FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

• 0908

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Colleagues, we have a quorum sufficient for hearing witnesses, so I would like to welcome the distinguished panel that we have with us this morning to help us with our study on North American integration in light of the new security challenges.

Thank you very much for coming. We'll start as provided for on the list, beginning with Mr. Christopher Sands, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He will be followed by Dr. Denis Stairs, Dr. Maureen Molot, and Dr. Andrew Cooper.

I hope you will be keeping your comments to around 10 or 15 minutes, because then we'll have more time for questions. Thank you very much.

Mr. Sands.

Mr. Christopher M. Sands (Director and Fellow, Canada Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, everybody.

As an outsider, as an American coming up to Canada, I'm very honoured to be asked to speak to you this morning. I want to begin with a little bit of a presumption, if I may. That is, presumptuous as it is for me to give you any advice at all, I want to add to my outrage by presuming to speak for 280 million Americans, because it seems to me that the best way to begin is by saying thank you.

I don't think it has been acknowledged well enough in the United States, but in the days since September 11, I think all of us in the United States have been touched at some level by our Canadian friends and by the things you've done in a very personal way to reach out to the United States. It's not just a question of policy measures that may or may not have been taken, it's much more the personal outreach that we have all felt. So I hope I won't get into too much trouble with my compatriots for speaking on their behalf. I don't represent anybody and I wasn't elected by anybody, but I do want to say thank you, at least on my part. Through you, I'd like to thank Canadians, because they've really done a lot for us and we're quite grateful.

• 0910

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sands, that's very gracious of you. We appreciate it, because sometimes it is difficult to get voices through in that extraordinarily complex media world that exists in the United States. But as you said, a lot of people in Halifax, in Newfoundland, and in other places, opened their homes and did wonderful things. Wonderful testimonials have been coming through from those helped by those people, but they don't get through in the media very often. So we appreciate it when we hear it from someone like yourself.

Mr. Christopher Sands: If we can add that to this record, then we've accomplished something already, and maybe that would be the only useful thing I have to say.

The Chair: We didn't get you to come this far for only that.

Mr. Christopher Sands: In the wake of September 11, I think Canadian foreign policy has an opportunity to undergo a kind of revolution in many ways. That's why I think the hearings you're holding on Canada-U.S. relations and on the world, in the aftermath of these attacks, is particularly apropos.

When I say “revolution”, I know Canada is famously the country of evolution not revolution, but you have undergone some important revolutions in recent years for similar reasons. You have faced changes in the world that have given you very few options but to make changes to your own policies. You'll all remember the fiscal revolution, when people who were looking backward said Canadians would never accept the kinds of policies that included balanced budgets, tax reductions, or cuts to social programs. As painful as those changes were, Canada underwent those changes because of a changed world, a world in which it was tough to maintain deficits and in which some changes were inevitable.

In the last several years, we've seen a change in the national unity debate, one in which Canadians made a change in their overall approach after many years of talking and referenda. We've now added new clarity to the way in which Canada and Quebec deal with each other. That's partly because, after the referendum in 1995, it was a changed world and change was required.

In the aftermath of September 11, I think Canada has an opportunity to change its foreign policy profoundly, and, in this sense, to bring its U.S. policy in line with its global-international approach to international relations so that the two complement each other. The best way to do that is to leverage September 11 in order to use this tragedy as a way to catapult change in overall Canadian foreign policy. To do that, you need to focus on five specific changes that may define where Canada is today versus where it was not on September 10.

The first is a change in the global dynamic. A popular paradigm heard in Washington quite a bit now is that the world after September 11 is a five-tier world. It's a world that was in a sort of gestation before September 11, but which was transfigured by the events of September 11, so that it's now clear how the nations around the world fall out. The divisions of the five tiers are based on the ability of countries around the world to project power. I'll give you a quick sketch of how this structure or this paradigm looks.

At the top tier is the United States—and it's an American model, so we're always on top. More significantly, the United States has this ability to globally project power that, at least for now, is unmatched. In the second tier are your great powers, countries like Britain, France, Russia, and China, which have the ability to affect the international system because of their size and because of their capabilities—economic, military, and so forth. In the next tier down are the middle powers. Canada fits squarely among the middle powers, about which I'll say more in just a moment. The fourth tier are those countries that are so troubled domestically, they project power primarily within their own borders. This tier includes countries like Ukraine and Mexico, countries that really aren't in a position to have a big world role because they have some things to sort out at home. And at the bottom of the five-tier world are the failed states, which have taken on a new importance after September 11 because of the dangers they pose to the rest of the states in the system.

The challenge of the middle powers today is different from the challenge we had during the Cold War in a couple of ways. One, they're farther from the great powers than they used to be, because the cost of maintaining a globally relevant military is so high. It's so high that it's difficult for all but the most determined or the most desperate countries to sustain.

• 0915

Secondly, the economy has changed. Over the last twenty years, most of the middle powers have joined regional trade arrangements that have not only focused their trade in a regional way, but have also focused their corporate community in a regional way—Canada in North America, countries like Sweden in Europe, and countries like Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.

This paradigm has important implications, because it means regional politics are particularly important for Canada going forward. It comes into play as something I've heard from a lot of Canadians, and that's as a concern over whether or not Canada's reaction to September 11 has met with American expectations. It's significant that, in this paradigm, Americans have begun talking, in Washington, about of a five-tier world. For Canada, which is worrying about the border and is working with us domestically in policing and trying to track down those who may have been responsible for the attacks and so forth, acting regionally is exactly what we expect. To the extent that Canada can provide support for the mission in Afghanistan, this is certainly welcome, but it is beyond expectations. And Canada often does perform beyond expectations.

We feel no great disappointment that Canada has no aircraft carrier to send. Do we think Canada should spend more on defence? Sure. We tell you that periodically. But now is not the time for that debate. Now is the time to move forward, and as I say, Canada's performance has been not only at expectations, but exceeding them. There is no disappointment in the United States.

If regional affairs are important to the Canadian foreign policy future, then it's important to recognize that our region has changed. Before September 11—to choose a date, I'll say September 10—the United States viewed everything in North America trilaterally. We had to move at the speed at which Mexico was prepared to move, whether we talked about immigration—and we had the section 110 debate, which you'll all recall—macroeconomic policy coordination, or a currency union. Everything had to be trilateral. Mexico was the laggard, but it also set the pace.

After September 11, you can look at the North American community agenda and can highlight some items that are now clearly too urgent for us to wait until Mexico catches up. I believe what we'll see after September 11 is a North America that looks more like the European experience of continental integration. That is, North America will be moving at two speeds. The United States is prepared to move forward with Canada—the other developed country in the region—on a whole agenda of integration issues, and to invite Mexico to participate in those dialogues, to ask Mexico to converge on a timetable that Mexico is comfortable with. Canada and the United States, working together, will then need to support and pressure Mexico to converge via that timetable.

But the future of North America is no longer a trilateral dialogue that is going to be moved at the pace of the slowest. It now has to move forward at a faster pace. I would suggest to you that this is an opportunity for Canadian leadership, because the United States, distracted by the war abroad and by other things, is not going to play a leading role. Just as we did with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, just as we did with NAFTA, we'll look to Canadians for particular leadership here, for your inventiveness, for your ingenuity, and for your ability to suggest positive, constructive ways to build the kinds of institutions, but also the kinds of programs, that will help us to move forward.

As we talk about how this regional progress will move forward, it's also important to talk about the way in which the United States has changed. I can only briefly characterize the profound alteration of our view of the world. You've seen some of the editorials. In the New York Times, Tom Freidman wrote that the United States is alone except for Britain. There's a great sense that, through this tragedy and the grief that we have, the United States finds itself surrounded by countries that don't care quite as much, that are not as energetic as we are. We're going through a shock, and as we come out of that shock, we're going to come to realize that the unilateralism that we saw from the United States and from this administration in Washington—not to pick on anyone—is no longer tenable. The only way to sustain this campaign against global terrorism, and the only way ultimately to prevail, is going to be to work with key allies and to develop stronger allied relationships.

Coming back to North America, the North American economy is key. If the economy is not strong, we can't sustain a long war. We need to be very concerned that the economy is not damaged as we fight this war, and that means not turning the border into an armed camp.

• 0920

I have to say that one of the nice things about being at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, my think-tank, is that I'm surrounded by really smart people. I wouldn't necessarily put myself in that category, but it's nice to be among smart colleagues, as you well know on this committee. Of course, you were kind enough to put me on a panel with people I respect and admire, so I get this reflected glow, which is quite nice.

I'm not going to presume to tell you how the United States is going to conduct a war on terror, because I'm just a Canada guy. But I do have one benefit, which is that I stand with my colleagues on the shoulders of giants—them—and in the weeks after September 11, we got together and put together a task force to look at the U.S. challenge, and to talk about what was going on abroad and what the United States would have to do in order to win the war on terrorism. In six weeks, that task force produced a report that includes an analysis of the situation with Islamic fundamentalism, the situation in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, key regions—including the Americas, the western hemisphere—the importance of the economy, and the military challenge.

Here's my surprise. It just so happens that this very morning in Washington, D.C., in our Congress, my colleagues are introducing this report. They're launching it for the first time. I thought that since Canada is just as important, I'd also launch it to you. Now, this is a cheat, because I'm just pretending that I'm introducing all these great ideas to you, but they're really everybody else's—so don't give me too much credit. You know you can only take so much on the airplane these days, but I brought you a copy of the report—400 lovely pages of everything you could possibly want—which I will submit to the committee. You're all welcome to have copies, but since I know you're busy people—even busier than me—

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): Some of us.

Mr. Christopher Sands: Yes.

Anyway, I brought you the summary. I'm going to pass it on, and I encourage you all to take a look at it. I'd be very happy, in Q and A, to try to respond to any questions you have if you thumb through this, or, if you want to have me back, you're very welcome to invite me and I'll answer any questions that I can. Alternatively, if you come to Washington, I'd invite you to come by, talk to the other authors, and really grill all of us about what we got wrong. All I can tell you is that if I got Canada wrong, that really is my fault, so you can throw eggs at me for that.

The Chair: Let's see if the...we're so responsive to your suggestion that we'll even do your passing for you. I'm going to ask, however, if our colleagues from the Bloc would mind having documents passed that won't be...we'll ask if it's in French, but since it's coming from—

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): That's fine.

[English]

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Do you have the Spanish version?

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Well done, Monsieur Paquette. Point made.

Thank you very much, Mr. Sands. I'm sure we'll have some interesting questions for you.

We're now going to go to Dr. Stairs.

Dr. Denis W. Stairs (McCulloch Professor in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Dalhousie University): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My comments are going to focus more on the management of the Canada-U.S. relationship from pretty much the Canadian point of view. As it is, I'm going to lower the level to what some might regard as a more pedestrian domain. Of course, the Canada-U.S. relationship is a relationship characterized by simply an enormous disparity of power, and that has created some tactical-cum-strategic problems for Canadian foreign policy over the years. I want to talk very briefly about those, and then make one or two suggestions at the end.

Traditionally, it has always seemed to me that Canada has used a combination of macro-strategies and micro-strategies in attempting to level the playing field with the United States at least a little. The macro-strategies have included, first, attempts to diversify our relations abroad, and especially our economic relations; and second, attempts to get as much of the bargaining and the politics as possible into multilateral arenas, some of them permanently institutionalized and some not, so that we won't be in the ring, as it were, with the Americans all by ourselves.

The diversification strategy has never worked well, partly because we've been unable to do the sorts of things that would make it work in a liberal world, and partly because we've usually had difficulty in getting other players to cooperate. With the negotiation of the FTA and the NAFTA, and now with the arrival of the World Trade Organization, it seems to me that this is now effectively impossible for us as a strategy, and the trade and investment figures show that very clearly.

The multilateral strategy is still relevant in some areas, but it, too, is much less useful, first, in a context in which the United States has become a global hegemonic power—it's at the top of the five-category list that we just heard about from Chris; second, at a time when Canada's relative position in the world at large has declined; and third, when many of the most important issues on the Canada-U.S. agenda are in fact bilateral issues and highly salient to particular interests in the American Congress. Generally speaking, I think it's fair to say the Americans are not interested in multilateral arenas unless they can dominate them, hence they talk of coalition-building. Environments that require them to accept a measure of power sharing don't really interest them very much.

• 0925

The micro-strategies have been aimed mainly at de-escalating the politics of the relationship as a whole, and they've included a number of tried and true techniques, if you like. One of them is linkage avoidance—that is, dealing with issues independently of one another as they come along, so that they can be resolved on their merits as much as possible, and in response to the play of very particular interests, rather than as manifestations of a kind of overall national interest.

Secondly, we've always tended to prefer the use of quiet diplomacy where possible, managing issues to the extent that we can at the bureaucratic level and behind the scenes, so as not to arouse an inconveniently emotional public response on either side of the border.

Thirdly, we have occasionally, but not very often, established rule-governed bilateral institutions for dealing with particular aspects of the relationship. Some precedents go back to the turn of the last century, but the most important example at the present time is the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which is now submerged into NAFTA.

Fourth, we have occasionally simply agreed to disagree in order to avoid, as it were, tilting at windmills. The most prominent example of that is the case of Arctic waters, a case in which neither side really pushes the issue home because it knows there isn't a basis for agreement. We just agree to let the issue lie unresolved.

The final one is what I call working the Congress and, occasionally, the public politics—that is to say, to engage in lobbying, log-rolling, and all that, vis-à-vis the Congress itself.

It seems to me that micro-strategies are still very important. I thought the fact that they're important was very evident in the testimony you received from officials at your first substantive meeting last week. But we need to recognize that they will not be effective overall in cases in which the Americans perceive that their fundamental national security interests are at stake.

In light of that general background, I just have a few very broad suggestions. First, it seems to me that we should slow down just a little. September 11 was a dramatic event, and there's no question the United States in particular is undergoing a great shock from which they're trying hard to recover. But contrary to widespread popular belief, it did not change the world, so I don't think we need to rush to melodramatic responses in Canada. We need to get and keep a firm grip on ourselves. Making long-term policy in circumstances of short-term, high drama, will produce mistakes. I think the Minister of Justice might even confess to that if we had her at a private place. The excitement will pass.

We can satisfy the executive branch in the United States with solid workaday cooperation of the sort that was described to you at some length by the officials you interviewed last week. But trying to satisfy the American Congress by dramatically legislated gestures will have little impact, in my view. It's a high-cost strategy, and it will yield minimal returns.

Secondly, in dealing with the Americans, we need to pick fights that we can win, or ones in which Canada has at least some prospect of accruing advantages. Tilting at windmills, particularly when Canada is alone in offering opposition to American preferences—which is usually the case in bilateral contexts, after all—is not only pointless, but positively counterproductive in the end. Above all, that's true when the United States is aroused, rightly or wrongly, on a matter that it thinks is related to its fundamental security.

Thirdly, we shouldn't waste the bargaining power that we actually do have. Mr. Sands has indicated that we do have some. The Americans, in my view, are Yankee traders. They understand the quid pro quo, and they don't resent being asked to ante up in a negotiation. We may indeed have some leverage at the present time—and perhaps in the long term—in their quest for a continental energy policy, for example. In that particular case, we may have given away some of the bargaining assets under the FTA, but we still have room to manoeuvre, and we should use that room to manoeuvre when the time is right.

That brings me to the hardest part of all. You have to know what you want. It seems to me that this is hard, because it's not clear to me that Canadians in general know what they want in dealing with the United States, apart, of course, from the undisrupted workings of the continental economy. More specifically, they don't know what they want that the Americans are currently preventing them from getting.

• 0930

The definition, as it were, of a Canadian national interest vis-à-vis the United States is up for grabs, in a sense. It needs to have a lot of national attention. Maybe we need what the Americans were happy to display to us a couple of decades ago, that being an irritants list, and maybe not now, but at some less excited time down the road. It's a list, however, of the things that irritate us, not the things that irritate them.

Finally, it seems to me that we need a major public relations and advertising campaign in the United States to deal with any inconvenient misconceptions that we think they have of us. To do this, I think we need top-notch professional help. I wouldn't for a moment suggest how we do it, what the themes should be, who the targets should be, or how it should be executed. But we're going to have to spend a great deal of money getting that kind of assistance in mounting the campaign. Properly done, however, it seems to me that the job would be worth every penny. There should be no argument about the priorities. In my view, maintaining an effective working relationship with the United States is the only true imperative in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Stairs.

We'll now go to Maureen Molot.

Dr. Molot, I notice you have to leave at 11:15 a.m. Is that correct?

Dr. Maureen A. Molot (Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University): Yes.

The Chair: Okay. When we've heard from Dr. Cooper, we'll let everybody on the committee know, and they can direct their first questions to you.

Dr. Maureen Molot: If that's the case, Mr. Chair, I'm perhaps sorry that it's been announced. I was hoping to be able to slip out.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Dr. Maureen Molot: I gather some of you may slip out before I do.

In any case, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee, and in the company of distinguished colleagues. The committee is obviously addressing a subject of enormous importance, that of Canada's relationship with the U.S. in the light of new security challenges. In many respects, the debate unfolding in Canada around the future of our relationship with the U.S. is reminiscent of the debate many of us remember from the early eighties, when we were debating the pros and cons of free trade.

The question of how we manage our relationship with the U.S. is obviously not new. It preoccupies many of us, and certainly those of us in front of you today. What has happened, however, is that September 11 has given a new urgency to issues such as border management. September 11 has also obviously underlined the link between trade and security in a manner that is not likely to recede with the passage of time.

My approach to Canada-U.S. relations and North American integration is derived from the literature on integration and some understanding of the behaviour of multinational corporations. From those two perspectives, let me make a number of quite specific points.

First, when a free trade agreement such as the Canada-U.S. FTA or NAFTA is being negotiated, the focus is usually on getting to “yes”. In other words, it's on reaching the agreement. As we will all recall, given the nature of the bargaining, that is clearly no mean feat. Very few in any of the three NAFTA signatory countries wanted to think beyond the successful conclusion of an agreement, even though, I would certainly argue—and I think it's supported by many others—free trade agreements are by their very nature unstable. They either evolve into something more, they risk falling into desuetude, or they break up. This is not a suggestion of economic determinism, but rather an observation shaped by an examination of a range of free trade agreements in Europe and elsewhere, going back to the early 1960s. Nor is it an expectation that the path of integration flows inexorably forward, without steps back or sideways. The European and other integration experiences teach otherwise.

The point is that analysts, including my friend Chris Sands' boss, Sidney Weintraub, began to raise questions about unresolved issues almost immediately after the conclusion of NAFTA, such as whether NAFTA should or would broaden to include new members, or deepen. In other words, would it address matters that were not on the table when the agreement was negotiated, or matters that the negotiators agreed to put aside because they were too difficult, such as anti-dump and countervail, facilitation of border management, expansion of labour mobility provisions, government procurement, and the list goes on?

• 0935

Secondly, the economic literature on integration predicts that when barriers to the movement of goods between countries fall, trade between the parties will increase. Much of this increase will be in intra-industry and intra-firm trade. Corporations will increasingly organize production on a free trade area-wide basis, and will make investment decisions based on efficiency rather national considerations. Pressures will grow for cooperation on issues related to facilitation of trade, such as customs and border management procedures, the development and implementation of product regulations and standards, and so on.

Third, what the economists anticipated would happen subsequent to the implementation of the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA has happened. Trade between Canada and the U.S. has increased dramatically. Other witnesses have provided data on the percentage of Canada's exports that go to the United States, the importance to the U.S. of the Canadian market, and so forth. U.S.-Mexican trade has also grown considerably since NAFTA was implemented in January 1994. Corporate decisions in a range of industries have played a critical role in linking the Canadian and U.S. economies—and there's a huge literature on all of this, both with respect to Canada-U.S. trade and more generally.

Fourth, we now find ourselves facing challenges for which there are no models and no easy answers. Much of our understanding of the dynamics of integration is based on the European experience; however, the European experience in most respects is not appropriate for North America. There are differences in the number of participants in the integration experience in Europe; the relative sizes of their economies; the global reach of their signatories—most of the members fall into my colleague Chris Sands' second tier, and some into the third; we hope none of them fall into the fifth—the extraordinary dependence of two of the NAFTA parties on the third; and the end goal of the exercise. The European Union consciously evolved from a free trade agreement, to a customs union, to a common market, to an economic union—and I can provide definitions if anybody wants them.

Fifth, how will the relationships in North America evolve? Here, we are treading new ground. The next steps in the Canada-U.S. relationship involve deepening the FTA or NAFTA, but not in the direction of what has historically been the next step in an integration arrangement, namely a customs union—and we can talk about that if you have any questions.

Let me note a few obvious subpoints. The first is whether or not all changes have to be trilateral—i.e., include all NAFTA signatories. Or can the level or deepening of integration differ among different combinations of actors? Chris Sands already referred to that in terms of a multi-layered NAFTA or a staged NAFTA. In other words, can we develop a multi-layered integration arrangement? Although there are some similarities between the issues around the U.S.-Mexico border and those around the 49th parallel, arguably there are some major differences.

As DFAIT's Jon Allen suggested last week, Canada's clear priority, for economic and security reasons, is managing our border with the U.S. to ensure that the movement of goods flows at the highest possible level of efficiency. At some point in the future, arrangements between Canada and the U.S. might expand to include Mexico. If that expectation is there, does it have an impact on the kinds of arrangements we might make with the United States? In other words, does the expectation of later Mexican participation shape the kind of discussion we would have with the Americans around managing our own border?

A second question follows from the commitment on the part of Canada and the U.S. to ensure the smoothest possible flow of goods and people across the 49th parallel, in the mutual interest of both economies. To quote Mr. Allen again, we recognize a need for “a seamless and sovereign” border.

Facilitating the clearance of goods also means facilitating the clearance of people—those who move the goods most obviously, but also those who travel for business. When this is on the table, so immediately are issues around immigration. Without getting into the complexities of the Schengen Agreement in Europe, the point is that it was negotiated in the context of a commitment to move to an economic union. That agreement certainly provided seamless movement, but at a cost—anticipated—of some sovereignty.

• 0940

A third question is whether or not border and immigration issues provide a sufficient basis for moving the relationship forward. For other aspects of the bilateral relationship, what are the implications of an agreement on border and immigration management? Should we include other topics in the discussion? If so, which ones? What is the mix of interests and issues that will engage the United States? Should Canada take the lead in proposing some new initiative? What, in fact, are we going to negotiate? How will it be managed? Will there be new institutions? What provisions will be made for review and amendment? One of the realities we see with NAFTA is the complexity of amending the agreement if the signatories begin to think some changes are necessary. Finally, what do we have time for? On the one hand, my colleague Denis Stairs may be right. We don't want to rush into anything. On the other hand, to a large extent, one might argue that time is of the essence, given the preoccupation of the U.S. with security concerns.

Congress is again moving to implement legislation that could impede the movement of goods, with obvious negative implications for both economies. Corporations have an interest in ensuring that the economic relationship runs smoothly. Some weigh in to impose the implementation of section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and one concern is that something like it will be back on the table.

Many businesses in Canada are actively pushing the Canadian government on border issues. Should it become difficult to move components and finished goods easily and reliably from Canada to the U.S., multinationals will see Canada as a much less attractive investment location, with the attendant impact on investment, jobs, and economic growth.

In conclusion, for a wide range of reasons, we find ourselves on the horns of a very difficult dilemma. These issues are not new issues. All of the concerns around border management have been with us for some time. The difference is that they have been made enormously more urgent. The U.S. is moving to implement changes it feels are necessary to maintain its own security, and we in this country have to think not only about the future nature of our relationship with the United States, but also about how that issue will be handled politically in the U.S. and in Canada.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Molot.

We'll move to our final panellist, Dr. Cooper.

Dr. Andrew F. Cooper (Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, University of Waterloo): I'd like to join my colleagues in expressing appreciation for the invitation today. I'm a latecomer to Canada-U.S. relations. I guess I'm what's called a multilateral academic, but I have written one article, for which I should give a plug to the Canada-U.S. Fulbright Foundation, because they have given me the opportunity to ground myself in U.S.-Canadian relations. The article had a title that I think had a sense of anticipation of some events waiting at the perimeter.

There's also a symmetry here. Maureen Molot had commissioned the piece. Chris Sands did a companion article in the volume—perhaps it should have had a question mark—called Vanishing Borders: Canada Among Nations, 2000. Denis Stairs, who had the first quotation, phoned me, saying the Canada-U.S. relationship was going to be the main game in the future.

I think we can see that Canada-U.S. relations have become the main game, and we have to rethink a whole lot of elements of that relationship. Not to be trivial, one way we can do this is by rebranding, in a sense. We've rebranded in a different way from the past. In the past, we had a slogan for the border and that slogan was. of course, “the longest undefended border”. September 11 has changed that.

At the same time, if we're going to rebrand, I think the perimeter notion is going to be a risky endeavour. Certainly, it may well bring opportunities, but it's going to bring problems and risks as well. For a start, it's risky because of the origins of the perimeter notion in the United States. It goes along with an explicit privileging of security, going back even to NORAD, and certainly coming fast-forward to issues such as homeland security. Through this lens, we can see some problems. Indeed, Chris Sands has mentioned that perhaps we'll see a model that is more relevant to U.S.-Mexico than to U.S.-Canada.

• 0945

The second problem is U.S. intentions. If we had a healthy debate about the EU Schengen model, this would have lots of salience for Canada. But I don't get a sense that, in the United States, we are having a healthy debate about Schengen or EU models. What we get is a very narrow orientation going back to section 110, going back to ITAR, and going back to all sorts of other issues that focus on self-help rather than complex interdependence. Therefore, I think the U.S. will look at perimeter not so much in a holistic fashion, but more as a form of forward defence. From this perspective, there may be benefits for Canada, certainly at airports and ports, but we can't exaggerate the benefits in terms of allowing open access at the border.

The third risk—and again, this a theme that has been picked up by Denis Stairs—is the whole issue of the restrictiveness of Canadian foreign policy. John Manley was right in saying that Canada has never been a neutral country. A form of Canadian foreign policy is certainly very much along the lines of supportership or followership, and this orientation should certainly not be minimized.

At the same time, as you're all aware, there's another element to Canadian foreign policy as well. Canadian foreign policy is certainly a hybrid, a dual component in many ways. Certainly, if coalitions of the willing focus on the U.S.-Britain access through big power arrangements, coalitions of the willing also focus much more on small middle powers, on specific niche issues, on issues that run with an issue at a particular time. The danger here is one of restrictiveness.

When compounded by a restrictiveness in a geographical sense—and Chris Sands has picked up the point here—there are opportunities in regionalism. But as you are aware, a closed form of North American regionalism also carries dangers and risks if we form a North American block, if we move toward a fortress. Certainly, the sense of the perimeter focuses on “us and them”, certainly looking beyond Canada in a dangerous way that looks at threats rather than at issues like cooperation.

For this forum, if we are rebranding, it's much better to move beyond perimeter notions. While it might be catchy to talk about zip-lock borders and so on, the emphasis most probably should be on something like smart borders. Not only does the concept of smart borders allow for security and an economic dimension, it focuses on technical issues at the same time, some of which see Canada ahead of the United States, certainly in terms of computer programs and so on. Also, it fits in with the sort of rebranding that perhaps all of you will see as being useful in terms of a smart country, in trying to equate Canada in the same way as Britain has been rebranded “Cool Britannia” and as Ireland has been rebranded the “Celtic Tiger.”

Certainly, perimeters are problematic here. When we throw Mexico into the equation, I think it becomes quite problematic. I'd agree with Chris Sands when he says there has to be a dualistic focus on Mexico. If the debate in Canada was intense after September 11, the debate in Mexico was much more intense, certainly looking back in many ways toward a foreign policy that focuses on national sovereignty and non-intervention.

From this perspective, while two speeds might be useful, it might also be useful to look at things in two tracks. This certainly fits in with a form of Canadian foreign policy that we focused on before. At the same time, it once more allows for duality, confidence-building with Mexico, and certainly for showing Mexico we're onside, as, indeed, many Mexicans have criticized Canada for being status-anxious in terms of the Mexican approach under the Fox administration. Additionally, standards should be ratcheted up to make sure we move forward in terms of smartness.

• 0950

The third and last point fits in with what Denis Stairs mentioned. September 11 certainly may have changed a lot, but I don't know that it has changed everything. In terms of the Canada-U.S. relationship, many of the ingredients of Canadian diplomacy still seem to be very relevant to, as he mentioned, de-linking public diplomacy. We can see certain areas that have become much greater in emphasis, almost because of the momentum of September 11. Certainly, we have seen an emphasis on business coalitions in terms of looking after the border.

What Chris perhaps didn't mention was that he was one of the people plugging for a border czar in the early stages after September 11. I think we do have to think of that type of issue. At the same time, in the Canadian context, and certainly as a multilateral person, I like to think much more as a sort of wise man in terms of looking after these issues certainly fitting in with the notion of smartness, and certainly not getting overwrought with everything changing after September 11.

In conclusion, very much like Denis, I suggest that Canadian foreign policy should bend. In many ways, borders were much more important than many academics have given them credit for. Many people within business schools certainly saw the eradication of old borders. Many people of a more transnational, critical perspective saw, of course, a world that was going to be hyperglobalist. In the Canadian-American context of September 11, we don't see this. Borders do matter.

At the same time, other things matter as well. Multiple identities in Canadian foreign policy matter. The fight for order—if not for justice—in the international scene matters. Beyond a narrow conception of perimeter, neighbourhoods matter as well. So while borders matter, as I've suggested, we shouldn't have a bound, constricted, restricted Canadian foreign policy.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Cooper.

We'll go to questions, beginning with Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for honouring us with your presence today, everyone. I have to say I have often picked the ample brains of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Having visited it, I can say that the work you do is really outstanding. Many of us here pick the brains of you and your colleagues all the time, just as we pick the brains of our Canadian colleagues.

Mr. Christopher Sands: I'll pass that on to my smarter colleagues.

Mr. Keith Martin: I mean that in all honesty. We do it to you just as we do it to our Canadian colleagues and the organizations represented here today.

In dealing with the problems that our countries have, and, indeed, the opportunities, we need to engage in and build a relationship. We need to have a structure upon which we, particularly as Canadian legislators, can work with our American counterparts. My first question is, how do we, as Canadian legislators, be seen and be perceived as effective working colleagues of our American counterparts? Post-September 11, there is an opportunity to build those relationships. With all of the experience on this panel, perhaps you could guide us with some suggestions as to how we can improve an effective working relationship with our American counterparts.

I also have a second question. Mr. Sands, you referred to this as bringing U.S. foreign policy in line with Canadian internationalist tendencies. I need not say the U.S. has been perceived as having more parochial tendencies in its foreign policy. Post-September 11, Mr. Sands, was there a heightened desire to increase U.S. multilateralism in American foreign policy, particularly with a view toward the fourth and fifth tiers?

I have a special interest in the troubled states and failed states. At first blush, one may see them as not holding immediate U.S. interest, but when one looks behind an egress of refugees and post-conflict reconstruction costs, it's something we all pay for. Within that context, I've always felt the U.S. has an extraordinary amount of untapped potential to work with other partners like Canada, which is interested in dealing with this. Perhaps you and the other panellists could tell us if the U.S. has an interest in terms of whether the Mogadishu effect is still alive and well, or whether we can work with the Americans in dealing with those and other challenges.

• 0955

Thank you.

Mr. Christopher Sands: That's a great question. Thank you very much.

Let me answer this in a couple of ways, and respond to my colleagues to some extent.

I actually agree with just about everything we've talked about today. Denis is right that part of the challenge is figuring out what it is that Canada wants from the United States and from others. That is an important aspect of the challenge. What I'm suggesting is that you do have leverage. You have more leverage than you might give yourselves credit for, or you may just be modestly assuming you can't get a word in edgewise. But I think Canada has gained a lot of clout with the United States just by the fact that it is able to be so much more helpful. President Bush is fond of saying he is not about rhetoric, he's about results, particularly when it comes to allies. Canada can deliver the goods, and that gives you a certain degree of leverage.

Denis's question is what you want in exchange. If I could suggest one thing that you should want in exchange, it's the structure to be able to dialogue with us on the regional development of North America, the North America of two speeds. Within that structure, you can pursue many goals. Those goals can develop over time.

Maureen Molot has actually outlined an agenda of deepening NAFTA, talking about not only borders, but a number of issues that are quite significant in terms of making the economy flow more effectively.

But as Andrew Cooper says, there are some risks to North America. The biggest risk is feeling that North America is going to happen to you, as opposed to North America being something you can build with us or, more importantly, something you can lead.

The structure that I think you ought to pursue is a structure of regular dialogue with Americans about building a North American regional community in which Canada would have a leading role in helping to shape things not only in terms of agenda, but in terms of follow-through. You could actually help to contextualize your Canada-U.S. relations in a region. By having a big influence on that region and its regional development—one of the largest markets in the world—you could multiply your international influence in dealing with failed states, in dealing with other large conglomerations like Europe, or in dealing in Asia.

This is a positive echo effect. You begin by thinking about U.S. relations, you put them in the context of North America, you create a privileged position for Canada in a North American dialogue, and that multiplies your clout abroad. You're not abandoning multilateralism, you're actually—and this is the revolution I'm talking about—folding U.S. relations in.

While I agree with you that the U.S. has often been a very parochial superpower, a parochial hegemon, Canadian foreign policy toward the United States has been sucked into that parochialism in many ways. Canada deals with the United States as a sort of special exception to its other international rules, because when you deal with the Americans, what can you do? You're stuck with us, so you have these debates about the border, the Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum program, and others. They're all very useful, but they're divorced from the rest of Canadian foreign policy, which often ends up seeming like a reflection of where you are with the United States. Either the rest of your foreign policy is about showing how different you are from the Americans, it's about showing that you can act independently from the Americans, or whatever.

A more robust and maybe more integrated approach that pulls all of these streams together and uses your better anchored U.S. relationship to multiply your impact abroad is within your grasp. That's what you should use your leverage for—to insist on a structure that then becomes second nature.

You know, we're terrible in the States. You know that because you've dealt with American legislators. We're suckers for the big idea. When he came to Washington, Vincente Fox got great press with his vision of North America. His vision is not going to happen, but he got great press. A lot of Canadians said, “Oh, no! He's the new best friend!” Well, he just stole from the Mulroney playbook. Fox came up and gave us a big idea. We like thinking big, so it became attractive to the media.

I think North America is a big idea, but the idea that North America is going to be led by Mexico died on September 11. The idea that it could be led by Canada is truly attractive and truly intriguing. There's something there, and if you can establish that kind of structure, then what Congress will look to Canada for—which it doesn't do today.... Congressmen will say we have to do something at the border, we have to do something about facilitating some sort of compatibility amongst our standards, getting our government agencies to work better with our neighbours, because we have an appreciation of integration. They'll turn to Canada. In turning to Canada, that does not just mean DFAIT. It means legislators like you, who have not only some expertise, but also some willingness to play a big role.

• 1000

It's pretty lame of me to come here to ask you to save us from ourselves in the United States, to say that the only possible future is if Canada comes to our rescue. This is where Andrew is quite right. The United States opens with our default position. When it comes down to it, we're self-reliant. I wouldn't necessarily say “self-help”—that sounds too much like one of those books you buy at the airport—but I think we're a country—

The Chair: Who goes to airports anymore?

Mr. Christopher Sands: Fair enough.

We're a country of rugged individualists who believe that, in the end, nobody has ever protected us, but we've always protected everybody else. That's part of what I think had to die on September 11 as well. A lot of people in the Bush administration had the view that we were the superpower, we could take care of ourselves, and the rest of the folks would just take orders by memo. Well, that doesn't work. We cannot fight this war on terrorism by ourselves, and clearly Canada has already been a big help. But that recognition that globalization affects us, too, may be one of the most important aspects of the September 11 event.

We believed in Washington that globalization was the handmaiden of American hegemony, that it worked for us. It meant a McDonald's for Red Square and Paris, and Disneyland for everybody. That's a good thing. What's everybody complaining about? We now recognize that states are weaker, that transnational forces pose new dangers, and that we need people's help. As I've heard several people say in the last couple of weeks—with some amazement down in Washington—we can't protect the American people without Canada's help. Who knew? But that's leverage. As Denis says, that's an advantage if Canada can figure out what it wants, maybe by following some of Maureen's advice on what you really do need, and by helping to restore the multilateralism to American foreign policy, as Andrew is suggesting.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you very much for your remarks. The three distinguished university teachers from Canada will understand that the representative from the U.S. is a rare commodity for us.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: For consumption.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Sands, I listened with great interest to your remarks. I had a look at Chapter 16, titled To Prevail: Key Findings and Recommendations. I do not have anything to say about the recommendations. My question is as follows. What are the chances that what you call key discoveries will become the basis on which American foreign policy will be built?

This would be more than an evolution, to go back to your first words, this would be a sort of revolution and also a way to help change the world. This is very, very interesting. I am absolutely delighted by that.

My second question I can link to one of the phrases you use when you say that security must be improved without disregarding our freedoms. We know that freedoms are important in the U.S., and everyone talks about the border. I attended some hearings of the subcommittee and, at the same time, I subscribe to Business Week, which I try to read. There is an issue on Privacy in an Age of Terror which is truly very worrying.

What I read in this article is that in the U.S. too, developing a very invasive technology would deeply transform the being “homoaméricanus,” because “homoaméricanus” decides for himself how much information he is going to give the government.

So, how can we make our borders fluid while also respecting the right to protection of personal information? What is this balance between better security and a police state? Those are my two little questions.

• 1005

[English]

Mr. Christopher Sands: Those are two very good questions, madame—and I'm going to keep this answer a little briefer, because I don't want to hog all the air in the room.

First, I fall back on the response of Chou En-lai when he was asked what he thought of the French Revolution. His response was that it was too soon to tell. With regard to whether or not the United States will act as I've hopefully suggested they might, it's too soon to tell. If anything after September 11, you get a real sense that everything is up for grabs, and there is going to be a battle over policy direction, as there always is. Canada can play a role in that, even in Washington. By indicating powerfully what you want, you can help to shape how we view these options. It may be a hopeful point of view, and I haven't given up on my American compadres, but I always have great trust in Canada and your ability to say a good word in our ear sometimes.

On the balance of security and personal liberty, this is a very difficult question. Some of the evasive technologies that you referred to that were in the article were with us before September 11. We knew they were there. We were worried about Internet privacy, all of these chat rooms, our credit card information, and so on. They've just taken on a new edge. We have to be careful that we don't do things in the name of security now that we would not have considered before, and then give up the whole nature of the country that we have and the country that you have, both of which are based on civil liberties.

If I can tap into our recommendations a little bit, we pose the challenge faced by the United States and the rest of our allies face not as one between Islam and the west, but one between authoritarianism and democratic governance. If you look at world history, authoritarianism is mostly the mode, whether it's authoritarianism in the Middle Ages or authoritarianism now. Democracy is relatively young. Very few experiments have worked as well as those conducted by Canada, the United States, and some of our allies. If you look at the majority of the world's population today, we're losing. Most of the world is not governed by democrats, but governed by authoritarians. If the 20th century can be characterized as a battle against two authoritarianisms, fascism and communism, the 21st century is challenging us with two kinds of Islamic world authoritarianisms—religious authoritarianism and secular authoritarianism—of which neither is particularly attractive.

The most important thing as we pursue that battle is not to give into authoritarianism at home. As important as it is to have an anti-terrorism bill—you have one and we have one—it's important to debate that. Debate it publicly, at length, for as long as it takes, so that even if we do have to take drastic measures, we've talked them out, we understand what we're undertaking, and we've put in the appropriate sunsets, so that we don't become police states ourselves.

That's not much of an answer, it's really more rhetoric. I just wanted to tell you that I appreciate your concerns. I have no easy answers, but I think you're onto exactly what we need to be worried about in both senses.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I would like to come back globally because it seems to me that in your presentations, you placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that relations... Actually, it is our committee's subject: North American integration.

But I would have liked to come back to the question of multilateralism. My impression is that September 11 showed us, contrary to what some think, that the U.S., like all western countries, is so interdependent in a globalizing world, that we must start from a premise of interdependence, and if we want to be able to deal with this interdependence, we have to promote multinational forums.

I do not know whether, in the U.S., the people realize that, but it seems to me that there was, for instance in the fact that President Bush agreed to free up the funds to pay what the U.S. owed the United Nations, an understanding of that, of the use that the Americans have always made of international organizations like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. It seems to me that, in that context, Canada can play a special role. Alone in relation to the U.S., we are not able to create an adequate power relationship. That is also the context in which Mexico, it seems to me, should be Canada's special partner, first in North American integration, and also in continental integration. I want to give an example and then I would like to hear what you have to say.

With regard to culture, preservation of cultural diversity, Americans seem to us totally insensitive to this concern. We have trouble mobilizing or getting Latin Americans interested in this aspect because they may have the impression, at present, they are a flourishing culture in the U.S., with all the Latin-American singers who...

• 1010

Our only ally, right now, is France. So, if we did not have forums like the Francophone Summit, like the World Trade Organization, how could we defend our point of view concerning cultural diversity in simple bilateral relations with the U.S?

It seems to me that for Canada, multilateralism is an option that has to be addressed if Canada is going to assume its place in relation to the Americans. Mr. Stairs, especially, you implied that perhaps multilateralism was a bit old-fashioned in the current context. So I would like to hear what you have to say about that.

[English]

Dr. Denis Stairs: Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to say it was outdated entirely. The one that I don't think works for us anymore is diversification. Multilateralism is still very salient in a large number of issue areas, so essentially I agree. It's just that when the United States perceives its national security interests to be fundamentally in jeopardy, it's going to act on its own, with such help as it can persuade to join its enterprise. In those circumstances, I have very little faith in multilateral environments as sources of effective constraint on American policy.

But certainly, in other issue areas, that's often true. Again, though, when they're very bilateral, when you're dealing with something that has some interest in Congress aroused and it's a Canadian-American issue, I think that's very difficult. Even in the cultural areas, certainly on the Anglophone side of the cultural issue in Canada, the power of Jack Valenti to control developments in Canada is really quite extraordinary. There's not much we can do by way of garnering multilateral assistance to deal with that sort of pressure. That was the kind of suggestion I wanted to make.

But your question also allows me to respond to Chris Sands. One of the reasons I'm so fond of Chris Sands is that every time I finish a conversation with him, I go away with a warm glow. The reason is that I'm left with the sense that Canada, in tandem with the United States, could have a major impact on American foreign policy decisions and so forth.

I understand the argument for structure, but joining a bilateral structure with the United States with a view to somehow determining a North American response to the problems of the world at large—the kinds of problems Mr. Martin was alluding to earlier—frankly just seems to me to be a highly improbably enterprise from the point of view of the Canadian perspective. If we get that close to them on those sorts of issues, we get buried. We might have a marginal impact here and there, but the reality is that we would have very little influence in that kind of construct. In the process, we would make it absolutely clear to the rest of the world that we were in fact an adjunct to the foreign policy of the United States.

This problem, in my view, is one that is serious enough for us already. It has always been a serious problem for Canada in the international community, but it has become gravely intensified in the wake of a NAFTA agreement. It's very hard to get Europeans, for example, to think of a Canadian economic interest that is somehow separate from the interests of the United States, or to take us seriously into account even when they're planning their investment decisions and so forth in the private sector.

So while I warm to this concept, I'm not persuaded by it. I therefore agree that if we're going to have influence in most of these areas, we are going to have to work with others. That's not to say it has to be done in opposition to the United States every time. We just have to find players elsewhere in the international community that share our perspectives and our concerns.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: And Mr. Cooper...

[English]

The Chair: I'm going to have to cut this off, because we're well over the allowed time. We may get a chance to get back to it, but I'm going to go to Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, am sitting here in the warm glow of the panel. It's just fascinating. Thank you so much.

Dr. Stairs, in what areas of international policy do you think Canada can stand independently of the U.S.?

• 1015

At the same time, Chris Sands, in terms of the structure of the dialogue, in looking at recommendations 13 and 14 in this booklet, it seems to me that Canada has much to offer in terms of working, sharing, and participating in the implementation of the recommendations with the States. One of the recommendations says, “The president and Congress should work together to fundamentally rewrite the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act,” etc. It takes all the different areas of the policy in a ten-point agenda. It seems to me that within some of the work in which we are presently are involved—the partnerships and the various avenues in which our Canadian International Development Agency works in Asia or Africa, etc.—much within that structure would allow us to find some avenues for collaboration. I'll go back to Mr. Martin's question. As legislators, how can we work with our U.S. counterparts to somehow use the best practices and all the other intelligence we've learned in working in the international sphere?

Also, I'm not too sure this is quite familiar language for us, but you kept referring to “failed states” in your document. I'm not too sure about the concept of failed states, but I at least connect to the language of “developing countries” more.

Dr. Denis Stairs: Mr. Chairman, where can we operate independently of the United States to some degree? It's easier to say where we can't than it is to say where we can. As I've said repeatedly, I don't think we can in areas the Americans regard as fundamental to their security. There's no evidence that we have been doing it, but it would be rather pointless of us to challenge them on a matter they regarded as vital. They are going to be unilateralists in those areas. In most cases, we can't change that, and we're probably better off by going with the flow than we are by trying to offer resistance, certainly in public. We can express reservations in private.

One of the concerns I've had about the Canadian response post-September 11 was that it was rather reversed when compared to the traditional pattern. The traditional pattern was that when the Americans were really concerned about security issues, we tended to support them unequivocally in public while expressing quite serious reservations on particular points behind the scenes—that is, through normal diplomatic and military channels, and so forth. In this case, it was rather the other way around. We were dragging our feet, or appeared to be.

That may be an unfair comment, but we appeared to be dragging our feet a little in the first week or ten days, while all our officials were doing the very best they could behind the scenes to reassure every American centre of power and decision that we were of course very anxious to help them in any way we could. I think we really had it a bit backwards, but that was my perception of it.

As for where we can act independently, I'm not very original on this. I think we do it in the areas that one would identify with specialized agencies in the United Nations. We do it in social development, economic policy areas, third world problems, peacekeeping, all of the marginalia, if you like, of international politics as perceived by the power politics, realist view of the world, which is in fact very important to peoples lives. Having said that, once you have that orientation, you have to realize that you have to put resources into it, and I'm sometimes concerned Canadian rhetoric is far in excess of our actual capacity or willingness to deliver. But those are the areas in which we're likely to make a dent.

President Bush was very revealing when he said very early in the game that the U.S. is not into nation-building, that they are going to go in, serve their objective, and then they're pulling out, and if there's a “melee behind” implication, that's their problem. If that's the American position, then the answer is that it's our problem. The rest of the international community has to do something about those things. With appropriate diplomatic pressure, we may be able to get the U.S. to help us pay the bills and so forth, but in a sense, that defines the areas in which we can operate.

Dr. Maureen Molot: I would add to what Dr. Stairs said. Those organizations of which Canada is a member, namely the Commonwealth and the Francophonie, have some opportunity for activity, and we do have some influence from time to time. But part of the challenge in this country has always been deciding what we're going to do and what we're not going to do. We still seem to be facing that. We clearly can't afford to do everything. Some of the activities of our previous foreign minister demonstrate that we can have an impact if we so choose, but we have to choose the issues carefully. Over the last little while, it has not been clear to me that we've done that.

• 1020

With respect to the U.S., the other thing goes back in part to something Mr. Martin said. Part of the enormous problem in dealing with the United States is that country's understandable self-preoccupation not only in terms of its military and economic clout globally—with which we're all familiar—but with the nature of the political system in that country. We haven't yet discussed that, but it effectively gives a new definition to the statement that all politics is local. Those of you around the table understand that from your own perspectives, but the imperatives of the U.S. system give it another definition. When you go to some of the points Dr. Stairs was making earlier about the irritants with which we have to deal on a regular basis, you can identify many of those irritants with particular members of the House of Representatives or the Senate.

I really do think we have failed dramatically in our educational efforts in the United States, and particularly in Washington, in explaining what this country is all about. I notice our Prime Minister is off on a Team Canada mission in the U.S. southwest or something. That's fine. There's no question that the U.S. is absolutely critical from an economic point of view. But the fact is that Canada is critical to about 38 U.S. states as the most important destination for what they export, so there's a great deal more to explaining what Canada is about than pushing the bottom line. That's not to say the economy isn't important—I made a whole argument that it was—but we miss a great deal if we do not spend some time talking to members of Congress about this country's values, its issues, its concerns, etc., and building coalitions.

Interestingly enough, on this last thought, what's interesting is that if you look at where there are coalitions, I think it's possible to do a great deal more coalition-building across the border than we actually do. The most obvious is the urban coalition with those towns and cities on the border that have been clearly impacted by September 11, but that have long discussed a whole host of issues. They circle around other relationships that are far more than just economic, including the environment, etc. So other kinds of coalitions could be built, and we therefore need to be thinking creatively in terms of how we can make a much bigger bang in Washington. A great deal of what we stand for in this country resonates in the U.S. as well.

Dr. Andrew Cooper: I'll just jump in very quickly, because it comes back to the dual forms of coalitions of the willing. In some ways, we have to go forward in building those domestic coalitions in the United States. But in other ways, it's almost going back to an earlier period, because what you have in the United States is an authentic multilateralism coming out of the State Department with Colin Powell, so this is a real opportunity. If we can tap into that, ward off or shoulder off other forces in the United States, and build a need coalition layered from local up to quite elite levels, I think we're going to be successful.

Not to go on too long, the other area is the diplomacy-building on coalitions of the willing in a very different form. This is still what Canada is good at in terms of diplomacy, and perhaps one of your major functions is not to let some of the issues you've focused on in the past get off the map. I can think of the Americas. We spent a lot of time working up on the Americas. It's not only in contested areas about free trade, but also getting to democracy. We support the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the Organization of American States extremely well. We've done an extremely good job of building or rebuilding some forms of democracy in Peru, using some types of features that other countries will use in Afghanistan—bringing together different components of civil society, different forms of governments past, and opposition leaders. This is the learning mechanism, the memory bank, that we should really tap into, without forgetting that even if this is on the margins in some ways, diplomacy matters just as much as other forms of international activity.

Mr. Christopher Sands: Let me just respond specifically to the question you directed at me with regard to the recommendations.

It's personal, but my father is one of those people who is very stubborn—but he's a nice guy...and let that be on the record, by the way, in case he reads this—but I don't think he has ever asked for—

The Chair: The record will show it, but you'll have to find it for him.

Mr. Christopher Sands: Okay.

Anyway, he's never asked for help in his life. He's very self-confident, self-reliant. A lot of people say Americans are arrogant. Sometimes we're just so can-do that we're convinced we can do it ourselves. People stop to ask about this and about that, but we just want to charge ahead. Sometimes, though, even if we don't seem to ask for help, volunteering can work wonders. Canada has the ability to say it has something in a given area, it has some expertise in working with states and governments that have to try to rebuild themselves, maybe even in areas like education and health care. Those systems are important for making the transition from the status of developing countries.

• 1025

With regard to developing countries specifically, to the “failed states” terminology, you can find a failed state in every tier but the U.S., the top tier, so the language is changing a little bit. Developing countries include China and Russia. They're at the middle-power level. Brazil certainly fits into that, as does Argentina. You might find developing countries in the fourth tier, like Mexico and Ukraine, and you'll find them in the failed states.

The “failed state” distinction is very specific. It includes those countries that have lost the ability to effectively govern themselves. There are very few, but they pose particular problems, because no sovereign authority exists in those countries to really get things done if the outside wants to help. The first thing you have to do is shore them up in their ability to get things done domestically—and I'm thinking of countries like Haiti or Afghanistan, where even domestic law and order is a challenge. Those countries are a much bigger challenge than a Mexico or a Ukraine, which govern themselves okay but have other challenges in terms of economic development. That's the distinction I would make.

Finally, in that very area of nation-building, I think you're right. The United States doesn't want to do nation-building. But one of the things Powell and others have raised in recent weeks is this notion that we might have the United Nations, as an entity, developing an aid and assistance nation-building function. The United Nations would lead the redevelopment of Afghanistan, but also that of other troubled countries where the UN has been involved. That's going to obviously take a lot of resources from the U.S., and we can't walk away from it. You're also right on that. But who's going to run this show? Canada not only has expertise, but credibility and legitimacy in those functions that may be particularly useful. In the end, coming back to the multilateral point in terms of best practices, we may be more helped than we know by countries like Canada if they're willing to volunteer to take on those leadership roles.

The Chair: Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: One of the many endearing qualities of our American friends is their willingness to grasp the big idea and have a can-do attitude. I, for one, like that a lot. I'm going to be a bit cheeky and pit our American friend against our Canadian colleagues—and I hope you'll forgive me.

Dr. Molot, you gave a very articulate description of some of the things we ought to be doing. Perhaps you could guide us and let us know how we, at our level, ought to engage in coalition-building with our American counterparts. One of the difficulties we all have when we go to Washington is our ability to even have meetings with our American counterparts. Perhaps you can give us a structure for how we can do that, how we can increase understanding.

Dr. Stairs, you mentioned in your comments that if we get too close to the Americans, we'll be “buried”. We don't want to be perceived as handmaidens of American foreign policy. How would we manage to engage in this coalition-building without being buried?

Dr. Cooper, you mentioned—and I completely concur with you—that with General Powell, we have a great opportunity to liaise with people like him, Senator Patrick Leahy, and others. How would you perceive that we're able to do that?

Mr. Sands, what do you see as the obstacles to this coalition at our federal level?

Thank you.

Dr. Maureen Molot: Since I got the first question, Mr. Martin, I'll start. When you said you were going to pit us against each other, I thought you were going to ask one question that you wanted us all to answer. You have actually posed an absolutely different question to each us.

You asked a good question that I should have anticipated. I don't have any obvious advice, but I think there are some strategies. Coming from B.C., do you talk to our consul general in Seattle and ask what some of the issues are around which you might usefully meet with the congressional representatives and senators from those states? Are they solely B.C. economic issues around softwood lumber, or are there other issues? So one way to do this is for member of this House committee to talk with the consuls general in the regions closest to the constituency they represent.

The second might be to talk with our embassy staff in Washington about the congressional representatives and senators they've identified as the most interested in Canada, and to find out the issues of most concern to them. That's a second strategy.

• 1030

A third might be to have some research done on some of the current issues before your counterpart foreign affairs committees of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. The foreign affairs committees are one thing, but I'm not sure who deals with trade. But are they holding hearings on some issues on which you might have some joint discussion?

Now, these are all ideas that one can throw out. The real problem is one of time. The biggest issue everyone faces, whether you're a member of Parliament or you're a member of Congress, is the demands on your time. So suggestions can be made, but the question is one of making a judgment about relative importance.

Having said that, as we engage in a discussion about the future of North America—and as the future that is important to us all, this may also be relevant in terms of building connections to Mexico—we do have to find ways to build linkages at various levels. We've been talking about this for a long time, but I'm not sure we've actually implemented one small percentage of what we've talked about.

Dr. Denis Stairs: I can't add anything very useful to what you've just heard, because it seems to me that it's absolutely on target. However, you did ask earlier not merely about coalition-building in general, but about what legislators on the Canadian side, what parliamentarians could do in particular vis-à-vis their American colleagues, and Dr. Molot didn't touch on that.

You will obviously be more aware of the limitations than I am, but one of them is getting access to American congressmen. That's a serious problem because of the range of their responsibilities and our place in their world, which is very low on the totem pole for most of them. But it does seem to me that if Canadian parliamentarians are going to have opportunities to talk directly to American congressmen, I would assume they would arise through the interparliamentary group, if it's still at work—although it may meet only casually; I'm not sure. But their role in the American system is clearly quite different from the role of parliamentarians in the Canadian context—they have the staff to prove it, and so forth—so obviously there's a kind of imbalance or disconnect in the encounters of the two groups.

I would have thought the primary objective of Canadian parliamentarians would be to try to deal with misunderstandings about Canada among people in the American Congress, and to enhance informal communication to the extent that it might be possible for a congressman puzzled by a Canadian policy to call up a colleague in Canada to ask what the devil you folks are doing up here, so that you can explain things to them, and so forth. I know that sounds rather soft, but I'm not sure one can expect more than that out of a congressman-parliamentarian direct relationship. On the other hand, that could be very important, so if you have room to promote those sorts of contacts, I would certainly advocate doing so to the best of your abilities.

The only other comment I would want to make—and it goes to Chris Sands' repeated emphasis—is the possibility that we may be able to influence the Americans with bright ideas and so forth. That is possible in the sense that we bring a different perspective. When they're not excited but do have a problem on their agenda, we might be able to come up with a bright idea—occasionally, of course, and just as many other powers can—but I do think we have assets on the table. It's not enough for us to go to the United States and say we have a bright idea for what they ought to do in post-conflict Afghanistan. We also have to say we have certain assets that we can put in place. But if we have no assets, we're basically saying we have a bright idea that we think they ought to pay for, and that we think they ought to pay for it in terms of loss of life, as well as property. We have a slight tendency to overdo that.

What I'm suggesting is that we really need to, in a sense, put our money—as small a parcel as that may be—where our mouth is, and be seen to be doing that. We have had a tendency to be very keen, enthusiastic supporters of issues that cause sacrifice elsewhere but cause no sacrifice in Canada, and I think that has cost us some credibility not only in the United States, but in some other countries. This is highly visible to other players in the world, so I don't think we can do this on the cheap.

Dr. Andrew Cooper: If I can add just two responses—

The Chair: Very briefly.

Dr. Andrew Cooper: —one is to tap into organizations like the one Chris belongs to, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies, like the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, because doing so gives you access to a whole variety of people. The other is to do end runs. Even Jesse Helms went to Mexico with a committee. Why not grab attention in a different way by linking up in some way? That strategy obviously has its risks, but it opens up some possibilities at the same time. This is an older idea in Canadian foreign policy, going back to energy issues and to north-south issues in the early eighties, but it still might have relevance.

• 1035

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Patry.

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you very much.

[English]

Thank you for your visit. I'll go to Mr. Sands.

In your comments, you mentioned that the perception in the United States is a perception pushed by the media, like the editorial you quoted as saying the U.S. is alone with the U.K. You also said that after September 11, the dialogue in the North American region changed from a trilateral dialogue to a bilateral dialogue, and that Canadian reaction on September 11 met with American expectations.

Regarding North American security, I have two questions. What are American expectations? Are they for us to tighten our immigration policy, our visa policy, our refugee policy? Knowing that it's easier to get an American visa than it is to get a Canadian visa, that close to 50% of Canadian refugees come from the United States, and that there are twice as many agents at Canadian border crossings than there are at American border crossings, what are American expectations?

The second point that you gave us previewed an American strategy for the campaign against terrorism, but terrorist attacks took place against the United States before. I'm thinking about the two American embassies and the USS Cole attack. What did the U.S. government do after these attacks? I read recently in the European media—you don't see this in the American media or the Canadian media—that the FBI agents investigating those attacks were told to stop their investigations in order to allow the start of negotiations between the Taliban government and U.S. government in regard to the possibility of the construction of a gazoduc through Afghanistan. It seems September 11 has confirmed for me that the only priority of the U.S. government was an economic priority. It has now turned to a security priority in the short term, but I hope it will be a global and human priority in the long term.

Thank you.

Mr. Christopher Sands: Thank you very much. That's a very good question, so let me answer it in a way that also allows me to respond to Mr. Martin.

When we look back upon this particular conflict, I think one of the things we're going to recognize is that for the first time, because of the Internet and because of other things, we've been sharing a lot of our public space for debate. That has had a big impact on how we perceive each other. Canadians want to have a perfectly legitimate debate about what Canada should do, how much they are in for, and whether or not they want to support the Americans militarily. That's perfectly normal. In every other war, you've had that debate. But now we're eavesdropping. In past conflicts, you always listened to our debate, made up your own minds, and then the Government of Canada would inform Americans that you were with us, you were not, or whatever. That was the process. But now we're listening in.

C-SPAN carried Peter Mansbridge's town hall meetings from the early days—

Mr. Stan Keyes (Hamilton West, Lib.): Oh, no. You're not making judgments based on them, are you?

Mr. Christopher Sands: The C-SPAN folks tell me they've had 12,000 American calls complaining that Canadians are a bunch of bums because of that. You also have Americans who read the Canadian newspapers on the web. But I'll give you a little bit of an insight. Most of us don't know anything about Canada, so we have no context with which to hear your debate.

Now, we are different. Our political culture is black, white, good guys, bad guys, white hats, black hats, so we quickly rally around the good guys' side. Canada's political culture is a big tent in which you hear all points of view, try to be reasonable, think about what you want to do, and then move ahead collectively. We're not used to that, so we make all sorts of snap judgments about whether the Canadians are for us or against us, based on these sorts of scattered impressions.

You talked about the criticisms of Canadian immigration policy. What a surprise! Americans don't know anything about Canadian immigration policy. What they hear are criticisms made in the Canadian media, and as they wrestle with what happened, why it happened, and what they're doing to stop it from happening again, the question that gets raised is what the Canadians are doing about this. Is this a problem? What are you doing? It's less an accusation than it is an expression of concern. In this mix, though, in this mélange of policy responses, it puts tremendous pressure on Canada.

I've said before—and I think it's true—that you don't want to hear some things with a qualification. You don't want to hear someone say, “I love you, but...,” or, “The kids are going to be okay, but...,” or, “The surgery was successful, but....” You just want to hear the good news, with no qualifications. The dilemma with our communication with one another after September 11 is that we want to hear you're with us, no buts, and then we'll talk about how to do it behind the scenes. This is something Denis referred to, and I want to pick up on one of his suggestions.

• 1040

I don't think you would do half badly by running ads in the United States saying, “America, Canadians are with you. We feel your pain,”—not to use the Clinton argument—“and we understand and are supportive.” Say those kinds of things, just like you did in your old tourism ads that built so much of a good image for Canada in the United States. Just get that message across, and everything else is then obviously negotiable. But you have to build up that political capital that you have to deal with us, because we recognize that you're with us—and this is where I come back to Mr. Martin's point.

After World War II, Canada really rose in American estimation. One of the reasons was that thousands of Americans went abroad for the first time in their lives to fight in that war. When they went abroad, they met Frenchmen, they met Germans, they met Italians, and they met Britons, but the people they felt were the most like them—from a rural background, grew up on a farm, knew what they'd gone through in the Depression—were the Canadians. They looked at the Canadians and saw that you are like us.

Today, after September 11, we look around the world and we see very few multicultural, immigrant societies committed to democratic values and principles, like Canada is. You are like us. Maybe some of you folks figure you're better than us, but we're basically in the same boat. I think that's a tremendous beginning for a dialogue.

What made so much possible after World War II was that we thought Canadians were our kinds of guys, our kinds of gals, you were with us and we could trust you. When you came up with a proposal to do something at the UN—to resolve the Suez crisis, to develop peacekeeping, or any number of great Canadian ventures—we could say we'd give it a listen because Canadians were our kind of people, could be trusted, had no hidden agenda, were good people, and were worth listening to.

That soft power is an extremely important one for Canada in dealing with the United States, and it's one you can still develop now, because for those people who actually have an informed impression of where Canadians are after September 11, not a misinformed one, there's a real appreciation of the fact that Canadians really are on our side. That is where you get a lot of leverage, if you can just figure out what you want to use it for.

The Chair: Bernard, you had another a comment.

Mr. Bernard Patry: It's just a comment, not a question.

You want us to tell you we're behind you, and that's fine. But sometimes we don't tell, we act. Look at what happened on September 11. First of all, you know as I do that five people in NORAD are responsible, and the one on duty that day was the Canadian person. How many Americans know a Canadian was on duty at NORAD that day? Probably not that many.

On the other hand, we act. The day of September 11, how many Americans landed in Canada? Over 35,000 people were here, and we acted. But how many Americans know about this? In Gander, Newfoundland, the city population is 9,000, but 12,000 people landed there and the population of Gander provided everything those people needed. But that's it. Sometimes we feel we need to get recognition from the United States for what we've done, and not just from the media. It's very rare from the American media, but it's also rare from the U.S. government itself.

That's my comment.

Mr. Christopher Sands: You're right about that. It's a story worth telling, and more of your congressional colleague counterparts ought to hear that story. Absolutely.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you.

The Chair: We'll do that.

I'm going to ask a couple of questions, and then I'm going to go to Mr. Paquette.

Just as a quick question to Dr. Stairs, you talked about essential U.S. security issues in which there's no wiggle room for Canada. Do you put National Missile Defence in that category?

Dr. Denis Stairs: I know it's an unpopular answer, but the short answer is yes. In other words, if we come to the conclusion that the Americans are determined to do this, it will not be possible for Canada to change that opinion, in my view.

The Chair: On this point, do you think the Americans have come to the conclusion that they will do it?

Dr. Denis Stairs: The tea leaves suggest to me that they will, but that could also have changed in the wake of this. But my sense is that they do want to move in that direction.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Sands, as a very quick question to you, is Colombia one of your failed states, by virtue of the collapse of internal security within that country?

Mr. Christopher Sands: I think it's heading in that direction. If you look at the list of terrorist organizations that we have identified in the Americas, three of them are in Colombia. If it hasn't failed, it certainly has a D minus, and the real concern is whether or not they have the ability to govern themselves effectively through this crisis. A whole zone of their country has no effective governance at all, except by the FARC, so I would add Colombia to the list—if not as a failure, then close to it.

• 1045

The Chair: Thank you. The reason for the question is that our committee is doing a study on Colombia at this time, so we're interested in that country.

Mr. Christopher Sands: You didn't mean British Columbia, did you? I think they're doing fine.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Chair: British Columbia is only a failed state because we can't get our softwood lumber into your country. That's our present failure.

The third question will take a little longer, because it's addressed to both Mr. Sands and Maureen Molot.

Both of you adverted to Canada-U.S. integration, and both of you have suggested that while the European model is something we have to look at, it's not entirely transcribable to the North American context. We agree on that point. On the other hand, I suggest to you that the European model indicates that if you're going to have economic integration, you have to have some institutional framework within which to manage it—and I think you suggested that, Mr. Sands.

What is the institutional framework, or where do we look to find an institutional framework that the United States will accept to constrain its unilateral action vis-à-vis Canadians, in the context of a greater integration? In other words, just take anti-dump and countervail alone. If you look at the European model, if you're going to have an economic integration, you cannot have anti-dump. But the United States has not indicated in any way whatsoever that it is prepared to give up anti-dump in respect of Canada. If they won't even give up something all economists clearly indicate is inappropriate in the case of an economic union, such as anti-dump, what on earth are they going to accept as any kind of constraint on their sovereignty in any form of an economic relationship? What will allow us to contain or have any influence on U.S. decisions that will affect the lives of our citizens if we continue economic integration? Those are the questions we have to ask ourselves, and that's what we're going to study in this study.

It's all very well for us to sit here saying we want to have greater economic integration with the United States, but if the consequences are that we will have nothing left to decide ourselves, except for more prosperity, that's one thing we want to know. Or, is there a willingness within the American system to accept that we're going into a partnership—you're going to be a partner, and here's the institutional partnership that will allow you to influence the decisions that will influence your lives? For what it's worth, my own personal view, based on my experience with Congress, is that Americans are not going to do that.

I just came back from Doha. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said the U.S. is willing to talk about anti-dump in the WTO context, but 75 congressmen wrote a letter to the President, saying they're not even willing to talk about it even if the rest of the world says it wants to.

What makes you think Canada's going to get anything out of this?

Dr. Maureen Molot: I expected that one.

You're expressing a concern of all Canadians who have been examining Canada-U.S. economic relationships since—I don't know—World War II, maybe. That's why I was, one, suggesting that there is no model out there that we can easily follow; and two, asking the question about what should go on the table.

A discussion of individual subjects isn't going to give us the kind of bargaining power my colleagues have referred to already. This is also an issue that requires building coalitions of a different sort in the U.S.

One of the lessons around President Clinton's inability to get fast-track on two separate occasions was the lack of involvement of the U.S. business community in the process. If anything of a bilateral sort is going to move forward to address countervail and anti-dump—which are among the largest irritants—the U.S. business community has to buy into it. Has the U.S. business community changed its attitudes in light of September 11? I think it has to some degree, but I can't cite a study on which I base that statement. One test of that will be what happens when President Bush asks Congress for what is now trade promotion authority, or what we all call fast-track.

• 1050

Congressmen are notoriously sensitive to the interests of their own constituencies, and an enormous education process is going to be required. It's not going to be easy. It comes back to something Dr. Stairs mentioned when he talked about energy and how we handle that asset that we possess. It goes back to the whole question...you'll remember the discussion that first took place in the early 1980s, around whether or not we would do sectoral free trade with the U.S. It was obviously a non-starter. Again, I'm trying to be very sensitive in regard to the kinds of issues that I think might be on the table, but we have to think expansively rather than narrowly as we undertake a debate about how we're going to manage the relationship.

You asked a question about institutions. I'm simply not sure. All of the history of the U.S. suggests an enormous uncertainty about institutions, and with respect to the WTO, we see the predilection of the Americans—and the Europeans, by the way—to ignore decisions they don't like. Only large actors can do that. Small ones can't, as we've discovered.

So do we want some large institution, or do we want issue-specific institutions? We have a history of issue-specific institutions. We have NORAD, we have the International Joint Commission, we have the North American Commission for Environmental Co-operation, etc. We may in fact have to think creatively in that way, because any time we go into something that might in any possible way be seen as supranational, all of the bells go off in both countries.

The Chair: If you could, Mr. Sands, please respond quickly. Others are waiting to ask questions.

Mr. Christopher Sands: Yes, absolutely. I'll keep this brief.

You raise an important question. Before September 11, the NAFTA model for having a dialogue about where we were going—which was something the U.S. did buy into—was that counterparts would talk to one another. They would talk to one another about a variety of things, ranging from immigration to harmonization to standards, and so on. It was very passive. What we discovered was that ministers talked to one another, but very few officials were willing to take the chance. Particularly now that we're in the Bush administration, NAFTA is seen as something the Clinton folks did, so they don't want to talk about it much anymore. Officials aren't willing to undertake the burden. If the U.S. isn't willing, then the Canadians don't want to bother, so why would the Mexicans open that door? So we have a NAFTA model that's stalled, which is one of the reasons I'm suggesting we need a new paradigm, and a paradigm that allows Canada and the United States to lead where they're prepared to go is very helpful.

That answers part of your question in the sense that I think it gives us the kinds of institutions Americans could accept, because they're not institutions. They're really just structures for a dialogue on North America that may be more effective than the previous model.

The question then comes to how to handle some of this anti-dump countervail. My view is that Doha was the wrong place to have raised that. If we get trade promotion authority—and you can count me as a skeptic, because I don't think the administration is going to get it right now, in part because of Doha—I think it will come at the price of Mr. Zoellick's job. We'll have a new trade representative if we're going to move forward at all, and we may just decide not to move forward.

If I were Canadian, if I were in your shoes, I'd be looking more at a different side of the relationship. Between Canada and the United States, we've always had a formal relationship between the governments and an informal relationship between the societies, including the business connections, the networks, and so on. As you know, the informal relationship is bulked up thanks to technology and so on. The economy is stronger than it ever was.

If I were facing the kind of harassment you've faced over the years on softwood and in other areas, I would think it's time to co-opt the litigants. Our system is highly vulnerable to people filing trade cases and insisting that they be followed through. Our politicians have taken the approach that it's all a judicial process, so they're going to stand back and let it run its course and they can't intervene. Then, when the WTO or NAFTA comes out with a ruling, the U.S. either says the courts have decided that we have to follow through, or it says we're not going to follow through, depending on whether or not the politicians are willing to take the political heat.

If I had the softwood lumber file, I would be looking...you have already successfully taken Georgia Pacific off the table as a potential litigant, so go after International Paper. That may mean inviting them to participate in the Canadian market in a greater way than they do now, and being proactive about it. It may mean buying a chunk of their shares. It may mean encouraging Canadian lumber companies to buy some of the small lumber companies in the United States so that no one's left to complain anymore. This is a focused, targetable task. It's also not a grand strategy. I think it's just a simple way of ending the harassment by eliminating the people who complain by giving them a buy-in into your system on the one hand, or by taking them over so that they don't see any gain in attacking Canada on the other hand.

• 1055

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Paquette, but I must say first that your last answer totally proves my point, because your only answer is that we have to operate within the American system, in accordance with American rules, in which case we will have no influence whatsoever on developing those rules. Around this legislative table, we can play in the American puddle if we go to Washington and deal with their lobbyists and their lawyers in the way they operate. We're working on that on softwood lumber, believe you me. We're doing that a lot—

Mr. Christopher Sands: I can only give you so much warm feeling. I tried.

The Chair: —but I don't find a satisfactory model in which to operate as a sovereign nation. Anyway, that's another discussion.

An hon. member: Over a large glass of fresh water.

[Translation]

Mr. Paquette.

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I would like to pick up what you started to discuss and what Mr. Patry also began to talk about, that is, on the American side, we know, economic interests are what take priority. Mr. Patry, rightly, was critical, but I would say the same thing of Canada.

To my mind, one of the problems of Canadian foreign policy is that it is based essentially on a short-term commercial view and, in this context, it is not integrated, it is not consistent with other aspects that could strengthen our position concerning relations with the U.S.

I continue onto the question of lumber, for instance. Never has Canada requested, in the current negotiations, any consideration from the Americans. Right away, it assumed a guilty position by asking the provinces to propose a number of changes in their forestry management. Up to now—there have been several weeks of meetings in Washington and Toronto—, Canada has not asked the Americans for anything to solve its own difficulties concerning the production of lumber, because we know that there is a problem very much linked to environmental constraints.

So, in this issue, as in others, we see, I would say, a short-term commercial interest. Where international relations are concerned, it is the same thing.

Mr. Stairs, you said that we have to find out what Canada wants in relation to the U.S. and we have to ask the Americans for things. It seems to me that that would require a repositioning with respect to foreign policy as a whole and dropping this strictly commercial concern.

[English]

Mr. Christopher Sands: In the short term, something of that nature can be self-defeating. Both you and Mr. Patry have also raised something in which there is a positive in the concern, that being that the U.S. is often preoccupied with economics. We're security-minded people, so the security fixation will never go away, but economics matters. Canada may be a small security ally, but you're an economic big ally for the United States, and that also gives you leverage. I know we're difficult to deal with sometimes. I don't advise a frontal assault, but you have ways in which you can use the networks that you have.

Somebody was telling me that Mexico will be the best friend of the Americans because of all the Hispanics in the United States. The Hispanic population is a big lobby, but Canada has a big lobby in the United States, too. It's big business, and you've seen that lobby come out very strongly on the border issue, saying certain things the security people want to do in terms of fortifying the U.S. border aren't acceptable because we rely on an open border for just-in-time trade.

This comes back to a point several people have made about finding new allies, about maybe not operating as Canada versus the United States, about Canada finding friends and basically running a guerrilla war, and about trying to get others in the United States to help in new coalitions. I just echo the comments of my peers. A lot of potential exists, but it's certainly worth doing. I don't have great hope that we're going to change, but knowing us as you do, you can certainly take advantage of our weaknesses and our vanity.

Dr. Dennis Stairs: If I could just make a comment on this, what we really should understand is that part of the negotiating problem is going to be us. For example, even if you take the hope that we're going to have a continental energy policy—and the Americans will have a security reason backing their thrust for this as much as they have economic reasons; the main reason is going to be primarily a security one, that being security of supply—we may have a brief window in which we have a great deal of economic leverage that we can use. We're prepared to make the deal, but on the other hand, there's a quid pro quo. Depending on how seriously they're taking the issue on their agenda, that would conceivably be an answer to getting into anti-dump and that sort of thing.

• 1100

In my view, the problem is going to be as much on our side of the border as it is on theirs. That is to say, Canadian interests will not want the Government of Canada to use energy as bargaining leverage in a way that jeopardizes the possible routines down the road. That will go for people who want the pipelines in their backyards, it will go for the people who actually have the resource, and so on.

My only observation about this is blindingly obvious, but that's what integration means. When push comes to shove, when the states have a go at one another, what integration of the economy means is that you've lost your bargaining power. That's the reality. When it looked like that border was being closed in the wake of September 11, the panic was in Canada, not in the United States. The panic was in Canada because our interests have become so economically integrated with those of the United States that, sorry, we can't afford to have that border closed. The question was, what did the U.S. want in order to keep it open?

It is a reality, but I'm not sure anything can be done about it. It's a product of geography, the long-term development of the North American economy, etc. But we went into this with our eyes wide open. In the middle of 1980s, we endorsed that process. Now we're living with the consequences. That's what integration is. In political terms, it confines your options.

We're now talking about turning it into a continental policy in which we play our politics more or less in tandem with the way the Americans play their politics, in conjunction with them, indeed. In other words, that means forming transborder alliances in the various sectors, in the hope that we may be able to get a little wriggle room in the American policy community. That's what we're doing, and that's a consequence of integration. That's the price.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: I have a small comment before finishing.

What has struck me up to now in the presentations we have heard from the officers in various Canadian departments is their lack of interest in Mexico. I say to myself, when we wonder whether to choose integration, that we have at least one other partner, Mexico, that could bring pressure to bear on certain aspects in relation to some American positions. But it is completely absent, and the reason why it is absent is that we do not have any major trade right now with Mexico, and that strikes me as being a total lack of vision.

The Chair: That is a comment.

[English]

Colleagues, we have 15 minutes remaining until the vote. I suggest that we go on for about six minutes, and then break. By then, it will be time to walk over to the House.

I'm now going to pass it to Madam Jennings.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Chairman, are we coming back after the vote?

The Chair: I think that will be impossible after the vote because it will be ten to twelve when we come back. So it will be impossible.

Ms. Jennings.

[English]

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you very much for your presentations. They were all very illuminating and enlightening.

Dr. Stairs, I particularly appreciate the recommendation or suggestion that you make that Canada should go slow. When you talk about how some of our ministers—whether it's the Minister of Justice or the Minister of Health—have possibly committed certain errors by going too quickly in certain files as a result of September 11, I think it highlights the need to step back in order to take some time for reflection.

I also appreciate the suggestions that you've given, Dr. Molot, on how we, as legislators, can possibly effect better bilateral relationships with our U.S. counterparts. One of the problems that we have, though, is that under the House rules and procedures, the travel budgets, etc., that we have are only for work within Canadian borders. That means Canadian legislators who wish to participate or foster better relations with the United States either have to do it through the official parliamentary association, or they have to do it on their own dime. That creates a real hardship, and it creates a certain unevenness or inequality amongst the legislators. Those who have their own personal incomes or whatever can possibly afford to do that, but others may not because they have other priorities. That may be an issue that we need to look at as a committee, and on which we need to make recommendations to the House.

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I also like the idea, Dr. Stairs, that Canada should possibly look at a major publicity campaign or ad campaign in the United States, in order to rebrand Canada in the United States. I sat on the industry committee until last September. One of the things the industry minister wanted to do was rebrand Canada as “Smart Canada”, in order to bring in foreign investments for the private sector, in terms of our advances in technology, etc. As an idea, even that is a good idea, but I don't know that we'll get the moneys we need for it.

Mr. Sands, I do have a question for you. Having done law school, with the volumes that we had to read, I became a pretty good diagonal reader. I've gone through your executive summary very briefly, and one of the things I've noticed—and I find it a little preoccupying—is recommendation 1 on page 323, in which you state:

The United States, working with the United Nations, other countries, and international relief organizations, should immediately launch an international emergency program to avert a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan this winter.

I find that preoccupying because the United States is a member of the United Nations—at least, I'm under that impression. When I look at the way that recommendation is formulated, though, it reads as though the United States is outside of the UN, doesn't consider itself to be part of the UN, and will lead the movement for humanitarian aid, etc. That brings me back to the fact that, notwithstanding the statements you've made here, a paradigm shift has occurred within the United States. While it is a world-hegemonic state, there is more openness to the fact that the United States cannot, in and of itself, solve the world's problems and cannot, in and of itself, actually protect itself within its own borders on all levels, be they economic levels, security levels, or you name it.

But then I come to the recommendation. The very way in which it's formulated tells me the actual core of that thinking doesn't seem to have changed. If it had changed, I would think the recommendations would have said, “The United States, as a member of the United Nations...”. A leading member should encourage, lead, advocate that the United Nations, along with other countries that are not members, and along with international relief organizations, should make this policy and move toward Afghanistan.

I wonder if you might comment on that, because I do find it a little preoccupying, given your earlier statements. When I come to this, it seems to tell me that the paradigm has actually remained the same.

Mr. Christopher Sands: First, I should say that I never underestimate a Canadian member of Parliament, but I'm truly impressed by your ability to read that quickly. I give you credit for it. And I appreciate your reading it, because I didn't give a copy to any of my colleagues, so they at least understand where you're coming from.

There is a great degree of alienation between the United States and the United Nations. It is an “us versus them” that has emerged over time. It is something that was not improved by a Democratic administration in the White House, or by a Republican administration. And it's not just Jesse Helms. I think an impression has intensified in recent years among a lot of Americans, that impression being that the United Nations is a well-intentioned organization that spends a lot of time on silly things and on things that are antithetical to what the U.S. would like the UN to be doing. That is what has created that paradigm. I've argued that this needs to change.

The first recognition is that we need our allies. The second recognition may be that we need our allies to work in certain clusters or organizations. I think we have greater confidence in Britain, Canada, and Germany, than we do in the United Nations, or even in the European Union as an actor.

We may have a long road to follow. I think the phrasing of that reflects where our thinking is. From an American point of view, it's almost positive, because at least we're saying we should work with the United Nations to get things done, but it's treating the United Nations as an actor in and of itself, with a Secretary General and with all of those agencies and their capabilities. Those are not us, but they are part of the collective effort of a lot of nations that we want to bring in as actors in all of this. It's a case of finally recognizing that the UN, as an actor, has a role.

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I respect what you're saying, because I think you're clueing in to something that is almost inadvertent and too subtle for my American brain. But from our point of view, that's a positive recommendation because it's suggesting the UN is worth taking seriously as an actor.

You're right, we may have a long way to go—maybe even longer than I have suggested—but I am an optimist about these things.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: I'll leave it at that.

The Chair: We're going to have to end on that, because we have to go to vote. That's something that usually happens when we go to visit your congressmen, by the way, Mr. Sands. We barely get a conversation introduced, and then they all have to run off to vote. And we're going to be like them. We're not coming back.

I'm sorry, we're not going to be able to. By the time we got back, frankly—

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: That is when the government wants to impose a gag order.

[English]

The Chair: By the time we got back, we wouldn't do the panel justice. On behalf of the committee members, I therefore want to thank the panellists for coming. We really appreciate your attendance and your evidence. I'm sure we'll have an opportunity to dialogue with you at another occasion.

Colleagues, we're adjourned until 3:30 this afternoon.