FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 24, 2000

• 0911

[English]

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, we should begin.

Mr. Graham, the chairman, presents his apologies. He's caught at another meeting and will be along shortly.

We have a long list of witnesses. I would propose to begin with General Maisonneuve.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I don't see anybody on the Liberal side of the committee. Are we expecting anybody?

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): We're not having resolutions, though, at this stage. If you object, of course we won't go ahead, but we're not making any decisions.

[Translation]

Since we are not making any decisions, it isn't necessary for us to have a quorum, unless someone objects. The thing is, we have some witnesses here this morning, including Professor Polanyi, a Nobel Prize recipient. I think we should proceed. Mr. Graham has given me the go ahead to begin, but unless you prefer to wait for the other Liberal members... I'm quite confident about the attitude of opposition members. I don't think they are about to table some resolutions unexpectedly. So how about it?

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that you recognize the work we do here, but I thought that pursuant to the standing orders, there were minimal requirements for hearing from witnesses. I thought members of the government party needed to be present. I'd like to hear the clerk's opinion on this.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Our clerk informs me that the committee has already agreed that it could proceed when three members are present, including one opposition members and one government member. Therefore, we can proceed to hear from the witnesses. Since we are not scheduled to vote on anything, I think we are in compliance with the standing orders.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: But the government member happens to be the Chair.

[English]

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Svend.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I know the rule, and the chair is quite correct in terms of the rule. I'm just frankly concerned. We have some very distinguished and important witnesses this morning, including General Maisonneuve, and I'm wondering whether perhaps.... I don't know if we have a representative from the Liberal whip's office, but frankly....

We have a Nobel Prize winner. We have a distinguished general here. It's rather extraordinary that there would be literally no one sitting on the Liberal side of the committee. While it may technically fulfil the rules to have the chair here, I wonder if we might make some effort to ensure there's representation from the government side as well.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): There is of course representation from the government side. I accept certainly the point you're making, Mr. Robinson. I understand. We are taking steps to ensure more government attendance.

• 0915

I personally regret it and will personally speak to members on the government side, but I'm satisfied with the quality of the opposition representation here, the intellectual quality and breadth. On the government side, if necessary, I will, as I say,

[Translation]

bridge the gap. There is already a very distinguished government member present. We can wait, of course, but I think it would be preferable, given the number of witnesses here.... The number of listeners doesn't have any bearing on the quality of the testimony presented. It's the calibre of the presentation that counts. Isn't that so?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes, but given the quality of the testimony that we are about to hear, wouldn't it be nice if more people were here to appreciate it.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Your point is well taken. I accept it and I will pass your views along to government members. However, I think it would be best if we got started. We have a lot on our plate and I'm very impressed with the calibre of the members from the three opposition parties.

Are we agreed then? Shall we begin?

I apologize, Brigadier General Maisonneuve. Are you ready to proceed?

Brigadier General Michel Maisonneuve (Director General, Land Force Readiness, Department of National Defence): I am, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you once again for inviting me to appear before this committee in conjunction with its examination of issues relating to the Balkans and Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations in this region.

On June 8, 1999, upon returning from Albania and Kosovo, I made a brief presentation to a joint session of this committee and the Sub-Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. At the time, I spoke about the Kosovo Verification Mission, or KVM, as it was called, and about its contribution, first to ensuring some stability in Kosovo prior to the start of the bombing campaign, and later to assisting the refugees in Albania.

One thing that was clear from my comments was that Canada could make an invaluable contribution, one that was out of all proportion to the size of its land forces in the region.

The situation has evolved considerably since then, as you know. In my brief remarks today, I will focus on the situation as it existed in the region in March 1999 and give you an overview of what I witnessed, of the feelings I have and of the conclusions that I have drawn.

[English]

One year ago to the day, what exactly was happening in Kosovo and about Kosovo? You will remember the Rambouillet accord negotiations were ongoing but had been put on hold, with the hope that both sides would spend the time considering and building consensus for the draft agreement. On the ground in Kosovo, tensions were almost palpable. Both sides of course could use an incident, however minor, to provoke the other side or as an excuse to back out of the negotiations. So my forces on the ground were very active in trying to keep the lid on the situation.

We were exactly one month away from the start of the bombing campaign on 24 March 1999, and we were 27 days before the KVM would be pulled out by the OSCE chairman in office.

Was the KVM effective? Certainly. Where we were present, we were able to keep the situation reasonable. But we were a small force, we had not yet reached the end-state 2,000 international verifiers called for in the 16 October 1998 agreement, and we had no means of enforcing compliance with the agreement.

In spite of this, let me give you a small example of the effectiveness of my courageous verifiers. At the end of February 1999, the Kosovar Albanian village of Randubrava was the scene of an action on two successive nights that well illustrates their work.

The first night, the Serb police allegedly decided to gather information from the village and were fired upon by the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA. When we arrived on the scene, a violent though localized small-arms firefight had begun. The police agreed to stop firing and to return to their barracks, and we also convinced the KLA to stop. The toll was, though, two Albanian civilians dead and one 65-year-old Albanian woman wounded.

• 0920

That night the KLA reinforced the village with heavy machine guns and defensive works. Late the next day, an ethnic Serb shepherd wandered into the KLA lines, and the police deployed this time a reinforced company, which is over a hundred people, in armoured personnel carriers to rescue him. This time, though, we were on the scene as soon as the heavy machine gun engagements began. By approaching the two opponents from the rear, at the risk of their lives, my verifiers quickly convinced the Serbs that we would be taking action to get the abductee back and the Albanians that we would get the police to pull back. Within a few minutes the firing stopped. The police even agreed to get back into their vehicles and return to their barracks.

The release of the Serb from the KLA was secured that very night, and he was returned to the authorities. More important, many lives, Serb and Albanian, were probably saved through the actions of my personnel.

Generally the atmosphere on the ground at that time was one of a police state. There were restrictions of movement by the Serb authorities—for example, checkpoints and roadblocks—as well as by the KLA in the areas they held. Of course the Albanian minority had no voice or participation in their own affairs, administration, state factories, etc. The Kosovar Albanian oppression could be best illustrated by the practice of not allowing them to look a member of the Serb authorities directly in the eyes. I'm not a human rights expert, but I can tell you that in my assessment, there was little freedom for the Kosovar Albanian majority in the province at that time.

The Serb forces, for their part, were distrustful of any international presence and fearful of the future. They had been increasing their force levels constantly and had no regard for the agreement with respect to what strength they were allowed to deploy outside their barracks. For example, after the Racak massacre of 15 January 1999, an event during which I was actually commanding the troops on the ground there, deployed Serb forces remained in place in spite of the best efforts of the KVM to have them withdraw. From the point of view of the KVM, our movement was also restricted, mostly by Serb security forces, but also at times by the KLA.

As the middle of March grew near, the liaison personnel the Serbs had provided to us were abruptly changed and replaced by more intransigent officers, which made our dealings more difficult. Both sides were provoking each other, and there were serious outbreaks of fighting in the south of Prizren, in Kacanik, near the crossing into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and in the area near Mitrovica. This fighting resulted in many internally displaced persons.

As of 20 March, the day of the withdrawal of the KVM, the OSCE reported that at least 230,000 persons were displaced within Kosovo, 170,000 had fled the province in the past year, and several hundred thousand who had not been displaced nevertheless remained affected by the conflict.

[Translation]

On March 20, the Chairman of the OSCE announced the withdrawal of the KVM from Kosovo. In fact, the benefits of this mission were beginning to pale in comparison to the threats to the safety of the verifiers.

The bombing campaign began on March 24 and I deployed an operational force to Albania to help the country's officials deal with an influx of 150,000 refugees who had crossed the border up until that point. Their number eventually climbed to 450,000. One of our tasks was to gather statements on how refugees were treated by authorities. Our findings were summarized in a confidential report which I sent to the OSCE on April 15 and which contained the following observation:

[English]

The general situation in Kosovo can be described as one of extreme violence and brutality, with little regard for human rights. Refugees are being driven from their homes by overwhelming, indiscriminate force inflicted by Serb and Yugoslav authorities. Reports of mass killings, arbitrary and extrajudicial killings, and the looting and destruction of property are widespread. Refugees report being forcibly expelled from their homes and being used as human shields around military installations. The refugees are being stripped of their identity documents and personal belongings before they leave Kosovo.

In summary, the situation within Kosovo was extremely tense and difficult while the KVM was in the province. Any KLA provocation—and there were some—ultimately led to a disproportionate response from the authorities.

• 0925

Despite the fact that the KVM tried to do its best to contain the violence and behaviour of both sides, there was less and less regard for the agreement that had been signed on October 16, 1998, and the KVM had no means of enforcing compliance other than the moral right of the international community.

Both sides believed in their right to live in this beautiful province, and we did our best to remain impartial. As a matter of fact, I was very worried about a possible backlash against the Kosovar Serb community in the event of a signature of Rambouillet, and we proceeded to open field offices in primarily Serb communities to help protect them. Unfortunately, you know the events that followed. We must now work to assist the parties in their efforts to get over their hatred.

[Translation]

Thank you for allowing me to address the committee today. I have brought along with me several documents which I will now describe for you.

[English]

The first is a layout of Regional Centre Prizren, which of course was the one I was commanding at the time we were pulled out. This is to show you the type of coverage we had. These are the field offices we had, as well as the coordination centres, with my headquarters in Prizren. You will see that we had coverage, or we attempted to have coverage, in as many places as we could, both on the Kosovar Serb side and in the middle of those Serb communities that I was very worried about that were surrounded by the Albanian majority.

Two of the other documents are the actual OSCE reports, which were drafted by the Pristina headquarters of the KVM, one for the period from February 22 to March 2 and one from March 5 to 12, which will give you an idea of the situation on the ground at that time.

There is a press release that was put out by the OSCE chairman-in-office when the KVM was pulled out on March 20, and you will also see an OSCE newsletter, which I believe is available in French as well for those who wish it, which gives a little more background to the actual pullout of the KVM.

That is the content of my remarks. Merci beaucoup.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Ted McWhinney): Thank you, General.

Before passing on to witnesses, I might remind the members of the committee and let the audience know that we had evidence earlier this week by Mr. John Fawcett of the International Crisis Group, which is an international body based in Washington, D.C. and Brussels.

Mr. Fawcett made very complimentary comments about the work of your force, General Maisonneuve, and about you personally, what you've been doing. He said it was a model for future verification missions. I thought we might repeat that for the record and thank you for performing in such a distinguished manner and getting the approbation of international groups of this sort.

Dr. Martin, we'll turn to our witnesses.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Ref.): Thank you very much, Monsieur le président.

General Maisonneuve, thank you again for attending here. I certainly echo the comments of our chairman today on the honourable work you and your soldiers have done abroad. It brings a great honour to Canada, to be sure.

I have a couple of questions. What we've heard prior to this are certainly many comments by individuals who felt the bombing was unnecessary and that the situation on the ground was blown way out of proportion. I am very interested to know if you could extrapolate on your comments on being there, on what was taking place.

Essential to our decision and what we're trying to deliberate here is the situation on the ground. As you said, there were mass killings and gross human rights abuses. Perhaps you could explain that a little bit more, what you saw, what you felt was going on.

Also, in your view, were the rules of engagement for your forces adequate in a verification mission of that type? Is the equipment you have adequate to do the job, or, in the view of groups like the Carnegie Institute, in situations such as this, the rules of engagement should be more robust, and regarding your equipment, you should essentially be outfitted for war, not for...? Well, peacekeeping is a war by another name, if I could use the description.

Thank you.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Thank you very much.

First of all, with respect to the situation on the ground, that is what I was attempting to describe in my remarks. Essentially, I would describe it as an oppressed situation on the ground before the bombing campaign began. As a matter of fact, as we grew closer to the time when the KVM was pulled out, essentially the problem was that there was no regard for the agreement that had been signed on October 16 between the OSCE and the President of Yugoslavia. The problem was that this disregard was by both sides, by the way. There was provocation on both sides, but the truth is, a small provocation by the KLA would result in a disproportionate response from the Serb authorities. This is what I saw all the time I was there.

• 0930

Racak is a good example. Whether you want to tie Racak to events that happened before...people forget that a week before Racak, two Serb policemen were ambushed by the KLA and killed in the Stimlje Pass. This was in my area. We reacted to that incident. In fact, we told the KLA that this was absolutely unacceptable. We sanctioned them as much as we would sanction the Serb authorities when they did something wrong. We did not condone any of their actions. The point is, a week later in Racak, 45 Albanians were killed, civilians who had, the way we saw it, essentially no part in the conflict.

So you see, this disproportionate type of response was what we saw all the time.

As we got closer to March 20, both sides were disregarding the agreement. There were outbreaks of fighting in the south of my zone in Prizren, near the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as in Mitrovica, to the point that the OSCE chairman had to decide whether the good that was done by the KVM justified the risks to those international personnel. He decided it was not acceptable. That is, the risk versus benefit balance had shifted, and it was time then to pull out the KVM and try other means to deal with the situation.

Do I think an intervention was necessary? Yes, I do.

Mr. Keith Martin: Sir, one question: did you see evidence of mass killings?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: There was Racak, if you could call that a mass killing.

Mr. Keith Martin: Other than Racak.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Well, yes. Rogovo was another one, 25 Albanians, albeit some members of the KLA were in that group.

As a matter of fact, the day I arrived in Kosovo, 35 or 37 members of the KLA were intercepted on the border between Albania and Kosovo and killed by the Serb security forces.

That's kind of different. It may not be referred to as a mass killing, because I believe any nation has the right to protect its borders, and in this case, they were caught there. But that's how I arrived. It was kind of an interesting way to arrive in theatre. The first thing I had to deal with was to hand over the 37 bodies, which was rather gruesome.

On the second question you asked, sir, with respect to rules of engagement, equipment, and so on, everything you've said is right. Rules of engagement must be appropriate for the force that is being used; the equipment has to be appropriate, and so on. That's what I would say about that.

With respect to the KVM, what must be remembered is that the KVM was an unarmed force, a civilian force. I was there as a civilian, therefore I wasn't wearing a uniform. I was wearing a baseball cap, as a matter of fact. But the point is, I was there as a member of the OSCE, sent by Canada as a civilian, and my forces were civilians.

The force was due to come to 2,000. That's what the agreement of October 16, 1998, called for, a force of 2,000 unarmed verifiers. It was a specific mission. There had been the agreement, and we were there to verify compliance with the agreement.

What ways did we have of enforcing? We had no way of enforcing other than speaking to the parties and making them understand that they were going against the agreement, and blowing the whistle, if you wish, to the OSCE, which would then put political pressure on the country or on the perpetrators.

So we had no ROE. We had equipment that was acceptable. We were patrolling in armoured orange 4x4s. It was adequate for what we were doing.

Mr. Keith Martin: Is that safe?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Peace support operations are not safe, intrinsically, and certainly the reason I gave you the example there is because when you're coming up to forces that are actually firing on the others, when you're coming up from behind and getting out of your vehicle to go speak to the actual person who's firing, saying, “Hey, why are you shooting?” it's not safe, of course.

• 0935

They had specific orders to stay in their armoured vehicles whenever shooting started. I felt it was more important for the verifiers on the ground to have the armoured vehicles, so I used to run around in a non-armoured vehicle, which bothered my bodyguards a lot, but that's the nature of the job.

On whether it was as safe as it could have been, we tried to be smart about where we would show up and how we would act, and so on. I believe we had great credibility. We certainly had credibility with the Kosovar Albanians, and I really worked hard to have credibility with the Serbs. The Serbs felt we were one-sided, and I certainly did my best to show that we were not.

We put a lot of effort into opening field offices in Serb areas, because I was very worried about their safety if there was a Rambouillet accord, because there would definitely be a backlash against them. We saw later that that's what happened, essentially.

[Translation]

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you very much.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you very much for your presentation and for all you have done. You have indeed gained a great deal of experience.

I have several questions for you which tie in with those put to you by Keith Martin. First of all, do you think action other than the air strikes could have been taken to help these two peoples overcome their hatred, as you noted at the end of your presentation?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: That's a speculative question, one that cannot easily be answered.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I realize that, but you were there and it's important to us. Those we have heard from have been critical of the military's intervention. No one likes to see a bombing campaign undertaken, especially given the dangers this poses for civilian populations. There may have been some military objectives, at least we assume there were, but....

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: As I said, I think some kind of intervention was certainly required on the ground. Things were spiralling out of control. Efforts were of course being made on the diplomatic side. In fact, I have never before seen such extensive diplomatic efforts undertaken so quickly.

I was also in Bosnia when the market in Sarajevo was attacked in February of 1994. It seems that a tragedy of this nature has to happen before people decide to step in. For me, the turning point may well have been the Racak massacre which convinced the international community that it was time to take action and to gather all of the parties in Rambouillet. This incident convinced the contact group and all OSCE member states, including Canada, to make some tremendous efforts and to bring pressure to bear on the parties to sit down and negotiate at Rambouillet.

Therefore, a major diplomatic effort was made. Could another course of action have been pursued? I don't really see what other option there was. Could our intervention have taken a different form? Naturally, we could have done things differently, but I think it was necessary for us to intervene.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: You're speaking hypothetically, of course. If the international community had simply withdrawn, do you think a civil war would have erupted or were the forces so unevenly balanced that the outcome was very predictable?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: My contacts with the Kosovo Liberation Army were such that I can tell you they believed they would lose out in a civil war, that they would lose out if left to their own devices. However, they felt that they could still inflict some damage on Serb security forces. They believed they could hold out for a few weeks and engage in resistance tactics, such as destroying oil storage facilities. However, I think they knew full well that the Yugoslav forces in the provinces were much stronger than their own forces.

• 0940

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Given the experience you've acquired, would you like to see the international community more prepared to intervene in a manner similar to that employed by your verification force?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: In fact, that was my first experience with the concept of verification. Canadian forces often participate in missions such as UN observer missions. This is currently the case in Kosovo and in Bosnia. This was my first experience with the role of verifier, that is someone who is responsible for ensuring that the terms of an agreement signed by two parties are being respected.

I think the concept works, provided clear rules are in place spelling out the measures to be taken if the agreements are violated. Furthermore, careful attention must be paid to the text of the agreement itself to identify specific conditions set out.

Let me give an example. In the agreement signed between the OSCE and Yugoslavia, clear conditions were spelled out as to the size of the forces to be maintained in the province by Yugoslavia as well as regarding human rights. The standards as such were very broad, noting that the two sides were required to meet certain international standards respecting human rights. There was nothing specific said about the number of troops to be maintained in a particular barrack, or about the number of Yugoslav tanks or personnel strength, nothing that the verifier could check with any accuracy.

Therefore, the standards were not clearly defined. However, we never got to that point, because we were always, as I mentioned, putting out fires. When shots were fired in a particular sector, we hurried on to the scene to settle the problem.

Yes, I do think the concept could work.

The Chair (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto-Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): Could we move on to someone else? This witness' time is almost up and I'd like to give someone else the chance to ask some questions.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I have no further questions.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you as well.

[English]

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General.

My questions follow from those of my colleagues, Mr. Martin and Madame Lalonde, and focus on the period immediately before March 24. One of my fellow British Columbians was a member of the KVM, Rolly Keith. I'm sure you've heard his evidence with respect to the role he was playing and the role KVM was playing.

It was his evidence—and he speaks very eloquently and very passionately on this—that the KVM really wasn't given a chance to fulfil its role. As you said, General, you were playing an important role, but if the KVM had been strengthened instead of pulled out, and brought up to 2,000, as was the original proposal, the situation might have been different. You might have been able to divert widespread violence.

He also said there was no evidence of any significant ethnic cleansing or anything of that nature, certainly in the area in which he was located, which I believe was Kosovo Polia, because of the presence of the KVM.

You've heard Mr. Keith's evidence. How do you respond to it?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Of course, any member of the KVM was emotionally attached to the mission, Kosovo, the people of Kosovo, and I believe all ethnic backgrounds—me as well. So it was very difficult for us to put up with being pulled out of a place where we were doing incredible good, day by day. We were saving lives and we felt we were very successful. It was a withdrawal emotionally, and I can understand how he felt. All my verifiers felt exactly the same way I did.

• 0945

The problem is, of course, that each individual verifier makes his or her judgment in accordance with the position where they were, the location they were in, and the actions on the ground at that time. The job, of course, of the chairman-in-office, the job of the senior personnel of the KVM, was to make a judgment in accordance with the whole province. That's why I'm happy to hear that things were okay in Kosovo Polia. I was there many times. It was quiet essentially because it was ethnically a fairly homogeneous area.

What I was telling my verifiers when we were pulled out was, I know how you feel, but you have to think that in our area things may have been fairly decent, fairly reasonable—although there was some fighting in the south—but in other areas.... I mentioned those three specific areas: Mitrovica, a place called Kacanik, and in the south of my zone. There were some engagements there and it was out of control. No matter how many verifiers we had on the ground—because we did have them—all they could do was speak to the parties. They would continue fighting. They didn't care what was going on; it was “get out of the way, we're fighting”.

So I believe that the chairman-in-office made the right decision. Again, it was a question. It's always a value judgment, and it's very difficult for these people to make the decision because they have to look at the security of the international personnel that have been provided by all the nations of the OSCE versus the good that is being done on the ground. Of course, the feeling was that at that time the risk-benefit had changed.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Of course, the OSCE reports themselves, and you, in your evidence, have noted that there were significant actions by the KLA as well. I'm just looking at the weekly report of the 5th to the 12th. In that week alone—and this is from the OSCE—KLA-initiated attacks killed 12 policemen and wounded 35 others. It talks about KLA attacks on Albanians who were in fact supportive of the Serbs. These weren't just rogue elements; this was from the highest level.

You've mentioned the three areas in particular. At that point, were you aware of any evidence of what has been called ethnic cleansing in any of the areas in which you were present as KVM?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Well, ethnic cleansing, of course, not being a legal term...but I understand what you're talking about. You would be amazed at what a Kosovar Albanian...at how quick he or she can actually grab everything they own and move out of a village. It happened all the time.

Let me give you a specific example. When I mentioned that two Serb policemen were killed in Stimlje Pass a week before Racak, the immediate action of the Serb authorities was to pull out a tank from the Stimlje combat team position they had and to start firing into a village that had absolutely no military use for them at all—just firing into the village. And what happened? Well, about 400 villagers grabbed all they owned and moved out of the village. They just quickly moved out of there.

Now, do you describe that as ethnic cleansing? I guess you could. The point is that people were like nomads. Very quickly they would grab their belongings and just move out. They'd wait a few days, go live with some friends or in the next village, and then return if the situation quieted down.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have just one other question, Mr. Chairman.

You're a military man as well as having worked with the KVM. After you pulled out, around the 20th, and you were aware of the gross imbalance of forces—you've said that yourself—in Kosovo, you talked about

[Translation]

intervention on the ground.

[English]

There was no

[Translation]

intervention on the ground.

[English]

There was bombing from 15,000 feet.

The Albanian community was totally vulnerable in that situation, precisely because of this imbalance. On the one hand, there was anger, as you know, directed at the KLA. There was fury directed at NATO because of these bombs that were raining down from up above.

General, what do you think about that kind of strategy? Did it make any sense from a military point of view? I know this is a difficult question, but you have a great deal of experience and we have to make some tough decisions here about the appropriateness of this intervention.

Many people have suggested, in fact, that we were abandoning these people and that what happened in retrospect was entirely predictable, that there would be reprisals, retaliation, and that the massive violence that took place—I was there myself and I talked to people who were involved—was entirely predictable, that we really abandoned those innocent people on the ground. What do you say to that?

• 0950

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Well, the whole concept of abandonment is one, again, that I and my verifiers all felt. When we were leaving, we felt our mission was half done, but we understood why and that we had to go, and so forth.

I was very lucky because when I left Kosovo, I went into Albania a few days later and had a chance to speak to some of the 150,000—that eventually grew to 450,000—refugees who were streaming across the border. When I spoke to them, I asked them that very question. Every day I would speak to them. Every day I would speak to some Kosovar Albanians who were coming across: “What do you think of the bombing?” They said “Thank you, NATO. Continue bombing. No problem.” That's not me talking; that's them talking. They were happy the bombing was taking place. They were hoping the bombing would continue.

Whether the intervention should have been on the ground or by bombing, that is not, of course.... I'm sure the military leaders of all the nations of NATO gave their opinion. The decision was made to go by aerial bombing. And that's what we're here for, to do what we're told to do. The point is, though, the Kosovar Albanians themselves felt the bombing was justified and should continue.

With respect to whether we had abandoned them or not, certainly when we spoke to them at the beginning, they would say, “Well, we were really sad to see you go. We really felt you were doing some great stuff on the ground, but we understand why you had to go.” All of them told us that. I guess that's the way I got a little bit of closure on the whole thing. I was able to speak to many of the verifiers. When we actually pulled out, we were reduced from 1,350 to about 250. So all those who went home, probably like Rolly, didn't get a chance to speak to the refugees. I did. I went into Albania. So it eased my mind a little bit, and it eased the mind of my confreres.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, General.

The Chair: Thanks, General. We have just a couple of minutes, then we have to move on.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): There's an expression that says the first victim of war is the truth itself. I have three or four questions that I'd like you to answer, if you can, rapid-fire basically.

We were told before, during, and after the bombing that there were 100,000 people killed by the Serbs in mass graves. The fact is, correct me if I'm wrong, only over 2,000 bodies were recovered. Can you tell me what percent of KLA men turned in their weapons or had their weapons taken away from them by you?

We were told by Human Rights Watch in the U.S. that 500 people died for no reason at all, because of indiscriminate bombing of civilians. Some may be Albanian Serbs, some may be Albanian Kosovars, but 500 innocent people died. They didn't have to die. They were not near targets or whatever. But the way the targets were chosen, they were so liberal. A few people died, so what, is basically the message that came from Human Rights Watch. It seems to me we admit KLA has the right to defend Kosovar Albanians. But who defends, in your mind, the interests of Kosovar Serbs in Kosovo itself?

The Canadian Serb community feel intimidated by what happened in their ancestral homeland. They feel discriminated against that NATO took over their land and settled with the Kosovar Albanians. My final question is, if you had a chance to address them, how would you react?

Those are five questions. Thank you.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Thank you. First of all, with respect to whether there are 100,000 or 2,000 people in mass graves, I guess it all depends on how you want to weigh a human life.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No. I grant you that. I'm not saying 2,000 is better than 100,000. But we're talking about the facts.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Well, I don't know the facts, because I didn't go look at the mass graves and count them. But I can tell you that 2,000 or 200 for me is as bad as 100,000. If you're into the business of weighing lives, that's fine. I'm not.

Secondly, with respect to the KLA and how many weapons have been handed in, I can't tell you that because I don't have experience in Kosovo after the bombardment. I was there before the bombardment. I'll limit my response to that.

With respect to 500 people needlessly being killed by the bombing, again, I can't answer that question. I wasn't on the ground at the time. But I can tell you that I have never seen an air campaign conducted with such accuracy and such regard to careful choosing of targets. As a military man—that's what we do, try to give advice and so on—I can tell you there was a lot of effort, a lot more effort than I have ever seen, in choosing targets. If everything I've heard is right, it was quite an effort. Unfortunately, that's what bombing does. It kills people. I don't condone any killing of any side by anybody.

• 0955

With regard to the KLA right to defend themselves and who defends the Serbs, I believe KFOR or any force that would go in there, as we went in there as the KVM, should be there to defend, if you want to call it that, with regard to what means you have to do that. Another word is “protect”. But the point is that all communities should be looked at in a fair manner, and you should try to be just in your approach to all communities, and that's what we tried to be. I believe KFOR would tell you that they are trying to be fair to all sides.

If I were to address the Serb community, I would say that I don't condone any action by the Albanians to evict Serb Kosovars, any more than I would have condoned—and I did condone at the time—the Serb authorities doing it to the Albanians. I would again try to reassure them that the best thing is for people to try to live together and to get along. It's very difficult. Some of these hatreds in these countries in the Balkans have been there for hundreds of years, and I know you are well aware of that. I would say let's try to work for peace.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

General, we've been told by several people who have come before the committee that the incident that occurred at Racak—and this was reported in the French press as well—was in fact cooked up by the KLA itself. The KLA soldiers were saying that the civilians had been killed in battle, and this was a great fraud that was perpetrated on western observers and ourselves when we were making a decision whether or not to intervene. You were there. Can you comment as to whether in your view that was a correct analysis of what took place at Racak.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: I looked at the bodies.

The Chair: So you were there.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: I was there. I looked at all of them. In fact, my people found the bodies in the morning. We were there the night the action by the Serb authorities against the village of Racak took place. That night we arrived on the ground and saw Serb tanks firing into occupied Albanian houses, and plumes of smoke were coming out of the houses. When the firing stopped and the tanks withdrew, we went to speak with the people in the houses who had taken refuge in their basements. They were all right.

The next morning we found the bodies. I looked at the bodies, and I can tell you that in my assessment they were not people of fighting age, i.e., they included older, more mature gentlemen; a young boy; a young lady 18 years old or so; a young boy maybe 10 years old; and his uncle. There was a villager who was maybe 55 or 60 years old with his head cut off, and his head was down the way a little bit. I could go on and on and describe it to a great extent, but I don't need to here.

The point is, would the Albanians go to the extreme of cooking up such a thing against their own people? Maybe they could. I can't say that. But to me, face value on the ground, it didn't look like a military target. These didn't look like military folks. It would seem to be useless violence.

The Chair: That's helpful. Obviously, one of the purposes of this committee is not to revisit the whole of what took place, but the credibility of people is important. When people come before the committee and say that this was just invented and it's not true, it's helpful to hear from someone like yourself who was there and actually saw a military operation. Basically, you are saying you saw a military operation against unarmed civilians in a village, and there were a lot of bodies at the end.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Yes, sir.

The Chair: That's helpful. Thank you very much.

Secondly, what about the issue of the KVM itself? We had evidence from somebody from the International Crisis Group the other day, and we're struggling with how these operations could be better in the future. Somebody has said that future operations of this kind should not be with unarmed people. On the other hand, how can you send armed people in if they are in the middle of a war situation? It's just going to make matters worse. You can't go in with a pistol and start firing at tanks.

• 1000

So what is the balance to achieve there in terms of the security of your personnel? You were responsible for these people. You were unarmed and in the middle of a terrible conflict and then had to pull out. Can you help us with some advice as to how we would advise the OSCE to do it differently or better next time?

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: One piece of advice I've already mentioned is this issue of taking the accord and developing more specific standards to go and verify. I believe the concept works. I would say that if you decide to arm these people, you have to decide why you're arming them. If you're arming them with sidearms, it's perhaps to defend themselves against rogue elements or whatever. The problem is that as soon as you start doing that, you might get people trying to take potshots at them. If you are unarmed, what you have arming you or protecting you is the willpower of the international community and your diplomatic status, which is what we had on the ground at the time, just as any diplomat would have.

This is another example of something we could do in the future. The speed at which we deployed was already pretty incredible. The agreement was signed on October 16, 1998. Just before a month later, I deployed to Vienna to generate the forces a little more, but the person I replaced deployed on the ground. So a month later on the ground the embryo of the headquarters was already deployed in Pristina. Two months after the signing of the agreement, we were actually quite effective on the ground in covering a certain part of it. But I would say that one of the lessons learned is that if you're going to have such a mission, be ready to go in faster as opposed to slower. Generate the folks quickly, and try to get rid of some of the obstacles to generating people to get them on the ground.

It is a workable concept. It's not an armed force. It's not an enforcement force, and it's not an observer force. It's somewhere in the middle. That's the way I saw it, anyway.

The Chair: It depends a great deal as well on what's happening at the upper levels in terms of cooperation at the state level.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: I've written at length about the importance of having unity of effort from the highest diplomatic level all the way down to the actions on the ground. I believe the market attack on Sarajevo in 1994 gave us that unity of effort. The nations and the international community decided to make an effort. NATO ensured compliance, and then on the ground UNPROFOR was working hard to try to keep the lid down. In a month the exclusion zone was put in. In Kosovo, after Racak, the international community decided that's it, we're going to get the parties at the table. They did. Rambouillet took place. On the ground we in KVM were really trying to keep the lid on things so that nothing on the ground was going to influence the very dangerous and very delicate negotiations taking place in the political realm. So unity of effort is very important.

The Chair: General Maisonneuve, thank you for coming before the committee again.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: It was my pleasure, sir.

The Chair: We appreciate your testimony. As we said to you the last time you were here, you brought credit to Canada in your operations there, and we thank you very much for that, as well as for your testimony this morning. Thank you very much.

BGen Michel Maisonneuve: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Merci.

The Chair: We're going to move straight to the next two witnesses. We have with us Professor Polanyi from the University of Toronto, and Graham Green, who's a former ambassador to Croatia and presently a journalist.

• 1005

I want to thank both Professor Polanyi and former Ambassador Green for coming before the committee. I just want to warn you that there may be a vote this morning. This is just quorum call at the moment, but there's a possibility of a vote between 10.30 and 11.30. The clerk will check.

Because we only have two witnesses and we had originally planned for three, hopefully we might be able to terminate this a little faster than usual. I'm sure it's a rule of chemistry, like anything else, Professor Polanyi, that evidence swells to fit the time available for it.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): Excuse me. I have a question. Now that we have new presenters here, do we still proceed with 10, 10, 10?

The Chair: We didn't really do 10 the last time. We tried to keep it to about 7.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: But it begins all over again.

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): There was really no time to ask questions of the general.

The Chair: There was only one name on the list: Mr. Assadourian. I gave it to him. I'm not psychic.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I'll be more forceful when I wave.

The Chair: Professor Polanyi and then Mr. Green. We'll try to fit everybody in.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Is Mr. Rudd not coming?

The Chair: No, he isn't coming.

[English]

Professor Polanyi, please.

Mr. John Polanyi (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here. Thank you to the committee for tackling this agonizing subject.

I am a professional scientist and am here simply as a concerned citizen who was vocal during the debate that went on when Canada was involved in the intervention in Kosovo. Having seen on the Internet something of the testimony you've heard, I want to congratulate you and read to you a couple of lines from Kipling: “If you can keep your head when all about you/Are losing theirs and blaming it on you”...well, you've done a public service.

Yesterday you heard that the intervention in Kosovo could be interpreted as a careless and indeed criminal act on the part of the United States, aided by a bamboozled, ill-informed Canada, and that it was an attempt really to initiate a war and to subvert the United Nations. That is a possible interpretation. I don't think it's a reasonable one. My own view is that the intervention, though agonizing in the way it was performed, was a proper act and a necessary one.

I have allegedly 10 minutes. I feel the only way of explaining how I came by my attitude to what my country did is by reaching back a bit in history, a history that's much better known to Ambassador Green than it is to me.

• 1010

Under Marshal Tito, Kosovo was autonomous and that autonomy was revoked. Some scientists in Serbia share some blame for that because they foolishly published a statement saying that Serbs had been victimized under Tito. Anyway, the autonomy of Kosovo was revoked. It had of course come into force 25 years ago. It was revoked and the cry was that Serbia was whole again.

This was a period when Mr. Milosevic was in the ascendancy. The state over which he ruled started to fragment and one of the fragments was his own—I mean what remained of Yugoslavia. That was a moment to ask for guarantees for minorities in these newly constituted fragments. In fact, such a guarantee for minorities was made and was rejected quite openly by Mr. Milosevic.

At that point, the Kosovars not only realized that they had lost this autonomy within Yugoslavia, which was considerable, but that they had also lost the guarantee of their human rights. They started to agitate for independence and did that for several years: 1990, 1991, and 1992. They elected a president, Ibrahim Rugova, of this rather phantom Republic of Kosovo, which really had not yet been born.

Well, these were a perilous five years that then followed. The international community saw that the Kosovars were in grave danger of being repressed, but they didn't do anything except protest. At least, I would say that's a fair summary. That's when the Kosovo Liberation Army, which as we've heard could well be described as terrorist, started to emerge.

Why was the international community, far from raring to go, so slow to move as war came surely, inexorably closer? I think the reason is that we couldn't conceive of a response to Milosevic's repeated pious statements that the fate of the Kosovars was an internal Yugoslav matter.

We asked for permission to mediate. Permission was denied. We applied economic sanctions. This seemed to bring no results. We demonstrated our determination with NATO aircraft flyovers, and this was a rather futile exercise. We arranged for the Kosovo verification mission, which you've just heard skilfully described by General Maisonneuve, who saw it at first hand. It was a marvellous act, but it really was a losing one, as he described it.

We come then to a period that is much closer. In the summer of 1998, an estimated 100,000 Kosovar Albanians were internally displaced, which means, as you've just heard, that summary executions occurred here and there, and people, terrified, fled in large numbers into woods and to miserable places. By October of 1998 the number internally displaced—in other words, the number who had been dispossessed from their villages by fear—was estimated to be 300,000.

This really was a crime on the part of Milosevic's regime against the Kosovars. It was a crime that was denounced by the United Nations Security Council, which passed a resolution saying that there was a gathering humanitarian crime and that there was a consequent danger to the peace of the entire area.

• 1015

Both humanitarian disasters and threats to the peace to an area are legitimate concerns of the United Nations, as we know from the experience of the last years. There was a presumption therefore that the United Nations would do something about it, but the United Nations did not.

I don't take you through all the details of the subsequent events—Rambouillet. But in late March 1999, 19 democracies of NATO acted in such a way that Mr. Milosevic, who had shown himself in other areas as being a canny individual who would only retreat if he saw a threat to his grip on power, did indeed feel threatened and did indeed retreat.

Those actions, as I said at the outset, I felt we had to take at that time. I also felt and said that we had taken them too late. I felt that we took them ineptly partly because they were too late. We acted with too little conviction and therefore at too great a price to civilians, bombing only, and bombing from high altitude. We acted with a shameful avoidance of risk to ourselves. But we acted, and we acted under circumstances in which a few years ago we would merely have covered our guilt with high-flown rhetoric.

Those who can see an opportunity to help and don't do so become party to a crime. But as you have rightly heard people insisting, those who do act have an obligation to act well.

If I have a few minutes, and I may or may not, I might end by asking a brief list of questions to anticipate ones that you might well ask, because I've left so many threads dangling.

First, what is the principle that was at stake in the Kosovo intervention? I don't want to repeat things you've heard before so let me put it a bit differently. Had Kosovo achieved independence of Serbia, as it so ardently desired and had repeatedly said, and as according to accepted principles it merited, because unlike the province of Quebec its human rights were flagrantly imperilled.... Had it achieved independence, then the international community would have regarded it as intolerable that the Serbian government terrorize and displace hundreds of thousands of Kosovars. That independence for Kosovo having been, I would say, cruelly withheld, should we then consider that a licence exists for Serbia or the Government of Serbia to act as it saw fit? Surely not. What's intolerable because it is external to a state doesn't become tolerable because it is internal. That is a summary of the emerging thinking, and it is thinking of which I am very glad and I think we should all be glad.

I think perhaps the next question would be, if a principle of international responsibility for gross infringements of human rights, whether internal or external, is accepted, why Kosovo? Of course, because we had come close to action and failed to act with appalling consequences in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and we were in danger of doing fearful harm to the United Nations and to the credibility of these new principles if we did not act. People say, why not also East Timor? In fact, international responsibility is being taken there now. There are many places where it is not.

• 1020

Did we act wisely in Kosovo? I don't think I have more than a minute or two, so I have to repeat that we were right to act, but because we acted too late and indeed with too little collective conviction, we didn't act well.

I actually argued in public and on record a year before that we should be sending ground troops to the borders of Kosovo, so that a threat on the ground could realistically be made in such an eventuality as actually happened. We should have done that.

How can we do better on the next occasion? I think I'll end with that and say that above all, by making a success of this one, now is the time when, acting through the UN, we, as I put it, have to keep our heads when all about us are losing theirs. The UN protectorate must stay in place until the warring parties discover a greater interest in maintaining peace and democracy than in sustaining strife and terror.

Our presence there is due to our belief that these are people like us. It was so clearly present in General Maisonneuve's remarks, and it is true. Given hope for the future, they will undoubtedly choose peace over war.

I think I'm going to stop abruptly at that point, Mr. Chairman, so as to save time.

The Chair: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Green.

Mr. Graham Green (Former Ambassador of Canada to Croatia, and Journalist, the Ottawa Citizen): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel something like a baseball player who has hit for the cycle. With 15 years in Foreign Affairs, I helped prepare ministers and officials appear before committees. In my current incarnation as a writer and columnist with the Ottawa Citizen, I cover committees. And now I finally get the chance to complete the cycle and appear as a witness to a committee. So I thank you for that opportunity this morning.

Kosovo has always—

The Chair: Thank you as a journalist for being willing to come before us. This is extraordinary.

Mr. Graham Green: Thank you. By the way, I think it's excellent that the committee is looking at the question of Kosovo. I think it's something that's needed to be done for a long time. There are a lot of lessons to be learned. There were a lot of mistakes that were made. The fact that mistakes were made doesn't mean we were wrong to try what we tried, but we must learn from those mistakes. I hope to cover a few of those areas in the remarks this morning.

Kosovo has always been at the core of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, starting back as far as 1987. But western countries failed, initially, to recognize either the seriousness of the situation or the potential for it to deteriorate into the type of violence that we witnessed in Yugoslavia through most of the 1990s.

When we did finally take notice in 1991, we made a fundamental policy decision that laid the foundation for last year's war over Kosovo. We chose to recognize Yugoslavia's internal republican borders as the international borders of the new states that were emerging. Because Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia and not a Yugoslav republic in its own right, that decision on borders meant Kosovo would never be offered a chance to become independent like Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and even Montenegro.

The west also decided to adhere strictly to the terms of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which did not permit any changes to international borders through the use of force. Add to this the fact that western countries were neither willing nor able to forestall the rise of nationalist politicians in Yugoslavia, or to prevent the early atrocities and massacres taking place. When the killings finally began, followed by the inevitable retaliation attacks, human nature made it extremely difficult for the various ethnic communities to live together again.

Yet because we had ruled out any changes to borders, the only way to maintain peace among the communities was either to move people across those borders so that the frontiers matched the ethnic boundaries, or to interpose a force sufficiently strong and authorized to take any necessary actions to restore and maintain the peace. In the end, we did neither of those things.

Everything else flowed from these fundamental early decisions: the constantly evolving and often contradictory mandates of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia; the lack of adequate troops to enforce security council mandates, particularly the safe areas such as Srebrenica and Sarajevo; the unwillingness to give UN troops robust rules of engagement; and ultimately the continuing pursuit of an increasingly unattainable political objective of ethnic reconciliation and reintegration within existing borders.

• 1025

Even though the worst of the fighting took place in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it remained a containable conflict within the boundaries of what had been Yugoslavia. But it was apparent from the outset that if the war ever spread to Kosovo there was a very real possibility of spillover into neighbouring countries, with the likelihood that this would eventually draw Albania and possibly Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey into a wider war in southern Europe.

That's why the United States warned Belgrade in 1992 and again in 1993 that it would not stand by if fighting did break out in Kosovo. But when the Dayton negotiations brought an end to the war in Bosnia, the question of Kosovo had been left off the table and the underlying tensions in the province remained unresolved.

When clashes began between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1997, the west became trapped by these previous policy decisions. Ethnic Albanians wanted independence and were prepared to use force to get it. Serbia was determined to oppose this through force if necessary, and western countries were left trying to square the circle while at the same time deeply reluctant to become involved in the fighting.

As the Kosovo situation deteriorated, the west tried to broker a political solution between the diametrically opposed notions of maintaining Serbia's territorial integrity and satisfying the Kosovar Albanians' desire for independence. Eventually, however, the west came down on the side of the Kosovar Albanians, although we continued to rule out independence. And when the Rambouillet process collapsed a year ago, NATO threatened air strikes against Serbia to compel Belgrade to accept the deal.

We had learned the wrong lesson about the role of air power in ending the Bosnian war in 1995, for it had not been air strikes alone that brought about the Dayton Accord but a combination of NATO air power and a joint Croatian-Bosnian ground offensive. NATO also misread the depth of Serbian attachment to Kosovo, which led to the belief that a few days of bombing would result in a Serb capitulation.

As is now evident, there was no plan B if those initial air strikes failed, and there certainly was no plan at the start for a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo. NATO also failed to predict the scale of the expulsions of ethnic Albanians that followed the initial bombing.

These expulsions had three main purposes for the Serbs: to create a fait accompli of a Kosovo with a significantly reduced Albanian population; to clog all potential routes for a NATO ground invasion; and to divert NATO military resources from the job of attacking Serbia to the job of coping with the hundreds of thousands of refugees. It took two months after the first bombs fell for key NATO countries to begin serious consideration of a ground invasion that would have involved upwards of 175,000 troops. It was this threat of invasion, coupled with Russia's decision to withdraw diplomatic support from Serbia, that compelled President Milosevic to accept NATO's peace terms in early June 1999. But the NATO air strikes were not the key element in the Serbs' decision.

During the Kosovo war, many people described NATO's action as the first ever humanitarian war fought in pursuit of values instead of interests. I don't subscribe to that interpretation, because in my view the real reason all 19 NATO countries supported the war was because they wanted to prevent the wider conflict in southern Europe. That's an interest, not a value. But because NATO felt the need to have some legal justification for bombing Serbia without a UN Security Council mandate, it resorted to claiming its actions were to protect the human rights of ethnic Albanians suffering under Serb oppression.

Not surprisingly, this has created an expectation that western countries would make similar interventions elsewhere in the world when there are massive violations of human rights. But when this does not happen, and there was never any intention that it would, the west has found itself facing allegations of hypocrisy and racism, that one nationality or skin colour or religion is more important than another.

That's not the case, of course, but it is true that dealing with a particular conflict can be more important than dealing with another conflict, and deciding which conflict to intervene in depends on our national interests, not our values. For if values alone were the determining factor, we would be intervening in conflicts all over the world, and clearly neither we nor our allies have the capacity to do that.

• 1030

In my view, then, Canada must do a better job of defining what our national interests are. We need to do a better job of understanding the complexities of a conflict from the outset and foreseeing the possible consequences and implications of our initial policy decisions.

That requires a foreign service with enough experienced personnel who have the time to monitor world events, to analyse them, and to make recommendations for action. I'm concerned that the demands that are competing for the time and attention of foreign service officers and senior managers in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is not giving them the time to do that analysis, monitoring, and recommendation for action that's required.

Canada also needs to concentrate its military efforts and resources on those conflicts where we have both an interest and an ability to make a difference. We cannot continue to spread ourselves too thinly or to deny our armed forces sufficient resources, both in terms of equipment and personnel, to mount a credible intervention and to sustain it beyond one or two rotations. I think we can all agree that today's Canadian Forces are seriously strained in their ability to meet all the demands that ministers place on them.

In short, we need to narrow our focus and increase our ability to play our full role diplomatically and militarily. We cannot continue to try to be all things to all people in all places.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Green, for your thoughtful comments.

We'll move to questions now.

Because of the vote, I'm going to hold everybody to five minutes, and we may get a second round. But let's see if we can go for five-minute rounds first, okay?

Mr. Keith Martin: I'll be brief. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Polanyi and Ambassador Green, for your most welcome comments.

It's interesting. The counterpoints you have articulated today are fascinating, given the people we have heard recently on this committee.

I have a couple of questions.

Did the degree of peril warrant the action that was committed here by NATO? The question that has been proposed by the naysayers is that the degree of peril was not there. They say what was going on on the ground was nothing compared to what we were told.

So I'd like to know from both of you, in your view, what was the degree of peril there?

The second question is on the rule of law. They would say the rule of law was violated, the UN charter was violated, which it was, but do we defend the letter of the law or do we defend the meaning of the law? Therefore, was NATO justified in taking action under international circumstances where we have seen time and time again the impotence of the Security Council in their ability to go to the defence of innocent civilians?

Lastly, I'd like either of you to extrapolate on any comments you can make concerning prevention and what we can perhaps suggest in this document on what Canada can do to engage in early intervention, early prevention, either through diplomatic, economic, or military means, so we can deal with these situations before they spiral out of control.

Thank you.

Mr. John Polanyi: Can I make a start?

The Chair: Yes. You can take all three questions at once, and then I'll go to Mr. Green to take all three questions.

We're trying to hold this to about a five-minute segment, so we'll try to bear that in mind.

Mr. John Polanyi: Certainly.

On question one—and I welcome all three questions—was there a sufficient need to act, just before the bombing occurred, the UN Commissioner on Human Rights identified 400,000 Kosovars as having been internally displaced. That sounds like a modest statement, “internally displaced”, but these were refugees running in fear ahead of threats of shooting. So I think it was a major disaster, and six months before the bombing, the Security Council called it a humanitarian disaster in the making. I think action was vital. I would prefer, of course, that it was action that had immediately stopped these evictions; it was action that actually catalysed even more evictions, twice as many.

What about the rule of law? I thought the question was very gently posed. As to the legality, I'm surrounded by people who are professional lawyers, so am I entitled to a view? But it seems to me that legality has to be tempered by morality, and that's how the law grows.

• 1035

If the Security Council says we have a humanitarian disaster here, and if the Security Council is paralysed, then the thought of 19 democracies, in this case, taking action without the Security Council having made it legal, I don't regard as intolerable; I regard it as preferable to the alternative, which is no action. I hope it is exceptional that the law has to be taken into the hands of others.

That leads me to the third question, which is, what could we do earlier? I would just say that we had been acting earlier. There is room to act still earlier. The pattern has been to make speeches deploring what is going on—for example, in Rwanda—and then to turn up two months later to count the dead.

Here action was being taken earlier, with all the dangers that implies. Could we act still earlier? I don't want to continue this answer. I wish, for example, that the operation General Maisonneuve was involved in could have been strengthened, but whether it could ever have succeeded against Mr. Milosevic, I rather doubt it. Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Green.

Mr. Graham Green: Thank you.

On the question of the degree of peril, you can't look at the Kosovo peril in isolation of what went before in Bosnia and in Croatia. We had ample evidence of the degree of atrocities that were capable of being carried out in both of those countries, and I don't think we should have needed to wait until there were 50,000 dead to say we should intervene. In fact, I think the whole idea of counting bodies—was it 2,000, 10,000, 500, or 50?—is irrelevant to this. The evidence was there from previous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia of the potential for this to become a very serious humanitarian crisis, and I don't think we should be criticized for having intervened at an earlier stage than we did in those previous ones.

On the question of the rule of law, again, I think the fundamental problem here is that NATO was acting within the provisions of the UN charter, but they chose not to use the appropriate article, article 51 on collective self-defence, because I genuinely believe the reason 19 NATO countries would agree to carry out this action was the fear of the war spilling over and becoming a regional threat in southern Europe, and that is a threat to NATO's interests, a collective security interest that is covered under article 51 of the UN charter. But because they relied on the humanitarian intervention, and it certainly suited our government to focus on the humanitarian intervention, because it supports the principle of a human security agenda that Minister Axworthy is very strongly supporting, I think that has put us in that problem of not being able to point to a legal justification for what we did. But I believe there was one.

Thirdly, on the question of earlier involvement, what we need to do, as I said in my remarks, is to have a stronger ability in our foreign service. It does an excellent job as it is, but I think it needs to have more time to be able to do the monitoring of conflicts to be able to foresee which ones are coming at an earlier stage.

I think we need to bear in mind the remarks of the Secretary General of the United Nations in his report on the Srebrenica incident, the massacre of thousands of people in July 1995, where he said if we intervene, we have to be prepared to carry our actions through to the logical conclusion. The minute we start to become involved, even with a monitoring mission or otherwise, if we are not prepared to carry that through to the ultimate, which is the use of force to carry out the intentions, then the parties on the ground will seek to frustrate or to drag out, to the point where we say we've had enough, we pull out, and then they get back to doing what they were doing in the first place. So if we intervene, we have to be prepared and able to stay for the long haul.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to comment on three of the statements made and to ask one question.

First of all, you seem to be of the same opinion when it comes to the type of action taken made by the international community and Canada. Mr. Green, you believe that Mr. Milosevic's actions were influenced by the threat of a ground invasion. At least that's what I'm reading here.

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You, Mr. Polanyi, on the other hand, maintain that our actions constituted a shameful avoidance of risk. You agree on the need for a different type of intervention. I'd like to hear more about this, because it's extremely important in terms of deciding on a future course of action. We know the kind of danger this entails for different armed forces.

My second question concerns the evolution of the crisis in Yugoslavia. I'm now reading a work published by the Centre québécois de relations internationales as well as an article written by Mr. Kirschbaum who says this:

The crisis in Yugoslavia calls into question the advisability of this policy of inviolability of borders and forces the international community to rethink the importance and the role of the principle of self-determination, not only to resolve the minority question, but above all, as a means of avoiding conflict and ensuring regional and international security.

These words were written in 1994.

Thirdly, are you not troubled by NATO's action, in light of what's happening in Chechnya? Perhaps Mr. Green is right in saying that quite apart from humanitarian concerns, actions were fuelled by countries having an interest in not seeing the conflict spread.

Lastly, is it still possible that the conflict might spread? Mr. Green, do you believe that NATO's action once again stopped the spread of unrest in the Balkans?

[English]

The Chair: We only have three minutes left.

Mr. Graham Green: In terms of the avoidance of risk and whether a ground invasion should have happened or not, it falls into the willingness of the parties to see it through to a logical conclusion and be prepared to do whatever it takes in order to achieve the objectives. If you decide it's worth going in, then you have to be prepared to do what it takes.

There is a limit to what the Canadian public will accept in terms of casualties and expenses. The Canadian public, I believe, accepts casualties when it is protecting Canadian national interests. Remember that 10 Canadian peacekeepers died while peacekeeping in Bosnia and in Croatia before NATO ever got involved with air strikes in 1995. We had more Canadian soldier personnel die as part of the NATO operation in Bosnia. So Canadians are prepared to see casualties sustained if they believe in what it is that's being done. But again, that's a question of identifying interests and where we are prepared to do that.

Secondly, on the question of self-determination and viability of borders, I think it does need to be rethought. Very clearly, the rigid adherence to the question of the inviolability of borders was a factor in all the conflicts and all the ethnic movement that took place in the former Yugoslavia.

Thirdly, on the question of Chechnya, again it's an interest issue. It's not in our national interest to take on the Russians at this stage over Chechnya. Our values are the same between us and what's going on in Chechnya and what happened in the former Yugoslavia, but the direct threat to us or our alliance through NATO is less in Chechnya.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: And what does the future hold in store for the Balkans?

[English]

Mr. Graham Green: I think ultimately it is becoming more stable, because unfortunately the ethnic communities are now lining up behind particular borders. We don't agree with that. That's not our principle. We don't think there should be this ethnic division. But unless we're prepared to send a massive military force into the area for an indefinite period of time to force the parties back together again, to live together....

To look at an example, if you looked at the Ottawa area, the equivalent of what happened in Bosnia would be 50,000 people being murdered by their neighbours in three and a half years and 500,000 people being forced to move from one side of town to the other side of town because either they spoke English or French or they were immigrants or they weren't immigrants. Then at the end of these three and a half years it would be “Okay, everybody. Forget that happened and all move back into your neighbourhoods and live with the people who did it to you or who you did it to or who it was done to while you stood by.” We would not do that, and it's unrealistic to expect the people who have suffered that in the former Yugoslavia to be able to do that in such a short period of time.

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Mr. John Polanyi: I agree with much of what Ambassador Green has to say. As a chemist, I'm reluctant to accept this acid test of national interest. I find it somewhat retrograde that we should come back all the time to that phrase. Everybody of course acts in their own interest, but there are various degrees of enlightened self-interest. National interest is now being defined more and more in global terms as we discover we have to live together in one world.

I think Canadians are willing to support actions in distant places they have to look up on the map, where those are clearly actions for peace, for stability, for tolerance, for democracy. That's not an old-fashioned calculation of national interest.

As for the use of ground forces, Mr. Green has made all the right points. If one is unwilling to take that sort of risk, make that sort of sacrifice, one is rendered helpless. The encouraging thing is that if one is willing to do that, then the necessity to do it should become less. Had there been a credible threat of the use of ground forces, there might well have been no need to use them.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Robinson, again try to keep it brief.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I'll be very brief.

The Chair: Just for the information of members, that is a vote bell, and it started at 10.46. It's the half-hour bell, so we'll leave here at 11.05, and that will give us 10 minutes to get there.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I want to follow up on one comment Mr. Green made, and then I just have one question actually.

Mr. Green talked about the difference between the situation in Chechnya and that in Kosovo, in response to a question from Madame Lalonde. I must say I was a little perplexed by his reply, Mr. Chairman, and I took note of it. He said the direct threat to Canada was less in Chechnya than in Kosovo. I'm not aware of any direct threat to Canada in Kosovo, and if it existed, I'd like to hear about it.

There can be other arguments as to why Canada wouldn't want to be involved in an intervention in Chechnya, not the least of which is the whole issue of Russia being a nuclear power, but I'm a bit mystified by the suggestion that somehow the direct threat was less. I wonder if Mr. Green could elaborate on that.

Maybe I'll just put my question as well, in the interest of time.

The Chair: That wasn't a question?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Svend Robinson: Sorry, my other question, which can be answered by either Mr. Green or Dr. Polanyi. I'd just ask for a response to the suggestion made by a number of people, including a number of witnesses, that in a sense the whole bombing in Kosovo and in Serbia was unnecessary, because the final terms that led to an end to the bombing were indeed terms that quite possibly would have been acceptable to Milosevic beforehand.

I must say I find that quite persuasive myself, when we look at some of the key elements of the June accord. The reality is it didn't involve NATO troops formally. It was a UN force, a multinational force. It did not contain the annex B provision with respect to access over all of Yugoslav territory, which would be a pretty tough sell for Milosevic or any political leader in Yugoslavia. And, very importantly, it didn't contain the reference to a referendum.

So the argument is that had this been on the table on Rambouillet and had it been accepted, it might have led to an avoidance of the horrible loss of life on both sides. I wonder if the witnesses could comment on that.

Mr. Graham Green: I'll just quickly respond to the point about the threat to Canada.

What I was referring to there was that if this spilled over and became a wider war in southern Europe and did involve our NATO partners—Greece or Turkey, or Greece and Turkey—then we'd have a treaty obligation to go to the defence of one or the other or whatever. So the possibility of us becoming directly embroiled in a war that was spinning out of control was much stronger there.

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We have no treaty obligations to any of the territory surrounding Chechnya. That was the only point I was making there. It would be taken out of our hands to make that decision, because we'd signed the NATO treaty.

On the other issue, I think you're right. In the terms of Rambouillet I, the original terms, there were points that were unacceptable. But I'm not convinced that there was a genuine willingness on the part of either party, the ethnic Albanians or the Serbs, to genuinely negotiate terms that would be agreeable and implementable. It's convenient now to point to that, and it is true that there was a milder provision.

And I think appendix B was an unacceptable term, to give NATO the right to move all over Yugoslavia at its will. But that could have been negotiated, and I don't think there was a genuine will on any of the parties to do that.

Mr. John Polanyi: I do see this as an action that's new in history. I see it rather as Mr. Havel saw it when he spoke to the House of Commons. I see it as an action that was prompted by a humanitarian imperative.

I agree with Svend Robinson that Rambouillet was probably not clever, not well organized, not well thought through. Mistakes were made. Everything could have been done better. The whole matter should be subject to a public inquiry, as indeed any major police action would be. But I'm not surprised that mistakes were made. The whole history of domestic police actions is only 150 years old, and after 150 years, the police force still makes mistakes. We don't therefore condemn police or disband them. But we certainly should try to do better.

The Chair: Thank you.

Madam Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to address a question to Mr. Green.

I kept on file at the time of the Kosovo debate one of your articles. Have no fear; you are remaining very consistent this morning.

Mr. Graham Green: My editors will be pleased to hear that.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: The title of it is “The war to end all humanitarian wars”, and you conclude:

The message of this to other dictators and tyrants around the world will be the exact opposite of what was intended when NATO's Kosovo adventure began. Far from sending a warning that gross abuses of human rights will not be tolerated, it will show that we just don't have the stomach to fight for our values.

In articulating this morning as you have the difference between a sovereign state pursuing an interest and it pursuing a value, you stay clearly consistent with your former remarks. My question is, if that is all sovereign states pursue.... And I would add the caveat from my studies that they don't always do so in an immoral way. Morality can be a component. But if that is the motivating factor, what in your view then is the impact of your conclusions on the human security agenda of Lloyd Axworthy?

Mr. Graham Green: It comes to the question of sustainability of the international intervention. What cost are we prepared to pay to achieve the objectives we set out from the beginning? We were severely tested in Bosnia and in Kosovo about the extent to which we were prepared to take casualties or to keep our troops on the ground. There were constant attacks against our troops, against UN troops in Bosnia, to try to provoke the UN to withdraw and allow the fighting to continue.

There are only so many things the Canadian public would be prepared to have our troops come under active fire for. That's where we get into.... Of course it's all shaped by our values. Our interests are certainly shaped by our values. But our values do not necessarily transfer or expand out to all the conflicts in the world.

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If that were the case, we would be very heavily involved in Sierra Leone right now, or we would have been last year. We would be involved very heavily in Congo. We would have been in East Timor militarily before the violence took place after the referendum, because that was a predictable event; we could see it coming. We knew the Indonesian military was not going to be able to prevent it and was maybe going to be involved in it, yet we were not prepared to put people there militarily to prevent that happening and to fight for that.

So I think what it says is that if parties to a dispute recognize that we're not really committed to throwing all the resources we need to throw at a conflict, then we're not going to achieve the political objectives, because they're going to find a way either to drag it out or to frustrate what we're trying to do, to the point where we eventually pack up and go home. I think that makes it less stable rather than more stable.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: I agree. In some ways I certainly agree with the paragraph that said the Canadian Armed Forces are unable to deploy or resupply once they get there. We have to do a whole lot more to augment our armed forces if we're going to achieve any of the interests that are indeed at the basis of our foreign policy.

I have one last question. When you then say we cannot continue to try to be all things to all people in all places, is that the interpretation you'd take of the so-called soft power approach Canada is employing now?

Mr. Graham Green: I think we need to be able to play our role in those areas where we can make a difference.

For example, the Australians took the lead in the international force in East Timor. The Americans take the lead on the Korean Peninsula and take the lead in the Middle East in keeping shipping lanes open. In Africa, the Nigerians have taken a leading role in certain international interventions. South Africa may be in a position to play more of a role in the future.

We have to be able to play a credible, meaningful role wherever we decide to deploy. By trying to be a part of everything, we end up doing nothing very well. Unless we can demonstrate that we can send the resources that are needed to help defuse a situation—and that means we need to have better military resources to do that—then others are not going to be compelled to follow us along this road of the human security agenda. I think it's a valid policy to try to follow, but only if we can play a meaningful role, and by doing that convince others to play a meaningful role as well.

Ms. Aileen Carroll: Thank you, Mr. Green.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.)): I'd like to compliment Mr. Green. This is a very rigorous analysis in the best traditions of the foreign ministry.

To your knowledge, was there discussion in the Canadian foreign ministry?

As you know, we were not involved in Rambouillet, but for these crucial years, 1989-1991, when everybody knew Yugoslavia would break up, you focused the issue here that if you recognized the existing internal republican borders, which had been rejuggled by Tito to achieve a greater multiculturalism, you would rule out the possibility of the Treaty of Versailles approach, of redistribution of population to achieve more integral frontiers.

You are aware that President Mitterrand's authorized biography is out and Hans Dietrich Genscher's autobiography is out, looking at those issues.

To your knowledge, was there any discussion in Ottawa? Were we involved in the policy planning at that level in 1989-1991 when these key options were available?

Mr. Graham Green: We were a member of the Security Council and I was a delegate to the Security Council in New York in 1989 and 1990 as issues were evolving in Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia had not come onto the radar screen of the Security Council at that time. In fact, Yugoslavia was a member of the Security Council in 1988 and 1989.

Canada took a leading role in the early days in getting international intervention in the former Yugoslavia. It was Prime Minister Mulroney who insisted that our ambassador, Yves Fortier, raise the issue with the president of the Security Council in September 1991 and, as part of that, offer peacekeepers. The Prime Minister at the time said if the UN Security Council decided to send peacekeepers, Canada would play a meaningful role, and that was very significant in galvanizing respect for the Canadian position.

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A number of people said Canada should have been able to see that since Yugoslavia was a founding member of the non-aligned movement, with this conflict being internal to the borders of Yugoslavia, this was outside the scope of the Security Council. The Prime Minister said we could not stand by any longer and watch this happen and that the Security Council should become involved, and that if it sent a peacekeeping force, Canada would play its role. Those were very critical interventions by Canada.

We also took a leading role in developing the UN peacekeeping operation. Where we ran into a problem was when we exhausted all of the traditional peacekeeping ideas that hadn't worked. When that happened, we did not have new ideas. That's when we fell out of the decision-making process and why we ended up being excluded from the contact group and subsequently from a number of key decisions over Kosovo.

The Chair: Dr. Polanyi wanted to add something to that answer.

Mr. John Polanyi: Mr. Chairman, just before you cut things off, I want to be able to comment on the last question; that's all.

The Chair: Why don't you comment now?

Mr. Ted McWhinney: I could pose the other two. They're very quick.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Ted McWhinney: The same question I'd raise in relation to the alternative legal options. We've had a lot of evidence on that, but you raised the issue of article 51 and collective self-defence. I'd be interested to know if that was considered in your time as one of the options we could put forward, to your knowledge.

The last thing, which is more dramatic, is it seems to me you were saying we were getting a de facto consolidation of new, ethnically homogeneous regions as a result of this terrible ordeal by fire. Would that be a correct interpretation? And would the logical consequence then be a legitimation of those frontiers, which might mean a split-up of Bosnia, which was one of the proposals, into the three zones—Serbian, Croatian, and a UN protectorate—and also the split-up of Kosovo?

It seemed to me you were saying basically a new fact has been created that recognizes ethnocultural reality as the homogeneity. Am I correct in that interpretation?

Mr. Graham Green: To answer your second point first, de facto that's happening. I don't think anybody wants to admit it. We're strenuously calling it an inter-entity boundary line inside Bosnia, as opposed to a border, but for all intents and purposes it is becoming a border between the two halves of Bosnia. And in Kosovo, I think that's part of what's behind the divisions at Mitrovica at the moment: this attempt to create a de facto situation on the ground of Serbian-dominated area in the north and Kosovar Albanian-dominated area in the south that will eventually get accepted, as is becoming the case in Bosnia.

On the question of article 51, no, in the early days that was not discussed, because we believe the Security Council can declare anything a threat to international peace and security, and the Security Council chose to do that in the early stages. At the end, since we knew the Security Council would not authorize, if it was taken to the Security Council, a military action against Serbia over Kosovo, the reliance of the NATO allies was on this principle of humanitarian intervention. But I think they could have relied on article 51 as well if they'd chosen to.

The Chair: Dr. Polanyi, very briefly.

Mr. John Polanyi: I just wanted to avoid being victimized because I don't write a newspaper column.

Voices: Oh, oh!

A voice: How about a Nobel Prize?

Mr. John Polanyi: Who cares?

Two questions were raised by Mr. Green and by committee members that I just wanted to respond to. They had to do with cost and with the future.

How far are we willing to pursue the human security agenda? A lot further than we have. I just want to suggest that you once again think about the early days of domestic police. It would have seemed preposterous then, 150 years ago, at the time of Robert Peel, when the first two policemen were appointed, to suggest that every town around the world should have its police force. Well, that is the case, and that is a huge investment, but if the operation serves a purpose, and a decent one, people can be made to support it. I think that's true in the international arena as well.

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I just want to add that where we are failing woefully to pay a modest cost that we could well afford—and “we” here is the international community, including Canada—is in supporting the police, literally the police, in Kosovo. If this committee were to recommend loudly that we not neglect this vital aspect of winning the peace after this agonizing operation, the committee would have done a great service.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Polanyi. That's very helpful.

Thank you both very much for coming. We appreciate both your expertise and your perspective.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have one very brief point of order, Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn.

The Chair: I just have an announcement to make. We were to have a steering committee meeting, but it's sliding away from us because of all this chaos in the House, for reasons we won't address to Madame Lalonde. We'll do it next Tuesday before the meeting.

Mr. Robinson, you have a point of order?

Mr. Svend Robinson: Yes. Committee members were asked to submit questions for the government witnesses. They are appearing on Tuesday. I wonder if we could have some indication of when we can expect to receive replies to these questions.

The Chair: The clerk advised me they'll be in tomorrow.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And they'll be circulated tomorrow then?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: We're adjourned then until Tuesday morning at 9 o'clock.