FAIT Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE • NUMBER 051

CONTENTS

Thursday, January 17, 2002

À

1005

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Harvard

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Eggleton

À

1010

À

1015

À

1020

Mr. David Pratt

General Raymond R. Henault (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence)

À

1025

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Eggleton

À

1030

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Eggleton

Gen Raymond Henault

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

À

1035

Mr. Eggleton

À

1040

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mrs. Jennings

Mr. Eggleton

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

À

1045

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Jennings

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Jennings

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

Gen Raymond Henault

Mr. David Pratt

Ms. McDonough

À

1050

Mr. Eggleton

À

1055

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Eggleton

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mrs. Wayne

Mr. Eggleton

Gen Raymond Henault

Á

1100

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Gen Raymond Henault

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. David Pratt

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Á

1105

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Anders

Gen Raymond Henault

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Rob Anders

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. David Pratt )

Mr. Bachand (Saint-Jean)

Á

1110

Mr. Eggleton

Gen Raymond Henault

Mr. David Pratt

M. Price

Mr. Eggleton

Á

1115

Mr. David Price

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. David Price

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. David Price

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Ms. McDonough

Á

1120

Mr. Eggleton

Ms. McDonough

Mr. Eggleton

Ms. McDonough

Mr. Eggleton

Ms. McDonough

Mr. Eggleton

Ms. McDonough

Mr. Eggleton

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Casey

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Bill Casey

Á

1125

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Eggleton

Mrs. Wayne

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

Mr. Patry

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Godfrey

Á

1130

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Godfrey

Mr. Eggleton

Mr. Godfrey

The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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l

NUMBER 051

l

1st SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Thursday, January 17, 2002

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À  (1005)  

[English]

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.)): I would like to call to order this joint committee meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

    I would like to welcome all the MPs around the table here today for what is the first parliamentary committee meeting of 2002. I would also like to offer each and every one of you a belated happy new year.

    I am joined by my colleague, Mr. John Harvard, MP from the foreign affairs committee, who will be co-chairing today's meeting. I understand that Mr. Harvard has a few remarks he would like to make in connection with the absence of the normal chair.

    Mr. Harvard.

    The Acting Co-Chair (Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James--Assiniboia, Lib.)): Thank you, David.

    I have the privilege of sitting in for the chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, our colleague Bill Graham. As everyone knows, Mr. Graham has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of all the committee members sitting around the table today to offer sincere congratulations to Mr. Graham. Mr. Graham will be unable to be with us today. As you know, he is kind of busy in the wake of his appointment, but he wanted me to say on his behalf that he will be appearing before the foreign affairs committee at the very earliest opportunity. Knowing Bill, I am quite sure that will happen very soon.

    With those few brief remarks, we'll switch it back to David, who will chair this morning's session. David.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, John.

    As John mentioned, I will be chairing this morning's session. John will be chairing this afternoon's session. If...[Technical difficulty--Editor] ...are going to be very challenging for the entire international community in the weeks and months ahead.

    The rules we are going to be applying for this morning's meeting will be the rules of the national defence and veterans affairs committee meetings in terms of the questioning of witnesses. This afternoon's rules will be those of the foreign affairs committee.

    I would also like to take this opportunity to remind members that it was suggested by an order of the House that our two committees meet periodically and jointly to deal with circumstances as they arise in relation to the ongoing situation in Afghanistan. With the recent announcement of the deployment of Canadian troops, the members of the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, it was felt appropriate that this matter be dealt with by a sitting of this joint committee as quickly as possible; hence our meeting today.

    Without any further delay, I would like to welcome the Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General Ray Henault, here today. I understand General Henault had some challenges getting in this morning from Toronto, given the snowfall we've had, so we are very pleased to see you here today, General, and you, Minister. I am sure there are going to be a lot of questions from members sitting around the committee table, and please, if you have statements you would like to deliver to us today, you have the floor.

    Hon. Art Eggleton (Minister of National Defence): Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Co-Chairman, committee members, ladies and gentlemen, and happy new year. This is the first occasion we have had to get together since the change of the year, and I do appreciate the opportunity of being before you today to discuss this matter.

[Translation]

    It is a pleasure for me to be here today to bring you up to date on the latest contribution of Canadian Forces to the international campaign against terrorism.

[English]

    Specifically, I would like to cover three issues this morning: first, our military contribution to date; second, the nature of our operation in Kandahar; and third, the issues of command and control.

    As you know, the multinational military response to the terrorist acts of September 11 began in mid-October. Canada is responding militarily on the basis of article 51 of the UN charter, and there have in fact been three resolutions of the Security Council in support of the use of that article in this case. That article of the UN charter allows states to exercise the right of individual and collective self-defence. This campaign was initially launched in the wake also of NATO's invoking article 5 of the Washington treaty, which collectively implements the UN charter's right to self-defence when a NATO member state has been attacked.

    In October the Government of Canada made it clear to the United States that it was prepared to contribute to the international military campaign aimed at eradicating global terrorism. At that time the government offered a range of Canadian land, air, and sea forces. A number of other governments also made similar offers of assistance, and the United States government, the leader of the coalition, accepted a number of these offers, including some of the military capabilities Canada had put on the table.

    Let me take a minute to update you on the status of those deployed forces. After being at sea for five months, the HMCS Halifax is leaving the Arabian Sea and should be back in Canada by mid-February. The HMCS Toronto has left NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the eastern Mediterranean and will replace the HMCS Halifax, to operate alongside other coalition navies in the Arabian Sea. The HMCS Vancouver, the HMCS Iroquois, the HMCS Preserver, and the HMCS Charlottetown are continuing their mission, which includes maritime interdiction operations and support for other coalition partners. There are some six ships presently involved in this mission in the Arabian Sea or close to it.

    At the same time, our Airbus aircraft continues to ferry personnel and equipment into and within the region. It has transported over two million pounds of equipment and goods in support of the military effort. We have two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft that are conducting surveillance missions over the Arabian Sea. Of course, there are also members of the JTF2. They're operating on the ground in Afghanistan, and have been for the past month. Within a few weeks we expect three Hercules transport aircraft will also be operational in the area to assist with the movement of coalition personnel and supplies.

    Altogether, that's just under 3,000 Canadian Forces personnel committed to this Afghanistan campaign. In respect of countries' contributions to that Afghanistan campaign, we are the fourth largest, after the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Overseeing the operations of these forces is the Canadian task force commander, Commodore Jean-Pierre Thiffault. He and his staff, some 50 of them, are working in Tampa at the U.S. Central Command headquarters, which is responsible for the conduct of the campaign.

    Back in October the United States also decided not to take up other elements of our offer for Canadian Forces, including an infantry battalion group. Of course, we sent the navy in particular and some air force elements at that point. At the time the situation on the ground in Afghanistan could not have been more fluid, and ultimately, the military campaign evolved much more quickly than anticipated. This being so, the United States came back to us early in November with a request to be ready to deploy our infantry battalion, and we therefore put them on a high alert status at that time, as you recall, going from a 7-day notice to move to a 48-hour notice to move. As the campaign plan continued to change very rapidly, we decided to stand down the high readiness level of the battalion until there was greater clarity on the next steps and precisely what and where the mission would be.

À  (1010)  

    Concurrent with these developments, the United Nations launched negotiations in Bonn, Germany, with the principal Afghan parties to try to establish an interim administration for the country. These negotiations also envision the eventual deployment to Afghanistan of a multinational military force to help provide security for that new government.

    The challenge of organizing this force was taken up by the United Kingdom, which quickly began to solicit possible contributions of forces from other governments, including Canada, for a mission that would be in the capital of Kabul and involve approximately 4,500 troops in total.

    At that time, I indicated to the minister of defence of the United Kingdom that we had the infantry battalion, which we had offered back in October, available for this kind of mission. He came back to me and said rather than that, would we consider 200 engineers now, and consider the infantry battalion at a later date, the later date being three months hence, when the British themselves were planning to pull out of the Kabul mission. And we would go in at that point in time to replace them, not to take the command--they would have the command--but to replace their infantry battalion.

    At the same time, the United States approached us with a request for our ground troops to join their mission in Kandahar. Following analysis by our military planners, we concluded that the Canadian Forces could make the most effective contribution by being part of the mission in Kandahar with the United States. It simply provided a better fit for the troops we were prepared to offer, and met our conditions of a clear mandate, set mission, and the use of a formed unit. The British accepted our decision.

    With regard to the ISAF in Kabul, the U.K. defence minister said that Canada's offer was not rejected; they were simply unable to accept it in its entirety from the outset. Of course, the request for 200 engineers at this point in time would have meant pulling together engineers from many different units, including the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI, which would have diminished the effective use of other forces because of the breaking up of the comprehensive team they are part of and the necessary service they provide for the battalion.

    Let me say that this mission we are sending our troops on, and the U.K.-led mission in Kabul, are complementary. They are meant to reinforce one another and ultimately assist with the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, an Afghanistan that never again should be a harbour for terrorists.

    Now to the nature of the mission in Kandahar. This is not a peacekeeping mission. The military campaign in Afghanistan is not over yet. Our troops will be carrying out a variety of tasks, some of which may involve combat operations. Specifically, these tasks include: one, exploring sensitive sites, such as Taliban and al-Qaeda camps and training facilities; two, operations to destroy residual Taliban and al-Qaeda forces; three, military de-mining; four, maintaining security in the Kandahar area; and five, supporting humanitarian assistance operations at the Kandahar airport.

À  (1015)  

[Translation]

    This mission is not without some risks. Some al-Qaeda and Taliban forces members are still present in this region. Unexploded mines and munitions also pose a real danger.

[English]

    But these risks are acceptable given the importance of the mission; they are manageable risks. Our troops are trained, they're equipped, and they're ready to carry out these tasks with particular skill in winter warfare and in reconnaissance.

    The United States requested our forces for these reasons. I know some people have said, well, did they request or did we offer? I think it's reasonable to say that they're both correct.

    In the initial instance back in early October this was part of the offer of forces we put on the table. There was a general offer. But they made a specific request for these forces and a specific request for our Coyote Reconnaissance Squadron as well.

    I would note here that serving with the United States forces in Kandahar is not a departure from standard military operations.

    For years now we have been participating in multinational, United Nations, and NATO missions, as well as with coalitions of the willing, such as in East Timor. These multinational missions have been based on a number of different compositions of forces and mandates, and this latest mission represents simply one in a broad spectrum of partnerships that characterize our international deployments.

    Let me add a final point on the nature of this particular mission.

    This deployment is planned to last up to six months. Before making any decision to send troops, our military planners carefully examined the overall strategic posture of the Canadian Forces, which meant making sure we could support this operation as well as other international deployments. More importantly, it meant making sure we could respond effectively to any potential operations that may occur here at home. This mission will not leave the Canadian Forces unable to fulfill its defence commitments.

[Translation]

    I would now like to turn to the matter of command and control.

À  (1020)  

[English]

    In any coalition operation, whether it's with the United Nations or NATO or a coalition of the willing, multinational troops are placed under the operational control of one coalition commander from a lead coalition partner country. While day-to-day operations fall under his or her orders, all tasks and missions that participating units may undertake are agreed to at the outset by the governments and the military authorities of the coalition partners.

    In this case, the Canadian Forces in Kandahar will only be tasked to conduct operations that have been approved in advance by Commodore Jean-Pierre Thiffault or a higher command, including the Chief of the Defence Staff. If the U.S. commander in theatre wants our forces to conduct any task outside of those that have been agreed to, he must get permission from Commodore Thiffault, who reports directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

    Let me make this clear. At all times, during this or any mission, for that matter, the Chief of the Defence Staff retains full command over all members of the Canadian Forces. These command arrangements are no different from any other missions we have participated in. In fact, there are many examples of Canadian officers exercising operational control over foreign troops. At this very time, Canadian Major-General Robert Meating is commanding the multinational force and observers in Egypt, which include 1,800 personnel from 11 countries, including an infantry battalion from the United States. Major-General Rick Hillier just ended his one-year command of the multinational division, southwest, as part of our SFOR operations in Bosnia. He commanded over 4,000 troops, not only from Canada but from countries such as the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands. There are many more examples of this.

    So when it comes to the mission in Kandahar, the bottom line is this: the chain of command is clear. Under no circumstances would our forces carry out tasks beyond what the Chief of the Defence Staff has authorized them to do, and he in turn has received government authorization through me.

    To sum up, I would say that we have known from the beginning that this campaign would be long and complex, but throughout these last months our resolve has remained steadfast. This latest contribution is proof of that. The men and women of 3PPCLI Battle Group face a difficult mission. There's no doubt about that, but like the other members of the Canadian Forces who are already making a significant contribution to this campaign, they will carry out their task with professionalism and courage.

    Tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to be in Edmonton to help send off the members of the battle group. Already their commanding officer and a tactical reconnaissance group are in Afghanistan, and we expect the remainder of the contingent to join them in the next few weeks. I know, members of committee, that you will join with me, as all Canadians do, in offering them our utmost support, our support to them for a safe return, and our support to their families.

    Thank you.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you very much, Minister.

    General Henault, do you have a statement at this point?

    General Raymond R. Henault (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, I don't have a prepared statement. I would only echo the comments that the minister has already made and add that I did visit the troops in the region. In fact, the minister and I were both in Southwest Asia over the Christmas period, just before and just after.

    I also visited Bosnia and other locations like Geilenkirchen and so on where we have deployed operations. Again, they're doing yeoman's work. The men and women of the Canadian Forces who are deployed, both regular forces and reserve, are doing outstanding service on behalf of this country. I saw very high levels of motivation, enthusiasm, and commitment to what they're doing in whatever region they are in.

    I was also given very strong feedback by the multinational commanders in the region, who expressed their high praise for Canadian Forces, for what they do and how they do it, for the professionalism they have exhibited, and for the capabilities they bring to coalition operations, including Bosnia, and also with the NATO commitment we have there, and of course also in Southwest Asia.

    So I can assure you that what they have there is reflective of the training, equipment, and capabilities they've always taken to the fore in these operations, and I think you can be very proud of what they're doing.

    Thank you.

À  (1025)  

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you very much, General.

    We'll get into the questioning right away then, the seven-minute round, with Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Good morning, Mr. Minister and General. It's very good to have you here this morning. I'm hoping you can answer some very important questions that Canadians would like answered and that we will ask on behalf of Canadians.

    There are a lot of questions to be asked about how we're going to get our troops to the area, what kind of equipment they're going to have, what kind of equipment they're short of--the issue of strategic lift is an example--those types of questions, which are extremely important.

    There are also questions about how we're going to possibly sustain this mission should it go beyond six months and still meet our commitments in the Balkans and elsewhere and other commitments in the area. There are some other issues as well, such as how would any prisoners captured be treated? Would they be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention? Would they be treated as criminals? How would they be treated?

    These are important questions. But this is the defence committee. We have the defence minister here and the Chief of the Defence Staff, so I'd like to get into some questions about some specific military issues.

    My first question, Mr. Minister, leads from a comment that you made here today. You said our troops are trained, they're equipped, and they're ready to contribute--something very much like that. I agree. Our troops are among the best in the world. There's no question of that. That's not the issue here. They're well trained certainly on a personal and small group level; whether there is enough training in the larger levels, certainly most would say no. They're equipped, yes, but are they properly equipped? Most would argue no.

    I'd like to ask you a question leading from that, Mr. Minister. I want to read to you from a memo drafted by the then Commander of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in 1999, Colonel Leslie, when we were deploying 800 troops to Kosovo, and you'll see the relevance here, Mr. Minister. The colonel wrote:

... I am still concerned that the force protection issue has been dismissed away by the assumption that we will rely upon the UK forces for force protection. If our present force has to occupy itself with force protection thus taking away from its primary task, then we will end up being more of an hindrance to any coalition.

    This is a very similar situation we're going into now.

    I'd like to know, Mr. Minister, why this wouldn't apply to this current mission in Afghanistan.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't agree with some of the comments you made in the preamble about most saying no, they're not sufficiently trained or equipped, or whatever else you said.

    This government will not send forces into any operation without making sure they are properly trained and equipped and able to handle the circumstances they could face in that theatre of operations, and that is absolutely the case here.

    In any other case we give them that kind of backing and that kind of resource. That's a policy of this government, and it's a matter that gets considerable discussion with the planning efforts that go on with each individual mission. You can't take a statement that might have been made about another circumstance in the past, which is completely different from the circumstance that exists here.... These people are prepared for this mission. They're properly trained and equipped.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: A specific question then. Do you not have any concerns that our forces are going to be excessively dependent on American support in the event of serious combat?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: There is an interdependence amongst all of the forces there. It's part of a comprehensive team. We're going to be about a third of the force in Kandahar with the 187th Brigade Combat Team, which is part of the 101 Airborne Division.

    We're going to provide, both of us, all of the things that are needed for the entire team to operate as a cohesive unit. We will ensure that we take what our forces need. They will ensure the same for their forces. There are some things we will share and some things will be complementary to each other's needs. And this is a very normal thing to do.

À  (1030)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Minister, have you had any people in the army expressing any reservations about sending 750 soldiers, such a small contingent, and being excessively reliant on American support because of that?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I haven't had anybody express that concern to me. There are thousands and thousands of people in the Canadian Forces. All I've heard is that the people who are part of this mission are feeling they are ready to perform this mission and are ready to go.

    Let me ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to perhaps expand on that.

    Gen Raymond Henault: Thank you, Minister.

    The minister is absolutely correct. The deployment of this battle group is very much complementary to the brigade combat team that is deploying, that being the U.S.187th Brigade Combat Team that is going into Kandahar.

    One of the reasons this battle group does fit so well with that of our American counterparts is that we do have very similar equipment, weapons, training, doctrine, capabilities, and leadership that are very complementary to each other, and all of us, Canadians and Americans, will be providing a force protection mechanism, if you like, that will very much support what they have to do in the theatre of operations.

    In addition to that, with the Coyote reconnaissance vehicles being deployed to Kandahar, that gives them additional surveillance, thermal imagery, and other capabilities that provide them with a day-and-night force protection enhancement. In a force multiplier sense, that will really improve force protection, not only for our troops but also for the American troops who are there. Our troops are also equipped with all of the small arms and self-defence weaponry required for them to do operations in that part of the world.

    Certainly, the commander of the army has expressed full confidence to me in the ability of the unit to do what it has to do with the equipment, training, weapons, and leadership it has, and that certainly is what's being expressed to us by our American counterparts as well.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, General.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you very much, Mr. Benoit.

    The next questioner is Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, let me just say that I returned from Bosnia at the end of November after spending 10 days with Canadian troops stationed there and after training exercises this past summer in Valcartier. I must say that the people currently serving in Bosnia and Afghanistan are extremely dedicated and professional individuals. When they are asked to do a job, they perform as dedicated professionals. However, whether they are officers or enlisted members, it's not everyday they get the opportunity to meet the minister or the Chief of the Defence Staff or to put questions directly to them as we parliamentarians get to do. As I see it, the opposition's role is to ask questions. The government's role is to say that everything is under control and going smoothly, whereas ours is to determine if this is in fact the case or whether the government is being overly optimistic.

    I have a question concerning command and control in Afghanistan. Specifically, I would like to know the reason for deploying 750 troops. I imagine it has to do with Canadian government policy. I'd like to know who is responsible for this decision, Mr. Minister. MPs had no say in this decision. We may have been consulted on the deployment of troops to Afghanistan and Bosnia, and some discussion may have taken place, but we certainly did not take a vote on this matter.

    Therefore, politically speaking, who decided that the number would be 750? How was this figure negotiated with the coalition? And why are Canadian forces under US command? I understand that once a decision is made and the mission unfolds in the theatre of operations...Earlier, you mentioned the deployment of five missions to Kandahar. Who negotiated this? The Chief of the Defence Staff or the government? If ever our troops were asked to do more, you say the decision would rest with the Chief of the Defence Staff. You also stated that you authorized the five missions in Kandahar that you described to us. If the Americans wanted to step up the pace, then the Canadian task force commander, Commodore Thiffault, would be contacted and he would consult with the Chief of the Defence Staff. Would the latter then come to you for final authorization?

    My final question is very important. Do you intend to consult with the Members of the House of Commons so that they can speak on behalf of the Canadian public? After all, they are the elected representatives of the people.

    I'd like you to explain how negotiations are undertaken and why you don't want MPs to be actively involved in the decision-making process by way of a vote in the House of Commons, the forum of Canadian democracy.

À  (1035)  

[English]

    Mr. Art Eggleton: Merci beaucoup.

    I appreciate the time and effort the honourable member took to go over to see our troops and to be involved in training exercises. I saw him in the new combat uniform at one point in time. I commend all members to do that kind of thing to get that kind of understanding. I appreciate his comments about the professionalism and dedication he found with our forces personnel.

    With respect to how we determine these matters of sending over 750 troops, or any number of troops, let me take that specific case. It does initially come from the Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, where we have approximately 50 of our personnel headed by Commodore Thiffault. It then comes up through the DCDS, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, who then contacts me. I in turn dialogue with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. That has been done on a fairly frequent basis over the last few months since entering into this campaign.

    With respect to consultation with members of Parliament, there have been over 50 hours of discussion and debate in the House about the Afghanistan campaign, the campaign against terrorism, with respect to the military aspect. It was known in previous sittings in the House when the matter was under discussion that we had this group, the infantry battalion out of Edmonton, ready to go and participate. We obviously didn't know at the time of those discussions in the House the specifics behind the mission or the specific numbers.

    How do we get to that number? Well, it's an infantry battalion, which, with its support elements, has about a thousand people. There are three rifle companies within the infantry battalion. We received a request for two of them. We may still get a request for the third one, but we've received to this point a request for two of them plus the squadron with the Coyote vehicle and other support elements. That comes out to about 750. It's not a number that's plucked out of the air. It's a number that's relevant to a cohesive team and unit that can perform a specific mission. That was the nature of the request.

    This question of the matter being debated and decisions made in the House is one that has been worked around a number of times. It is the position of the government that the government makes decisions on these matters, that it wishes to consult with Parliament, with the members of the House, wherever possible before making these kinds of decisions and wherever possible when the House is sitting—we've done that on many occasions—but that the ultimate decision must be made by the government.

    Now, I think the holiday period we've just come through is an illustration of why the government needs to be able to move quickly even when the House is not sitting. It has to make that kind of decision. But I must tell you that before I announced the decision for the 750 being sent, I phoned and personally talked with the leaders of each of the four opposition parties and offered to appear here, as I am doing today, so we could further discuss this matter with members of Parliament through these two committees. That's the process that has led us to where we are.

À  (1040)  

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

    Ms. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce--Lachine): Thank you very much. Happy new year to you both. Thank you for coming to appear before the committee.

    I have a couple of questions. The first one arises from Mr. Benoit's statement when he read a memo or a report that was written in 1999, wherein a military officer expressed concerns or fears regarding the capabilities of the Canadian troops in the Kosovo theatre of operations. Did the fears or concerns expressed in that memo, that there were going to be problems, materialize?

    Second is the issue of the mandate that has been agreed upon by our government with the American government, etc., in advance, for the actual role of our Canadian troops in Kandahar. You expressed the line of authority, if the Americans ever ask for our troops to do something that goes beyond the strict mandate that has been agreed upon.

    I'm assuming that the same type of agreement or mandate was negotiated prior to us going to Kosovo, for instance. During that experience, were there ever requests that went outside the initial mandate that had been negotiated? What were they, did we agree to them, and why?

    My third question is on the issue of how anyone who is taken prisoner by our Canadian troops during the theatre of operations in Kandahar will be treated. It's all over the newspapers that the United States does not appear to intend to use the Geneva Convention as the legal and legislative framework for treating prisoners of war.

    I'm assuming that was part of the mandate that was negotiated, so what position has Canada taken on the issue of anyone we capture during the six months in the theatre of operations in Kandahar? Will we be using the Geneva Convention? If we're not going to be using the Geneva Convention, in the sense of designating them prisoners of war, what legislative framework will we be using?

    Those are my questions for now. If I have more time, once you've answered them, I have other questions.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I will ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to address the question of the problems that were raised in the memo, plus the rules of engagement matter and any change there. I may have some further comment on that. Then I'll come back on this question of prisoners.

    Gen Raymond Henault: I'm familiar with Colonel Leslie. He's one of our very bright and talented young army officers, and is now General Leslie, as it turns out. At that time he was the brigade commander in Land Force Western Area.

    I'm not familiar with the specifics of what he was referring to in terms of force protection concerns. I can only assume they were likely related to Bosnia or Kosovo. I have been involved in operations for the last three and a half, almost four years, as deputy chief and now as chief. In all of the operations I've been involved in there have been no force protection issues, that I'm aware of, that have created concerns or problems for us that have not been addressed by concerns raised by our commanders, and obviously heeded. If we had to make changes or adjustments to what we were doing, they were done. So I'm not aware of any issues that arose from that concern.

    Whenever those types of issues are raised to us, we obviously take them into consideration, because the protection, safety, and security of our members, men and women, who are deployed are the foremost of our concerns. So we do what we need to ensure that their security, medical, and logistics requirements are always taken care of.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Therefore we can presume that will again be done with our operations in Kandahar. Thank you.

À  (1045)  

    Gen Raymond Henault: We ensure that they have all of the equipment, training, capability, and orders available to them, including rules of engagement, to do their jobs properly and to protect themselves appropriately.

    In terms of command and control, our contingent commander--in this case the task force commander, Commodore Thiffault, who we've talked about--liaises on my behalf and on behalf of the Government of Canada with the coalition lead, who in this case is Central Command for the United States. The missions and tasks are proposed to us. We consider them and make recommendations to the minister and government, based on our abilities and capabilities to respond and honour those missions and tasks. Then we make recommendations to government on the types of missions and tasks we can take on.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: And you've done that for Kandahar.

    Gen Raymond Henault: We have done that, yes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: A framework, or a specific mandate, has now been developed, and the same thing was done for our involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. What I'm asking is, once that was done in Bosnia and Kosovo, was there an expansion of the mandate? As well, how did that happen? What was it? That may be a precursor to the same thing happening in Kandahar.

    Gen Raymond Henault: That's a legitimate question. Sincerely, when the missions and tasks are changed, they do come back to us through the chain of command, the mechanism we have in place, and ask us to consider them. We look at them in the fullness of our knowledge of what their capabilities are, what equipment they have, and so on, and we make recommendations upwards as to whether or not we can change our missions and tasks.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: It didn't happen in Bosnia or Kosovo.

    Gen Raymond Henault: No, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, we do have changes in deployment areas and so on that are sometimes proposed to us through the NATO chain of command as well as our own commanders. Those types of things have happened over time, and we have considered them in the fullness of our NATO responsibilities and made recommendations to government to operate in different areas.

    For example, normally within our multinational division, although sometimes outside of it, those are the types of tasks we've been asked to do. Normally they're in support of other divisional commanders for specific tasks, and usually of very short term. An example of that was the request for our reconnaissance squadron to deploy to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia last year. It was a deployment to Kosovo of a formed unit, a capability outside of its assigned area of responsibility, in support of what was considered to be the NATO priority at the time.

    So that was proposed to us and asked of us.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Yes.

    Gen Raymond Henault: We made recommendations to government, government approved, and we did it. It was about a 30-day mission.

    The same thing happened in Kosovo when we were there. We were asked to take into consideration a request for reconnaissance and surveillance in an area of responsibility different from what we were deployed into with our British counterparts. Again, that proposal was made up to government, back down the chain of command, and we approved it.

    So the mechanism is very sound. It's one in which all the appropriate interlocutors and certainly the decision-makers are brought into the frame.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Ms. Jennings, I'm going to have to cut you off there. You're over your time. Although it's a very important question, I'm afraid we're going to have to get back to it in another round.

    I'm going over to Ms. McDonough.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Minister, and General Henault, for meeting with the committee this morning.

    I just want to say at the outset that the professionalism, courage, and competence of Canadian Armed Forces personnel is not at question here in terms of any questions I or my colleagues would raise--or I think, to be fair, any members of Parliament. But what is very much at question from the point of view of the New Democratic Party is the nature of the deployment, where 750 troops are about to be engaged in Kandahar under U.S. command, and not in any explicit way under UN auspices.

    I know, Mr. Minister, you've gone to great lengths to talk about how this is a mission that is no different from many other operations like it. I'd like to know from you then, sir, why your predecessor, Lloyd Axworthy, would say that this decision is not only extremely alarming, really unprecedented, but in fact--and I quote directly--“puts Canadian sovereignty at increasing risk”. That's my first question.

    Second, Mr. Minister, I have heard you talk about the Kandahar mission in which Canadians are going to be deployed in combat roles, that it's very much complementary to the Kabul mission. And yet, as you are well aware, the Kabul mission is specifically authorized by the United Nations in a Security Council resolution, in the context of the Bonn Agreement, establishing an international security assistance force. It speaks very specifically about what the purpose and nature of that engagement is--and I quote directly--“to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”.

    I'd like to hear from you, Mr. Minister, what the specific authorization is for this so-called complementary mission in Kandahar. And I don't mean in some vague, general way that a country has the right to defend itself when it's under attack, because I don't think anybody believes that would be a sufficient basis for the authorization of what it is Canada has committed to in Kandahar.

    Third, very much more specifically, knowing that we're operating under U.S. command here in a U.S. unilateral mission in this instance, I'd like to know whether the Canadian troops have been directed that they are to operate exclusively within the terms of the Geneva Convention as it relates to the handling of prisoners and whether, if that is not the case, they have been directed to withdraw.

    Second, will they specifically refuse to be a party in any way to sending captured prisoners to an American-based prison camp where they may in fact find themselves being tried in a military tribunal? Has that direction been given, and will Canada withdraw from any engagement in that specific operation in Kandahar if any such practices continue?

À  (1050)  

    Mr. Art Eggleton: With respect to the auspices under which this mission is occurring, I've made it quite clear in my remarks that this occurs under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In fact, all the troops that have been sent, with the exception of the Kabul mission, are under that provision. The naval forces and the air forces of all the countries that have been involved in this mission, the JTF2, and the other special operations forces that are in Afghanistan are all there under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for self-defence. It has been reinforced by three resolutions of the Security Council since the terrorist attacks of September 11. They are 1368, 1373, and 1378.

    Kabul happens to have a different, more specific mandate, but the operation we're going to be a part of is already ongoing. The Americans have been there with the U.S. marines for several weeks and months now. They are replacing the U.S. marines with the 101st Airborne Division, particularly the 187th Brigade Combat Team, with which we will join. But again, that continues on the same provision that it went on in the first place, and that's under article 51 as reinforced by those Security Council resolutions.

    With respect to Mr. Axworthy's comments about it being unprecedented, I don't know in what context he was saying that. It is not unprecedented for members of coalition forces to go under the command of another country. I gave numerous examples of where we Canadians have been in command and Americans have been reporting to us, or the British have been reporting to us, or the Dutch, or vice versa, in many different theatres of operation.

    We reported to the Americans, to General Short, who was in charge of the air campaign at the time of the bombing that was occurring over Yugoslavia, in which we participated. We reported to American commanders at the time of the Gulf War. There have been numerous other occasions where we have reported to other lead coalition commanders. There's nothing unusual about that.

    Let me make it very clear that the command still rests with Canada as to what operations we go into. Let me give demining as an example. We determined that that is one of the areas we will engage in. The Americans, on a day-to-day basis, can say that today they'd like the Canadians to go over to this area and do this demining effort. The original authorization for that is still coming from Canada. It's still under the control of Canada. It can be withdrawn by Canada if Canada wishes, but the day-to-day operational control would be exercised by the Americans in this case, or by another coalition force in some other case. They don't come down to specific troops, to a corporal or a private, and ask them to please go over there and do that. Of course, they ask the commander of the force there in the field to do this and that on that day. It's in accordance with the terms and conditions as agreed to by the Chief of the Defence Staff. That's how that kind of thing would work.

    With respect to the Geneva Convention—

À  (1055)  

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Minister, I'm going to have to wrap up our time here.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: You're going to cut me off again. This is the second time.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): In fairness to all the members sitting around the table here, I would ask members first of all to speak directly into the microphones, if they would, and also to put their questions very succinctly so that the minister can have an opportunity to respond.

    Mrs. Wayne, you have the floor.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Minister, I want to deal with the rules of engagement. The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia concluded that some of the major problems that plagued that mission related to the rules of engagement.

    Are the rules of engagement for our Canadian Forces in any way different from those the Americans have adopted? Is the wording identical? Do you agree that if our forces have different rules of engagement, it is possible that in a certain circumstance the American component of the force would open fire when our troops would not? You know and I know, Mr. Minister, that if that happens and there's open fire, they don't have time to go back to Tampa, Florida, to find out just exactly what they're supposed to do.

    Putting it another way, if the American field officer gave our troops an order to fire that contravened the Canadian rules of engagement, what would you expect our troops to do? Would they refuse the order or break the rules of engagement provided to them by our government? Where are the rules of engagement between us and the Americans?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: The rules of engagement are presently being finalized, and they will be agreed upon before this mission commences, so those kinds of problems will not occur. I've told you what the mission of our Canadians is, and the rules of engagement will be relevant to being able to deal with the mission as assigned.

    The mission involves the possibility of combat, which includes the defences and the use of firearms, and they would use them as necessary to carry out the mission. As I said, when it comes to details, what happens is that the U.S. commander in the field will indicate to the Canadian commander a specific mission or project. It doesn't get to quite the detail you're expecting, but I'll let the Chief of the Defence Staff take it from there.

    Gen Raymond Henault: I would add to what the minister has said that when we work through rules of engagement, which are clearly orders to Canadian Forces--they are not direction, they are orders, and they're to be followed--those rules of engagement are orders that come directly from me, as the delegate of government, and those rules are very specific to Canadian law. The rules of engagement are obviously patterned on the rules of engagement developed for a coalition. Obviously, in a NATO context or in a coalition context, you need to have similar rules of engagement, but there are always amplifications to those rules of engagement that take into account Canadian law.

    Those rules of engagement are extremely specific. The training on the rules of engagement is absolutely mandatory before troops go into operations, and they have to be very comfortable with them. In fact, not only are they trained, they are tested, through scenario-based training and testing, on the rules of engagement. They are continually updating and training on those rules while they're deployed, usually on a monthly basis, sometimes more often. They also have what we call soldiers' cards--for airmen it's airmen's cards and so on--which provide them with a very quick and easy reference to those rules of engagement, to ensure that they remind themselves continually of what their legal responsibilities are.

    I would say that the rules of engagement provide for us a control mechanism to ensure that they do not take orders that are unlawful or would be in contravention of Canadian law, and those are very important to us. But the one rule of engagement that is not a rule of engagement is the right of self-defence, and so we don't insert self-defence into the rules of engagement, because that's an inherent right to protect yourself in the way you need to to preserve your life.

    We're very confident in the development of rules of engagement. We go into very great detail to ensure that they're correct before we sign them off, and we continually update them during a mission. So I can assure you that those rules of engagement probably comprise one of the most important documents we provide to our forces as they deploy.

Á  (1100)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But are they the same rules of engagement as the Americans have right now? The minister has just said that you're going out to Edmonton to say goodbye and to wish them all well, so we must know whether our rules of engagement are the same as the rules of engagement the U.S. troops have.

    Gen Raymond Henault: They are basically the same. The only difference is that they have amplifications to them that take into account restrictions that may be in place for Canadian law and what that implies from a Canadian point of view. Those amplifications are spelled out in very graphic detail in rules of engagement, and training is done on them, and all the members are very much aware of them, down to the most junior.

    I can tell you that when I was on board one of the ships in the Arabian Sea, I talked to a young leading seaman who uses those rules of engagement continuously--he's a member of a boarding party. He trained on those rules of engagement before he deployed, he has done boardings on many occasions, and this leading seaman uses his little soldier's card--or navy card, if you want to call it that--to remind himself of what those rules of engagement are. They're very similar to the rest of the coalition's rules of engagement. They do have specific Canadian amplifications. He is not only confident, but totally comfortable, with those rules of engagement and he knows what he can and cannot do.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I wanted to know, and I kept my preamble very short so I could ask the questions and get the answers. Okay.

    Finally, in Somalia it was found that there were multiple, even inconsistent, versions of soldiers' cards explaining the rules of engagement being carried by our personnel in the theatre. How many different versions have been prepared this time, or is it just the one version they have?

    Gen Raymond Henault: Somalia is well behind us now.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I know.

    Gen Raymond Henault: We learned a tremendous number of lessons from Somalia, and this is one of the reasons we do so much to ensure that the rules of engagement are correct, because they are an absolutely critical and important document. There is only one soldier's card issued to a unit. That card may be slightly different for the NATO component, it might be slightly different for the air component in the context of a bombing campaign, for example, but I can assure you that there is only one soldier's card issued to all of the members who are deployed in the field.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Is it possible for those of us on the foreign affairs and defence committees to have a copy of that card?

    Gen Raymond Henault: Rules of engagement are classified, so I can't provide those to you without specific authorization.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I would just say that if our men and women who are in uniform are in the midst of combat--the men and women who are going and are leaving tomorrow--we indeed want to make sure they have the tools needed to do the job and to protect themselves. Can you assure us that this is the situation?

    Gen Raymond Henault: It is the situation.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: It is the situation.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

Á  (1105)  

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Mr. Anders, you have the floor for a five-minute round.

    Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Minister, you were talking about “interdependence”. Frankly, I found that amusing. I'm going to give you a quote here:

A battle group equipped with Coyote-type vehicles was regarded as likely to be suitable for peacekeeping but not necessarily for peace-restoring operations.

    That is from the Auditor General's report, and you're basically sending our troops into an area without armoured vehicles.

    In terms of helicopter transport, we have a Sea King. I wonder how a Sea King and a Coyote light armoured vehicle, when compared to armoured transport, serve as a form of interdependence. How are the Americans depending upon those?

    Gen Raymond Henault: The equipment being deployed is specifically for the mission being assigned to the troops.

    You have to remember that this is a light battalion. The nature of a light battalion is such that it is one that is very mobile and can move from one place to the next very quickly.

    The movement or transport of our troops in theatre will be in concert with the other elements of the brigade combat team. The primary method of movement in Afghanistan will be by helicopter or by other vehicles provided to us by our coalition partners. We are not going to be using Sea Kings over land. The Sea Kings are doing their mission off the backs of our Canadian frigates, destroyers, and supply ships. There is no intention for us to put Sea Kings into operation over Kandahar or inside Afghanistan in any way, shape, or form.

    So what our troops are deploying with are exactly the types of equipment and armaments--small arms, as well as anti-tank and other types of weapons--they need to do the job they have to do.

    Mr. Rob Anders: What I'm pointing out is that I've travelled on a Sea King, I've been given all the instructions to bail and whatnot if those things go down. It's a pretty scary situation. The crews will even tell you how long Sea Kings will float and the whole bit, just to prepare you in case they crash. Frankly, when that's the type of stuff we're sending over, the idea that we're somehow "interdependent" with our allies is ridiculous.

    Really, what I'm trying to stress here is that they're not being sent over with the proper equipment, and these are two key illustrations of that. As well, they're not being given the resources and the money they really deserve.

    I'm going to ask you a question, Mr. Minister, in order to follow up on that. The Prime Minister has stated that a bunch of lobbyists are representing those who sell armaments, and that those lobbyists will tell you that of course they will give you a better lunch if they have more contracts. That was said by the man who just rehired you for your job, the Prime Minister. I look around this room and I see members of the Conference of Defence Associations and from Esprit de Corps magazine, and people from the Royal Canadian Legion, for example, with whom I've talked for a number of years. Are those people all representing those who sell armaments? Are they all lobbyists for the arms industry?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I think the comments you've quoted from the Prime Minister are an indication of the kind of frustration many of us in the government experience when it comes to talking about the preparedness, the equipment, and the support the government gives to our troops going overseas. It's a frustration that doesn't seem to recognize the very positive things we do. If the cup is half full, you prefer to say it's half empty. I think a lot of the things you say are, in fact, ridiculous.

    Let me tell you about the Sea King. The kind of briefing you got on the Sea King I also got on the Sea King. Everybody gets it, plus they get it on every other aircraft that flies, either military or commercial. Any time you fly Air Canada, they talk about all the safety measures. This is a standard practice.

    Let me tell you about the Sea King, though. We put money into upgrading it, and it is performing well in the theatre of operations over there. I flew on one myself going onto one of our ships. It is involved in missions every day. It is doing a terrific job in working with our naval frigates and destroyer in the area.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Minister, very quickly--

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Very quickly, Mr. Anders. Thirty seconds.

    Mr. Rob Anders: Sure. As far as ridiculous goes, I'll wrap up with this. For you to say that the rules of engagement are “being finalized”--this is what you said--aren't some of our troops already on the ground? Shouldn't those rules of engagement have already been finalized before you made that statement today?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: The troops that are on the ground there now are the reconnaissance team that have just got into Kandahar, and part of what they do is check things out for any finalization in the arrangements or rules of engagement before the advance party or the main body of the troops go over. That's a standard procedure.

    Mr. Rob Anders: So you sent them into a theatre without having the rules finalized. You're admitting that.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: They're not engaged in...they're not up and operating for the mission that is going to occur. So don't try to create a misleading situation.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt ): Mr. Bachand, you have the floor.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Many people claim that given the current commitments of the Canadian Forces, capacity is stretched to the limit. There are already some 2,000 soldiers in Bosnia. A further 2,000 are stationed on board ships sent to Afghanistan and now an additional 750 troops are being deployed. Many taxpayers are pressing me to raise the following question: are Canadian Forces in a position at this time to meet internal needs? Let me elaborate.

    I can give you several examples. When the ice storm hit our region, the PPCLI came to the public's aid. The military also provided assistance during the floods along the Red River and in the Lac-Saint-Jean region. And I could go on.

    While taxpayers are proud of the Canadian Forces, they see troops leaving by sea or by air for the theatres of operation and wonder if the Canadian army will be there to help if another flood or some other disaster strikes. I'm not just talking about land forces. Can we really say that Canada's coasts are as well protected when approximately one third of our naval fleet has been deployed halfway around the world? Can we really say that Canada is as well protected by its air force when some of our aircraft have been deployed overseas and when our NORAD commitments have been increased at the request of the US?

    Canadian taxpayers see Canadian troops deployed in foreign theatres of operation and wonder what will happen if this campaign drags on. If the capability of our Canadian Forces remains stretched to the limit, will they be able to provide assistance here at home should a disaster strike? Taxpayers are asking me to raise this legitimate question.

Á  (1110)  

[English]

    Mr. Art Eggleton: There's no doubt that we have a lot of forces overseas, and we are stretched. But we will not be sending any forces to do anything that they're not capable of doing and we will not send forces that leave other missions here at home unfulfilled.You mentioned the ice storm. We had over 3,000 Canadian Forces personnel serving abroad on peace support missions during the ice storm, and yet we put 16,000 troops on the streets and roads of our cities and our towns in central Canada. The same can be said of those other domestic requirements. We can meet those requirements.

    So the short answer to your question is yes, we can meet our commitments and will meet our commitments.

    Gen Raymond Henault: I would add that even though we do have a significant number of forces deployed.... I would make two points. One is that the defence of Canada and the security of Canadians is our most important task in the Canadian Forces and the department.

[Translation]

    It's very important to remember that we have deployed our combat capability to this region in order to protect Canadians here at home. Therefore, in this respect, we are doubling our efforts.

[English]

    But we also have a considerable number of capabilities here at home still, and we are still patrolling the skies of Canada in the enhanced fashion that we have been doing since September 11. We have not deployed any fighter aircraft to any theatres of operation and therefore continue to respond to all of those responsibilities for North American aerospace defence.

    So I can assure you that has not diminished in any way. We still have a considerable amount of capability on both coasts and within our regular force and reserve to be able to respond to incidents here at home.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price (Compton--Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have several questions, and I'll keep them really nice and short.

    First of all, Mr. Minister, you said the mission was a six-month mission. Is there an exit strategy in place?

    The first question I would like to ask is to follow up on my colleague's question, because I think it's a very important question that you didn't have a chance to answer. That's regarding the prisoners captured, the American prison, an American tribunal or the possibility thereof. Could you speak a little bit about that? I'll come back later if time permits.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: With respect to the six months, yes, we're planning for six months, and we would leave at that point in time. We will review the matter as we go as to whether further time is needed. If that is the case, we will conduct a rotation. We're not contemplating that at this point in time, and to my knowledge the Americans are not contemplating it at this point in time. There's a desire to accomplish the mission and be able to leave. However, we'll see as time goes on.

    The British, in their Kabul mission, are planning on leaving in three months' time. Talk about countries being stretched; there's a country that's pulling out after three months in that operation. We can go the six and perhaps six after that, but we'll determine that at a later stage.

    With respect to any prisoners, the Canadian troops are instructed to follow international and Canadian law. International law is determined, with respect to prisoners, in the Third Geneva Convention, which deals with the treatment of prisoners of war. But there is also, of course, the question at times of whether these are prisoners of war or unlawful combatants. There is other terminology that is used. In all cases, we would treat people in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

    If there is some determination to be made as to the status of that person as a combatant, that would need to be made by a competent tribunal; that is, is the person a prisoner of war per se, or is the person an unlawful combatant? The reason for that distinction is that prisoners of war are generally considered to be military people, perhaps people who are identified in uniform, part of an armed force, part of a militia. Other people who could be combatants may not be in that situation. However, there are legal means of addressing that issue through a competent tribunal.

    Canada will not be providing detention facilities for prisoners. The provisions of the Geneva Convention say that prisoners can be turned over to allies within the coalition who also are applying the Geneva Conventions. The United States has said it is applying the Geneva Conventions. Of course, there is also monitoring of this, as done by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Apparently they are going to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to carry out their monitoring mission.

    So that is the status. We would follow international law and we would follow Canadian law. I must add that I understand that a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs will be here this afternoon with lawyers from the justice department who can get into the legal details of that with you.

Á  (1115)  

    Mr. David Price: This is just a little detail, Mr. Minister. We're talking about a Canadian who takes a prisoner, and that prisoner is a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention. That's where we start. But you mentioned that then it is to be determined whether they are something else, other than a prisoner of war.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: We would treat them the same whether or not they are something else. In terms of treatment, we would not distinguish.

    Mr. David Price: That is not distinguished until a later date?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes. A competent tribunal would then make a determination as to what their classification is.

    Mr. David Price: Do I have any more time?

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Unfortunately, Mr. Price, your time has expired.

    Ms. McDonough, you have five minutes.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to pick up directly on this question about the Geneva Convention and prisoners of war. I know the minister is aware that internationally there is a growing chorus of voices expressing concern about the American treatment of prisoners of war in Afghanistan and very real concerns about whether the Geneva Convention is already being violated.

    Mr. Minister, you have said that the United States takes the view that it is observing the Geneva Convention. I think Canadians deserve to know whether you, as the Minister of Defence for Canada, which has deployed troops, are in full agreement with the Americans' assertion at this point that they are fully observing the Geneva Convention.

    Just so we are not talking only in the abstract here, we now have special forces, commando forces, who have been in Afghanistan for over a month. I would like to know specifically how many prisoners Canadian Forces have taken in the month they have been in that commando role in Afghanistan, and to whom they have turned over those prisoners.

Á  (1120)  

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I'll take the last question first because the answer is none. We have taken no prisoners in regard to our missions. I think you are specifically referring to the JTF2, who have been there. They have been on a mission where prisoners were taken. They did not take the prisoners. Remember, they are part of a multinational force, a special operations force that is working in the area.

    With respect to military commissions, no military commission has yet been established by the United States. Of course we are interested in the details of how that would be carried out; as a government we would be interested in how that would be handled. There is a provision in the Geneva Convention for military tribunals, indeed the most notable being the one at the end of the Second World War used to try Nazi war criminals, the Nuremburg Trials.

    I think that answered your question, or was there an other aspect I missed?

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: In response to the question about....

    Mr. Art Eggleton: Do I believe that they are following the Geneva Convention? Yes. I have no reason or knowledge to believe that they are not. Certainly all of us, including the United States, would want to hear the information provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross after their inspection and monitoring activities.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: Could I then repeat my previous question? If there is evidence through monitoring that the Geneva Convention is not being fully observed, will you withdraw Canadian troops from that U.S.-led operation in Kandahar?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't anticipate that would be the situation; that's a hypothetical question. I have told you that we would abide by international law and Canadian law. I have also said that the Americans intend to follow the same laws, those of the Geneva Convention.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: But if they are found by observers, by monitors, not to be doing so, will you withdraw Canadian troops?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't expect that to be the case.

    Ms. Alexa McDonough: You won't address the question.

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't expect that to be the case. If anything were found to be not in complete compliance, the United States would have the opportunity to bring it into complete compliance.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Thank you, Ms. McDonough and Mr. Minister.

    Mr. Casey.

    Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland--Colchester, PC/DR): Thank you very much.

    Just as you were talking, I was reading some newspaper articles. It says in one article that even Prime Minister Tony Blair is calling on the U.S. to obey Geneva Convention rules, but the White House insists the detainees are unlawful combatants, not prisoners of war, and therefore not covered by the Geneva accords. The U.S. Secretary of Defense said on CBC last night that technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.

    I just don't understand. What is an unlawful combatant? What rules are the Americans using to fill up planeloads of Afghani citizens and bringing them to Cuba?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: As I said to you earlier, the unlawful combatants are persons who take part in hostilities but do not meet the law of armed conflict, whereas people who do are generally regular armed forces or militias, frequently in uniform, not always. I think when you have the lawyers--and I'm not a lawyer--

    Mr. Bill Casey: I'm not either.

Á  (1125)  

    Mr. Art Eggleton: --before you from the justice department later this afternoon, that kind of detail can best be addressed by them. But I can tell you that all these matters have to be fully understood and worked out before we're in the theatre of operations and up and operating.

    Mr. Bill Casey: Earlier the chief of staff said our soldiers have legal responsibilities, and he also referred to amplifications pertaining to Canadian law and the fact that we must follow Canadian law. What is the law that allows another country to move people to a third country? Does that mean that any country, if they feel there are people involved with armed conflict, can move in and take planeloads of people to a third country? What law are we using here? Is it international law? It's not the Geneva Convention; what is it?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: There is nothing in Canadian law that prevents our turning over anyone captured to an allied country, and from there on it is the application of international law. There could be a dispute over the classification of these prisoners, whether they are unlawful combatants or prisoners of war, and that will be determined by a competent tribunal.

    Mr. Bill Casey: I have one last question. If they aren't prisoners of war, there must be an extradition process. But there is no process involved here, they are just moving people around. I just have to ask, if there were armed unlawful combatants in Canada, could another country come in, take these unlawful combatants, and move them to a third country without any paperwork or any extradition process?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: No.

    Mr. Bill Casey: How can they do it in this country?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I would again ask you to put those questions to the lawyers who come here this afternoon. They'd be happy to go through it with you chapter and verse.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Do I have a minute left in my time? I shared a few minutes.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Ms. Wayne, in fairness, I'm looking at a situation where the opposition has had virtually 50 minutes of questions and the government only 12 minutes. So I would like to go to the government at this point, if I could.

    Mr. Patry, you have the floor.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds--Dollard, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief, to allow my colleague time to put a question as well.

[English]

    Mr. Minister, you said the U.S. follows the Geneva Convention. But do they really do it with every prisoner? Because at some borders they have an outside camp, and in this camp they're not called war prisoners, but just prisoners, because they want to except themselves from the Geneva Convention.

[Translation]

    As you stated, those who are taken prisoner under Canadian command will be turned over to US authorities. In your opinion, in so doing, isn't Canada setting a major policy precedent? In point of fact, by turning over prisoners to the Americans when these will not be considered prisoners of war, Canada is indirectly shirking its responsibilities under the Geneva Convention.

[English]

    Mr. Art Eggleton: There are two aspects to this: there's the law, international law and Canadian law, and there's policy. I have told you what the situation is with respect to international and Canadian law. I've told you what would be our intent with respect to prisoners, since we will not have detention facilities, but we still have obligations under international law. With respect to any further policy issues, those matters are still under examination and will be finalized shortly.

    Let's also remember that there is a mandate to the International Committee of the Red Cross here to examine the conditions under which these people are being kept and to ask questions about all those procedures, including their status.

    Let's also be mindful that we came into this campaign because of the terrible things that were done by terrorists, by the al-Qaeda and the Taliban, their supporters, and we want to ensure that they are brought to justice. We want to ensure that in their being brought to justice, they are handled in a fair way in accordance with international law, and that is the basis on which we are operating.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Mr. Godfrey.

    Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.): The more I hear you talk, the more alarmed I get.

    My question is this. What if we're part of a joint operation in which our partner is behaving in a way we find unacceptable? At what point are we compromised in our sovereignty, in our value system, in our morality, by saying, “Well, that's the way they handle prisoners”?

    I don't think this is a trivial matter, I don't think this is an administrative matter, I don't think this is a question of classification. I think this goes to the heart of who we are and how we behave. The way we behave internationally is simply an expression of who we are as a people.

    When I see those hooded prisoners being put on planes to Cuba, I say to myself, would we allow that if Canadian troops were taken? The lack of respect for the human person.... I can't believe that under any convention, the Americans haven't already violated international law by treating people this way. Until we sort this out.... This is not just the rules of engagement. This is being part of something that really matters to us. You cannot get away with some sort of classification about unarmed combatants. They're still human beings. Before we commit and before we approve, we have to sort this out.

Á  (1130)  

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I indicated that, regardless of the classification, if any people are captured by Canadians, we would treat them in a reasonable way, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. We would expect the same of our allies. Indeed, if we find at some point that our allies are not doing that, we still have every sovereign authority with respect to our involvement in any mission. We still have complete command and control over our involvement at any time.

    Mr. John Godfrey: If we were ultimately unsatisfied on this issue, we would withdraw?

    Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't want to go down that hypothetical path. I've said to you that we always exercise command over the use of our troops with respect to this mission.

    Mr. John Godfrey: Thank you.

    The Co-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Minister and General, on behalf of all the members sitting around the table here, through the joint committee, I'd like to thank you for your presence here today.

    The special joint committee will convene again at 1:30 this afternoon. Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.