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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, September 16, 2002

0910

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

The Chair

Ms. Lalonde

0915

The Chair

0920

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

0925

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

0930

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

0935

Ms. Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

0940

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

0945

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

0950

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Mr. Harvard

0955

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

1000

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

1005

The Chair

Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister (Portfolio: Africa and Middle East), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1020

1025

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

1030

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1035

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.)

1040

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. John Godfrey

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

1045

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

1050

The Chair

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

1055

Mr. Bill Casey

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Price

Mr. John McNee

Mr. David Price

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

1100

The Chair

Mr. O'Reilly

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. John McNee

Mr. Leon Benoit

1105

Mr. John McNee

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

1110

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard

The Chair

Ms. Marleau

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

1115

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian

The Chair

1120

Ms. Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard

1125

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

An hon. member

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Ms. Marleau

Mr. John Harvard

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard

The Chair

1130

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

1135

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. John Godfrey

1140

The Chair

Mr. James Lee (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

1145

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

1150

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard

Ms. Diane Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

1155

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 091

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Monday, September 16, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): This is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and I call the meeting to order.

First of all, I want to thank my colleagues from all parties for being here this morning. The committee is meeting to consider a motion, tabled by Madame Lalonde and supported by three members from other parties, with regard to the committee's study of the Iraq situation.

[Translation]

The committee considered the situation in Irak last June 4 when Mr. Scott Ritter, former Chief Inspector of the United Nations for the disarmament of Iraq, and Mr. Denis Halliday, former Humanitarian Aid Coordinator of the United Nations in Iraq, as well as officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, testified before the committee.

[English]

During the spring of 2000, the committee considered the matter of sanctions against Iraq, and on April 12 of that year tabled a resolution in the House recommending that the Government of Canada establish a Canadian diplomatic presence in Iraq in order to monitor developments in that country more effectively and to make direct representations to the Government of Iraq, and to continue to pursue the broader issue of the reform of the use of sanctions in order to allow a clearer targeting of military forces and regimes instead of civilian populations.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde tabled two motions requiring 24 hours' notice, as required by our Standing Orders. The clerk had those motions sent to the offices of the members of the committee.

I will now invite Ms. Lalonde to speak to her first motion. I would like us to discuss matters this morning in the following way. Firstly, I'm going to ask Ms. Lalonde to speak to us about her first motion, because this is a motion concerning matters to be studied by the committee, and is thus a part of the future business of the committee.

Afterwards, with the permission of all of the committee members, I would like to invite the officials from the department, such as Mr. John McNee, who is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and the Middle East, and Ms. Jill Sinclair, Director General, International Security Bureau, to come forward and give the committee an overview of the current world situation, especially that which prevails in Iraq.

We can then move on to Ms. Lalonde's second motion and discuss that.

[English]

Is everyone agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, you have the floor for your first motion.

[English]

Is the September 10 motion the first one?

The Chair: Yes, exactly.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde, please.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the colleagues who supported my motion, as well as all of those who are present today, and our chairman, who very expeditiously convened the committee. I also thank him for his introduction. I had in fact prepared the same elements to begin my introduction.

The committee tabled a unanimous motion in the House proposing the lifting of economic and military sanctions in order to put an end to the economic sanctions, which were so severe and dramatic for the Iraqi population. We know that that proposal had a certain effect in several milieux, in particular at the UN.

Secondly, Mr. Scott Ritter and Mr. Halliday appeared before the committee in the month of June. Their testimony was troubling, and all the more important in light of the events which unfolded at an increasingly rapid pace this summer; their comments threw new light on them. Mr. Ritter has indeed exercised his powers of persuasion on several of the members who are here to get us to support Canada in an initiative that could prove to be important, which is to appoint a person who could be what is known in French as an intermédiaire impartial and in English as an honest broker, in order to facilitate the return of the inspectors, since Mr. Ritter informed us that in 1998 it was not Iraq who chased the inspectors away, but the United States who had asked them to leave, given that the US was preparing to strike the targets identified by the inspectors. I'm referring to the testimony of June 4.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I would greatly like to see us support this second motion this morning.

As to the first one, concerning our collective decision to hear witnesses, as have other parliamentarians throughout the world, the Americans among them, as we can understand, but also the English and others, I would like us to adopt this motion in order that we may form an opinion on the matter of possible strikes and on Canada's position with regard to Iraq and the sanctions. As we know that the House will be prorogued, hearings could be prepared during this period by our brilliant and efficient team, which would allow us as soon as we get back to be ready to hear witnesses, as well as to take part in the emergency debate on this issue which will certainly take place at the House of Commons.

Thus, I would like to obtain your support for the second motion this morning. I would like us to support this initiative overall: the preparation of hearings on the situation in Iraq and Canada's policy vis-à-vis Iraq. I would also like the committee to consider how we could encourage the quick return of disarmament inspectors from the UN to Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0915)

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lalonde. We are examining your first motion. I will read it and then see whether there are any members who want to propose amendments or express an opinion.

Whereas it is alleged that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction in its possession;

Whereas the Government of Canada has always officially called for the return of the UN disarmament inspectors;

Whereas many MPs are in favour of having Canada play the role of honest broker in this regard;

Whereas the United States is considering attacking Iraq unilaterally;

Whereas there is criticism from many influential individuals in the United States and less public support for a unilateral attack by the United States;

Whereas Canada has a tradition of multilateral action;

It is proposed:

That the committee begin hearings as soon as possible on the situation in Iraq and on Canada's policy on Iraq;

that the committee look into ways to promote an early return of the UN disarmament inspectors to Iraq.

That is the text of your motion. Does anyone want to make any comments concerning this text?

Mr. Assadourian.

[English]

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join my colleagues in congratulating your leadership on this issue and also my colleague for presenting the motion.

I have some questions, and maybe the honourable member can clarify those questions.

Mr. Chairman, I and everybody in this room and throughout the country share the concern that no country should be allowed to have weapons of mass destruction. That includes, of course, Iraq and every other country. A while ago President Bush spoke about an axis of evil, naming three countries: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. I wonder why we're focusing only on Iraq and leaving North Korea, which has ballistic missiles that could hit Japan, and which were tested recently, but we have taken no action against North Korea, for example.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I have difficulty with this motion, because many times we refer to ourselves in Canada as an “honest broker.” Here there are questions that Canada is an honest broker, but my main concern is what is the end game from this motion? Are we in there forever? Are we in there for one month, six months? I think we should put some sort of clarification to this ongoing concern.

I am not even sure, when Iraq has removed or destroyed all the weapons of mass destruction through the UN inspections, we still have to go after this country. Will we remove the sanctions against them? What are we going to do? What will happen if the weapons of mass destruction are destroyed? Will we continue the sanctions? Are we still after a regime change there? This doesn't address that concern.

I hope she can clarify the concerns I have regarding this motion.

Thank you.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.

Mrs. Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you, Mr. Assadourian.

Why are we focusing on Iraq? Because at this time the topic of the hour in the United States, who have now accepted to go to the United Nations, is Iraq. That is why. Of course, we can talk about preemptive strikes within the context of our work here, but our real topic is Iraq.

Your second question, involving the timeframe, justifies our dealing exclusively with Iraq. As we speak, in the United States, foreign affairs committees are sitting and no one expects them to finish this work anytime soon. So, we will be able to see things coming. We may think one thing, and we must keep our hopes up and prepare ourselves: the United Nations are going to ask Iraq to allow the inspectors in. We certainly hope that this will take place and that Iraq will accept. We must also hope that this action will then be productive, but we have to get ready. We will have some time to do so.

It is important that Quebeckers and Canadians know that we would really like to see the inspectors return to Iraq and that we think that we should contribute to this in any way we can. When the inspectors are there, we can begin to eliminate the mass destruction weapons that are purported to be in Iraq.

The purpose of the two motions is to allow us to get ready for this, first with relation to the inspectors and then with Iraq; we can then follow the situation as it evolves.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Assadourian, a small reply.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: My question was when do we conclude this mission? When do we become satisfied observers of the Iraqi situation? That is the question. Will it be one year, two years, four years, ten years? How long will it be?

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: We will not be debating this here, but I heard Mr. Blix, the new director of the monitoring mission, say that with the cooperation of Iraq, this could be done before another year has passed. Remember that Mr. Tariq Aziz himself stated that he agreed with the French-language motion because it separates the two, but added that if the inspectors are satisfied, the mission will come to an end and the sanctions will at last be lifted. We have established at this committee that the sanctions cause a very important prejudice to the population, and certain respected NGOs have talked about a million dead. We will be in a better position to contribute to accelerating the work. We don't want this to last indefinitely, but the decision as to the timeframe is not ours to make.

[English]

The Chair: Merci, Madame Lalonde.

The next two speakers will be Ms. McDonough and Mr. Pratt.

Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

I also would like to congratulate you as chairman and express my appreciation for your initiating the reconvening of the meeting. As you know, I wrote on August 12 urging that you do so.

I think that as the situation becomes more and more dangerous vis-à-vis the seemingly insurmountable chasm between Iraq and the U.S., we need to step up our efforts to play whatever role we possibly can to facilitate a resolution to this situation.

I would just urge in the strongest possible terms the unanimous support of the resolution that has been placed before us by the member for Mercier. I think it's very straightforward.

The question has been asked by Mr. Assadourian, what is the end game in advocating the return of the weapons inspectors to Iraq? I think it is not an exaggeration to say it is to avert an all-out war in Iraq. We need to be saying in the strongest possible terms that all parties in the House of Commons of Canada stand together around that principal objective and that end game.

We have stated unanimously as a committee, and this is actually the official policy of the Government of Canada, that there be a quid pro quo. If the Iraqi government complies with the UN resolution and enables the weapons inspectors to do their job of verifying the non-existence of weapons of mass destruction, and should there be any such weapons of mass destruction then to do as they did between 1991 and 1998, which is ensure the complete dismantling and destruction of any such weapons of mass destruction, then the quid pro quo must be honoured, and that is to end the economic sanctions so that the horrifying number of deaths, estimated at 5,000 a month, of innocent civilians in Iraq will end and the people of Iraq will be able to resume an existence based on the rebuilding of the public infrastructure and services desperately needed by them.

Again, I would urge the strongest possible support for this resolution. I want to say very clearly that I see it as an important step for there to be an all-party resolution to convey a vote of confidence and--this may seem like an unusual thing for me to say--to help strengthen the credibility, the mandate, and the hand of our Prime Minister and foreign affairs minister to do the job Canadians want them to do. If we can express that in a unanimous resolution, that can enable them to get on with playing the role of honest broker, which has been urged upon us again and again.

We have seen over the last several days a definite acceleration of diplomatic efforts on the part of a number of Arab nations, including Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all doing what they can to urge the Iraqi government to comply with the demand of the people of the world that the weapons inspectors be allowed back into Iraq. We need to be prepared to play a similar role vis-à-vis our closest neighbour, of course, the U.S., but also a kind of honest broker intermediary role, which I believe is necessary, amongf Canada, the U.S., Iraq, the other Arab nations, and the European allies, all of whom want to see this two-part objective achieved of getting the weapons inspectors back in, putting an end to the economic sanctions, and allowing the reconstruction of civilian life and infrastructure to get underway in Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0925)

The Chair: Thank you, Ms McDonough.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to offer my congratulations to you for convening this meeting of the foreign affairs committee.

As some of the members around the table know, I'm from your partner committee, the national defence committee. I think it's always good for us to attend each other's committees to get a feel for what's happening at the other committee, because one can't do much without the other, certainly.

I'd also like to congratulate Madame Lalonde for her interest in this subject and for her concern on an issue that certainly engages the interest of all members of Parliament. Everyone is concerned about the situation in Iraq right now, and everyone would like to see a peaceful resolution to the situation there.

Having said that, Mr. Chair, I've looked over the motion, and there are some things with which I can agree in the motion and some things I don't necessarily agree with in terms of the tone that is being established by certain aspects of the preamble.

I would like to suggest to the committee that we support paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the preamble and also that we support both aspects of the resolution itself: the proposal that the committee begin hearings and the proposal that the committee look into ways to promote an early return of the UN disarmament inspectors to Iraq.

One of my fears, however, is that if the foreign affairs committee were to engage in a study of the situation, it may, quite frankly, be overtaken by events. The United Nations and the United States have given signs that they are going to be looking at various aspects of this issue very quickly and that there may in fact be action on this issue, as the Bush administration has said, within a matter of days or weeks, and not a matter of months. However, I do think it is important, from the standpoint of parliamentary involvement in this process, that the committee look very seriously at this subject.

From the standpoint of the aspects of the preamble that I don't agree with, Mr. Chairman, Canada has obviously played in many circumstances the role of honest broker. However, I think at this time it is incumbent upon the Government of Canada, or I would hope at least that the Government of Canada would see itself as part of a larger international community, and not break away from that international community in terms of trying to play a special role. I think the heat must be maintained on the Government of Iraq with respect to international support for all of the relevant resolutions that have been passed in connection with Iraq, and we should stay focused on that issue in terms of having the Government of Iraq abide by and fully comply with those UN Security Council resolutions that have been passed over the course of the last ten years.

I don't think that, in all honesty, we can play the role of honest broker, in the sense that we sent troops to the gulf in 1991, and we were part of the allied coalition effort in that regard, and we are clearly not seen as being honest brokers from the standpoint of the Government of Iraq. From that perspective, I think our role is somewhat circumscribed.

I think that in paragraphs 5 and 6, which talk about the United States, really the focus has to continue to be on Iraq. We shouldn't be necessarily talking about the United States with respect to this particular motion.

Finally, “Canada's is a tradition of multilateral action”--I think that speaks for itself. It is not necessary to repeat that in this particular motion.

I certainly do support the idea of looking at this issue. However, I would urge the committee to remove paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 in the preamble.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

¿ (0930)

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, you may answer because Mr. Pratt has not moved any amendments for the moment. We'll see later if there are any.

Ms. Lalonde, please.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: For the sake of unanimity on this matter I would be willing to drop the whereases, all the more so since the motions were drafted before we knew that President Bush would go before the United Nations, as he has done. You will understand that if President Bush had not taken such a strong position on the United Nations, these elements would not seem too strong. So, in the interest of unanimity, I am willing to withdraw the whereases when we get to the vote.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Lalonde. So if I understand correctly, you agree to the deletion of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

Personally, I am pleased. In paragraph 6, you refer to “less public support for a unilateral attack by the United States”. There is indeed less support, but we don't know what that is due to. The drop was from 80 to 70%. There was a drop, but a majority of the people still supported such an action. So there may be some inconsistency, but you agree with Mr. Pratt to delete paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7. Thank you.

Ms. Marleau.

¿ (0935)

[English]

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): I'd also like to recommend, after we pass this motion, that we invite the minister to come before us. I know the Minister of Foreign Affairs is meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iraq--I believe today--and I think it would be important to make sure that he attend the meeting as quickly as possible.

The situation is extremely fluid. We will probably have a prorogation of the House of Commons either later today or tomorrow, which will mean that unfortunately our committee will not be able to have further hearings until the House returns and the committees are struck once more. Hopefully that will be rather quickly, but unfortunately that may take more than two weeks. In the meantime, I believe the Security Council is seized with the issue of Iraq and of the inspectors returning, so I hope that in the interim there will be some form of resolution. I certainly sincerely hope that Iraq can be convinced to allow the UN's inspection team back in.

There is a new commission that was struck in response to some of the criticisms that said the previous one was too much dominated by the U.S. and Great Britain. It is very much to be desired that the commission, which was struck in 1999, be allowed full access. If Iraq has nothing to hide, then it should let the world know that it has nothing to hide and there will be no need for any further action.

Hopefully this motion moves forward. I would also like to hear from the Department of Foreign Affairs to see if there is any evidence that it has heard that there are weapons of mass destruction right now, ready to be launched or sent to threaten us and the United States.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mrs. Marleau.

Last week I was with our minister for the United Nations General Assembly and I discussed the matter with him. He is ready to come before the committee to talk about the Iraq situation any time the committee can resume.

Mr. Day, please.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair, for your willingness to hold this important meeting.

We'd like to address a number of factors. First of all, clearly, the need for parliamentary debate, not just on this but on all areas of significant foreign policy, is something that has been lacking in our country. Too much decision-making flows directly from the Prime Minister's Office without the involvement of members of Parliament. We want to see this move to Parliament for a full debate so that the people of Canada can be involved in the debate through their elected representatives.

In terms of some of the paragraphs themselves, I will address those with which we have concerns in the order in which they appear. The first one says “Whereas it is alleged that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction...”. I would like to suggest that it is far more than “alleging”, that in fact it is a grim reality.

The degree to which it does have weapons of mass destruction is something we could discuss at length, but I can tell you, as you know, that Iraq has already acknowledged that prior to 1991 it produced mustard gas, sarin, and VX. Former weapons inspectors know that, and that they have retained stocks of CW munitions, which remain viable today. UN inspectors in Iraq recovered several mustard-filled 155-millimetre artillery rounds in 1998 that were still ready for combat use, and that was a decade after they were produced. They also believe that Iraq has produced VX salt, a form of the highly lethal nerve agent that can be stored on a long-term basis.

Also, according to U.S. documents, Iraq probably retains enough precursor stocks to produce several hundred tonnes of agents of various types, including VX , as well as the production equipment necessary to do so. Again according to the UN inspectors themselves, Iraq has been able to manufacture chemical and biological weapons since the mid-1990s. There's no question about their biological weapon capacity, whether we're talking about anthrax or the agent and seed stocks required to grow other types of biological weaponry.

In terms of missiles, former UN inspectors have stated that Iraq retains a small operational force of mobile al-Hussein missiles. We also know that they are fitted with CBW warheads. These have a 650-kilometre range and can reach major population centres in Israel and Saudi Arabia. We also know that because Iraq is permitted to produce missiles with ranges of up to 150 kilometres, it does have the infrastructure, the talent, and the know-how to rapidly constitute and reconstitute its missile program. These are things we know.

In terms of nuclear weaponry, the International Atomic Energy Agency has never recovered many of the components that were produced by Iraq for its atomic bomb prior to the 1991 Gulf War. UN inspectors report that since then Iraq has reassembled its bomb design teams. They are probably working to resolve bottlenecks they ran into in their pre-1991 program, and they're probably working to achieve a smaller, lighter, and more efficient weapon design.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is also important to note the comments of the chief of BND, Germany's intelligence agency, Mr. August Hanning, which he made in Berlin a year ago. He said, “It is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years.” That was a year ago, and there are estimations that they could be moving up that timetable.

So the issue of “alleged” is clearly not an issue. The weapons are there, the capability is there, and Saddam Hussein's past demonstration of a willingness to use those weapons is most evident. So we have some concerns with that particular clause.

MPs are in favour of having Canada play the role of an honest broker. When looking at this, we have to consider the actual history of Saddam Hussein himself to understand what we're dealing with.

¿ (0940)

The Chair: I just want to let you know that paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 are being deleted.

Mr. Stockwell Day: For the record, Mr. Chairman--

The Chair: If it's for the record, that's fine.

Mr. Stockwell Day: For the record, it's important that people understand what we're dealing with here as we look at the rest of this motion and at the next one. Canadians who are not aware of it need to be reminded that in fact he has twice invaded other countries. In eight years of war against Iran, with one and a half million people killed or wounded, he used chemical warfare. He has fired his missiles at four different countries in the past. He has used chemical weapons of mass destruction against his own people in a genocidal attack on the Kurds.

As we have seen, he has nuclear capacity, and unlike other nations that also have nuclear capacity, he openly menaces and threatens other nations, including the United States and its allies.

To be honest, we have to consider what we are dealing with in terms of this issue about being the honest broker.

We also have to look at the historical integrity of the Prime Minister's recent remarks related to a possible.... And I know he has danced around on this and he has spun backward and forward. He's at the United Nations today, and I hope he is clarifying. He has made remarks that seem to suggest a rationale or a link between prosperity in the west and a lack of prosperity in other nations, and he is suggesting or at least hinting at a possible rationale not just for attacks against the United States, as he said, but even possible attacks against other countries. That is not an historically accurate presentation.

We desperately need to see the Prime Minister retract any suggestion that there could be any rationale for the type of terrorist attack and activity we have seen because of issues related to prosperity or issues related to policy. The terrorists themselves do not accept the Prime Minister's remarks. The September 11 attacks had nothing to do with wealth. They had everything to do with hatred. These people wanted to see Americans dead. They wanted to see Jewish people dead. They wanted to see other people dead. It is simply a matter of hatred. They are backed by millionaires. It is not a matter of money. If we ever let that suggestion be out there, that there can be any kind of moral equivalency on this issue, then we introduce a noxious and toxic influence into international relations, possibly excusing people for even considering this type of attack.

¿ (0945)

To date, the only political leader who has had the courage to publicly condemn these remarks is Stephen Harper, leader of the Canadian Alliance. We need to see the Prime Minister back away from these remarks. If we're going to talk about being an honest broker, whether this is accepted or not, these remarks have to be addressed. We have to see a full cancellation of these remarks on behalf of and on the part of the Prime Minister.

We also need to take into consideration and be mindful that when we are talking internationally, nations who develop prosperity do so after long periods of time, after putting in place certain policies that reflect democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of trade, strength of family, and strength of communities. These are the things that lead to a nation being prosperous and wealthy. In fact, Saddam Hussein, with his type of regime, keeps his own people from moving towards prosperity. It's this angle, this approach, that has to be taken in our discussions and in our deliberations.

Just to reflect as well on the last suggestion, “Whereas Canada has a tradition of multilateral action”, yes, we do, but we also have participated in action that has not been 100% endorsed by the United Nations. We do have a role as peacekeepers that we are known for historically, but we also have shown historically that we have a role as peacemakers. Canadian military action in the past century has been known to be very effective in terms of peacekeeping, but also, in two world wars, another engagement in Korea, and in other engagements our military has shown itself to be very dedicated and courageous when it comes to peacemaking as well.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we want to have on the record our concerns. We want to have on the record the fact that the capability and the potential are there in terms of Saddam Hussein. They are not just “alleged”. We want to have honesty in the discussion, and that begins with the Prime Minster.

We support, of course, public hearings. We support this issue coming into Parliament. We look at ways of getting the UN inspectors back there, but in a full and honest appreciation of the very dangerous potential and the very dangerous time in which we now are.

The Chair: Thank you--or is that it, Mr. Day?

Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, we support the direction already indicated by the person who has tabled this motion, and for clarification now on what we had intended to do related to some of the paragraphs that we feel need to be deleted, we would ask the promoter to make sure and just clarify for us that the “alleged” in the first paragraph, “Whereas it is alleged that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction”, will in fact be left out.

As well, we've addressed the clause that states “Whereas many MPs are in favour of having Canada play the role of honest broker”, and looked at why that creates problems and should be left out.

I think we've already addressed--and I want clarification again from the presenter--the paragraph stating “Whereas the United States is considering attacking Iraq unilaterally”. And I believe she's already acknowledged...and we just want to make sure for the record that we're talking about the deletion of the paragraph related to “criticism from many influential individuals”.

Could we just have clarification now on all of the items from the presenter? They were made, I might add, with good intentions, and I appreciate her good intentions with this motion.

¿ (0950)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Day. If I understand you properly, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 are deleted, and you want to change the first paragraph regarding “alleged”.

With the help of my table people, such as Mr. Schmitz, we could change it, if Madame Lalonde agrees, to say: “Whereas Iraq's capability in regard to weapons of mass destruction and non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolution are of grave concern to the international community”. I think that would pull everything together. Is that fine?

[Translation]

I now give the floor to Ms. Lalonde, who moved the motion, and then to Mr. Harvard, Mr. Casey and Mr. Bergeron.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, the proposed wording is different; it alleges the presence of a dangerous capability. I read the newspapers regularly, and the press says that in the United States desperate efforts are being made to prove that, but that there is no evidence. No later than last week, again, one could read in the New York Times that senior CIA officials said that there was no new information. The important thing is that we get to the facts. Even though I disagree with what Mr. Stockwell Day said, I propose, Mr. Chairman, that we remove all of the preamble and go straight to the facts. Others have defined their basic position, and then we will be hearing from witnesses. We will then vote on the second resolution concerning the return of inspectors.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

I now give the floor to Mr. Harvard.

[English]

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, you have removed all of the preamble.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. John Harvard: Let me say, first of all, that I appreciate the very conciliatory tone and approach that Ms. Lalonde has offered. It's appreciated a lot because I think we are here to do serious business and to focus on what the proposal really is, and that is to have this committee consider this very serious situation.

I must say that I find Mr. Day's remarks extremely unfortunate. At a time like this, when we are debating a very serious issue, the last thing we need is to have a strong element of partisan politics introduced. I find Mr. Day's direct and personal attack on the Prime Minister nothing short of repulsive.

A voice: —[Editor's Note: Inaudible]—

Mr. John Harvard: Yes, it is a personal attack on the Prime Minister. I take it as that, and I will leave it at that. But let me say this, because I know that a lot of conservative commentators, including Mr. Day now, have accused the Prime Minister of blaming the United States or of blaming the victims for this terrible incident that occurred on September 11, 2001. The Prime Minister never said that. It's fallacious and terribly irresponsible to misconstrue the Prime Minister's remarks in that way.

The Prime Minister points out a simple fact, that terrible people, whether it's Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden or the hijackers who did that terrible crime in New York, prey on desperate conditions. It's not a matter of how much money they have in their pockets or how much money they have in their bank accounts. These are despicable creatures with warped ideologies and they play upon public sympathies and public misery, as did Hitler in the 1920s.

If you want to look at your history, Mr. Day, look at the 1920s and the heavy reparations imposed on Germany after the First World War. I think you will find that a number of people would probably say that wasn't the way to go. The German economy was in a terrible shambles. You might remember the kind of inflation that was prevalent in the German economy in the 1920s, where the price of a cup of coffee went up while you were drinking the cup of coffee. Hitler preyed on that kind of condition--that despicable creature called Adolph Hitler. Now we have the 21st century kinds of Hitlers.

To suggest for a moment that the Prime Minister is somehow blaming the United States or blaming the victims for that terrible tragedy of 9/11 is very irresponsible.

I wasn't going to make those remarks, Mr. Day, but it was your attack on the Prime Minister that prompted this. That's the kind of thing that happens when you inject partisan politics. You think that somehow you're going to score great political brownie points by attacking the Prime Minister. Well, you haven't. You haven't for one moment. What you have done is brought disrepute to yourself. It's very unfortunate.

Particularly after listening to Ms. Lalonde, I thought we would be able to approach this issue in a very responsible and mature way. I hope we can do that despite your remarks. I appreciate what Ms. Lalonde has done. I think we should go to the main proposal, and I would call for the vote right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvard.

Before calling the vote, I will acknowledge Mr. Casey and Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Thank you.

First of all, I'll be supporting this motion with or without the preamble. I don't think the preamble is as important as what might be uncovered in the hearings if we have the right hearings and the right attitude.

I would like to endorse Madame Marleau's proposal that we bring in the minister. It's very important that we know what he knows, as much as he can tell us.

We should know for sure that Canada is an active player in encouraging the UN to force the UN inspectors' issue and get the UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq. We should know that Canada is not a passive player but rather an active player, because this is our role. This is what Canada is good at. I'd also like to know what proof he or his department has seen that there are weapons of mass destruction.

We might also call Scott Ritter as a witness. It would be interesting to get that side of the story.

In the event that there is no Security Council resolution and the U.S. does attack, we should know what Canada's role will be, and we should have a say in that. It's a very critical thing. I'd like to know what the department has calculated will be the ripple effect of an attack on Iraq in the region and perhaps in global politics.

I compliment Madame Lalonde for moving this motion.

I'd also like to say that I agree with Mr. Harvard.

[Translation]

The Chair: Merci, monsieur Casey.

Mr. Bergeron, please.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): I don't want to prolong this debate unduly, as it is important that we quickly go on to the vote about the content of the motion. But I simply want to say that I support Ms. Lalonde's position, which is that rather than watering down the first three whereases, to the extent that we may pervert their meaning, it would be preferable to maintain unanimity on the issue of withdrawing them, since, obviously, everyone here agrees on the mechanism of the motion, that is to say on what is being proposed as such, i.e. to study the situation in Iraq more in depth.

That being said, I also subscribe to Mr. Harvard's statement deploring the partisan turn this debate has taken, a debate which should normally have rallied unanimous support without discussion, since the object is indeed to take a more in-depth look at the situation in Iraq. There has been an unfortunate digression, I must say. Perhaps this is due to the fact that this hearing is televised, leading some to take advantage of the situation to introduce this digression on terrorism, but I would like to say Mr. Chairman, that this issue of terrorism cannot be reduced to a simple expression of hatred. That is a simplistic analysis, since this hatred is not immanent, not inherent, not preexisting. There are factors that feed into this hatred and cause it to develop. Indeed, whether we like it or not...

When we had the debate on what needed to be done to fight terrorism after the unfortunate events of September 11, we said it was important to fight terrorism and also attack the deeper roots of terrorism such as poverty, injustice and other such factors.

I think that the Prime Minister, in his statement, which was perhaps a bit awkward in that it allowed some people to exploit it to partisan ends, only reiterated the fact that we must absolutely seek out the sources of terrorism and not just the terrorists themselves.

I wish to reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that I consider Mr. Day's intervention to be totally unjustified and inappropriate within the framework of this current debate.

À (1000)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

[English]

Mr. Day, if it's to add something, I will agree, but, with all due respect, if it is just to comment on the comments of Mr. Harvard and Mr. Bergeron, I will not accept that.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In the interest of a free and open debate, which I believe was the intention of this motion and which I appreciate, we've now had another statement about the root causes of terrorism, including injustice and poverty. I appreciate the sincerity of the remarks. This really gets to the nub of the issue. These are issues that must be discussed when we look at this problem. If we are going to accept that there is a rationale for terrorism, that then becomes a significant factor in the strategic approach to dealing with it. To have me ask for a clarification from the Prime Minister for remarks that have caused quite a situation not just in Canada but internationally is not a personal attack, Mr. Chairman.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: I don't take it as a personal attack. But you will have a chance to ask your questions in the House of Commons. I'm sure about that. Thank you.

The preamble has been removed. However, I think we need a little bit of a preamble, so I will ask you to consider this wording before we deal with the proposition itself. I will ask Madam Lalonde about that.

[Translation]

The urgency of the current situation and the possibility of imminent military action against Iraq;

[English]

And the preamble in English would say “Considering the gravity of the current situation and the prospect of imminent military action against Iraq”. Would you agree just to have this as a preamble, and the proposition as it's stated? That's fine?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: I am going to proceed to the vote.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, since you are the mover of the motion, you have the last word. Proceed.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to point out that actively seeking peace has never meant that we thought that Saddam Hussein was not a dictator and that he would not seek to have in his possession weapons of mass destruction. I would however like to remind you--and we have to remember these things because there have been no so-called world wars since 1945--that the absence of war since then is not due to the fact that there have not been political figures one might describe as repugnant, dictators who did have mass destruction capabilities at their disposal; it is simply due to the fact that there was a balance of terror which acted as a deterrent. This is what preserved the peace. We would have preferred an active peace, but that is not what we had.

We worked to reduce nuclear arms, and it is important that we agree on this idea of preemptive strikes, because this is new. Preemptive strikes transform international rules and mean that any country could attack any other country whose government displeases it, who has a dictator at its helm or who has weapons of mass destruction. China could for other reasons attack Taiwan; India could attack Pakistan, and Pakistan, India.

So, Mr. Chairman, it is urgent that we examine these issues.

À (1005)

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

[English]

The notice of motion is the following:

Considering the gravity of the current situation and the prospect of imminent military action against Iraq, it is proposed:

That the Committee begin hearings as soon as possible on the situation in Iraq and on Canada's policy on Iraq;

That the Committee look into ways to promote an early return of the UN disarmament inspectors to Iraq.

[Translation]

(The motion carries unanimously)

The Chair: We are going to adjourn the hearing for two or three minutes because of technical problems, following which our guests from the Department of Foreign Affairs will be speaking to us about the current situation in Iraq.

À (1007)

À (1015)

The meeting will now resume.

It is our pleasure this morning to have with us Mr. John McNee, Assistant Deputy Minister for Africa and the Middle East, as well as Ms. Jill E. Sinclair, Director General, International Security Bureau.

Mr. McNee, you have the floor.

[English]

Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister (Portfolio: Africa and Middle East), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you very much for this timely opportunity to speak with you about Iraq. The international security, weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian dimensions of this issue have been the focus of Canadian policy since the outset.

The series of events that have refocused attention on Iraq should be seen in a broad context. Let me first speak about the human dimension of this international problem, an aspect of the Iraq issue that has preoccupied Canada over these difficult years.

For the past decade the Government of Iraq has ignored the interests of its own citizens, placing the interests of the regime, including the goal of possessing weapons of mass destruction, over the basic needs of ordinary Iraqis.

As the committee knows, the United Nations, with the help of countries such as Canada, has worked to fine-tune and target sanctions. From the beginning, food and medicine were exempt from the embargo.

The oil for food program, which had been proposed by the Security Council in 1991 and was finally accepted by Baghdad in 1995, allowed Iraq to use its oil wealth to meet humanitarian needs.

In 1999 the ceiling on oil export revenues was removed, and finally, with Security Council resolution 1409 of May 14, 2002, the sanctions regime was drastically streamlined, with only a restricted list of military goods still subject to review.

These efforts were a clear demonstration of the will of the international community to find ways to help meet the basic human needs of the Iraqi people while maintaining pressure on the Iraqi government to comply with the council. The sanctions issue is a difficult one, but there has always been a clear way to end sanctions: full compliance by Iraq with UN Security Council resolutions. But the Iraqi government has worked against these efforts. It has smuggled oil out of Iraq, generating revenues for its own purposes rather than focusing on the needs of its people. It has at times put in place restrictions on oil sales and embargoed imports from countries, including Canada. Above all, it has refused to take the steps required that would begin the process of lifting sanctions.

The Security Council resolutions being violated by Iraq aim inter alia to end Iraq's development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the missile systems needed to deliver them. The council has determined that Iraq must not possess such weapons and that it must satisfy the world that it no longer has any such weapons in its arsenal.

The Iraqi government has singled itself out for this treatment by its aggressive behaviour. Iraq is in a category of its own. It is the only state to have used chemical weapons in recent decades, both against its own citizens and against Iran.

Iraq's compliance with these resolutions is not optional. It is not a matter for negotiation or mediation. Iraq is a member of the United Nations. We do not think there is a need for other UN member states to mediate on behalf of Iraq. Iraq has full access to the UN, including the good offices of the Secretary General, who has himself tried throughout to find a way forward with Iraq.

The only way forward is for Iraq to admit UN weapons inspectors, to let them do their job without restriction, and to abide by their findings. Based on Iraq's consistently aggressive behaviour, anything less leaves reasonable grounds for concern that Iraq may well be rebuilding its arsenal of chemical and biological arms.

It also leaves open too many serious questions regarding the eventual achievement of one of Iraq's other goals: the development of nuclear weapons. The onus is and has always been on Iraq to prove that it is no longer developing or stockpiling any of these weapons.

À (1020)

[Translation]

The Iraqi government knows what is expected of it. It understands the link between the respect of the resolutions and the lifting of sanctions against Iraq, as explained in Security Council Resolutions 687 and 1284, but it has chosen to do everything in its power to avoid having to comply with its obligations.

In spite of the many efforts Baghdad has made to hide the existence of its programs to manufacture chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, seven years of inspections carried out by the UN have provided irrefutable proof of Iraq's attempts to make weapons of mass destruction. As you know, Iraq's intractable attitude led in 1998 to the departure of the first team of UN inspectors. A second team was created at the beginning of the following year, but Baghdad never recognized the basic principle according to which inspectors had to be given unconditional access to all of its facilities.

Consequently, over a period of almost four years, there were no inspections carried out in Iraq. Logically, it is impossible to conclude that Iraq has abandoned its illicit weapons manufacturing programs. Only inspections will give us this assurance.

As recently stated by Minister Graham, the Iraqi regime's refusal to accept the return of inspectors leads one to think that it has something to hide.

Canada feels that members of the international community should work together under the aegis of the United Nations in order to urge Iraq to discharge its obligations. This is what the Prime Minister and Minister Graham have already stated, a message which has indeed been reiterated by our friends and partners.

Canadian authorities have no illusions. It will be very difficult to impose the respect of the Council's resolutions on Iraq. On every possible occasion, the government discusses possible solutions to the Iraqi problem with its allies and partners the world over, and seeks to foster opportunities for constructive debate, and to accelerate this process.

All through the summer, as well as in September, Canada's representatives held talks with their partners, the United States and other members of the G-8. We also communicated with the authorities of Middle Eastern countries, apprised ourselves of their viewpoints, and explained our position.

We are in contact with leaders of countries who are in a position to influence Iraq and we encourage them to help Baghdad authorities understand that they cannot continue to defy the Security Council indefinitely.

Moreover, we communicate directly with Iraqi authorities. Canada's message remains clear: Iraq must comply with the resolutions of the Security Council without delay and unconditionally. Today, indeed, Minister Graham intends to meet the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to deliver this urgent message to him.

[English]

Canada's clear objective has been to re-engage the Security Council and to focus action on the United Nations. The Prime Minister has made this clear. As Mr. Graham said last week, we have been encouraging the U.S. and others to bring this issue to the Security Council because Iraq's obligations are to that body. Canada welcomed President Bush's clear commitment before the General Assembly last week to work with the Security Council to meet the common challenge posed by Iraq.

We understand that several permanent members are preparing new resolutions to put before the council. At this stage it is our assessment that there's a growing view among Canada's principal allies and partners that the Security Council should urgently find ways to bring Iraq into compliance with its obligations to the international community.

As a member of the Security Council in 1999 and 2000, Canada worked hard to try to advance both disarmament and humanitarian objectives. Although Canada is currently not a member of the council, we are engaging all our bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and political tools to contribute to resolving this issue within the context of that body. The responsibility now lies with the United Nations Security Council, and, above all, the onus is on Iraq to comply with its obligations.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My colleagues and I would be delighted to try to answer your questions.

À (1025)

The Chair: Merci beaucoup, Mr. McNee.

We'll now go to questions for five minutes. I will ask my colleagues not to present long preambles and to ask short questions. That way we'll have more questions and more answers.

We will start with Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for coming this morning.

You made some important statements in your presentation. You pointed out the United Nations resolutions that apply to weapons inspectors and Iraq. You pointed out that because Iraq has refused to allow weapons inspectors back in, it would lead you to suspect that they are in fact rebuilding their weapons of mass destruction or continuing to hide caches of those weapons. Those are important statements to make, but I didn't hear you comment on what happens if Iraq continues to refuse to allow weapons inspectors into their country. I'd like you to comment on that, if you would.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, I think in the first instance at this stage the question is hypothetical. The key thing is that in the absence of weapons inspectors for close to four years, we simply don't know what has gone on in Iraq. That underlines, in our view, the overriding urgency of finding a way to get the inspectors back in. It is really for the Security Council at this stage to determine what to do with Iraq, and we are in close consultation with the members of the council, but we're not there at this point.

Mr. Chair, I think it's getting a little bit ahead to speculate as to what happens if they don't.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you agree that it's important, from Canada's point of view, to have our position out there clear?

I just want to go over some of the comments from our Prime Minister over the past years on Iraq. Since September 11, I think the Chrétien government has refused to support military action against Iraq--they have come out and made that statement. The Prime Minister's position on Iraq has oscillated sharply over the past years, and I can demonstrate that with some quotes from the Prime Minister, starting in 1990. I think it's important to look at the history of what the Prime Minister has said on Iraq over the years.

In 1990, the Prime Minister, commenting on the Canadian military--

The Chair: I just want to let you know, Mr. Benoit, that Mr. Chrétien was not the Prime Minister in 1990.

Mr. Leon Benoit: That's right, but his record is certainly important, I would argue.

The Chair: I just wanted to let you know.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

I know the Liberals get a little nervous when we start talking about the Prime Minister's record and statements he has made on this issue. I think that's understandable when you read them, but I do want to put them on the record. I think it's very important when dealing with this issue.

In 1990, the Prime Minister, who wasn't the Prime Minister at the time, Mr. Chrétien, commenting on the Canadian military buildup in the Gulf, said, and this is quoted from The Toronto Star:

At the moment we in Canada are looking more belligerent than the Americans. The international reputation of our country has never been so low.

In 1991, prior to the Gulf War, in the House of Commons, January 15, the Prime Minister said:

If faced with an act of war, we say on this side of the House that it is premature and that our troops should not be involved in a war at this moment, and our troops should be called back if there is a war, unless we decide to be in a war.

That was January 15, 1991. On January 22, one whole week later, after war had erupted, the Prime Minister flip-flopped and came out in support of the resolution on military action. Then, in 1998, the Prime Minister said--and this is contradictory to the statements he has made over the past couple of weeks. In 1998, at the time of a new crisis in Iraq, the Prime Minister--and Mr. Chrétien was of course the Prime Minister in 1998--said in the House of Commons:

We can conclude from his past actions, however, that if we do not intervene, if we do not stand up to him, our inaction will encourage him to commit other atrocities, to prolong his reign of terror over his own people, his neighbours, and the entire world. There is no doubt about it. Saddam's determination to develop and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical warfare in particular, is well documented. Anyone doubting the serious character of the threat this man represents has only to recall how he turned these weapons against his own people.... Make no mistake, Saddam's behaviour to date indicates that he will not honour diplomatic solutions so long as they are not accompanied by a threat of intervention. The least sign of weakness or hesitation on our part will be interpreted as incitement.

That's what the Prime Minister said in 1988. I am going to go on:

We believe that Canada cannot stand on the sidelines in such a moment.... Canada will be counted. Not on the sidelines. Not in isolation. That is the decision we must make. I believe the choice is clear. I believe it is a choice dictated by the responsibilities of international citizenship, by the demands of international security and by an understanding of the history of the world in this century.

Then, in 2001, after September 11, in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said--I have just one more short quote here and then the question. After September 11, November 20 actually, in the House of Commons, he said:

...our position has always been that if there is no clear evidence the war should not be expanded elsewhere. We made that view known very early in the process. Remember that right after September 11, some people in Washington were urging that troops be moved into Iraq. I said publicly then, and I say it today, that it was not advisable to do that.

We've seen the Prime Minister make contradictions, and that was last week with his comments that the attacks of September 11 were provoked--

À (1030)

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, you have exceeded your time by one minute. You have made your point for the record, but this is a question to be asked either of the Prime Minister or the foreign affairs minister. It is not a question for the officials.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But my question--

The Chair: There was no question. It's already six minutes. It's past six minutes and a half--

Mr. Leon Benoit: I didn't realize we were limited in the time allowed, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Yes, I said at the beginning it was for five minutes, and asked you to ask a short question. You've done a big preamble. That was your question.

Now we'll go to the Bloc and you'll have time to come back later.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Very good, thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron, or Ms. Lalonde. Earlier, Mr. Bergeron had asked to be recognized. Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you for agreeing to appear before the committee this morning. I was a little surprised to see that you have placed the burden of putting an end to the surveillance mission in Iraq squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi government by claiming that it had acted in bad faith, had refused to co-operate and had engaged in illegal oil deals.

We all heard -- and allow me to play devil's advocate for a moment -- the allegations of the Iraqi government to the effect that the mission's real purpose was to spy on Iraq. Obviously, we can construe this as Iraqi propaganda, except for the fact that in an article published in this month's edition of the Monde diplomatiqueAlain Gresh wrote the following:

Mr. Rolf Ekeus, who headed up the team of UN inspectors in Iraq from 1991 to 1997, recently revealed that not only had the United States used its inspectors for spying purposes, it had also pressured them to carry out missions seen as controversial by the Iraqis, thereby creating an impasse that could justify direct military action.

Considering the source of this revelation, namely a member or rather a head of a team of inspectors, could we not think that the Iraqis were somehow justified to be concerned, or even suspicious of the inspection mission and that consequently, they felt compelled to act as they did?

What is the position of the Canadian government vis-à-vis these allegations that the missions were used to spy on Iraq?

My second question deals with the same subject. What assurances do we have that Iraqi authorities will not be suspicious of another observer mission that could be set up in the coming weeks?

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

These were likely comments made by Scott Ritter when he appeared before our committee.

Ms. Sinclair.

[English]

Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Merci.

Monsieur Bergeron, you asked two questions with regard to Iraq's concerns about the first mission, UNMOVIC. Clearly, there were lots of accusations by the Iraqis with regard to UNMOVIC, but I'd like to start by recalling that during the course of UNMOVIC's work there were more than 1,000 individuals from 40 different countries who took part in inspection missions. I think there has been a sort of forgetting of the record here that this was a very diverse mission at the outset and that there were representatives from many different countries. Many countries that were not necessarily allies of the United States were taking part in these missions.

With regard to the second part of your question, how can we ensure that in the future Iraq's concerns are allayed, I think there was a very serious debate at the end of UNSCOM's work to deal with the serious concerns raised by Iraq. In that sense, the composition of UNMOVIC is quite different. UNSCOM was composed of individuals who were seconded by various nations. This was a voluntary offering of personnel to this international mission. UNMOVIC is full-time United Nations personnel. Again, in the resolution that established UNMOVIC there is specific language that talks about equitable geographic representation. This means that UNMOVIC is working in quite different terms of reference. Indeed, this was to deal with the concerns that Iraq had expressed. Whether one thinks they are of a greater or lesser validity, one has to deal with that, because Iraq has to feel that these inspectors can come in and that they should give them the free and unfettered access that they need. UNMOVIC has been redesigned specifically to deal with those concerns.

À (1035)

[Translation]

The Chair: You have one minute remaining, Mr. Bergeron.

Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Still on the subject of spying, Scott Ritter, who served as lead inspector from 1991 to 1998, noted the following when he appeared before the committee and I quote:

...we must not lose sight of the reason why UN inspectors left Iraq in December 1998. The reason was not because Iraq had expelled them from the country, but quite simply because the US government had ordered them to leave on the eve of a unilateral military strike that was being prepared as a result of intelligence gathered by these same inspectors which had enabled the government to identify military targets.

That's what Mr. Ritter told the committee.

Richard Butler who was also in charge of the mission at the time, also admitted passing along intelligence.

Therefore, let me put the question to you again:is Iraq seeking assurances that inspectors will turn over any information they gather to the UN, not to the CIA or to Washington? Do you consider this to be a reasonable request on their part?

The Chair: Quickly please, Ms. Sinclair.

[English]

Ms. Jill Sinclair: What Iraq thinks or not, I can't comment on.

On the context in which the first set of inspections ended, I should recall that Iraq basically obstructed the inspectors for many years during their efforts to undertake their inspections. In fact, just before UNSCOM formally withdrew, Iraq had said it would no longer cooperate with it.

So there is a rich history around this. Again, I think what's important is to focus on UNMOVIC and the fact that those concerns were taken seriously by the international community and that the new resolution provides for a different structure of inspectors. It's up to Iraq to let those inspectors in.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.

Mr. Godfrey.

[English]

Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.): I have one quick observation to make to Mr. Benoit through you, Mr. Chair, and then two questions for our witnesses. The observation is that it's always dangerous to go back too far in quoting people's views, as Mr. Benoit did in the context of Mr. Chrétien's 1990 views of Iraq, because if you were to go back to the Reagan period and ask what President Reagan thought of Iraq, you would find that he rather liked it and its president because they were against Iran.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. John Godfrey: My questions are these. The first has to do with the nature of the complaints the United States has against Iraq. They have essentially made two demands, and one has tended to trump the other. The first is that there be a regime change, and the second is that weapons inspectors be allowed in. But by insisting on a regime change as much as it has, is the United States in fact making the work of the United Nations more difficult? If you insist on a regime change, you are much less likely to get cooperation from the regime you wish to change than if you leave it in place. Secondly, it's a tradition of the United Nations to respect the sovereign right of governments to choose their own administrations, however awful they may be. Has this complicated matters? That is the first question.

Second, in terms of a resolution coming out of the Security Council, in order that the United States or anyone else who joins with it be compliant with international law, is it up to the Security Council to determine compliance with a resolution it passes before a member state of the UN can go and do something so that that member state isn't simply behaving unilaterally? Once a resolution is passed, who determines whether or not it has been satisfied and the degree of the next action taken?

À (1040)

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, in response to Mr. Godfrey, I would first clarify what the Canadian government policy is. We really are here to speak to that. That is focused on trying to find ways to ensure Iraqi compliance with all the Security Council resolutions, and our main focus has been on the return of the weapons inspectors. Regime change per se is not part of Canada's policy.

As to the United States and its decision to go to the United Nations, Mr. Graham has applauded the decision of the U.S. administration to work with the Security Council. It means implicitly that they will have to find common ground with the members of the council if this is to move forward. So I think the answer is that it remains to be seen. But they have chosen a route based on compliance with the resolutions of the council, none of which, I recall, explicitly adopts a policy of regime change.

On the second question, Mr. Chair, I think that under the UN charter it's the Security Council that has the authority and responsibility to make those determinations.

The Chair: Just a little supplementary, Mr. Godfrey.

Mr. John Godfrey: In the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan, neither of which were, properly speaking, United Nations actions, the Security Council allowed the United States to do what it did. There was a specific resolution that allowed that to go forward. How does that work?

The Chair: Madame Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

You're right, in the case of those two operations there was approval sought subsequent to the actions. That was the choice of the member states to bring that issue before the Security Council. As John McNee has said, the Security Council has the final word, but one should never forget that the Security Council is made up of member states, so it is up to member states to bring those issues before the Security Council if they would like.

The Chair: We will now go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, before putting a question to our guests, I just want to take a moment to comment for the record briefly on what I think was a grotesquely irresponsible attack and misrepresentation of the comments of our Prime Minister a few days ago on the whole matter of moral equivalency arguments rationalizing terrorism.

I don't think, except for the most perverse and distorted reasons, that one could possibly interpret the comments made by the Prime Minister as engaging in any such moral equivalency argument. What the Prime Minister did say--and we should be applauding him for saying it--is that it is very worrisome that we have an increasing gap between the rich and poor nations in the world and that Canada and other rich nations should be doing better in addressing this problem. I, for one, say that if we can now have some initiatives from the government to get us back on that course, after a nine-year detour, we should be applauding him from the highest heights.

I don't want to be in any way provocative, but I was distressed--and I assume you were here for the first hour of the committee meeting--at the comments made by one of my colleagues opposite, Mr. Pratt, questioning whether in fact Canada could credibly and responsibly play the role of respected intermediary or honest broker, and I don't want to get hung up on the terminology, given some of our less than fully multilateral actions over this decade, and whether in fact we are respected in a way that would allow us to be taken seriously, for example, in being more proactive in stepping out more boldly to try to help facilitate the return of the weapons inspectors to Iraq. As I said, I think the spirit of non-partisanship in this meeting is extremely important, but I also think that's a worrisome issue.

I guess I would put the question as to whether at this point the official position of the Department of Foreign Affairs supports what you would have to characterize as pleading, practically on bended knee, by witnesses before this committee on June 4--both Scott Ritter and Denis Halliday--in saying that Canada is in fact very much respected, that Canada is desperately needed to step into this situation all of the time, reaffirming the multilateralism that's been at the core, certainly, of the NDP position throughout the entire last year's debate following September 11.

I will just quote very briefly. This is only one of several such comments made by both of our witnesses on June 4:

We need our friends to stand up and show us the path out. That's another thing that Canada could do. Show us that the path out of this problem is a course that adheres to international law and full respect of the Security Council, including not only the disarmament of Iraq, but also the quid pro quo agreement that calls for the lifting of economic sanctions once a finding of compliance about Iraq's disarmament obligation has been made.

There were repeated urgings that Canada step into the role that Canadians have been proud of traditionally, and which I think the overwhelming majority of Arab states would still consider Canada to have considerable credibility to exercise. I would like to hear your comments on that worry about whether Canada's credibility has been tarnished by some of its association with less than multilateralism and on some occasions the unilateral actions of the U.S.

À (1045)

The Chair: Mr. McNee.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, I'd say that in the Middle East I think Canada continues to enjoy a great deal of respect across the region. Whether or not at this point there is a useful role for Canada or another country to play the role of honest broker or intermediary, that's where we have doubts at this stage.

We think it's more effective at this stage to tell the Iraqis directly what we think. Mr. Graham will be doing that today, as I said earlier, to work through other governments in the region who have more influence in Baghdad to work with the United Nations.

We're struck by the fact that the Secretary General of the United Nations, who has long been involved in trying to find common ground with Iraq and who you remember in 1998 went to Baghdad, in July gave up his own direct participation in discussions with the Iraqis, feeling that there was no further way to go.

I think we've reached a point where there's a risk of a third country, Canada or another, getting in the way of the process of compliance.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, Mr. McNee and Ms. Sinclair.

I have a few short questions. In the 1991 Gulf War we had a coalition of 32 countries, I think, including Middle Eastern countries in the region--Turkey, Syria, what have you, except Jordan. This time around, if we don't have the support of those countries, especially gulf countries.... I grant you, Saudi Arabia said yesterday that if an attack takes place with the UN approval they're prepared to provide the American bases and what have you.

Basically, my question and my concern is if the attack on Iraq takes place, with or without the UN, what do you think the consequences will be in the region as far as our interest is concerned with other Arab countries in that Middle East area?

The second question is to Ms. Sinclair on the international security. Last week there were reports that Russia might consider attacking Georgia for basically the same reason the U.S. attacked Afghanistan. Now, if you continue going like this, then half the countries will attack the other half. Where do we draw the line on how far we are going on this route of attacking, teaching someone else what to do, what not to do? That's very much a concern to us, because we have interests all over the world. I'm concerned that if you start a snowball like this, the end is quite ugly, I think.

Can you comment on our own interests in the Middle East?

À (1050)

The Chair: Mr. McNee.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, on that question, we've been struck, as Mr. Assadourian mentioned, by the fact that in recent days the Government of Saudi Arabia has made it clear that if the United Nations Security Council decides on a course of action, that would greatly influence its own stand and its own willingness and in fact they would cooperate with the decision of the Security Council. President Mubarak of Egypt is undertaking urgent efforts in the Middle East to see if Iraq can be persuaded to comply.

We haven't seen the full picture yet, but we have a sense that the framework has shifted and that there's growing international support, including in the Arab world, for the Security Council taking action.

That's a long way of saying that of course if there is broad consensus internationally--the western countries, the Arab countries--on whatever course of action is decided, then that will lead to easier acceptance in the Arab world for whatever takes place. So I shouldn't have thought that the Canadian interests would be adversely affected, depending on the context of action.

On your second question, perhaps Jill is better placed to answer.

The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This also gives me an opportunity to clarify a point I made in response to Mr. Godfrey's question with regard to Afghanistan. The UN Security Council of course passed a resolution unanimously invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, which was on self-defence.

You asked where we draw the line. We draw the line with the Security Council and with the rule of law. Clearly, the role of the United Nations Security Council, the authority of that body, is where we draw the line.

With regard to the details on Georgia and Russia, I'm afraid we're here on Iraq, so I wouldn't want to speculate on that.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you very much.

Mr. McNee, I think you said in your remarks, if I heard it correctly, that it's clear Iraq has put forth efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them. Do you or anybody else in the department have absolute proof that there are weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Iraq?

The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Sorry, Mr. Casey, you get me in response instead of John.

À (1055)

Mr. Bill Casey: That would be my preference anyway.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I think the best way to respond to this is with a little bit of history and by looking forward. Clearly, when UNSCOM was in Iraq, they were able to destroy significant amounts of weapons and materials related to chemical and biological weapons and missile programs. We have documentation from the United Nations, which we would be happy to provide to the committee, and we can ascertain without any doubt that there was a massive weapons of mass destruction program under way in Iraq.

The inspectors were unable to complete their work. In its final report to the Security Council, UNSCOM said it had not received the cooperation of the Government of Iraq required to enable it to conduct its work as mandated by the Security Council. Therefore, it was not able to give the Security Council assurances with regard to the final disposition of Iraq's prescribed weapons programs and possible reconstitution. When that group of inspectors left, there were lots of questions in their minds with regard to what Iraq may still have. Again, there are lots of detailed reports with regard to a number of priority issues that the inspectors said would need to be looked at immediately. They left being unable to answer questions with regard to biological weapons warheads, conventional weapons, missile propellants required to deliver these weapons, and indigenous missile production. Again, these problems date back to the very inception of UNSCOM's work when the initial declarations made by the Government of Iraq were not necessarily accurate. As many may remember, they didn't even admit for a long time that there were biological weapons. So there are lots of unanswered questions and lots of documentation to support real concerns about continuing capability.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.

That's it, Mr. Casey. We will now go to Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two short questions. The first is a technical one. As we are no longer a member of the Security Council, are we able to make a resolution directly? If not, and even if we can, are we in the process of preparing a resolution? You mentioned that many countries are in the process of getting their own resolutions ready. Are we going to piggyback on someone else's? How are we going to get our resolution in there?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, the way it works at the UN is that in order to propose a resolution in the Security Council, you have to be on the council at the time. The council is composed of five permanent members and ten elected members, who serve for a term. That was our position in 1999 and 2000, so at that time we could and did. The short answer to that one is no.

Mr. Graham is in New York today. He has been there for the past week. He has had an intensive round of discussions with the G-8 foreign ministers, including Mr. Powell. He is seeing the Iraqi foreign minister today and the Jordanian foreign minister. He has been in close touch with some of the permanent members of the council . That's where we think we should look, for the resolutions coming from the French, the British, and the Americans, who are permanent members of the council and who are seized of the question now.

Mr. David Price: So we aren't preparing our own. We will piggyback on someone else's.

Mr. John McNee: Indeed.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Ms. Gallant.

[English]

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): In your opinion, Mr. McNee, why hasn't Saddam been charged with war crimes given the fact that he attempted genocide on the Kurds and actually succeeded in killing thousands of people? Or has he?

The Chair: I'm not sure if I can accept this question. I think that's a question to be asked not to an official, but mainly to the minister. When the minister appears in front of this committee, I will agree to accept such a question. This is an update on Iraq, and it's not up to the officials to answer this question.

Do you have another question, Mrs. Gallant?

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Yes, I do. Thank you.

For over a decade, Iraq has defied UN resolutions. What is Canada's threshold to the tolerance of this defiance? Is it a matter of time, a deadline--how many more months or years we will put up with it? Or is it a matter of a direct assault on North America?

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, I would simply say that the minister has made it very clear that this situation is a very grave one. The Security Council has found that. We are pleased that the council has taken it up on an urgent basis right now. That's the focus of attention. That's where we think it should be.

We are supportive of all efforts of the council and others. As we said, Canada has reached out to governments in the Middle East and elsewhere to bring pressure to bear to try to find a resolution to this.

The Chair: One more question.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: In your estimation, from a foreign policy point of view, did the commentary that the Prime Minister made on September 11, during his interview with the CBC, have an adverse effect on our foreign relations with the United States?

Á (1100)

The Chair: I don't accept this question. I'm very sorry. Sorry, Madame Gallant.

Mr. O'Reilly, the last question, please.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the officials for attending. It's really nice to be at such a non-partisan gathering. It's always great to know that the committee works together and tries to accomplish things.

There are two things I have been asked on which I'm not clear on the answer yet. First, is Canada at a disadvantage, being a non-member of the Security Council, in advancing our thoughts as a nation?

Secondly, it's continually mentioned that Iraq has acted illegally in selling oil illegally to other countries. I wanted to know what proof you have of that.

Those are my two questions, Mr. Chair, and I compliment you on calling this meeting.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, on the first question, I don't think Canada is at all at a disadvantage. We've never been shy at making our views known in New York before the council. We have the opportunity to come and make statements when the council has important open meetings. I think it's never been an inhibition, never been a problem. It just so happens that our most recent period on the council was two years ago, and we're not on the council right now.

As to proof of the illegal export of oil, I confess I would have to check, but reliable estimates are that around $3 billion worth of oil a year is being sold illegally by Iraq. These are massive amounts of oil coming onto the international market.

I would say through you, Mr. Chair, to Mr. O'Reilly that it's pretty well acknowledged that this is happening, not on a small scale but on a pretty big scale. But we can do some research and get back to the committee on that.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly. Thank you, Mr. McNee.

One question without preamble by Mr. Day.

[Translation]

Mr. Stockwell Day: That will be difficult, Mr. Chairman, but I'll try.

[English]

In 1995, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, as you know, defected. He reported that Saddam Hussein was making weapons at a site that had previously been investigated and searched by the inspectors. He said, and apparently it was later confirmed, that they had produced 30,000 litres of biological agents, including anthrax and forms of botulinum toxin. What is your assessment of that, that a site could actually be inspected, left, and then later they found 30,000 litres of biological agents? That seems to be pretty extreme.

Also, can you tell me if there's been any development with the designation of the so-called presidential sites, where Saddam Hussein said you can't go there, and apparently they didn't?

The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: One of the sad realities about the work of UNSCOM is that the commissioners, the inspectors, were never able to have the access they wanted. There are repeated examples of where Iraq tried to prevent, and was able to prevent, the inspectors from going in, or delayed their arrival at certain sites.

When it comes to biological weapons, the fact is, much less than this can kill, so it's pretty easy to move this stuff around. It's pretty easy to have mobile laboratories. Of the areas of concern, then, the biological weapons area is a key one. Unfortunately, yes, that's why you need to get the inspectors back in, and you also have to have ongoing monitoring and verification. Things and situations can change. Things can be moved out and things can be moved in, and you want to know what's going on in any of those sites.

With regard to the designation of the presidential sites, pending the return of inspectors under the new UNMOVIC provisions, nobody knows where anything is.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.

Mr. Benoit has asked for a clarification of an answer by Mr. McNee--twenty seconds, no preamble.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. McNee, I just want to get clarification on whether you did or didn't say that the Secretary General of the United Nations has given up on discussions with Iraq.

Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, there was a series of discussions in the late spring, early summer. He withdrew from personal participation in those discussions; they continued at a lower level. I think that's not quite the same--and perhaps I wasn't clear the first time around.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So how is that to be interpreted in terms of how the United Nations views Iraq?

Á (1105)

Mr. John McNee: It's really a question for him, Mr. Chair, but I think the Secretary General made very clear, in his speech on September 12 before the General Assembly, what was required of Iraq. He made it very clear: compliance or else, he said; the Security Council would have to face up to its responsibilities. I think that's the bottom line.

The Chair: Thank you.

I want to thank our witnesses, Mr. McNee and Ms. Sinclair, whose appearance in front of our committee at such short notice was very much appreciated.

[Translation]

Thank you again.

We will now go consider the second motion tabled by Ms. Lalonde.

Please read your motion, Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mine is a three-part motion. I believe there is unanimous support for it, but if not, I hope that at least the majority of members will support it. Let me make my position clear right away.

The first part of my motion reads as follows:

That the Committee express its strong preference for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict with Iraq;

I hope we can all agree on that.

Secondly:

That the Committee urge the government to use all diplomatic tools at its disposal for a quick return into Iraq of the UN disarmament inspectors;

Thirdly, and most concretely:

That the Committee recommend to the government that it offer its services to the UN Secretary General for the nomination of an honest broker whose mandate would be to build confidence and cooperation between parties, making sure that the UNMOVIC inspectors:

a) have all the freedom they need to pursue their work of disarmament; and

In other words, they need to be able to move freely around the country.

b) remain within the framework of their duty, excluding any work done on behalf of any country.

Although not mentioned specifically, this includes the United States.

I heard it argued, particularly by officials who were here, that we should all be putting pressure at this time on Saddam Hussein. I don't disagree with that, but in the face of a number of valid arguments, including seeking assurances that inspectors will not resort to the same kind of behaviour, that is engaging in spying activities, something they freely did between 1991 and 1998, it would seem to me that providing these kind of guarantees puts even more pressure on Saddam to comply.

I also heard another argument raised, namely that Saddam had been involved in oil smuggling operations. We heard testimony from Mr. Van Sponeck and from Mr. Halliday, both of whom served as directors of the program Pétrole contre nourriture. They told us how inadequate the program truly was. It is important to remember how greatly the population of Iraq has suffered. Therefore, it's important not to give Saddam any justifiable reason for refusing to allow inspectors into Iraq. It's important to focus on the need to send inspectors back into Iraq and to allow them to do their job and move freely anywhere in the country. They must be allowed to do their job, but only their job. As I see it, far from remaining outside the Security Council's actions, this would support the Council's actions. In any event, I hope that this topic has already come up for discussion, because it's an extremely important issue.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that such matters need to be taken into consideration before a preventive military strike is launched against Iraq, even one under the auspices of the United Nations, not only because the state of international relations would be changed, but primarily because of what's happening in the region and mounting anti-Western sentiment owing to poverty, hunger and all of the other issues to which Prime Minister Chrétien rightly alluded.

When we fail to do everything in our power to diffuse the situation, we fail to do our job. But when we do everything we can, then we are in fact doing our job. That's why I wanted us to meet today and vote on this motion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Á (1110)

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Harvard, on a point of order.

Mr. John Harvard: Mr. Chairman, I have knowledge of two possible amendments that will be moved. It might be helpful to the debate if the amendments--neither, as far as I know, are that controversial--were moved now so that we can debate the motion in the full context of the main motion and the amendments.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harvard.

Effectively, we have a motion by Mrs. Marleau to amend the motion by Mrs. Lalonde; a subamendment by Mr. Pratt to Mrs. Marleau's amendment; and an amendment by Mr. Benoit. If we want to discuss the motions, I think it would be good to discuss the amendments also.

I will first ask Mrs. Marleau to bring forward her amendments, then Mr. Pratt, and then Mr. Benoit.

Mrs. Marleau.

Ms. Diane Marleau: Thank you.

I appreciate Madam Lalonde's motion. I think it's a very good one, and I have absolutely no opposition to the first two parts of it. But when it comes to the third part, which speaks to Canada becoming an honest broker in this issue, while I appreciate that we often act as an honest broker, given that the international community is firmly convinced that Iraq must permit unconditional and unfettered weapons inspections to demonstrate its full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, frankly, there is nothing to mediate. Canada would not want to undertake any action that would weaken the Security Council or undermine the coordinated international efforts to ensure that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission would be able to carry out its work in a timely, unconditional, and unfettered fashion, or interfere in any way with Iraq's fulfillment of its obligation.

Given the direct link between the commission, which was established in 1999, and the Security Council, any intermediary role would undermine both bodies unless it were requested by the Security Council. As Canada remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iraq, possible alternative language for the third paragraph of the motion would be this:

That the committee recommend to the government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council.

The Chair: Fine. Now I'll go to the proposed subamendment to Mrs. Marleau's amendment.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To begin, I want to say that I fully support the comments that have been made by Mrs. Marleau on this matter.

The subamendment to her amendment that I would suggest, which is basically really a melding together of both of these amendments, would be that, in relation to the current situation in Iraq, this committee recommends that the federal government urge the United Nations Security Council to pass a strongly worded resolution calling upon the Government of Iraq to immediately and fully comply with all relevant resolutions, subsequent to UN Security Council Resolution 660; and furthermore that the Government of Iraq give the highest priority to immediately allowing the return of UNMOVIC and the IAEA to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capability.

Very briefly, Mr. Chair, I think the United Nations is really in a critical position at this point. I'm struck, actually, by the historical comparisons one could draw between the situation we have right now in connection with Iraq and the situation the world and the League of Nations faced with Nazi Germany during the 1930s, where the Nazis, under Hitler, were prepared to take various steps to destabilize European security in terms of taking over the Saar area, the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, as well as the Sudetenland takeover there, not to mention the complete and willful destruction of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to German rearmament during the 1930s. I think the comparison is striking in terms of what the Germans did and what the League of Nations were prepared to allow them to do in terms of violating that particular treaty.

We have a situation where the credibility of the United Nations is on the line with respect to Iraq. Again, in relation to the honest broker comments, Canada has to do everything it possibly can to support the UN Security Council in this situation.

I would urge members of the committee to support these two motions, or a motion and subamendment to the motion, in order to convey a very strong message from this committee, through the Government of Canada, to the United Nations that we support their efforts very, very strongly.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Á (1115)

[Translation]

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Pratt. We'll now go to Mr. Benoit's motion.

Ms. Lalonde, you have the floor on a point of order.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I'm trying to understand. Are we talking about two sub-amendments to my third motion (paragraph)?

The Chair: Here's how I'd like to proceed at this time, Ms. Lalonde. I'll hear the three motions. I listened to yours. I believe Mr. Pratt's amendment is a new provision. In my opinion, it should be added on to the first two paragraphs. We'll hear Mr. Benoit's motion and then we'll decide how we will proceed.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I was wondering if the member wanted to add something to my motion, or to replace it with one of his own.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: To replace it.

The Chair: Quite possibly, but to my knowledge, that's the intent of Ms. Marleau's motion. Mr. Pratt's motion would add something.

Mr. Benoit.

[English]

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, we have just received these two amendments. I would really like to be comfortable that I understand what they say and what they don't say. If we could have maybe five minutes, just to take a good look at it, discuss it, and then come back.... If the amendment proposed by Madam Marleau and the subamendment by Mr. Pratt do what our amendment was going to do, then we'll support that, but I'm not sure. I need a couple of minutes to look at that.

I would also like to move that we strike clause (b). I believe the mover has indicated that she is referring to the United States, and to me it seems like more of that anti-Americanism that the Prime Minister had initiated. Frankly, I don't think that's the kind of thing we need coming from this committee. If we could just strike clause (b), have time to examine the motion, the amendment and the subamendment, then we'll come back and determine whether it's still necessary for us to make our first proposed amendment or not.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

I'd like to suggest that we proceed as follows. Since the two first paragraphs are not recommendations as such, we will try to adopt them right away. These are the recommendations that begin with “That the Committee express...“ and “That the Committee urge...“ We'll try to adopt these two paragraphs. Subsequently, we'll move on to the recommendation as such, if that's all right with you.

Any comments?

[English]

Are there any comments regarding the first two paragraphs? The first one is:

That the Committee express its strong preference for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict with Iraq.

Is it agreed, this paragraph?

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Chairman, can I ask Madame Francine Lalonde a question?

The Chair: It depends. Is it with regard to what I just mentioned?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No, it's not. The first motion says everything you need to do. The second motion is a duplicate. We ask for hearings to begin. Once we get the hearings, we can get whatever we want done and we don't have to pass a motion.

The Chair: That's what I'm saying. Mr. Assadourian, I'm sorry, you're debating,

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Okay.

The Chair: Does everyone agree with the first paragraph?

Some hon members: Agreed.

The Chair: The second paragraph says:

That the Committee urge the government to use all diplomatic tools at its disposal for a quick return into Iraq of the United Nations disarmament inspectors;

Is it agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

The two first paragraphs are carried unanimously.

We now go to Ms. Lalonde's motion. The first amendment was moved by Ms. Marleau.

We will reread Ms. Marleau's proposed amendment. Basically, Ms. Marleau, there are two parts, parts a) and b) to your amendment.

[English]

In French it is not marked a) and b), but in English you have a) and b). She wants to add something.

Á (1120)

Ms. Diane Marleau: No, I want to remove the third... I want to replace that with what I've put down.

The Chair: If you want to replace it, you will also replace a) and b). You replace everything, the whole thing.

Ms. Diane Marleau: The whole thing, yes.

The Chair: You want to say that paragraph 3 should be amended by replacing it with the following:

That the Committee recommend to the government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council.

That is your amendment.

Ms. Diane Marleau: Yes.

The Chair: Fine.

[Translation]

Ms. Bergeron, you may speak to Ms. Marleau's amendment.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: Mr. Chairman, while I understand quite well the rationale behind Ms. Marleau's proposal, I would not want to strike outright the reference to the impartial role that Canada could play in this conflict as an intermediary. Among the arguments invoked, in particular by Mr. Pratt, was the contention that Canada may not currently have all the credibility needed to take on this role or to have a Canadian citizen do so.

While I'm on the subject, I have to say that Mr. McNee stated quite clearly that in the Middle East, Canada still enjoys a stellar recommendation. Moreover, may I point out for Mr. Pratt's benefit that during the Gulf War, Canada was one of, if not the, only western nation not to sever its diplomatic ties with Iraq. That was rather amazing and I think it attests to the credibility Canada enjoyed then, and continues to enjoy to this day, in the eyes of the various players in this conflict.

Another thing about Ms. Marleau's motion is that I'm extremely uncomfortable with the idea of doing away with the recommendation that the UN team should have the latitude it needs to carry out its disarmament mission. Ms. Marleau is proposing to delete the reference to our desire to have UN inspectors be given free reign to do their work properly. I was under the impression that we could all agree on this point.

Therefore, I fail to understand the reason why Ms. Marleau wants to delete this part of the recommendation. I understand that Mr. Benoit, for reasons with which I disagree, is proposing to delete b). However, I can't understand deleting a).

Therefore, I wonder if Ms. Marleau would agree to integrate subparagraph a) and even subparagraph b), which Mr. Benoit is seeking to delete, into her recommendation. Personally, I disagree with Mr. Benoit because it's extremely simplistic to say that this is nothing more than anti-American sentiment. We want UN inspectors to do their work for the UN, not for the United States or for any one country in particular.

The Chair: Ms. Marleau, do you agree with Mr. Bergeron's comments?

Ms. Diane Marleau: Totally.

The Chair: Before we go any further, I would like to hear what Mr. Harvard and Mr. Benoit have to say about this matter.

Mr. Harvard.

[English]

Mr. John Harvard: Mr. Chairman, I support both the amendment and the subamendment in that they would delete the third part of the motion proposed by Ms. Lalonde. I fully endorse Ms. Lalonde's motion up to the beginning of the third paragraph. I think that paragraph should be deleted and replaced by the amendments.

I say that, particularly to Ms. Lalonde, because I think that we, as a committee of the House of Commons of Canada, should be expressing what we might call a general policy direction to our foreign affairs department and of course to the United Nations and to Iraq. For those who are on the ground at the United Nations and elsewhere, it may be that they feel there is a need for an honest broker, but I would leave it to them. I think that's more the mechanics of dealing with this issue than the general principle. I don't think it's really for us to tell the United States that they should pick an honest broker. In this situation, I don't know if there is such a thing as an honest broker. There might be, but I would have difficulty naming one. I would leave that to them.

I think the amendment moved by Ms. Marleau and the one offered up by Mr. Pratt make sense, because basically what we are saying is that we urge the Security Council to remind Iraq of exactly what resolutions have been passed in the past and why they should be observed, and recommend compliance or else. Of course, we're also saying to Iraq exactly the same thing, to let the inspectors in.

If we pass the two amendments proposed by Ms. Marleau and Mr. Pratt, I would think there wouldn't be any need for Mr. Benoit's second motion, which is the deletion of clause b), because that would already go. I support Mr. Benoit's amendment, but I really think it pretty well coincides with what Mr. Pratt has already offered.

That's all I would have to say, Mr. Chair.

Á (1125)

The Chair: Merci, Mr. Harvard.

Just for a point of clarification as to where we stand right now, paragraphs 1 and 2 have been accepted. Mrs. Marleau recommends that paragraph 3 be deleted and be replaced by her paragraph, but we are keeping parts a) and b). That is where we stand right now.

Mr. Benoit, you have the floor.

Mr. Leon Benoit: When I read this amendment, which says that the committee should recommend to the government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council, I have a hard time really understanding the purpose of it, quite frankly, or even what it says for sure. I don't think we should be here tying the hands of government, requiring that they examine any step that they might take to support the Security Council. I would assume they've done that, or I'd like to believe they have, but I certainly don't know why we would want to further do anything to tie the hands of government.

I really don't know what this motion would do, quite frankly. We can't support it as it's written. We've all supported the first two clauses. I would suggest that we just scrap the rest of it, and I think we've done our job here.

An hon. member: And what would be the recommendation?

The Chair: Mr. Pratt, please.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's my understanding that it was proposed by Ms. Marleau that in fact we get rid of all of the third paragraph of the motion, and that the contents of Ms. Marleau's motion and my own motion in terms of having Iraq comply with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council cover off the details of how those inspections would be done. It is implicit within those Security Council resolutions. So I don't think there's any need whatsoever, I would agree with Mr. Benoit, that both a) and b) should go.

In terms of talking about the freedom that the weapons inspectors need, however, what we might want to do in my resolution, where it says “calling upon the Government of Iraq to immediately and fully comply with all relevant resolutions”, is to insert “fully and unconditionally comply”. That presumably would provide the weapons inspectors with all the freedom they would need in order to be able to do their job.

So “fully and unconditionally comply” could possibly be inserted as well.

The Chair: Mrs. Marleau, please.

Ms. Diane Marleau: I really feel that implicit in these two resolutions is exactly what Madame Lalonde would like us to say, so I suggest that we move forward on my amendment, including Mr. Pratt's suggestions. I think we will have covered off the meaning of Madame Lalonde's a) and b) without undermining any resolution by the Security Council or the work of UNMOVIC.

Mr. John Harvard: Mr. Chairman, could I just offer something that might be helpful?

The Chair: You have the floor, Mr. Harvard.

Mr. John Harvard: I was just thinking, Mr. Chairman, that it might ease Mr. Benoit's discomfort a little bit if we used Madame Marleau's recommendation or amendment as the beginning of the two subamendments from Mr. Pratt and Mr. Benoit. In other words, it would read something like this:

That the committee recommend to the government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council, including

So it would add the word “including”. Madame Marleau's amendment would just be the beginning of a larger amendment. In other words, after “examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council, including”, add Mr. Pratt's amendment, and yours after that. Then it all becomes one, and it deletes the entire third part of Mrs. Lalonde's motion.

[Translation]

The Chair: I'll hear from Ms. Lalonde, and then from Ms. McDonough and Mr. Casey. Please keep your comments brief, Ms. Lalonde.

Á (1130)

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I have to say that I'm disappointed, Mr. Chairman, because this motion does not express opposition to what the Security Council is proposing to do. I didn't author the motion, but I support because I think it shows some imagination and creativity and opens the door to allowing inspectors back into the country. As I see it, no one can remain indifferent to the fact that inspectors engaged in spying activities, unless of course, and this should be stated clearly, the consensus is that spies should be allowed into Iraq.

However, that's not the UN's role. The UN was established to facilitate peace and its role is to pave the way for inspectors to go back into the country and disarm any weapons that might be found. That is the UN's mission.

Why then not take an imaginative approach. In any event, all we're doing is offering our services and showing that we're truly concerned about finding a peaceful solution. In my opinion, Ms. Marleau's amendment waters down the substantive part of this resolution. Quite frankly, I felt it was most important this morning to take a stand on this issue, because it can make a difference.

Canada may not have a seat on the Security Council, but that doesn't mean - and we've established this fact - that it doesn't have the credibility it needs to fulfill a peacekeeping role. We need only recall the bold, courageous actions of Pearson. Not too many people were happy when he stressed the need for peacekeepers and called other major world countries to task.

Therefore, I think we have a duty to do whatever we can. The committee heard from Scott Ritter, someone with first-hand knowledge of the situation. He maintained that a way must be found to gain Iraq's trust. His words have considerable credibility given his hands-on experience. He spoke about what the inspectors were capable of doing overall.

Just think about what Mr. de Chastelain was able to do in Ireland. He was brought in to resolve disarmament issues between the two opposing extremist groups.

Why not suggest bold action? All we're doing is offering our services. Why object to that? I just don't understand. We're not criticizing the actions of other. We're merely offering our services to maximize the mission's chances of success.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. McDonough, please.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Mr. Chairman, I don't want us to end up in a major procedural wrangle here. But I think we're getting somewhere.

I'd like to propose an amendment to the proposition that is before us. It seems to me completely consistent with the spirit of the amendments proposed by both Ms. Marleau and Mr. Price, and it incorporates the sense of what has been proposed by Ms. Lalonde. It would be possible to support Ms. Marleau's amendment “That paragraph 3 be amended by deletion and replacement by the following--that the committee recommend to the government that it examine any steps it might take....” It would include the subamendment put forward by Mr. Pratt, but it would add a second element. So it would include (a) Mr. Pratt's subamendment and (b)--and this is the wording I would suggest if it were accepted as a friendly amendment--it would also include “an offer of services directly to the Secretary General for Canada to play a role of honest broker in whatever ways Canada can contribute to building confidence and cooperation among affected parties and averting a war in Iraq.”

The reason I propose that is I think it is somewhat worrisome for us all to be tiptoeing around the issue of whether Canada no longer has the credibility to play the kind of honest broker role that has been so valued in so many situations of critical tension and threatened war around the world. We have just heard in the news, which was reinforced by the foreign affairs spokesman this morning, that Saudi Arabia is clearly actively engaged in an honest broker kind of role, as is Jordan. I think we need to step up to the plate to say that we also wish to assume an honest broker role. Otherwise, I think we undermine confidence in our own ability to contribute significantly in this situation. We are uniquely positioned geographically, historically, economically, and in every other way to play the kind of honest broker role because of our proximity and ties with our closest neighbour and ally, the United States.

Á (1135)

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

Next is Mr. Casey, followed by Mr. Godfrey. Then we'll deal with the resolution itself.

Mr. Bill Casey: I think we should stick with the original motion. Looking at the motions, they all seem to be redundant. They don't really do anything. They ask others to do something instead of Canada doing something. Mr. Pratt's says “to pass a strongly worded resolution calling upon the Government of Iraq to immediately and fully comply....” That's happening right now in the United Nations, or something to that effect. Another one says that we ask the government to “examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council”. I would hope that they are doing that now. The last amendment is that we ask “the government to urge Iraq to allow UNMOVIC inspectors to have all the freedom they need....” Those really aren't going to do anything. That is not anything we're doing. The original motion says let Canada do something. Let's offer at least. Our offer may not be accepted.

So I say we should stick with the original one. It's actually something we're doing. We're not passing the buck. It's action on our behalf.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Casey.

Mr. Godfrey.

Mr. John Godfrey: I have no objections to that, but I would like to say that Ms. Lalonde's motion calls for three things: first, for “the nomination of an honest broker”, second, for the inspectors to have “all the freedom they need“ and third, that they not work “on behalf of any country. I don't we can have all three. The problem lies with the first part.

If it were somehow possible to work out a compromise of sorts where the committee would recommend to the government that it support the work of future UNMOVIC inspectors, taking care to ensure that these inspectors enjoy total freedom and so forth, and that they also remain within the framework of their mission, then it would be possible. However, I believe there already was a motion on the table calling on the committee to examine at some future date all of the details of this mission, and perhaps it would be best if we endorsed that motion. There's no solution that would allow us to keep the positive elements of Ms. Lalonde's motion.

Á (1140)

[English]

The Chair: It's not complicated now, it's very complicated. Our research staff will try to include all three of the amendments. I will ask the researcher to read it. Please listen, everyone.

Mr. James Lee (Committee Researcher): What we have tried to do is include, obviously, Madame Lalonde's piece, Madame Marleau's amendment, and Mr. Pratt's amendment. Also, if you'd like, I've tried to include Ms. McDonough's suggestion of the honest broker role and the last suggestion Madame Lalonde made of the inspectors only doing their job. I'd like to read it, please.

I assume the first two paragraphs stay as they are. They've been adopted. Following that, it would be:

That the Committee recommend to the Government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council, including, if it wishes, as an honest broker, as well as urging it pass a strongly worded resolution calling upon the government of Iraq to immediately and fully comply with all resolutions subsequent to UNSCR 660 and, furthermore, that the government of Iraq give the highest priority to immediately allowing the return of UNMOVIC and the IAEA

--this is a change--

for the sole purpose of verifying the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capability.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Pratt, followed by Ms. Lalonde and Mr. Benoit.

[English]

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, I have serious difficulties with adding the honest broker aspect to this. Frankly, I don't think we want to leave...not that the Iraqis pay a lot of attention to this committee, necessarily. Maybe they should, but I suspect they probably don't. At any rate, I don't think we should provide the Iraqis with any chink in the armour whatsoever in terms of dealing with them in a very strong way in relation to previous UN Security Council resolutions. For instance, we don't want the Iraqi foreign minister saying, “Why don't we take the recommendation of the Canadian foreign affairs committee in terms of Canada playing a broker role?”

What has happened over the course of the last ten years or so is that the Iraqis have used every possible opportunity to divide the allies in any way they can, to thwart the inspectors. I don't think we should be giving them a gift-wrapped excuse to delay the process that is currently under way. We have to take a strong position, as a committee, in support of the United Nations and not play any games that would effectively put us in a position of perhaps running interference with respect to the Security Council. I just don't think that would be terribly constructive at this particular moment.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Go ahead, Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I can't accept Mr. Pratt's explanation. My motion does not set us apart. It's merely an offer extended to the Secretary General who, in negotiating the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution, might find something useful. In order to act as an honest broker, it's important to recognize the facts, namely that some inspectors engaged in spying activities. The UN has even admitted that much is true. In 1991, UNSCOM made some vague excuses about Mr. Kay who in 1995, was found to be working for the CIA. That's a fact. I think we need to use our imaginations and come up with a way for inspectors to get back into Iraq, unless of course everyone has already made up their minds to give Saddam a good swift kick, in which case I recommend they read if not the entire book, then at least a summary of the book penned by Georges Bush senior with Scowcroft. It's the first work by prominent Republicans to come out of the United States which opposes the Iraqi attack. The book's authors claim that Saddam was not the target and that the terms of the UN resolution had been applied because according to the estimates, 50,000 soldiers would be needed to occupy Iraq and that this was not a desirable option, either for the United States or for the Security Council.

It's important to know what we want. If we think that the problem will be resolved by attacking Saddam, we need to give this matter careful consideration. However, if we want the inspectors to have any real hope of carrying out their work of disarmament, then I think we need to agree on what the role of “honest broker” would entail. We could do that with either Ms. McDonough's amendment or with Mr. Godfrey's additions. We also need to recognize that inspectors engaged in spying. We know this for a fact.

Á (1145)

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

[English]

We will now go to Mr. Benoit, followed by Mr. Harvard and Ms. McDonough.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thought we were getting somewhere for a while with Mr. Pratt's subamendment. I think that helped us along. With a minor adjustment to that, so that it would read “immediately and fully and unconditionally comply with all relevant resolutions”, I think that would be a friendly amendment Mr. Pratt could accept.

The idea that Canada should offer to be an honest broker is, quite frankly, ludicrous. It's out of touch with reality. Let me explain that. First of all, Canada took part in the Gulf War against Iraq. That is reality. Secondly, in 1998, without UN consent, the Prime Minister agreed to the United States and the United Kingdom bombing Iraq, and that happened. How can we possibly set ourselves up as some kind of impartial honest broker? It simply isn't working within the realm of reality. I think that as much as everybody on the committee wants a peaceful resolution, and we all do, we also have to consider the situation realistically, and those suggestions simply don't do that. The third thing, of course, is that we share this continent with the United States, and we're intimately tied together with them. Reality says there's no way we could portray ourselves as an independent honest broker. So let's deal within the realm of reality at this committee.

I think Mr. Pratt's subamendment to Mrs. Marleau's amendment, along with the minor adjustment I talked about, would allow us to support this, and we could then get on with it.

[Translation]

The Chair: Ms. McDonough.

[English]

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Just very briefly, I have to say, having just heard the words of the colleague who spoke before me, that I feel even more strongly that we salvage some way of reaffirming our confidence in ourselves and reasserting our intention to our neighbours around the world to act in any way possible, not having totally squandered our reputation as a respected, honest broker--to do everything humanly possible to offer our diplomatic services to the Secretary General, to say we would want to do so.

If the difficulty is with the terminology, “honest broker” specifically, then I suggest we replace it with the concept of offering our diplomatic services directly to the UN Secretary General.

I really felt that our research staff came up with an excellent way of incorporating the sense of cooperation here, the sense of our wanting to say, in a very clear way, that, yes, we do indeed still see ourselves as Canadians as an independent, sovereign nation absolutely committed to multilateralism.

If we don't believe in that role of offering our diplomatic services, then what is it that John McNee was describing this morning that the Prime Minister and the foreign affairs minister are actually doing at the UN today and around the world? If we don't believe in that, then are we declaring that we absolutely are impotent and no longer even see ourselves as respected in that role?

I don't want to sound like a cheerleader for my political adversary, but at a time like this, when we face the kind of crisis that we face, with the threat of war in Iraq, it is time for us to stand together and give that vote of confidence to the Prime Minister and the foreign affairs minister, to say, “We do support what you're doing and we think we want to ratify that”, and even suggest that it be a more formal offer of diplomatic services to the UN Secretary General. The UN Secretary General can say, “Thank you very much, but that won't be helpful”, or “Yes, we have some very specific things that we do respect Canada for and think you can do, and we at the UN embrace that commitment from Canada”.

Á (1150)

The Chair: Merci, Ms. McDonough.

Mr. Harvard, Ms. Marleau, and then I will add something of my own at the end.

Mr. Harvard.

Mr. John Harvard: I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to make it short, that I think the research staff have done a good job of coming up with a compromise resolution. I think the committee is hung up on two words, “honest broker,” and I think if we eliminate those two words--if we want to find something else to describe Canada, fine--we can get a unanimously endorsed resolution, which I think is very important.

We do have our differences, but when it comes to sending a message to Iraq and to the United Nations about how we feel as a committee, it would be really important that all of us sign on to the resolution.

I would appeal to Ms. Lalonde. I think you have already made a great contribution. You have already got a lot of what you have asked for, and I would appeal to you, Francine, just to drop those two words, “honest broker”. I don't think by removing those two words that it in any way disables that compromise resolution. I don't think it takes any meaning away from that compromise resolution. Without those two words we are making it very clear where we stand as a foreign affairs committee.

That is my suggestion.

Ms. Diane Marleau: Can I call for the vote on that?

The Chair: Yes. If you wish, I will read it again, because our researchers just had something...

First, the third paragraph will read:

That the Committee recommend to the Government that it examine any steps it might take in support of the Security Council, including offering our services to the Secretary General, as well as urging it to pass a strongly worded resolution calling upon the government of Iraq to immediately and fully comply with all resolutions subsequent to UNSCR 660 and, furthermore, that the government of Iraq give the highest priority to immediately allowing the return of the UNMOVIC and the IAEA for the sole purpose of verifying the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capability.

I think it's good.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Mr. Chairman, nobody questions the sincerity of the motion. It's what we may wind up with that's the problem.

I need some clarification. Is the motion saying limited to that countenanced by the Security Council? The reason I ask that question is that in 1998 there were American and British air strikes on Iraq that were not endorsed by the Security Council. But the Canadian government supported them without Security Council endorsement. Are we tying ourselves here to only those things that are endorsed by the Security Council? Then we have difficulty with it.

[Translation]

I don't doubt your sincerity, and unanimity is possible if we retain only the first and second paragraphs. Otherwise, we cannot support the motion.

Á (1155)

[English]

The Chair: It is close to noon. We will proceed. As I said before, the first and second paragraphs were adopted. We have an amendment to the third paragraph from Ms. Marleau. It's to delete paragraph 3 and replace it with what I just read. I call the question. Does everyone agree?

Just for clarification, not for a question, Ms. Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, I'd like you to clarify something for me. Did I clearly hear “for the sole purpose of”?

The Chair: That's correct.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I see. Thank you.

[English]

(Amendment agreed to)

(Motion agreed to)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you.

[English]

That concludes our meeting.

[Translation]

Thank you all for coming. It's the first time everyone's been able to attend.

[English]

Ms. Alexa McDonough: I have a point of order. Can I just seek clarification for a moment? I believe that as we were undertaking the important work of this committee this morning...or some time later today we will have a formal prorogation. Can I just suggest, however, that there is nothing to prevent the committee from unanimously agreeing to move forward with the work we have today voted to undertake? Can we not agree to get on with that work?

The Chair: The problem, Ms. McDonough, is that there is no committee after the prorogation.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: There are still some...

[English]

The Chair: There is no committee. If there is prorogation today, I am no longer a chair and you're no longer a member.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: What if your colleagues agree unanimously that we should come together and that you should chair the meeting, so that we can do some homework in the face of this crisis?

The Chair: I'm not entitled to do that. That's the problem.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Not even with the support of your colleagues?

The Chair: Not at all.

Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Thank you and have a nice day.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: While we're on the subject, I think it would be possible to send us the witness list so that we could prepare ourselves. That's what I meant.

[English]

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.