of Canadian citizens will say—along with our police officers—this is reasonable.

We can continue to be involved in this detailed debate, and we're not going to get anywhere. Ultimately, we have to respect the decisions that were made in a thoughtful way by justice department officials who have reviewed the law, who have considered what the Supreme Court of Canada said, who have dealt with police officers, who have listened to attorneys general across this country. Let's move on with this. I mean, where are we going here?

The Chair: On that note, Paul.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Thank you, Mr. Andy. I just want to make the comment that Mr. Mosley just made on the history here, that we had a process. I know when we started talking about the timetable on this bill there were concerns expressed that we were going to be rushing this through. This was a significant legislative scheme that we're going to be talking about.

As Mr. Mosley pointed out, there were consultations, draft legislation, the white paper. There was a whole process that went on. As far as there being any confusion about there being two separate processes, the subcommittee that did the work on organized crime was very clear that the legislative scheme was a separate process going along on a separate track.

Now we come to the relevance of that legislative scheme in the organized crime context. Yes, it goes further than that, but it is certainly essential to the organized crime initiatives. I think the thing I retain the most from our subcommittee work was when the police told us that the number one tool they have against organized crime is intelligence. With the vastness of this country and the scope of international efforts on behalf of organized crime in the way they break up into cells, etc., if they don't have the intelligence to fight organized crime, then they're going to be very ineffective.

So I think the scheme, inasmuch as it may go further than many of us would like, needs to be put in place because of the vacuum that was created by Campbell and Shirose. I can assure you I'm never going to get the endorsement of the Canadian Police Association on the law and order ticket, but this is one case where I believe it's a tool that is necessary and we need to give it to the law enforcement agencies in this country.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I just want to respond to something Mr. Toews said. I don't think we should feel bad about having taken a couple of hours to try to understand better what we have before us. We are already committed to getting this thing done today. It's not as if the safety of Canadian citizens who are terrorized by organized crime is in danger by the fact that we're spending a couple of hours here trying to figure out better what we're doing or what we're not doing. I don't know. I didn't see any report as present. So I really didn't understand the politics of it.

I'm just saying it's important for us to understand what we're doing. I think the time has been well spent actually. Once we get past clause 2, it's probably pretty much clear sailing. So if we want to spend some time on clause 2, understanding what we're doing, I don't think we should be apologetic about it. I don't think we are not acting in the best interests of the Canadian citizens who are terrorized and who insist their life is going to be in danger if we don't pass this in the next five minutes.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Question.

The Chair: Mr. MacKay and Mr. Owen.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I tend to agree with what Mr. DeVillers just said about there being these tracks we were on and the organized crime committee he and I and others were a part of. We're looking at ways to empower police or try to bring them back on some level. They're never going to get there completely, but this certainly brings things back somewhat in line. I'm just concerned about the intellectual honesty of saying we're designating police officers for the purposes of fighting organized crime when we know in our heart of hearts—-

Mr. Paul DeVillers: I didn't say that.

Mr. Peter MacKay: No, I'm not saying you said this.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: The white paper—-

Mr. Peter MacKay: The white paper said this.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: No, it didn't. It didn't say it was aimed at organized crime.

Mr. Peter MacKay: The result is going to be that officers with this designation are empowered to essentially use these extraordinary powers for things outside of organized crime. So let's be upfront in saying that.

• 2020

Mr. Mosley said at one point—and correct me if I'm wrong—that sometimes police don't know whom they're dealing with until they've completed their investigation. If that's the case, I'm extremely worried about the competence of that officer. If they don't know whom they're dealing with until they get to the very end of their investigation, I would find that very, very troubling, if not preposterous. We're not talking about empowering officers to go out and steal a car on a dare. They know whom they're dealing with. They know why they would have to do it. That's why they need the designation—so that they can penetrate this group and find out exactly what's going on. This is more a matter of being upfront about what exactly we're empowering police to do.

I don't think there should be any stealth or any hesitation in saying that those who have this designated power are special police. As Mr. Owen said, why don't we just...? We're going to have to empower a lot of them. What police will inevitably do—I can see it now—is they're going to pair up. You're going to have every officer on the beat, one designated and one not. That way, they'll do what they have to do.

If that's what we're empowering them to do, then fine, but let's be honest about it. Let's not try to say that it's only for the purposes of fighting organized crime. If that's the reason we're hesitant to bring this language in, then that's the reason.

The Chair: Mr. Owen.

Mr. Stephen Owen: This has been a very important conversation, as Mr. Blaikie has said.

From what I've heard so far on this amendment, I'm more than inclined—I have decided that I will vote for the amendment. Without repeating myself from earlier comments, I would just like to add one other consideration. That is that we are taking an extraordinary step here, and it's somewhat into the dark. It always is with new legislation, and it always is with powers that haven't been expressly laid out in legislation before, for the extra powers that we give the police in order to fulfil the very difficult jobs we give them.

But whenever we do that, we should do it very incrementally, I think, and very carefully. No disrespect—in fact quite the opposite—is meant to the justice officials who have put this together in order to respond to the Supreme Court of Canada decision as well as the organized crime threat. But I don't think we lose anything by testing this legislation and the effective, responsible, accountable implementation of it by limiting it—as long as we can do it effectively through this amendment—to the investigation of crimes related to criminal organizations, as have been more broadly described in this legislation.

We can come back with great assurance, as we play this out, to widen it at a later date, but I think that, with confidence as well, we can speak to the police community and the public at large in dealing with what those who know something about it understand to be the major threat to our society. I think I'm inclined to take the incremental step first.

The Chair: Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Three or four weeks ago, when the police chiefs were here, I think the RCMP commissioner outlined it best. He scared me when he said they've stopped any undercover surveillance at all. I asked them whether this immunity would be granted to officers retroactively. “Oh, my goodness, no, no, certainly not, no, no!” I said to myself, certainly it will, and I'm willing to go along with that.

Giving that power to the police scares the hell out of me, but if we don't do something about organized crime, or crime that is organized, or disorganized crime—I don't really care—we're going to have a terrible situation in this country. I would like this to be reviewed. We're told that it will be reviewed in five years. I think that's too long a time. I'd like it reviewed before then.

I'm willing to go along with the police and trust them. If they betray our trust, then we'll have to do something about it, and our heads will be on the chopping block. But we have to do something other than just sit here and talk about it. We've gone up, down, and sideways over this thing. I think what everyone's afraid of is how the police are going to implement this thing.

• 2025

I don't know how they're going to do it because it seems impossible to me to have half the force authorized to do undercover surveillance in organized crime while the other half aren't. Supposing the other half are there at the wrong time—we just let them go? We can't do that. Let them implement it. They said they can do it; they said they can make it work. Let's let them do it. Let's take a chance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: John McKay.

Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Maloney would like to respond to Mr. Grose.

Mr. John Maloney: I don't want to respond to Mr. Grose; I want to make my own comments.

Go ahead, Mr. McKay.

The Chair: Mr. McKay, and then Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John McKay: I think this has actually been a helpful and healthy debate and has put on the table a number of levels of discomfort. Unlike Mr. Toews, however, I think this is where you do the detail—you don't do the detail here; you'll never do it. So I don't mind spending the time on debate, where there is certainly a large philosophical significance here.

I share a lot of the comments with respect to the sale of the bill, shall we say, on the basis that it is organized crime and that this part of the bill is a substantial attempt to address a larger issue in Campbell and Shirose.

On the level of trust, I go back to some of the previous comments where—how shall we say—the accountability provisions were somewhat superficial. I largely agree with those comments that the accountability is superficial, and so I'm therefore somewhat less enthusiastic about extending this level of trust. In my city we've had a number of—not a number, a very few—incidents among police organizations that would raise a level of legitimate distrust among citizens.

I know Quebec has had some incidents where citizens have reason to have some level of discomfort, so I, too, will be supporting Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment. I would also adopt Mr. Grose's view that the amendment period that will be proposed in a while be shrunk. I wouldn't even be overly bothered if the government came back with another go at Campbell and Shirose, and the police came back, and everyone else came back and made the argument as to why other kinds of non-organized crime investigations need this kind of authorization.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, it certainly concerns us here that police officers don't misuse or abuse their authority. I disagree with Mr. McKay that the provisions to secure accountability are certainly more than superficial.

If I can just bear with the committee...if I can just outline some of these, and think about them....

Police officers who enjoy the special immunity must be specially designated. All of their actions must be reasonable and proportional to the circumstances. An individual officer must believe on reasonable grounds that committing the act, or failing to act, is a reasonable and proportional course of action in the circumstances, taking into account the nature of the criminal activity being investigated, the nature of the act or omission, and the reasonable availability of other means of carrying out their duty.

Some conduct is completely excluded, and nothing in the proposed scheme would provide immunity for the intentional or criminally negligent causing of death or bodily harm to any other person; the wilful attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice; or conduct that would violate the sexual integrity of an individual.

Prior authorization by senior officials is required in other cases.

An annual report, as we've mentioned, must be issued by the Solicitor General of Canada and each provincial minister responsible for policing in their respective jurisdictions as well as federal ministers responsible for the enforcement of other federal statutes such as fisheries and immigration. They have to indicate, among other things, the number of times officers under the responsibility committed acts such as the destruction of property. Where a police officer causes serious loss of or damage to property, there will be an obligation for the senior official to inform the owner of the damage, similar to those requirements that exist in respect of wiretap authorization targets.

• 2030

All these above-mentioned mechanisms for recourse against the police remain available in the event of misconduct, including: that police officers may still be charged with a criminal offence if they overstep the bounds of the limited protection granted by the scheme; criminal compensation for victims of crimes in appropriate cases; civil liability for torturous or abusive conduct; constitutional remedies for unconstitutional behaviour; common-law remedies for abuse of process; officers remain liable to internal discipline for unprofessional behaviour or other misconduct; and police and public complaint mechanisms and procedures are still available in appropriate cases. These are significant safeguards, and I ask you to consider those when you make your decision to vote.

The Chair: Are you ready for the question?

[Translation]

Ms. Allard.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: I would like some information. We are voting on the amendment proposed by the Bloc Québécois to limit this to criminal organizations. Is that it?

[English]

The Chair: Very specifically, we're voting on the amendment referred to in your paper as amendment BQ-3, as amended.

[Translation]

In French, it's...

[English]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Okay, I have it here.

The Chair: It refers to a “criminal organization”, as against “organized crime”. Do we understand each other? Okay.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I ask for a recorded division.

[English]

(Amendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 6—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Amendments BQ-4 and BQ-5 were included in the defeat of amendment BQ-2, so we'll move now to government amendment G-3.

Would Mr. Maloney like to speak to amendment G-3?

Mr. John Maloney: The amendment would require the agent to ascertain whether a clear or sufficiently specific direction to commit a criminal act has been provided by a public officer, and secondly, to have the reasonable grounds for believing the public officer has the authority to give such direction.

This responds to the concerns respecting the ambit of the immunity scheme with regard to agents. A requirement that the agent turn his or her mind both to the act directed, as well as the officer's authority to direct such act, effectively prevents the justification scheme from being invoked illegitimately or without due exercise of diligence on behalf of the agent.

The Chair: Understood.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: I now refer you to government amendment G-3A, which was inserted. Before we begin, let me make sure everyone has their hands on that amendment. We do.

Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: This amendment would further restrict the availability of the justification scheme for acts committed by agents at the direction of a public officer. Immunity for the public officer would be lost if he or she, (a) directed an agent to commit an act or omission that is likely to result in destruction of or damage to property if such destruction or damage would likely exceed $5,000, or (b) directed an agent to commit an act or omission in which violence against the person is likely to be used or attempted.

• 2035

Immunity for the agent would be lost, (a) if he or she committed an act or omission that at the direction of a public officer results in the intentional or reckless destruction of or damage to property, which destruction or damage actually exceeds $5,000, or (b) if he or she committed an act or omission at the direction of a public officer in which violence against the person is used or attempted.

The rationale for that is, given the differences between the public officers and agents in terms of training and control, it is appropriate that additional restriction be placed on agents both in regard to what a public officer can direct and what an agent can do. While public officers themselves will be able to commit the actions prescribed in this amendment where the proportionality test can be satisfied, agents will lose all immunity from the scheme if they venture into this area, as will police officers who direct agents to embark on such activities.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Just so I understand this, if I'm a police officer with this limited immunity and I hire or I associate with some thug to do a job for me, effectively, if he gets a little enthusiastic about his job and does something of damage in excess of $5,000, I as the police officer have lost my immunity. Is that a fair understanding?

Mr. John Maloney: And the agent as well.

Mr. John McKay: Well, the agent is off on his own and freelancing. So that affects the officer as well. Is that the effect of the amendment?

Mr. John Maloney: Only if the officer directed him. If the agent was on a lark by himself, then the officer—

Mr. John McKay: Well, he's on his own. But if I, as an officer, authorize you to go out and steal this vehicle and I wreck it, if it's under $5,000, I as an officer am okay. If it's over $5,000, it's out of my pocket.

Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Canadian Alliance): And they don't exactly steal junk.

Mr. John McKay: You're not going to steal one of Mr. Toews' cars; you're going to....

Mr. Paul DeVillers: Your van is safe.

The Chair: I'm aware that Mr. Toews doesn't own a car.

A voice: That's for your protection.

Mr. Richard Mosley: I must admit, this is an area of some difficulty.

Mr. John McKay: You understate it so well, Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: You will recall the evidence given by the Montreal Urban Community officer and legal adviser who described the process under which agents are employed. The intent of proposed subsection 25.1(10), as it currently reads, is to recognize the fact that an agent may be a thug, they may be a low form of human life, but they may also be officers who are not covered by the scheme. They may be foreign officers who are assisting with an undercover investigation, a member of the FBI, for example, who is brought in because of a particular facility or knowledge of the milieu.

The difficulty is, the concept of “agent” covers a very wide range, but the plans they put in place are very specific about what the agents can or cannot do. The examples were given in the context of the port of Montreal.

What we want to make clearer by these amendments is both to attempt to ensure that the agent understands first, in the motion just passed, that he is acting under the express direction—there's no mistake as to what he is told he can do—of the officer who has the authority to do that, that is, a designated public officer, not just any officer....

A concern that arose for the reading of proposed subsection 25.1(10) is that it could lend itself to the interpretation that a mistake of fact would apply. This current motion attempts to go further, to put the agent in a more restricted area than the public officer. It's not to increase the liability of the public officer who is directing the agent, but to limit the scope of action that the agent can perform in these circumstances.

• 2040

I'm not sure that addresses your concern, but if the damage exceeds $5,000 because it happens inadvertently—it's not an intentional act and it's not a reckless act—the officer is not caught by this. But if the officer were to direct the agent to go beyond the scope of this provision, then, yes, the officer is acting beyond the scope of his authority and would lose the protection that he would otherwise have. He would therefore share the potential liability of the agent that he directed to go beyond that authority.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I'm concerned with putting in these kinds of limitations. This is a very artificial limitation, because I know what will happen out there in the real world. Somebody's going to figure out how to use this.

I'm more concerned about whether this is bona fide for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and if it's $5,001, then it's $5,001. In the context of destruction of property, my concern is that I want to make sure a citizen is protected, that if an innocent, third-party citizen's vehicle—like Mr. McKay's van—is destroyed, he in fact gets compensation for that. We want to deal with that as an amendment later on in the bill, so that there's nothing here that takes away from the right of a citizen, an innocent, third-party citizen, to claim for that.

What I don't understand is the purpose of a $5,000 limit if the reason behind it is a bona fide law enforcement purpose. Certainly we should address whether it's $4,500, $4,000, or $6,000, by compensation. This kind of restriction only complicates matters, and I think it will create a very artificial atmosphere.

Now, I can't think off the top of my head right now about how this would in fact be used, but would the citizen be outraged if the damage was $4,500 or $5,500? No, the outrage is caused when a police officer does something that isn't for a bona fide law enforcement purpose. So I'm just wondering what the....

I can support most of this amendment. I can't support this part that says “exceeds five thousand dollars”, because it seems a little artificial. If the government wants to go along with this, and if police officers feel comfortable with it, that's fine, but don't think this seems to make any sense.

It's like the old definition in the Criminal Code. I don't know what it says now, but when I prosecuted many years ago, if it was under $200, it was a summary conviction offence, and if it was over $200, then it was an indictable offence. Here, if it's $4,999, it's not a criminal offence, but if it's $5,001, it is a criminal offence. It doesn't make sense. Maybe somebody can explain.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: I might start by saying it's the price of inflation.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Richard Mosley: That's why the $200 limit that you dealt with is now $5,000. In the code, it has become the line of demarcation between what are considered less serious property offences and more serious property offences.

Unfortunately, there's no convenient way to use that kind of terminology. If we said “a serious loss or damage or destruction of property”, the courts would have some difficulty trying to determine what that might be. There is no guidance in the code or any of the statutes that allows the courts to make that distinction.

• 2045

So, you're right, it is an arbitrary line in the sand. It's an attempt to provide further guidance to designated public officers and to their agents, in that they may have to do something in the course of this investigation that will result in damage to property, but they can't be authorized to go out and trash somebody's car or house or whatever.

Mr. Vic Toews: Well, then, Mr. Mosley, if I have the scenario right, let's say we have a gang leader telling the police officer to go get somebody to smash up Mr. McKay's Mercedes-Benz.

Mr. John McKay: After this raise, I'm driving one.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Vic Toews: The officer goes out and says this is now part of his initiation. He's told he's allowed to smash up the Mercedes, but should go a little light. It doesn't make any sense. A police officer is now caught in an untenable position. Because he doesn't want his cover blown, he has to hope the thug he gets to smash up the car, or the foreign officer who is going to smash up the car, better not do damage for more than $5,000. Isn't that an artificial distinction? Why do we need this distinction?

If we trust the police that it's a bona fide police operation, let's not quibble about the dollars, provided that the citizen whose Mercedes—Mr. McKay, after his raise—is...it's compensated for in a fair way. That's my question.

The Chair: Mr. Peter MacKay, the one without the Mercedes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm driving a used Jeep.

The Chair: I take it to the Maritimes. I know that.

Mr. Peter MacKay: They can smash my car up, I guess.

An hon. member: Oh, oh!

Mr. Peter MacKay: I'm equally troubled by this. It does seem to be an arbitrary offence. I guess I've practised law more recently than Mr. Toews, because I knew it had jumped to $5,000. But it's still arbitrary, because it is setting up these almost comic-like scenarios in which police are going to say, “Right, commandeer that car, but make sure it's a Lada!”

An hon. member: That's if it's a Russian officer.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Yes, if it's a Russian officer.

Similarly, if we can move down to paragraph (b), this is a bit of a bizarre situation too, because you're saying nothing authorizes a public officer to direct somebody to go into a situation in which violence might be used.

Again, I don't know if we should be stating this, because I would suspect the officer is going to be thinking that anyway. He's not going to send part of his designation...the person he is bringing into this scenario surely isn't going to be intentionally sent in to cause bodily harm to somebody. That's already explicitly stated. Do we really need to restate it?

Mr. Richard Mosley: No, it's not, if I may. Unfortunately, that's what concern arises from proposed subsection (10) as it's currently worded.

It is conceivable that a person could go into a situation as an agent of an officer, and, following the direction of the officer, could commit an act that would be an act of violence against a third person. The object of the motion is to make it clear that the scope of the authority given to the agent—and this is not the officer, it's the agent—does not extend to the use of violence.

Again, it's a question of public policy. Do you want agents in these circumstances being entitled to go out and beat someone up at the direction of an officer? It's an effort to draw that line a little bit more narrowly.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I guess I'm at a bit of a loss because I just naturally assumed officers wouldn't go out and designate an agent to commit bodily harm or to seek violence against another person. You're right, the officers may find themselves in situations in which they have to restrain somebody or worse, but this is again Cartesian thinking. Do we have to write everything down?

• 2050

Mr. Richard Mosley: I must confess that I find myself arguing effectively the obverse of the debate over the last provision.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Bill Blaikie: We were starting to notice.

Mr. Richard Mosley: But it is a matter of greater concern.

In the case of a public officer, there is a disciplinary regime in place. There are extraordinary controls over most officers who will be authorized to exercise this authority. Beyond a criminal law, there is really no control over agents. The problem that I think we recognize—and I must give credit to Mr. Owen for first having raised this in a question directed to witnesses from Montreal, but it was also raised with us by the Canadian Association of Police Boards—is that as proposed subsection (10) was drafted, it contemplated a situation in which an agent could go beyond the scope of the authority that he was given by the public officer and could then claim mistake or mistake of fact: “I thought the officer told me I could go and attack this person”, or “I thought the officer told me I could go and trash their car”. The motion is an effort to ratchet that back to greater control over the agents.

The Chair: I'd like to put the question. We're referring now to government amendment G-3A, and I'll make it a recorded vote so that we get this straight.

Mr. John McKay: Hands up, those who understand what they're voting for.

(Amendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 6—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: I now turn to the Canadian Alliance amendment numbered CA-2.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: This amendment essentially expresses my concern that when we are authorizing police officers to, in effect, commit illegal acts, we are not saying the innocent third party is then deprived of a right of civil action. We're not changing the law in any way; we're just simply making it clear that if the citizen had a civil right of action prior to these proposed sections being passed, this doesn't change it. We preserve an innocent third party's right to bring a suit, as may be his or her right today. It just clarifies that issue.

I understand that we may be getting into areas of provincial law. That's why I don't think the amendment can go any further than that. But it simply clarifies that the criminal law doesn't attempt to change the provincial civil law.

The Chair: All those in favour...?

Mr. John Maloney: Could we discuss this?

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Maloney.

• 2055

Mr. John Maloney: I'm a little concerned about what “innocent” means. I don't think there's any definition in civil or criminal law, and I question whether the federal Parliament has the jurisdiction in all cases. Certainly when I was there it was under the provinces.

I would suggest that the officer would still have a civil justification defence and I would say the crown would have no vicarious liability, I submit. That's why I would oppose that motion.

The Chair: Madame Allard.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Personally, I want to explain to Vic why I am against. I have the impression that we should not have to specify that. If a person's civil rights... In Quebec, we have civil law. I am uneasy because I am asking myself why we should mention it specifically. I believe that a person's rights should be self-evident. It is not excluded elsewhere. Why should it be included there?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I think we are. When we are saying that a police officer is in fact allowed to do something in the context of criminal law, how then can that action that has been excused form the basis of a civil suit, even if it's in provincial jurisdiction?

We have to remember that criminal law can affect the right we exercise in the provincial context if it contradicts that civil law in the province.

So, for example, if today we could bring a lawsuit against the thug who stole the Mercedes-Benz and smashed it up, what then is the imposition of the section that says a police officer or a public officer may authorize that person to do it? We are then acting with an excuse that excuses civil liability because of this statutory provision.

So if the committee is satisfied, if you can say here today that you're satisfied that this does not impact upon the civil rights of an individual in the context of a civil lawsuit, then I won't proceed on this. But I know the first thing that's going to happen is when a city—and it won't be the federal government, it will be a city where a police officer has in fact authorized it. The city will then be sued, the police officer will then be sued, and he'll just say, “I was acting under authority of law, there is no jurisdiction to bring this suit against me and you'll have to dismiss it.”

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Vic, why couldn't we let the courts judge on the first case? I don't think we have any jurisprudence. We should therefore let a victim sue and then the judge will have to decide on whether the police are immune or not. Let's let events take their course and we will see in the coming years if third parties have rights or not.

[English]

The Chair: John McKay.

Mr. John McKay: I must say I'm becoming quite attached to this Mercedes.

The very simple question is, is Mr. Toews' amendment redundant or is there anything in this bill that derogates from the right of third parties to pursue civil remedies?

The Chair: Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Richard Mosley: I think, as I believe was said to the committee during one of the proceedings by one of my colleagues, the scheme does create a justification for the officer who causes the harm. The officer would thus not be liable in any action. It's our view that there would be no vicarious liability for the government that employed the officer.

• 2100

So it does create the situation where we can't say that a civil action would be successful on behalf of a third party, innocent or otherwise. Insofar as innocent goes, if the courts were forced to interpret that, I suspect they would say if he was charged and he got off, then he's innocent in the eyes of the law; presumption of innocence applies. You may find this attaching to someone who is not, in a moral sense, innocent.

There is a problem about whether the federal Parliament has the competence to impose civil liability on a province or municipality under the delegated authority of a province. At best, I think Parliament could address the issue of federal liability in these circumstances. But I would argue that there is a process, there is a mechanism in place, that does work. I know it may not give you a great deal of comfort because it does rely on discretion. That is the ex gratia compensation program. I'm sure Mr. Scott recalls from his days as Solicitor General that there are payments made out on a regular basis to people whose property was damaged by the RCMP where there is no liability in law that would require the RCMP, or the Government of Canada, in a court to pay for those damages.

So that scheme does work. Governments are conscious of their responsibilities. The advantage of that approach is of course it does allow governments to make some judgments about who they're dealing with. If you put this into the law there'd be a debate as to whether or not it did apply to any province. I can tell you an attorney general would in short order, if there was an effort made to employ this, challenge whether it was within the vires of the Parliament of Canada.

At the end of the day—and I know you may find it difficult to accept this, but I think you have to rely on the good faith of those who are responsible for the policing authorities to make good the harm that occasionally happens in the execution of their duties.

The Chair: Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I might just say, somewhat tongue in cheek, I don't know why we're spending all this time on such detail. The people out on the streets are afraid for their homes and their property, and I think we should get on with it. I think we should proceed because the people want action, and we're just taking up more time here.

An hon. member: You weren't serious.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Of course I wasn't. I was just having a little fun with Mr. Toews.

The Chair: Point made, and we're going to the question. All those in favour of amendment CA-2?

An hon. member: I want a recorded vote.

(Amendment negatived: nays 10; yeas 5—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

• 2105

(Clause 2 as amended agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 3 agreed to)

(On clause 4)

The Chair: I refer you to amendment G-4.

Mr. John Maloney: This amendment incorporates a reference to offences against the Crimes Against Humanity Act and the War Crimes Act and structural changes resulting therefrom. It also clarifies that the list set out in section 183 of the Criminal Code is intended to be non-exclusive. The rationale for this is to correct an inadvertent omission.

(Amendment agreed to)

(Clause 4 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 5 to 10 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 11)

The Chair: We're on amendment BQ-7.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I simply want to add the words ”or a journalist“.

I believe, and many other people seem to share that opinion, that journalists have an important power, perhaps even more important than that of members of the House of Commons or the National Assembly in terms of information delivery. In Quebec, the journalist Michel Auger had written a series of articles on organized crime and was shot point blank by someone from organized crime. That is no doubt absolute proof that all journalists, when they do investigative work on criminal cases that involve organized crime, hold an extremely important power of information and that they can be the prey of organized crime, which may try to intimidate both the judicial and the political systems by acting against journalists.

Nowhere in this bill do we try to protect these people. I think that goes without saying. I do not need to argue any more than is needed on this topic. I think that everyone has an idea about what protection should or should not be granted to journalists.

[English]

The Chair: Are there any comments? Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, what was the question? I was chatting with my associate here.

The Chair: Sorry. I got the impression you wanted to respond to Mr. Bellehumeur's explanation of the amendment.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: Let me pursue that. We are expanding from justice system participants to another category of persons, namely, journalists. What's the counter-argument to Mr. Bellehumeur's position?

Mr. Richard Mosley: The counter-argument is simply that journalists are not part of the justice system. That may be little comfort for those who suffer violence as a result of investigations they themselves conduct. But they're not involved directly in the administration of justice, in contrast to those who are listed in the definition of justice system participant.

May I suggest that if the committee were inclined to support the spirit of this, the motion is misplaced, because where it is situated is as an amendment to the offence, as opposed to the definition of justice system participant. If the rationale for including journalists is that they are somehow players in the justice system, it would be more appropriate to have that amendment made in that definition. Of course, that opportunity has passed. Here it's misplaced. It's referring to a large group of actors in the criminal justice system, and then it tacks on journalists at the end of it.

• 2110

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Allard.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What Mr. Bellehumeur is proposing raises many issues. Having been a journalist myself, I believe that today the word ”journalist“ is badly defined. Are we talking about a reporter, a journalist? I think that journalists themselves have a hard time defining themselves. It says:

423.1 (1) No person shall, without lawful authority, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) against a justice system participant...

Here we would add: ”or a journalist“. I think we are confusing things. I believe the impact of intimidating a journalist has been greater than it would have been if it had been directed against someone in the justice system. In Quebec, prison guards were assassinated in their car and we did not have the general outcry that the attempted assassination of journalist Michel Auger brought forth.

I think that journalists are well able to defend themselves and that since it is difficult to define the word ”journalist“, its inclusion in the act would create a problem.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Excellent.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, proposed subsection 423.1(1) refers to intimidation of a justice system participant. It's an extra penalty, a special penalty, but I think journalists and others would likely be protected by proposed subsection 423(1), which just deals specifically with intimidation. I think this is an umbrella that the journalists certainly could seek refuge under. That's clause 10 of the act, referring to proposed subsection 423(1) of the code.

The Chair: Understood.

Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not wish to respond to Ms. Allard, but I think she has a very selective memory. When the prison guards were killed by organized crime, there was a fairly significant general outcry. There was even a march, of which I was a part, around the court houses and the prison. There was a very important general outcry. There was an incredible funeral. I think it is incorrect to say what you did, Ms. Allard.

Whether it is a reporter or not, a freelancer or not, a television journalist or not, we are talking about a journalist as defined in an ordinary dictionary such as the such as the Le Petit Larousse, Mr. Chairman. The issue is whether we want to give journalists special protection. Did I put that in the right place? I think it's fine there, but too much doesn't break. We are sovereign here. Even though section 2 was adopted by unanimous consent, we could go back and include the word ”journalist“ in section 2. Otherwise, I will see that it is introduced in the House of Commons at the report stage. The issue is whether we want to protect journalists or not.

Is it conceivable that the clerk or the person who tells people to stand because the judge is there and the session will start is better protected than the journalist who writes a column, who is present in court to write a faithful summary of everything that goes on in order to inform the public about organized crime and put pressure on the men and women in politics? That is what those journalists do.

You in the government believe you know the truth these days. If you believe that journalists do not warrant protection, that's something else. We won't waste our time and will move on to something else. That is not my opinion. I believe that journalists must have special protection because they play an extremely important role in a free and democratic society for which we have fought and for which we shall continue to fight.

• 2115

[English]

Mr. Lynn Myers: Question.

The Chair: A response for this.

Mr. Richard Mosley: The point that Mr. Maloney made earlier about the application of section 423 is an important one because journalists are protected, as is everyone within society who may be the subject of intimidation. The distinction between section 423 and proposed subsection 423(1) comes down to the question of the penalty. What is the maximum that may be applicable in the circumstances? The proposal behind proposed subsection 423(1) arose because of the reality that those who work in the criminal justice system are being increasingly subjected to threats and intimidation in the course of their work.

The fact that someone is a journalist simpliciter has no relationship necessarily to that work. They may be, as suggested, a journalist who is engaged in some other line of reporting entirely. If a charge is laid under proposed subsection 423(1) simply because it's a journalist, then I think the courts will have some difficulty with whether the scope of the provision is too broad. It would be difficult to justify proposed subsection 423(1) with an increased penalty range applying to a journalist in those circumstances. The protection is there under the existing provision of the act.

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I think Mr. Bellehumeur has a good point here, and as for the term “journalist” being too broad, one could make the same comment about “justice system participant”. Not every justice system participant is involved in organized crime or the prosecution of organized crime or dealing with organized crime.

I think journalists play a very special role in our society. I think they're fundamental to free speech and in uncovering organized crime. I think the experience with the journalist in Quebec being shot in the way he was demonstrated that, and I think there's good reason to include journalists in a special category. It'll be noted that organized crime figures won't go out and just shoot down any journalist. It'll probably be a journalist who is involved in some kind of specific reporting, in the same way they'll seek out justice system participants who are involved in some active way against an organized crime figure or that.

So that doesn't trouble me in terms of the breadth. I think you run into the same problem with “justice system participant”, and I would certainly encourage support for this amendment.

The Chair: On that note....

Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Well, I'm wondering if there might be some merit in offering a friendly amendment that we include in the definition of “journalist” a journalist reporting on organized crime. We're talking about a special designation of journalist, are we not?

Mr. Vic Toews: We'll run into the same problem we've just been talking about.

Mr. Peter MacKay: But if it's about having a journalist, and you're worried that it's just going to be any old journalist, the test is still going to be to prove to a court that this journalist put himself in a precarious position because he was reporting on something that was happening that was seen as a threat to the criminal organization. That test, that threshold, that definition, is still going to have to be met in a court of law in order for this section to attach in any event. You're going to have to prove to a judge that it was an aggravating circumstance that put this journalist in that position.

The Chair: Does Mr. Mosley or anyone wish to comment and respond?

Mr. Bagnell.

Mr. Larry Bagnell (Yukon, Lib.): I have two questions, one for Mr. Mosley.

You say a journalist is not involved in the justice system, but you say a journalist who covers a crime beat is constantly influencing justice policy, and writing on criminals is less involved than being a member of Parliament who's not on the justice committee or never has any involvement in crime.

My question for Mr. Bellehumeur is: you haven't convinced me that journalists are not covered. You haven't commented on whether they're covered under that other clause.

• 2120

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur, the question was put.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: As for intimidation, I think it is not necessary to indicate that we are talking about journalist who write columns about organized crime. It's exactly the same thing for members. Do we indicate that it covers only members of the House of Commons working on an issue related to organized crime? It's the same thing. If organized crime is blackmailing us or intimidating us, it is not because we are an endangered species in the House of Commons. I believe it's the same thing. I would be surprised if organized crime threatened sports journalists. I think we don't have to specify that it is related to organized crime, in the same manner as for members of the House of Commons or the Senate.

As for convincing the government, I am telling you that journalists have a very important power in a democratic system like ours. It is often thanks to articles in the papers that things come up in politics, that issues move forward, that things move. It is not by chance that Michel Auger was shot by people from organized crime. It's because he was disturbing. It's because organized crime wanted to use a journalist to intimidate the politicians and the judges.

If we want to protect the clerks, I think we should protect... It's not because they aren't doing a good job. They do excellent work, but I think that the clerks and the guards who tell people to stand and sit are much less likely to be intimidated than journalists.

If you don't follow my reasoning, I can't explain it another way. If I don't convince you this way, I don't know what to tell you. Journalists are the third power and everyone knows it. The question is whether we should protect them or not. That's the question. As for the rest, let's adopt this amendment, and I will move, at the report stage, the amendment that will complement the preceding section. The government has done that before with the Young Offenders Act. I should be able to do the same for a section.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could we not have unanimous consent—

Mr. Larry Bagnell: On a point of order. My second question didn't get answered. Mr. Mosley.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley, sorry.

Mr. Richard Mosley: Would you be kind enough to repeat the question?

Mr. Larry Bagnell: The only rationale you gave against this amendment was that journalists weren't involved in the justice system. Is not a journalist who writes about criminals and organized crime more involved than say an MP who's not involved in this committee or any issues related to crime?

Mr. Richard Mosley: I have no doubt that many journalists, possibly a significant portion, do in fact write about organized crime—various forms of crime. But there are many other journalists who don't.

If you pass this amendment, then you're extending a special provision, which is being adopted for a very particular reason—to make the justice system a little bit more secure. You're extending it to somebody who writes on business affairs for the report on business.

The word “journalist” is exceedingly broad. It may not cover somebody such as Yves Lavigne. Is Yves Lavigne a journalist? He's the author of books, but he's written more on the subject of the biker gangs in this country than just about anyone else. Would he be covered by that term? I don't know.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: It's the same thing for members.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Grose.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Would we not be better off to get unanimous consent to go back and reopen this where it should be, wherever the heck that is? If Mr. Bellehumeur would ever shut up...I'm trying to help you.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I'm listening.

[English]

Mr. Ivan Grose: Get unanimous consent and go back and open up wherever this thing should be; I've forgotten where. Mr. Bellehumeur is an outstanding member of this committee; he is well spoken, treats us nicely, is always polite, and I think it's about time we gave him something.

Mr. John McKay: The boot.

• 2125

The Chair: Do we have unanimous consent to go back to...? No, we do not. Okay.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: I have a question.

[English]

The Chair: Unanimous consent has been denied. So I just want to establish that by Mr. Myers.

An hon. member: She has a question.

The Chair: I know. Now we're moving on. That's all.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Before agreeing, I have a question.

Mr. Mosley, we are including journalists here; we are giving them protection. If we include them in this section, is anyone whoo intimidates a journalist or makes an attempt on his life going to be liable to a maximum imprisonment sentence of 14 years?

In the provision where they are actually protected against intimidation, what is the relevant sentence? Five years? If we add journalists under this provision, attempted murders on them will become much more serious. That is what you are telling me. We are giving criminals 14 years of prison instead of 5. Is that it?

[English]

Mr. Richard Mosley: To intimidate a journalist. But you are of course extending it very broadly, because it would apply to any act of intimidation against a journalist, whether or not it had anything to do whatsoever with the subject matter of this special provision, that is, the administration of justice.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Couldn't we call them media representatives? That could also be a cameraman.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: The odds that that would be the case are very slim.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: Well...

[English]

The Chair: To clarify exactly where we are—

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: The cameraman who filmed...

[English]

The Chair: Order, please. I'd like to clarify exactly where we are.

Mr. Grose offered to seek unanimous consent to include Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment at the place that was referred to earlier by Mr. Mosley as the appropriate place.

An hon. member: Agreed.

The Chair: The unanimous consent at that time was denied. Now, having said that, there has been additional information. So I seek—one more time and for the last time—unanimous consent to in fact insert Mr. Bellehumeur's amendment in a different place in the legislation, which would require us to go back to something we've already dealt with. Do we have consent?

We do not have consent. Okay, well, then the point is moot.

Mr. Vic Toews: Let's have a vote then.

The Chair: On the amendment as put, I'd like to have a vote.

Mr. Myers.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Just before we vote, I want to emphasize something Mr. Mosley has already said, namely, that this is already covered off in the intimidation section. So really to vote for this would be redundant in my view. I think we've heard about the can of worms we would be opening as a result of this class and category of individual. I would caution this committee to vote against this for the right reasons.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I will distribute the list to the journalists tomorrow. A recorded division please.

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: I object to the threats by Mr. Bellehumeur. I find that constitutes intimidation.

[English]

An hon. member: That's intimidation.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: That's intimidation and I would like him to withdraw his words.

[English]

Mr. Vic Toews: Let's open up the section and put that in.

[Translation]

Ms. Carole-Marie Allard: No, but I find that it is intimidation.

[English]

The Chair: Order, please. It's early yet. It's only 9:30 a.m. It's going to go a lot longer. We've called for a recorded vote and we've commenced.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

• 2130

The Chair: The next amendment is identified as G-5.

Mr. John Maloney: The amendment would also make a technical amendment to proposed subsection 423.1(1).

The Chair: Hold on a moment, Mr. Maloney, please.

The amendment referred to as amendment G-5 cannot be entertained since it refers to the same line as was the case in proposed amendment BQ-7. If everyone understands, because the same lines are covered, amendment G-5 cannot be entertained.

(Clause 11 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 12 to 18 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 19)

The Chair: I turn now to clause 19 and amendment BQ-8.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, would you mind explaining why you've ruled out amendment G-5 again?

The Chair: We can't entertain two amendments to the same line.

Mr. John Maloney: What line are you referring to, then? Perhaps the counsellor could be a little more detailed.

The Chair: Could the clerk confer?

Ms. Susan Baldwin (Legislative Clerk): That would be line 45 on page 17.

Mr. Vic Toews: So what did you want unanimous consent for?

Mr. John Maloney: I'm not asking for unanimous consent. I'm trying to get an explanation of why they think we've already dealt with it.

The Chair: He's asking why it's out of order.

Mr. John Maloney: If amendment G-5 wasn't even on the table, how can you block amendment G-5?

Ms. Susan Baldwin: There's a general rule when you're dealing with amendments in committee, and that is that you can only amend the same line in a bill once.

Mr. John Maloney: So it's who gets there first with the amendment?

Ms. Susan Baldwin: Yes.

Mr. John Maloney: Thank you for the explanation.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Vic Toews: We could do it by unanimous consent, though.

Mr. John Maloney: I won't even ask. We'll get it at report stage.

The Chair: Now we're entertaining the amendment from Mr. Bellehumeur—amendment BQ-8.

[Translation]

Mr. Bellehumeur.

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I have no illusions. I will not have two victories in a row.

It is an amendment that the Fédération des policiers et policières du Québec, among others, wants; its representatives came here to testify. It is about the overturning of evidence from goods and products that came from illegitimate sources. It is aimed at organized crime, among others those people who drive Mercedes cars and live in a $300,000 castle and declare an income of $25,000 per year. There is a small problem.

In all probability, it would be up to them to demonstrate that the goods came from legitimate sources.

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I think there has been a lot written on this subject and that the police, among others, want such an amendment.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I do have a concern about this, and perhaps it relates to the concern I have about the protection of property generally. I don't like to see criminals amass fortunes and not pay taxes on them, but I am concerned here. If I understand the import of the amendment, a police agency or a government agency could come in and take my house by simply alleging that it was the result of a criminal activity, because no one could be as prudent as I've been in amassing a half-million-dollar or three-million-dollar house, which I don't have.

Mr. John McKay: I'm glad you clarified that.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: But you will after this raise.

Mr. Vic Toews: They would seize that house and say, well, this is the proceeds of crime, and therefore I am now obligated on a balance of probabilities to demonstrate that it did not come from organized crime activities. I think there has to be some onus on the state to prove, at least on a balance of probabilities, that there is some connection between that house and the proceeds of organized crime. I'm just wondering what the impact of this amendment is, because if this is simply an arbitrary way for government to seize houses of citizens without demonstrating some kind of a reasonable case, I couldn't support this amendment.

The Chair: Mr. Mosley, did you want to comment?

Mr. Richard Mosley: Yes. With the greatest respect, I would suggest that the amendment would be counterproductive to what I think is the intent with which it is being presented. If you read proposed subsections 462.37(1) and 462.37(2) very carefully, the court can only make these orders where satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. All the person who is the putative owner of the property need do is raise a reasonable doubt to defeat the application by the crown. The effect of the amendment would be to raise that bar to a balance of probabilities.

The Chair: Are there any other comments or questions?

(Amendment negatived—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clauses 19 to 26 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 27)

The Chair: The first amendment is amendment G-6.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, this amendment would expand the definition of criminal organizations to include organizations whose complement is situated either in whole or in part outside Canada.

The Chair: Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd just like to go on record as thanking the government for doing as it has. I think that one came about as a result of a question I had representing the people from Vancouver. Thank you.

Mr. John Maloney: We're very responsive, Mr. Cadman, to constructive criticism.

The Chair: Mr. Toews, can we expect something similar? Go to it.

Mr. Vic Toews: I do thank the government. I think it's a good amendment, but, just in terms of the impact of this, how then do we establish jurisdiction in a Canadian court? Would this be the same way we always do it, and this won't complicate establishing jurisdiction?

Mr. Richard Mosley: The court would have jurisdiction because the offence before it would have had a substantial connection to Canada.

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Mr. Vic Toews: So that's the basis on which we establish jurisdiction, that the offence has a substantial connection, and it doesn't matter whether or not the three or more people are inside or outside Canada.

Mr. Richard Mosley: That's right.

Mr. Vic Toews: Provided the court is satisfied there's a substantive connection with the offence, it comes within the jurisdiction of Canadian courts.

Mr. Richard Mosley: Exactly.

Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Next is amendment BQ-9.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: I will also be very brief. I would add belonging to a criminal organization in this section.

You have surely heard of the infraction of belonging to a criminal group. It seems the government has forgotten it since it wrote:

467.11 (1) Every person who knowingly, by act or omission... is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years...

With our amendment, this provision would read as follows:

467.11 (1) Every person who belongs to a criminal organization or who, by act or omission... participates in an activity of a criminal organization... is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years...

It is the participation that I am aiming at with this amendment.

[English]

(Amendment negatived)

(Clause 27 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 28 to 30 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 31)

The Chair: On clause 31, we have amendment G-7.

Mr. John Maloney: This is a technical amendment. It replaces the erroneous reference to “an” offence with the class of offences actually referenced by this provision, namely the indictable offences.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Amendment G-8 is next.

Mr. John Maloney: Again, this is a technical amendment. It tracks the correction made in the preceding motion and extends it to the French version of paragraph 490.2(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, replacing “d'une infraction” with “de l'acte criminel”.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 31 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 32 to 45 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 46)

The Chair: On clause 46, we have amendment G-9.

Mr. John Maloney: The amendment would require a parliamentary review of sections 25.1 to 25.4 to be undertaken within five years of their proclamation into force.

The Chair: I think there are going to be comments here.

Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay: It's not that I'm opposed to the principle you're proposing here, but I have some issue with the time. I think five years from now effectively means that this Parliament will not deal with its own legislation. I would put on the table whether the government would entertain a shorter timeframe, something in the order of three years, so that this Parliament deals with its own legislation and doesn't postpone its own sins to the next Parliament.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: I think there's a practical response to that. We feel it would take up to five years before there would be sufficient data and case law for an effective evaluation of how this scheme was actually operating.

The Chair: Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews: I think this is in fact a good suggestion by Mr. McKay, that we shorten the time period, because I heard many of us say earlier in the evening that we have concerns.

Mr. McKay is right. If we made a mess here tonight or with this bill, it's our obligation to clean it up. What we're doing effectively by putting it to five years is letting somebody else clean up our mess. So I think that's a very prudent suggestion. Two or three years would be good.

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It will certainly, I think, demonstrate very quickly whether or not it is working, whether our concerns are justified. If there is some consensus, Mr. McKay has said three years. That's satisfactory with me.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: I think the suggestion is good, but I don't think it's practical. If we're looking at three years from when this comes into effect, there isn't going to be any time to do the study before the dissolution of Parliament in any event. So as much as I think it would nice to be able to do it, if you went two years, then you haven't got enough time, there haven't been enough operations that you're really evaluating anything. So I just don't know if it's practical.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: My concern, Mr. Chair, is that the mess Mr. Toews refers to may not have been created within three years. If that's the case, then we would have lost that opportunity, and you wouldn't want that to be the intention of this committee. Considering the way the cases proceed through the courts, all the way up to the Supreme Court, I think three years is a little short; five years is probably right on the mark.

The Chair: Mr. Peter MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In response to Mr. Maloney's comment, I would say that if within three years there are insufficient data or if, lo and behold, everything is going tickety-boo, then fine. The committee that's been asked to look at that says, great, they did a good job. The greater concern is that if within three years there is another Supreme Court challenge, as I suspect there will be or things are not going great and, God forbid, there are abuses, at least, as Mr. McKay has pointed out with this amendment, there is an opportunity for us to take responsibility, for those who are sitting around this table to actually have an opportunity to look at what we've done, to try to take some responsibility for it and fix it. Why would we shirk that responsibility and put it off to the next Parliament, where it's very unlikely that those who have had a hand in it won't have a similar opportunity to take that responsibility and fix it?

The Chair: Ms. Sgro.

Ms. Judy Sgro: Mr. Chairman, on that three years, even if they don't have a whole slew of things to bring to us—and hopefully they don't—it's more than an annual reporting process, and it gives us a little more feeling of accountability there. That means on all ends there will be the accountability, not only our end, but also on the other end, as a bit of a monitoring stick.

The Chair: Mr. Cadman.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would support Mr. McKay's idea, because I think some of the things we've heard, the concerns being expressed, are going to jump out at us pretty quickly. I would agree that if there is nothing wrong in three years, we can certainly push it forward to another year or two to look at it again. I think we have to take another look at this.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul DeVillers: We're talking here about a mandatory review. There's nothing to prevent a review. If we see problems developing at any time, a review can be undertaken. But this isn't going to come into effect until the end of the first year of the mandate. You wait three more years, and then you're at the fourth year of the mandate. It's not a practical amendment, to think that you're going to be able to get a mandatory review done. I know with the CCRA we did the five-year review at eight years or something. This isn't going to happen. As much as it might be a great idea, it's just not practical.

The Chair: Mr. Bellehumeur.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Bellehumeur: As for me, I do not agree with the three years. It's not that I don't trust the government, but I would like it to be in the act so that we are not forced to rely on the goodwill of the House of Commons to study that before the deadline to be indicated in the act. If there were to be an election or anything else in the meantime, the first mandate of the new legislature would be to look at amending this law. It will be extremely important for them also.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Myers.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Given the tenor of the comments, I wondered whether we could go with the three years, but on the first line where it says “into force”, insert the following, “and provided there is sufficient data for review”. Everyone is saying you want sufficient data for the review, so why can't we do this?

The Chair: I don't find an overwhelming.... I'd like to entertain, I think, a subamendment to three, because if we vote on this, the way the discussion has gone, and if it were passed, it wouldn't be the first choice, or it would be defeated, and then we'd be.... So I would entertain in the subamendment to change the five to three.

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Mr. John McKay: Let me just discuss this before I move it, in order to get the sense of the committee. If we just simply substitute three for five, I wonder if that still keeps our feet to the fire. I wonder whether we should undertake to move within three years and have it completed within one year of that. What does that accomplish though?

The Chair: Nothing.

Mr. John McKay: So let's just stay with three years.

The Chair: Okay, there has been a subamendment proposed to change five years to three years.

Mr. John McKay: I just talked myself out of it.

The Chair: I found it to be an interesting exercise myself.

Mr. Stephen Owen: He can't even agree with himself.

Mr. John McKay: I've been in Israel too long.

The Chair: We're voting on a subamendment that would change the five to three. Understood?

Mr. Larry Bagnell: If it fails, do we then get to vote on the five?

The Chair: If the subamendment is defeated, we would go back to the amendment, yes.

(Subamendment agreed to)

(Amendment as amended agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Bear with us for a second. We've created a new section, so in addition to clause 46 carrying, the new clause 46.1 will have to carry. That will reflect the additional amendment.

(Clause 46 as amended agreed to)

(On clause 57)

The Chair: Before I put the next question, let me bring to the attention of the committee that the amendment proposed by the government as amendment G-10 is not receivable. The reason it is not receivable is that it is amending an amendment to a bill, when the original amendment—

A voice: It's amending a clause to a bill.

The Chair: Right, it's amending a clause to a bill, when the original amendment did not contain the reference to the other legislation within that clause.

For a clearer explanation of what I just said—

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. John McKay: I thought I was confusing.

The Chair: I have it in my mind, but I'm sure it's going to come out better somewhere else.

The Clerk: I refer the committee right away to the Marleau-Montpetit book, which states:

For a bill referred to a committee after second reading, an amendment is inadmissible if it amends a statute that is not before the committee, or a section of the parent Act unless it is being specifically amended by a clause of the bill.

Amendment G-10 aims to amend a clause of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act that is not contained in the original bill.

The Chair: Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney: I'm just wondering, Mr. Chair, if this would leave a sort of anomaly in the law. I would ask the legislative clerk whether we could bring this forward with the unanimous consent of the committee.

The Chair: I'm advised that we cannot do that even with consent. It's inadmissible.

An hon. member: If it's out of order, it's out of order.

Mr. Chuck Cadman: Fix it at report stage.

(Clauses 47 to 66 inclusive agreed to)

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(On clause 67)

The Chair: I would refer you to the government amendment numbered G-11.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, I guess it would appear to be another consequential amendment. It makes necessary adjustments to the definition of “serious offence” as applied in the context of the National Defence Act. Again, the rationale for this would be that the military justice system does not utilize the distinction between indictable and summary conviction offences. Accordingly, the definition of a “serious offence” should be amended to acknowledge this fact.

The Chair: Understood.

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 67 as amended agreed to)

(On clause 68)

The Chair: I refer you now to clause 68, and we have the same problem we had in clause 57. In this case, rather than it being the CCRA, it's the National Defence Act, but exactly the same circumstance applies. There was no reference to the National Defence Act in the original; therefore, the amendment is out of order.

(Clauses 68 to 80 inclusive agreed to)

(On clause 81—Bill C-11)

The Chair: I refer you now to clause 81 and the government amendment numbered G-13.

Mr. John Maloney: Mr. Chair, this is another technical amendment.

This amendment incorporates a reference to offences against the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act and structural changes resulting therefrom into the coordinating amendments section of the bill. It also clarifies that a list set out in section 183 of the Criminal Code is intended to be non-exclusive. Again, it's just to correct inadvertent admissions.

The Chair: Thank you for the explanation.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I want to go back to clause 57 and, more to the point, amendment G-10.

In looking over amendments G-11, G-12, and others, it seems to me that these kinds of amendments are similar. I'd like the clerk to repeat why amendment G-10 was out of order and could not be received.

Ms. Susan Baldwin: It's because the...let me double-check the act here.

The act referred to on page 51 is the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. The only thing in this bill that would be amended in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act is schedule II. That's in lines 40, 41, and 42 on page 51 of this bill. If you go over to the next page, you're starting on another bill.

What they're trying to do here in amendment G-10 is amend subparagraph 125(1)(a)(i) of the CCRA in the French only. The rule your clerk read to you states very clearly that you can only amend the clauses in the parent act that are already amended in your bill. You have to stick to the amendments made to your parent act as they are currently in the bill. The only thing that's done is in the schedule II section, so you can't then amend clause 125. That would be out of order.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Okay, thank you.

Could I have a re-reading of the reference, please?

Ms. Susan Baldwin: Certainly. It is:

...an amendment is inadmissible if it amends a statute that is not before the committee or a section of the parent Act unless it is being specifically amended by a clause of the bill.

Mr. Lynn Myers: Thank you.

The Chair: Now, where was I?

Mr. Chuck Cadman: You were just finishing up.

The Chair: Can we be more precise?

Mr. Vic Toews: I think we passed everything.

Mr. Peter MacKay: We were on G-13.

The Chair: Did we pass G-13? No?

(Amendment agreed to—[See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 81 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 82 and 83 agreed to)

The Chair: Shall the title carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the bill carry?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

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The Chair: Shall I report the bill, with amendments, to the House?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Shall the committee request a reprint for use at report stage?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.