---

PART 3 -
THE FUTURE OF THE SOCIAL INSURANCE NUMBER SYSTEM:
PUBLIC-POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

At the outset of this report, we noted that our hearings on the Social Insurance Number system raised more questions than they answered. Throughout our work, we were constantly confronted by our realization that a solution to the immediate administrative problems identified by the Auditor General's report (dealt with in Part 2) does not tackle the central and fundamental problem within the context of the SIN system. As parliamentarians, we quickly understood that our job is to address the extent to which the SIN system has evolved and strayed from its original intent. Over and over, a variety of witnesses repeated the fundamental importance of clarifying the purpose of the SIN.

The broader public-policy debate, therefore, should attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Should the Social Insurance Number return to its original purpose as an account number to identify files of government programs? If so, can the SIN system be salvaged by following the recommendations set out above or should it be "scrapped" and replaced by a new card - for example, a Millennium card that incorporates new "smart card" technology such as a computer chip or biometric identification?

2. Is it time formally to recognize the SIN's de facto use and to take steps to convert the SIN into a national personal identification number for each and every resident of Canada? Can the introduction of such a card be accompanied by the use of encryption and other "smart card" features that will protect individual privacy?

We were told - and we strongly agree - that any move to turn the SIN into a national identifier must entail widespread political debate as well as adequate and appropriate public input. The creation of a national identification system presents challenges to personal privacy that must be addressed. Personal privacy is too fragile; the guarantees of protection are too weak - and likely to remain so. The temptation for both the public and private sectors to use the data in any national identification system for unintended or unauthorized purposes could be intense and would have to be counterbalanced by adequate technical and legal safeguards.

But we also think that Canadians need an opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of any significant alteration of, or replacement for, the Social Insurance Number and to debate these in a public forum. Again, the temptation to use a reformed SIN system or a new card for purposes other than those for which it is intended will be very strong. Function-creep based on the demands for "efficiency" is a powerful argument to resist. Individual citizens do not fully understand what they may be giving up. We have already seen examples of this in the recent lawsuit launched, and won, by the Privacy Commissioner to prevent matching of information collected as Canadians enter or leave the country with unemployment insurance claims. In light of these considerations, we recommend that:

16. HRDC should prepare a report by 31 December 1999 that sets out a series of options - including the associated costs - for improving or replacing the SIN system with an entirely new card system. This report should assess the feasibility of implementing in Canada a SIN administrative model that resembles the Belgium Crossroads Bank model (as discussed in Appendix D of this report).

Our study of the Social Insurance Number has underscored our overall concerns about technology, privacy and data-matching. Witnesses constantly raised these broader issues in our hearings on the SIN. The report of the former House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons With Disabilities, Privacy: Where Do We Draw The Line ?, tabled in April 1997 dealt with these public-policy considerations in detail and at length. That report, the result of an intensive study into issues related to the impact of changing technology on human rights and privacy rights, amplifies and explains many of the concerns that came to animate our members as we looked at the narrower question of the future of the Social Insurance Number system.

In our view, Privacy: Where Do We Draw The Line? identifies, discusses, evaluates and recommends measures to deal with these questions and it does so within a framework developed during very extensive public consultations and debate. Due to the timing of the Report's release, there has not been a government response. Consequently:

17. Respecting the existing legislation, we adopt the recommendations and acknowledge the dissenting opinion contained in the report Privacy: Where Do We Draw The Line?, the Third report of the House of Commons Standing Committee Human on Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities tabled in the House of Commons on 27 April 1997 (Appendix E of this Report). We request a response to these recommendations pursuant to Standing Order 109.

In conclusion, we are left with a series of questions that we have not had as much time to explore as we would have wished.

• If the SIN is "modernized" or "replaced", how will citizens' privacy rights be protected?
• How will we ensure that inappropriate data-matching does not take place?
• What are the best ways to guard Canadians against the rising incidence of identity theft?
• Will we be prepared to respond to the request for a secure and unique identifier for Canadians as more and more commerce takes place electronically?
• As technology expands and becomes more sophisticated, should the office of the federal Privacy Commissioner be given expanded powers to combat intrusions into personal privacy of Canadians and if so, what would the scope of those powers be?
• What are the cost implications of ensuring privacy?
• To what extent are Canadians prepared to shoulder the cost of expensive technology to ensure privacy?
• How do we balance the need for increased efficiency with the rights of individuals to privacy protection?
• How do we deal, in a proactive fashion, with fraud and abuse of the SIN system as well as other forms of card fraud?

These questions represent a sample of the broad public-policy issues that governments will have to deal with in the years ahead. None of these questions has a "yes" or "no" or a "right" or "wrong" answer. They all imply tradeoffs. The basic decisions here, as in the broad public-debate over personal privacy, is the requirement for "informed consent." In order to make these decisions, politicians and Canadians need information and discussion. Too many decisions about the current use of the Social Insurance Number were made by default. This was, and is, not appropriate and should be avoided in the future.