FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 20, 2001

• 0907

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Colleagues, I'd like to begin the second of our hearings leading up to the Quebec summit.

I'd like to welcome Professor Dymond, Mr. Wilson, and the Honourable Warren Allmand, who will be going over various aspects of the summit.

I'd like to welcome the Honourable Diane Marleau, who's dressed in fuchsia this morning because it is the first day of spring as of 8:30 this morning. Mr. Harvard looks doubtful, but the television told us it was so, so it must be so.

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): I forgot it was spring.

The Chair: Well, there you are. It's hard to remember anything around this place, isn't it?

We're going to start with Mr. Dymond. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. Bill Dymond (Executive Director, Centre for Trade Policy and Law): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks to you and the committee for the opportunity to present the views of the Centre for Trade Policy and Law. I plan to address my remarks to the free trade agreement of the Americas and in those remarks cover three themes—the context for the negotiations, the negotiating dynamics, and the relevance for Canada.

First of all, let me talk about the context. Free trade agreements are both political and economic instruments. Politically they depend upon democratic governance, and economically upon open markets. Just as democracy creates political choice, free trade creates economic choice.

Twenty years ago the negotiation of a free trade agreement in the Americas would have been inconceivable. Brutal military regimes, other authoritarian forms of government, closed markets, and erratic economic performance were the dominant characteristics of the region. Over the last 20 years the region has moved to democratic governance. The colonels, the generals, and the caudillos are gone, and free elections are now the model. Even where there are problems, such as in Peru or Paraguay, the attempt to revert to authoritarian government has proven unsustainable.

Open economies are now the rule. The region has abandoned the attempt to build walls between domestic economies and the global economy. Industrial strategies, import substitution, and other varieties of command-and-control economic management have gone into the dustbin. In fact, Latin American countries have followed the same path as virtually all other developing countries and countries of the former Soviet Union—that is, when given a choice, voters discard the dictators and adopt the free market. The exceptions include Cuba, which on two accounts disqualifies itself, and China, which is attempting to manage a transition to an open economy with authoritarian government.

• 0910

Second is the negotiating dynamics. There are two distinct negotiating dynamics at play—the NAFTA dynamic and that of the rest of the hemisphere. The NAFTA dynamic is driven by the very success of the agreement, so much so that it's becoming a victim of that very success. The economic integration achieved, especially that between Canada and the United States, is equivalent to the integration you normally see in a customs union or a common market. Many of the problems that arise in the NAFTA are for the most part beyond the rules and institutions of a free trade agreement to manage. Competition policy is one example, customs and border issues are another.

The regional priority of the three NAFTA countries should not be hemispheric integration but how to remove the barriers to wealth-creating trade and investment in a timely way that will prove attractive to the voters.

The negotiating dynamic driving the other countries is quite different. Much as Mexico needed access to the U.S. market through the NAFTA to underwrite its massive internal economic reforms, so other countries in a similar reform process need that same access to markets. They bring a more prosaic agenda to the table, looking for the kind of market access and related provisions that the NAFTA countries have already achieved. Trade in agricultural products, steel, textiles and clothing, and disciplines on Canadian and U.S. trade laws head their list. The readiness of these countries to negotiate on issues important to the NAFTA partners will depend importantly on the extent to which these market access needs are met. That is not going to be easy.

Third is the relevance for Canada. The FTAA is relevant for Canada for three reasons, and I cite them in descending order of importance: geopolitical, the opportunity to push out the frontiers of trade agreements, and the direct trade benefits.

First, while Latin America was changing, Canada was changing as well. A few years ago Canada's southward gaze stopped at the Rio Grande. Latin America held last place in Canadian foreign policy. Throughout the eighties and nineties Canada began to grow out of a decade-old identity crisis in which the country tried to be an Atlantic nation, a Pacific nation, and even an Arctic nation, anything but a nation of the Americas. By joining the Organization of American States and by negotiating the NAFTA, Canada stopped denying the judgment of geography and embraced its rights and responsibilities as a nation of the Americas.

Canada's commitment to the FTAA is an expression of that new-found identity, but the Canadian interest in the Americas goes beyond trade. It embraces all of the dimensions of modern democratic governance—the rule of law, the highest standards of human rights, the environment, and the protection of labour, to cite a few.

It is indeed, Mr. Chairman, worth recalling that the richest countries in the world are those that meet these standards. They're also the countries most deeply committed to multilateral and regional free trade agreements.

Second, a regional agreement provides an opportunity to push out the boundaries of trade agreements to create rules and institutions needed for global governance. This is what Canada did in the free trade agreement with binding dispute settlement in trade remedy cases and subsequently in the NAFTA with comprehensive investment provisions.

We should be exploring in the FTAA issues such as competition policy, opening government procurement markets, streamlining customs administration, and a range of other issues to determine the scope for free trade agreements to address such problems. Solutions would not only make the FTAA a better agreement but would point the way forward for the NAFTA and eventually multilaterally in the WTO.

Third, the impact upon Canadian exports and imports will be modest. Canada does approximately 95% of its trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan. The FTAA is not going to induce a massive change in the direction of trade flows. In the medium to longer term, Latin America could come to be an important second-tier market for Canada, equivalent, for example, to Europe. However, as in any trade agreement, individual Canadian firms and their workers will benefit from an improved market and investment conditions, and these benefits are worth fighting for.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the FTAA is an idea whose time has come. May it prosper. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Dymond.

• 0915

Mr. Wilson, we'll go to you next, please.

Mr. John Wilson (President, Ottawa Chapter, Canadian Council for the Americas): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to participate in this hearing this morning. This is my second visit. The previous occasion was to discuss the free trade agreement with Chile, perhaps four or five years ago, and to explain how important it would be for future sales of Canada's hydro turbines and generators to that country.

I'm particularly pleased to note that two members of the committee have major GE Canada facilities in their ridings. I refer to Colleen Beaumier, Brampton West, and Stan Keyes. Francine Lalonde had our CAMCO plant in her riding until the last redistribution.

The Chair: They left her, did they?

Mr. John Wilson: Yes, we switched.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): I gave them to Réal Ménard.

[English]

The Chair: She says she gave you up.

Mr. John Wilson: Oui.

When I was invited late on Friday afternoon to participate, I neglected to ask whether I was representing GE Canada; the Canadian Council for the Americas; FOCAL, the Canadian Foundation for Latin America; or the Trade Facilitation Office of the Canada-India Business Council, although the latter seemed unlikely. This has now been cleared up, and I'm in fact representing the Canadian Council for the Americas. FOCAL, of which I'm also a director, will have their turn next week.

Mr. Svend Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to interrupt Mr. Wilson, but I wonder if he could perhaps just inform the committee about the Canadian Council for the Americas.

Mr. John Wilson: That's the next thing I'm going to do.

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's great.

The Chair: I don't think that's a friendly question, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Robinson never asks friendly questions.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. John Wilson: I'm on my guard.

The Canadian Council for the Americas is the principal private sector link between Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean. As a networking and information vehicle, the CCA's primary objective is to stimulate the expansion of Canadian commercial interests in the markets of the countries of the region. It was founded in 1987. It has headquarters in Toronto and chapters in Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, Calgary, and Vancouver, with over 600 members from coast to coast. The membership ranges from some of Canada's most well-known and important companies to some small and new companies that recognize the importance of trade outside of Canada's boundaries.

The national president is Halina Ostrovski. I am president of the Ottawa chapter. The chairman of the board is David Winfield, a former Canadian Ambassador to Mexico. The Canadian Council for the Americas is closely linked to the Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce, and Halina Ostrovski is president of both organizations.

If I'm permitted a brief personal note, my first sight of South America was from a ship entering the magnificent harbour of Rio de Janiero at sunrise, in 1950, over 50 years ago. I was on my way to Argentina. Subsequently, I lived in Chile, Argentina, and Peru, and in 1966 I spent many months in Guatemala commissioning a hydroelectric plant designed by Canadian engineers. My international marketing responsibilities for Acres and then GE Canada took me back many times to Central and South America, until I retired about 10 years ago.

The Canadian Council for the Americas strongly supports the FTAA, as it has supported other initiatives, including Canada-Costa Rica; Canada-Central America; and, as I mentioned before, Canada-Chile.

Historically, since the days of the Spaniards and Portuguese, Brazil and the countries of the southern cone have always traded mostly with Europe; the northern countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador look more to the United States; the Caribbean countries look traditionally to the U.K. and the U.S.; and Mexico traded with the U.S. and Europe.

• 0920

As well, there were strong rivalries in the past between neighbours, sometimes leading to wars, and little trade between neighbouring countries in the region. Even in 1960, when I moved from Argentina to Peru, shipping documents from my household effects had to be stamped approved by the Argentine Fabricaciónes Militares, the military arsenal of Argentina, to certify that exporting my household effects from Argentina would not impair Argentina's ability to wage war.

Times have changed. Today, as Bill has remarked, it's strikingly different. You have trading blocks like MERCOSUR and the Andean Group. You have Argentina preparing to export one-third of its natural gas production to Chile, the country with which it almost went to war about fifteen or twenty years ago. You have gas pipelines linking many countries that previously were barely on speaking terms.

To the north, we have the North American free trade area. We have new governments in Mexico and in the U.S.A. There is momentum for change, and the time to push ahead with the free trade area of the Americas is now, despite the reservations of the United States and the hopefully temporary lack of fast-track authority of its new president.

Despite the coolness of the Brazilians, who, we're told, would rather strengthen MERCOSUR, which they dominate, and use it to bargain with NAFTA and the Europeans, who are waiting to make cherry-picking binational agreements where it is in their own narrow interests, thus weakening the whole concept of FTAA, now is the time to push ahead. As Peter Cook eloquently pointed out in his excellent final column in the Globe and Mail yesterday, what has to happen in the Americas is for the chief participants, the U.S. and Brazil, to discover that they need an FTAA and need to be prepared to make sacrifices to achieve it.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson.

Next we have the Honourable Warren Allmand, from the democratic centre in Montreal.

Mr. Warren Allmand (President, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the committee for inviting us to appear on this important question.

As stated on several occasions, Rights and Democracy is not opposed to trade or to free trade agreements, but we emphasize most emphatically that such trade agreements must recognize the primacy of human rights, and must be fully consistent with the human rights treaties that we have already ratified. Trade law should never trump human rights law. To the contrary, trade should serve the advancement of human rights.

I should point out that 27 of the 34 states participating at the Summit of the Americas have ratified the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 25 countries out of 34 at the summit have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.

In recommendation four of your report of October 1999, concerning the free trade agreement, you said:

That the Government of Canada, in preparing positions for negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, assess their impacts on human rights, seeking to ensure that there are no conflicts with Canada's international human rights obligations or with measures to protect and progressively realize rights which are affirmed under international law. The Government of Canada should also encourage its negotiating partners to do the same and take advantage of these negotiations as a way of advancing respect for human rights throughout the Americas.

That's an excellent recommendation.

As well, in recommendation ten you said:

That the Government of Canada should work to build up the presence of the International Labour Organization in the hemispheric initiative and continue to promote labour standards throughout the Americas.

Finally, you recommended in thirteen:

That the Government of Canada ensure that the rules governing a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement do not in any way impair the government's sovereign right to regulate in the public interest.

Mr. Chairman, we fully support these principles, and the government, in its response to your committee's report, said it supported these principles as well. However, we have not yet received from the government sufficient detail on how it intends to implement or flesh out such principles. For us, the detailed language in the draft agreement is fundamental, and it should be for this committee as well, on the basis of your recommendations four, ten, and thirteen already referred to.

The general affirmation of principles was repeated in the Speech from the Throne on January 30, and again in Mr. Manley's statement before this committee last Thursday, on March 15.

• 0925

To refer to Mr. Manley's statement, he said at one point:

The Summit of the Americas must serve, and must be seen to serve, the real interests of the people of the Americas. They must lead to improvements in their quality of life and their standard of living if they are to be judged successful.

Mr. Chairman, once again, these are good words that we support as an expression of intent, but we await the specific texts of the draft declaration and plan of action for the summit before we announce our full approval.

Furthermore, none of us, including the members of this committee, have the draft text for the free trade agreement of the Americas, with or without the usual bracketed clauses indicating lack of agreement or alternatives in wording. I think it's absolutely unbelievable that this most important document is not before members of Parliament and before the public at this time, so that we can really discuss what's at issue.

I might say, this is in stark contrast with the ICC treaty of the statute of Rome. That entire draft document was available well in advance of the six-week conference in Rome for approval of, disapproval of, or amendments to the treaty, and all NGOs and all civil society had a right to examine the draft document well in advance, before it was finally agreed to and negotiated.

I congratulated Minister Pettigrew on December 14, when he released some of Canada's negotiating positions for the FTAA, but I pointed out at the time that the release was incomplete in that it did not reveal Canada's position on four critical chapters—investment, services, intellectual property, and dispute settlement.

The minister also released a draft preamble with two explicit references to human rights. While this was a step in the right direction, preambles are not binding. Consequently, in my view, this would not satisfy your recommendation four, nor would it satisfy our request that there be binding provisions in the FTAA that would subject the agreement to standards set out in either the American Convention on Human Rights or the International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the universal declaration and the two major covenants.

There has been a proposal to include a democracy clause in either the summit declaration or in the FTAA. It is not clear as to which document it would apply.

At present, in this hemisphere, there are democratic clauses guiding the OAS under resolution 1080 of June 1991, in the MERCOSUR agreement of June 1996, and in the European-Mexican free trade agreement of December 1997, but none of these are fully satisfactory. In the OAS provision, the democratic clause has been used four times to expel countries, but the threshold for suspension is extremely high and subject to the vote of the permanent council.

In the MERCOSUR provision, it is weaker again, with no definition of “democracy” and too much discretion left to state authorities. In the European-Mexican provision with respect to a democratic clause, it's a very good statement that refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the provision lacks evaluation and enforcement mechanisms.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, a democracy clause could be an excellent provision, depending on its content, its definitions, and its enforcement provisions. We are preparing a paper on this proposal for a democratic clause that we will release shortly.

We are also preparing a comprehensive paper on the FTAA that will be ready next week. Entitled “A Human Rights Framework for Trade in the Americas”, this document will be used as our basic submission on the FTAA to all governments, including Canada, at the summit. We have a summary of that paper with us today.

I'm pleased that Diana Bronson is now with me. Diana will distribute the summaries of the document to the committee. They're in both English and French.

In this paper that we are preparing, we point out that Canada has ratified several international human rights treaties. As I said previously, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been ratified by 142 states in the world, including 27 of the 34 states that will be at the summit.

• 0930

In addition, the Organization of American States has an international human rights system that includes a declaration of human rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the San Salvador protocol, which deals with economic, social, and cultural rights.

All these institutions at the inter-American level are very important to the peoples of the Americas because many of them don't have a reliable or an honourable justice system where they can bring their grievances and complaints. Their only recourse is to the inter-American system, which we believe must be strengthened.

Unfortunately, Canada and the United States have not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and consequently are not full players at this time in that system. We believe if Canada is to proceed with some form of an FTAA, it is all the more important for Canada to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights.

As I said, we don't have a copy of the draft text of the FTAA. We presume it will be based on either NAFTA or the WTO. According to the WTO agreement, regional agreements must comply with WTO rules or go beyond them. The regional rules cannot be weaker than the WTO.

Consequently, we have many concerns. Our first concern is that human rights will be overridden by trade rules and by investor rights. Secondly, we're concerned that certain economic and social rights, such as the right to food, the right to education, and the right to health, which are set out in the ratified human rights covenants in the universal declaration and in the other covenants, will be subject to the same threats and attacks as they are under the NAFTA and the WTO. In the paper which I refer to, we cite several examples of these attacks.

At the United Nation's World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, 170 countries, including Canada, declared human rights are the first obligation of states and all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent. If Canada's ratifications and votes on these matters are to mean anything, then they must apply to trade as well as to other issues. Otherwise, we are hypocrites. We say one thing and vote one way on human rights when it is convenient to do so. Then we go out and sign trade agreements that totally ignore or contradict our human rights commitments.

Mr. Chairman, that is hypocrisy. I'm saying to this committee, make your recommendation four of October 1999 and make it stick. Demand that it be implemented. Demand that Canada, in trade agreements, fully respects its international human rights commitments. Otherwise we all lose our credibility.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Allmand. It was very helpful in view of the international law.

I understand, Madam Bronson, you will not be adding anything. You're with Mr. Allmand, is that correct?

Mr. Warren Allmand: She's here to help me answer questions.

The Chair: As well, thank you very much for this very helpful document.

I wonder, colleagues, if I could break with tradition and first ask one or two questions, because they've been rather troubling to me for a long time.

Mr. Dymond, you mentioned the geopolitical nature of what is happening here. It has been said Canada is perhaps moving from a north Atlantic nation to a nation of the Americas, with a focus on the Americas and then perhaps with peripheral views on Asia, Europe, etc.

From a sheer political point of view, do you think the free trade of the Americas agreement will enable us to move beyond the dependence we presently have on the United States in terms of trade dependency, economic dependency, and also security dependency? In other words, in view of the political context, does this agreement enable Canada to become not only a greater participant in the Americas but one that perhaps is less under the American dominance or umbrella under which we presently exist?

Mr. Bill Dymond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, on the trade or general economic side, trade investment and the whole dimension of economic integration, my answer is no. Economically we are integrated into the North American economy. We should not expect that any trade agreement—the FTAA, or APEC, for that matter—will change that fundamental fact of economics or geography. If you look geopolitically in a larger sense, I think the answer is, yes, it does.

• 0935

Going back into history—and I apologize if I sound like “historical division” here—one of the criticisms of the free trade agreement and NAFTA was that Canada would lose its independence in foreign policy-making and trade policy-making. I seem to recall that similar criticisms were voiced in Mexico.

If you look what's happened since the adoption of NAFTA, it's the United States that has been paralyzed in its trade policies. The United States has not had a trade policy since it adopted NAFTA and approved the Uruguay Round. In the meantime, Canada has concluded a free trade agreement with Chile, and our government has launched a number of free trade agreements apart from the hemispheric one. Mexico, I think, has been even more active.

So having a Canadian position and a Canadian presence in the Americas has created opportunities for us that weren't there before. That's why I think it has geopolitical importance for us.

The Chair: I'm not quibbling, but I think you'll probably agree with me that the American paralysis, as you call it, is due more to internal political factors than to structural factors related to geopolitical considerations in the Americas.

Mr. Bill Dymond: I think that's the case, Mr. Chairman. All U.S. observers of the NAFTA debate recall that there were two debates, one in 1991 on whether to grant fast-track, and the second in 1993 on whether to approve the agreement. I think it was understood that the size of the vote would determine the future of U.S. trade policy. It was a very narrow vote of approval indeed, particularly in the House. And since that time, the efforts of the former administration to assemble a consensus for fast-track—which is, in fact, U.S. trade policy—have failed.

The Chair: Thank you.

A very quick question to Mr. Allmand. You've raised the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights before. Many members here are very interested in it, and in what its impact on Canada would be. I've been informed that there are problems with it that have inhibited our signing it so far. I understand there's a right-to-life clause in there that might interfere with a woman's right to choose what she wishes to do with her own body in terms of children, etc. There are some other serious interferences with the charter.

You recommend that Canada should sign it, but I'm told there would be so many reservations it would look like Swiss cheese. Perhaps you don't have time to get into that fully here, but maybe it would be helpful if the centre could give us a piece on the inter-American commission. I think our colleagues here would like to understand it better, and decide whether we should be pushing the government to ratify it—and if so, what the problems are.

So perhaps you would be good enough to provide us with further information, maybe even quickly deal with it here. I think all our colleagues here would be interested.

Mr. Warren Allmand: We've been pushing for the ratification of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for several years now. The government originally said there were seven objectionable articles. We've looked at those seven and found that many are not legitimate—they've been overcome by rulings at the inter-American commission, the interpretations of the inter-American court.

There are really only two remaining that are difficult. One is article 4, on the right to life, and the other is on freedom of expression or pre-censorship of such things as child pornography.

In both those cases we've consulted widely with women's groups in Latin America and in Canada. As a matter of fact, just last week we had a teleconference with Canadian women's groups on this. We're exploring with them a proposal put forward by Rebecca Cook, a renowned human rights lawyer and feminist. She believes we can deal with article 4 with a memorandum of understanding, which would leave only one article on which there might be reservations. We have a very full brief; I went to see the Deputy Minister of Justice about this last week.

We're also working hard to meet with the provincial governments to try to get them onside on this. We'll send you a complete brief on this subject. We feel that the treaty can be ratified, with perhaps a memorandum of understanding and one reservation.

By the way, those are not to undermine the treaty. Most human rights groups oppose reservations. But in this case we support them, because they go in the direction of favouring the general human rights set out in the treaty.

The Chair: Thank you. We'd appreciate getting your memorandum.

Thank you as well for your reference to Professor Cook at the University of Toronto law school. I thought I should perhaps draw it to the attention of our members that she was a colleague of mine at law school.

Mr. Obhrai, or is it Mr. Lunn?

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, CA): My colleague has a short question, and then it'll come back to me.

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, CA): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

• 0940

First, I want to apologize for being late. And I will defer to Mr. Obhrai.

I have one short question, and I'd like to direct it to Mr. Dymond. Again, the Canadian Alliance fully supports free trade. We think it's good for Canada and for our industry and our economy. It will strengthen our trading position.

However, right now, as you are aware, we are embroiled in a bitter trade dispute with our largest trading partner, the United States, over our largest export to the United States, which is softwood lumber. We supposedly have free trade under NAFTA, once the softwood lumber agreement expires, but we're going to find out that in fact we don't. Even after three previous rulings—and I'm sure you're aware of the history—where in fact we have won, the United States is about to launch another one only weeks away, which will cost our industry billions of dollars.

Having said that, the question I'm raising is about the process. Even though we have a free trade agreement, we find out that when our neighbour to the south wants to be protectionist, it really doesn't matter that we have that agreement.

Can we safeguard against this type of thing happening in an FTAA? Has a resolution process been established that is workable and that will actually prevent these types of problems so that it's not going to cripple our industry? One has to question our largest trading partner now and our largest export, and here we're facing a four- or five-year legal process that will cost billions of dollars. I'd like your comments on whether we can learn from this and try to rectify this in an FTAA.

Mr. Bill Dymond: We've had lumber problems with the United States for over 150 years. It is a perennial. When I was in government, I went through some of them myself.

This is a very hard issue. It is very hard to get a grip on what the issue is. Most of us who are involved believe the issue is really that our lumber is too competitive and Canadians take up a very substantial market share. We observe that the pressure goes up each time our market share seems to exceed 30%.

In my view, the American case that the four principal provinces producing should go to market-based systems for pricing lumber has merit. When you operate a system where the prices of lumber off crown land made available to loggers are basically administered, you open yourself up to these kinds of allegations. None of us, however, would pretend that a move in this direction would solve these problems forever.

So what is the answer? We have something in the free trade agreement and reconfirmed in the NAFTA that we never had before, and that is the ability to challenge. We have challenged successfully, and we will have to challenge in the future. But it is one of those problems that I don't think the FTA can deal with because it is so intensely bilateral and it does not raise, in my opinion, the types of systemic issues that could be attacked in the FTA. This will have to be fought out bilaterally and, yes, we will have to get the rules that are required.

The Chair: You have some time left, Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you.

I have just two questions for Mr. Warren Allmand. Perhaps you could be very brief, as I have a small amount of time.

Based on your presentation here, I suppose you would agree with us—and I want you on the record—that, as opposed to my colleague from the NDP, Cuba at this time should be barred from attending the summit. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Warren Allmand: No, I wouldn't. I think they should be invited to participate in the discussion of this agreement. Rules should be developed, whether a democracy clause or rules with regard to human rights, and once those rules are developed, if Cuba does not qualify under those rules, then it should be expelled. But the same rules should apply to all countries. The problem with the application of democracy rules in the OAS in years past is that they've been applied unevenly. Cuba was expelled and attacked, whereas Chile under Pinochet was not. So we would like Cuba to be involved in the discussion of what the rules should be, but once they are there, if they don't qualify, out they go. But so should other countries.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Based on your presentation and on what you're saying and on what I'm understanding you're saying, I think there is a tremendous contradiction here. Let me explain what I think it is.

• 0945

You are stating quite clearly here that there should be human rights associated with trade, and you are putting your conditions over there. We right now know that Cuba has not fulfilled those conditions, and other conditions are not fulfilled. You are putting in rigid rules now, and we want to talk about human rights. My view would be that you start with trade rules, and as the doors open, you put your foot in and start slowly building towards that. But your centre is saying, in putting up these rules here, that we should have these things for trade agreements.

As of today Cuba is not part of that, and yet you are saying, “Bring them in”. How? They are not part of it right now.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Sir, in answer to your question, if you look at the UN Commission on Human Rights, which is now having its meetings in Geneva, many countries that may not be considered the perfect democracies are participating. That commission has condemned not only Cuba, but Guatemala, Colombia, and several countries in Latin America. If we're going to go by the condemnations of countries for human rights abuses, in addition to Cuba, many others should be eliminated from the discussion.

In discussing what the system should be, I would invite Cuba, but I would argue strongly that there should be human rights criteria and democracy criteria. Once they're agreed upon in an FTAA, any country that does not live up to those criteria, even though they participated—and they may have lost the battle or they may have made suggestions that were not acceptable to the majority—then don't qualify. Out they go.

But it's not just Cuba. When you say Cuba has been criticized on human rights issues, I can tell you—I participate in the UN Commission on Human Rights, and I'll be there very shortly—that several countries in the Americas have been condemned. So maybe we should leave others out as well.

The Chair: Do you have a list of which ones we should leave out? Are you prepared at this time to tell us which ones we should leave out?

Mr. Warren Allmand: At this time, Chair, I'd invite them all, because I think it's important that they all be involved in the initial discussion on the FTAA.

The Chair: Okay. I'm going to have to go on to the next questioner.

[Translation]

Mr. Paquette, go ahead.

Mr. Pierre Paquette (Joliette, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you for your presentations. My question is for the three witnesses.

As Mr. Allmand mentioned, many people are concerned that the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, specifically when it comes to investment, will be based on what exists in the North American Free Trade Agreement, and on Chapter 11 in particular. The Canadian government and the American government have had a great deal of problems with this chapter, more specifically as regards the definition of investments, which seems far too broad, and the issue of dispute settlement. What it boils down to in the end, is that the rights of investors would be superior to the rights of states to protect a certain number of their citizens' rights. There are a number of lawsuits before the courts in the three-member countries of NAFTA.

I would like to know if, according to you, negotiations on investment protection—I think we would all agree to the fact that investments and investors deserve a certain amount of protection—should be based on something other than chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Mr. Allmand could begin.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I will ask Ms. Bronson to answer this question.

Ms. Diana Bronson (Coordinator, Program on Globalization and Human Rights, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development): There should be another starting point, and that starting point is the general framework that we are defending for international trade agreements. It's a framework of human rights. An investment agreement should allow States to maintain their right to protect rights within these agreements.

I imagine that you are already aware of the cases that had been heard on chapter 11. I will only cite the example of Metalclad. Following a local Mexican protest movement against a landfill site, by a community that wanted to keep its access to clean water, the Metalclad company managed to sue the Mexican government which was forced to pay a fine of $16 million.

In our opinion, not only is it one of the rights of states, but also one of their obligations under international conventions on rights, to protect the health and the environment of its citizens. And it is this right that is being threatened.

• 0950

We are proposing a much broader human rights framework for investments, a framework which would maintain the ability of the states to legislate on public health, on the environment and to reach other social objectives.

Mr. Bill Diamond: If another of the witnesses...

[English]

The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Dymond.

Mr. Bill Dymond: Thank you, and thank you for the question.

I have long believed that the whole debate on chapter 11 is misdirected, and it's avoiding the real issues. The real issue in chapter 11 is not the right to litigate. The real issue in chapter 11 is what are the obligations you undertake.

Chapter 11 is the whole of the investment chapter. It's not only the scope for litigation by a private investor. Remember what we're trying to do in investment agreements. We're trying to attract private savings not of other countries but of other individuals, of other corporations. If you're trying to do that, you offer protection. If you don't want that investment, if you don't want to attract private savings, you don't enter into investment agreements.

The purpose of an investment agreement is to create a climate that attracts foreigners to come and invest in your country. That's basic. Secondly, what's at issue in all of these things is not the right to litigate but the nature of the obligation.

The problems we've had with the S.D. Myers case, which went to judgment, and Ethyl, which did not, is not that the Government of Canada was being sued by a private investor. It was the obligation which the Government of Canada had undertaken. The S.D. Myers judgment is devastating in its criticism of the government for failure to observe a fundamental obligation of international trade.

What is appropriate for debate is this: Should the Government of Canada undertake that obligation? Because the problem for the government and the problem for Parliament would scarcely be less—indeed, it would be more—if we were sued by the Government of the United States, or if Mexico had been sued by the Government of the United States. That's why I say the debate is misdirected.

The first point of the debate is, do you want to attract foreign investment into Canada, Mexico, Chile, or wherever? If you do, what is the nature of the obligations that you are prepared to undertake, vis-à-vis another state and vis-à-vis other investors, on the protection?

Ms. Bronson may well be right that the obligations that we have undertaken are too rigorous, they're too constraining in our ability to protect health, environment, and other social goals, but that is an appropriate matter for debate. But to argue that the big issue is who has the right to litigate, in my opinion, is to miss the central point.

Thank you for that opportunity to make my commercial.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: This allows me to add that, in my opinion, while subsidizing exports is something that is unreasonable, because, basically, we are paying to send our national resources abroad, while social dumping, whether it be from the environmental or labour standpoint, is a type of subsidy which should be prohibited in a well-thought-out trade agreement.

When you export goods, it's because someone wants to import what they are not able to produce themselves or do so at an acceptable cost. In some ways, as chapter 11 is currently written, the situation is quite different. We're now prepared to sacrifice national resources or the welfare of the population in order to attract investment. So, in my opinion, this should not be the starting point for negotiations.

Back to Mr. Allmand. When we have attempted to include human rights issues, such as labour rights and environmental rights, in the Free Trade Agreements of the Americas, the Canadian government and Mr. Pettigrew have often told us that the Southern countries, Brazil specifically and a number of other countries, see the inclusion of social clauses or democratic clauses as a new form of protectionism. How do you respond to this argument?

[English]

Mr. Warren Allmand: Our answer to that argument is that we are never suggesting that the standards or conditions or the human rights criteria inserted in these agreements be our conditions or our standards but that they be international standards, which Brazil and these other countries have already agreed to.

I referred earlier to the fact that 27 out of the 34 states have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 25 have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. It's those standards that we want referred to, not our standards.

• 0955

So all we're saying to Brazil and to other countries, and to Canada, is “You have ratified these conventions. We're asking you to live up to them in your trade arrangements as well. You cannot separate trade from human rights or trade from environment. It's all part of life.”

By the way, although it's not perfect, in Europe there's a greater attempt to do that with the European charter and the European system.

Ms. Diana Bronson: Perhaps I could just add a supplementary comment to that. We're not seeking to have the eventual administrative organs of the FTAA take on the mandate of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, or to have the WTO or NAFTA dispute settlement bodies become adjudicators for human rights issues. What we are asking for is that the laws and regulations set up under those bodies be consistent with human rights. What that's going to require is a strengthening of the systems.

If you look at the resources, of money, of negotiators, and of people, that are devoted to the negotiation of trade and those that are devoted to the protection of human rights, there is an astounding imbalance. In Geneva, the WTO has well over 500 employees. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights has two, and that is the relative importance that we accord to these things.

We're going to have to beef up the human rights institutions internationally, regionally, and nationally so that they can meet the commitments that they have undertaken under international law. We believe that trade agreements should be written up in consistency with those. We are not seeking to just put a little clause in that says the FTAA should all of a sudden take care of all the human rights issues in the hemisphere. That's not appropriate. In fact, it's a frightening proposition for most human rights groups.

The Chair: I'm going to ask you to reflect on that, Mr. Allmand and Ms. Bronson, and perhaps we can come back to that at the end. If we're going to make a recommendation about integrating human rights norms into trade agreements, there has to be an enforcement mechanism. Whether it's a democracy clause or anything else, clearly the nuclear war option of throwing somebody out of a trade agreement after there's been a half century of economic integration in place just won't work. It's not conceivable.

So what is the enforcement mechanism? Nobody's talking about that. What will it be? Will it be a fine? Somebody has to tell us that, or we're going around in a circle, and it's really very perturbing to me as to how we can deal with that issue if we decide... Maybe you can reflect on that at the end, because other people want to ask questions, but we have to deal with that, and I think all the members are interested in that.

I have Mr. Harvard, and then I'm going to go to Mr. Robinson, Mr. Casey, and then I'll go back to that.

Mr. John Harvard: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps we can just carry on this debate a little further in terms of one or two of these points. I'd like to refer the first question to Mr. Dymond.

I guess what I really would like to know, Mr. Dymond, is if there is any way you can come to any type of satisfactory settlement with Mr. Allmand and Ms. Bronson on these issues having to do with investment obligations or human rights obligations. I'll put it this way: Can we not have it both ways? Can we not have investment that is satisfactory to you and free trade that is satisfactory to you and yet respect all the human rights concerns the people here have?

Mr. Bill Dymond: The answer is yes.

Mr. John Harvard: We're not having it, though, at the moment.

Mr. Bill Dymond: There is no necessary inconsistency. As I said in my remarks, look around the world and find the countries with the best human rights records—us, the Americans, the Europeans. We're the rich countries with the highest standards in all the areas of what I call modern democratic governance. There's no necessary inconsistency with having a powerful, trade-driven economic growth, which is what most countries of the OECD do, and meeting standards about which people would say, yes, those are the right standards.

The second point is that I am very glad to hear what Mr. Allmand and Ms. Bronson have said about using trade rules to enforce these things. Most trade people, including myself, would say, no, it doesn't get the job done. The record of UN sanctions... Incidentally, I haven't seen this document that people are talking about. It will no doubt include the standard provision that will allow a country to depart from its FTAA obligations to implement UN resolutions. All of these agreements do. Most trade people have very little faith in the effectiveness of using the trade weapon to effect changes in social behaviour. It just doesn't work.

• 1000

The second point I would make—and the chairman refers to the nuclear option—is that we also have to think about the effect on Canadians. I would anticipate that with the free trade agreement, an FTA successfully concluded, the government will be out there saying to Canadian business and the Council of the Americas—the council will be out there with us—that there are opportunities for trade and investment. Some Canadians will take this up. Investments will be made. Workers will be employed. Exports and imports will occur.

To suddenly deprive Canadians of these types of investments and this type of economic activity in the market is a very serious step indeed, one which cannot be taken on a whim.

As to linking trade to human rights in an enforceable sense, most of us will tell you it won't work, and I'm one of them. In the long term, nobody can believe what the historians would call the counterfactual, that if you keep these countries poor by denying them a free trade agreement, their human rights record and environmental performance will improve. That is not going to happen. The opposite will occur.

Mr. John Harvard: I'd like to put a question to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson, you mentioned in your remarks the reluctance on the part of the Americans and the Brazilians, and you suggested that they were going to have to make some sacrifices. What were you talking about there?

Mr. John Wilson: I was quoting Peter Cook at that point. In his final column yesterday he made that statement.

One observes certain similarities between the Brazilian position and the U.S. position worldwide. They're both large, powerful countries, and they both resent being regimented by rules of large international organizations.

Watching the activities of the United States over the last few years has been quite fascinating. Whenever a situation arises where they are expected to put themselves at the mercy of some international organization, they back away very effectively. I would imagine they think that as the biggest and most powerful country in the world, why should they do this? They'll do what they like. This may not be the view of Washington, but this may well be the view of the Midwest: Why should we give in to the rules of an organization and be told by the Europeans what to do?

Brazil, I think, shares this position to some extent. I imagine that is what Peter Cook was referring to.

Mr. John Harvard: If Brazil continued its recalcitrance, would you then suggest that an FTAA of a kind could be consummated without Brazil?

Mr. John Wilson: I don't think that's possible.

Mr. John Harvard: You say that's not possible.

Mr. John Wilson: Brazil is such a big country and comprises such a big percentage of Latin America.

Mr. John Harvard: Do you mean an agreement without Brazil would be meaningless?

Mr. John Wilson: It would crippled, shall we say.

Mr. John Harvard: How much more time—

Mr. John Wilson: If the non-Brazilian element were doing things, Brazil could probably sabotage anything they were trying to do.

Mr. John Harvard: I have one more thing.

Mr. John Wilson: Brazil is also very, very versatile. There's a lot of scope in manufacturing and other things.

Mr. John Harvard: I have a tiny question, a short one, for my old colleague Warren.

The fact that there's been no draft text made available for the FTAA, does that invite some deep skepticism, perhaps even cynicism, on your part?

Mr. Warren Allmand: As I mentioned, we've been preparing this paper for the summit for months now. Without knowing the exact terms of the draft agreement even now, we have to speculate on what it will be. We're basing our speculation on NAFTA and on the WTO.

Mr. John Harvard: What do you think the real reason is for holding you back?

Mr. Warren Allmand: That's a good question. We've been pressing the minister to release papers. On December 14 he finally released part of the negotiating position, and other documents have gradually been released. But as I pointed out, with other areas of international affairs where I've worked very intensely, such as the ICC, the documentation was available well in advance, including the bracketed clauses, the disputed alternatives, and so on. We all knew what was at play and we could...

It seems to me that even members of Parliament really can't debate what's going to be before the Quebec summit because you don't know the exact terms. You know what Canada has proposed, but you don't know what's in play.

• 1005

I guess the minister was here last week. We're still pressing the minister to release the document so we can have a meaningful discussion about it.

Mr. John Harvard: Thank you.

The Chair: You registered the minister's response to us, Mr. Allmand. You heard what he said. It takes 34 people around the table and they have to agree. One can't unilaterally release the document without...

I mean, do you disagree with that analysis? Do you think Canada should—

Mr. Warren Allmand: Yes, but as I point out, there were 140 countries at the ICC discussions and all the documents were public.

The Chair: But they'd agreed to that, no?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Well, I presume they had, but what's the problem with something that's so important to Canadians and all people in the hemisphere? Who's stopping the release of these documents so that we can all look at them and discuss them?

The Chair: I don't know. The minister told us the other partners at the negotiation are stopping us. Are you advising Canada to go out and release documents in an international negotiation, against all the will of our negotiating partners, and cause all the diplomatic problems that would do to the negotiations? Is that what you are advising us to tell the government to do?

Mr. Warren Allmand: I'm saying isolate those countries that are refusing the release of those documents. Identify them. There's no reason in a democratic system. We're saying we're promoting democracy. We want a democracy clause, yet we're giving in to certain countries in this group who refuse to have them released. Who are they? Let us know who they are. Let them defend their position as to why these documents should not be released.

I agree with you, if Canada's made an agreement to do that with these countries, but Canada should, on the other hand, if Mr. Pettigrew says he believes they should be released but it's being blocked by certain countries... All I know is that in other fora... I mentioned the Rome conference. We had way more countries there, from every continent of the world, and still we had the documents.

The Chair: No, I understand that. Okay.

We're going to go to Mr. Casey now and then we'll go to Ms. Augustine. Mr. Robinson will come back to us later.

Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): Mr. Dymond, you'll be interested to know that the other night I turned on the television at about 2 o'clock in the morning and watched an interesting program on CPAC about softwood lumber. I thought it was very unbalanced. It only gave four provinces' points of view until it came to you, and you did have a balanced view. In fact, I've written CPAC about it, you may be interested to know. Your intervention—or your point of view—was welcome.

I want to just ask one question about that before we go onto the others. It concerns trade agreements. In the softwood lumber issue, we've won three tribunals or arguments or court cases with them, but still we're going back now to the fourth. Is there any limit where a government—for instance, the Government of the United States—should step in and say, “No, we've had enough of this and we won't allow the industry and the judicial system, the tribunal system, to carry on a fourth time”?

Mr. Bill Dymond: My understanding of U.S. law is that this is not possible. The U.S. administration does not have the scope under the law passed by the Congress—and amended several times and each time made tighter—to allow the executive to interfere with the process. I understand our own law is coming pretty close to that as well. The purpose is that members of Congress and their constituents wanted to prevent foreign policy considerations from entering into such a calculation.

What it means, of course, is that the United States has handed over a large chunk of its commercial policy to private interests, and I think that's wrong. But that's what they've done. That's what the Congress has adopted over a number of years.

What has happened in these panel decisions is that the United States has, or Congress has, on the first occasion, changed the law in order to make it easier to get findings that will sustain a challenge under their own law.

The panel findings that were for Canada in each case were panel findings that either the Department of Commerce or the International Trade Commission, which makes injury findings, had not followed U.S. law. What is the solution? Change U.S. law. That's what they've done.

Mr. Bill Casey: So that's what they've done every time.

Mr. Bill Dymond: Yes.

What we have not done... because the industry in the past, and from the news this morning will be encouraging this again, is take this to a full adjudication under international trade rules as to whether the basic U.S. law is compatible or not. The industry said in 1986 and in 1996, and some of those from British Columbia appear to be saying this morning, “Don't fight. Give up.” That's what they're saying.

Mr. Bill Casey: What would you do?

Mr. Bill Dymond: I'd fight.

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Mr. Bill Casey: On the other hand, there's a big potential risk there, too.

Anyway, we're not here about softwood lumber, but I appreciate your comments on that. It does indicate, however, or is a precursor to the problems that are going to be involved with this free trade agreement with the Americas. We recently had a dispute with Brazil, one of the countries you mentioned, and also now we're in a dispute with the U.S.A., another country that Mr. Wilson mentioned, actually. You have to wonder whether this is going to be possible, considering the differences.

Yesterday the minister said that part of the problem of developing this agreement was going to be that some of the smaller countries don't have taxation systems. In fact, for some of the smaller countries involved in the Caribbean and so on, the tariffs they have now are almost their total revenue. They will have to establish taxation systems in those countries in order for us to have this free trade agreement. It struck me that the first export we're going to have to these countries is our taxation system, and I'm not sure if I agree with that.

To any of you, how do you see us meshing or finding a fit between our large economies and some of the smaller countries that have, in fact, no taxation systems and have to develop a taxation system?

Mr. Bill Dymond: The picture reminds me that at the time of Confederation the principal revenue of the colonies—and for a long time of the confederated Canada—came from the tariff. As late as 1980, when the government was considering the tariff reductions to which it had agreed under the Tokyo Round, there were a number of warning shots fired from the Department of Finance about the revenue implications. So this is not unusual.

That is a very difficult problem. Ways and means can be found to solve it. It is basically technical, rather than of a policy character, because it involves replacing one system of taxation—that's what a tariff is—with another system of taxation. There are lots of countries around—Canada being one of them—who can offer assistance in doing that.

The more difficult problem for these countries—to the extent I understand what they've been saying—is how can we, as small island economies, derive economic benefit in a free trade agreement with much larger countries?

That's a good question. You have to ask what is their comparative advantage, and what will happen under that. They have to ask themselves whether they would be better off without entering, because nobody has to join it. You can stay out. It may be your conclusion that they will be better off, because they really don't want to have a tax reform or industrial restructuring. That's a calculation that they'll have to make. Nobody has to join the free trade agreement for the Americas.

Mr. Bill Casey: Could such a taxation system be phased in? Could everybody agree to that, or has this happened before in other agreements?

Mr. Bill Dymond: In the taxation sense, no. By the time we got into modern trade agreements, the importance of the tariff as a source of revenue had declined. The tariff reductions initially were quite modest, so that the reductions in revenue could be absorbed.

With regard to extensive phase-in periods, absolutely; they are part of any trade agreement. I'll give you one example where we benefited. In the Tokyo Round, we agreed to change our whole system of customs evaluation. It's a complicated story, and I won't take up your time. We took four years to do it because it required a major rewrite of the customs law, major consultations with industry, and extensive parliamentary involvement in time. We took four years to do that, and we are a modern country with sophisticated infrastructure and capable of doing such things.

So the concept of building in phase-in periods on this and other issues is entirely accepted, and would form I expect an integral part of the agreement. It would indeed be individually negotiated because each country would have a different situation.

Mr. Bill Casey: Mr. Allmand, I'm going to switch direction here a little bit.

The Chair: I'm sorry, Mr. Casey, we're running well over your time, so I'm going to go to Mr. Robinson. We'll have a chance to get back to you.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry I had to leave briefly, and I apologize if the areas I wanted to question have already been covered.

I have questions in two areas at this point. The first is for Mr. Wilson on behalf of the Canadian Council for the Americas.

• 1015

Mr. Wilson knows that the existing trade deals, including WTO, NAFTA, and others, are quite rigorous in their protection of corporate rights in particular—for example, intellectual property rights. I'm thinking of the big pharmaceutical companies that are busily suing in Brazil and South Africa to try to prevent low-priced AIDS drugs from being made available to help with that infection, and there are sanctions if these particular rights are breached.

What is your position with respect to rights that many of us consider to be just as fundamental, and rights that have been internationally recognized as just as fundamental, the rights of working people, for example—not standards, as Mr. Allmand said, but basic rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, the right to join a union, the right that children have not to be exploited? These are rights that are recognized largely universally under ILO conventions, and yet the business community has been pretty slow in suggesting that they should be enforced with equal rigour within the context of trade deals. Why is that?

Mr. John Wilson: I don't think I have an answer to that. I'm speaking for the Canadian Council for the Americas. We tend to concentrate on trade and leave these things to the experts. I don't think there is a position of the Canadian Council for the Americas, to answer your question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: You're not prepared to defend that particular exclusion, then, obviously.

Mr. John Wilson: I'm not prepared to discuss it. I don't know enough about it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay. That is revealing.

Mr. Allmand has referred to the profoundly undemocratic nature of this process, the fact that the 34 governments that are negotiating have refused to make available to their citizens the texts that are being negotiated. They say, “Go to the website and see what we're negotiating”. But when we go to the website to find out what we have to say about investment, for example, we're told we haven't made any representations on investment. So we don't know what's going on there.

Many Canadians feel that this is profoundly undemocratic. I'm one of them. My party certainly feels that way, and you've indicated that you feel that way. Some Canadians, as a means of voicing their resistance and their anger at this undemocratic process, have indicated that they intend to engage in acts of peaceful civil disobedience to protest this denial of their democratic rights, the right to know what's in an agreement that's going to fundamentally affect their future, their children's future, the environment.

Among the many groups that have said they are prepared to accept this non-violent, peaceful, civil disobedience are many groups in Quebec.

[Translation]

There is the Réseau québécois pour l'intégration continentale, for example. I saw that the Prime Minister, Mr. Chrétien, had denounced civil disobedience. I was frankly stunned to see that Mr. Paquette, apparently, did the same thing when he distanced himself from groups that are prepared to accept civil disobedience. I was surprised to see that.

[English]

Mr. Allmand, you represent rights and democracy. You have a long record of fighting for human rights. What's your position on this issue?

Mr. Warren Allmand: To begin with, I should point out that our organization, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, now known as Rights and Democracy, was set up by this Parliament with the explicit mandate of defending and promoting democracy. When we speak out on behalf of democracy, we're doing it because Parliament gave us the mandate to do that.

We feel that it's not democratic, it's not transparent, to keep such important documents back for so long. We could understand that maybe at the initial stages, at the very first or second drafts, there might be some reason, but at this stage, less than a month away, we still don't have the basic document because some countries in the system do not want it to be done. We feel that's contrary to principles flowing out of the United Nations, and so on.

With respect to those, we can understand people being angry and wanting to protest. We've taken a very strong position, though, against violent protest, against setting fires or breaking windows or destroying property. We're against that. But we think the right to protest is a very fundamental right entrenched in our Charter of Rights.

• 1020

By the way, I was talking about this in Montreal to some people who are very active in the business community. They told me it was deplorable, these people going to Quebec to protest the way they were. I responded by saying, “I thought I saw you very same people in the streets of Montreal a few weeks ago protesting the forced amalgamation of the municipalities of Westmount, Outremont, and others.” They were there. They had to say yes. There were about 100,000 of them in the streets of Montreal protesting the amalgamation of the municipalities. So I said, “Well, there are other people who are just as angry about the possibilities of this trade agreement and want to protest, just like you did, in the streets of Montreal.”

Mr. Svend Robinson: From what you're saying, I take it that the right to protest would also include the right to peacefully and non-violently engage in civil disobedience.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Well, when you engage in civil disobedience—

Mr. Svend Robinson: There's a long and honourable tradition of civil disobedience.

Mr. Warren Allmand: When you do that, you accept that you break the law and that you may be sent to jail. Gandhi, who was a great hero of mine, involved himself in civil disobedience.

Mr. Svend Robinson: That's right.

Mr. Warren Allmand: He took the consequences.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Absolutely.

Mr. Warren Allmand: If you break laws, you take the consequences. But what you have to be careful about in civil disobedience, whether it's blocking traffic, and so on, is that sometimes you may interfere with ambulances and fire engines. I personally have taken part in civil disobedience before and have had to bear the consequences of my act. You have to recognize that these might be illegal acts, and you may be condemned as a result of them.

It would depend on the type of civil disobedience. I wouldn't want to do anything that would harm other people.

Mr. Svend Robinson: For example, one of the actions that has been proposed by many of the groups that are involved is an action here in Ottawa on April 2 that would peacefully, and again, non-violently, seek to liberate the texts that are being negotiated. I'm sure Mr. Allmand is aware of this.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I am aware of it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It would be outside at the Foreign Affairs building. This would not involve any violence. Indeed, it may involve a peaceful, non-violent breach of some regulation or statute. Those who are involved are obviously fully prepared to accept the consequences of their actions. I take it that Mr. Allmand recognizes and agrees that this is the kind of action that has a long history in terms of trying to promote democratic and peaceful change.

Mr. Warren Allmand: There is a long history of that. As I say, Gandhi was one of the principal exponents, and I've seen it take place in Northern Ireland on several occasions. But I have a hard time getting into the Pearson Building, so good luck to those fellows who hope to go in and liberate the documents.

The Chair: We're going to have to end this exercise by Mr. Robinson to try to get some free legal advice from Mr. Allmand about what he will plead to the court when he's picked up civilly disobeying somewhere.

Ms. Augustine.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke—Lakeshore, Lib.): I wish there was an opportunity to ask the question of Mr. Robinson, “Could we have the plan?”

I want to ask a couple of questions. The ones I had in mind are actually around the WTO and Brazil in terms of human rights, when we say we have the right to health, and so on, and what happens in the case of the AIDS drugs and intellectual property. But I think that was answered when you—

Mr. Svend Robinson: It wasn't answered.

Ms. Jean Augustine: There was an answer, anyway.

I would like to ask what you see as being a successful summit. We know that the summit in Miami highlighted the whole issue of trade. We know that Santiago came out highlighting education. What do you see coming out of this in terms of all the discussion that is going on at this point? What would you consider to be a successful summit of 34 different countries, with their economies all different, and our position being that everyone will have the same rights and the same obligations?

Perhaps you can speak to that issue. I'd like to hear the perspective of all the witnesses here before us on what would be considered a successful summit.

• 1025

Mr. Warren Allmand: That's a difficult question. If there was to be a free trade agreement agreed to or advanced, we want to see provisions that will recognize human rights and democracy in a meaningful way, with measures to enforce, whether it's a democracy clause or human rights clauses.

You know, the eventual impact of developing democracy takes a long time. It doesn't happen overnight. There are improvements as you go along. As long as there are goals that are agreed to and you move toward those goals, then I think that's acceptable.

In Miami, Jean, the first summit, although they dealt with other things, was really called to promote a free trade agreement in the Americas. In Santiago, they widened the scope of the discussion, brought in poverty and education and other things, but still the principal focus was on the FTAA. And while they have four theme baskets in Quebec, most of the focus is on the FTAA.

Of course, the problem is that while NAFTA was finally agreed to in 1994 and the Canada-U.S. agreement in 1988, there hasn't really been a good evaluation of those agreements yet, a serious objective evaluation by governments or by Parliament, and here we're launching into new agreements.

It's my hope that we come out of this with a greater commitment to democracy and human rights, but in my document, which will be released next week, we go into details of the very sorts of things we want in, line by line. Whether we get that or not is another question.

Ms. Jean Augustine: Do you have a comment, Mr. Dymond?

Mr. Bill Dymond: I think a successful summit is one that moves all the baskets forward. My sense of where the government is would be that they'd be uncomfortable, I think rightly so, with progress on one item only, the trade item. That's not where they are, and I think the agenda is larger.

I think on the trade item you will get a good clue when you see what the trade ministers issue from their meeting in Buenos Aires in about ten days' time. Their mandate is to prepare the declaration of the heads of government. That will give an indication.

Third, if I had a wish, I would invite the leaders to trash this 900-page agreement. I negotiated for the Canadian government for over 30 years. It is useless. No serious negotiator would ever use such a document. This is what I've heard.

It is a version of the declaration for Seattle, which in the first cuts were 32 or 34 pages. It was useless. The ministers did not address it. It doesn't help you deal with any of the real issues, either trade issues or the issues that Mr. Allmand and his colleagues are concerned with.

To come to grips with a negotiation, you have to understand the concepts, you have to understand the principles. The politicians have to be comfortable with the direction in which you're going. When you come to write some things down, with respect, Mr. Chairman, you hire a bunch of lawyers and send them all to the side room and they'll do the job for you. The serious work of a negotiation is not done with people saying, “Move your comma four metres to the left”.

So if the document appears, as it doubtless will, my advice, if I may, Mr. Chairman, would be to weigh it, don't read it.

Thank you.

The Chair: You sound like you're of more the civilian law than the common law persuasion, trying to put every little thing in and save it, but I think that's a very good point.

Am I incorrect in thinking that the free trade agreement itself and NAFTA are about 1,000 pages? They were the last time I looked at them. I don't know in a modern light how you'd get around all that technobabble, which seems to be the core of the way in which the modern negotiating and agreement structure seems to go. The WTO is the same.

Mr. Bill Dymond: It is one of the reasons, to refer to one thing that Ms. Bronson said, why trade agreements and trade negotiations command such large resources. It does get down to quite an expert level.

The concepts are fundamentally simple. The fact that the tariff reduction schedule will be a document like this does not get away from the fundamentally basic issues on which governments have to decide: Do you believe in non-discrimination? Do you believe in national treatment? Do you believe in protection of investment? Have you got a solution to replace the tariff revenue lost?

• 1030

These are among the issues that engage the senior negotiators and their political masters. The text that's actually written is something that should come at the end of the process, not at the beginning of the process.

The Chair: As you pointed out, the Americans can say, “We agree on non-discrimination, but we believe it for other folks, not us”. The whole purpose of writing a long and complicated agreement is to make them do it, not us. That's what everybody tries to do and that's what the whole process is about.

Everybody agrees to all these principles, Mr. Dymond, but everybody's looking for wiggle room. These 1,000 page agreements, as I see it, are just a bunch of wiggle room that people have negotiated over the years to get out of the basic theory they have proposed. It seems to me that's what it's all about.

Mr. Bill Dymond: Documents are important.

The Chair: Mr. Allmand is a well-paid lawyer. He must want to get in there.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Mr. Chairman, there was one point I forgot to mention in answer to Jean Augustine.

One thing, of course, I would like to see happen in Quebec City is no violence by either side, in the streets or otherwise. By the way, we've supported the invitation for an international monitoring team to come to Quebec to observe violations of human rights, against both government officials and against demonstrators. People will be coming from Europe and the Americas to participate.

That's been accepted by the Government of Quebec and I believe by the Government of Canada. They've said the international observer team can go wherever they wish and examine whatever they want.

I might say that we take the position, against some demonstrators, that governments have the right to meet as well as NGOs. In other words, to these people who say “Close down the FTAA, close down the Quebec summit”, I'd respond that it's a violation of the rights set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Whether I agree with what's going on inside or not, the government officials have the right to meet and the right to decide, just as we have the right to demonstrate peacefully and the right to meet in our study sessions and our human rights forums.

I want to take issue with any group that would say “Governments don't have the right to meet. We're going to stop them from meeting and we're going to close down the meeting.” Much as I might disagree with what might be decided in that meeting, under human rights under the covenants, under democracy, those people have the right to meet just as much as we have the right to meet.

The Chair: Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Thank you.

It's an interesting discussion. I find I'm agreeing with some things. I'm even agreeing on some points with Svend Robinson, specifically that the documents should be out. There should be transparency. It is important to discuss what's been on the table as it affects all Canadians. At the same time, I also agree with Mr. Allmand when he says the government has the right to meet.

I disagree with Svend Robinson on his civil disobedience. It amazes me that a member of Canadian Parliament, a democracy, feels it is all right for him to trample others' rights, not his, by doing civil disobedience. When he alludes to Mr. Gandhi, I think there's a total difference. Over there, there was no democracy and it was a different issue. I think these two connections are totally irrelevant.

Having said that, let's move ahead.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I think I'll have a second round, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: If you're planning civil disobedience you don't get one.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai: I have one question. This affects everybody. I was at the WTO, and there were trade lawyers... This is about the issue Bill brought up and asked you to discuss, of the enforcement mechanism of the United Nations. You have said here, “We live in a world where it is more serious to break trade rules than it is to violate human rights.”

What surprises me is that organizations like yours and all the others do not hold the United Nations accountable for the organizations that are supposed to police the labour standards and environmental standards. We do not want the trade organization's enforcement mechanism to be a world policing body, which you have already stated yourself. We don't want them to do that. But we do have mechanisms in the United Nations where we can bring this thing.

• 1035

It seems organizations are moving backwards and are not that forceful in asking for those enforcement standards to be put in the ILO or the United Nations Environmental Agency.

In the end, perhaps I'll ask you a philosophical question. I think you have stated, and we all agree, that free trade brings prosperity. If free trade brings prosperity, then prosperity brings better human rights, better labour standards, and better environmental standards.

Is it not better for the negotiations for free trade to in some way be successful, so you and the other groups who are protesting can advance their agenda through successful negotiations that have already taken place on both sides?

Mr. Warren Allmand: To begin with, I would have to say perhaps you haven't been following things very closely. We've been criticizing the United Nations and the UN Commission on Human Rights for several years for the ineffectiveness of their mechanisms.

As a matter of fact, we have tabled with the UN a document—it's in one of their documents—for the strengthening of the UN machinery for human rights. We've also made a proposal to the UN Commission on Human Rights with respect to the protection of human rights under globalization and how it could be done more effectively.

The statement that we haven't been critical or we're moving backwards in criticizing the UN for the ineffectiveness of enforcing human rights is not correct.

You make a good point that the UN Commission on Human Rights has not been as successful as it should be in enforcing human rights. As a matter of fact, different from the WTO, the UN Commission on Human Rights can simply make statements or condemnations. Then it's up to the political processes in the world to see that something is done. With the WTO, if you violate a provision of the WTO, it provides for retaliatory sanctions and other measures that are enforceable.

We would like to see more enforcement and we've been arguing on that point for several years. I want to make that very clear. We're not soft on the UN or the UN Commission on Human Rights.

As a matter of fact, yesterday, Mary Robinson said she would not stand for another term because the world is not giving the UN Commission on Human Rights enough resources to do its job. It's extremely difficult to do the job she has to do with the limited resources. She herself is being critical.

We were critical as well. The point Diana Bronson made a few minutes ago is that if you compare the moneys and resources spent on trade in comparison with human rights, it's completely out of whack. The governments of the world are responsible for that.

The Chair: Exactly. It's more on arms than on human rights.

Mr. Warren Allmand: Way more.

The Chair: Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I must say that what I am expecting from the Quebec Summit, is that it will allow the Peoples' Summit of the Americas which will bring together at least 1,500 people, including parliamentarians... You will be invited to participate, and I am sure that you will be there. This Peoples' Summit of the Americas will bring together community groups, women's groups, environmental groups, labour representatives from both continents in order to develop a social power relationship, because that is what is needed: A social power relationship. I think that it is much more important to work on this than to set up a group of hooligans, even with good intentions.

The Quebec Summit should, in my opinion, distinguish itself from others and be the start of a continued and strengthened civil society movement, including parliamentarians.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to state that it is important for me to underscore that trade and war on poverty do not necessarily go hand in hand, even Vicente Fox recognizes this, stating that the NAFTA results might have translated into increased trade, but that they did not translate into a better distribution of wealth within Mexico. Therefore, it is important to be weary of the dogma that trade will bring wealth.

• 1040

On the contrary, I think that current research demonstrates that small countries in particular, whose financial systems and economies are not geared to all the requirements of international institutions, devote a few resources they do have to adapting rather than developing economic policies. This is not a recipe for success, in fact quite the opposite. I believe that this trade agenda will, in the years to come, be tampered by an actual assessment of the improvement in people's living conditions.

I was quite happy to hear Mr. Allmand—and I would have liked others to speak to this as well—to the need to see the texts on which the negotiations will be based, not out of some unhealthy curiosity, because, when the rules which apply to society change, the people affected should know, in order to debate the respective needs of the southern and northern hemispheres.

I have a question on a topic which has not yet been discussed, and which concerns me enormously, that of services. Take the $5 daycare system in Quebec, which is a success. The daycare system is a network of private non-profit institutions, funded mostly by the government and in part by citizens. It's a model that has been used in other fields, but has really been developed for daycares.

However, if there is no protection for this system, because of the fact that it is private, it could be a subject of negotiation, and Quebec could even be sued for anti-competitive trading practices if things remain unchanged. Do you agree with this?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Dymond.

Mr. Bill Dymond: Yes, absolutely.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: You repeat: yes, absolutely. In French, would you say "oui, absolument"?

Mr. Bill Dymond: Absolutely.

The Chair: Without reservations.

[English]

Mr. Bill Dymond: But I would make the point... why the current text is quite useless. How are you going to protect these things? They're not a subject of negotiation. You're going to protect them by reservation. Nobody is going to be negotiating in the FTAA for Quebec's système de garderies. That's not the issue.

The issue is, how do you protect those systems from the trade agreement? You do that by a reservation. That's the only way you can do it.

Now, we have a reservation in the NAFTA for those systems, the whole social safety network, federal and provincial. Is that reservation adequate for the NAFTA? In my opinion, it is. Is it adequate for the FTAA? You're going to have to tell me what the FTAA says first. We haven't got a negotiating text yet, just a mass of indigestible paper.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: So, we must have the text.

[English]

Mr. Bill Dymond: Yes, when the text is ready.

Negotiators first of all have to say, and reach an agreement on, “What is the services package?” If the services package in the FTAA is like the WTO, you don't need a reservation because it's bottom up. It only covers what's there. If the services package is like the NAFTA and is top down, you need a reservation.

What should that reservation look like? Now that I'm not longer a civil servant—I'm a citizen and can give advice to Parliament—I would argue that this is what you should look at. Look at what the reservation says. But looking at the reservation by itself is irrelevant until you know what you're reserving against.

You know, as and when this text appears, it will no doubt give rush to a rise of wholly premature judgments because, in my opinion, these issues have not yet been engaged seriously by any country. Nobody in fact will engage on them until the U.S. obtains negotiating authority.

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The Chair: Mr. Robinson.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I am sorry, Mr. Robinson...

[English]

Mr. Warren Allmand: Can we make a quick point on that question?

The Chair: Very quick, because we're over the time there. But it's a good question, so allez-y.

Ms. Diana Bronson: My answer would be yes as well, so there more people agreeing across the table than we would think.

I would just like to express a doubt about our ability to carve out everything we want to protect. We've now heard proposals to carve out health, to carve out education, to carve out water, to carve out culture, to carve out the daycare system. I just don't know how effective that is going to be in the long run.

If you had a human rights framework for a trade agreement, which would make one of your goals of the trade agreement to facilitate the achievement of equality between men and women, then you could use a public daycare system, or a very well-subsidized national daycare program, as a means to achieve it. In fact, one of the goals of the trade agreement, for example...

The services take on a whole different allure if you are saying that your objective is to provide education to all citizens of the hemisphere on a non-discriminatory basis than if the goal of trade and education is for private exporters to make a profit by marketing in niche markets in poor countries where the systems have already been privatized.

The Chair: Perhaps I could just follow up on that for a second, Ms. Bronson. We're talking lawyer talk here for a second, but isn't the problem with that general principle—and I've seen it work in the European Community and others—that once you impose a concept like that, one I totally agree with by the way, and I agree with Madam Lalonde's concerns, because of the interpretation of those obligations you would be virtually handing the social policy of this country over to the dispute resolution panels? They would be the ones that would have to decide which value would trump over which value in any one case.

We might find, for example, with a panel imposed on us by a Republican government in the United States, that a whole bunch of values we don't like are being imposed on us in the very name of the social and human rights that you want to create.

I'm not disagreeing with what we're trying to achieve, but it seems to me—going back to Mr. Dymond's point—the mechanism is so important. And we have to understand the mechanism. That's why the members want to see the text because people want to know how the thing works.

So I understand Mr. Pettigrew's point when he says he can't get 12 other countries mad at him for releasing the text. But I also understand us saying to each other “How can we discuss what the negotiations mean if we don't know what the text says?”

So we're going around in a circle here, but on this particular issue, if you're going to create an overarching constitution on trade agreements relating to human rights, you're going to have make it enforceable, and you're going to have to create a tribunal that will do that. It'll be like the Charter of Rights in this country, and you'll have courts for the rest of your lives telling what your rights will be. You'll have other people saying, “Wait a minute, we didn't vote for that. The court decided for us.”

How do we get around that?

Mr. Warren Allmand: If I had to err, I'd err on that side and work out the solutions. Find the solutions from that point of view rather than stay with what we have and have no hope, really, of finding a solution.

Ms. Diana Bronson: But the other thing is that we do have the Charter of the United Nations, and for that matter, we have the Charter of the Organization of American States. These include the promotion and protection of human rights among their fundamental principles and are part of customary international law. The problem is that we have an autonomy. This has been addressed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, among others.

The problem is that the WTO—I know Bill Dymond won't like this—is outside the UN system and does not admit the jurisprudence of UN organs, designed to protect human rights, into its own dispute settlement body. I repeat that we are not seeking to have human rights adjudicated in the dispute settlement bodies of trade organizations, but we are seeking to have the jurisprudence of human rights bodies admitted into those deliberations. Right now, they're not even considered.

The Chair: No, that's fair. And like the environment issues that are starting to—

Mr. Bill Dymond: Yes.

The Chair: I'm going to go to Mr. Robinson because he's been waiting.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very important line of questioning, and I want to pick up on it.

The chair talks about how we could be in a situation where we have these unaccountable tribunals or international bodies telling us what to do about our policies. The tragedy is that this is exactly what we have now under chapter 11 of NAFTA. We have, in fact, unaccountable tribunals under NAFTA that can supersede Canadian law. We've seen that with a number of decisions.

• 1050

We've seen, for example, the Metalclad decision just recently, in which a community in Mexico said, “Look, we don't want to have a toxic waste treatment facility in our community”. The state government of San Luis Potosi agreed with them, and they were told, “Tough luck”.

We have this secret tribunal here that trumps all of that, so we've already got that. I think there are some very serious constitutional questions, frankly, about whether the powers of our judiciary have been in a sense taken away by what's been negotiated under NAFTA in chapter 11. I think there are some real, serious concerns about that, which may be explored in the courts in the future. I hope they are.

I had a couple of questions following up on earlier questions, including a question from Madame Lalonde. One of the arguments that's been made, and we heard it explicitly from, I think, Mr. Dymond and Mr. Wilson, is that free trade brings, I think in their words, “prosperity and better human rights”. That hasn't been the universal experience when we look at Mexico, for example. The experience of poor Mexican women working in maquiladora zones with toxic chemicals has not exactly been a positive one.

When we look at the experience of indigenous people in Chiapas who have been pushed off their land and denied the right to grow subsistence crops because of this move now for export-driven agriculture by corporate farming, we can see it certainly hasn't benefited them at all.

But I want to ask Mr. Wilson about Cuba. I don't know if... and he says that he's not going to answer this question, or he hasn't got to answer the question.

Your association, your council, does a lot of business presumably, and your members do a lot of business, with Cuba. Do you believe it's appropriate that Cuba should be excluded from this summit?

Mr. John Wilson: Cuba is not a member of the Organization of American States.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Right.

Mr. John Wilson: That's my answer.

The Chair: Well, to be accurate, it's a member, but it's been suspended.

Mr. John Wilson: Yes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So you agree—

Mr. John Wilson: That is not necessarily the answer of the Canadian Council of the Americas. The Canadian Council hasn't addressed this issue, hasn't discussed it.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So there's been no position taken by the council.

Mr. John Wilson: No position taken by the council, no.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I see.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Paquette: This fellow surely respects the mandates given to him.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: I wanted to ask Mr. Allmand a question as well with respect to this issue of human rights and the inclusion of standards. By the way, when you talk about international bodies and the frustration of Mary Robinson, I'm sure Mr. Allmand knows that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights itself is virtually bankrupt. It's really quite pathetic. There are millions of dollars for other inter-American agencies, but the human rights commission itself is virtually bankrupt.

When you talk about the inclusion of human rights standards within trade agreements, and I take Ms. Bronson's point about not having the necessary enforcement mechanisms by trade bodies, what is it you're talking about? Because human rights, as Mr. Allmand knows very well, are not just civil and political rights. There is also the Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

I'm wondering to what extent you're suggesting that, if we're going to be serious about the inclusion of human rights, we include at least some reference to those fundamental rights within the context of these trade deals as well. If so, how would you go about enforcing them?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Yes, we want a reference to those treaties that are in force and have been ratified by the countries in question. We feel, first of all, that you should not be penalized for living up to your obligations under treaties you've ratified, whether they're human rights treaties, environmental treaties, health treaties, or whatever. If you've ratified an international treaty and you pass legislation further to that obligation under the treaty, you shouldn't then be faced with the WTO or the new FTAA, whatever it is, saying that this law is a barrier to trade.

I know that many in Quebec may not like it, but the recent appeal panel judgment of the WTO saying that France had the right to ban asbestos because it was a threat to health is, I think, a step in the right direction, where they recognize certain health standards. I would like to see the same thing, where the panels in the WTO and the FTAA, if they were to be there, would be able to...

There'd be the right of intervention, the right to say that we've implemented this obligation as part of our ratification of a treaty in human rights, and consequently it's not a barrier to trade; it's part of our international obligations. That is one way in which we could do it.

• 1055

As well, I think it's interesting to note, and it's a step in the right direction, that last year, I think, there was a judgment of one of the appeal panels of the WTO accepting for the first time certain types of intervention. I can't remember the exact case, but it's to be tested, I think, by other bodies in trying to get intervention status before the panels.

But I think the rules of international law, human rights law, should be taken into account in the interpretation of the matters that go before the panels that judge these things, and there should be written into the agreements a reference to those types of international human rights treaties, among others, that this is the acceptable thing to do.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have just a brief final question. It goes back to the issue of civil disobedience, and I emphasize here we're talking about non-violent civil disobedience. We're not talking about casseurs; we're talking about peaceful, non-violent civil disobedience.

Mr. Allmand, I believe you indicated you'd been involved in civil disobedience yourself. I wonder if you could share that experience with the committee. When was it, and what were the circumstances?

Mr. Warren Allmand: Is this True Confessions? Yes, in my younger days I did.

The Chair: You don't have to answer any question that will incriminate you, Mr. Allmand.

Mr. Warren Allmand: It was with respect to the anti-nuclear movement. When I was at McGill we took strong measures. We invited Linus Pauling to McGill and organized a meeting for him. We sat on the streets and sang songs and had a good time.

We were blocking the traffic, there was no doubt. As I said earlier, I would not want to block traffic to the extent that I would interfere with a fire engine going to put out a fire or an ambulance taking somebody to the hospital, but I was young then, and I didn't think about that particular matter. We didn't actually cause any great damage, but we were thrown off the streets, some of us. I finally got up and left.

The Chair: Youth and discretion are not necessarily consistent, but we notice you're much more moderated now, Mr. Allmand, in the way in which you appear before the committee.

Mr. Warren Allmand: I was only about 24 or 25.

The Chair: On Mr. Robinson's line of questioning, though, I wonder... because Ms. Bronson mentioned it too. Clearly there's a problem about culture with these trade agreements not being interpreted consistently with international legal principles regarding human rights. You've made that point in many papers to us. I was very impressed when you came before the committee before, saying that as lawyers—and Mr. Robinson's one, I'm one, you're one—it seems to me it would be more generally accepted that international legal principles of human rights are a part of international law. When a trade tribunal is applying an international obligation, it's a part of international law, and it has to take into that all forms of international law.

So it seemed to me, when I looked at some of the recent cases involving the environment, for example, that clearly the panels are getting more sensitive to environmental issues. You mentioned health in respect to the asbestos case. I'll have to ask for just a yes or no answer to this, but do you see a movement, at least, toward the system becoming more coherent, a movement at least somewhere in that direction to recognize that, or are you kind of discouraged about it?

Mr. Warren Allmand: I think a few of those recent cases provide us with a lot of hope. My fear is that some states and some negotiators, seeing those judgments, may take steps to stop that kind of thing. I would like to see it supported more explicitly right in the agreements to say what's happening is right, and we should move further in that direction.

The Chair: That's helpful. Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank all the members of the panel. You were all extremely helpful.

Colleagues, before you go, Madame Lalonde has asked that we should have more hearings, because this is important. You will recall that when we had the steering committee we agreed to three or four hearings. We can't go to ten hearings, but is there a willingness in the committee that, if we could fit in one or two more afternoon hearings, we could do that, recognizing the importance of this issue?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Madame Lalonde, I don't know if we can get as many as you'd like, but certainly there's agreement around the room that we will extend the number of hearings.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes.

[Translation]

The Chair: We will extend the testimony.

[English]

Thank you very much, colleagues.

We're adjourned.