TRGO Committee Report

            Prior to the tragic events of 11 September 2001, most Canadians — and citizens of most countries — felt that aviation was a safe mode of travel. Compared to some other countries, Canada has been relatively free of hijackings, security breaches and terrorist events. In essence, a risk assessment revealed that the probability of such events occurring within Canada was low.

            After 11 September 2001, it is still the case that air travel in Canada is characterized by an acceptable level of security, which is not to say that improvements cannot be made. In analyzing the events of 11 September 2001, it must be remembered that the terrorists were not carrying prohibited articles. The problem, perhaps, lies with the design of security systems that did not contemplate terrorists willing to give up their lives during an attack. In light of this new reality, a different approach to aviation security is needed.

            This changed environment gives rise to the question of what is required to enhance aviation security in the future. Countries have responded differently to the events of 11 September 2001. Within the United States, legislation has been passed that provides for an Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, a Transportation Security Administration within the U.S. Department of Transport, a Transportation Security Board, a goal of 100% baggage screening by federalized employees and the establishment of a passenger fee to cover the cost of screening.

            In their presentations to the Committee, witnesses repeatedly stressed the need for a single agency with overall responsibility for aviation security. Various options were proposed for this entity. Some favoured an expanded role for Local Airport Authorities (LAAs), noting that they currently have responsibility for all aspects of security except passenger and baggage screening. Thus, they believe that providing LAAs with responsibility for this function in the security process is the logical approach. On the other hand, some believe that LAAs have a conflict of interest since their priority could be ensuring customer service and air carrier satisfaction, rather than security per se. Moreover, some LAAs are relatively small and might be unable to take responsibility for the full range of security functions. The result could be a fragmented system.

            In speaking to the Committee about the status quo — whereby responsibility is shared among airports and air carriers — witnesses focused on the role played by air carriers and their subcontracting of the screening of passengers and their belongings. The overwhelming majority felt that changes must occur — the current role played by air carriers must not continue, even with enhanced federal oversight. In their view, a significant problem with this option is the possibility for conflict of interest.

            The establishment of a new, not-for-profit organization modelled on the operation of NAV CANADA was proposed by a number of witnesses who argued that such an organization would not suffer from the conflict of interest concerns that are perceived to exist with the airports and the air carriers.

            Finally, others proposed that aviation security personnel should be federal government employees, in a manner similar to the recent federalization of screening personnel in the United States.

            The Committee has spent considerable time studying the issues related to aviation security and believe that another option not raised by the witnesses exists: the appointment of a Secretary of State for Transportation Security, whose primary responsibility is security. This office would be tasked with choosing the best methods, tools and organizational structure to ensure aviation security within Canada. This option would provide what we believe to be a key ingredient for success: a single entity with responsibility for aviation security that can implement a national system to be consistently applied and administered.

            Resident in a Transportation Security Authority within the portfolio of Transport Canada, the proposed Secretary of State should have the ability to hire and second employees from relevant departments to ensure the highest level of available expertise and should report annually to Parliament on the state of aviation security. Although the Committee’s study focused on aviation security, we believe that the proposed Secretary of State’s mandate could be expanded to include responsibility for all modes of federally regulated transportation. From this perspective, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 1

The federal government enact a Transportation Security Act administered by a Secretary of State for Transportation Security. The Secretary of State should be supported by a Transportation Security Authority within the portfolio of Transport Canada, and should report annually to Parliament on the state of transportation security within Canada. Moreover, the Secretary of State should engage in ongoing dialogue with counterparts in other countries. The legislation should prescribe the mandate, methods of operation, and accountability of the Secretary of State for Transportation Security and the Transportation Security Authority. Provision should be made for a mandatory statutory review one year after the legislation comes into force.

            The Committee believes that the establishment of a Secretary of State for Transportation Security would provide Canadians with the security of knowing that we have a national, single, accountable, consistent and seamless system of transportation security. A legislative mandate provides greater certainty, clear lines of authority and accountability, and an enhanced role for Parliamentary oversight.

            The Committee thinks that the proposed Secretary of State could most effectively fulfill his mandate through close collaboration and dialogue with a range of government departments, groups, and individuals with an interest in aviation security. To that end, we believe that two advisory bodies should be struck: one comprised of the Ministers of relevant federal departments and the other of interested parties.

            The first body, the Ministerial Working Group on Transportation Security, could include, for example, the Ministers with responsibility for Transport, National Defence, Justice, Solicitor General, Citizenship and Immigration, and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The second body, the Air Travel Security Advisory Group, could be comprised of departmental representatives, NAV CANADA, airports, air carriers, organized labour representing aviation personnel, airline passenger groups, and others. We believe that this advisory group could serve as a model for the establishment of similar advisory groups for other transportation modes. Thus, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 2

The federal government establish the Ministerial Working Group on Transportation Security and the Air Travel Security Advisory Group to assist the Secretary of State for Transportation Security in formulating policies, procedures, and mechanisms to enhance aviation security in Canada.

            A main theme raised by witnesses appearing before the Committee was the importance of information — or intelligence — gathering and sharing. Some witnesses told the Committee of the lack of information sharing that occurs at present in Canada and argued that a higher level of security could be attained if government departments more regularly communicated with one another. Intelligence gathering and sharing within Canada was not, however, the sole focus of witnesses. Some raised similar concerns about the lack of intelligence sharing among governments and government agencies in other countries.

            The Committee firmly believes that intelligence gathering and sharing is fundamental to establishing a security culture. In our view, security begins well before passengers and their carry-on baggage arrive at the gate. Although a number of organizations worldwide collect information on passengers and identify those individuals of particular interest, this information does not appear to be shared among government departments and agencies within a country, let alone among countries.

            What is needed is an international organization maintaining a global database and disseminating relevant information — in real time — to airports, air carriers, law enforcement agencies, and appropriate authorities. Such organizations as Transport Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Justice Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency, the Department of National Defence, police forces, and — importantly — their counterparts in other countries, would contribute information from their existing databases to this global database. While the Committee’s interest at this time is aviation security, we believe that the information contained in this database could also contribute to a higher level of security in other modes of transport.

            The Committee received testimony about the Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System — or CAPPS — in the United States. This system might be a useful model that could be expanded to permit the participation of all interested countries, departments, agencies and stakeholders, and the collection of a range of information that would ensure a high level of security.

            The existence of a global database would be an invaluable tool in assuring transportation security as it would enable the flow of information that could allow the identification of individuals of particular interest well before they gain access to airports and aircraft. Moreover, it could be used as a screening device to eliminate those passengers who are not of interest and thereby allow efforts to be focused on those who are.

            From this perspective, and recognizing that the establishment of a global database is imperative to enhancing aviation security, the Committee recommends that:

Recommendation 3

The Secretary of State for Transportation Security consult with the appropriate federal departments, including Justice Canada, the Department of the Solicitor General, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Transport Canada, the Department of National Defence, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, prior to developing a national security database. This database could include information on known and suspected terrorists and their organizations, passport and visa information, criminal background checks, terrorist alerts and advisories, and travel patterns, among other items. This database should be designed with a view to any future integration that might occur with similar databases in other countries in order that efforts are global in nature.

            Moreover, while a national database is an important initiative, it is equally important that intelligence be shared with relevant departments and agencies in other countries. The Committee believes that the proposed Secretary of State for Transportation Security should, as a priority, meet with relevant parties in other countries to discuss the development of a global database. As a result, the Committee recommends that:

            At present, passenger and baggage screening are the responsibility of air carriers, who generally contract out this function to a private sector firm. All passengers pass through a metal detector and can be subject to additional security procedures, such as scrutiny by a screener with a "hand wand." Carry-on baggage passes through an X-ray machine and can also be subjected to hand searches. A very small proportion of checked baggage is screened, a process which occurs on a random basis.

            The Committee heard much testimony on the issue of passenger and baggage screening. Some witnesses noted the relatively low wages paid to screeners, job boredom, a high turnover rate, a lack of adequate training, and inconsistency of screening procedures across the airport system. Concerns were also raised regarding the low level of checked baggage that is subjected to screening. Witnesses offered such solutions as higher rates of pay, job rotation, more training, and financial incentives for screeners who perform well.

            Moreover, witnesses told the Committee that one measure that might improve the security screening process would be to limit further the number of carry-on bags. Air carriers might consider limiting passengers to one bag. Such restrictions could reduce the opportunity for passengers to carry restricted items onto the aircraft. They would also reduce the volume of baggage for screeners, thereby allowing them to concentrate their efforts on the people passing through security. There are some in the aviation industry who believe that the focus should be the passenger, rather than the items carried by him or her.

            The Committee recognizes that screeners have been at the forefront of the debate over aviation security and, like our witnesses, feels that such factors as relatively low wages, inadequate training, and job boredom may play a part in the quality of the service being provided. We believe, however, that there are other factors that play a role, including the present practice of awarding contracts for screening to the lowest bidder and the absence of management techniques designed to alleviate job boredom and thereby enable screeners to perform their job tasks at an optimal level.

            The point must also be made that screeners are not the first line of defence in aviation security — other airline and airport personnel, including ticket agents and local police forces, have a role to play as well. Moreover, we stress again that the items carried aboard the aircraft on 11 September 2001 were not prohibited articles; as a result, it cannot be said that screeners did not do their job on that day.

            The Committee believes that there are a number of items that must be addressed to enhance the screening function at airports. These include: screening performed under the most rigorous standards, using best practices exercised throughout the global aviation community; consistency of standards and screening practices throughout the country; and the adoption of such human resource management practices as job rotation, adequate compensation to attract and retain employees, non-financial recognition programs for high performers, opportunities for career progression, enhanced training in such areas as passenger profiling, and the development of a licensing system for screeners.

            In addition, enhancements to the screening system should include: 100% checked baggage X-ray and positive baggage match; the use of biometric identification devices and improved X-ray and explosives detection systems; and enhanced passenger profiling techniques. While we recognize that these initiatives will involve considerable time and cost, we believe that their implementation is an essential part of enhanced aviation security.

In order to ensure that the correct decisions are made in the aforementioned areas, the Committee recommends that:

            During the hearings, the question of whether to use armed air marshals on some or all domestic and/or international flights was constantly raised by witnesses. Air marshals have been used in some countries for a number of years.

            Canadian air marshals are required for the Toronto-Washington, D.C. (Reagan National Airport) route, as mandated by the United States. As a result, an air marshal training program has been instituted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide air marshals for this route. We support the ongoing provision of this service by them.

            The Committee considered whether Canada should expand the use of air marshals to other flights. We are convinced that air marshals are one of the tools needed as part of an overall aviation security strategy. We recognize, however, the need for additional study of such issues as rigorous risk assessment to determine which flights

require air marshals, and extensive training programs for both air marshals and flight crews to adapt to this type of security system. For this reason, the Committee recommends that:

            The Committee heard that locked and reinforced cockpit doors are essential elements of enhanced security. In conjunction with securing the flight deck, arming pilots was seen by some as the "final" line of defence against hijackings and terrorism. Questions were raised about the type of weapons that should be used, the amount of training that would be required for pilots, and whether the main function of pilots on the flight deck — that of flying the aircraft — would be impaired in any way by arming them.

            The Committee believes that the flight deck must be protected from unauthorized entry and urges the federal government to ensure that cockpit doors meet the strictest possible security requirements. Regarding the arming of pilots, we feel that pilots should not be armed.

In order to ensure the security of the flight deck, the Committee recommends that:

            Witnesses told the Committee that enhanced flight crew training should be an integral part of a range of tools designed for on board security. With locked cockpit doors, and a limited ability of flight deck crew to leave the cockpit, some argued that flight attendants are isolated in the aircraft cabin with no additional support available in case of emergencies. In their view, flight attendants require training to protect themselves and the passengers and to deal with terrorist acts.

              The Committee supports the witnesses in this regard and believes that Canada must have standards for flight attendant training in such areas as self-defence and conflict resolution. Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

            Throughout its deliberations, the Committee was told that standardized training for aviation personnel is vital to the delivery of enhanced security. This training is particularly important for those directly involved in baggage screening and in contact with passengers. At the present time, while training is required, there is no assurance that the training is consistent across the aviation system. Witnesses also discussed the importance of training in areas that include passenger profiling.

            The Committee endorses the importance of training and believes that stakeholders must be consulted about the training they require to more adequately ensure aviation security within Canada. From this perspective, the Committee recommends that:

            Technology was an important focus for the Committee’s witnesses, who said that the best possible technology must be implemented consistently across Canada. They mentioned such technological innovations as biometric identification devices and improved X-ray and explosives detection systems, and stressed the importance of training for employees when these innovations are implemented. Although the development and implementation of technology is costly, it is necessary. Many witnesses believe that the purchase of new technology should be financed by the federal government as part of a national security strategy.

              The Committee views technology as one of the more important security tools needed in this new environment. Although it cannot solve all problems, it is a key component in the delivery of an advanced aviation security system. Having said this, we also recognize that technology is expensive and sometimes difficult to obtain, particularly at times such as these when worldwide demand is high. In addition, significant infrastructure upgrading would have to take place at Canadian airports to accommodate this new technology and comprehensive and standardized training of personnel would be required.

            For these reasons, the Committee feels that the best possible choices must be made when new technology is purchased and once purchased, it must be used to its maximum capability. Adequate consideration must be given to such issues as the type of equipment needed, its ease of maintenance and its failure rate. To this end, the Committee recommends that:

            At the present time, employees at an airport who require access to restricted areas must have a pass allowing them access. In order to obtain a pass, the airport operator determines whether an individual requires access to restricted areas, and then submits his or her name to Transport Canada for a security clearance. In determining whether an applicant receives a clearance, Transport Canada considers such factors as criminal records, national security indices, credit history, and affiliations with groups/individuals. If the clearance is granted, the airport operator issues a pass. Passes must be renewed every five years, which requires another security clearance from Transport Canada.

            In their appearance before the Committee, witnesses stressed the importance of consistency across Canada in determining who issues a pass, who receives a pass and the format of the pass. Another issue raised was the extent to which individuals who no longer work at an airport fail to return their pass. In their view, it should not be the case that the process is handled one way at Lester B. Pearson International Airport and another way at the Vancouver International Airport. Witnesses also noted the delay sometimes associated with obtaining a security clearance.

              The Committee shares many of the concerns raised by witnesses. We believe that the lack of consistency in deciding who issues passes, who has access to restricted areas, the format of passes, and the extent to which passes remain in circulation once employees cease employment or otherwise lose access to restricted areas raise relatively serious security concerns. A new system is needed for passes — a system in which a single entity would issue passes for use in all Canadian airports. Pass information would be recorded a single database, passes would have a consistent format and would be issued only to those employees with a clear need for access to restricted areas. There would also be a mechanism for retrieving passes once an employee ceases employment at the airport.

Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

            At present, Transport Canada personnel inspect and audit security procedures and performance at major Canadian airports, including the monitoring and testing of screening procedures. Following 11 September 2001, Transport Canada inspection and testing activities have been increased.

            Witnesses voiced concerns about Transport Canada’s audit and inspection activities, particularly with respect to the number of inspectors and the frequency and quality of audits. In their view, Transport Canada should be doing more to monitor and test screening procedures in order to ensure a high level of security in Canada’s aviation industry.

            In the Committee’s view, the government’s role in auditing and inspecting our security procedures is of paramount importance for ensuring aviation security and public confidence in flying. In this regard, it is important that the proposed Transportation Security Authority hire and train adequate number of inspectors and auditors in order to permit audits and inspections that are sufficiently rigourous, frequent and consistent across Canada. From this perspective, the Committee recommends that:

            In their appearance before the Committee, witnesses recommended a variety of tools that could be used to enhance aviation security in Canada: the adoption of technological innovations; more training for aviation personnel; standardization of procedures and regulations, as well as audits and inspections to ensure that these are implemented; the development of a database for information gathering and sharing; air marshals; strengthened cockpit doors; greater control over passes to restricted areas; and improved passenger and baggage screening.

            The Committee views these proposals as essential tools in the pursuit of enhanced aviation security. The usefulness of these resources could be enhanced if their quantity, type and location were easily identified. We believe that a national registry of our aviation security resources should be developed in order to have an accurate inventory of aviation security resources. This registry would enable an assessment of our preparedness and would facilitate the rapid deployment of resources to ensure that the right resources are in the right place at the right time. For this reason, the Committee recommends that:

            Currently, aviation security is financed by airports and air carriers in accordance with the standards established by Transport Canada. Airports have responsibility for all forms of security except passenger and baggage screening, which is the responsibility of air carriers.

            Many witnesses argued for higher levels of security: 100% screening of checked baggage, the use of new technologies, higher wages for screeners as an incentive for improved job performance and air marshals, among others. They differed on the manner in which these enhancements would be financed. Some called for the federal government to assume all costs associated with aviation security, arguing that this is needed in the national interest. Others felt that we should adopt a user-pay system, with airline passengers paying a fee dedicated for the purpose of improved security to recognize that they are the prime beneficiaries of enhanced aviation security.

            The Committee is aware that changes and enhancements to ensure aviation security will be costly. For example, new equipment and modifications to airport infrastructure will be needed. It is unclear at this point what decision would be made by the proposed Secretary of State for Transportation Security regarding the ownership, maintenance and responsibility for screening equipment, and the financing of airport modifications to accommodate new technology. In any event, we believe that the funding sources are limited: the travelling public, the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and the airports and air carriers, who are already incurring certain costs for security.

            Depending on the decision made by the proposed Secretary of State for Transportation Security, it may be necessary to continue the current spending levels of airports and air carriers for aviation security. These funding sources, however, may not be sufficient. The Committee was repeatedly told that passengers are willing to pay a price for enhanced aviation security, and we believe that this is the case. Moreover, we also feel that there is a national security priority that must be recognized; this could involve federal funding for aviation security. Therefore, the Committee recommends that:

            Witnesses spoke to the Committee only briefly about international issues. When they did so, their focus was two-fold: the importance of international co-operation with respect to the sharing of intelligence, and the differing screening systems for passengers and baggage found in various countries.

              The Committee believes that the international community should pursue harmonization of its aviation security regimes to ensure the highest level of security for domestic and international travellers. Rather than requiring that all countries adopt identical systems, we believe that the priority should be the adoption of systems that, while they may differ, have equivalent effect.

            There are a variety of ways in which harmonization could be attained. One way is through the standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Another is through the establishment of the database recommended earlier. Although a global database is the preferred option, it may be necessary to begin with its development on a North American basis, with later expansion.

            Although the Committee’s current focus is aviation security, we believe that harmonization activities should extend to other modes of transport. The database we have recommended — whether global or North American in scope — could also be used by other modes of transport to ensure heightened levels of security.

Recognizing the importance of harmonization of transportation security systems across countries and across modes of transport, the Committee recommends that:

            One conclusion we have reached throughout our deliberations is that security is everyone’s concern. Everyone has a role to play — aviation personnel, passengers, government, and all Canadian citizens — in ensuring the security of aviation, and indeed all travel. To succeed, a system must have built-in redundancy in the sense that multiple checks are required. Perhaps too much focus has been placed on the role of screeners in our aviation security system and not enough on other key components of the system.

            Aviation security must begin at the point of ticket purchase, when an opportunity is provided for a link between the reservation system and an intelligence database to assess whether a passenger is a potential risk. It must continue at the curb, when airport personnel see passengers approach the airport, and at the ticket counter, when passengers are provided with their boarding pass. It must continue at pre-board screening, when passengers and their belongings are subjected to security devices, and at the gate, when air carrier personnel can assess passengers prior to boarding. Finally, it must continue once the passenger is on board the aircraft, when crew must continually oversee activities in the cabin. Clearly, multiple checks and constant vigilance are the foundation of an aviation security culture.

            However, an aviation security culture may not go far enough. The horrific events of 11 September 2001, which involved airplanes, could perhaps have equally involved other modes of transport. For this reason, what is needed is a transportation security culture, again involving built-in redundancy.