FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 22, 2001

• 0911

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.)): Good morning.

The Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investments we will deal with when we have a quorum.

I begin, then, by welcoming the witnesses before us. We're pleased to have you here to continue our study of North American integration and Canada's role in light of new security challenges. Today we shall be taking up the specific theme of Canadian foreign policy priorities and options in light of the tragic events of September 11. We believe our witnesses today are eminently qualified to guide us in our reflections.

We shall begin with the Honorable Barbara McDougall, who is president of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs. She's well known to the workings of this House and the workings of this committee, having served in the capacity of minister. Welcome. It's good to see you here.

Ms. Barbara McDougall (President, Canadian Institute for International Affairs): Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. It's a long time since I appeared before a parliamentary committee, and I should say that sometimes it was somewhat acrimonious. I hope today will be a little bit different.

Actually, if I can digress for a moment, my best appearance before any committee was before a Senate committee in 1985, and it had to do with the failure of two banks. It was the first time ever that a Senate committee had been televised, which meant there was a full turnout from anybody who could totter into the room, all spiffed up in their best ties and new haircuts. I'd been playing tennis the day before and had take a bad fall, and I showed up at this committee with two black eyes. So I did better today. I did not fall down any stairs or disgrace myself, at least so far anyway.

First, I'm delighted the Canadian Institute for International Affairs has been invited to make a presentation here, because as a foreign policy organization with a national membership and a long history of interest in all aspects of foreign policy in Canada, we have been involved in assisting the government and in assisting Parliament in discussing these issues for nearly 75 years.

I'm going to give a smattering of views across a range of fronts, if I may, today. I'm going to talk a little bit about the relationships within North America. I'm going to talk about globalization and regional issues, about the economic impact of some security matters, and a little bit about immigration.

As this committee well knows, when we talk about North American integration, we're talking about something that is very uneven. NAFTA is fundamentally a trade agreement. It's not even an economic agreement, let alone a political document, it is about trade. So when we talk about North American integration, we're really talking about a set of three bilateral relationships: a U.S.-Canada relationship that is increasingly—and for some people alarmingly, although I don't see it that way—integrated, an integration that is well entrenched and has been going on for many years; a U.S.-Mexico relationship that is integrated only in a very specific sense, in a trading sense somewhat, but also in a negative sense through illegal immigration, which preoccupies both Mexicans and Americans. I was at a conference on this topic on the weekend in San Francisco, and the Mexican on the panel spoke almost entirely about immigration matters and how to handle the illegal Mexican immigration into the U.S. And the third bilateral relationship is, of course, the Canada-Mexico relationship, which is virtually not integrated at all.

• 0915

There are no institutions that could be remotely described as dedicated to integration, particularly as it relates to trilateral integration. There does not even exist a pattern of regular meetings among all three political leaders or the three parliamentary groups on a trilateral basis, although there are between Canada and the U.S. well-developed bilateral relationships.

Despite the political declaration in Mexico City by President Bush one week before September 11 that NAFTA will lead to Mexico's firmly entrenching itself as a North American country rather than a Latin American, there's very deep ambivalence and doubt throughout the Mexican populace about this integration, for historic reasons, which I obviously need not go into, and for language and economic reasons.

September 11 demonstrated that international friendships can be very short and shallow indeed. President Bush declared that Mexico is the U.S.'s new best friend, but we haven't heard a word about that since. Now it's Great Britain that's the new best friend. I remember, when I was the minister, James Baker announced in Tokyo that Japan was the best friend of the United States, so it does depend on what week it is. But there's no question that the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship is secure and significant to the U.S., whatever they may say in whatever capital they happen to be in that day. And September 11 did demonstrate that there is a real need to look at Canada's relationship with the U.S., both bilaterally and in a global context, and that's what I will concentrate on today.

While the terrorist acts took place on American soil and did take the lives of 30 Canadians, the backdrop to the action was a complex fabric of ethnic, religious, power-hungry, obsessive, geopolitical, historic events and attitudes that began half way around the globe. We've read a lot about the causes and the root causes of terrorism since September 11. I don't think we're anywhere close to understanding what those may be, but there's no question that the events themselves, although they took place within this context, had a much broader basis, beyond North America, and were based, in many cases, on long historical grievances.

We can draw two conclusions from this. First, globalization does affect regional issues and patterns. Second, regional, in this case bilateral, relationships are vital to our future and every single aspect of our lives. You cannot carry on a conversation in Canada today without a reference to the U.S. Whether it's cultural, business, political, security, perimeter, theatre, shopping, there is always an aura of the benchmarking of the U.S. and what we are doing vis-à-vis the U.S., and it's almost in the air we breathe.

Integration has broadened and deepened since the free trade agreement, but it did not begin there. Without the free trade agreement, one of two things would have happened: integration, particularly economic, would have continued, but at a slower pace of growth and at considerably greater cost to Canadians, because of tariff and non-tariff barriers that existed; or a subsequent government, this one, would have signed an FTA treaty very similar to the one we have. In fact, it is frightening to contemplate this continent with non-integration or without an agreement of some kind. Canada, with its 30 million people, is perched on top of this hemisphere, with 600 million people below. So we'd be sitting up there like a little beret on top of the continent, and our job as Canadians is to manage integration in our own interests and not fight it.

• 0920

The first order of business after September 11, of course, is to ensure that the border with the U.S. remains as open as possible and that impediments to trade are removed. I know we're here today to talk about security, but the greatest threat to our security would be a threat to our economic stability and to our trade with the United States. We are seeing some of that now. As an example, Dell Computer Corporation has announced that it is moving from the three-day inventories it normally holds to seven-day inventories as a precaution against transportation delays. The threat to Canada under those circumstances, of course, is an economic one, because it will add to the cost of doing business, but it may also affect investment in Canada for products that are destined for an integrated market.

So there is an added urgency to, if I can say it, harmonized procedures to facilitate trade, some of which had been under way previously. There was a movement towards at least cooperative pre-clearance, which was in the process of development. There were in process discussions about bonding transportation companies, so that there could be virtually free movement across the border without stopping, similar to that in Europe. That is the economic threat to our security, and it is a real one, one it's very important that the government and business, the private sector, together jump on very quickly, to ensure that those impediments do not last, because there will be real points off our gross domestic product as a result of the delays at the border.

We must also be prepared to be much more hard-nosed about immigration and security. Let me be clear that this does not mean harmonizing our immigration policy with that of the U.S. It does not mean changing our immigration outlook in any way in respect of where people come from. Canada is a diverse country, as has been pointed out on a virtually daily basis in the last month or so, and we have to keep hammering the point home, so that there are no threats to the kind of immigration policy we want. There is nothing wrong with immigration or with our immigration policy, or with our refugee policy for that matter.

Where we have problems is in our security and intelligence policy and in our deportation implementation. What has been starkly pointed out to us is not that the terrorists in this case came from Canada, but that we as Canadians and Americans as Americans are increasingly vulnerable and must enhance our security checks for those entering the country, aggressively pursuing those with refugee claims, or visitors' visas for that matter, those who disappear once they get here. It does mean tougher action on deportation, something Canadians have not had a lot of taste for. And it does mean finding the resources for better intelligence. It means sharing intelligence more smoothly, not only with counterparts in the U.S., but among our own agencies, CSIS, the RCMP, and local police, the last being the best-equipped to manage their own communities. And it does mean coming down hard on groups that shelter terrorists or finance them.

We must take these actions not to give the U.S. comfort that Canada is secure, but to give Canadians comfort that Canada is secure. Canadians must believe in the integrity of the immigration system. If not, the first people to suffer are those legitimate immigrants who look like so-called suspects, in this case Muslims. It used to be that if you heard an Irish accent, you assumed they belonged to the IRA. Now it is Muslims who have a hard time. I spoke with a Pakistani in Toronto yesterday who was explaining some of the troubles in his own mosque. The first priority of the government is to ensure the security of all Canadians, wherever they are from, including, most particularly, those who are vulnerable. I'm glad to see the government's making some moves along these lines—we can talk about that later, if you wish—with a new immigration bill and the anti-terrorism bill.

• 0925

Finally, I don't know how far the committee wants to get into the military aspects of the security side, but I want to make a couple of points.

Canadians at the moment are understandably and genuinely confused over what role Canada is playing in the conflict. It has really not been made clear whether the troops are collected or whether they're going or not going, what equipment is going. There really is genuine confusion out there.

Second, I never thought I'd hear myself say this, but I do think it is time for a defence review. What are our defence needs to secure the so-called perimeter—we're hearing a lot of discussion, but not a lot of facts at the moment about securing the perimeter—and to meet our security needs overseas, when we're seeing in the present war-like environment confusion over what contribution Canadians are making? Should we also re-examine NORAD along with the Americans or incorporate some anti-terrorism activities into a new bilateral arrangement?

I'll conclude by saying that none of this is done without cost, cost to the economy. It adds to business costs, it adds to government costs, which therefore add to business and income tax costs for individual Canadians, and we're going to have to bite the bullet and accept that those costs will go up as a result.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you very much, Ms. McDougall.

I think we'll move quickly to Professor Albert Legault, with a very impressive résumé. I think it might interest the members to know that Professor Legault was a NATO fellow. He's currently the director of the forum on security and defence. He served as adjunct director of the Centre for International Information on Peacekeeping Operations in Paris from 1966 to 1968.

Professor Legault, you have a few minutes for your presentation. Thank you.

[Translation]

Professor Albert Legault (Political Science, Laval University): Thank you, Madam Chair. Like Ms. McDougall, I am both honoured and pleased to be here, and I thank you for the invitation.

In the text I submitted, I think there's a rather dramatic error on line seven, page 4, under the heading "Space Shield". The text should read "no Canadian territorial resource", not "US".

...no Canadian territorial resource is involved in [...] current anti-missile defence deployment plans.

I wanted to make that correction.

Obviously, neither the clerk, the chair, nor the vice-chair asked us to deal with specific issues. Since your committee's mandate is extremely broad, I decided to take a rather general, overall approach as well.

On the issue of North American integration, there are four important issues in my view. There are also two variables that are very important with respect to these four issues. They are the time factor, that is the timeframe, and mutual perceptions in the two capitals, as regards these four issues.

You heard Ms. McDougall speak about Canada-US relations. That is one issue. Then there is the effort to combat terrorism, third there is the NMD, and fourth, the fundamental issue of the interoperability of the Canadian and American Armed Forces.

• 0930

I am not going to dwell at length on the issue of Canada-US relations. I think that both sides see this as being very urgent. The same is true with respect to anti-terrorist activities. I think the issue of the NMD is slightly less urgent. It is urgent, but there may be some competition with the anti-terrorism efforts on the American side. In Canada, I think this is seen as something of low to medium urgency, depending on the departments involved. Obviously, the Department of National Defence would see this as a relative priority, but on a medium scale, whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs is probably much less interested in this issue.

With respect to the interoperability of our military forces, it all depends on how we look at the problem. The urgency is very high on the American side, probably because the Americans have all the financial and military resources required to follow the revolution in military affairs, and the urgency is much lower or medium level on the Canadian side, where we simply want to maintain a type of cooperation with the United States.

As Ms. Barbara McDougall just said, as far as Canada-US economic relations go, I think this is an urgent matter. Of course, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, has described the Canada-US relationship as something transcendental. I am not sure what this means. I know what it means in political philosophy, but in practical terms, I'm not sure what that means. But it sounds good.

Clearly, there are some obstacles, and we must eliminate all obstacles to trade between Canada and the United States. However, I think this involves issues that are much more technological in nature, such as the locking of containers, the use of electronic cards, control points or shipments that are sealed from departure to arrival. In my view, these issues are much more administrative than technological in nature, and, with time, probably within a year, should be settled to the satisfaction of both parties.

I will set aside the issue of port security, on which you have not touched, and which will probably be a very serious problem for Canadians in the future. As you know, during the Second World War, American ports were more or less controlled by the mafia, and that is somewhat true of Canadian ports. I think Canada has a lot of work to do to clean up this situation.

As regards the anti-terrorism campaign, I would associate myself with what Ms. McDougall said. I think the Canadian system is just as effective as the American system. I do not think that Canada has sheltered more terrorists than the United States. That means that neither side can really make any well-founded accusations.

On the other hand, I am not sure that there should be a continental security perimeter, which is the same thing as a security perimeter, for reasons that I will explain later when I touch on the military aspects of the question.

The implementation of Canadian laws goes to the very heart of the Canadian political system—that is the relationship between a government and its citizens, between a government and its provinces between its police forces and its subjects. Here you are going to the very heart of the Canadian political system, and I would have my doubts about any joint committees that might be established to achieve a system of continental security in the effort to fight terrorism. After listening to you, Minister, I think our positions on this subject are quite similar. I think we should be cautious in what we do.

• 0935

I think there are three essential criteria as regards our cooperation with the United States in the campaign against terrorism. The first two are increased information-sharing between Canada and the US and greater consultation on ambiguous issues. If you read today's Globe and Mail, you will see that an assumed terrorist of Egyptian origin was reportedly released by the RCMP following contact with the FBI. I think both sides made a mistake, hence the importance of consultations on ambiguous issues. The third criterion—and here I agree with Ms. McDougall as well, is firm enforcement of the anti-terrorism legislation that will be passed shortly.

The anti-terrorism campaign is first of all a police matter and one involving the intelligence services. The armed forces should be involved only incidentally to assist the police or intelligence officials regarding terrorist activities. That does not mean that this will not become their role in the future, but for the time being, I do not think military involvement is required to enforce the anti-terrorism legislation. I think this should be handled by the departments that are responsible for the anti- terrorism legislation. This may mean that there should be increased coordination among these departments, which is not the case at the moment, because each one is protecting its own turf and its own information, so coordination is extremely difficult.

The Americans have a slightly different problem. They have a national guard, which Canada does not have. The DOD, the American Department of Defence, is calling for the creation of a new CINC, a new commander-in-chief, who would come under the office of Tom Ridge, with a direct line of command from the president, to Tom Ridge and to the commander-in-chief. This would be a completely different chain of command from the current military chain of command.

It may be that this matter is much more important in the United States and in Canada, specifically because there is a national war effort there, the equivalent of which does exist in Canada. As was stated earlier, it is clear that if there is greater integration between Canada and the US in the anti-terrorism effort, Canada may have to review its military command structures for homeland defence as well, depending on the direction the Americans take. We could talk about that later.

The third point is the space shield or the NMD. There is no sense of urgency on the Canadian side. To facilitate Canada-US relations somewhat, some people would like Canada to make a decision on this now. This attitude is broadly contested by others who say there is no urgency, that we still do not know what the Americans will do with the 1972 ABM Treaty, and that Canada is very strongly attached to the non-weaponization of space. The national missile defence systems will probably result in the launch into space of offensive defence systems, so as a result, we are somewhat ambiguous on this at the moment. The official line or the general policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs is to say that we will not participate unless the Russians and the Americans agree and unless we know what will happen with the ABM Treaty.

• 0940

You see, this sense of urgency is not exactly shared by the different departments. I think Canada can afford to wait for the Americans to clarify their position and for the Russians and Americans to agree on a new security apparatus before seriously contemplating Canadian participation in this area.

In the U.S., the fight against terrorism has shoved the issue of antimissile defense onto the back burner, but there are obviously two things the Americans have in abundant supply: time and money. So the issue will eventually resurface. Like it or not, it is clear the Americans are going to take all necessary steps to ensure their security, so the government of Canada will continue to come under American pressure in the future over matters that to my mind are very important.

As for the interoperability of Canadian and U.S. forces, there is no problem there. We already have a continental security perimeter through the navy and NORAD. It is false to claim that our equipment is completely obsolete. Witness the fact that there are currently 2,000 sailors involved in the security perimeter of the U.S. fleet deployed in the Arabian-Persian gulf. I say Arabian-Persian out of respect for my friend Houchang Hassan-Yari. I am not taking any position on that issue.

Professor Houchang Hassan-Yari (Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada): You should say Persian.

Prof. Albert Legault: Yes, that is in fact what I said. You dropped one word.

This North-American integration already exists for the navy. It is also in full operation in the air force. The Department of Defence has pulled off quite a feat. It came up with $800 million to modernize the CF-18s. The money obviously came from other sources and was not specifically intended for modernizing the CF-18s. The CF-18s are at the cutting edge of technology. They can operate with American forces day or night. So as far as interoperability of military forces is concerned, Canada and the U.S. are highly compatible.

There is however one small problem: land forces. If you read the Globe and Mail and the articles on the endless disputes over Janice Stein's position and the series of responses on the issue of the future role of the Canadian army, you will see that there are obviously some minor problems, but we do have a SWAT Team or Joint Task Force 2 that is now probably working with American forces in the Gulf area and maybe even Afghanistan, although we do not know for sure. Maybe they are performing other duties like protecting VIPs, but I am not sure about that either. The minister does not seem to know, or if he does, he has no intention of saying so, which is the same thing.

So there is a minor problem with respect to land forces. Do we absolutely need to aim for a high degree of interoperability with American military forces? That raises three political questions. Are we to become mercenaries working for the Americans? Are we automatically to become shield forces for American forces abroad? Or are we simply going to become a specialized pawn in certain aspects of land-based military operations?

• 0945

This issue was raised by the person who took the floor a few seconds ago. This should be a priority issue for the Department of Defence. Whatever position is taken, in my opinion, this is a medium priority for now and is not as much of an emergency as trade or trade relations between Canada and the U.S., or as the fight against terrorism.

In conclusion, I would say that the main issues change over time. How do you contemplate solving these problems in light of perceptions on both sides of the border? The only words of wisdom I could give the Government of Canada would be to talk to the Americans and try to find areas where a Canadian contribution might make a difference.

Perhaps that is why I am Canadian.

[English]

We think we are different.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chair (Ms Jean Augustine): Thank you very much.

[Translation]

Thank you very much, professor.

[English]

We'll move to Mr. Houchang Hassan-Yari, Professor of Political Science from the Royal Military College of Canada.

[Translation]

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Members, given that the issue raised is a very broad one, let me throw out a few ideas in no particular order, and we can come back to them afterward.

I would first like to thank you for this invitation. I am pleased to see that government people are talking to one another and that another component of government is also invited to take a position. I am referring to the college.

The issue of economic integration, a process that is incomplete but in full swing, is a live issue. The more structural issue of relations between both countries, Canada and the U.S. is also a live issue.

With your permission, I will present a few ideas. I may go somewhat beyond the very strict confines of the Canada-U.S. context in order to include other important elements without an understanding of which it becomes very hard to achieve integration.

First of all, I think that since September 11, there is a certain tendency to cut ourselves off or isolate North America to reduce the risks of terrorism, but that does not completely get rid of terrorism. Sealing off borders creates a false sense of security.

My second point is that integration does not have to lead to some sort of Americanization of Canada. We do not have to make all of our laws and practices compatible with the U.S.

Third, greater cooperation in the area of common security is, of course, on the table. My colleagues here have discussed that. However, the perimeters must be defined. We must not enter into a political/military game without knowing the ground rules.

Fourth, in times of crises like the one we are going through now, we must avoid hasty decisions in response to calls for immediate action. Any involvement clearly commits us to a medium and long-term course of action that will be very difficult to depart from.

• 0950

Fifth, it would be better for Canada to participate in multilateral fora. As you probably know, Canada's foreign policy heyday was due to our international involvement. My fear is that this integration issue will draw us back into a much more limited region, with all the dangers associated with such regionalization. Canada must not withdraw into its geographic region now that the economic trend in particular, but also the political trend, is toward globalization, and now that the war on terrorism, if it is to continue, must be fought, at least in part, in far away places.

In other words, Canada cannot hope to deal with the root causes of terrorism with only the U.S., or even with Mexico too, as was mentioned earlier. The problem of terrorism has extremely deep roots, and there can be no hope of effectively combatting this scourge without dealing with the root causes.

The other point is that security is no longer regional. In the past, we pinned our hopes on NORAD, etc., to curb the Soviet Union or the spread of communism, but today, security is global. Witness the fact that the Americans are waging war in Afghanistan, a little known country just a few months ago, and Canada and a number of other countries are taking part in that war.

Therefore, if it is a global problem, if it is a universal concern, we have to have a global solution. We cannot expect to fight against terrorism effectively by isolating ourselves in our own regions.

The other thing I wanted to say, and I believe this is very important, is that security is no longer only a military affair. It is an issue involving extremely varied and diverse problems, such as poverty, repression, economic policies, population explosions, the environment, social injustice, the polarization between the haves and the have-nots, immigration issues, etc., some of which have been pointed out today.

The second point is the need for a more real and binding understanding of others' problems. I believe this is why others' problems are now our own. The tragic events of September 11 and the events that followed clearly show this reality. In other words, in the best case scenario or perhaps with the most noble hope, we are experiencing a return to the values of the Charter, the values Canada closely subscribed to at the time of the drafting of this document.

This is why we must make the UN work; it is the only worldwide organization that has very broad legitimacy. We must dispel the clouds of suspicion that are weighing heavily on the organization. Its mission must be universal, but there must above all be some consistency to the return to UN values. We must not use the UN at this time of crisis, and then go back to unilateralism once the crisis is over. This can only be done through a greater operation in the area of security between the different players on the international scene, including Canada and the United States.

• 0955

I must stress the need for a return to the legitimacy of the United Nations. Everything that is happening in the Middle East, for example, and all of the positions taken by the countries in that region clearly show that there is a great deal of hesitation when the operation is carried out by the Americans, but they would almost automatically buy into an operation carried out by the UN.

By way of a conclusion, I would say that we must be very cautious in thinking about integration. Integration must not be automatic and above all not blind. A little while ago, Professor Legault mentioned the anti-missile shield and the lack of urgency regarding this issue. In fact, there is none, particularly for Canada. Canada must not hasten to give its approval to this extremely controversial project, which would cause tremendous harm to Canada's place and prestige on the international scene, as we are well aware of European reservations regarding the shield. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no reason for Canada to espouse such a controversial idea.

In all honesty, what happened on September 11 was a tragedy for the Americans, but one has to say that such tragedies happen almost daily on the international scene. I think we should perhaps be careful when we talk about a world war against terrorism. I do not want to repeat what you already know, that is that a significant number of the terrorists are former allies of the powers they are battling today.

Therefore, we must be cautious and we must try and study the basic questions, which are those that I have already pointed out, that is to say the causes of terrorism, the why of terrorism, the reason why the United States is being attacked. As a result, we must try and eliminate terrorism or at least isolate terrorists in the regions where their voices are heard.

My colleague pointed out the suspicions regarding the minorities coming from that part of the world. In fact, I am feeling some pressure. When I went to New York two weeks ago, there was a random check, and by chance, I was identified as one of those who had to go through the process. Therefore, Canada must avoid participating in such hysteria, which we can try to understand but which is not necessarily justifiable.

In conclusion, I exhort Canada to be cautious with the whole issue of the fight against terrorism. Thank you for your attention.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you very much, professor.

[English]

We have a small piece of business before we go to the second half of the panel. We'll try to execute this motion that is before us. It is on Bill C-41.

• 1000

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Madam Chair, sorry.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): We have quorum. Are you asking about quorum?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): We don't actually.

Mr. Stan Keyes (Hamilton West, Lib.): We can cede quorum.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): We can cede quorum?

Mr. Stan Keyes: Yes. By unanimous consent, Madam Chairman, we move to cede quorum. I don't think this is a very contentious motion.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): I'm not too sure we can cede quorum at this point.

Mr. Stan Keyes: You can by unanimous consent; we can agree that we cede quorum.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: May we, with unanimous consent, see a quorum when we do not have quorum?

[English]

Mr. Stan Keyes: No, Francine, by unanimous consent.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I know.

[English]

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): We all agree.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: No. Once it has been asked for, we can no longer do that.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): All right. I think we'll just have to get quorum. My adviser says that if quorum is called and we have a motion, then the motion cannot be dealt with if we don't have the quorum to deal with the motion.

Mr. Stan Keyes: Okay, can I ask the clerk a question, Madam Chairman?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Yes.

Mr. Stan Keyes: If by unanimous consent the committee, not by count, but by agreement, decides that it cedes quorum, can it proceed to hear the motion?

The Clerk of the Committee: Madam Chair, in my opinion, the question of unanimous consent is a decision of the committee, and if the committee is to be a decision-making body, it requires a quorum.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Madam Chair, Pierre Paquette is coming.

[English]

Mr. Keyes, Pierre Paquette is coming, so it will make your quorum.

[Translation]

You will be happy.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): All right, we'll proceed with our witnesses and we'll wait.

Mr. Stan Keyes: I challenge the clerk—he can look it up.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): We would not have our clerk challenged in the presence of—

Mr. Stan Keyes: No, I don't mean here and now, Madam Chair. I would like to have him look into in on his own.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Do we have quorum now? Do you cede quorum? All right, we'll proceed then.

Bill C-41, an act to amend the Canadian Commercial Corporation Act, was given second reading on November 20 and referred to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There has been some discussion about referring the bill to the Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investments. The chair circulated, through the clerk's office, a draft motion to that effect yesterday, and I think we all have that draft before us.

Mr. Stan Keyes: So moved, Madam Chair.

(Motion agreed to)

Mr. Stan Keyes: Unanimous.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you very much.

Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.): On a point of order, Madam Chair, are here until noon?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Yes.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: We've got a panel with considerable expertise and the remarks are very interesting. but I would note that if each of the remaining people speaks the same length of time, two-thirds of the meeting will have been for the comments, however useful.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): I understand that you're anxious to get to the questioning of the witnesses.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Yes, that's exactly it.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): So I'll ask for the cooperation of the remaining three witnesses to keep their remarks to eight to ten minutes, so that we'll have ample time for questions. I think the previous three witnesses have so challenged the members that they're anxious to get into questioning.

We'll now call on Jean Daudelin, who is the senior researcher, conflict prevention, at the North-South Institute. The North-South Institute is celebrating it's 25th anniversary. I was at a breakfast meeting this morning where they launched their report, Canada and the World, an impressive document. As a senior researcher, I'm sure you had something to do with this. Welcome, Monsieur Daudelin.

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[Translation]

Mr. Jean Daudelin (Individual Presentation): I would first of all like to thank the committee for having invited me to appear. I should also add that my comments do not necessarily reflect the position of the North-South Institute.

We also have discussions on the subject of September 11, and we don't always agree. To a certain extent, I am appearing as an individual, but my thoughts are in part a reflection of the discussions that we have had amongst ourselves.

The attacks of September 11 have had two significant results for foreign policy in Canada. Firstly, they showed how deeply Canada is embedded in the North-American whole with extraordinary clarity. Secondly, they put security issues squarely at the forefront of our discussions regarding our relationship with the rest of the world. I would like to explore the implications of these two developments over the next few minutes.

Let us start with the deepening of Canada's integration in the North-American whole. Paradoxically, it is probably because of their impact on public policy that the implications of September 11 on foreign policy in Canada are the most significant.

As the present debate on the security perimeter and the anti- terrorist legislation shows, the attacks in September in the United States first and foremost have had an impact on our domestic policies. This will surprise no one. The interweaving of economic policies between our country and the United States and our dependence on the American market represent a basic fact of the Canadian reality.

What we have discovered is the degree to which this dependence makes Canada vulnerable. We have never before been able to measure so brutally the degree to which the survival of our industrial structure depends on the transparency of the border we share with the United States. In other words, the monetary flow that ensures the economic security of Canada depends on the credibility of the security measures that we are presently discussing. We must convince American investors, but also Canadian and European investors, that the border will remain as transparent as possible and that they can do business in either Canada or the United States.

Canadian policies that affect continental security, without being a direct copy of American laws, must clearly play the same roles and have the same results. These laws are numerous, and the idea that they must be passed largely taking into account the concerns of our neighbours bothers a lot of people, who see an unacceptable attack on our sovereignty in this. There are three reasons why I feel such a position is not justified.

First of all, Canadian and American territorial security imperatives are largely the same. Secondly, in the area of immigration, a matter which is central to these discussions, these countries have more similar policies than any other countries in the OECD. Finally, the costs of a overly nationalistic policy are unacceptable.

The solution does not lie in an out-and-out rejection of the security integration of North America nor does it lie in the resistance to individual attacks on our sovereignty that would be found in each law that was tabled or amended. Rather, it lies in a concerted discussion on the provisions of North-American integration.

Let me explain. For the above-mentioned reasons, the management of North-American issues has to be at the heart of our concerns. However, their domestic implications mean that they cannot only come under the jurisdiction of foreign policy. They come under something else, as European affairs are not really a foreign policy issue for France or Germany.

Some people have called this new field "intermestic", a word I personally can't stand. I would rather paraphrase Brian Tomlin and solidify the concept to simply talk of the North- Americanization of Canada's public policies.

The events of September 11 have focused attention on the crying need for serious reflection regarding strictly North- American affairs, based on the premise of Canadian integration in a secure economic area, and therefore also a political one, which extends to the Rio Grande and even, but not necessarily, as several people have already said, to the southern border of Mexico. What we need now is not a new North-American, domestic or foreign policy, but a whole new order.

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This approach must be integrated. It cannot separately address issues regarding currency, the dollar, dollarization, trade issues, energy issues, environmental, migratory, police or military ones. The time is past where people discussed things such as a common currency, a common market, migration or a security perimeter in separate fora. We need a policy which is not solely based on the defence or foreign policy of a country. I would even go further in saying that the development of a post-September 11 North-American foreign policy would be counterproductive.

We must fully acknowledge and deal with the fact that all of Canada's public policies must be based on a continental approach. We need an overall federal policy statement.

The second major consequence of the events of September 11 is the renewed focus on security. After those tragic events, it seems that every issue is debated from the angle of security. This obsession with security may lead us to make unsound foreign policy investments, especially in terms of the poorest countries, as they are already suffering economically because of the events of September 11 and because they may pay the price if we focus our interests more on North America. I would briefly like to draw the committee's attention to this issue.

The repercussions of September 11 events have not spared developing countries. The recession, or economic stagnation, which has hit the United States, Europe and Japan has brought exports to a halt. Countries which depend on tourism have been particularly hard hit.

Furthermore, as a side effect, the problems which developed economies are facing may also impact development assistance, since governments' revenues have fallen and their security expenses have increased. The Canadian government must not succumb to this trend and must make sure that security measures are not funded on the back of already small aid budgets.

The events of September 11 have done nothing to solve the problems facing the poorest countries. AIDS is still killing hundreds of thousands of people in Africa and, as a result, this has led to the breakdown of family, social and economic structures, and it has created thousands of young homeless people who contribute to the cycle of political or criminal violence, or both, which in turn feeds the political crisis, the civil war and the resulting suffering. The problems of public health, public security, the reintegration of refugees, of massive migration, of governments, of basic education and of the supply of drinking water are still there. And yet, there is no commitment to make the necessary investments to address these issues. The problem is made worse by the tendency, which was reinforced by the terrorist attacks, to consider development issues through the security lens.

In the last two months, many people have stated publicly that we have to make a particular effort to help developing countries. But they are also saying that this must be done in the name of fighting terrorism. This argument was raised from both the development and security sectors. The underlying reasoning is quite simple: poverty and suffering, and the despair which comes about as a result, incite people to violence and terrorism, and countries toward civil war, and causes populations to flee. Development aid should therefore be designed as a means for us to protect ourselves against terrorism and massive migrations from the third world. This point of view is dangerous because it is based on faulty reasoning. The poorest countries are not and have never been breeding grounds for terrorism. Most refugees arriving in Canada and in other western countries do not come from those countries.

And if it's true that the world's poorest countries have a disproportionate amount of civil wars, it's not clear whether this is due to underdevelopment, or whether the wars themselves led to underdevelopment.

Development aid in itself will not create peace in countries which are at war; it will not disarm terrorists and put an end to the flow of refugees to western countries and to Canada in particular. If people expect development aid to solve these problems, which is impossible, it will discredit the aid itself and cause aid budgets to be misdirected and decreased even more.

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Last but not least, selling development aid as a way of protecting ourselves against the potential dangers represented by the have-nots may be very counterproductive, since, as Cranford Pratt put it, the fear of the poor is a bad guide, first and foremost because it leads to the creation of defensive measures and not to a sustained increase in aid budgets. It is also perverse in that it depicts victims as being aggressors and those who seek to help them as petty-minded, calculating people.

Aid policy should be based on genuine generosity and the recognition of the interdependence of all living beings on the planet, who all face the challenges of environmental, health and economic problems. Aid policies will not solve the problem of terrorism any more than regional development programs solved the problems in Northern Ireland or in the Basque region. Terrorism is a political, military and financial problem. Development aid is not a good way to solve it.

In conclusion, the events of September 11 are forcing Canada to develop a true North-American policy, which takes into account our far-reaching trade, financial, security and cultural integration with the United States, and also the necessity to address all these issues together.

The development and implementation of such a policy does not mean that we must choose economic or monetary union, or even integrated political arrangements. However, it means that we must abandon the piecemeal approach which until now has been advocated in the white paper on defence, and which is supported in the new white paper on foreign affairs, the anti-terrorism legislation, the special bill on immigration and other such instruments.

Furthermore, Canada's foreign policy must not be distracted by North-American concerns which have come about as a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States; Canada must ensure that aid to the poorest countries is not decreased, and see to it that aid policies are not based on security issues.

Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Merci.

We'll go to Mr. Andrew Cohen. Your name precedes you as a former correspondent in Washington, and presently you are a professor in the School of Journalism and Communication.

Mr. Cohen.

Professor Andrew Cohen (School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University): Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee. I will, if I may, look at the question of Canada's foreign policy priorities far more broadly than North America.

Much has been said about Canada, its relationship with the United States, and its place in the world since the events of September 11. But of all the declarations perhaps the most striking has come from the lips of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley. He said this on October 5:

We are still trading on our reputation that was built two generations and more ago, but we haven't continued to live up to it. You can't just sit at the G-8 table and then when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there's a cost of doing that.

The minister spoke about the glaring inadequacy—his words—of this country's capacity in key areas of foreign and defence policy and how that weakness is compromising Canada's ability to honour its traditional commitments abroad. Mr. Manley didn't speak awry, he didn't retract his comments. Indeed, the next day he reaffirmed that quote. A lot of things have changed since September 11, and one of those is that the burden we will be asked to bear internationally is going to become greater, and we're not going to have the option, if we intend to play the influential role we have in the past, without shouldering that burden.

This morning, Madam Chair, as this committee considers Canada's foreign policy priorities in North America and around the world, I quote Mr. Manley because his comments are timely, urgent, insightful, and refreshingly blunt. Amid the flurry of platitudes that too often passes for public policy these days his lament has a ring of truth. What he's got, I suggest, is a better sense than most of the limitations of this country's foreign policy and the danger it holds for us. For his lament is a siren call to a country that has, in a sense, withdrawn from the world.

That isn't to say that we're no longer engaged abroad. Of course we are, and will remain so, at least modestly. It is to argue, as does Mr. Manley, that Canada has been unwilling to make its means match its ends. For too long we've been a free rider, trying to do the same for less, practising, as one critic put it, “pinch-penny diplomacy and foreign policy on the cheap”. Our reluctance to pay the freight has had a cost. It has eroded the pillars of our international stature. Our commitment to the strength of our armed forces, the quality of our diplomatic service, the depth of our intelligence gathering, and the generosity of our foreign aid have all declined measurably in recent years.

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On September 11 the bill came due. The new war on terrorism compels us to make a choice if we want to have a voice—and I repeat, if we want to have a voice. So as Canada continues, as it always does, to debate what kind of country it wants to be at home, it must debate anew what kind of country it wants to be abroad.

Do we, then, want to be a country that continues to starve our military, reduce our humanitarian assistance, dilute our diplomacy, and absent ourselves, by and large, from global intelligence gathering? Do we want to remain in the councils of the world—and we are members of virtually every club—content to recall our days as the world's helpful fixer and honest broker, recalling the nostalgia of that golden era of Canadian diplomacy? After all, as the satirist Tom Lehrer once asked, what good are laurels if you can't rest on them? In other words, do we want to continue to sit at the table by virtue of our economic standing, yet unwilling to adopt a foreign policy worthy of our geography, our history, and our diversity?

We can remain mediocre if we want to. It isn't hard. All we have to do is continue what we're doing today, which, to be fair, is certainly still more internationalist than most of the 188 other members of the United Nations. We could do it. We could make a choice not to have a voice in the world. It would be a legitimate choice, even an honourable one, if we actually discussed it and agreed upon it. So let's have a national debate. If, having weighed the costs of our internationalism against our social and economic needs at home, we consider it too expensive to go abroad, let's turn inward, draw up the bridges, and retreat into what was once called a fireproof house, and let's stop pretending to be something other than what we are beyond our shores.

Practically speaking, there would be advantages to choosing this form of neo-isolationism. We could, for example, drop that long-standing, but unfulfilled, promise to devote 0.7% of our gross domestic product to foreign aid, which returns in every budget like Banquo's ghost. We could then close embassies, quit international clubs, and contract out our diplomacy even more than we're doing now. We could abandon peacekeeping missions we still accept, and settle for a national constabulary, solely in defence of a civil power. And we could stop wringing our hands about the inadequacy of our intelligence gathering abroad.

Embarrassing as this approach would be, at least it would be honest. Presumably, most Canadians would reject that kind of parochialism. They would say a limited foreign policy isn't good enough for the world's second-largest nation, one of its oldest, most successful democracies, an exemplar of pluralism and tolerance. They would say it belittles Canada, an architect of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and La Francophonie, the midwife of the Land Mines Treaty and the Tribunal on War Criminals. They would say it's a travesty for a country that generates some 40% of its wealth in international trade, emerged from the Second World War with the fourth largest armed services in the world, and has left its dead in the soil of Ypres and Verdun and Vimy, Italy, Normandy, and the Netherlands; a country that used to boast one of the finest diplomatic services in the world, became synonymous with peacekeeping, and had aspired at one stage to lead the world in addressing the needs of its poorest citizens.

The question we must answer today, more urgently since September 11, is whether we want to be an international player again, with all the rights that confers and the responsibilities it implies. If so, let's ask a new, more pointed question: how can we be an activist, imaginative middle power, reflecting our tradition of moderation and compromise, conscious of our limitations, but alive to our influence? How do we become the soldiers we were, preparing ourselves for new as well as old threats, without necessarily abandoning the peacekeeping we do so well? How do we become the humanitarians we once were, an exemplar of innovative aid and trade that helps the neediest of the world? How do we become the diplomats we were, advancing our interests everywhere, as we once did, with an effectiveness that was recognized internationally? In other words, how do we play to our strengths, use our diversity, our experience, our ambitions, and our resources? How do we maximize what we do best, where we have a comparative advantage, such as in languages, transportation, and communications?

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This committee will hear from experts who can offer solutions in far greater detail than I, but if we are to think broadly about reordering our priorities, let's consider these four areas.

It's become axiomatic in recent years to lament the decline of our armed forces, even as we praise their courage and training. Between 1993 and 1998 the budget of the Department of National Defence fell by 30%, its real purchasing power fell by even more. We spend about 1.1% of our GDP on defence, while Britain, for example, spends 2.4% and the United States 3%. Our forces, now about 55,000, are a shadow of what they once were. There was a time, as a matter of pride, that we joined every peacekeeping mission, but no longer. There was a time we could go to war adequately equipped in adequate numbers. We still go to war, barely, but proudly.

Everyone agrees that our equipment is old and our ranks are thin. Everyone agrees that we must spend more money on the military, and not just the $1 billion the government is suggesting, which may appear in the next budget. The question for the review is whether we want to remain an all-singing, all-dancing army, so to speak, that does everything everywhere, or whether we should specialize in a few areas. Some critics, like the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, which I understand will appear before this committee, suggest that we take on fewer UN commitments. I think they're wrong, I think we should take on more. Either way, having a voice in the world still will necessitate a bigger, stronger military.

In foriegn aid, our budget has fallen to some $2.3 billion, some 0.25% of our gross domestic product. Once a leader in contribution to international assistance, Canada is now among the lowest of the nations of the OECD. From 0.49% in 1991 we're now about 0.25%, as I've just said. By one calculation, we're half as generous as we were 15 years ago. It's a disgrace. Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland have all reached 0.7%, we haven't. However, it's not just about money, it's about how we spend it. After years of debate, it's time to end the practice of tying our aid to the purchase of goods and services, which is more costly and less efficient. It's time to forgive more debts to the third world, ease remaining tariff barriers against third world nations, and allow developing nations to trade their way to prosperity. More important, it's time to direct our aid to those who need it most and reduce our exposure in countries that don't need it as much. The government, to its credit, has announced some changes to its program, including spending more on nutrition and health, fighting disease, promoting education. It's only a beginning.

The budget cutting that has afflicted other departments in the last five or seven years hasn't spared the Department of Foreign Affairs. Once one of the most prestigious branches of government, the flagship of departments, the diplomatic service is now a shadow of its former self, and it shows. Too many of its jobs are done by locally engaged staff, some 1,300 persons around the world, undermining the quality of our representation abroad. No wonder some 25% of officers, it is reported, will quit within a year or at the end of their current assignment, frustrated with the work they're doing. A shortage has compelled the government to recruit officers from other departments without examinations, circumventing the department's rigorous screening process. Here too the government must strive to create a more effective force. If savings can be found in joining fewer international clubs, so be it, but the point remains that diplomacy begins with diplomats, and ours need help.

Canada is the only country of the G-8 that does not have a separate foreign intelligence gathering service. This too is scandalous. It is not enough that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will reportedly increase its activities abroad. If we're to be taken seriously, we need a service devoted exclusively to that function. In this, once again, we have a comparative advantage. We're good at communications, at high technology, and we draw from a diverse people from a multitude of countries with a multitude of languages.

All these areas, defence, aid, diplomacy, and intelligence, should be the subject of a thorough re-examination, not individually, but as part of a comprehensive re-examination of Canada's foreign policy. All this was needed before September 11, and I suggest the urgency is greater after September 11. Out of calamity Canada can find opportunity to matter in the world, to reaffirm our values, to win the respect of our allies, to carry our weight, and perhaps even to punch above it. In the end, this debate is about voice and whether we have the resolve to be the internationalists we were and, with determination, can be again.

Thank you.

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The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you. As the chair, I guess I cannot say that sounds almost inspirational.

Mr. Kirton, you are last, simply because you're from my alma mater, the University of Toronto..

Professor John Kirton (Department of Political Science, University of Toronto): Thank you very much. My fellow Torontonian has informed me that I have four minutes, so I'll try to live up to that harsh task.

I wish, like Andrew, to speak on the subject of Canadian foreign policy priorities in their full globalité, but come to the Canada-U.S. relationship, the question of North American integration, with a particular focus on two international institutions I think are of central consequence—the NAFTA family and the G-7, G-8.

First is the big question, does September 11 require a rethinking and a redefinition of Canadian foreign policy priorities? Here my answer is an unequivocal no. Go back to February 7, 1995, the definitive statement on foreign policy. Read the opening passages. It speaks more boldly than ever before about the capacity and need for a Canadian leadership, in part through its hosting of consequential international institutions, such as the G-7. Go to November 1994, the defence white paper, produced after a very vigorous debate with Canada 21, which said unequivocally that the Canadian Armed Forces would be multipurpose, combat-capable forces, able to fight against the best and alongside the best, and there were no footnotes exempting particular classes of equipment where it was said we would settle for second or third best. So the policy and the priorities, I think, are just fine. The issue now is to reaffirm them, to revitalize them, to invest the resources in making them come alive.

How do we do it in the wake of September 11? Let me suggest in my remaining three and a half minutes eight particular points.

First, as the starting point, I think we have to affirm at the highest level in Canada the basic fact that this is our war, even more than the campaign to liberate Kosovo in 1999 was. The number of innocent Canadians knowingly killed at the World Trade Center, the second-largest premeditated mass murder of innocent Canadian civilians in our history, was not a matter of collateral damage, it was quite deliberate, a public campaign to exterminate Americans, their allies—that's us—and the Jews, that is, in part, us. So I think it's wrong to see this as America's war for our starting point and turn the question into that of how we manage our relations with the United States.

Second, if it's our war, Canadian leadership is required, proactive, assertive, strategic leadership, rather than waiting for the United States to define the issue and then call up with specific options and requests. I'll set aside the lost opportunities of the first few months to look ahead, because we do have to realize, I think, this is a long campaign, with an appropriate objective in the extermination of global terrorism and its causes, and we have to think seriously about how that campaign will unfold, both in the military operations at present and in the conflict prevention program that comes next.

Third, Canada should make a distinctive contribution, and here, I think, we can define very clearly the parameters of what it is. It means using our classic instruments, professional diplomacy, international institutional leadership, and summit diplomacy, rather than rushing into creating alien add-ons, such as a separate overseas offensive intelligence service of the sort, for example, that France has and has used. It means affirming such values as the rights of minorities, abroad as well as at home, global environmental protection, debt relief for the poorest, generous official development assistance, refugee relief, and resettlement. It means saying to our coalition partners, now that you have, as it were, our significant and distinctive contribution, you must call us to your councils, so we can collectively define in an effective way the overall progression of the campaign. That collective council, I think, is the greatest lacuna in a piece of diplomacy that is all too centred on Washington and separated bilateral consultations.

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Fourth, the basic premise for the management of Canadian-American relations is to treat Canadians and Americans equally, for our sake as well as theirs. It's a multifaceted question. As one example, when Canadians take off from Pearson Airport to any part of Canada, they should feel as secure as they do when they're flying to Reagan Airport in the United States. Those latter flights, of course, have air marshals on them. The proper way to handle that issue, let me suggest, was to scour the world for best practices. I think that would have brought us to Israel, to our free trade partner, to El Al, asking questions about importing those best practices, rather than waiting for the issue to come to us from Washington and be turned into a morality play on gun control.

The key point about the management of the Canadian-American relations is to realize that in the modern world of integrated production, they are now as vulnerable as we are. We saw that in the week after September 11, as we do any time there's a strike with the quite separated Canadian auto workers. Yes, our auto plants went down first, but a day or two later theirs went down too. The integration is everywhere, and the message I think we have to get to the United States, with the facts assembled behind it, is that they need to keep the borders open for their stake, to fuel the economy needed to win our war abroad. It's not just about collateral damage for Canadians.

Fifth, we should reactivate the North American advantage, rather than cast the last decade aside and try to return to a previous world of a separate special Canada-U.S. relationship, in which we go off to war together overseas and leave the Mexicans behind. That is, I think, a real temptation. Let me suggest that it's wrong, and there's much that could be done with the NAFTA institutions. The NAFTA Free Trade Council could issue a statement declaring the importance of an open border. Mr. Zoellick will do it over in Doha. The G-7 finance ministers did it. Where is the core NAFTA free trade institution on that?

NAFTA has a rich array of institutions, about 50. One of the more successful is the land transportation subcommittee working party on the transportation of dangerous goods, a clear functional relevance in the current campaign. If one thinks of anthrax, or more broadly, bio-terrorism, biological and chemical agents, the NAFTA working group on pesticides centred in the Commission for Environmental Cooperation has a wealth of built-in functional capacity that we could easily put to use.

The clearest opportunity, I think, lies in the field of energy, and after September 11 I think the deliberately low-key approach we've taken since April in Quebec City to work towards North American energy cooperation is inadequate. Certainly, the consensus exists, I submit, in all three countries for a much more high-level approach, and one that is of some pressing danger. We would want, in the larger world of oil diplomacy, the Mexicans to behave as good members of the North American caucus and coalition, rather than as de facto members of OPEC, in the game plan they wish to unleash.

Sixth, we must play the good international host. It is striking, for example, how successful Mr. Martin's initiative in hosting the G-20, and along with it the international monetary and finance committee and development committee of the IMF and the World Bank, was this weekend. Why not an equivalent in the field of foreign affairs? At the G-8 foreign ministers meeting in Rome last July Mr. Manley, as incoming chair, was invested with the responsibility, in conflict prevention and other areas of an outreach program, of bringing states, certainly in Africa, but beyond that, into a more regular consultation. It is time, I think, to hold such a meeting in Ottawa and perhaps use it as the starting point for the creation of a G-20 equivalent in the foreign affairs field, and to have, as a minimum down payment, that club of foreign ministers do and activate on the anti-terrorism campaign what is required, but their finance minister counterparts of last weekend don't have capacity to do back home.

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Seventh, we should energize the G-8. It is certainly time to take up, I think, George Bush's major campaign promise to call a meeting of G-8 energy ministers, a meeting that has happened before, a meeting the President had wanted before September 11, a meeting we badly need now, because it is Russia that we need to play a coordinated global energy and terrorist-related energy game as part of a common club, every bit as much as Mexico. Most broadly, borrowing from what we know worked during Kosovo, it is the G-8, beginning with the foreign ministers process, that is the effective forum that could provide ongoing political direction to the campaign against terrorism in its integrated military and political dimensions abroad. If there is to be a council to which we are called, it is that, and that is the proper nest for it.

It may not be an appropriate moment to hold a special intersessional summit of the sort Mr. Berlusconi called for in the days following September 11 and Mr. Putin and others endorsed. Mr. Chrétien certainly had the right instinct in looking in the first instance to the G-8 as the institutional nest to manage this campaign, but certainly there is a role, I think, for foreign ministers to act.

Finally, we should reinvest in Canadian diplomacy every bit as much as in defence and development assistance abroad. More political officers, more public diplomacy officers, more military attachés posted abroad in the most effective regions are what we need. These are the people who are able to develop relationships with the locals, to meet continuously with the G-8 caucus groups in missions abroad, in the diplomatic community, Commonwealth caucus groups. And I think central to this, although we in Toronto don't have a comparative advantage in speaking of it, is a caucus group of La Francophonie, for it's members of La Francophonie who are really the front-line states.

This is our first line of defence in intelligence gathering, in incubating the habit of consultation consensus, in delivering the academic relations program to some of the religious schools in Pakistan and elsewhere, and assisting with the relief and refugee operations. We will need these if this war, above all a war of legitimacy, is to be won.

Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you very much, Professor.

We'll go now to a five-minute round, and we start with you, Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

I thank you all for your very eloquent interventions.

Mr. Cohen, you speak of a nation—I would agree with you—that's punching far below its weight, but doesn't need to. I also think our own economic security is tied to being an effective international partner. I would also suggest that while we need to review programs, the problem is not the presence of solutions, the problem is a presence of action. So my questions are actually a couple.

In dealing with a lot of problems we often have a tendency to react rather than prevent. The first question I have, Mr. Cohen, is, from the U.S. perspective, what does Canada need to do to be seen as a security asset, instead of a security liability?

My second question is, in the fight against terrorism and the coalition we have at this present time, do any of you see that there's a great opportunity to drain the swamp, as it were? How do we deal with the hateful, violent, anti-western propaganda that children are fed in some Arab states from a very early age? And how do we try to convince modern Muslim states to act as a bulwark against their more violent compatriots. Do you think there's a great opportunity to improve relationships between a number of cleavage points that exist right now by using this coalition to deal with issues such as Kashmir, Palestine and Israel, the Arab and the western world?

Thank you.

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The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you.

I think he dealt with you, Mr. Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Right. I'll just answer the first one.

You asked, Mr. Martin, how we can be a security asset rather than a security liability in Washington. I'm not sure, having spent time in Washington, that we can ever do as much as the Americans would like us to do. I thought we were perhaps unfairly treated, at least initially—it's since been softened—with the blame that was laid on our shoulders, the sense that we have a porous border. It struck me as very odd that in fact, all those who entered the United States had to pass through the American border, a reality that seems to have been forgotten. But the perception does exist in Washington that we have a porous border. I wouldn't sit here and suggest we need to harmonize immigration policies, which some have addressed here, or refugee policies. I do think, though, it's a matter of building confidence—are you a reliable ally in that effort?

Not having been there in a little while, my guess is that in Washington the steps we're taking now and have taken since September 11 will build confidence. I don't know if it'll ever be enough, because in Washington it's almost as if nothing can ever be enough. That is simply the demand of that kind of society. But I would suggest that what we are doing now, moving to tighten the scrutiny of people entering this country, will be helpful and will win some points in Washington.

That's not to speak of anything else we may do militarily or otherwise, where the United States still thinks we don't carry our weight. But that's another question.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Any others?

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: On the question of the Arab slogans and so on against westerners, we are talking about 1.5 billion people. How many of them really protested, not against the western countries, against the Americans? Very few. Obviously, when a TV camera is there, people jump.

All Arab and Muslim regimes, governments, without any exception and including Iraqis, condemn the attack against the Americans. So nobody really endorses that. All clergy responses will be the same, from the mufti of Jerusalem, to the spiritual leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Khomeini in Tehran, and to Indonesia, and so on. So all of them condemn that. Many of them qualify this attack against New York and Washington as an attack against humanity. We have to know that in Islam, when you kill one person, you kill humanity. That's not a slogan, that's a reality. This is why those terrorists are really very isolated. This is why I insisted on the cause of some very negative policies of the United States in the region.

Mr. Keith Martin: Can we use the moderates, the vast majority of the Muslim world, Muslim leaders, to actually work on the ground in those environments where this perversion of Islam is taking place?

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: Yes. Those people are, I believe, more disturbed than we are here with the whole debate surrounding Islam, because they see it a very negative, if you want, action against Islam. Many scholars will tell you that whatever they tried to do in the past many decades, a good chunk of that has really gone down the drain because of what happened and because of the very negative reaction by the media and so on.

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So yes, we can cooperate with those people you qualify as moderates, but I believe actions will carry more weight than words. You mentioned yourself the question of Palestinians, the question of Kashmir, and so on. As long as they go on, I believe we will see bin Ladens and others trying to capitalize on the misery of those people who are under stress. So in order to eliminate bin Ladens in the future, I believe we really have to eliminate those causes. If you do that, you will see the same thing as happened in West Germany, for example, during the Cold War. The fight of government against terrorism was successful because those terrorists were isolated in society.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you, Mr. Martin.

We'll move now to Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you. I would like to thank all our witnesses, including Ms. McDougall, for your very interesting presentations. I heard many thought-provoking ideas, which makes asking questions very difficult.

I will react to what I understood of your various interventions, some of which may have been in contradiction with others. Doesn't continued North-American integration, which some people find desirable, go against the reality of independent Canadian policy, which in the past marked Canada's influence in diplomatic circles? Isn't there a contradiction between these two objectives? How can we prevent this contradiction from suffocating- -?

[English]

Ms. Barbara McDougall: If you're asking me, Madame Lalonde, I don't know that there's a contradiction. Canadians have always—if I understood your question correctly—fought beside allies. We do belong to a number of alliances that we have signed on to fight with. Am I understanding what you said?

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Doesn't the fact that Canada is becoming more dependent on the United States mean that it has a less significant foreign policy role?

[English]

Ms. Barbara McDougall: I don't think we need be more dependent on the United States in matters of foreign policy. Despite the integration I spoke about earlier, we have a lot of other venues, and I'll go back to the earlier question by way of example. I'm not comfortable with the concept of using other countries to deliver something we want delivered, but there was a mention of schools. Canada belongs to La Francophonie and the Commonwealth and delivers aid through both those organizations, so education is a priority of our aid program more than it is maybe in the United States or other countries. We can do that quite independently of what the United States does in its foreign policy. Delivering education, building schools, and training teachers are very important.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: That's just international aid. I'm referring to foreign policy and the role Canada should or could continue to play, which other people mentioned as well. Mr. Daudelin?

Mr. Jean Daudelin: I think you are right. The fact is that

[English]

what is at stake,

[Translation]

Canada's role outside of North America has significantly diminished as Canada has become increasingly integrated into North America. As a result, Canadians feel that it is becoming more difficult to justify investing huge amounts into our military, intelligence and diplomatic capacities. So it has become easy for Canada to cut the budgets in these areas without paying the political price.

However, and this is undoubtedly an advantage, the outcome is that we are much freer to move internationally, precisely because we have little at stake.

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So we must use the freedom that stems from the fact that most of our eggs are in the North-American basket to do things that others cannot. We do not have many global interests.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I have a supplementary question. Isn't the Kyoto Protocol disturbing this peace and resulting in the commercial agreement being even more detrimental to Canada?

[English]

Prof. John Kirton: Let me try to answer by putting that question into context.

On a more general point, it's no longer appropriate to think of it primarily as a process of Canada becoming ever more dependent on the United States. I think what's new about the 1990s is that the United States has become as vulnerable to outside forces as Canada had long been. We learned that with the collapse of long-term capital management in the global financial crisis of 1997 to 1999. We learned it in the security field with the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and now. So it really is a matter of our looking for new affiliations for greater opportunities. And that includes, if we could come directly to the field of global environmental protection, one of the central values in Canadian foreign policy, not disturbed, I think, by the events of September 11.

There's much that we could do to affirm that. One thing, of course, is to protect the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve as an ecological treasure. But that, at the same time, means moving together with the Mexicans and the Americans on a much more comprehensive and far-reaching program of North American energy integration than we've seen to date. So there are those linkages.

On the specific question of the Kyoto Protocol, here I think we have to understand the particular situation our American friends have. It is a question of the management of the United States-Mexico relationship. We finally got our forests, thanks to a lot of help from our important G-8 partners the Russians and the Japanese, but the remaining fact is that the United States could meet its current commitments essentially by shutting down all the industry in Texas, moving it across to the maquiladoras, and having them pollute endlessly. So there's a fundamental flaw in the Kyoto regime for the United States, which Texans recognize in the first instance, and I think we do have to fix that if we're going to get the United States on board.

The great opportunity, though—and I'll end here—is to give us North Americans the same privilege as the Europeans took for themselves, to allow us to take our carbon reduction commitments as an integrated trilateral North American community, a full NAFTA bubble. If we can get that, a solution is readily at hand.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you.

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: It goes without saying that the Americans obviously prefer unilateral measures when they can proceed that way. You raised the issue of Kyoto and you are quite right in doing so, but there are also other measures that have been—

When American interests are at stake, all of a sudden the Americans discover the need for or benefits of multilateral forums. The issue of chemical weapons is an example. In Geneva, the Americans are trying to push as far as they can by accusing a certain number of countries in this area. Why? Because of anthrax. These same Americans refused to sign the convention just a few months ago.

As regards the integration, or the contradiction, Canada can minimize the pressure from our very large American neighbours by working on multilateral forums instead of ending up alone with the Americans, and in the best case scenario, alongside the Mexicans.

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That is why I emphasized that integration is necessary in certain specific areas, like in Europe and elsewhere in the world, but this integration should not be to the detriment of what is left in terms of independence.

As we pointed out, the Americans are also losing some elements of their independence to broader global integration.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Jean Augustine): Thank you very much.

Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much to the witnesses for very stimulating presentations, to say the least. I was pleased to hear Ms. McDougall make reference to the Irish. The discrimination was unfortunate, but it is maybe not as well known by Canadians as it should be that, of course, the first refugee group of any significant size to come to Canada were the Irish. We can see that there can be progress for refugees when they come to this country.

I have a number of questions, Madam Chair, and I'll just go right to them and see how many I can get through.

Ms. McDougall, first, I think most of the witnesses spoke to this, but I would like to ask you specifically, since, as a former minister, you have an interesting perspective on this. You used the phrase “manage integration”, and I agree with that. But how much integration can we stand before we may as well go bottom line and become part of the United States? We have always resisted that as a nation. My reading of Canadian history is that as a country we have always been willing to pay a price to maintain as much independence as we can. How much integration can we stand before the slope is too slippery, if you will, and how does one determine that? You may be aware that within our own Liberal caucus there are those advocating the old commercial union idea, which I will, frankly, strongly resist. I do think we have to manage integration with the United States to maximum benefit for us as a country, but I think it is a very dangerous exercise. I would be interested in your perspective on that.

The Vice-Chair (Jean Augustine): Ms. McDougall.

Ms. Barbara McDougall: I think, Madam Chairman, this is more a political and philosophical question than anything else. My own view is that while integration is so much a part of our life now, we continue to retain very strong political and constitutional institutions of our own. I don't see that changing. I think you can go a long way in integration. It's very hard to say where that will end, because it depends on technology, economic development, and so many other things, and it also depends on how well we manage our own affairs. If we manage our own affairs financially and in business, we will be in a position to retain the structures that are important to us. They are cultural in the broad sense, as opposed to going to the movies, and political in terms of institution building.

The other thing is how strongly we ensure we are a full participant in discussions. Dr. Kirton talked about working through the G-8 as a full partner, and Mr. Manley talked about putting our money where our mouth is. If we want to be regarded as independent from the United States, both externally and internally, we have to be in a position to speak up and to remain very strongly in support of our own institutions. That means financial responsibility and being aggressive in managing the relationship through institutions and bilaterally.

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Mr. Pat O'Brien: I'd like to pursue that. I certainly agree, for the record, Madam Chair, with Mr. Manley's comments. I'm glad that Mr. Cohen cited them. I thought they were almost brutally frank and honest. They needed to be said, and all Canadians needed to hear them. I think there's enough blame to go around as to why we find ourselves in the position he described without all of it having to land on the current government. I'm not suggesting anyone was trying to do that, but sometimes that's a political temptation, in the House anyway.

Yes, I agree it was a bit of a philosophical question. Can I then go right to a practical application of that question? Would you support a commercial union? Would you support a common dollar, which would really mean the American dollar? How far can we integrate without making it impossible for us to really maintain any credible independence?

Ms. Barbara McDougall: I'm not a supporter of a common dollar, for economic as well as political reasons. It has to do with the nature of our economy from east to west, the trade lines, values, and so on. I realize that's part of a public discussion at the moment. There are those who do favour it. I think that leads to other difficulties, not necessarily political, but it means readjusting the whole relationship. The other thing is that Canadians think that if we have a common currency, it will be equivalent in value, which it won't be. I have a real concern right now about the value of the Canadian dollar and the integrity of our own currency. I would be really interested in the government's taking a serious look at the value of the dollar. We all believe in flexible exchange rates, but how far is the government prepared to go in allowing the dollar to slide, because that could determine this for us, if we can't retain the integrity of our own dollar?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Professor Legault.

Prof. Albert Legault: Thank you.

In answer to your question, a common union would imply common currency and a common tariff with regard to the external world. So I'm not sure it would lead us very far. More precisely, I think you could look at the situation in Europe. They will have a common currency, and it doesn't prevent the British, for sure, or the Germans or the French from having a different foreign policy. So I'm not too worried about this possibility of the common currency. I think there are more economic problems in that particular aspect of the question than people think. It touches upon the floating exchange rate, productivity, the unions—it covers an awful lot of old issues.

Coming back to your first question as to how far we can we go, I don't know. In my brief I mention that when you talk about NORAD or continental defence or control of maritime approaches, you're almost talking about a shared management system of Canadian sovereignty and American sovereignty to a certain extent, and it hasn't worried people too much. I think we have achieved quite a successful role with the United States in this particular area. So how far can we go in being more integrated and still, at the same time, have an independent foreign policy?

Mr. Pat O'Brien: That was my point.

Prof. Albert Legault: Yes, sure. I think John Kirton has given a pretty good answer to that. As I have said, much will depend on the current situation. Houchang was mentioning we should be prudent. The whole issue of anti-terrorism is a very important one, because it touches not the foreign instruments of Canadian foreign policy, such as NORAD, maritime defence, and so forth, but the core of the Canadian political system, the kind of political regime we have, the kind of relationship the government has with its own citizens, its provinces, its police force, and so forth. This is, in fact, where Canadians really have to behave as Canadians. If we give up too much ground on those issues, it will make a hell of a difference in the possibility of having our own foreign policy.

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Now, Madam Chair, can I make an off-the-record statement? Is that possible here?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): There is no off the record. Everything is on the record. Every word you have said today, Professor Legault, is on the record.

Prof. Albert Legault: I cannot make an off-the-record statement?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Anything you say is on the record.

Prof. Albert Legault: Well, okay, I'll say it more politically.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): But there is parliamentary privilege, the clerk says.

Prof. Albert Legault: I'm not a parliamentarian, I don't have any privilege. The only privilege I have is freedom of expression.

I just want to say that I'm a bit perplexed by this committee. You don't have a quorum. You only have four people attending committee. We're all busy people, and I find this a bad indication of the Canadian political process in setting up its foreign policy. When people come in from different parts of the country, at least you should have more people attending the meeting.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm sorry for this remark. You didn't want it off the record, so it's there.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): No, no. This is...

Mr. Pat O'Brien: If I might, Madam Chair, I think that's an important observation. I think we should note that there are at least twice as many on the government side as on the opposition side. It may assuage the gentleman's feelings to realize that normally the committee is 9 to 11. Ms. McDougall has been here and she knows what goes on. Members come and want to ask questions, and no matter how brilliantly they're lectured to, if they feel they're going to basically be lectured to, the tendency is, hey, send me your brief, I can read, and I want to explore your brief with you. So I think, having been a chair of a standing committee for two years, defence, we have to try to find a balance, and it's difficult.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Also, we have conflicting things happening in the House right now. The foreign affairs committee has a bill that's going through, and so the parliamentary secretaries have to be over there to channel that bill through. Other members, again, are monitoring other committees, because we all sit on a couple of committees and there are difficulties in quorum and in votes etc. This is why we get people moving in and out. So we apologize for this.

But everything is on the record. We have your statements, we have your documentation. The important people who are going to be helping us to synthesize and get it all together have not moved, and we will definitely have your documentation for further consideration.

Mr. Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: If I may speak to the question from the honourable member philosophically on the Canadian-American relationship, I'm concerned that we sometimes worry too much about integration, not that that isn't a consideration. If September 11 teaches us anything, it's what Professor Kirton was saying. We need to be able to still identify our interests and not worry about whether they coincide with the American interests. For example, on September 11 the Prime Minister of Great Britain stepped forward right away and defined what happened in clear moral terms. Our Prime Minister, I think, was less emphatic, and he worried more about how it would be seen in the context of our relationship with the United States, not seeing it perhaps for what it was, an attack on us, our war.

I think that as we consider our relationship with the United States, which is enormously important to us—and we always must be, I think, aware of the question you were asking—we should not be so obsessed with it that we are unable to see our interests when they coincide with the United States.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: I guess I didn't express myself well. I have no problem with that. I would take issue with your characterization of the Prime Minister's response. Within minutes of the attack he personally called the American embassy. Ambassador Cellucci made that point. I think he very quickly identified the fact that this was an attack on Canada and the free world, not just the United States. Those are points of fact I disagree with you about.

• 1115

Of course we're going to react differently from Britain across the Atlantic Ocean. We have a unique relationship with the United States, shared by no other country. The old statement that the United States is our best friend, whether we like it or not, is something that helps me to get to my point. I think we could integrate economically to a point where our political survival, as a nation, is questionable. That's not a revolutionary thought, it's not my thought, it's a thought that runs all through Canadian history. I don't think it ought to be lightly dismissed. I'm alarmed that I'm hearing some witnesses of pretty high calibre maybe dismissing that possibility. I'm a bit shocked by that. There's not an analogy, for me, between Canada and the U.S. and the EU. With all due respect, I don't see them as analogous. They are very different situations.

I have to tell you, as a political animal, that I think there's a high level of concern in the Canadian public that the future survival of this country could be at stake if we aren't careful. I even have colleagues in our party saying we can have a commercial union with the United States, saying things like, that's economics, I'm not talking political sovereignty. It's incredibly naive to believe you can separate the two. That's the concern I have, that's what I've been trying to elicit from you, and I've been getting back an alarming degree of, well, it's not a big deal, we can go much further with the States. It concerns me as a Canadian, that's all.

Ms. Barbara McDougall: I think he's talking about me, Madam Chair.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Pat O'Brien: No, I'm not, Ms. McDougall. I'm talking about everybody who has responded to my question, frankly.

Ms. Barbara McDougall: I think you misunderstood.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Okay. I want to understand, that's why I asked.

Ms. Barbara McDougall: In my own remarks what I was talking about was if we don't manage the relationship. I'm always interested in what the U.S. would have to say if we slithered in to some kind of pro forma thing; they'd say, oh God, who are these people who now think they're a part of us? This is a two-way relationship.

I think there's enough backbone in the Canadian public and enough tradition, value, precedent, and all those things in Canadian institutions that we can withstand quite a bit of integration. I don't agree with certain aspects of some of the proposals that are floating out there, but as a Canadian, I know who I am and what my institutions stand for, and I'm very comfortable with helping to ensure that they continue.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Professor Kirton.

Prof. John Kirton: On the question of deeper North American integration, take it one step at a time. I had a chance to serve with three of your colleagues after October 1993 on the International Trade Advisory Committee. The next stage, of course, is common external tariff. So I'd love to see Mr. Pettigrew go down to Washington and say, yes, let's harmonize that. What we would put on the table is that the Americans would get up to the Canadian reference of having full free trade with Chile, Central America, the Caribbean, the Palestinian Authority. Jordan and the Palestinian Authority prove the functional relevance to this case. They've just done Jordan, so I think there's some chance that we could get them to harmonize on what we want. In the broader context of the great NAFTA and free trade debate, I think many Canadians said free trade with the United States was a good place to start, but a bad place to stop.

One of the reasons I want Mexico at the table, of course, is that they have free trade with the European Union. It's just bizarre to members of my family and many Canadians that we, as Canadians, will have free trade with El Salvador, say, but not with Ireland or the United Kingdom.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: But you know we're pursuing it.

Prof. John Kirton: Yes.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: The hesitation is on that side, not on this side.

Prof. John Kirton: There may be other ways around that.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Okay, thanks.

Thanks for the indulgence of my colleagues.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Okay.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: I'm passionate on this point.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): I think I have to go to Madame Lalonde, and then come back to you, Dr. Patry.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you very much.

Mr. Legault, you left off on a touchy issue: should we strive to make our army interoperable? I made some quick notes.

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You said that there were three policy issues: Should we become American mercenaries, automatic friends or specialized pawns in certain areas? You did not seem to establish a priority for these three political choices. Could you comment on that?

Prof. Albert Legault: Yes I did raise the question, but I did not provide an answer. I think that is a very important aspect that the Department of Defence should review, and other witnesses have emphasized that.

I do not know if there should be a new white paper on defence or not, but one thing is clear, there needs to be new interdepartmental coordination to examine aspects that revolve around foreign policy, defense and terrorism. All of that must be reviewed.

In Canada, we have a serious interdepartmental problem. The United States have their own problems. Don't be deluded. The problems that Tom Ridge must deal with today are the same problems that we are facing. Some people say that our defense policy should no longer flow from our foreign policy or be determined by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Some people are even recommending that the Department of Foreign Affairs be abolished.

When you look more specifically at what is happening, you wonder what purpose Foreign Affairs serve. People have a lot of difficulty defining Canada's foreign policy role, and that is why there are so many problems.

To answer your questions more specifically, I will say that in some areas we must be interoperable: in all areas of peacekeeping and with respect to the multinational chain of command, be it under NATO or the United Nations. Jean Daudelin or John Kirton, or perhaps even Houchang, pointed out earlier on that we have participated in roughly 70 United Nations missions since the organization's inception, but today, as regards our participation in NATO, we are in 29th place. So we are very, very far behind. In fact, we hardly participate in any United Nations operations, but we participate in operations under our allies' command, regardless of whether they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, or anti- terrorism operations in the gulf. So we feel that our participation abroad depends to a much larger extent on our national interest than on the UN's interest. Regardless of how the Canadian government reviews these matters, I think that interoperability and peacekeeping are essential functions. For the rest, the Joint Task Force is interesting. In the past no one knew that we had excellent SWAT teams that can intervene in anti-terrorism operations.

There are some highly specialized fields that must be identified, but when witnesses appearing before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs say that our army is useless, I cannot accept that characterization. It's a message that is constantly being brought forward by the media, but it is absolutely false. No one can tell me that the Canadian Navy or our air force cannot respond to practically any situation, in cooperation with our allies.

Therefore, some adjustments must be made and some matters must be examined. The objective is not to tell a committee that defence spending has dropped and that if you give us $1.4 billion—as was implied before the Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs—we will all be happy. That makes no sense. Start by defining your policy and then tell us what you want. The question you are asking is a matter of some urgency to which the Canadian government must respond.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Was it made clear that we should invest in intelligence? Do you believe it is important?

Prof. Albert Legault: Intelligence is of vital importance. I don't think it has ever been taken seriously but it must be taken seriously now.

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The Department of National Defence will obviously not tell you that it is a priority, because of what is known as the elastic effect. When you give one billion dollars to a department, another department will be deprived. A choice must be made. But clearly, when it comes to intelligence-gathering, a special effort must be made. I think it goes much further than that.

Last week, in Wakefield, I discussed this with an expert in intelligence. We must find a better way to connect what I would call outside and internal intelligence. He said: "What internal intelligence?" as if we had no law enforcement agencies, as if we had no RCMP. The role of intelligence-gathering services is to find ways to coordinate information with services abroad and with internal agencies, with all foreign countries as well as with the Americans. The same thing is done in the United States. That's where we have some work to do, that's where we have to completely review what is being done, even within our own borders. When Bernard Landry, the Premier of Quebec, travels to Paris to ask the French to explain how their law enforcement agencies operate, then, we have a problem in this country: we must be aware of how information gathering and civil protection really work. We have yet to be told how the organization resulting from the merger of the civil protection bureau and the office for the protection of critical infrastructures will coordinate its activities with Mr. Manley's organization for internal security and the fight against terrorism. One of these days we will have to put our heads together and see how all of this is going to work.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you very much, Professor.

Mr. Jean Daudelin: I would like to say something if I may.

Intelligence is important, regardless of what the Armed Forces are required to do. For example, even if we were to decide to specialize in peacekeeping and put more effort into that field, intelligence would still be important. In the case of the crisis in Eastern Zaire, a few years ago, the lack of proper intelligence was a debilitating factor. It was phenomenal. Regardless of what the army is asked to do, intelligence remains essential.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Doctor Patry.

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you Madam Chair.

I would like to thank our witnesses. This morning's discussion is very interesting. I will have questions for Mr. Cohen, Mr. Daudelin and Mr. Legault, and the others are welcome to answer as well.

Mr. Daudelin, I was interested in what you had to say about our laws affecting our sovereignty, but I would like to deal with development aid. You told us that underdevelopment had not caused the wars, but rather, the wars led to underdevelopment, particularly in the large region of Africa. You also stated that development aid was not a solution to terrorism and that in the future, development aid would be considered in the context of security.

I'm not sure if it was Mr. Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, who said that the United States has been engaged in development aid for the past 50 years without any concrete results. When the Americans start to feel that way... I would like to hear what you have to say about that. We know that the two issues are not totally related, because terrorists are well educated. A number of the terrorists studied in England. They became terrorists to defend a given cause. Religion is involved, as well as other more complex factors.

I would like to hear your comments, because we are told that Canada has only reached .25% of its GDP. We are striving to increase this percentage. There are fiscal constraints. How do you see development aid? If the United States no longer engages in development aid and if Canada and other Nordic countries, as well as Europe and Japan, are left to pick up the slack, do you see any solutions to this?

I have other questions to ask as well, thank you.

Mr. Jean Daudelin: First of all, with respect to terrorism, your comment is similar to the question asked by Mr. Martin a little earlier.

Regardless of whether one chooses subsidies or some other short or medium-term method, it will take more than that to solve the problem in Palestine or Kashmir. I think we have to admit that there are limitations to what can be done through development aid in trying to settle these issues. There are some things that development aid just cannot accomplish.

So what can it do? Over the past years, a lot of thought has been given to the effectiveness of development aid, and the answers are twofold.

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On the one hand, there is consistency. We are trying to integrate a development perspective within our trade policies. Mr. Cohen spoke of tariffs. For example, Canada has set tariffs for Bangladesh that represent around 50% of the aid that we send to that country. Canada sets similar tariffs for a number of developing countries. We must be consistent, particularly when it comes to our trade policies.

On the other hand, there is the coordination between all the countries responsible for aid and the large multilateral organizations: the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank. Much progress has been made in that area, particularly under the leadership of the OECD committee for public development aid. But in order to maintain our credibility within these groups, we must be willing to make a financial contribution. We have to be a major contributor if we want to have an influence on where this aid will be directed. Then we can move on to more specific items. The World Bank has done some very interesting work recently on the role of conflicts, as well as some work on coordination and conditionality. So we can move on to more specific issues.

What we need is consistency and coordination and, in both cases, the more we invest the greater our influence will be.

Mr. Bernard Patry: Thank you.

[English]

Mr. Cohen, I don't know if you said it or if it was Mr. Manley who said there is a cost if we want to be part of the G-8; too long Canada has been a free rider, and we need to make a choice if we want to have a voice. I always thought Canada had a strong voice in the United Nations. I was once on a trip with members of Parliament to the United Nations, and I was told the United Nations is really working well because about 10 countries are devoted to the United Nations. It's surely not the United States that's not helping the United Nations.

To have a stronger voice what should we do exactly? Should we improve our diplomacy, give more money foreign aid? What's your opinion about this?

Prof. Andrew Cohen: My worry is that we had a stronger voice two generations ago, as Mr. Manley says. Historians look longingly at what we call the golden age of Canadian diplomacy under Lester Pearson and earlier, when Canada was influential in constructing the architecture of the post-war era. I'm talking about the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, IMF, World Bank, human rights, where we drafted documents. That was just international organization, but there was aid policy as well, our involvement in the Colombo Plan early in the 1950s. With peacekeeping, I thought I heard a figure that we're only 29th—I don't know who said that. I didn't even know it was that low. Up to about 10 years ago there was not a mission we refused. We accepted every mission, and we thought that a point of pride.

My concern is, as Mr. Manley has suggested, that we are allowing our stature to erode in the areas I mentioned. In foreign aid we've now dropped to about 0.25%. We used to be towards the top of the OECD nations, we're now towards the bottom. The United States, I believe, is below 0.2%, but people gave up on the United States giving money to aid a long time ago. The United States expresses itself differently, and it does indeed have a voice in the world.

Others have referred to our military, so have I. It's very hard to be an active, muscular military when you have armed forces of 55,000. You can't do peacekeeping either.

I've talked about the erosion or dilution of our diplomacy, the state of the Department of Foreign Affairs, once the flagship of our departments, once the most prestigious of government departments, its inability to retain officers now, the numbers who are leaving early because they're attracted by the private sector. It used to be where every bureaucrat wanted to go. So I think our diplomacy has become weaker.

The last area I looked at was intelligence gathering, and we're not there at all. We have no voice at all, because we don't essentially do foreign intelligence gathering. It may be because we made a moral decision not to do it. Often that kind of work is unsavoury. It involves a kind of activity that we, as Canadians, may not want to engage in, foreign intelligence gathering.

Were we to be strong in the areas I've suggested, I think our credibility would be enhanced, which isn't to say that we're nowhere. It isn't to say that, as you've just pointed out, we're nowhere at the United Nations, we still are a player, we're on the Security Council every 10 years. It's simply to say we face an erosion. And as for the idea that we are punching above our weight, we're no longer punching our weight at all. I think we're punching below our weight.

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[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Patry: I have a quick question for Mr. Legault. In your brief, you say that, with respect to the fight against terrorism:

However, Canada can be criticized for having a more liberal system of immigration and refugee legislation than that of the United States. The question here thus becomes one of legislative harmonization—

Prof. Albert Legault: Or equivalence.

Mr. Bernard Patry:

...or equivalence between the Canadian and U.S. systems.

Can you elaborate? What problem do we now have? Is it simply a matter of exchanging relevant information about people?

[English]

Prof. Albert Legault: I think the answer is the answer you have just received on intelligence. In fact, we have no prior screening, which is really efficient when somebody's asking for a visa in a foreign embassy, because we have no intelligence. That's a problem. And if you talk about having compatible or equivalent laws, we have to do something about it, and I think this is precisely a peculiar aspect of our immigration policy that should be looked at.

The second one is deportation implementation. It's been mentioned by a former minister, the Honourable Barbara McDougall. I think this is a vital one. I say in my brief that we have to be consistent. If we do pass laws, we must make sure they will be implemented, however tough they are. But we have to stop being angels. The world is not surrounded by angels. That's the problem.

If I may allow myself to expand a bit on the relationship between poverty, the crisis we're facing in the world, and terrorism, I always remind my students that after all, when Iran and Iraq made their own war, it wasn't because of Palestine, and they incurred a million dead people. We cannot be responsible for all the problems in the world. The events of September 11 show quite clearly a situation where you import a civil war from other countries. It's been imported into the U.S. They've been very successful at doing that. The answer by the States has been to criminalize terrorism and make sure you can have an international coalition to fight it. So what do you do? You re-export their civil war and make sure you will solve your own problems in your own countries. This is why Afghanistan is so important, because this is not a country, it's a regime of terror on which transnational terrorism has grown. We have to settle that for the benefit of the international community, and we'll see what happens afterwards. It will depend on how it is be done what will happen after Afghanistan.

At the same time, I'm very sensitive. I think we are at a turning point in history. I was listening to Senator Mitchell last night again on CNN, and they are actively looking for a solution. The same thing will happen between India and Pakistan. You will see the American pressure being brought to bear on that crisis, which doesn't mean it will be settled tomorrow, but I think this crisis will have some positive benefits, and this is an important point.

We will be in Afghanistan, no doubt about it, and we will pay. We have pledged some money to the $6 billion that will be invested in Afghanistan. We'll presumably send troops there, if not today, in a month or in a few weeks. We will be part of the reconstruction process. Then the question becomes, are we fighting with the British, are we maintaining peace with the British and the Americans or with the UN? We still don't know what the outcome of the crisis will be. Will it be a UN force? Will it be a multinational force? Will it be a Muslim force? We simply don't know for the time being. But there is no doubt we will be involved in the process.

I think foreign aid, in answer to your question, is like fighting terrorism. You have to fight in every aspect of foreign policy and make sure we are involved with the people, we're involved with other nations, we're involved with groups, with G-20, G-8, and others, to make our influence felt. The greatest danger to Canadian independence or to Canadian integration with the United States is to behave like the Americans, that is to say, in a unilateral way. We need multilateral friends, we need our alliances, we need to make sure we have a consultative council, to make sure we know what to say and how to tackle the problems with our neighbour to the south.

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Ms. Barbara McDougall: Madam Chairman, if I may.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Yes.

Ms. Barbara McDougall: There's another thing that's really important in dealing with these issues, either bilaterally or multilaterally, some consistency over time. I'll use Haiti as an example. There's no point in going into Haiti, monitoring an election, and then leaving a country that has no institutions, no parliamentary procedures, no judiciary, no way of dealing with problems, and no history of doing it. There is a continuum to this. If you monitor the election, you have to help with the institution building, and maybe you have to provide police and military to ensure stability, because these are very long-term issues.

The same would be true in Afghanistan if everybody walks away from Afghanistan when this is over and doesn't help with institution building. It's very long-term, and it's naive to think we can do it quickly or we can do it perfectly. We do need to have some consistency in how we manage these issues. If we're going to take something on, it takes all the aspects Andrew referred to, to bring influence to bear and to be there for a long time.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Good points.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Hassan-Yari, in one of the last points that you made, you said that we had to return to the UN, to the United Nations Charter, to the legitimacy of the UN. I would like to hear more about that. You said it would be easier for Canada and the other countries to play a multilateral role, but also because the UN, in the present context, is the body that would be most effective in broadening the coalition.

However, the UN is reluctant. It all depends on who you speak to. The United Nations Organization can be either Kofi Annan, the Security Council or the General Assembly. In any case, Kofi Annan seems hesitant, and I believe the Security Council refused to have the Taliban surrender to them, under their banner, because they have no forces on the ground. Does the fact that the UN is not present there represent an important shortcoming at this time?

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: Since international affairs have become individualized, the more powerful countries have tried to settle their problems with their neighbours or with countries a little farther away. Increasingly, these organizations no longer speak of States, which is giving rise to extremely serious problems. The problems arising out of the new situation are primarily related to legitimacy.

If there is trouble in Afghanistan, even if the ongoing operation appears to be successful, this will not settle things in that country. We have to go to the root of the problem, and that is something that I wish to emphasize. The Taliban arose out of a certain number of special circumstances, and as a result of actions undertaken by some countries: the United States, Pakistan, etc. Now they are trying to correct the situation.

Why choose the hard way when it would be so much simpler to have the UN involved? I must repeat that, without the member States, the UN is nothing. If there is no one in this room or if there are no students in a classroom, then this room or the classroom would be nothing.

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We must end the isolation of the United Nations. We must return to the UN and to the Charter. The Charter is not perfect. It must be refined and updated in order to reflect events that are taking place today and that were unthought of in the mid-1940s, when it was drafted.

As was said earlier, Canada is becoming less and less important on the international scene, because, among other things, the UN has become weaker, and that is where middle powers such as Canada could play a role internationally. There was some hope. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, order has returned—I hate to say that it is a new order—where international legitimacy is predominant. But that is not the case today. Special interests are moving the world from one crisis to the next. I think this is very very dangerous. These will no doubt be cyclical attempts that are doomed to failure if there is no follow-up.

But out of this darkness shines a glimmer of hope. There is the hope of witnessing the emergence of something more positive. Now that the Americans have succeeded in reaching part of their goal, they are opening the way for international organizations, beginning with the United Nations. If, for example, Kofi Annan was hesitant, it's because the poor fellow didn't send in any troops. He sent Brahimi to do this and that, but as you are no doubt well aware, when you are at a table with strong people who are backed up by a certain number of soldiers, then, the UN, Brahimi and Annan cannot play an important role. That's why we have to revive what was left as a dead letter in the Charter. The Military Staff Committee, if given the means, can set up—and this hearkens back to the golden age of Canadian politics—a multinational police force or something similar to play a role internationally when necessary.

But it could be like hitting a brick wall. The most powerful countries do not necessarily share the interests of most of the international community, which has contributed to the weakening of the UN.

In closing, I would like to add to what Ms. McDougall said about the future of Afghanistan. It is obvious that Afghanistan will fall into anarchy, the Taliban will resurface, if the Americans repeat the mistake that was made in 1989, when they thought that with the Red Army gone, their problems were over. It is very very dangerous because Afghanistan could explode as a country, while increasing the size of the Taliban, or creating even more bin Ladens. We know that bin Laden is not of Afghani origin, of course, but radical ideas such as his can emerge, something that would be very dangerous, which is why countries like Canada must force the Americans to stay put, now that they have destroyed part of the terror infrastructure, in order to rebuild Afghanistan so as to prevent the emergence of other terrorist organizations.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you.

Madame Lalonde.

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[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you. Yes, I know. I will ask you later.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): We'll move then to Mr. O'Brien—please be brief.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Thank you, Madam Chair.

I have two quick questions. I wish we had another hour, frankly, but we don't.

Mr. Hassan-Yari mentioned NMD. I chaired the defence committee when we held those hearings about two years ago, and the interim report did not make a recommendation, it just updated the House on the extensive set of hearings we held. You're saying we should not make a hasty decision. I think it's clear we're not making a hasty decision. But then you said, don't sign on. So I guess I saw an inconsistency I'd like you to speak to.

I'll just pose my other question to Mr. Cohen. Don't you think there's some hypocrisy on the part of the Europeans, or some of the European nations, on ODA and the fact that we're falling down, which I think a lot of Canadians regret—though not all, as I can tell you from my mail? Is there not some hypocrisy on the part of the European countries when they then stand firm on their common agricultural policy, the removal of which would be far better for these developing nations? I agree with a lot of what you said, but I think we just beat the hell out of ourselves more than we really need to do sometimes.

So if I could get answers on those two questions, I'd appreciate it.

Thanks, Madam Chair.

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: I call Canadians to be prudent, not jump and then sign the paper, because, frankly, there is no paper. I'm talking about NMD.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: Yes.

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: There is no such thing as a defined strategy on the part of the Americans. There is no such thing as a clear, picture of what the Americans want. Also, it should be mentioned that those tests the Americans did failed more than they succeeded. This goes back to the question of the relationship between Canada and the UN. This is a clear violation of an international, signed treaty. So if Canada—

Mr. Pat O'Brien: If I might, I'm aware of all that. As I said, I sat through a lot of hearings on this, so I'm aware of everything you're saying. I thought I heard an inconsistency in what you said. You said, don't take a hasty decision, but then you said, don't sign on. Do you mean don't sign on no matter what or don't sign on now?

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: No, I don't say, don't sign on no matter what happens. You could sign it, but when the picture is really clear, when there is no violation, when the Canadian interest is protected, and when—at least, we're talking about the western world, we are not talking about the rest, unfortunately—there is a consensus.

Mr. Pat O'Brien: That clarifies it. I agree with that. Thank you.

I had a question for Mr. Cohen too.

Thanks, Madam Chair.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: In reponse to your question, Mr. O'Brien, I think you're right. I think there's an enormous amount of hypocrisy in Europe. I don't think that's something new to say. Clearly, in many ways the Europeans are not as muscular and activist as they should be—not that that excuses us.

As to your other comments, I think you have the wisdom of the ages when you say we're hard on ourselves. We are very hard on ourselves in this country. There's nothing like spending five years outside this country to get a different sense. I've always thought we're a nation of complainers with the least to complain about.

Some hon. members: Here, here.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Still, that having been said, the numbers don't lie on where we are militarily, on where we are on aid. Those numbers are there. We aspire to do things, and for years we have done them very well, as soldiers, as peacemakers, as humanitarians, as traders, as donors. We've done things marvelously well, which is why, having set that standard for ourselves, many of us regret the erosion, and the challenge before us, I think, as a country that has been engaged by the world, is to return to some of the ideals we had about two generations ago, and maybe longer, and to address these notions.

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There's a notion out there, for example, that we're only a peacekeeper. I have students who perhaps don't know this country fought and left 60,000 soldiers in the fields of France and other places in World War I, let alone World War II and Korea. There's a sense that we only do peacekeeping. I'm not saying we shouldn't do peacekeeping, we should, but there are other roles we have played in the past. I think we've got away from that. Yes, we're hard on ourselves, but I would hope we remember what we were, so that we might one day return to that.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Mr. Daudelin, briefly.

Mr. Jean Daudelin: I have a brief comment to reach back to what you were saying before.

I think the fact that we've been able to cut our defence spending so much, to cut our aid spending so much, to cut our diplomatic capacity so much, the fact that we're all talking in terms of things we should be doing, instead of things we must do, is a reflection of the fact that we don't have as much interest out there in the world as we used to have. When we were involved in the setting up of the multilateral global system, be it trade or the UN, we had lots at stake. Our involvement in peacekeeping was driven to a significant extent by our national interest. What's happening now is that with North American integration taking place, we're contracting the scope of our interest. This has consequences for our foreign policy. This should be recognized for any reflection on where we're going. We have less interest in the world out there, in part because much of it is concentrated in North America.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Please be very brief, Doctor Legault.

Prof. Albert Legault: I think John would have the answer for that, but I'm not sure we'll still be a member of the G-8 in the year 2025. I guess we will be the 21st or 22nd industrial power in the world. We have some adjustments to make, but I think if we do have a leader in this country, if we do have a policy that tells us we should do that even if it costs money, that may help too. Because we're all talking about the role of Canadian foreign policy. When Jean Daudelin says, stop talking about “should” and talk about “must”, he is right. The American way with a problem is to solve it. The British way is to muddle through. The Canadian way is to try to outlive it.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Thank you.

When I introduced the panel, I said they were eminently qualified to guide us in our reflections. I also think the media help to guide Canadians in their own reflection. Can I ask each one of you to give me in a sentence, a capsule, how you think the media are serving us on the questions of security, the border issue, the war on terrorism, whatever? How do you think we're being serviced by our media?

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Just a sentence?

I think the media before September 11 had not served us well. We don't pay enough attention to things that happen in the world. We don't maintain enough foreign bureaus, that is, our news organizations, in either language. They are not bringing the world to Canadians, not talking about international affairs in the depth they should. Since September 11 I think there has been an improvement, largely driven, of course, by the enormity of events. But I think generally the media can do a lot better job informing Canadians and giving them the information they need to make intelligent decisions about the world.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Amen.

Prof. John Kirton: This is one of the areas of my professional interest. I think the Canadian media have done relatively well, but of course, we know that if Canadians are to have a Canadian perspective on the issue from Canadians, the media, in a sense, are compelled to cover our Prime Minister speaking to Canadians directly. I think in the earlier weeks the reliance on reportage of fundraisers of particular political parties, viewers of Larry King Live, was useful, but I think it's important that our political leaders do get out with major throne speech-like events regularly to communicate Canadian thinking on the war, in part to get away from this reactive mentality that I see.

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[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jean Augustine): Mr. Hassan-Yari.

Prof. Houchang Hassan-Yari: From time to time, just as the others do, I myself speak out through the media. At the very least, I would say that the media leave a great deal to be desired. Many of the well—known journalists, at least those who appear on television or on radio, do not even know where Afghanistan is. For example, they don't really know who lives there or what the issues are. They don't know why Afghanistan has found itself in this situation, why the Americans have become involved, etc. That's why I think that the media are simply repeating what the Americans tell them, which is most unfortunate. There is no Canadian point of view being expressed in the media, which means that we tend to turn to the American networks for our news.

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Jean Augustine): I would like to take the opportunity, on behalf of all my colleagues, to thank you for your presence.

Before you leave your chairs, members, the Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes, and Investments adopted its report on border issues yesterday. We understand it will be ready to be circulated to members of the full committee by internal mail, so it will be in your offices. Actual consideration of the report will be done on Tuesday. Remember that the report remains confidential until we've tabled it in the House, so please give that your attention.

I want to thank you very much for being with us these three hours. It has been long and gruelling, and I notice you sat there and some of you did not have the good coffee we provided.

Thank you so much.