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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE • NUMBER 052

CONTENTS

Thursday, January 17, 2002

1335

Mr. Harvard

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1340

1345

1350

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Benoit

1355

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

1400

Mr. John Harvard

Mr. James R. Wright

1405

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Godfrey

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Godfrey

1410

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC/DR)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. James R. Wright

1415

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Bill Casey

1420

Mr. Harvard

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mrs. Gallant

1425

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

1430

Mr. Harvard

Mr. Dromisky

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

1435

Mr. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. James R. Wright

1440

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Harvard

Mr. Patry

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Bernard Patry

Mr. James R. Wright

1445

Mr. Bernard Patry

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James R. Wright

1450

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Godfrey

Mr. James R. Wright

1455

Mr. Godfrey

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Godfrey

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Harvard

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Leon Benoit

1500

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. James R. Wright

1505

Mr. Harvard

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. James R. Wright

1510

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James R. Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Wright

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Wright

Mrs. Gallant

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mr. Bill Casey

1515

Mr. John Holmes

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Harb

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Harb

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Harb

Mr. Bill Casey

1520

Mr. Harb

Mr. Casey

Mr. Harb

Mr. James R. Wright

Mr. Harvard

Mr. James R. Wright

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Harvard

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Harvard

1525

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mrs. Jennings

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. John Holmes

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Harb

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. John Holmes

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Mr. Harb

Mr. Harvard

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

1530

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. James R. Wright

M. Harvard

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 052

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Thursday, January 17, 2002

· (1335)

[English]

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)): Thank you, members.

The order of the day is pursuant to the order of the House on October 15 last, joint consideration by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs of matters relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the participation of the Canadian Forces in the international military coalition against terrorism.

I'll be chairing this afternoon's session on behalf of the chairman of the foreign affairs committee, Mr. Graham.

At this time I would like to welcome our guests, our witnesses, Mr. James Wright, who is the assistant deputy minister, global and security policy, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; John Holmes, director, United Nations criminal and treaty law division at DFAIT; and Shelley Whiting, deputy director, United Nations human rights and humanitarian law section at DFAIT.

Members, I understand Mr. Wright has a short statement, which he will deliver in a moment.

I'll just tell you that we'll be following foreign affairs rules for this afternoon's session. There's not much difference from defence--a bit of a difference--but we'll get to the questions right after we've heard from Mr. Wright.

Mr. Wright, welcome, and thank you for coming.

Mr. James R. Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the invitation and for the opportunity to address the committee as it looks at this important issue of Canada's growing role in the international campaign against terrorism.

It has been slightly more than four months since the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Over this short period, many of the objectives of the democratic world set out in the early hours of the crisis have been met. Many other challenges remain. Allow me to comment on the government's vision of where the campaign against terrorism now stands and how we situate the forthcoming deployment of Canadian Forces to Kandahar.

Among the principal objectives of the campaign against terrorism was the destruction of al-Qaeda's infrastructure; it has been largely destroyed and its membership apprehended or on the run. The Taliban has been overthrown and the Afghan people liberated from its prison, with much less bloodshed than feared. The future of Afghanistan is in Afghani hands, with an internationally supported roadmap for governance and a process to plan reconstruction.

All partners in the governing coalition agree that terrorism has no place in Afghanistan's future. Elsewhere, terrorism-supporting states are under intense scrutiny, and some have responded by making arrests and moving to dismantle terrorist networks operating on their soil. The flow of terrorist funds is being disrupted, and rejection of terrorism as a legitimate political instrument has been sweeping. International organizations have made counter-terrorism policy a priority with tremendous vigour.

Just as important, none of the doomsday scenarios have come true. The United States responded to the attacks with resolve and patience but also with restraint. The military coalition in Afghanistan has remained united politically. The Northern Alliance has proved so far to be capable and to be a uniting presence. The secular leadership in Pakistan has not only survived cooperation with the west but has been strengthened by it. Central Asia has not fallen into turmoil. Russia and China are important allies in this struggle. The United Nations Security Council has not been paralyzed but instead has played a very dynamic and unifying role, and Osama bin Laden has failed in his attempt to paint this conflict as a war against Islam. Where terrorists sought to divide and defeat, they have instead united and galvanized the forces of light.

· (1340)

[Translation]

But many challenges remain before us still. Even without an infrastructure, al-Quaida remains a threat. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar remain fugitives, not captives. Other terrorist groups and their benefactors are merely laying low. Some States continue to sponsor terrorism, while others lack the capacity to prevent terrorists from operating from their territory. And the peace in Afghanistan can still be lost. This is a state of affairs that calls for continue international involvement, not a self-satisfied belief that the worst is over.

· (1345)

[English]

The international campaign against terrorism is multi-dimensional. It involves complementary action on the military, diplomatic, financial, and humanitarian fronts. Canada is active in all of these areas. The deployment of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group to serve with the U.S. Army task force in Kandahar is a major contribution to the coalition-U.S. Army task force in Kandahar. It will help to create a stable environment within which reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan can take place.

But this deployment is built on a consistently high level of political engagement by Canada since September 11. Diplomatically, our first priority was strengthening the Canada-U.S. relationship through increased cooperation on issues of public security and border management--matters that have been addressed recently by this committee. This cooperation culminated in the signing on December 12 by Minister Manley and the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, of a 30-point action plan to preserve the integrity of our border.

Internationally, Canada has been engaged at the highest levels to build the broadest possible international support for the campaign against terrorism. The Prime Minister and Minister Manley personally reached out to both traditional and non-traditional partners, and I am very confident that Minister Graham will do likewise. Canada has been active in a number of major international organizations to advance the anti-terrorism agenda. This includes the UN, NATO, the G-8, the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, APEC, and la Francophonie. Canada has supported and often led the way in urging these organizations to take a strong stand against terrorism. And we are now actively engaged in the implementation of these declarations, resolutions, and action plans that have been adopted.

A notable example is UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which called on states to adopt concrete domestic measures against terrorism and to support a strengthened multilateral regime against terrorism. Canada was among the first nations to report to the Security Council on measures taken in support of Resolution 1373, including our ratification of the remaining two of 12 UN anti-terrorism conventions. A copy of the government's detailed response to the UN Security Council was provided earlier to this committee by Minister Manley.

[Translation]

As president of the G-8 this year, Canada is playing a lead role in the implementation of the comprehensive G-8 action plan on counter-terrorism. This 25-point plan covers a range of issues including support for the UN role on anti-terrorism, financing, aviation security, immigration, drugs, cyber-crime and judicial cooperation.

This month, Canada will chair meetings in Ottawa with our G-8 partners which will address ways of curbing terrorism financing. On February 8 and 9, finance ministers from the G-7 countries will meet at Meech Lake to discuss, among other topics, the problem of terrorism financing, following up a similar meeting by the G-8 group last November in Ottawa.

An important part of our G-8 work will be to harness the unique assets of this group in support of capacity-building in other countries to combat terrorism. We intend to use the opportunity of our G-8 presidency in other innovative ways in support of the campaign against terrorism and wider global stability.

[English]

On both the political and humanitarian front, Canada continues to be engaged in the stabilization of Afghanistan in parallel with our military support for this objective. Since September 11, Canada has contributed an additional $16 million to meet the humanitarian needs of Afghan civilians, bringing our total contribution over the last ten years to about $150 million. The recent federal budget allocated a further $100 million for Afghanistan. Canada is actively involved in a number of major donor forums that are developing strategies to promote Afghanistan's recovery, including ways of supporting the political transition process that is now under way.

On January 21, the Canadian International Development Agency will lead the Canadian delegation to the international conference on Afghan reconstruction in Tokyo. In advance of this meeting, Canada will be depositing with the United Nations Development Programme a contribution of $1.5 million in support of the new Afghan interim administration. Our overarching goal, which we share with our coalition partners and which we have pursued through a range of methods, is to foster the development of a stable Afghanistan that can be a secure home for the Afghani people and that can no longer serve as a staging area for terrorist operations.

The deployment of Canadian Forces to Kandahar is the latest military contribution to this multifaceted effort.

[Translation]

Our decision to go to Kandahar is extremely important because it will contribute directly to the establishment of a stable environment in which the rebuilding and recovery of Afghanistan will be possible.

As such it will complement the efforts of the International Security Assistance Force that is being deployed under the leadership of the United Kingdom to ensure stability in Kabul, so that the Interim Afghan Authority will be able to do its work.

[English]

The Kandahar mission is in keeping with our history of taking on difficult combat missions and serving alongside our allies. Canada has a tradition as a peacekeeping nation that is rich and respected. We are deservedly proud of this heritage, and we continue to provide this valuable service in the Balkans and in the Middle East. But Canadians have never shied away from more robust missions either. We should be clear that Canada's decision to serve with the United States task force in Kandahar does not suggest a shift in relative importance of the alliances we keep. Our presence in Afghanistan will strength the bonds of military collaboration, not just with the United States but with all countries serving alongside us.

Canada has always looked across the Atlantic and across the 49th parallel. This is a product of our history, our geography, and our shared values and interests. Canada also has a tradition that emphasizes both continentalism and multilateralism. It is not a question of choosing between the two.

The Kandahar mission is part of a multifaceted strategy of complementary efforts by the coalition against terrorism, which is aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan and ensuring that it never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists. It is an honourable mission and Canadians can be very proud of the contribution that Canadian Forces are making to the eradication of terrorism and to bringing about a safer and more secure world.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to address the question of detainees, which I understand was the subject of considerable interest for the committee this morning.

Canada is involved in an armed conflict. Particularly, the laws of armed conflict apply to the conduct of Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. The law of armed conflict consists of conventional law, Geneva Conventions, and customary international law. International law recognizes the right to detain persons during an armed conflict. Detainees could have a variety of statuses under international law, including those of prisoners of war, unlawful combatants, or civilians.

The status of a person detained determines the standard of treatment required by international law. Should there be cases of doubt as to the exact status of a person who takes part in hostilities, the person should be treated as a prisoner of war until the status is determined by a competent tribunal. If there is no doubt as to the status, then that detainee must be given a level of treatment accorded to the status. At minimum, detainees are entitled to a standard of care referred to as humane treatment.

In Afghanistan, our Canadian Forces may be involved in detaining persons. This could involve a wide spectrum of persons, ranging from locals engaged in petty crime to persons taking part in hostilities. As a matter of policy, Canadian Forces will treat all detainees to the standard of care afforded prisoners of war until their status is determined or they are transferred. In cases where we transfer detainees to other authorities, Canada has an obligation to ensure that the detaining authorities are willing and able to respect international law. U.S. authorities have publicly indicated and have advised Canada that detainees will be accorded humane treatment that respects their obligations under international law.

Earlier this week, Mr. Chairman, I hosted the head of the regional delegation for North America of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Urs Boegli, who is today leading a Red Cross delegation visiting detainees in Guantanamo Bay. As you know, the ICRC has a unique and special role under the Geneva Conventions to ensure humane treatment of detainees. The ICRC has stated publicly that it has ongoing access to detainees being held by the Americans and Afghans in Afghanistan.

During the visit to Guantanamo Bay today, the ICRC will be inspecting the facilities and meeting and talking with detainees. This visit is indeed welcome, and we expect that the United States will continue to grant the ICRC access to all detainees in Guantanamo Bay. If there are any problems with the treatment of detainees, we fully expect that these matters will be raised by the ICRC with U.S. authorities.

· (1350)

There has also been some concern expressed with American military commissions. The American government has said that military commissions are another tool in their campaign against terrorism. No military commissions have been established to date. As the rules of procedure and other instruments for the commissions have yet to be finalized, it is premature for the Canadian government to make a judgment on whether it would comply with the applicable international standards.

That ends my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Thank you for that statement. I am sure it will give rise to many questions from members.

It is time to go to members. I just want to remind members that each round will be five minutes. I will be watching the clock quite closely. We'll hear first from the Alliance, then the Bloc, and then the government side, in that order.

Mr. Benoit, for five minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. I have two lines, I guess, of questions for you. I'll get into them both and just let you respond to them.

The first is on land mines. As you know, the U.S. hasn't signed the land mines treaty and uses anti-personnel land mines. The reality is that it's very likely our Canadian troops will be protected by American land mines. Of course, Canada has signed the land mines treaty and it seems that our soldiers could be prosecuted if they break that treaty.

Can you absolutely assure our troops that if they are protected by American land mines they can't be prosecuted for breaking the land mines treaty? That's the first line of questioning.

The second has to do with a comment made in your statement, Mr. Wright. You mentioned all of the various international organizations that Canada is a member of and plays a role in, including NATO and the G-8. I have heard a lot of concern expressed lately that Canada could lose its position at the G-8 table because we simply don't back up our words with proper military commitment. That concern was expressed by the Chief of the Defence Staff last spring when he said:

This high operational tempo has taken its toll on our people, our equipment and our ability to conduct training. Managing the operational tempo will be critical to the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.

He said that at a time when we had fewer than 3,000 troops committed overseas. Now we will have 4,300, half again as many, committed overseas, so that concern has to be magnified.

Obviously Canada cannot sustain these operations over a long period of time. I would suggest that it would be extremely difficult to extend this commitment for a year. Now the minister has said it is only a six-month commitment in Afghanistan, but that's exactly what this government said about the commitment in Kosovo, or pardon me, in Bosnia, in 1995. It has been seven years now. My concern is that Canada has gotten into this now. I think most people agree this should happen and we should have a military that is strong enough to meet a serious commitment in Afghanistan, but with the lack of commitment to our troops, who are so committed to serving this country, we can't meet our foreign commitments. We certainly can't sustain them. We cannot possibly sustain our commitments at the current level.

My question to you is, considering this, is it possible that in fact Canada will pay a dear price in terms of our stature amongst nations and actually lose a position at the G-8 table and possibly at NATO? Canada spends only half of the NATO average in terms of spending on our military. That's not a very strong commitment. That is my second line of questioning. Could Canada in fact lose its stature and its place at some of these tables?

· (1355)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): You have 90 seconds to answer all that.

Mr. James R. Wright: I think I can do it in 90 seconds, Mr. Chairman.

There are two dimensions to the response on land mines. No, Canadian soldiers cannot be prosecuted just because they happen to be there and American troops might be going ahead and using land mines to secure some of the areas where they are operating.

There is a second dimension to this, which I believe either Minister Eggleton or General Henault alluded to this morning, and that is the fact that in our rules of engagement there is a standard procedure for Canadian Forces when they go overseas. It is understood, not only by Canadian Forces but by allies with whom we work, that Canadian Forces, while they are overseas, will not go ahead and be involved in the deployment of anti-personnel mines. If there were a request, for example, by a U.S. command to go ahead and use Canadian Forces to lay land mines, that would be one of those circumstances.

Mr. Leon Benoit: [Inaudible—Editor]...be protected by these American land mines?

Mr. James R. Wright: The question you asked was whether the Canadian soldiers were going to be liable to prosecution, and the answer is no.

On the second issue, which is whether we can back up our participation in international councils appropriately, my answer to that is absolutely. Canada is a full member of the G-8. Our forces are in high demand from G-8 partners, from NATO partners. We play a leadership role on the international scene.

As to exit strategy, in fact, we followed our exit strategy to plan, 100%, with respect to Kosovo; we said we were going to go in briefly and then get out, and we did.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What about Bosnia, though?

Mr. James R. Wright: Okay. In Macedonia, we went in and out. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, we went in and out. In Bosnia we have made a long-term commitment. We make a distinction. Bosnia continues to be the most assisted country in the world, and this is a commitment not just by the Canadian government but by a significant group of countries, not just from NATO but from other countries in central and eastern Europe.

So I would make the case very strongly that we continue to play a leadership role in all the international councils to which we belong--NATO, G-8--and that is backed up with strong support from our Canadian peacekeepers.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): I ask members to keep their questions on the short side so that the witnesses have some opportunity to answer.

Mr. Bachand, five minutes, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm not going to talk about the events of September 11 again. Everyone has said that on September 11 everything changed. I am wondering whether this applies to Canada's traditional foreign affairs policy. Let me explain what I mean.

Historically, the Canadian Forces have always had an excellent reputation as peacekeeping forces. This is universally acknowledged. People say that Canadian soldiers are probably the best in the world for peacekeeping missions. However, 750 of these soldiers will be involved in an offensive action very soon. They are leaving tomorrow. I think this is a huge change in the traditional policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian government as regards our involvement in conflicts on this type. In my view, this is the first obvious point.

The second obvious point is that Canada, from what I have seen, has always favoured actions headed by the UN, NATO, or a major coalition. I find it rather special that the Canadian Forces are now coming under the command of the American Forces. In my view, this is not in keeping with the approach traditionally adopted by the Government of Canada.

My final concern is about civil rights and prisoners. I do not think I heard Canada complaining that there is a camp located on a ship and that American civil law does not apply to these prisoners. What is going on on that ship? Not many people are aware of this, and no one within the Canadian government has protested about the civil rights of these prisoners and about the issue of rights in general. Canada has hardly mentioned the Geneva Convention in this regard.

The same is true of the base in Guantanamo. Prisoners are being taken from one country to another, and there have been no protests from Canada about this either.

My question is very simple, Mr. Wright. Has there not been a break with the past? Have the events of September 11 and their aftermath not meant that there has been a fundamental change in Canada's traditional policy on foreign affairs?

¸ (1400)

[English]

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): [Inaudible—Editor]...90-second box.

Mr. James R. Wright: Thank you very much.

I don't think Canadian foreign policy has changed at all. What I would argue is that the world environment continues to evolve. We are seeing different types of conflict from those we have seen before. We're seeing more civil war; we're seeing more inter-ethnic conflict. I think the international community, including the United Nations, I would argue, has had to adapt to those changing circumstances. The demand out there for international peacekeeping forces outstrips available assets. The number of conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and central Asia outstrips the capacity for people to go ahead and perhaps respond as meaningfully as we could. But I think the UN has adapted to the fact that not all of these forces have to be sent out as blue-helmeted operations. In fact, the International Security Assistance Force, which is being led by the United Kingdom in Kabul, is a force authorized by the United Nations, but it is clearly a coalition of the willing. We have seen the same take place in the Balkans. In fact, the majority of peacekeeping troops operating internationally right now are more in the form of coalitions of the willing, similar to what we are doing in Kandahar, to what the British are doing in Kabul, than the traditional blue-helmeted UN operations.

So I think that is simply the international community adapting to changed circumstances. I think Canada has recognized this, and our peacekeepers are contributing where we think they can do it best. In some cases it's as a blue-helmeted operation, as was the case in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In other cases we are doing it as part of a coalition of the willing. That's the case in Kandahar and that's the case in the Balkans.

I would also argue that these forces going to Kandahar right now could be part of offensive operations. We have participated actively in similar campaigns in the past, including instances where we have been operating under a UN umbrella, wearing blue helmets, as was the case with the UN protection force in Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990s, when about 18 Canadian soldiers lost their lives. So this is not a new dimension of Canadian peacekeeping, where all of a sudden we're participating in action overseas that is higher risk.

The final item is with respect to civil rights of prisoners. The answer I would give is that we have a very active and ongoing dialogue with our American partners on all aspects of the conflict. The Americans have made it very clear that they intend to treat all detainees humanely. They intend to fully respect international law. I can tell you from my discussions with the International Red Cross on Monday of this week that they expressed no difficulties in gaining access to detainees on ships, or in detention centres in Afghanistan, whether held by the Americans or by the Afghanis. As I said today, the international Red Cross is in the process of visiting those detainees who are at Guantanamo Bay.

¸ (1405)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Mr. Godfrey, you have five minutes.

Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.): I'd like to continue to pursue the aid of prisoners. In the context of my understanding of our national sovereignty, which is a blend of our values, our self-interest, and our intellectual sovereignty over problems, we make our own independent assessment of how things are.

Following on your last question, let me ask you two. Are you satisfied at this point with the information you have to date that the Americans have been entirely correct in the way in which they classify these people--you call them “detainees”, I think “prisoners” is more to the point--when they call them “unlawful combatants”, or is there some element of ambiguity in there about them being regular Afghan soldiers or Taliban soldiers who come from a poor country and don't wear uniforms? That's the first issue. Are we absolutely confident that the Americans have got it right today, or that we don't know?

There is a second issue. If this ambiguity persists, and we're not convinced they're right, and we know from what the minister said this morning that prisoners will be taken because of the nature of the operation--we're going to be investigating high-danger sites, we're going to be chasing the Taliban, we're going to be chasing al-Qaeda; he said so--we're left with three alternatives. Since we don't have any detention facilities, the alternatives will be: take no prisoners, free them, or turn them over to the Americans. How do we calibrate our response to that? I don't think we can turn a blind eye or outsource our moral obligations. It seems to me that unless we're absolutely certain about this issue, we are hopelessly compromised.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Mr. Wright.

Mr. James R. Wright: The answer to the first question, are we satisfied to date with the treatment of the detainees by U.S. authorities, is yes. Are we monitoring the situation carefully? Yes. Are there questions that still need to be addressed, including the question of these military commissions? Yes. Will we be following closely the results of consultations undertaken by the International Red Cross? Yes. Will we want to ensure that all prisoners are treated humanely and under international law? Yes.

Our understanding is that, like Canada, if there is uncertainty as to the status of an individual--whether that individual is a civilian, an unlawful combatant, or a prisoner of war--until that individual is examined by a tribunal to formally establish that individual's status, the Canadian government treats that individual as a prisoner of war until it is determined otherwise. And my understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that we can expect exactly the same treatment by the U.S. authorities.

Mr. John Godfrey: Thank you.

¸ (1410)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): As to the evidence for which you make the statement that you're satisfied that the Americans are doing the right thing to date, has that been independently verified or are we simply taking the Americans at their word? Do we know, for example, that there are no prisoners taken who are under the age of 18? Do we know if they're making a distinction between people who are supposed to be al-Qaeda versus people who are supposed to be part of the Taliban? Do we know the difference between irregular and uniformed forces in that context? Have we done it independently?

Mr. James R. Wright: I guess there are two answers to the question. Given the fact that we are only just beginning to put our troops on the ground in Afghanistan, we will be able to better independently corroborate some of the questions you are asking in due course. However, I would say that we have seen no evidence to date--and that was your question--as to whether or not the United States is not living up to its obligations under international law. Furthermore, I would argue that in fact the principal responsibility for independently corroborating evidence here in fact rests with the International Red Cross. As I say, we have kept an active and ongoing dialogue with them to the point that we had the number three representative from the International Red Cross in Ottawa on Monday, together with the team that was going into Guantanamo Bay. We discussed these issues at some length with them. If they had serious problems with the treatment of detainees by U.S. authorities, we didn't hear it from the International Red Cross. Quite the contrary.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Mr. Wright. Just before we go to Mrs. Wayne, I would like to have one clarification.

You made reference, Mr. Wright, earlier to possible cases where there may not be a transfer of a detainee or detainees. When Mr. Eggleton was here this morning, he said there would be no detention facilities. So if you do have a detainee, and regardless of what classification might ensue, what do you do with the person? What do you do with someone? You're not transferring them. You don't have a detention facility. What do you do?

Mr. James R. Wright: I think we're getting into a level of detail here that goes beyond in a sense some of the competencies of the panel you have in front of you right now. These are issues we are discussing with our colleagues at the Department of National Defence. I'm not sure we've had an opportunity, frankly, to work through all the hypothetical scenarios. They quite understandably are being raised here by the committee this afternoon.

As I say, I think we have a very clear sense as to what our obligations are under international law and we will ensure that those obligations are met by Canadian soldiers. But I'm not sure I want to get into details as to how all of this is going to be operationalized by Canadian troops on the ground. Quite honestly, I have not had an opportunity to sit down and discuss this issue with the Chief of the Defence Staff and with his team in terms of how this is going to be done. But I'm sure there will be opportunities in the days ahead for us to work this through.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

And thank you for your patience, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): I'll take the second question.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Oh, okay.

Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC/DR): I'm impersonating Elsie Wayne.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): You've got a task ahead of you.

Mr. Bill Casey: I do, don't I? I don't think it will ever work, but thanks very much.

Mr. Wright, you should know that the Minister of National Defence told us this morning that you'd have all the answers.

They said earlier that there had to be a tribunal to determine the status of detainees--to determine whether they're unlawful combatants or POWs. To the best of your knowledge, was there a tribunal prior to transporting all of these Afghanis to Cuba?

Mr. James R. Wright: To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Bill Casey: If there are any prisoners captured by Canadians, will there be a tribunal to determine their status before they are transported?

Mr. James R. Wright: Again, I think that gets back to the question from the chairman. You're asking me operational questions as to how some of these transfers may be affected on the ground.

Again, I wasn't here for the hearing that was held this morning before this committee, but my recollection--what I was told--was that the Chief of the Defence Staff and Minister Eggleton made clear that not all of the rules of engagement had been finalized and concluded by the Canadian side and discussed with our colleagues from the United States. My suspicion is that these are exactly some of the issues that are in the process of being sorted out right now.

It's a good question, Mr. Casey, but I can't give you a definitive answer as to exactly how this is going to be done. I know the standards against which Canadian soldiers will be taking decisions on these issues, but as to the actual process that will be followed by Canadian Forces on the ground, I would hesitate to give you a precise answer. I simply haven't had an opportunity to discuss this with our colleagues at the defence department, but I know they are sensitive to these concerns.

The statement I read out at the end of my opening remarks with respect to this issue was a statement that we had discussed carefully with our colleagues at the defence department, the Judge Advocate General's office, and ourselves. I'm very confident that those standards that we have out there will be applied 100% by Canadian Forces on the ground. As to how it's going to be operationalized, I would hesitate to give you a precise answer.

¸ (1415)

Mr. Bill Casey: This isn't so much an operational issue; it's a policy issue of whether or not we are going to determine the status of people before we move them to a different continent.

Just moving along, if an unlawful combatant is subject to the death penalty after capture by Canadian soldiers, he'd move to the American jurisdiction or control, and he is then possibly subject to the death penalty. Does Canadian law kick in there and prevent us from transferring a prisoner to somebody...that would be subject to the death penalty?

Mr. James R. Wright: I will answer the first part of the question, I'll try again, and I will then ask, as they always say, my legal counsel, as I am not a lawyer, to go ahead and, to the best of our ability, answer the second question, which I certainly understand.

I would simply repeat that if there is any doubt about the status of a detainee, the international principle that is out there is that you have a tribunal. If there is no doubt--

Mr. Bill Casey: Excuse me. Will that be done before he's transported to another continent?

¸ (1420)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Mr. Casey, your time has expired. You'll have to get your further question in the next round.

Mrs. Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much for your presentation.

I have one specific question. Canada does not have the death penalty, not in our Criminal Code, not in our military law. I participated in the Assembly of Parliamentarians at the Council of Europe in June and in the debate on the issue of the death penalty, where the judicial commission had recommended that the United States, if it does not abolish the death penalty, at least declare a moratorium on it. It has the death penalty within its military law, unless I'm mistaken. Therefore, my concern is that prior to our giving over anybody we have arrested to the United States, though we're happy that their status was rightfully determined to be unlawful combatant or prisoner of war, we ascertain that the individual will not be subject to the death penalty through an American-led and -controlled judicial process, whether it's under their military law, whether it's under their criminal code, regardless, if we are the ones who have detained that individual.

So what I would like to know is, under the rules of engagement--and we're not talking about day-to-day operation, we're talking about our government's policy--have we made the determination that we will not turn over any person we have detained, regardless of whether we're satisfied with the fact that they'll be treated humanely while they're being detained, etc., that their status has been properly designated by the United States, without the assurance that if they're brought before some form of judicial hearing, military or not, they will not be subject to the death penalty? That's my question.

Mr. James R. Wright: I think it's a very good, very important question.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Well, yes, people's lives depend on it.

Mr. James R. Wright: The best answer I can give you is to pick up on some of the observations from Minister Eggleton and General Henault.

As we are working through the various rules of engagement, we are extremely sensitive to this issue. We are aware of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in this respect in terms of extradition. We are discussing this issue with lawyers at the defence department and the justice department, and we will be engaging U.S. authorities. I cannot give you a definitive answer to this question at this juncture, but I certainly understand the nature of the concern and understand what efforts the Canadian government has made in the past with respect to the extradition of individuals to the United States.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: May I interrupt you?

In that case, can you give this joint committee an undertaking that once those discussions have been completed to the satisfaction of the Canadians representing our government, whether they're military or otherwise, and there is a final determination of the basis on which we will be turning over, etc.--death penalty--that you will either come back to this committee or will write to this joint committee and explain those terms in detail?

Mr. James R. Wright: We are happy to take this issue under advisement and come back to the committee. Of course, we'll need to also confer with our new minister on this issue.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

It is time to go to Ms. Gallant, and then to Mr. Dromisky--and Mrs. Wayne, we will then get you in.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): During the parliamentary recess, the Prime Minister appeared on TV and unilaterally declared, without consultation with the representatives of the people of Canada, that should the war on terrorism extend to Iraq, Canada would not be participating.

Further to the question of my colleague on meeting our future obligations, I have to ask this question. Is the supervised neglect of our military dictating our foreign policy? And what is our overall foreign policy as it applies to the expansion of this war on terrorism? Are we going to continue to fly by the seats of our pants, or are we eventually just going to become an extension of U.S. foreign policy? That's my first question.

¸ (1425)

Mr. James R. Wright: I have a couple of answers.

First of all, with respect to your example of Iraq, I would say a couple of things. Are we happy with the situation on the ground in Iraq? No. Do we want Saddam Hussein to comply with existing UN Security Council resolutions and to allow inspectors into Iraq? Yes. Did we support the smarter sanctions that were approved by the UN Security Council in late 2001 to try to encourage greater cooperation on the part of Iraqi authorities? Absolutely.

Do we support an expansion of the campaign against terrorism to include Iraq right now? No. We would require clear and compelling evidence of either a direct threat from Iraq, or of a direct connection between the events of September 11 and Iraqi authorities, but no such clear and compelling evidence has come forward. I think the Prime Minister also observed that there would be an impact on the existing political coalition created following September 11, one bringing together the Arab and Islamic world, in support of this fight against terrorism.

I think the comments of the Prime Minister were that we should be proceeding very judiciously here. I don't think it was a reflection of Canada's disinterest or lack of concern about Iraq. Quite the contrary. I also don't think it was a suggestion that Canada is abandoning its international responsibilities in the fight against terrorism. I think the Prime Minister simply was laying down some very clear criteria that Canada would be looking at in respect of any new phase of the campaign against terrorism, beyond Afghanistan.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

What is Canada's long-term foreign policy as it applies to Afghanistan? We have to participate in the reconstruction so that, five years down the road, we're not in a situation in which we're going through this entire exercise all over again. What is Canada's foreign policy going to do to promote a stable environment, one of cooperation as opposed to one fostering hatred?

Mr. James R. Wright: I would answer very clearly that it is not just Canada, it's the international community. There is a commitment out there to assist the Afghan authorities through this very difficult period of time, not just in the short term, not just in the medium term, but in the long term. I think the Prime Minister, Minister Manley, and others have made the case very clearly, very squarely, that it is going to take a long-term, sustained effort to assist the Afghan authorities to put in place the appropriate governance structures that country, sadly, has been lacking for so long.

Humanitarian efforts are underway on the part of the Canadian International Development Agency. This includes the contribution of $100 million that will be made in the months to come to assist in this reconstruction effort—everything from humanitarian assistance, to return of refugees, to de-mining. This is not an effort that is going to end in a matter of months. We are talking about sustained, long-term investment, not just by Canada, but by all countries in the world. I think you will hear that message come through loudly and clearly when Canada and other countries participate in this very important reconstruction conference that will be taking place in Tokyo—and I think that's next week, but I can't remember the exact dates.

¸ (1430)

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Mr. Dromisky is next, followed by Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Stan Dromisky (Thunder Bay—Atikokan, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Two of my questions have already been asked regarding Iraq and the role of NATO. I have a concern that I'm sure a great number of other people have.

Prior to the al-Qaeda–Taliban period of government and governance, there was a government in power--prior to the Russians coming in--under which corruption was a way of life. It was corruption to the point at which I think that way of life helped to bring about a change to the government we are now trying to destroy--and at this point, I think we have very successfully destroyed it. A new government has come in, and I believe it is called the Northern Alliance. They are composed chiefly of the very same people who were in positions of authority and governing the country before the Taliban came to power.

What guarantee is there in our policy, operations, or strategies that corruption will not continue? Once upon a time, over 90% of the heroin in the world was being produced in the northern portion of Afghanistan. What guarantee is there that this will not continue? Corruption existed between and among all authorities at federal, regional, and municipal levels. Not only public authorities, but government and military authorities engaged in practices that we would classify as being corrupt.

Taxpayers are giving millions of dollars to this country. We know for a fact already, right now, that there are authorities charging for the food we are donating. There is graft taking place. Corruption is there. I don't want Canadian taxpayers' dollars going to a humanitarian effort at assisting people who have been devastated for years and years, when it will assist a few individuals to become extremely wealthy and then, when those individuals have obtained sufficient funds, leave the country and claim landed immigrant status in Canada.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Mr. Wright.

¸ (1435)

Mr. James R. Wright : These are all such simple questions. I really....

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): That's why they pay you the big bucks, right?

Mr. James R. Wright: That's right.

I have a couple of answers. I don't disagree with the picture you paint. This is a country that has suffered for a very long period of time—warlordism, corruption, drugs, and terrorism. Afghanistan has suffered for decades, in the past three years from drought as well. Nobody should underestimate the challenge that faces Canada and that faces the international community.

I would answer you by saying that we go into these reconstruction efforts with our eyes wide open. It's not as though we haven't faced this kind of situation before. We are experiencing exactly the same types of problems in the Balkans today, problems of drugs, organized crime, and corruption, and within the international community Canada has, I think, played a leadership role on issues like police training, military training, training for the judiciary, human rights, teaching tolerance, education, and health standards. These are all areas where Canada has established excellence in what it can bring to bear in terms of improving governance structures in countries where we are trying to help out.

I think you can take it as a given that the Canadian International Development Agency will be attaching particular importance to governance structures to try to ensure that the scenario you have painted becomes history for Afghanistan and that we are giving the people of Afghanistan a better opportunity than what they've had for the past two or three decades. It's a very legitimate concern you have raised, but I think the international community understands full well what we're up against, as does the Canadian government.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you. I think you earn your pay, Mr. Wright.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

Well, my question is a little different. My question comes from my concern about terrorists right here in Canada: what are we doing? I say this because in the last two and a half months I have been called to a meeting in my riding to find there were reservations made right in my riding by people who apparently were and are terrorists trying to get to New York, trying to find out the way to get from Saint John to New York. They made 23 reservations, didn't keep the 23 reservations, but tried to find out how to get from Saint John to New York. And then there was one who did get out. I believe you might find that the one who did was one of those who hit the towers in New York.

Now, I have major concerns, and I've been trying to address them with the Solicitor General's office. I know that NATO is deploying two additional AWACS, early warning aircraft, to the U.S. They're adding two more. I'm asking myself, are we expecting more attacks?

But right here in Canada, my understanding is, Mr. Chairman, that in 1999 CSIS asked for more money because they knew there were problems with some of these people in Canada. Instead of getting an increase in their budget, they got a decrease, and they had to lay some people off. I am really concerned about Canada right now. Could you please just inform us as to what steps...? You work, I would assume, with the Solicitor General's office and with the defence department, all of you together...because we have major concerns here in Canada.

I also was informed in just the last two months that some of these terrorists are looking at 11 of our cities across this nation right now. One happens to be mine because I have a nuclear power plant and the largest privately owned oil refinery there is anywhere in Canada and probably in the world. But mine is one.

So there are all kinds of them right across this nation. What are we doing to protect our own country of Canada from these types of attacks that have been taking place here, in Afghanistan, in New York City, and so on. What are we doing, sir?

Mr. James R. Wright: Well, I'm very grateful for the question. I won't pretend to be the expert in terms of all the steps that are being taken in Canada. It's a question that would probably be better directed to the Solicitor General, CSIS, or the RCMP.

What I can answer, however, is that there has been an unprecedented level of effort undertaken by the interdepartmental community in the Canadian government. We work together, hand in glove, with our colleagues at the Solicitor General, at CSIS, at the RCMP, and with the Department of National Defence, in running down exactly the kinds of concerns you have identified today.

You are well familiar with the steps that have been taken by the Canadian government in terms of increased resources for the RCMP, for CSIS, for the Solicitor General. Some new resources in the budget came to the Department of Foreign Affairs as well to help us out in the area of counter-terrorism policy. I can assure this committee that these resources are being put to the very best effect.

Again, in terms of threat levels against Canada, I think you are better off getting that information directly from the Solicitor General. But I think he has indicated in the past, as have others, that there are still threats out there. Every one of these leads is run down, not just by the appropriate Canadian authority, but by the international community. The level of cooperation that is underway, not just between Canada and the United States but among all allies in this fight against terrorism, has been exceptional. Sharing of information....

There is a case you have read about in the last day with respect to Singapore, where there are allegations. We are working closely with our colleagues from Singapore to try to get to the bottom of that particular case.

You made an assertion with respect to the fact that there may have been Canadians or individuals who came from Canada to participate in the attacks against New York.

¸ (1440)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Not Canadians, but people living in Canada.

Mr. James R. Wright: Not Canadians, but individuals who may have come from Canada to participate in these attacks.

To the best of my knowledge, I think the ministers—Minister Manley, Minister MacAulay, the Prime Minister, and others—have been very clear on this score. There is no evidence to date to suggest that any individual who perpetrated those attacks on September 11 came from Canada. They came from a lot of other countries. A lot of them had been in the United States for an extended period of time, and the Americans are the first to acknowledge this. To the best of my knowledge, to date there is no information to suggest that individuals came from Canada, and that is an acknowledged fact on the part of U.S. authorities.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Dr. Patry, followed by Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wright.

I want to continue with Ms. Gallant's line of questioning about the reconstruction of Afghanistan. You said in your statement that Canada was actively involved in the work of a number of donor groups, which are currently developing strategies designed to promote the recovery of Afghanistan. All these matters will be discussed in detail in the very near future, namely, next week in Tokyo at the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.

My first question is this. Will the Government of Afghanistan be represented at this conference in Tokyo? What objectives will be genuinely sought? Have you already had some discussions with these donor groups, or are you in discussion with them at this time? Are the objectives similar to those of CIDA, that is, education, etc.?

[English]

How do these objectives compare with those of the Afghan government? Is the Afghan government seeking these objectives? Is there any interference with their internal affairs?

Mr. James R. Wright: Thank you very much. That's a good question. Can I get back to the committee on the specific question as to whether or not the Afghan authorities themselves are participating in the conference?

I can tell you that one of the reasons they have these international conferences on reconstruction--and we went through this with respect to the Balkans as well--is to ensure an appropriate needs assessment and to ensure that we avoid duplication of effort on the part of international organizations and on the part of individual countries. In terms of establishing priorities for Afghanistan, I think the lead on that has been taken by the World Bank, the UN Development Program, and the Asian Development Bank. They will be making presentations at the conference in Tokyo based on their own needs assessment, based on looking at the situation on the ground and talking to the Afghan authorities, so I don't think you're looking at a set of circumstances where the international community is going to turn around and offer assistance that is contrary to the wishes of the Afghan authorities.

Mr. Bernard Patry: That's fine.

There's no way they want to impose our views, our western views, on the Afghan people?

Mr. James R. Wright: No. In fact, I think there have been a lot of lessons learned from exactly this type of experience in other countries. You have to respect the history, the culture, and the social norms in Afghanistan. You have to work with Afghan authorities in a way that best responds to their requirements. I know that the UN's special representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Brahimi, is especially sensitive on this particular issue and is trying to ensure that the international community is attuned to exactly that issue, so I don't believe that will be a problem.

We'll get back to you specifically on the issue of the Afghan authorities participating in this conference. I'm afraid I just don't know the answer.

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Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Mr. Patry.

Mr. Bachand, followed by Mr. Godfrey.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to continue my discussion with Mr. Wright about Canada's traditional foreign policy. I gave some examples earlier. I think Ottawa's policy has changed since September 11, and I am afraid that it will continue to change. I would like to describe for Mr. Wright how I see the situation since September 11.

I think the American position is one of an extraordinary power that is ahead of about three-quarters of the planet. Mr. Bush set the tone of the policy when he said, and some now call this the Bush doctrine—that those who were not with the Americans were with the terrorists. That placed many countries in an awkward position. They thought that they could not be with the terrorists, because they were with the Americans. From that point on, the American policy dictated how all countries particularly Canada, should behave.

In my view, Canada has no choice, it must say yes to whatever is decided at the high command in Tampa Bay. I do not think we had any choice: we had to send people to the theaters of action. Canada could have said that it would go to Afghanistan once peace was established, because its specialty is peacekeeping, and that it would send in troops when it was all over, but I think the high command in Tampa and George Bush did not want that. So we could not take that position. Nor could we say that we would go to Afghanistan only under the auspices of the UN. I think the Americans dictated Canada's foreign policy. Canadians were told that they would go to Afghanistan, but under the auspices of the Americans.

The same is true of human rights. In my opinion, Canada has always been as a country with a great deal of respect for human rights. As we saw in the examples I gave earlier, we are closing our eyes to what is going on, and we are going to have trouble correcting the situation if it is not in keeping with Canada's traditional respect for human rights.

Mr. Wright, are we not in a trap, to some extent? That is my question. Is Canada's foreign policy at the moment, not constrained by the Bush doctrine, which states that if one is not with the Americans,one is with the terrorists, particularly given that we are the neighbour of the United States, the country on which they can automatically count?

[English]

Mr. James R. Wright: I would answer, I guess, in a couple of respects. Yes, the United States is a pre-eminent world power at the present time, but as I said in my opening remarks, I think a lot of people expected that the United States would conduct itself differently in response to this terrorist attack that killed over 3,000 people in New York, in Washington, and in Pennsylvania. I think a lot of people thought the Americans would act precipitously, that they would do it without consultation, that they would not work with the United Nations, that they would engage in revenge, and that it would all happen extremely quickly.

Well, it didn't play out that way. The United States took their time. They worked very closely with the international community in trying to develop a coalition, not just with NATO but with Arab countries and with Islamic countries. There was no precipitous action by the United States. There was a lot of resolve, but they developed their case; they presented their evidence to the international community; they worked cooperatively in developing this political coalition to combat terrorism.

They have played a helpful leadership role at the UN Security Council--again, something that was perhaps not expected by some in the international community. I have to say that at an extremely tense time in the world today, the United Nations Security Council continues to operate on the basis of unanimity. I think that's a powerful signal to the terrorists who are out there.

Did we have a choice as to whether we participated in the Kandahar operation? Yes, we did. I think we took the conscious decision that we wanted to be there. We wanted to go ahead and contribute. We're not going because the Americans told us we have to go; we're going because we feel we can make an important contribution in the global fight against terrorism. We're going because we feel our troops are up to the challenge.

So I don't regard this as a trap at all. I regard it as an opportunity to stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends and neighbours and to show support for this fight against terrorism.

As Minister Manley indicated a few weeks ago, it's not as though we agree with the U.S. administration on everything they want to do. In fact, we disagree with them on a number of fairly important policy issues, whether the issue is biological weapons, land mines, the International Criminal Court, or arms control and disarmament issues. Take weaponization of outer space: we have some questions concerning the ballistic missile defence program. It's not as though, just because the Americans want to do something, Canada automatically turns around and says yes.

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The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Mr. Wright.

Now we go to Mr. Godfrey, followed by Mr. Benoit.

Mr. John Godfrey: I have three questions.

President Bush says he makes no distinction between terrorists and the regimes that harbour them, so my first question is, does Canada make a legal or foreign policy distinction between those two sorts of entities?

My second question is, if we do make such a distinction, how will that be reflected in the Kandahar operation when we seem to be indiscriminately chasing members of al-Qaeda and members of the Taliban army?

My third question goes back to the one I asked earlier about whether you were satisfied to date with the treatment of the prisoners taken to Guantanamo. If Canadian soldiers were in a war and taken prisoner and then, without tribunal or trial, hooded and bundled onto aircraft, taken thousands of miles away to a third country and put in solitary confinement in a cage, would we accept that as standard, humane treatment unless we were otherwise advised?

Mr. James R. Wright: I think Canada has spoken out not only on the question of terrorists but on the question of countries that harbour terrorists as well. I know that we have spoken very directly, for example, to many of the countries in the Middle East, so-called countries of concern, with regard to this whole issue of state-sponsored terrorism and countries that turn a blind eye to terrorists in their countries. We have taken a very clear position on this issue, whether the issue is Iran, Syria, or Lebanon. There are a lot of other countries as well. Those are the three that come to mind.

I know that Mr. Manley, when he was travelling in that part of the world, had some pretty tough discussions with his counterparts. They didn't necessarily always like the messages he was delivering, but I think we are true to our word here. Are we only concerned about terrorists? No. Are we concerned about state-sponsored terrorists? Absolutely.

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Mr. John Godfrey: I guess the point I was trying to ask about was whether we make an official distinction between terrorists and regimes that harbour them: a legal distinction or a foreign policy distinction.

Mr. James R. Wright: There is a distinction between a terrorist group and a country that harbours terrorism, so yes, we do make a distinction between them. But as for countries that harbour terrorists and countries that sponsor terrorists, we take a very dim view of this from a foreign policy point of view and we say so very directly to the countries in question. I'm not sure that from a legal point of view there is a distinction. I don't think there is.

In regard to your last question concerning this hypothetical set of circumstances you're describing, I guess we're going a little bit around in circles on this. I don't want to try to offer more detailed responses than I think I have already given on this issue. There will be a lot of hypothetical circumstances that Canadian Forces are going to have to deal with on the ground. I have tried to articulate what principles I think will guide their behaviour in terms of how they treat these individuals and how we, the Canadian government, will guard treatment of these detainees, whether it's in Afghanistan or whether it's in Guantanamo Bay. We will speak directly to U.S. authorities, as we have in the past. We will also listen to what important international agencies like the international Red Cross have to say about this. I am not sure I can take the issue any further.

Mr. John Godfrey: I guess my only point is that I hope we would wish to treat other prisoners of war or detainees in the same way as ours would be treated. That would strike me as being a reflection of our values.

Mr. James R. Wright: As I said at the outset, we will be guided by international law and we will make certain that prisoners are treated humanely. The Canadian Forces are used to this. They have dealt with this problem. They have dealt with this issue in the past. I have every confidence in the ability of the Canadian Forces to understand what their obligations are under international law and under Canadian law.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Mr. Wright, we talk about prisoners of war. Is this a war? I know we are there under the blessing of article 51 of the UN Charter. Generally speaking, at least, I think of war as some kind of a formal declaration by one state against another. According to Canadian law or international law, is this a war?

Mr. James R. Wright: I'll let John answer this, but I think the answer is that we would regard this as an armed conflict. I am not sure when the last time was that the Canadian government issued a formal declaration of war. My suspicion is that it goes back to World War II. I think the answer to your question is that we would regard this as being an armed conflict.

As I mentioned before, I think the nature of armed conflict is changing and has changed in the last 20 or 30 years. In the Second World War, probably 90% of the victims would have been military. In conflict today--too often civil conflict--the figures are reversed and 80% to 90% of the victims are civilians. It's a very different type of environment that we are dealing with right now. I think the international community, the UN, NATO, and other institutions, has done its best to go ahead and adapt and respond to that by putting together these various coalitions of the willing. That is understood, respected, and supported by the United Nations.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Mr. Benoit is next--thank you for your patience--followed by Mrs. Jennings.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Wright, you have made a big issue of signing and actually helping lead to the establishment of the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty. I asked you a question about that earlier, and I don't think I got a complete answer. Maybe I'll follow up on it a bit.

I've been told that the Chief of the Defence Staff has issued a direct order to our troops going to Afghanistan not to participate in the planning of any operation involving the deployment of anti-personnel land mines, yet Canadian troops could well enjoy the protection of anti-personnel land mines set by the Americans.

You have assured me that our troops are not threatened in any way legally by this activity. But of course if the Americans were to leave, and the Canadians and Americans had together been physically protected by American anti-personnel land mines, only the Canadians there would be protected by those land mines. I'm looking for some real assurance that our troops aren't going to get stuck in a mess as a result of a situation like that, as an example.

¹ (1500)

Mr. James R. Wright: It's a hypothetical question.

Mr. Leon Benoit: It could well happen, though. It's well within the realm of possibility.

Mr. James R. Wright: I don't want to speculate on how long the Americans are going to be there, whether the Americans will leave before we leave, and whether they will remove their land mines if they leave. I'm afraid I don't know what the standard operating procedure is, what either the international norms or the American norms are on this particular issue. What I do know is that Canadian soldiers understand full well their obligations to respect the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty. My understanding is they will not be subject to prosecution, based on what the Americans may or may not do themselves, on the issue of laying land mines. I don't know--

Mr. Leon Benoit: But isn't it hypocritical that Canada--the Chief of the Defence Staff, on behalf of the government--is saying don't dirty your hands by getting involved in laying anti-personnel land mines, but we'll enjoy the protection of these anti-personnel land mines? To me, that seems awfully hypocritical.

Mr. James R. Wright: No, I don't think it's hypocritical at all. We didn't put the land mines in, and when we send Canadian troops out to operate in places like Bosnia, Kosovo or elsewhere, where there is risk--Ethiopia, Eritrea--our forces are used to dealing with that level of risk, without having to resort to the use of land mines.

I think the answer is that there was a national decision taken by the U.S. government to go ahead and use this. It's their prerogative to go ahead and do this. We don't use them, we won't use them, and our troops won't be associated with going ahead and planting them.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, on a different line of questioning, it seems to me that the government in the past has allowed Foreign Affairs to direct them in a way that has gotten Canada in trouble, by making military commitments that really can't be dealt with properly. I'll refer to a quote from the Somalia inquiry. This was from 1997, in the Somalia report.

...we found that reckless haste and enthusiasm for high-risk, high-profile action undermined due process and rational decision making at the most senior levels. Doctrine, proven military processes, guidelines, and formal policy were systematically disregarded. What guidelines and checklists that did exist were treated with little respect. The deployment therefore began with an uncertain mission, unknown tasks, ad hoc command arrangements, an unconsolidated relationship to U.S. command,and unclear rules of engagement.

The minister was here today and you are here today, saying the rules of engagement are still being developed, in spite of the fact that our troops are leaving tomorrow en masse for Afghanistan. We still got in a mess after that in Somalia and Zaire, in 1996, where again these things weren't properly considered before the troops were sent in.

I'm looking for your assurance that this time, in Afghanistan, we're not going to end up with the same kind of mess because the government has listened to Foreign Affairs and become involved, when the military simply is stretched too thin, hasn't had enough commitment from government, and doesn't have the people and the proper equipment to properly and safely carry out this mission.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): We'll try to let you give a short answer, Mr. Wright.

Mr. James R. Wright: Of course the Department of National Defence listens to what the Department of Foreign Affairs has to say, but I would also say Foreign Affairs listens very carefully to what National Defence has to say. No decision on deployment is taken by Foreign Affairs alone. It's standard operating procedure that we work up these missions as a team. There is no freelancing by the Department of Foreign Affairs, just as there is no freelancing by the Department of National Defence on something like this. Sending our peacekeepers overseas is a projection of Canadian foreign policy. We do it as a team. That's the first point.

The second point is that, yes, we have learned a lot of lessons from previous missions, and if you are hearing caution on the part of the Chief of the Defence Staff, Minister Eggleton, or me, it is because we have learned these lessons that we look very carefully at rules of engagement, at mandate, at command and control, and at ensuring that our troops are properly equipped when they go overseas and are ready when they go.

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The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Mrs. Jennings.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I'm going to switch paradigms a little bit, and maybe give you a little bit of a break.

I want to explore with you, discuss with you, and learn from you if, and if so, how, Canada is proceeding to develop ongoing diplomatic relations with the interim government of Afghanistan, what that entails in determining the establishment of those kinds of relationships, and what that implies in terms of developing or creating our consular activities in Afghanistan. When do you foresee that happening, if we're in the process of evaluating the establishment of those kinds of relationships?

Lastly--and I know I don't have much time, thus you will have even less time--since September 11, a number of Afghan Canadian citizens have been highlighted in the news in Canada, whether it was a doctor in British Columbia who was a former mujahedeen fighter, or others in eastern Canada who have had links to or ties with different elements within the Northern Alliance. What, if anything, has Canada done to attempt to identify Canadian citizens of Afghan origin who could be credible in providing ties and links on an ongoing basis in the future--including those needed for economic development, etc.--and who do not have ties with some...therefore, they are not seen by members of the interim government as being aligned, and would be seen as being welcome, impartial, and independent?

Mr. James R. Wright: Those are two good questions.

On diplomatic relations, we are in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. My understanding is that it's a fairly formal process, whereby Canada sends a diplomatic note to the new interim administration and the interim administration responds by saying, yes, it wants to establish diplomatic relations. That process is under way.

Bear in mind that when we talk about the interim administration in Afghanistan, this is a new organization. They're trying to come together as best they can. They are led by Hamid Karzai, a very charismatic individual who is doing yeoman service in the most difficult of circumstances. But it may take a little while for this process to sort itself out. It doesn't mean there's a problem, but that is happening.

In terms of consular activities, my understanding is that we will cover Afghanistan diplomatically, at least initially, probably from our High Commission in Islamabad. This is traditionally what we've done in the past. Our high commissioner, Konrad Sigurdson, was in Kabul for the inauguration of the interim administration on December 22, I think, and we have had our consular officers in there periodically to help out. So that process is under way.

On the second issue, we do recognize that there are some wonderful Afghani Canadian citizens with rich experience that we can learn from in terms of the next steps for the Canadian government in engaging Afghanistan. We have tried to reach out to that community, and I think we've done so successfully so far. There have been a number of what I would call seminars, policy fora, that we have organized at the foreign ministry. We've brought these people in, we've sat down, and we've talked about what the problems are, what the challenges are, what some of the Canadian niches are, and what their reaction is--the reaction of Afghani Canadians--in terms of some of these ideas. So we have done our best since September 11 to identify who these individuals are, but it's a work in progress. I don't pretend that we've captured them all, but we've have some exceptionally good meetings and strong dialogue, and that process will continue.

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The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

Ms. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: To what extent is the supervised neglect of our military shaping foreign policy?

Mr. James Wright: Sorry? To what extent is the...?

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The neglect, the decline of the state of readiness of our military, the decline of the resources, of the capability; to what extent is that shaping our foreign policy?

Mr. James R. Wright: Well, that's your characterization, not mine. I would answer that the Canadian armed forces continue to play a leadership role in terms of peacekeeping activities overseas.

I've been in this business of crisis management since the early 1990s and I've been through four or five wars: Croatia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan. I've done Ethiopia and Eritrea. I can tell you that the Canadian military is held in the highest regard.

I think rather than being skeptical, Canadians should be proud of the fact that when those deployment options were being considered by the British government and by the American government, to whom did these two authorities turn to help them out? They didn't say, “Your armed forces are not up to snuff.” They said, “We want you. We need you as a partner in this process.”

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm not saying that the people are not up to snuff. We're very proud of the work they do. They do the best with what we have. We've let down the people who defend Canada.

Mr. James Wright: But your question was the impact on Canadian foreign policy. I would argue that Canada has a commitment to multilateral institutions, to good governance, to peace and security, to values, to a rules-based system out there. Part of our projection of foreign policy is offering stability in parts of the world that have run into crisis. Our Canadian peacekeepers have helped us go ahead and deliver on those foreign policy objectives time and time again.

So I would not accept the assertion that Canadian foreign policy has been hobbled because our armed forces don't have, in your words, the resources they might like to have. We are using the assets we have right now effectively. We are using them in delivering our foreign policy overseas. This is enormously appreciated by the countries in question and our partners who have participated with us in peacekeeping.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Would we better be able to meet our foreign policy objectives if, for example, we had a rapid-response, air-mobile, self-sustaining light infantry, as we did?

Mr. James Wright: On the issue of strategic lift, the only observation I would make is there are maybe only two countries in the world that have strategic lift. Those are the United States and Russia. Every other country in the world runs into the same type of circumstances the Canadian government runs into in trying to get troops quickly into the field. So don't think for a minute the Canadian situation is particularly unique in that respect.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey: I just want to go back to the process of the tribunal.

Mr. Holmes, maybe I'll address the question to you. Just for debate, we'll say the United States has gathered up some prisoners or detainees in Afghanistan. Who can determine whether there's doubt as to whether they are prisoners of war or unlawful combatants?

You say if there is doubt it will go to a tribunal, but who can do it? Is it only the Americans, or can the Afghans themselves say, “There is doubt here; we're not combatants, we're not soldiers, we're just civilians”? Can another government do it? Who does it? Who raises the flag on doubt?

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Mr. John Holmes (Director, United Nations, Criminal and Treaty Law Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Again, international law requires that the detaining power respect the Geneva Conventions and other aspects of international law.

If that state decides that the status of the individual is not that of a prisoner of war and therefore merits a different status, that is where the doubt first surfaces.

In the situation that we have here, the U.S. has said publicly and to us that although they have not made a determination before a tribunal whether the person is a prisoner of war or has some other status, they will accord that individual the equivalent status. That is the key thing I stressed before. It is the result.

If you put it in doubt--and that would be the detaining power, in this case the United States--and you're going to afford them a different status, you have to have that determination. But if you're going to provide them with the same status and treatment as a prisoner of war, then the question of the tribunal can happen whenever that state so chooses.

Mr. Bill Casey: Is it only the detaining country or state who can determine whether there's doubt?

Mr. John Holmes: The Geneva Conventions provide that if you capture someone who is a belligerent, you must accord them prisoner of war status. So that's your obligation, your basic requirement.

If the detaining power has doubt and you want to treat them differently, then you must put them before a tribunal. If you have doubt--and there have been public expressions of doubt by the U.S. and other authorities--the only reason to go to a tribunal is that you want to accord them different status. And we're not there yet.

Mr. Bill Casey: When it comes to potential prisoners captured by Canadian soldiers, do you know yet how you will handle that? I think you said earlier you don't know, but I just want to confirm that you don't know how we'll handle that as far as a tribunal goes. Will there be a tribunal or do we just treat them as prisoners of war and turn them over to the Americans? Have you established a policy on that?

Mr. John Holmes: I'll go back to what Mr. Wright said, and that is, our forces respect international law. We accord them status equivalent to or better than a prisoner of war status. We have an obligation, when we transfer, to ensure that those individuals have that same status or are treated in that same manner until a determination is made.

So we would accord that status and that level of humane treatment up to, including, and beyond the transfer.

Mr. Bill Casey: If there's doubt, it seems to me the only options we've talked about are unlawful combatant or prisoner of war, but couldn't somebody be a civilian, not involved, and captured by accident? Could that person or a third party not raise doubt and say “Look, you may have a hundred unlawful combatants, but that person's a civilian, and he shouldn't be transported to another continent”? Can anybody raise this doubt and seek a tribunal hearing for that person before he's transferred, in the case of Canadian prisoners?

Mr. John Holmes: Again, the requirement for the detaining power is to determine whether the person is a prisoner of war or a civilian. Normally civilians should not be detained, although they can be. If they are detained, then other aspects of the Geneva Conventions and other areas of international law would apply.

Again, here we're moving into a hypothetical and very specific case.

Mr. Bill Casey: Yes, I know we are.

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Mr. John Holmes: It's really difficult to mention a general rule when in fact these determinations have to be made on the basis of specific cases and specific situations of fact.

Mr. Bill Casey: Just based on this morning and this afternoon, there are two or three areas in which policy hasn't been clarified. One this morning was on the rules of engagement, whether or not they're going to be exactly the same as in the United States. Another one was brought up by Ms. Jennings with regard to the death penalty.

On this tribunal question, I think I'm starting to get it, but if there is a clarification on policy, would you notify the committee on those three issues?

Mr. John Holmes: As Mr. Wright said, I think we have to have our interdepartmental consultations and we have to discuss with our minister. I think he has given that commitment before.

Mr. James R. Wright: Yes, we'll get back to the committee. And it may not necessarily be us; the defence department may want to do this.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you.

Mr. Wright, you made reference to the interim administration in Kabul. First, from where does the Karzai administration draw its legitimacy?

Second, what process is in place that would work towards making whatever is in Kabul a more permanent arrangement, one that perhaps would be seen as having, at least in the eyes of international observers, more legitimacy than, say, what Karzai has? Some people, I assume, would think that Karzai is there as a result of the Americans and the U.K., and that this where he draws his legitimacy from.

Mr. James R. Wright: In fact, I would answer a little differently. I would say that Mr. Karzai and the interim administration derive their legitimacy from the United Nations, which hosted a meeting in Bonn over a number of weeks to try to see whether they could encourage all the different representative groups from Afghanistan to come to agreement on this interim administration. It was the Afghanis themselves with the assistance of the United Nations who took the decisions on who would participate in the interim administration, and Mr. Karzai was chosen by his peers to take on this important challenge. I don't think it's any one individual country. If you want to point in a direction outside Afghanistan, I would say it's the United Nations.

Secondly, I would say that it was the Afghans themselves who agreed on who would be in this interim administration. It is not of course only the Northern Alliance that is represented in this interim administration. In fact, Mr. Karzai is a Pashtun, as are others in the administration. I would not want to lead the committee to believe that there is only one group from Afghanistan that's in this interim administration.

Next, our sense is that under the most difficult of circumstances, so far, so good. The administration is working together reasonably well. The interim administration has a mandate they have agreed to, to rule for the next six months, leading to an emergency session of their council of elders called the Loya Jirga. That mandate is to decide on a transitional authority in approximately June 2002. This transitional authority will govern for no more than two years before handing over power to a democratically elected government in Afghanistan by June of 2004.

These are all the elements of the peace process that were agreed to in Bonn by the Afghan parties themselves. That's the political process, and that's where they derive their legitimacy.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thank you, Mr. Wright. We have five minutes, members, and—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have a point of clarification, if I might, Mr. Chair.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): What's your point, Elsie?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, Mr. Wright had suggested to me when I asked my question that I should be dealing with the Solicitor General's office. I want Mr. Wright to know that I have been dealing with the Solicitor General's office for two months, but I have major concerns. I'm sure that he will have major concerns when he gets all the information I have.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): Thanks, Mrs. Wayne.

We have five minutes, so we'll split it between Mrs. Jennings and Mr. Benoit. You'll get approximately two and a half and no more. The carpenter has to put his hammer down at five o'clock.

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Okay, I'll try to do my question very quickly.

If I understood you correctly, Mr. Holmes, when you explained the Geneva Conventions, everyone the U.S. military personnel has arrested and detained during this conflict in Afghanistan is to be considered a prisoner of war, and if the United States, who is detaining them, feels that they should have another status, they need to go before a tribunal. Is that correct?

Mr. John Holmes: I'm sorry, it's not a clear area of international law, and perhaps I'm not explaining it well. I'll try again. The state has an obligation to provide prisoner of war status to respect the Geneva Conventions and other areas of international law. If you want to accord a different status, you must make a determination.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And to make the determination, you have to go before a tribunal under international law.

Mr. John Holmes: Exactly, but you're missing a step I've tried to convey, which is that the U.S. has said publicly that although they haven't made a determination yet on these individuals, they are going to accord them the equivalent status, and this meets the Geneva Conventions' test. So, yes, the tribunal may at some point be necessary if you want to change the status you're according them, but in practice, as long as you are providing them with certain minimum status....

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Either the status or equivalent status of prisoner of war, which means that theoretically right now every single individual who has been detained by the United States and who is either still in Afghanistan or has been transported to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba is being considered a prisoner of war or is being treated as such. If the United States wishes to change that status, it needs to go before a tribunal, correct?

Mr. John Holmes: Yes.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Mr. Walker, the American citizen who was arrested by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and transported to Guantanamo Bay, and who the United States has publicly just said--

An hon. member: No.

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: He's being detained. Sorry, you're right. He's on a ship. He's being detained. The U.S. has just said it is going to be trying him under its criminal provisions, not under military provisions, not under international provisions, etc., which means that it is not treating him as a prisoner of war. Am I correct?

Mr. John Holmes: First of all, on the treatment he's getting--and I don't want to get into the specifics of an individual case, because I don't know--

Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I mean in terms of the application of the law for trial.

Mr. John Holmes: We are told that the individuals who have been detained, perhaps including Mr. Walker, are receiving the treatment that they would receive under the Geneva Conventions. It's important to remember that under Geneva Conventions international law you can be charged with crimes.

On the question of his status, as to whether he's entitled to some kind of combatant status, that can come up before a competent tribunal. The Geneva Conventions don't specify what. There is case law like, for example, the General Noriega case, where the issue of his combatant status came up at his criminal trial. He was accorded that status by the court, so it is not precluded that Mr. Walker may some day get combatant status.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): One very short question from Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'll follow up on an answer you gave at the very end of my last round of questioning on the issue of Canada learning from past mistakes. I read a quote from the Somalia inquiry. I'd like to know when Canada learned, because Zaire came after Somalia, and there was the Somalia report. We have learned from Somalia, hopefully, but now we're again into a situation where many things aren't clear and yet we're sending our troops into action in Afghanistan. We don't know entirely what the situation is with the land mine thing. We don't know exactly how our troops are going to be working with Americans. We don't know the terms of engagement. The minister said earlier that we don't.

There are a lot of things we don't know yet about what we're sending our troops into, so how can you be so convinced that we've learned from past mistakes?

Mr. James R. Wright: I think we are trying to give as precise answers as we can to what in some cases amount to fairly complex questions that you're putting to us. My bet is that 10 or 20 years ago, when we were sending off troops into the field, none of these questions would have been asked.

The fact of the matter is, yes, we are engaged on some of these issues, and yes, there are a few dimensions of this that need to be tied up. I am very confident that they will be tied up shortly. I am extremely confident that our forces will go ahead and not only fulfil all their obligations under Canadian and international law well but also will work in partnership with American authorities, and we will play a significant role in terms of helping to bring peace and stability to a very important part of Afghanistan.

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Mr. Leon Benoit: If I may, I would suggest that is in spite of government, not because of government. Our men and women serving will do a good job, but no thanks to the government having these things planned out ahead of time and ensuring that we're going into a situation with proper background.

Mr. James R. Wright: I disagree. These issues will be sorted out. When our soldiers arrive, they will have a clear idea as to what their mandate is.

The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard): With that, we will conclude this afternoon's session.

On behalf of all members I want to thank our witnesses, especially you, Mr. Wright. I think you've done extremely well today. Thank you for spending the last two hours with us. We appreciate it very much.

Thank you. This meeting is adjourned.