NDVA Committee Report

INTRODUCTION

War is not polite recreation but the vilest thing in life and we ought to understand that and not play at war. — Tolstoy

This report is the result of a full year of hearings on the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces (CF). It was never our intention to rewrite Canadian defence policy, nor did we ever assume we could do a better job restructuring the CF than could the professionals. We see our role as one of helping the CF recoup, and indeed enhance, some of what they need to be able to carry on as a professional fighting force.

The government’s response to our previous reports has been both encouraging and disappointing. We fully understand that not everything that we ask for can be fulfilled. However, the fact remains that the CF continue to be underfunded, for both the short and long term. As a committee, we cannot appropriate funds or legislate program changes. We can only recommend. And our success will depend upon how well government listens. This suggests we need remain responsible in the recommendations we make and ensure that they stay within the realm of what is or should be possible.

We want to be a positive force, a vehicle through which the needs and aspirations of our serving men and women, and indeed the Canadian Forces as an institution, can be clearly put before the government. We also hope to be a vehicle for change, helping the CF to face the many challenges of the future. Some of what we recommend will be accepted, some will not. Whatever the result, we begin with the assumption that the status quo is not acceptable. But, having said that, we might also note that our mission is not to abandon common sense and those things that work. Policy‑making is a pragmatic art ― we seek what is reasonable, affordable, and realistic. As a group charged with making serious recommendations to government, we cannot afford the self‑indulgence of perfect solutions or visionary schemes.

The CF needs to be prepared for a strategic environment in which certain of our old assumptions no longer hold. To recognize this is not to argue that we begin from scratch. We will not fight on the European central front, the Russians are no longer our major concern, Europe is increasingly capable of defending itself and the asymmetric threat is very real. At the same time, there is no good reason to abandon NATO, we will remain an active participant in NORAD, the United States will remain our closest ally, we will continue to be called upon for peacekeeping duties and our multilateral tradition will continue to affect the choices we make.

Our concern is that the CF be fully capable of meeting the challenges that lie ahead. During our previous investigations we heard much about equipment rust out, poor morale, inadequate living conditions, lack of training, unsustainable levels of operational tempo, funding shortfalls, etc. We have already addressed some of the major issues of concern in our previous reports, but more needs to be done. By having over-committed our forces in recent years, we may actually have contributed to their decline in operational readiness. Over-commitment has meant less time for training and recuperation. It has meant that restructuring has had to be put off and that we have had to work with units perhaps not best suited for the new threat environment. If one is continually scrambling to meet the contingencies of the moment, it means that future directed thought and analysis become a luxury rather than an obvious requirement.

Operational readiness entails more than equipment and strategy. One can have the best technology and the most forward thinking senior commanders, but above all, one must also have sufficient well-trained enthusiastic troops in order to defend the country’s vital interests. Conversely, morale is certainly furthered by good equipment. The choices that need to be made are not of an either/or nature.

For too long, the CF have found it necessary to sacrifice one element in order to sustain another. We saw first-hand how quality of life issues were put to the side in order that money for other essentials could be made available. To ensure operational readiness, we need to see to all facets of the Canadian Forces including quality of life, training, equipment, education and leadership. As well, we need to have a good sense of what it is we are “getting ready for.” Our force structure must be appropriate for the strategic environment in which we expect to operate.

While our previous reports did not specifically focus on the question of readiness, they have, nevertheless, had an important bearing on the matter. In our report entitled Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces, we made a series of recommendations that went a long way in helping improve the morale of CF members and their families. On November 25, 1999, our Committee passed a motion, subsequently also tabled in the House of Commons, calling upon the government “…to embark upon a five-year plan for the revitalization and modernization of the Canadian Forces which would substantially increase the budget of the Department of National Defence as a percentage of GDP.” This was followed by our Procurement Study wherein we encouraged the government to speed up required equipment purchases and suggested ways in which the overall procurement process might be improved.

In June 2001, we tabled our Report on Plans and Priorities where we recommended, inter alia, that the government re-examine its spending plans for the next two fiscal years with a view of increasing the budget for the Department of National Defence. Finally, in November 2001, our Committee tabled its report, State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces: Response to the Terrorist Threat, wherein we again recommended that DND’s budget be increased. Here we also called for a greater emphasis on strategic lift as well as an increase in Special Forces.

The Canadian Forces did not get all we thought necessary. We believe that the Committee has made progress and are firmly committed to ensuring that our troops get what they need. We also believe that members of the CF must never be tasked for deployments for which they are neither adequately prepared nor equipped.

Finally, we have also come to realize that today the notion of “security” needs to be understood in a broader, or more comprehensive, sense than previously. The threat of terrorist attacks and the potential use of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological (NBCR) weapons means that a variety of jurisdictions must be involved in order to ensure the safety of Canadians. The events of September 11th have clearly demonstrated that we need to have a multi-level and multi-jurisdictional understanding of security and how to better respond to threats.