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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, April 25, 2002

0910

The Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke--Lakeshore, Lib.))

Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs)

0915

0920

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

0925

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Bill Graham

0930

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ)

0935

0940

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)

0945

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Diane Marleau

0950

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Diane Marleau

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Diane Marleau

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Diane Marleau

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

M. Bill Graham

0955

Mr. Bernard Patry

Mr. Bill Graham

1000

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1005

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James--Assiniboia, Lib.)

1010

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1015

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

1020

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.)

1025

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1030

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Chris Westdal (Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1045

1050

1055

1100

The Chair

Mr. Chris Westdal

1105

1110

1115

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

1120

Mr. Chris Westdal

1125

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Chris Westdal

1130

The Chair

Mr. Chris Westdal

1135

The Chair

Ms. Diane Marleau

The Chair

Mr. Chris Westdal

1140

The Chair

Mr. Chris Westdal

1145

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

1150

Mr. Chris Westdal

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Chris Westdal

Mr. Keith Martin

Mr. Chris Westdal

1155

The Chair

1200

Mr. Chris Westdal

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 072

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, April 25, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke--Lakeshore, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying the agenda of the 2002 G-8 summit. I want to welcome the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and with him, Mr. Jim Wright from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the assistant deputy minister, global and security policy.

We have, Minister, an hour and a half with you. We'll ask you to make an opening statement, and then we'll go to questioning from the members.

Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I'm pleased to be back before the committee after my appearance last week. I look forward to future opportunities to work with you.

[Translation]

I believe that today's study of the G-8 agenda is very important for a number of reasons. If I recall correctly, this is one of the rare occasions when the Prime Minister himself has asked a committee to undertake such a study. I think that this is a sign of the importance of this study for the committee and for parliament. In my view, parliamentarians have a key role to play in advising the government on the Summit priorities. I very much look forward to the committee's recommendations and I know many Canadians are eager to have the chance to address you so that their views may also be heard and included in your report.

[English]

As with the Summit of the Americas, however, I expect that the value of this study you're doing today will go beyond the essential input that it provides prior to the summit. It will also serve to outline points of consensus in Canadian society on key global issues from the perspective of Canadians' elected representatives.

[Translation]

As chair of the G-8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which I will host this year in Whistler, British Columbia, June 12-13, I have been asked here today to speak about the upcoming G-8 meeting in Kananaskis and about how the Foreign Ministers' process fits into the overall agenda. I know that Robert Fowler, the Prime Minister's personal representative for the G-8 Summit, spoke to you earlier this week, so I will try not to repeat what he has already told you.

[English]

However, I think it is helpful to begin with a bit of history. As I'm sure you're aware, the first summit, with six countries participating, took place because of concerns over the economic problems that faced the world in the 1970s. It was held in 1975 in Rambouillet, France. Since then the group has grown to eight countries, plus the European Union, and the process has evolved from a forum dealing essentially with macroeconomic issues to an annual meeting dealing with a wide range of international economic, political, social, and security issues.

[Translation]

Following last year's Genoa Summit, the Prime Minister was clear that he wanted a summit done differently—a focussed, retreat-style, businesslike meeting with small delegations and a minimum of ceremony. As you know, there will be a much smaller number of people attending this year. There will be no communiqué. The leaders will therefore not spend a lot of time negotiating such a document. In accordance with the Prime Minister's wishes, the entire process will be simplified so that the discussions can be productive. I have taken this as my model for the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Whistler as well.

[English]

The agenda for Kananaskis is focused and substantive. Discussions will centre around strengthening global economic growth, building a new partnership for Africa's development, and fighting terrorism.

[Translation]

As Mr. Fowler will undoubtedly have told you, the Prime Minister is especially committed to ensuring that G-8 countries adopt a concrete action plan for working with African countries on key development issues such as governance, peace and security, trade and investment, knowledge and health, and agriculture and water.

[English]

The aim is to respond to the New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD, a visionary initiative to reverse the marginalization of Africa from the globalization process that was conceived by some of Africa's most progressive leaders as the New African Initiative and enthusiastically endorsed by G-8 leaders at the 2001 Genoa summit. The PM's vision, which I think is particularly opportune, is to act now, to take this opportunity, when there is an African wish to work with other countries, to develop aid programs that are responsive to their needs, but also enable us to encourage good governance and good practices in Africa. I think it's most encouraging that we are undertaking that at this particular time.

Since its inception foreign ministers have also played a key role in the G-7, G-8 summit process, initially by providing assistance on political issues to leaders at the summit site. For example, at the Birmingham summit in 1998 the emergence of the pre-summit ministerial occurred, allowing foreign ministers to develop and implement their own agenda. This forum brings together the key foreign policy decision-makers from the world's most powerful countries, and its outcomes both influence current political issues and inform leaders as they gather for the G-8 summit.

The value and importance of the G-8 foreign ministers process is exemplified by the meeting in Cologne in 1999, when foreign ministers played a central role in addressing hostilities in Kosovo by negotiating the United Nations Security Council resolution. This was profound, for the group had played, for the first time in history, a direct role in resolving conflict. It was the foreign ministers, with strong German leadership, who set the G-8 political process on a new and promising course. A new standard of activism has been set, a standard we are striving to uphold and even surpass.

On September 19 leaders asked the G-8 foreign ministers, along with other relevant ministers, to develop a list of specific measures to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This will, therefore, be a central element of this year's G-8 foreign ministers meeting. The other agenda items we will discuss, beyond counter-terrorism, include post-Taliban Afghanistan, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and regional issues, such as the Middle East and India-Pakistan. The agenda, however, remains fluid.

After discussion among most of my G-8 counterparts, we agreed that flexibility is a key component of the G-8 foreign ministers agenda. We need to be able to respond to world events as they unfold, and foreign ministers have both the knowledge and the mandate to do so. For example, as I said the other day before the committee, over the last few weeks I've discussed the Middle East situation with all G-8 foreign ministers and the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as with Mr. Peres and Mr. Shaath, who acts in that capacity for the Palestinian Authority. I'm convinced the G-8 will be a crucial player in bringing together all relevant parties and encouraging their commitment to the path of peace.

¿ (0915)

[Translation]

The situation in Afghanistan will be one of the main items on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

[English]

Canada has stood firmly with those who recognize the need to strike back after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The tragic loss of Canadian soldiers last week reminded us again of the gravity of this responsibility and the serious risks our brave armed forces face in the fight for freedom.

[Translation]

Equally important towards this end is the assistance we and our G-8 partners are providing to assist Afghanistan in its recovery from more than two decades of internal conflict, oppressive rule, and most recently, drought and earthquakes. As you may know, Canada has allocated $100 million in assistance for Afghanistan.

[English]

These efforts are enabling the Afghan interim administration to take the first critical steps towards a sustainable, representative, and democratic government, for which security is the fundamental prerequisite.

[Translation]

G-8 experts have met with the UN, and with the Afghans to discuss what support the G-8 might be able to provide in areas such as the development of an Afghan security sector; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; and the opium problem. Next, G-8 Foreign Ministers will need to determine in conjunction with the Interim Administration, how to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to provide for its own security.

[English]

Colleagues, I had the opportunity of meeting with Mr. Abdullah, who is the foreign minister of Afghanistan, when I was in Geneva a couple of weeks ago, and I'd be happy to share with you his perspective on what he sees as Afghan needs, if you would like me to do that.

As for long-term counter-terrorism aims, the G-8 will work together with the UN counter-terrorism committee to provide capacity building assistance, such as technical training and legal assistance, to those countries that are unable to implement UN Security Council resolution 1373. This resolution includes measures for suppression of terrorist financing and the implementation of the 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions.

[Translation]

As I am sure many of you are aware, on April 3, Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. This Convention gives countries jurisdiction over the use of explosives for destructive or terrorist purposes. As with other similar counter-terrorism instruments, Canada and the G-8 played a major role in drafting the original text of the Convention. Canada served as chair for its negotiation and was among the first signatories.

Counter-terrorism will also be a central component of other ministerial meetings—in particular the G-8 Justice and Interior Ministers, and the G-7 Finance Ministers.

[English]

Another crucial element in the fight against terrorism is the need to coordinate international action to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These weapons include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. For example, we need further strengthening of export controls and of security measures applied to these dangerous materials. There clearly is a role here for the G-8 as well.

Colleagues, I've provided a mere outline of some of the most pressing items facing the G-8 foreign ministers. Between now and June there will be other events that will provide challenges and set the stage for our work. Foremost, of course, will be developments in the Middle East, but there is also the review of sanctions on Iraq, the Bush-Putin meeting in Russia in May, the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Iceland, also in May, the end of the ABM treaty in June, and the convening of the Afghan Loya Jirga, also in June.

[Translation]

In the lead up to the meeting in June, I look forward to speaking again with many of my counterparts, some on the margins of the Canada-EU Summit, at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in May, and elsewhere.

[English]

In conclusion, let me be clear that within the G-8 Canada acts amongst equals. Our influence is real, and our contribution is real. We bring a Canadian perspective to this group, grounded in what I would call the Canadian way, meaningful, substantive, and recognized for its quality and moral strength. Through the G-8 we can magnify our contribution to the global community by exerting influence based on our values. Being in the G-8 chair this year is an opportunity for Canada to make a difference in the world by working with G-8 partners to re-engineer the forum to focus on its strengths, political leadership, priority setting, and common action.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to present to you my perspectives on the G-8 foreign ministers process. I look forward to a successful G-8 year. I want to thank you for the study you're doing, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

Having sat in this chair, you know how many minutes you need to take, and you were right on.

Mr. Bill Graham: Why did I do that? Because I know members have more interest in getting at me than listening to me, I'll put it that way.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan--Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to get with the minister, not at him, and I'll try to focus on a few questions and leave them for the minister to address within the time.

As the minister knows, we've got concerns relating to the costs of the G-8. I don't blame the minister for these, they are out of his control. I made the comments on those, and Mr. Fowler at the meeting responded, but I'll ask the question. The cost is estimated to be at least $300 million. We know at the G-8 in Japan they predicted costs lower than the final outcome, and the final amount was some three-quarters of a billion dollars. So are the minister or his people coming forward with some innovative approaches to holding these meetings?

We get different suggestions that come to us and I'll pass on to him, I don't know if they would work or not. One is the better use of interactive teleconferencing capabilities. Mr. Fowler said the other day Canadians demand that the G-8 leaders meet face-to-face. I actually hadn't had that call, either from constituents or others across the country. The G-8 meetings are valuable, they're necessary. We've had a suggestion about a country, possibly the United States, holding the meeting on an aircraft carrier. There are different innovative suggestions that come in to make the price far less. Rather than us paying at least $300 million—and we think it's going to approach half a billion—more dollars could be directed to true poverty-related issues, for instance, in Africa. So are there some innovative ideas that the minister can advance to his colleagues to bring the huge cost of these meetings down?

Second, can we get a commitment from the minister related to the liability issue for businesses in and around the Calgary and Kananaskis area? My understanding is—correct me, Minister, if I'm wrong—that the insurance industry is saying they are not going to take on the responsibility of protest-related damages, and we haven't heard a clear commitment on the liability issue from the federal government on behalf of businesses, especially in that area of Alberta. Can we get a comment there?

With Africa, again, I made some comments on this two days ago. I know there is a self-evaluating process the African leaders and nations are going to use for qualifying, if I can use that term, for aid. The Prime Minister, quite rightly, is talking about aid being based on countries that have constitutional democracy, the rule of law, freedom of markets. A self-evaluative process will be deficient. With all good intentions, you can't evaluate yourself as an independent party can. What are the evaluative tools? A peer review process, for sure, would be helpful . What is the Prime Minister going to be saying, and who's going to evaluate the various nations? If you asked Robert Mugabe, he'd say everything with their election was fine. If you went back a couple of decades and talked to Idi Amin, he'd say everything about his administration was fine. At the height of apartheid in South Africa, that government would have evaluated themselves by saying everything is fine. We need an external evaluative tool, so we can assess the aid going to the various countries.

The last question, Madam Chair, is related to the issue of terrorism financing as he works with G-8 partners. The minister indicated he's open to doing a review of the Hezbollah funding. Our government still, wrongly, I believe, gives to Hezbollah. I'm familiar with the debate related to charitable organizations. We've presented evidence that there's no guarantee that it won't go to terrorist fundraising back in Lebanon. What is the difference? Why did the government quite rightly ban all funding to Hamas, and yet not all fundraising potential for Hezbollah? What were the clear differences there that categorized Hamas as quite rightly being cut off in Canada for fundraising, but not Hezbollah?

Thank you, Madam Chair.

¿ (0925)

The Chair: Mr. Minister.

Mr. Bill Graham: Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I'll take your questions seriatim, Mr. Day.

I certainly recognize the concerns about costs. The Prime Minister and the government are very concerned about the cost too. I think members of the committee will agree with me that we're facing an issue of a different order of magnitude as a result of the events of September 11 in New York. So the costs of all these events will now be more, I'm sure. I'm sure the next WTO meeting will have similar issues raised. All international meetings of this kind will now have a dimension of cost we just didn't have before we saw what someone can do by just taking an ordinary civil airliner and turning it into a weapon.

So the cost will be more. I honestly can't give you a number, because it's what the police will call for in evaluating the risk as it comes up, and that's what they'll put in place. So we're not going to know the cost until after--

Mr. Stockwell Day: Madam Chair, in fairness, I was asking if the minister or his officials have come up with or will be coming up with alternative, innovative approaches.

Mr. Bill Graham: I think that's one of the things we've asked the committee to do. If you have some really good ideas, let's get them in the report, and the government will certainly look at them.

The place where this has been located by the Prime Minister is rather isolated. The whole idea is that this is a stripped-down congress. In Genoa, for example, one of the reasons the costs were enormous was that the Americans took 800 delegates. Here the Prime Minister has said every leader can have 35 or 36 people in Kananaskis. Already you're talking about a reduction in security, hotels. That was an attempt by the Prime Minister to do this, and it was his way of having a better meeting as well. So I think maybe, by reducing costs, we'll have a better meeting.

We can certainly review the idea of teleconferencing, which you suggested, but even within your own party, you might do some teleconferencing, but ultimately, the caucus comes together to meet. You want to talk to one another face to face and discuss matters.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Our caucus coming together is another issue for debate.

Mr. Bill Graham: I don't want to bring up any bad memories for anybody, but our caucus comes together face to face too. So I think at some point you do want to bring people together, and as we struggle with issues of global governance, it's going to be really important. These types of meetings, I think, are going to become more prevalent, not less, as we struggle to deal with issues of global governance. We certainly welcome suggestions from the committee as to how we can reduce the costs, but I don't think it would be in the interests of the world community or of Canadians if we were not to have these meetings. That would be my point.

As to the second point, there are discussions going on with Alberta at this time to discuss the liability issue with the business community. You would probably be aware, Mr. Day, that after the Quebec summit arrangements were entered into with the business community in Quebec City to compensate for losses suffered as a result. I'm confident the same regime will be put in place here and the government will take its responsibility where insurance companies are not willing to offer ordinary insurance.

As to Africa and the self-evaluating mechanism, I think what was encouraging about NEPAD was the attempt to get away from this kind of neo-colonialism. You often hear complaints about the IMF: it goes in, tells everybody what to do, cut prices here, do that, no discussion, it's our way or the highway. A lot of the recipient countries had trouble adjusting. Sometimes these policies weren't necessarily the right policies either. So I think NEPAD involves much more of a dialogue, and that's very encouraging for the world community and the whole aid process. While, as you say, it will be to some extent self-evaluating, it won't be the one state that evaluates itself. It's going to be a collective evaluation process.

I go back to, for example, the recent experience with the Commonwealth. Much to the surprise of a lot of people, Mr. Obasanjo and Mr. Mbeki got together with the other Commonwealth leaders and said, yes, we have to sanction Mr. Mugabe for his conduct. A lot of people said Africans will never criticize one another, they'll never come to that, but they did. I think there's a genuine will in Africa today to recognize that they have issues of good governance they have to address. But we'll have to work in partnership on them, we just can't go in and impose it.

So I'm quite encouraged, really, by the evaluation mechanism of NEPAD. I think the Prime Minister's idea is to take this opportunity and say we're going to funnel our aid where it can make a difference, to AIDS, to the huge problems there are, but we're going to work with the African countries as partners in this.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Stockwell Day: My point is, if it's strictly self-evaluation, we already have some of Mr. Mugabe's neighbours saying his election process is okay and supporting him. A peer-review process is good, but there needs to be an independent referee, if I can say that, and an evaluative tool, a checklist, a template you can put over what they're doing and truly see if taxpayers' hard-earned dollars should be sent in great amounts over there.

Mr. Bill Graham: Absolutely. One of the issues will be security and whether or not there is civil unrest and whether there is stability. Given what we've seen in recent years and experienced, I don't think countries are willing to put vast amounts of money into building infrastructure in countries where it's all going to be blown up six months later because of hostilities. The African leaders themselves will have to recognize this reality and address that issue if they're going to get substantial amounts of aid. I agree with you from that perspective. I think we will find encouraging signs that the African leaders themselves are recognizing that they have to step up and be responsible with these good governance and stability issues when they evaluate their own ability to receive the aid.

I wasn't there when the decision was made about Hamas and Hezbollah. That's a specific question I am not in a position to answer, but as I told you when I appeared before you the other time, we are constantly willing to review this. As you know, Canada has, since this process started, put some 11 terrorist organizations on the list, and I personally, with Mr. Martin, put some individuals on the list just recently. We get the reports, we act upon them, and we will continually review this in the light of all circumstances and all policy considerations, to make sure we're doing the right thing.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

We will move to Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Hello, Mr. Minister. More and more, we are hearing concern expressed about whether there is a genuine desire on the part of Western countries to help Africa, given how obsessed they are, particularly the United States, with the fight against terrorism, which is also spreading to all America's allies.

First, what are our real concerns in connection with the development of Africa, in the present tragic context?

There is another area of concern. To what extent are we really interested in developing Africa itself, as opposed to developing our own interests?

¿ (0935)

To what extent are we really interested in putting Africa's interests ahead of our own? Are we using development as an excuse to impose our values and ways of doing things? For those who respect it, Africa certainly has its own unique culture.

In addition, is it your impression that our western partners have a genuine desire to achieve what the UN would like, which is that each of the countries allocate 0.7% of its GDP for aid to developing countries? That was my first question.

Here is my second. All possible measures must be taken in Kananaskis to ensure the safety of participants, and of heads of state and their delegations, but what is being done to protect the right of the world's citizens to express their concerns, not to say their disagreement, with respect to globalization? What provision is being made for freedom of expression and the right to protest in this context?

¿ (0940)

Mr. Bill Graham: You are asking me if the fight against terrorism will take precedence over all other discussions in Kananaskis. That is certainly a concern, and I think that the Prime Minister, who is chairing the Summit, clearly indicated that we were going to focus on the Africa plan, because it is vital that it receive the attention of leaders in Kananaskis. The Prime Minister has been very clear on this during my conversations with him. He is determined that the discussion should not be restricted to military activities and the fight against terrorism. We must also look at the root causes of people's despair and of poverty.

Africa is a special case today, primarily because of the problem of AIDS and of poverty. It is vital that the international community focus on this. The Prime Minister has been clear in this regard and I am confident, Mr. Rocheleau, that we will not lose sight of this at the summit.

Your second question had to do with developing Africa. Should we look at this from our own perspective or from theirs? I will come back to what I said to Mr. Day. NEPAD contains a certain notion of partnership, does it not? That is what I wanted to convey to Mr. Day. It is an encouraging sign. It is a two-way partnership. First of all, it is a partnership, because the Africans will to a certain extent decide on their needs and perspectives. They will also discuss our perspectives with us and ensure that aid is effective by seeing that it is allocated in a climate of good governance, accountability and so forth. This is the attraction of this new climate, if I may call it that. I think that there is a new climate. We must seize the moment and work in this context. We must not approach this in a neo-colonial spirit, nor must we approach it with unrealistic idealism. The problem will be resolved by talking with people, as part of a partnership. In this context, the G-8 meeting in Kananaskis will be very important.

I think that we can already see some encouraging signs, in particular Mr. Bush's statement at Monterey concerning an increase in American aid, followed by action in Europe and our Prime Minister's announcement that we will be increasing our aid by 8% a year. This is still a long way from the goal of 0.75%, but we are resuming the process. That is what is important. We are on the right track. After putting our fiscal house in order, we can now think about increasing our aid. We have made a commitment to do so. I think this is encouraging.

As far as the public is concerned, obviously there will not be much room for protest in Kananaskis itself, but the public will have an opportunity to make itself heard. This is a free country and the public can do what it wishes without having to confront the police. I said that I would be in Calgary. It has been proposed that I hold meetings with NGOs and with other organizations wishing to express their views and tell the government what their objectives are. I have made it clear that I would be available if people wish to meet with me. I believe there are plans to have me meet with a large number of NGOs, as was done in Quebec, for example. I could hear their views and pass them on to Mr. Chrétien before the meeting in Kananaskis, so that the leaders could have the benefit of their observations.

So we are going to launch a process which will allow people to express their views effectively.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

Madam Marleau.

Ms. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Welcome back to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. It's always nice to see you here. It feels like being back home.

Madam Chair, I listened to Mr. Day question the cost of the G-8 Summit. While we all want to control costs, there is always a price for belonging to a club. Obviously, if Canada wants the G-8, it has to do its share. If the people out west think it's too expensive and they don't want it, people in northern Ontario think this would be a great boon to the economy. Not only is the federal government spending a lot of money, every one of those delegations brings a lot of bucks with it and spreads them in Canada. The economic benefits are very good for whatever region is lucky enough to have the summit. Just in case the west decides it doesn't really want this thing, we'll ante up right away.

Mr. Stockwell Day: To be fair, no one said that.

Ms. Diane Marleau: Every time you question the cost, I'm sort of wondering—come on.

The real place for any kind of action is with the major powers of this globe. With some of the issues we're dealing with, the G-8 has the power to really make a difference.

I'm very happy to see that the African countries want to be part of the evaluation system. Mr. Day should know that sometimes your harshest critics are right there within your ranks. We know in our party, if you're in the front benches, sometimes your real opposition is behind you and not across from you. I would hope that it has a lot of impact on what happens in Africa. Of course, we still control what we do and what we don't do.

I'm a little off topic here. Everyone knows my big concern with corruption. A lot of the problems in Africa are the direct result of some form of corruption or another in some cases. The northern countries often pretend to be these saintly, well-developed places. By and large, they benefit greatly from any aid, any contract, or anything that goes into Africa. The benefits are far more into the northern countries than into the African countries. Are we prepared to push the other countries of the G-8 to take tremendous action, not only in the case of terrorism, but in the case of transfers of large amounts of money through corruption, with those areas that are havens against taxes and those countries that allow secret bank accounts? I am absolutely convinced that the only people who can really make a difference with these real concerns are those in the G-8. I know there are all kinds of resolutions, but some of the biggest powers do not really want to conform, because a lot of the political pressure is coming from the very groups who make use of these bank accounts, these ways of getting away from taxes.

It's a very serious question in light of September 11. We do know that now it's very easy for them to come up with lists. Now the will is needed to expand what we've done after the G-8, to now really get together and say, okay, we're big, we're strong, we can deal with our own. We're going to say to the Africans, you deal with one another, we'll deal also with our own. That's my first question.

My second question also goes to something similar, and it has to do with arms sales. I asked the same question of Mr. Fowler. Again, he said, the major powers don't want to be telling the Africans about legal arms, and this kind of thing. A lot of African countries have extremely well equipped armies, people don't have any food to eat, and they're in the middle of war. Again that's something the G-8 can take action on. You know my feelings on that as well. I hope we can push that agenda even further.

¿ (0945)

Third, while I agree with supporting those African countries that are making tremendous progress with democracy, and there has to be a real benefit, I hope we don't stop working with those groups who are from the poorest of the poor, not working with their countries, but doing some work with them. If we abandon them completely, other forces will come in. I have travelled to many countries. When a country is so poor that there are no social programs, other groups come in and fund social programs. We have seen the creeping of extremism through these kinds of mechanisms. If we shut the door on some of these poorest countries, are we going to see another force come in and build on that?

The Chair: They say true communication is impossible: what I say, what you hear me say, what you understood me to have said could all be different. I understood Mr. Day to be saying he was looking for innovative ways to bring costs down. I just want to clear the decks, so we don't get back into an answer on that. I appreciate that Madam Marleau would like to see this in Sudbury, but I think what Mr. Day was saying is something all of us would like to have a discussion on at some future time.

You have about three and a half minutes to respond to Madam Marleau's many questions, Minister.

Mr. Bill Graham: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I take it from your introductory comment that you don't wish me to use up half of my three and a half minutes talking about the glories of Sudbury, which we could, of course. I certainly understood Mr. Day's question in that light too, and I'd like to come back to that for just one brief moment, because I think Mr. Day's point is a valid one, and we're all looking at it. A lot of the costs of these summits aren't just about the actual summit when the leaders get together, but all the build-up to it, all the activities beforehand. Mr. Wright was just reminding me that they're trying to use a lot more of this sort of telecommunication. He had a long meeting just yesterday with all his counterparts. In previous times they would have all gone to the same place and sat down around a table, now they are using these methods. As I said to the committee, any recommendations will certainly be respectfully looked at and could well be helpful.

Madam Marleau, on your point about corruption, I think this is a very serious issue. Those, for instance, who were in Doha will recall that there was a lot of talk about trade initiatives and how they can be totally destroyed if the regime is corrupt and the benefits don't flow through to people. We're looking at that with the Americas. So everywhere this is a very serious consideration. I think there are ways of approaching it. Mr. Williams, for example, has this project he's been pushing for parliamentarians to be more active in controlling their governments and corruption. I personally support his initiative very strongly, and I think a lot of members of Parliament are supporting him on that, as we try to build stronger legislatures to make sure they can address issues of corruption. They don't have the capacity even to know what their governments are spending their money on or where it's going.

Ms. Diane Marleau: What about the northern countries? What about our own countries? When we talk about the Africans evaluating each other, what about the G-8 working with one another to get to that too? That's the issue I'm really speaking to.

¿ (0950)

Mr. Bill Graham: I thought you closed that door by describing us as being saintly.

I hope you're not suggesting that--

Ms. Diane Marleau: Not Canada.

Mr. Bill Graham: —the G-8 are corrupt.

Ms. Diane Marleau: No, but there are a lot of things going on in the northern countries.

Mr. Bill Graham: I'd like to go back to what I said to Mr. Rocheleau in answer to his question.

Ms. Diane Marleau: But I'm not talking so much about governments, I'm talking about financial institutions.

Mr. Bill Graham: What I think is encouraging about the NEPAD initiative and the Prime Minister's initiative in Kananaskis is that we have got a kind of dialogue going, and it's going to be more of a partnership dialogue, not a matter of, you've got to do this or else, or a finger-pointing exercise. It's going to say, corruption, in the end, is not to your benefit. And we're getting African leaders coming forward and saying, you're absolutely right. There's a new generation of African leaders coming forward who have lived through these conditions. The chair was recently in Africa. She met a lot of these people, saw the conditions there. I think she would agree with me that there's a new atmosphere there, a realization that they have to attack these problems responsibly, to recognize that some of these are their own responsibility, so that they've got to clean up their own house as well as just asking for more money. I think that's the productive atmosphere that exists in today's climate, and that's what we've got to seize upon.

And I think that will apply also to your second issue. Are states' resources going to go into large armies instead of into good resources for their citizens? I go back to the point that if there's lack of stability, people are going to put resources into armies. It's the old guns and butter argument, and there's not money for both guns and butter. So with the G-8 stepping in and reducing the whole conflict, we reduce the need for armies and expenditures in military matters. We have things like the UN initiative on the sale of diamonds, which was helping finance the army in Sri Lanka, these illegal militias, and this type of instability that's being created. Of course, there are problems out there, but you can see some encouraging signs for global initiatives directed at them.

As for the poorest of the poor, as I understand the NEPAD initiative and the Prime Minister's initiative, our own $500 million for Africa won't supplant other aid programs. This will be in addition, and therefore help to encourage good governance and good conditions in Africa. If you take some of the failed state issues, which you recognize, it's very hard to provide aid in the lake district now, but we're doing it as we can through NGOs and responsible organizations, and we'll continue to do that. But the states that will benefit from the additional resources will be those that get their act together. That, I think, is the encouraging thing, and our hope is that as other states see that happening, they're going to say, hey, there's a benefit for us here, let's conform to the best practices. That's what we're trying to achieve.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Patry, while Mr. Casey gets an opportunity to think through his question.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds--Dollard, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Speaker, and thank you, Minister, for joining us this morning as we discuss the G-8.

We all know that this summit has three essential components: terrorism, the economy, and NEPAD. I have two questions. The first has to do with Afghanistan.

In your remarks, you quite rightly reminded us that Canada has set aside $100 million in aid for Afghanistan. Can you tell me what form this aid will take? Will it be short-term aid for the essential needs of the population or aid to establish the rule of law? Since the entire international community is taking part in this effort, will the partners be working together to ensure that there is no duplication in the aid that they will be giving to Afghanistan?

You may answer this question, if you will, and I will then ask my second one.

M. Bill Graham: That is a very good question. If I understand correctly, the $100 million promised will be made available over a period of two years. It will not necessarily be five years because, as you say, we must ensure that the aid is effective. This the subject of debate right now. It is a bit like the chicken and the egg. Which comes first? Security or aid? For example, a hospital is needed in Kabul. Are we going to build a hospital if there is a chance that it will be blown up two months from now in a new outbreak of violence? Should the emphasis be on security first, followed later by aid to rebuild the infrastructure?

There is perhaps no corresponding process but, for the time being, the international community is focussing on security. This is what Mr. Abdullah told me when I met with him in Geneva. We had a long conversation and he told me that it was essential that we address the problem of the war lords, the problem of drugs, which is where the war lords get their money. It is vital that we address this in conjunction with infrastructure aid. Otherwise, all the aid we provide for infrastructure will be wasted.

So, Canada and other countries want to put the accent on a return to civil peace in the country and on security, and then pursue aid, in co-operation with our allies so that there is no duplication. Mr. Abdullah told me that, in his opinion, aid would be absolutely essential to the development of rural areas of the country. People must return to their farms and work productively. They must not stay in the cities doing nothing.

Canada has been quite innovative when it has tried to give aid directly to the Deputy Prime Minister so that she can reintegrate women and ensure that their rights are taken into account in current political discussions in Afghanistan, so as to avoid a return to earlier problems.

It is tremendously complex, but the first thing is to ensure security and the second is to restore the infrastructure.

¿ (0955)

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you.

My second question has to do with NEPAD. We know that the New Partnership for Africa's Development was founded by Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. In my view, it differs from earlier efforts in one very important respect: it is Afro-African.

NEPAD's long-term objective is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to set African countries, individually and collectively, on the road to sustainable growth and development. I think it is a very ambitious program. I am thinking in particular of maternal and infant mortality, and schooling. There are many problems.

My question is a very simple one. Will the program's initiatives be regional or continental?

Mr. Bill Graham: The objective is obviously continental. However, it is a huge continent and the conditions vary tremendously from one region to another. In the Great Lakes region for example, the conditions are very different from those in the North, which is home to Egypt and other countries in the Arab tradition, which differ from Subsaharan African countries. So, while the objective is global for the African continent--

For instance, the objective of education is very important. The objective is the same everywhere, but the manner in which it is implemented will be very different from one country to the next. I am thinking of the educational needs of young women, etc. These differ depending on the level of development of countries. South Africa is much more sophisticated in this regard than other countries. So the objective of education will apply to all of Africa, but the method of implementation will differ from country to country and region to region.

As far as I know, there is no interest in large regional projects. For example, at a meeting I attended in Paris, I think it was, there was a proposal to build a hydroelectric dam serving several countries. This sort of project could be considered, but I do not think that it is NEPAD's objective. Rather, their objective is to look at the root causes of African problems, as you say: education, security, etc.

À (1000)

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Martin, five minutes.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt--Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

Thank you, Minister Graham and Mr. Wright, for taking time out of your schedules to be here. I would just ask my questions, because time is limited and I have quite a few of them.

In the issues we're dealing with and the countries we're dealing with, while the people are desperately poor, the countries are fabulously wealthy in many cases, and the issue of governance is critical. Will there be, as a condition to aid, a commitment to very strong governance issues, because the continent is run by big men, and little people are forgotten?

The second question is on the Africa Fund. Will you be articulating objective goals and measuring these in the future, and will you be tying in aid as a condition for access to those funds? I hope not.

The third question is on HIV. If we're not involved with AIDS in Africa, I think we're irrelevant. A third of the population, as you know, is HIV-positive. That pandemic is going to eviscerate the continent in ways we cannot imagine. Will you be pushing for a larger financial commitment from the G-8 nations towards HIV, towards access and distribution measures, as well as a statement from the G-8 countries to encourage African leaders to make a very strong commitment about HIV in their countries? I single out people like President Mbeki and President Mugabe, whose countries are devastated by this, and yet they continue to stick their heads in the sand.

On the Kimberley process, one element of that has a huge loophole in it that makes it utterly flawed. It will not be successful unless there are going to be import-export measures for the diamonds going into and out of countries, particularly with Antwerp and Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, as you know, being an utterly corrupt place for the trafficking of diamonds.

Finally, on what Madam Marleau mentioned, will you push for a commitment of the G-8 nations and the EU to work towards a small arms registry, specifically looking at automatic weapons? If you have to take one thing in small arms control, it's automatic weapons you have to get control over. So will we at least put that on table at the G-8?

Thank you. I apologize for there being so many questions.

Mr. Bill Graham: I will try to deal with them quickly.

As I understand it, the whole object of the NEPAD process and the G-8 process the Prime Minister is leading is precisely to tie this additional aid to good governance issues. I quite agree with the premise of your question. That's the whole purpose of what we're trying to do here. We're trying to create new conditions and create a new mentality, a new culture, if you like. What I like about this present process is that it will be a culture encouraged by dialogue. Because of the NEPAD proposal and our proposal, we'll be encouraged by working together on it, rather than having the previous model, which was, we have money, and we'll give it to you if you do this or do that. Now we have additional money for additional things, and if we see the conditions where we can actually build up this new culture, we will invest in it. This is conditional in that sense. That addresses your second point as well, I believe.

On the AIDS issue, I couldn't agree with you more about the seriousness of this problem. There are 700 million people in Africa who are affected by AIDS. It's horrendous. The foreign minister of Botswana told me it was something like 40% in his country. With that in our country, we wouldn't have an economy left, there wouldn't be anything. We absolutely have to do this, and it will be part of this process, there's no question about it. There's a recognition that this is a huge issue. We're working with people like Jeffrey Sacks at Harvard and others, who are working on raising consciousness. Also, didn't the United States promise $500 million more specifically for AIDS? This is an issue we are conscious of.

À (1005)

Mr. Keith Martin: Should we be asking the African leaders to stand up and say, we have a problem in our country, let's work together?

Mr. Bill Graham: We certainly can ask them. We have no trouble bringing that up, but I can't force Mr. Mbeki to say what he doesn't believe. Then we'd go back to what we said was a lack of partnering, and politics is politics. There are lots of things said in this country that I think are seriously crazy, but we live in a free country and people are entitled to express their opinions. Why would we tell Africans they can't have their opinions too? We have to try to change the opinions when we disagree with them, but I don't think we can force that. We constantly work with the Government of South Africa to have good practices in respect of AIDS, and I think you have seen some recent changes in the government's policy on distributing medicine to pregnant women. I see the chair nodding her head. She's been there more recently than I have.

So we can see some movement. When Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Mbeki or others you might speak about meet with their colleagues who, like my colleague from Botswana, describe what they're doing and what they're trying to do in their country and the conditions they have, that will have some influence too, because it's African to African. That's what we have to work on.

The Chair: We have to move on.

Mr. Bill Graham: I'll just quickly say on the Kimberly process that we're following it. I take your point about trying to make sure that's better.

Concerning small arms registry and the G-8, many members of the committee will recall that some years ago we went to New York and talked about small arms registry. At the G-8 level this runs into a serious thing called the NRA in the United States and the influence it has on the American government, but we raise the issue continually, and we won't hesitate to continue to raise it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Harvard.

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James--Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Welcome, Mr. Minister. I have a geopolitical question. It's about Le Pen's electoral success on the weekend, and I'll try to make it relevant to this morning's discussion.

One might describe the G-8 summit as an exercise where leading countries of the world come together to tackle some of the contemporary pressing problems facing the world, and I see the very opposite of that in the Le Pen success in France. It's insular, it's xenophobic, and it really says, I don't give a damn about the rest of the world. If it were only Le Pen we were concerned about, maybe it wouldn't be so bad, but we have seen other things, maybe not as dramatic as what happened in France a few days ago. There has been a move to the right, as you know, in Holland and Denmark and Austria, and there's now talk that Schroeder is in danger of losing his chancellorship in Germany; he lost a significant by-election a few days ago.

We talk about the G-8 countries coming together to do things that are not only very important, but require some very bold imagination or bold initiative. It's very difficult, I think—and you know this as well as I do, Bill, because you're a politician as well—for politicians who take bold initiatives if they constantly have to be looking over their shoulders. The European Union has a presence in the G-8 exercise as well.

Does any of this have an impact on the work you people do, either at the foreign ministers level or at the national leaders level. While you're answering that, maybe you can indicate Canadian support or lack of same for these exercises? Do you feel that when you go to Kananaskis, you have very strong Canadian support for whatever is pursued, and particularly pursued by Canada, by our Prime Minister?

À (1010)

Mr. Bill Graham: You raise a subject we could spend a lot of time on. We're not going to be able to do that, but it would be disingenuous of me not to say I was concerned by what happened in the French election. To put it in proportion, I think Mr. Le Pen's support was something like 17%. It's true he came second, so he beat out the Socialist Party, but there were a lot of divisions on the left, there were a lot of candidates in there.

Mr. John Harvard: That's true, but at the same time, you had all these fringe candidates, and they gobbled up 47% of the vote in the presidential election, which suggests that the leading parties, the Socialists and the Gaullists, are not seen as exciting parties by the electorate.

Mr. Bill Graham: We could get into the French election, but let's have a look at next Sunday, when the final election takes place, and let's see what the tally is of the far right. Even if it's 20%, it's preoccupying. As you say, when you add it to what we see in Austria, in Italy, and elsewhere, this is preoccupying for us. You've tied it to what we're talking about here today by saying, how are we going to have open generous policies toward the rest of the world if, in fact, we're turning inwards on ourselves? I totally agree with the fundamental pieces you're expressing, but these are foreign countries, it's their internal politics. What we have to do is work with like-minded people to try to ensure that the right policies are there.

I think there's strong Canadian support for what we are trying to do. Whatever the disagreements we have around this table between the parties, ultimately, I think every party here and all of us in the Canadian Parliament recognize that Canada's one of the most open societies in the world, not just from a trading nation point of view, but think of our immigration and the way in which our society works. We're extraordinarily open. Yesterday I had some Spanish journalists in my office, and they were asking how we deal with immigration. I described where in my riding I've got 12,000 people and 57 different languages spoken, and their eyes sort of went, my god, how does that work? They're trying to struggle with immigration. These are older societies with more rigid cultural traditions, and this is a big issue for them. But Toronto's such a extraordinary multicultural city, Calgary, all the cities in Canada are multi-cultural today, across the land. I think that's reflected in our support for initiatives that reach out to the rest of the world. We have to recognize that Canada has a role to play there, and we can't afford to ignore it. And I think that's one of the reasons we get the support we do for this type of initiative. I think our society actually demands it of us, and we would be neglecting the will of our voters and our electors if we didn't respond in a positive way.

The Chair: Thank you.

Are you ready, Mr. Casey? Casey's at the bat.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland--Colchester, PC): Thank you.

I was a little late getting here, but I haven't heard the word Zimbabwe. Will that be discussed at the G-8? What positions will the G-8 take or will Canada recommend the G-8 take with respect to political action, intervention, governance, or democracy in Zimbabwe?

Mr. Bill Graham: I don't know. The thing about a meeting is that any leader can bring up anything they want. So Zimbabwe might well be mentioned, Mr. Casey. But I think where Zimbabwe is important in the discussions that will be had in Kananaskis is in relation to what we were talking about a little bit before you came in. The whole purpose of the Prime Minister's initiative is to put Africa on the agenda, to work with NEPAD, and to work at creating a new political culture in Africa whereby we're going to increase aid, but the aid will go where it is accompanied by good governance, by social programs, where we know it's going to benefit education, it's going to benefit the population directly. This new initiative, I would suggest, while not specifically directed toward Zimbabwe, is directed towards trying to deal with the types of conditions that were reflected in the Zimbabwean election and the problems we had with that process. So I'm confident that what we're doing here is addressing on a continental basis the issue of Zimbabwe.

What I like about the process, as I was saying earlier, is that the applicants themselves, through NEPAD and through coming to the G-7 and G-8, have bought into this process . They said, we want to be a partner in this. We recognize that we have to clean up our own act to some extent, but we don't want to be told what to do, we don't want a neo-colonial order from you. We want to be your partner in defining what the conditions are in working with you, because we recognize that we must have good governance, we must have better education for young women, we must deal with the AIDS problem, or we're not going to survive. So we want to work with those like-minded African countries, and we will, and they'll get the benefit of these new programs, this new attitude, and hopefully, the countries that do not and see themselves falling further behind will recognize that if they change their policies, they'll be able to participate. I think that's one of the positive aspects of what we're trying to achieve in this new initiative.

À (1015)

Mr. Bill Casey: You're taking a global approach. Would you not consider bringing up some recent issues of specific countries that are particularly offensive? You said anybody can bring anything to the table. Would Canada bring the Zimbabwe issue to the table, to talk about potential intervention or anything we could do to just promote democracy, as we are in other parts of the world?

Mr. Bill Graham: Maybe you should put it in the committee report, and the Prime Minister can have a look at that. One of the interesting things about this G-8 meeting is that five African leaders, as you know, and Mr. Kofi Annan will come. I'm confident the issue of Zimbabwe will come up, because it's such a recent one, and as I said earlier, I'm encouraged by the action the Commonwealth took. These were two leading African statesmen, Mr. Obasanjo and Mr. Mbeki, who actually agreed that the Commonwealth should take action to sanction Zimbabwe because of what took place in the elections. This was a surprise to a lot of cynical people. I think it's a very encouraging sign, and when the African leaders come to the summit process and argue the case for NEPAD, I'm sure examples of the types of problems will come up, such as the lack of security in the lake district. How are we going to actually get development going in the lake district if the conflict is going to continue, particularly a conflict that's being encouraged by outside forces? African leaders will have to address that issue if they want to get improved infrastructure in that area.

Mr. Bill Casey: I'm homing in on Zimbabwe because I was involved with it a little while ago. Some of us were paired with opposition members in Zimbabwe. I was in touch with my equivalent before, after, and during the election, and I asked what Canada could do to help. He said the most important thing Canada can do is apply pressure on other African countries to encourage democracy. It has to come from other African countries, but a country like Canada can influence the other countries, and he specifically asked us to do that. After our discussion, I dropped you a note about that, to see if there was some pressure Canada could put on other countries in the region to apply pressure on Mr. Mugabe to reconsider some of the positions he's taken, or even call another election.

Could that be considered as one of the agenda items for the G-8, to try to influence all the countries to promote this? That's what you were talking about earlier, but it specifically applies to Zimbabwe, for sure.

Mr. Bill Graham: As I say, that's the wonderful thing about the committee process. You're going to be deliberating, other members might agree with this, and if you made that a recommendation, I know the Prime Minister would look at it.

To some extent, we are doing what you suggest. If you go back to the Commonwealth process, I think it was a very good process. It had two African leaders, along with the Prime Minister of Australia in that case, judging the Zimbabwe elections, judging the process, and as you say, that's what made it effective in this case. It was Africans speaking to Africans. If it had been just us, if you like, I don't think it would have had the effect.

We do also try to do similar things through the Francophonie. The purpose of the Francophonie at the moment is not just to be an organization of a cultural nature for the French language, it is becoming much more an organization, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, of human rights. One of the good things about both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie is that the African leaders are there themselves. They sit around the table. They have to look their counterparts in the eye and get their respect. That's how we deal with this, through any sort of community organization.

Mr. Bill Casey: The member I talked with regularly said he applauded the two African countries that supported them, but they need more.

Mr. Bill Graham: By the way, colleagues, we're going to be having a meeting next week, I think, with the chairs and the various people who do the parliamentary associations. Your comment just now, I think, shows what we call parliamentary diplomacy. The more we come into contact with our colleagues in different countries, work with them, discuss with them, and go to the OSCE, and pursue the African initiatives the chair has with African parliamentarians, we have an enormously important way in which we can not only have contacts, but also genuinely influence what is taking place in those countries. I wouldn't play down the amount of influence you and others can have by working with them on these issues. As I said, Mr. Williams' project and things like that are very important.

À (1020)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Casey. Thank you, Minister.

Madam Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much for your presentation, Minister. I was struck by the fact that in the last couple of weeks you've discussed the issue of the Middle East with your counterparts of the G-8, as well as with the foreign affairs ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, Mr. Peres of Israel, and Mr. Shaath, who acts as the equivalent of a foreign affairs minister for the Palestinian Authority. You mention too that the G-8 is working closely with the counter-terrorism committee of the United Nations. Given the situation in the Middle East, and given the fact that Mr. Annan has recently announced the establishment of a tripartite committee to establish the facts of what happened in Jenin and elsewhere in the territories under the Palestinian Authority with the Israeli military, have the foreign affairs ministers of the G-8 discussed the fact that Israel, while it welcomes such an impartial fact-finding mission, has requested that individuals with military and counter-terrorism expertise be full members of that committee? Has that been part of any discussion you've had with the foreign affairs ministers of the G-8? If not, why not?

My second question is on the issue of the Church of the Nativity and the fact that they're all Palestinians who sought sanctuary in the church. Historically, churches and other places of religious worship have had the tradition of providing sanctuary, but sanctuary for unarmed people. It appears to be established that there are close to 200 armed Palestinians in the church, and they have been there since April 2. Has the issue of these armed individuals been the subject of discussion, the fact that they have maintained their arms while they are being provided with sanctuary within the church?

My last points are on NEPAD. I am very pleased that the African nations have taken this initiative. I think it holds real promise for a future in the continent of Africa. At the same time, I do have some worries. One of the worries is that NEPAD is driven by the top, while the grassroots were not involved in the development of NEPAD and until recently were not even aware of the existence of NEPAD. So I'd like to know what Canada has been doing to ensure that NEPAD itself and what it could mean are actually being brought down to the grassroots.

Second on that, have there been any discussions about the fact that there are some countries on the African continent that may have been signatories of NEPAD, or if they have not, may wish to participate in the benefits, but actually practise slavery within their frontiers? If the governments themselves do not practise slavery, they do not provide any protection for the peoples of their country from the slavery that's being practised right within their borders. Has that been any part of the discussions, to ensure that this kind of government would not be able to benefit at all until issues as fundamental as that are addressed in a proper fashion?

À (1025)

The Chair: Minister, you have about a minute and half to answer these very easy questions.

Mr. Bill Graham: On whether I personally have been able to address the first two issues you raised with my counterparts, I haven't, because of the timing. Of course, I'm not the only one to have these discussions, we have the department officials, and they're in contact. Mr. Wright informs me, for example, that they were discussing with the G-8 the whole issue of the Middle East and what we could be doing. Both the issue of the Church of the Nativity and the fact-finding mission go back to some extent also to the resolution of the Security Council that Israel should withdraw, that the Palestinians should make the necessary efforts to cease all acts of terrorism. So we're discussing that. I think particularly the issue of the Church of the Nativity very much relates to that, because Israel has indicated that it's not going to withdraw until that's resolved. So we're all anxious to get that resolved. As you pointed out, the tradition of sanctuary is one that's exercised for unarmed people, not for people who are using the church because it has thick walls and will stop bullets. That's not what sanctuary is all about.

On the fact-finding mission to the Palestinian territories, I am a very strong supporter of this, because I believe, and I think most of us agree, that as there are all sorts of allegations made on both sides of everything, it's very important to have a neutral body. I do believe Mr. Annan's approach of working with Israel and making sure we have a committee that can get full access and work with the cooperation of the Israeli government is the right one. I think it will pay off. I'm confident that by the weekend we will see the committee going. I can understand why the Israelis would take the position that they want somebody with a military background, because if you destroyed something, there's a question whether this was reasonable or not in the circumstances. You'd want people who understood the types of circumstances, so they could bear that in mind. I'm confident that Mr. Annan will be able to work out with the Israeli government the right composition of that, and the world will get the facts of what took place. I think it's very important that we do.

It's interesting that you say NEPAD's being driven from the top. We thought that in a way, it was more grassroots, because it's coming from the Africans and there's a new level of what's top and what's bottom. I don't disagree with you that for all these things to have success, there has to be a cultural basis broader than a leader getting up and saying, I'm going to do this. That's perhaps one of the things we're going to try to achieve with good governance in Africa, to change that climate and work more directly with populations, engaging them in making decisions and being responsible for those decisions. We in democratic societies know there's a consequence to what we do in our political acts. That will be, hopefully, one of the by-products of this enterprise, to engage populations more in democratic activities in the countries, particularly in educating young women who have been left out of the cycle and things like that. There are huge challenges there, but this is an encouraging start, I believe.

À (1030)

The Chair: Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Madam Jennings.

There is one point, Minister, that I would like answered for clarification. You said that on April 3 we ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Some time before, I think when Mr. Wright was here, we had a discussion about a new comprehensive UN convention on terrorism. I wondered what the status is of that convention and whether we did arrive at a global definition of terrorism.

Mr. Bill Graham: I would let Mr. Wright answer that question, because he's been directly involved in those discussions, but you put your finger on the problem with those negotiations. If you're going to have a comprehensive convention, you have to come to grips with who is a terrorist, whether that's an objective definition or whether it's subjective in relation to a given struggle, and that's one of the problems.

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Madam Chair, Canada has signed and ratified all 12 UN conventions on terrorism. I think there may only be one other G-8 country that has done so. We are working very hard with the UN community, through the counter-terrorism committee, through the capacity building initiatives we're looking at within the G-8 context, an issue the minister will be discussing in Whistler, to encourage other countries to sign and implement the existing 12 terrorism conventions of the UN.

On the comprehensive convention, Madam Chair, we are working with UN circles to try to promote this. There is not agreement to move forward. The biggest challenge for this comprehensive convention is the inability of the international community to come up with a definition of a terrorist. As hard as we are fighting to try to encourage others to deal with this issue in a constructive way, sadly, there continues to be a strong difference of views within the international community, and it's that one issue that is holding up movement on the comprehensive convention. I think it's unrealistic to expect that we're going to see movement in the short term at the UN on this issue. We'll continue pushing, though, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you very much. And thank you, Minister, for your time with us. We know we can call on you at any time as we proceed with this work.

Mr. Bill Graham: At any time? I love this committee, but--

The Chair: Not that much.

Mr. Bill Graham: I'd much rather be here, but I'm supposed to go to a cabinet meeting. Thank you very much, colleagues. I look forward to my next appearance. I understand I will be back shortly for the estimates.

The Chair: That's right.

Mr. Bill Graham: Thank you very much.

The Chair: We'll suspend for a minute or two.

À (1034)

À (1041)

The Chair: Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we move to the study of Canada's policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament.

I want to welcome Ambassador Chris Westdal, as well as the deputy director of the non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament division, Mr. Proudfoot, and Ms. Holland, who is with the same division.

If you remember, committee members, we did a paper in 1998 entitled “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge:Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century”. One of the recommendations, on page 13 of the document, recommendation 2, stated quite clearly that we should be calling the ambassador for disarmament on an annual basis. This is really our mandate to get you here, Ambassador.

You will make some opening remarks, and then we'll go to questioning by the members. Welcome. We are always very pleased to see you.

Mr. Chris Westdal (Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you, Madam Chair and members of Parliament.

As you mentioned, it's my duty, further to the report of this committee—and let me just take a moment to say the report has been extremely useful to me and my colleagues in the years since it was produced—but it's also an honour for me to appear before you. This is now the third time I'm doing so. My introductory comments will be briefer this year than in the past, leaving more time for discussion and for your questions, and, if I am able, for my answers.

[Translation]

I will speak in English, my mother tongue, in order to express myself clearly, but I understand French of course and we can also speak in that language.

À (1045)

[English]

I will summarize some of the impact of September 11 on our work. I will review several implications of the U.S. withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty. I will briefly rehearse the ongoing deadlock in the conference on disarmament in Geneva and its impact on our hope to prevent an arms race, in outer space particularly. Finally, I will report briefly on the first session I attended in New York, ending last week, of the preparatory committee for the review conference in 2005 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the NPT. I hope to do all that, Madam Chair, in about 15 minutes in plain words, avoiding at least some of the dense jungle of acronyms in this field.

I last appeared before you almost exactly a year ago, on May 8, 2001, and the year since then has been highly charged. Above all, the events of September 11 have created a new context for the global non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament regime. The attacks on the trade towers and the Pentagon have surely deepened our commitment to nuclear disarmament. Those blasts in New York were the equivalent of less than a kilotonne, 1,000 tonnes of TNT, exploding well and cleanly. We should put that number in perspective and put the calamity that caused in some kind of perspective relative to a nuclear strike.

The atomic bombs that obliterated Nagasaki and Hiroshima were the equivalent of about 12,000 to 15,000 tonnes of TNT, as compared to less than 1,000 tonnes in New York. Hydrogen bombs, thermonuclear bombs, are megatonne bombs, the equivalent of millions of tonnes of TNT. So you move from half a thousand to 12,000 to 15,000 tonnes, the most common image of what a nuclear bomb entails, to a megatonne bomb, and the largest ever exploded was 52 megatonnes, equivalent to52 million tonnes of TNT. I think it's important to keep those dreadful dimensions of nuclear weapons in our minds. We would not be talking about thousands of casualties, we'd be talking about millions of casualties. We wouldn't be talking about a couple of towers coming down in Manhattan, we'd be talking about the destruction of the entire island. That's the kind of lethality nuclear arsenals entail.

So surely, what happened with that explosion—and it didn't involve any radioactive fallout either—should make us think hard about what the use of nuclear arsenals would entail. Surely, also, those attacks underscored for all of us the urgency of the control of fissile material, which is highly enriched weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, and other ingredients of weapons of mass destruction.

In that context, I should mention that presiding over the G-8 this year, we are working on measures to control fissile materials, particularly in the plutonium dispositioning program you will have read about, trying to deal with some of the plutonium and enriched uranium coming out of the Soviet and Russian warheads.

These events also reinforced a propensity already existing within the United States administration to maximize flexibility and avoid what were referred to as the constraints of multilateralism. Canada understands American concerns regarding the ability to verify and enforce multilateral treaties, to make sure they're effective. Our own approach might best be described as multilateralism-plus. We know that state-of-the-art multilateralism in our real state-of-the-art world, with our real global institutions and all they're capable of and all they're not capable of, is necessary, is essential, but isn't sufficient. That's why our approach is something beyond multilateralism. By that I mean that we have the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and in addition to it, we have IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, safeguards and other safeguards. We have the Zangger committee, whose job is to define which materials are prescribed for transfer further to articles I and II of the NPT treaty. We have the nuclear suppliers group. Similarly, in addition to the chemical weapons convention and the biological and toxin weapons convention, we have export controls in such groups as the Australia group. We have strengthened national implementation legislation, as in Bill C-45, which is currently before the House; it would strengthen our implementation of the biological and toxin weapons convention--and so on: mutilateralism-plus.

The event regarded as perhaps the prime example of U.S. unilateralism was the announced withdrawal in December, which will take effect in June, of the United States from the bilateral anti-ballistic missile treaty. Last year before this committee I cautioned that the value and the current relevance of the ABM treaty ought not to be overstated, that it was counterproductive, and that it would probably be an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophesy to overstate the current relevance of that treaty. It will meet its demise in June if the withdrawal of the United States takes place, as is expected, but it was a treaty that ensured utter vulnerability, was part and parcel of the notion of mutually assured destruction by nuclear means. Therefore, from the start, it's been at odds with the notion of nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, the U.S. announcement of planned withdrawal was disconcerting for the international community, including Canada, because of its possible implications for the multilateral regime.

À (1050)

I note again that this was a bilateral, not a multilateral treaty, but the ABM treaty had provided a certain confidence and predictability in the U.S.-Russia strategic security relationship through the years of the Cold War, and there was a fear of a new arms race. There was a fear that withdrawal from that treaty would lead the Russians to “re-MIRV” their missiles, to overcome anticipated defence in the old traditional way by enhancing offensive means. But in fact, U.S.-Russian relations—this was true before 9/11, and it's certainly true post-9/11—are astonishingly amicable, historically speaking; they're better than they have been since the Second World War. The two have announced their intention to reduce the size of their arsenals, their strategic arsenals particularly, and to reduce the operational status of other missiles in their arsenals, to take them from being deployed and ready for use to being stored. And they have also—I don't know that this is further to our urging, but it's certainly in the context of our and other parties' urging—announced that these reductions will be codified. They might not be in the form of a treaty, but they'll be in the form of a legally binding instrument, and they will be verified using techniques that were developed in the negotiation of START I and START II.

Canada has encouraged both Russia and the United States to develop a new strategic framework that might offer benefits of confidence, predictability, and stability comparable to those the ABM treaty provided in a different, Cold War setting.We want that new strategic framework to be legally binding, we want it to be transparent, we want those steps to be irreversible—some of them are and some of them aren't—and we'd want them to be verifiable.

Turning to other dimensions of a busy year's work, last year was a particularly difficult year for the biological and toxin weapons convention. The negotiations of a protocol to the convention collapsed last July. Last November's five-year review conference of the BTWC was suspended when the United States introduced language that was clearly not able to command consensus report. That session will resume this November, and we're not quite sure where it will go. That convention bans a whole class of weapons that, in its preamble, it refers to as being “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”, but it is toothless, without means to monitor and enforce compliance.

There was better news on another front, with regard to small arms and light weapons. There was a UN conference last July that did adopt a quite impressive action plan. We're now hard at work trying to promote that, through reinforced export controls over small arms and light weapons by many parties, through effective marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, or through the actual collection and destruction of these arms and weapons in fields of conflict.

Another field we have been chairing since last September, the missile technology control regime, the MTCR, has launched for negotiation the first instrument concerning missile behaviour, the International Code of Conduct, which would involve transparency and confidence building measures, for example, pre-launch notification.

You will remember that then foreign minister John Manley led the committee and delegation to the entry into force conference of the comprehensive test ban treaty, the CTBT. There were 47 foreign ministers there reaffirming their determination to see this treaty enter into force and to have the current testing moratorium continue pending that entry into force. You will know that the Bush administration has announced that it will not take the CTBT to the Senate for ratification, but it has reaffirmed its commitment to a moratorium on testing. We think that American commitment will be exemplary. We don't think other parties would be willing to incur the political costs involved in a resumption of testing. We want that moratorium to persist. We think that's critically important. We want the cost of testing to be perceived as simply prohibitively high, and the American role in all of that is crucial.

À (1055)

The deadlock in the conference on disarmament in Geneva continues. I spoke to the committee about that subject last year. It is frustrating, because there is universal acceptance that we should proceed there with the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, the FMCT, or the Fissban, as it's referred to. That would be a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons or other explosive purposes. It is understood, though not guaranteed, that if a negotiation of an FMCT proceeded, Canada, on behalf of the western group, would probably take up the chairmanship of those negotiations again. At the General Assembly last fall we led in the adoption of a resolution calling for those negotiations, and yet that stalled because of the linkages some countries are making to other issues.

If I might just put that FMCT in some kind of comprehensible context—the field is rife with acronyms, but to put it simply—with the NPT and the CTBT and the FMCT, we would be simply stopping, first of all, the spread of nuclear weapons, we would be then stopping the testing of nuclear weapons, and we would be then stopping the production of the material nuclear weapons are made of. Put in plain English, those are pretty straightforward, obvious steps required in pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

If the CD were to adopt the combined work program that's on offer—and it's called the Amorim proposal after my Brazilian colleague in the CD—it would also deal with the matter of negative security assurances. Those are the assurances made by weapon states that they would not use, and therefore not be threatening to use, nuclear weapons on other states unless those states were threatening to use nuclear weapons on them or were in an alliance with weapon states threatening to use nuclear weapons on them. One part of that work program would find a legal basis for those negative security assurances. They would also deal with nuclear disarmament, and they would deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As our minister, Bill Graham, speaking to the conference on disarmament, noted last month, we accord a high priority to the prevention of the weaponization of outer space, as distinct from the militarization, which has already taken place. We have tabled working papers on this subject in the CD, and we will continue to seek to use this body, or, if it won't work, other fora, to achieve a ban on space weaponization. We intend to sponsor a seminar on this subject in Geneva this fall. I should note that for us and other countries this is, of course, not only a security matter, but very much an economic issue. We have significant interest in satellites, particularly given the geography of our country, and other technology in space, which we would not wish to see jeopardized.

I might just say there that I don't think arguments about the sanctuary of the heavens and the sentiment that it would be nice to keep them free of weapons will win the day. Arguments would have to be hard-nosed about the security interests that would be served or compromised by such a ban on the weaponization of space and by the implications for enormous and growing economic assets and our enormous and growing dependence on satellites for our civilization and for our global economy.

Á (1100)

The Chair: You just blew my argument, Ambassador.

Mr. Chris Westdal: I'm sorry.

References to that sanctuary, of course, have political resonance, but they won't persuade hard-nosed security analysts in settings that count, I don't think.

Finally, Madam Chair, I have a few words about the NPT. As I mentioned, I've just returned from New York, from the first meeting of the preparatory committee. It was the first of three such meetings that will lead to the 2005 review conference. I think we made a good start in leading to that review conference. The atmosphere was unexpectedly constructive. All NPT parties, the weapon states and the non-weapon states—and by the way, that includes everyone on earth except four, Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan—clearly regard the treaty as central to global non-proliferation, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and their own security interests. Much of the discussion was useful and forward-looking. There had been fears that this would not be so. There have been long-standing concerns on the lack of universality of the treaty, and there have also been unresolved suspicions of non-compliance, particularly with respect to Iraq and North Korea.

As expected, the United States reiterated its already established opposition and intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty and its unwillingness to take the test ban to the Senate for ratification, thus compromising its support for the disarmament action plan we played such an active role in having adopted at the 2000 review conference of the NPT. But nonetheless, they're real positive steps, and I think it's instructive that the NPT's meetings bring out the best behaviour of the weapon states, as it were. For example, all five of the nuclear weapon states reiterated their negative security assurances, and they were an important part of the bargain in 1995, when the NPT was extended indefinitely, and they were part of a Security Council resolution passed just on the eve of the indefinite extension of the NPT.

The preparatory committee threatened to collapse over a disagreement on the significance and the meaning of the undertakings made at the last review conference in 2000. That was ostensibly a procedural matter, to do with the allocation of time and what subjects would be focused upon in the course of our meetings. We were asked by the Swedish chair to mediate a compromise with, principally, the United States, but also some other weapon states, and principally the Egyptians, but also other non-nuclear weapon states, particularly from that region. We worked hard at that for three days and nights, and we did succeed and keep that meeting on the rails.

I think the role we were able to play in that mediation at the request of the Swedish chairman, just like the role we were able to play in 2000 at the request of the Algerian chairman, a role mediating between the parties unable to reach agreement, does reflect well on our credentials and does reflect respect for our vantage point, not in that it is neutral—it's well known where we stand—but in that it is nonetheless objective, independent, and trustworthy. I think those are attributes and perceived credentials we should want to sustain. I think they counter any notion that we are seen as a reliable echo of the views and positions of other states, including particularly our powerful neighbour.

Á (1105)

Canada's priority at this meeting was to deepen the meaning of accountability, to try to make accountability work for all members of the NPT, and particularly to increase the transparency on the measures they have all taken to implement that treaty. To that end, we launched an initiative to elaborate the reporting requirements that are in step 12 of the NPT action plan. It sounds dreary and dull, but it isn't. You would know full well that transparent reporting is the essence of accountability. In fact, it was a Canadian in the human rights field, John Holmes, who said mobilized shame is one of the oldest engines of human progress, meaning that the comparison of one's commitments with one's behaviour and any exposure of difference between the two make up one of the oldest driving forces of progress, and this is at the heart of accountability. So we gave a very high priority to insisting that the undertaking to report was meaningful and that it was important what happened to those reports, that they didn't just end up in the archives at the U.N., but were read, scrutinized, analysed, and publicized. We see a very important role for all the members of the NPT, but also for civic society in making that reporting requirement contribute to accountability.

We also worked for greater access for NGOs to the NPT process. We had two NGO representatives as members of our delegation. We were unique in that respect at the NPT, and we go on seeking ways, in that setting and in others, to enhance the participation of civic society.

I want to close, Madam Chair, with the briefest summary of what those 13 steps are, just so you know and it can refresh our memories about the action plan that was adopted in 2000.

They involve, first, the entry into force of that test ban treaty, the CTBT. I talked about the fact that it's currently derailed, with the United States, one of 13 parties whose ratification is required, not prepared to take it forward for ratification.

The second, directly related, is the continuance of the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions pending the entry into force. We think that moratorium is absolutely crucial, and I think it would be a sad day when we next read—and I hope we never do—of another nuclear weapon test.

The third is the negotiation of the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, with which Canada is very much associated. We chaired the group that looked at this in late 1998. The mandate for that group is called the Shannon mandate, named after one of my predecessors. Canada is very closely associated with that measure. It goes right back to the notion of suffocating the nuclear arms race that was launched in the 1980s by Prime Minister Trudeau.

The fourth is the establishment of a body to “deal with nuclear disarmament at the CD”. We've never found agreement to negotiate nuclear disarmament in that body, but we have sought agreement to at least talk about and deal with it.

The fifth is the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament arms control and reduction measures, meaning just what it sounds like, but we'd prefer those measures to be difficult to reverse. We prefer to see warheads or missiles or bombers taken apart and destroyed, rather than put into storage or parked on a tarmac, simply to make it more difficult to reverse those steps. We prefer to see fissile material reprocessed into forms that cannot be used for weapons, rather than retained in forms that can. That's what irreversibility is about.

The sixth was much in the headlines. This was the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. This was an unprecedented, unambiguous commitment by weapon states to move on nuclear disarmament. I should say that the NPT makes non-proliferation and disarmament interdependent, and that only stands to reason. You can't stop the spread of nuclear weapons unless you're getting rid of them, because that involves having one rule for one group of people and another rule for another group of people, and that inherent discrimination, which grates on many non-nuclear weapon states, is only acceptable in the larger context of a credible commitment and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. I don't know what that means in respect of dates or specific steps, but it certainly means a credible commitment to that end and in that direction.

Á (1110)

The seventh is the entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III, while preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty. Obviously, that step has already been violated, although, as I said, we're pleased to see that what will take the place of the ABM treaty looks like being codified, looks like being verifiable, looks like being in part irreversible, and looks like using the verification techniques that were developed in the negotiation of STARTs I and II.

The eighth has to do with securing excess fissile material. That's an agreement—the trilateral initiative it's called—between Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for safeguards.

The ninth was important. It talked about further practical steps by the weapon states, including unilateral reductions. There has been criticism of the fact that some of the steps announced are unilateral, in the recent nuclear posture of the United States, but it's to be noted that this action plan itself calls for and welcomes unilateral reductions, increased transparency, and reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. Much of this discussion has been about the larger, strategic nuclear weapons, but there are thousands of smaller tactical nuclear weapons to which we haven't paid nearly so much attention and about which there hasn't been nearly so much transparency. Those tactical weapons are on average larger, by a great margin, than the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so they're to be taken very seriously indeed. It called for reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapon systems, and though one might regret, for example, that in the steps that have been announced some of the warheads are only going into storage, not being destroyed and reprocessed into forms that aren't useful for nuclear weapons, that does still represent a quite dramatic reduction in their operational status. They're nowhere near being hair-triggered if they're sitting in warehouses. It's true they can be moved back from those warehouses with dispatch to the top of missiles, but not in 10 seconds. So there's an important element of the alerting in such a step.

This action plan, this committee, and Canada called for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies, diminishing political profile and political value. That has to do with the status nuclear weapon possession is perceived to entail. That's related to the fact that all the permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear weapon states. That hasn't passed unnoticed by countries in south Asia and elsewhere that are concerned about their perceived status in the world. We've called for a reduction in the political salience and the political value of nuclear weapons. In fact, that was the very title of the report of this committee.

The tenth was to place excess fissile material under IAEA verification and arrange for its disposition. While I talked about the plutonium dispositioning program, you will have heard of the comprehensive threat reduction initiative, the Nunn-Lugar legislation, all of which is intended to gain greater control over fissile material. In this case we're talking about fissile material that would be declared excess to security needs and its disposition. Its sequestering and control, first, and then its reprocessing into forms that aren't useful for weapons would be arranged.

The eleventh is, at the insistence of the nuclear weapon states, a reiteration of the commitment to “general and complete disarmament” that was always in the treaty, a kind of escape hatch, in the sense that it purported to put nuclear disarmament in the realm of Never-Never Land: nuclear armament would be part of general and complete disarmament, and we might achieve nuclear disarmament when we were rid of sticks and stones and slingshots. That's why the unequivocal commitment was so important, because it took the commitment to nuclear disarmament out of that imaginary realm.

Á (1115)

The second last step is one we've seized on, regular reports by NPT members on the implementation of article VI, which is the commitment to disarmament of the treaty.

The final step was the further development of verification capabilities required to provide assurances of compliance. Make no mistake, the technological capabilities for verification have been deepened dramatically. Some of the means that are available now are those that are used by the comprehensive test ban treaty organization, the worldwide range of sensors, whether they be seismic sensors, radio sensors, or other means to detect, and thus to monitor and verify nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Those are the 13 steps of the action plan that were agreed to in 2000, and they are a template for disarmament progress.

I will stop there, Madam Chair. I welcome your comments and any questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ambassador. I think that was a really thorough breakdown of the various activities. I think, if I can speak for my colleagues, we are all amazed that you can keep all these initials and acronyms straight.

We'll go to questioning, and we'll start with the opposition. Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Madam Chair. You're correct in your observation that proliferation of nuclear-related treaties has also resulted in a proliferation of these acronyms, and the recipients, as in nuclear war, are rendered almost incapable of action or reaction after getting buried by them. But the ambassador has done a good job explaining all the acronyms to us, so I appreciate that. My acronymic layman's response would be, OK, OK, let's mind our Ps and Qs and ASAP get an A1 policy PDQ to the UN that's seen as triple A before we're all DOA.

I appreciate the ambassador's information, and I want to tie what he has said to a comment that was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs just before he departed. I'd just like to make an observation, and then pose a couple of questions.

The minister said we have to reduce the need for armies, and thereby reduce the amount of money for armies and military, so there's more money for butter, as he said. I appreciate that observation, but all of human history shows that the time of widespread peace--I'm talking globally, or even with the known world at the time--is usually directly related to an imbalance of power, where potentially belligerent rogue states or power-hungry warlords are actually kept in check, because they are convinced that the superior military strength of their targets is too formidable to overcome. The Pax Romana was an era of remarkable peace and relative--and I use that term carefully--abundance, as long as the political enemies of the Roman Empire were convinced of the military capability and the political will of that government. I'm not recommending a system of Caesars and senators--we have that today--I'm just making a point on one of the necessary ingredients, historically, for peace and security in the world, and that is a clear and constant military capability among the very nations desiring peace and stability.

We can jump from the Pax Romana to the relative peace in the western world during the Cold War era. As strained at that might have been, that was achievable because any imperialistic designs on the part of the Eastern Bloc communist nations were held in abeyance by their sense of the military strength and capability of NATO, the allies, and the United States. I hope our country keeps that in mind, that we don't ever stray into this naive philosophical minefield of saying, if we would all just turn our spears into ploughshares, that would be fine. There will always be rogues in the global village who want to overpower those who are not seen as being capable of defending themselves.

So with that prior observation, when we look at discussions on nuclear arms and proliferation and reductions, is it really desirable to make a blanket statement? We use all these detonating terms here, but it's an explosive topic to even broach. With the so-called weaponization of space, if we are talking about exploring--and I use that word carefully--a defensive system based on laser capability that would be reasonably proficient in eliminating surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, or any type of missile, rendering them obsolete in respect of military capability, is it really wise to just make a blanket statement that we should absolutely not have anything to do with a defensive system that could be shared among peace-loving nations? I want to put that out there. Has that thought really been explored?

Second, with regard to what the minister has said, do your good offices, your department, your areas of influence, include impressing on the government that the depletion of our armed forces and the lack of fiscal support there is not a harbinger of peace, but a possible invitation to belligerence from others who would perceive us as being weak, and therefore the necessity to make sure we have an effective armed force--not using nuclear weapons though?

Á (1120)

Mr. Chris Westdal: Thank you.

Those are profound questions, and I can't deal with all their implications in the time we have available, but I begin by saying I don't think our analysis of arms control and disarmament is naive in the sense you would fear. There is no conflict between the goals of ambassadors for disarmament and advocates of arms control and disarmament steps and the goals of the government more generally, with its profound and primordial responsibility for the security of its citizens and the Department of National Defence and the members of our armed forces. We are all seeking security, and we recognize that force is required in defence of the freedoms we treasure and in defence of peace. Those are not the issues. The issues are how that security might best be sought. Any measure of security we can obtain through diplomacy, through negotiations, through agreements, such as those negotiated in the conference on disarmament, for example, are measures of security we and other states are therefore not compelled to seek by other means, through arms. All of us are striving for the same goal.

It is true you can cite cases of disaster occasioned by a failure to adequately sustain deterrent military means. You can also cite cases where excessive expenditure on arms leads to collapse of an economy, the Soviet Union being the most obvious example, but Paul Kennedy's book not too long ago cited other examples. So there's a balance to be sustained there.

Á (1125)

Mr. Stockwell Day: My point exactly. That's another instance where one power actually collapsed, and they were convinced of the military superiority of the other power, knowing they could not in any way keep up. That is, in fact, my thesis. It led to--using your words, sir--U.S.-Russia relations becoming astonishingly amicable, because one side was finally utterly convinced of its military inferiority.

Mr. Chris Westdal: I simply mean to underline, though, that one can err on either side. One can err with inadequate investment in the means of security, including diplomacy, but also arms, as required, and one can err on the other side as well. One can err, I would say, more generally, on the other side in one's reaction to such outrages as recent terrorism, which require security and military responses, but also a broader comprehension. And we require, it seems to me, a world in which there is a greater comprehension, vision, compassion, and effective aid on the part of the powers that be. For example, it's interesting to compare military expenditure—you spoke about military expenditure—and the $46 billion increase in the Pentagon budget with the total amount of aid in the whole world, some $50 billion. I think we will be more secure in a world that is less seething with resentment and anger on account of the distribution of wealth and opportunity, and in a world more inspired by what I referred to as the vision and effective compassion of the powers that be, economic powers and military powers.

I turn to the questions that you raised about weaponization. Indeed, a blanket statement against weaponization is not a sufficient response. One can posit benefits of having weapons in space. One can imagine greater benefits in being able to not so much monitor, as we already can with space-based sensors, missiles, but to have a more rapid response to bring down a missile from a weapon system based in space. One can imagine as well some advantages in using weapons based in space to attack other space assets, if it comes to that. And one can imagine some advantages in attacking earth-based targets from this ultimate high ground. But those benefits—and they'd have to be analysed in hard-nosed terms—would have to be weighed against the costs, the enormous financial costs of literally having to harden all of those assets, particularly launching costs, the costs from the boomeranging of weapon technology, also as ancient as history, where, at enormous cost, one side develops a new technology and finds that within a very short time, at a far lower cost, another party is now using that technology. That is an implication of the development of weapons in space technology that would also have to be taken into account.

Our own analysis is that the costs of that kind of weaponization would exceed, by a great margin, the military benefits that might be gained. Those are subjects that need to be explored further, and that's an exploration we're encouraging.

Á (1130)

The Chair: Thank you.

Monsieur Paquette.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Thank you for your remarks. This is the first time I have attended one of your presentations and I see that there is a great deal of information and material. I am far from being an expert on the topic, although I have always been concerned about the proliferation of nuclear arms and nuclear matters in general.

I will stick to a fairly general level. One impression which is increasingly shared in Quebec and in Canada is that the new U.S. administration, perhaps because of Mr. Bush's personality and also the events of September 11, seems increasingly to think that it alone knows what is right and to be trying to impose it on the world. The Americans are looking more and more unilateral. Next thing we know, we could find the ABM issue back on the table. The Americans seem quite bent on it. I think this attitude could be very detrimental to the reduction of nuclear arms.

First of all, in the United States itself, there seems to be a very strong lobby in the Pentagon to resume the arms race against an enemy which is now unknown and hence less identifiable. Second, I have the feeling that there is a move to get certain countries, such as China or Russia, back into the arms race simply in order to maintain some balance with the Americans, even if the balance will obviously never be the same again.

I do not know whether you, as an ambassador to the United Nations, and your colleagues notice this American unilateralism. If you do, could it get in the way of the work being done to reduce nuclear arms?

[English]

Mr. Chris Westdal: In my introductory remarks I talked about the unilateralist propensity, perhaps, of this administration, even before 9/11, but certainly after 9/11. I think this administration has observed some of the lessons that arise from the aftermath of 9/11. It needs to be emphasized first, as I said earlier, that multilateralism has to be effective. There is no appetite in this administration, nor should there be, for ineffective multilateralism, for fooling ourselves, for pretending we have measures in place that will work.

That's why we have talked about multilateralism-plus and the fact that current state-of-the-art multilateralism is necessary and essential, but not sufficient. In fact, I think one of the greatest intellectual challenges we face is trying to reconcile the values, the institutions, and the means of multilateralism, which is necessary, but not sufficient, with the values, the institutions, and means of much less multilateral approaches, including unilateral and plurilateral approaches. They're also necessary, essential, but they're also not sufficient. We have to find in the real world, which is messy and difficult and confused, a way of reconciling those two approaches, because we need them both. That is clear in the aftermath of 9/11.

It's also clear in the aftermath of 9/11 that no state, however powerful, including the United States, can go it alone. The wholehearted cooperation of governments is obviously required in addressing such an ubiquitous threat as the risk that weapons of mass destruction or other means of mass destruction we hadn't imagined, like fully fueled airliners, could fall into the hands of terrorists. That cooperation of other governments is not going to be evoked through imposition and the threat of force. It will have to be evoked through international law and international cooperation. That lesson is clear and obvious to the American administration in the wake of 9/11 as well.

We remain committed to a multilateral framework. It's congenital with us and it's congenital with other parties who don't have power to match the Americans, and no other party does. The first quote that comes to mind is from then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who said in discussions, I believe, with this President's father, that of course, American power had to be exercised with a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. I certainly believe this administration recognizes that it has to sustain unique power, because it faces unique threats and it has unique responsibilities, but as well, it has to sustain a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and it has to evoke the effective cooperation of other governments. That can only be done through multilateral means.

So I think this equilibrium you referred to will be achieved, and I think we have a role to play, both with respect to the United States and more generally, in sustaining the most effective multilateralism we can create and establish.

Á (1135)

The Chair: Thank you.

Madam Marleau.

Ms. Diane Marleau: Yes, Madam Chair.

By the way, I've had the opportunity of working with Ambassador Westdal in the past. I must say he's very enthusiastic. If anyone can make a difference in this job, I think he certainly can. I think he has already.

I want to go back to existing nuclear stockpiles. I want to talk about how much progress has been made in controlling some of these nuclear warheads that sit in submarines at the bottom of the ocean in some port somewhere in former USSR countries. How confident are you that a lot of this fissile material is not getting into the hands of the black market and finding its way into places like North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan? Are there further safeguards that can and should be put in place to control that? It is a question of great concern to me, and I know it is to you also. I'd like to know what progress has been made on that.

I also want to talk about dirty bombs and the fact that there is fissile material in many parts of the world—I believe there may even be some here in Canada—that would allow for the production of what they call dirty bombs. Should there be more done to control that particular product?

The Chair: Ambassador.

Mr. Chris Westdal: Those are two very good, penetrating questions.

We'd all like to be 100% certain that fissile material is safe, in safe hands, well sequestered, well guarded, all of it. There are mountains of it around, so it's an enormous problem. How confident am I? I'm more confident now than I was pre-September 11, because I think that really was a wake-up call about the dangers of this kind of material finding its way into the wrong hands. I think it needs emphasis that it costs trillions of dollars to make these arsenals, and it's going to cost big, big money to cope with their residue. We know that through trying to take action in the context of that plutonium dispositioning program I talked about. We know that through what it has cost to implement the Nunn-Lugar legislation.

There are steps that can be taken. They are being taken in strengthening the physical security in Russia. We are having more countries sign and implement these safeguards agreements with the IAEA, particularly the additional protocols and the strengthened safeguards. We ratified our strengthened safeguard last year. So there are additional measures that can be taken. They're not much of a mystery, but they're expensive. I think it was John Manley, when he was our minister, who said that in the G-8 you can't be in the washroom when the bell comes. These are big bills, and we have to face that fact. If we're going to take effective action in this vital realm, it's going to take real resources.

Directly related is, of course, the threat of dirty bombs, radiological bombs. Those are bombs where radioactive material is dispersed through a conventional explosion. Radioactive material is widespread and needs to be carefully controlled. I do think it's worth emphasizing that though there is an image that with the kind of high school science and drawings available on the Internet, people can make nuclear bombs, that is an exaggeration of the risk we face. In fact, there has not been very much at all, if any, detected smuggling and sale of fissile material on the black market, because authorities around the world are aware of this threat and are very sensitive to it, particularly since last fall. Governments around the world are determined to keep control of that fissile material.

The threats you cite are real. The cost of confronting them will be real and significant as well.

Á (1140)

The Chair: Thank you.

Ambassador, you mentioned that there is an impasse in the negotiations in the conference on disarmament, and you said that was due to certain linkages. Could you speak to us about what those linkages might be, what progress we're making, and what we're attempting to do to get countries out of the impasse?

Mr. Chris Westdal: Yes indeed. I don't want it to be a stream of acronyms, but there are four subjects that are interlinked in this possible work program that we've come very close to approving, and they are nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, PAROS, the fissile material ban, the FMCT, and negative security assurances. The current proposal is that there would be four working groups established; two of them would have negotiating mandates, and two of them would have mandates simply to discuss. The negotiating mandates would apply to the FMCT, and we've given the highest priority to that, and to negative security assurances. The discussion mandates would apply to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Those are the four subjects on the table.

There are knots within knots, and some of the reasons and objections that are ventured are ostensible, not real; they hide other resistance. What we do know is that the weapon states are most reluctant to agree ever to negotiate nuclear disarmament multilaterally. They don't even particularly want to talk about nuclear disarmament in a setting like the CD, because its mandate is negotiation.

We know as well that the United States refuses to countenance a negotiating mandate for the body that looks at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In other words, it will refuse to negotiate limits on space technology, and at the same time, explicitly, the Chinese will not accept any mandate for such a group that does not include the very term negotiation. So there's an open disagreement about the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We know the weapon states, not all of them, but we and the United States, the UK, and France, give the highest priority to the ban on the production of fissile material, but some parties at the CD, for example, Pakistan--I can list some others--don't want to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons, because they're in the business right now of producing as much fissile material for weapons purposes as they can, because they're wanting to enhance their arsenals.

So you have some open disagreements and some that aren't so open. Parties would rather express their reluctance by, for example, insisting on the negotiation of a ban on space technology than voice their desire to make more fissile material. Some causes are more easily presented and defended than others.

As to what we've done to try to overcome this impasse, thanks to the alphabet, which brought Canada to the presidency of the CD a year and a bit ago, I travelled to all five of those capitals and implored them to make the compromises, which didn't seem to us to be enormous, required to enable work to recommence at the CD, but we were unsuccessful. There are fundamental security questions involved here, and countries are not willing to change their positions, because they feel it's unfortunate that the CD is not being used to its full capacity. In a speech I made to the CD a couple of months ago I said we had to remember in that conference that we were a tool of our members, that we were a shop that had produced and delivered the goods before, global public goods, and we could deliver them again, and that it was a poor workman that blamed his tools and a hapless tool that took the rap. The responsibility for the inactivity of the CD does not reside in Geneva, it's a reflection of a lack of will, from the weapon states above all, to go ahead with negotiation of restraints on space weapons and to go ahead with an effective ban on the production of fissile material.

Á (1145)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you, Ambassador Westdal and your colleagues, Mr. Proudfoot and Ms. Holland, for being here.

I'll just get into the questions. The first one falls in with Madam Marleau's question, a huge issue with the control of fissionable material as referred to in points 8, 9, and 10 in your action plan. Pandora's box is open, and unsavoury characters are dipping into that fissile material. Perhaps you can explain to us what's being done with the Americans and other countries to track this material that's getting into the hands, particularly, of Russian Mafia and other elements that are selling it to groups in the Middle East.

Second, I hope you will propose to Mr. Fowler, the PM's Sherpa on the G-8, that at the G-8 summit there should be a real commitment by the members to pursue a small arms registry dealing only with automatic weapons. It's something they can focus on.

A further issue is whether or not you're going to pursue or consider pursuing a ban on depleted uranium and on cluster bombs, which have not quite the same effect, but verge on the effect of land mines.

Finally, China, I think, has been giving us the façade of a backward country with a lot of people, but behind the scenes they have a superheated military-industrial complex that is producing a very strong military, with a fairly aggressive nature backing it up. I wonder what your views are on what we can do with the international community to work with the Chinese to convince them to engage in demilitarization, particularly when it comes to nuclear weapons.

Á (1150)

Mr. Chris Westdal: With respect to the fissile material, particularly in the ex-Soviet Union, the measures are quite straightforward. As I mentioned, they're not a mystery, in the sense that they involve simply the physical security, which requires fences and locks and guards and effective measures, in some cases the centralization of dispersed or, as I'd call them, orphan caches of fissile material. That's a physical security process that costs money, effort, time, and organizational talent. That's all part of what Nunn-Lugar and related measures are financing.

It will also involve reprocessing of fissile material into forms that are not weapon grade and cannot be used in--

Mr. Keith Martin: Ambassador Westdal, I am referring to the fissile material that has already been lost from ex-Soviet Union stores.

Mr. Chris Westdal: I don't know that there has been recorded lost fissile material. I've read of discrepancies in records, and that might well represent lost material. I read recently about some unfortunate shepherds who came upon an abandoned nuclear battery, another kind of lost source.

Mr. Keith Martin: I'm sorry to jump in, but it was really the Russian police who apprehended a number of individuals who were trying to sell fissile material to people in the Middle East, and they said, we've lost a substantial amount of fissile material, we don't know how much, we don't know where it's gone. What I'm really asking is, from your vantage point, what is being done to locate that material and apprehend the individuals involved?

Mr. Chris Westdal: What's being done is cooperation between Russia, the United States, and many other countries, cooperation between their militaries, but also cooperation between their police forces. Interpol and other such agencies would give the highest priority to trying to trace any networks that would take fissile material into the black market and into criminal hands. Beyond that, I don't think there are really practical measures, and we would hope that such cooperation between institutions will be effective. Certainly, all those concerned would be highly motivated to try to stop such losses. It is not my impression, though, that there has been evidence or proof of large amounts of fissile material in the black market. There have been a handful of stories. I think some of them have been exposed as hoaxes or tests of security systems gone wrong.

I was going to draw attention to another dimension of that problem, because Canada has been directly involved. I was directly involved when I was ambassador to Ukraine. In both Moscow and Kiev there have been established science and technology centres that employ scientists who were previously involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction. That's the criterion, and those programs are based on the straightforward proposition that if that scientific talent isn't going to find its way into settings we wouldn't want to find it in, it's best to employ it for purposes that might find commercial use and other scientific application.

On the other questions you raised, yes, indeed, in a G-8 setting and elsewhere we would be pushing for registers of small arms, particularly of automatic weapons. You know that in that setting we've always pushed for a comprehensive approach that would not only deal with illegal flows of small arms and light weapons, but would also address the implications of perfectly legal, but problematic, trade and flows in small arms and light weapons.

With respect to a ban on depleted uranium, our considered and studied view is that there is no evidence that the use of depleted uranium ammunition has compromised health after the fact. I know there are allegations and claims and there is continuing medical research, but I am not aware of any evidence that depleted uranium has had the effects that are feared or alleged.

With respect to cluster bombs, we have addressed that issue in the context of the convention on certain conventional weapons. It has to do with the dangers of unexploded ordinance, that is, what remains after the use of such munitions as cluster bombs. Cluster bombs have a military utility we and our armed forces recognize. Our approach has been to focus on the prevention of the problem in the first place, and that is to focus on means in design and construction of these munitions that reduce the proportion that remains unexploded, thus preventing the problem from the start, and second, to alert civilians. These threats are different from land mine threats. Usually these munitions are above ground, easy to spot, rather than beneath, buried, intentionally hidden. And we also would focus on the responsibility of those who have used cluster munitions to clean the fields where they've been used in the past.

Á (1155)

Finally, with respect to China, I'm not sure it's fair to the Chinese to talk about a hyped-up or super-hot military-industrial complex. In respect of their nuclear weapon program, the Chinese have not been provocative, if you will, in the face of arsenals of thousands of strategic and tactical weapons. They have built a modest arsenal of perhaps a score, a few dozen, strategic weapons, and they don't seem to be planning to increase that dramatically, though it is thought that the arsenal is being modernized and updated. I think, to refer back to some of the issues Mr. Day was mentioning, the Chinese have been very careful to contain the proportion of their gross national product devoted to the military, probably on the simple ground that their security was best served by investing as much as they could in future growth and increasing their prosperity and the economic base as a means of security. So I don't know that the premise that they have an evidently red-hot military industrial complex is fair to their vision of their security interests and their security behaviour so far.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ambassador, for the time you've spent with us, for taking very complex issues and making them language- and listener-friendly. We appreciate the work you're doing. We know it is difficult, and Canada's interest is served as a result of the work you and your staff and others are doing on our behalf. So I want to thank you for being with us. According to our mandate, we'll see you again next year.

Â (1200)

Mr. Chris Westdal: Thank you. You're very welcome, and I look forward to that.

The Chair: Also, I know your colleagues at the table didn't get an opportunity to speak, but I thank them for being here.

We have one item of business, and I'd like to ask for unanimous consent to bring this before us. It is a motion that notwithstanding the motions of Tuesday, February 20, 2001, and Tuesday, October 2, 2001, for the purposes of the travel of the of the Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment to South America on the dates of April 28 to May 11, 2002, the opposition members participating be Rick Casson, Gary Lunn, and Ghislain Lebel.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.