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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

1530

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

1535

Hon. Art Eggleton (Minister of National Defence)

1540

1545

1550

The Chair

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

1555

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

1600

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Toews

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Mr. Art Eggleton

1605

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

1610

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

An hon. member

Mr. Art Eggleton

Some hon. members

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

1615

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

1620

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Harvard

1625

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Harvard

Mr. Art Eggleton

1630

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie--Bathurst, NDP)

1635

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

1640

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

1645

Mr. Godin

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Art Eggleton

1650

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

1655

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

1700

Mr. Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.)

1705

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Catterall

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Catterall

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Marlene Catterall

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Catterall

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

1710

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

1715

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

1720

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Stoffer

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Stoffer

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

1725

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Art Eggleton

1730

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Mauril Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

1735

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Hill

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Pratt

Mr. Art Eggleton

1740

The Chair

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

1745

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

An hon. member

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

1750

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton--Melville, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Ms. Marlene Catterall

The Chair

Ms. Catterall

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

1755

Mr. Bélanger

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Pratt

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

NUMBER 046

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

COMMITTEE EVIDENCE

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): Colleagues, I call this meeting to order.

This is the 46th meeting of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The order of the day is, pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31, 2002, by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements in the House.

Our witness today is the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence.

Minister, I'll welcome you more formally in a moment. We have two or three items of committee business I'd like to finish before we actually begin.

Colleagues, I want to say, with respect to our previous two meetings, that the committee staff are following up with regard to the various requests for information--the information from the Clerk and the information from Mr. Brian Pallister, who was our first witness.

The mailing to Commodore Thiffault, including the questions submitted by all members, has gone, with the letter revised as we decided late last evening. Commodore Thiffault is being asked to reply by next Tuesday at 5 p.m.

With regard to the matters raised by our colleague, Jay Hill, I want to say first of all, with respect to the order of witnesses, I checked the blues of the steering committee meetings and I now apologize: it was something I had in fact missed. Jay Hill had made the point that where people in the same organization were called, the senior people should be called last. There were murmurs of approval for that. I have to say in my own defence that elsewhere the blues did say the chair had some discretion, but frankly, as I said, I had forgotten.

Colleagues, our witnesses of next Tuesday are General Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff, Jim Judd, Deputy Minister of National Defence, and Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff--that is the order in which they exist on the current version of our schedule. I'm going to find out if it's possible, given their timing, that their order be reversed. I have explained--and again, my apologies--that this is a complicated matter: we've already asked these people to appear at certain times, and so on.

I would remind members of the committee that the version of our schedule of witnesses that we're using is the one of last evening. Be very careful if you have a previous one, because we're changing the agenda as we hear finally from these different people.

The second matter to do with Jay Hill is his motion requesting a number of documents. I would propose not necessarily that we deal with it but that we address it at the end of this afternoon's meeting, if that's okay.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Colleagues, I'd like to welcome on your behalf the Honourable Art Eggleton. Minister, we welcome you to our committee and greatly appreciate your being here.

I understand you have a presentation you would like to make at the beginning. We are in your hands. Please proceed.

¹ (1535)

Hon. Art Eggleton (Minister of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members, and colleagues.

Let me begin with some general remarks so that the committee will understand the underlying purpose of this statement and the spirit in which I intend to answer any questions members may wish to ask following these opening remarks.

I wish to address at the outset two fundamental issues underlying the matter that the House of Commons has asked you, as a committee, to inquire into. First, I would like to take the opportunity to restate what I said before, both inside the House and also to the media, on the issue of briefings I receive from officials of my department.

As Minister of National Defence I receive quality, timely briefings and advice from my officials, both in the military chain of command and in the civilian part of the department. If there is controversy associated with my responses in the House, the departmental officials bear no burden of responsibility for such controversy. Indeed, in times of peace, Canadians and the Government of Canada receive the very best of service from our forces, and in times of conflict they provide outstanding commitment to our values and courageous performance in their duty.

Secondly, the charge that a minister of the crown, in the performance of his or her duties, has deliberately misled either house of the Canadian Parliament is a serious matter. As a member of Parliament and also as a minister of the crown, I am fully aware of your duty here today, and I intend to be as forthright as I possibly can be to assist you in that duty.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to help you in your task I have prepared a chronology of events that I will outline to you.

I will start with the remarks I made on Thursday, January 17, before the joint meeting of the committees on defence and foreign affairs about Canadian Forces' detainee practices in Afghanistan.

I explained that government policy requires treatment of any detainee to be in accordance with international law--specifically the Geneva Conventions--and also Canadian law. Further, since we do not have detention facilities, we would turn over any detainees to our allies, the United States, who are the leaders of the coalition. Such transfers are also covered by the Geneva Conventions, which the United States assured us would be followed.

A committee member on that occasion asked me whether we had taken any detainees because of the activities of our commando group, Joint Task Force 2, who were the only land force at that time in operation in Afghanistan. In reply, I said we had not, to that point, but that we had been present, as part of a multinational special operations force, at the time some detainees were taken.

Now the following day, January 18, I went to Edmonton to say farewell and good luck to our troops who were preparing to go to Afghanistan as part of a 750-person battle group. I then proceeded, on the weekend, to travel to Mexico City to begin my first official visit, as Minister of Defence, to Mexico.

On Monday, January 21, I had a heavy program in Mexico City involving various meetings with the Secretary of National Defence, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, and Secretary of the Navy, and finally, President Vicente Fox. Around the noon hour I broke away from these meetings to go to the Canadian embassy to use a secure telephone for the purpose of my briefing.

It is my practice, Mr. Chairman, to receive briefings, wherever I may be, from the Chief of the Defence Staff or, in his absence, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. On most occasions these are done by secure telephone and they last between 10 and 20 minutes. They cover the campaign in general, plus specifics about Canadian Forces' activities.

¹ (1540)

The briefing by the DCDS that day lasted about 20 minutes and included the usual array of subjects. In the course of the briefing, he advised me that the JTF-2 had been involved in a multinational operation where detainees had been taken.

My concern on that occasion was, first, that our troops were safe; second, that the mission was successful; and third, that the mission was carried out in accordance with government policy and the rules of engagement as laid down by government policy.

I understood that such was the case and I therefore did not pursue the matter further at that time. And I did not phone the Prime Minister to inform him of the taking of detainees, since there was no diversion from government policy or the rules of engagement. The apprehension of alleged terrorists, Mr. Chairman, is the normal and expected outcome of this type of operation that forces were sent to Afghanistan for in the first place.

Following Mexico, I visited the U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, on Wednesday, January 23, where I received briefings about the Afghanistan campaign, met with various commanders, and thanked our Canadian Forces personnel who are currently stationed there as part of the multinational coordination of the campaign.

On the evening of the same day, I returned to Canada, first for events in Toronto, and then the following evening, Thursday, January 24, I returned to Ottawa.

Now, on Friday, January 25, I attended a cabinet meeting, a cabinet retreat, as it is called, that was held in the Lester B. Pearson building, at the Department of Foreign Affairs. After the meeting, which lasted most of the day, I went to my office at the Department of National Defence, arriving in the late afternoon. My executive assistant, Mr. Young, then informed me that the issue of detainees was on the cabinet agenda for the following Tuesday.

Mr. Chairman, when our troops were first committed to the campaign there was no apparent issue about detainees. The applicability of the Geneva Conventions was not at issue; it was agreed upon by the United States. But subsequently, concerns were raised about photographs, television footage, showing hooding and shackling of dangerous detainees, I might add, when they were being transferred to the United States base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

In the week that I was away, comments by officials in the United States resulted in a heightened debate about the status determination process for detainees. So to prepare for the cabinet meeting on the following Tuesday, I determined that further discussions with officials were necessary, both to get a better understanding about the mission I had been advised about the previous Monday, but also to talk about the whole question of detainees and government policy in that respect. So I began a series of meetings and conversations by telephone that involved everybody from the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the deputy minister and the Judge Advocate General, who is the chief legal adviser and most knowledgeable person on this subject in our department.

Also, on that same Friday afternoon, I saw for the first time a photograph showing three detainees being escorted by three soldiers, with a United States' aircraft in the background and with a caption referring to the soldiers as being from the United States. The photograph had been published the previous Tuesday, January 22, on the front page of the Globe and Mail. Mr. Young said he believed the soldiers were actually JTF-2 Canadians, noting the forest-green colour of the combat uniforms. Well, to determine whether that was the case or not, I called the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff into my office and he confirmed that the soldiers in the photo were Canadians and that this was relevant to the operation I had been informed about on the previous Monday, January 21, when I was in Mexico.

¹ (1545)

Mr. Chairman, the old saying that a picture is worth a thousand words was never truer. I was realizing, for the first time, the full extent of the involvement for Canadian troops in that operation.

The fact was that we had gone beyond the kind of mission that I had previously described to the two House committees on January 17, 2002. In this case, we had actually taken custody of the detainees, we transported them to Kandahar, and then we turned them over to the Americans.

This realization, however, Mr. Chairman, did not change the fundamental fact that the mission had been carried out in accordance with government policy and the rules of engagement. I must emphasize that, Mr. Chairman.

While that photograph, and the discussion with the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff provided more details, more background, it did not change the bottom line with respect to the knowledge I needed on the Monday, as well as the Friday, to be able to make the judgment that this in fact had been done in accordance with government policy and the rules of engagement.

The following Monday, January 28, 2002, when the debate about detainees was heating up even more, and there was commentary about Colin Powell's versus Don Rumsfeld's different views about the matter, the Prime Minister was asked about detainees by the media and he referred to that situation as being hypothetical. When learning of his comment, I regretted not having told him earlier, and subsequently I apologized to the Prime Minister.

But on Tuesday morning, January 29, 2002, I made a presentation to cabinet on the subject of detainees. At the end of the presentation, I brought to my colleagues' attention the fact that Canadian Forces personnel had taken detainees, and I also noted the photo in the Globe and Mail from the week before.

After cabinet, I engaged in a media scrum on my way out of the meeting. In response to direct questions about detainees, I informed the media that detainees had been taken and subsequently turned over to the United States military. I also referred to the newspaper photograph. I was subsequently asked by a reporter, “When did you become aware of that? You said it was in the Globe last week. Did you hear about it last week when you saw it in the Globe? The rest of us didn't notice it.” To this I responded, “No. I knew about it as of last Friday.” My reference point, Mr. Chairman, in answering that question, was the newspaper photo that I had previously described as giving me a fuller understanding of the extent of operations in question.

Later that afternoon in question period, I gave a similar answer to the question by the honourable member from Laurier--Sainte-Marie. The previous question, by the honourable member from Portage--Lisgar, involved the photograph, and in that context and with that thought in mind, I gave my answer to the Bloc Québécois leader that I first became aware of the possibility on Friday.

Of course, in the larger context of the operation involving our troops, I should have said Monday. But in the cut and thrust of question period, I connected the two questions from the two members, which had come in quite rapid succession.

When returning to my Department of National Defence office that afternoon, I was reminded that I had received a briefing on the operation on Monday, January 21, 2002, while I was in Mexico. Having realized my omission in not connecting the two briefings, I returned to question period the next day, Wednesday, January 30, 2002, and put the matter in the correct context.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me state emphatically that at no time have I intended to mislead the House of Commons. If that was the conclusion of some honourable members, then I indeed regret and apologize to the House and all members of the House for anything I have said that would leave such an impression.

I have served truthfully and honourably in elected office, Mr. Chairman, for over 30 years. I served 22 years at the municipal level, including 11 years as the mayor of Toronto, and now, for over eight years as a member of Parliament for York Centre and as a member of the cabinet, with almost five of those years as the Minister of National Defence.

¹ (1550)

I am proud of that service. I know that I hold a special trust given to me by my constituents. I hold a very unique trust given to me by the Prime Minister. That I would, Mr. Chairman, by design set out to breach that trust by knowingly and wilfully giving false information to the House of Commons is simply wrong and untrue.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to serve. I've always felt it is a privilege and an honour to serve, and I believe I have fulfilled my duties to the best of my abilities. Thank you.

The Chair: Minister, thank you very much. As I said earlier, we appreciate you being here. I appreciate the fact that that was a very brief and useful statement.

Minister, I should explain to you what the members of the committee already know: the procedure we've adopted for these meetings is that for the first round, which will be very much the larger part of this meeting, the parties get ten minutes each. Sometimes you will note the parties use that time with one questioner; sometimes they may use more than one. So from time to time I will explain to you where they are.

Minister, as we always do in this committee, we go from one side of the committee to the other, beginning with the official opposition. The first speaker I have is from the Canadian Alliance, Vic Toews, and he's followed by Geoff Regan and Paul Macklin on this side of the House. Then it's the two Bloc members.

Vic Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate the brevity, Mr. Minister, only because we have ten minutes. I have a number of questions to ask and certainly would like to ensure that we have as few appearances here on your schedule as possible.

First, Mr. Minister, through the chair, I understand your testimony to be that you were briefed on Monday, January 21, in Mexico City through a secure line. Is that correct?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Vic Toews: And as a result of that briefing on the prisoner issue, you did not tell anyone in the Prime Minister's office, or the Privy Council Office during the week of January 21.

¹ (1555)

Mr. Art Eggleton: No.

Mr. Vic Toews: So that briefing was shared by you with no one else.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I did not.... I followed the procedure. The procedure that is laid down in the policy of the government is that the CDS is reported to on JTF-2 matters directly. This is a different procedure from other troops in other services, and he then in turn reports them to me.

As I indicated, I did not call the Prime Minister because there was no diversion from government policy. They were sent there to capture al-Qaeda terrorists. They were sent there to be part of a coalition effort to bring these people to justice. So there was nothing out of the ordinary, nothing that one would expect would be a diversion of policy. I clearly made that judgment and understanding on the information I received, so there was no call that was made to the Prime Minister and no call made to the PCO. No, I didn't make any calls to advise them.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right. Did you share that information with your executive assistant, the one who reminded you later on about the possibility of the significance of this discussion?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't recall doing that. I do recall the conversation with him that was relevant to detainees, and I discussed with him the general policy issues that were rising in momentum at that particular point in time, and he brought to my attention the photograph.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right. So the incidents disclosed in the briefing of January 21, you would have shared with Mr. Young then, prior to you--

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, I don't recall doing that. I do recall having a discussion with him about the general issue of detainees, and he brought to my attention the photograph.

The Chair: Minister, perhaps you could respond through the chair. The member is referring to the chair from time to time.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes. I am sorry.

Mr. Vic Toews: So your executive assistant, Mr. Young, I believe you said his name was, raised the issue with you of the photograph because of the conversation you had on January 21, that briefing that you had.

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, it was completely extraneous to that. He had seen the photograph in the newspaper on January 22. He looked at the uniforms. He remembered the fact that there'd been an issue about the colour of the uniforms that Canadians were wearing, that they weren't the desert camouflage, and here was a dark green kind of uniform that he thought at first might be Americans, because they were, after all, labelled underneath the photograph as being United States soldiers.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right.

Mr. Art Eggleton: But then he subsequently wondered about them being Canadians because a close examination of the uniform would identify the Canadian pattern. So he then brought it to my attention and said he thought these might be Canadian uniforms and I said “Well, then let's find out”. So I called in the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The chief was away.

Mr. Vic Toews: So the issue that was raised in the secure briefing on January 21 was not mentioned again in any subsequent briefings that week on Tuesday, January 22, Wednesday, January 23, or Thursday, January 24.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Nothing that would involve any breach of security with respect to the JTF-2.

Mr. Vic Toews: So you weren't aware of any further discussions regarding the possibility that our forces had been involved in the capture of prisoners.

Mr. Art Eggleton: The fact that there were detainees was not in itself a security matter. The actual details of the operation would be a security matter. There would be no reason not to talk about detainees. It was becoming a hotter issue all the time, and of course when I came back I found out more information about the mission. I found out more about the issue, which was then escalating, at least in the United States media, and so I was determined to find out more information about it.

What's important here is not to jeopardize the personal security, or the operational security, of JTF-2.

Mr. Vic Toews: I understand that, Mr. Minister, through the chair, of course.

Did you at any time discuss this matter with the Prime Minister between Monday, January 21, and Friday, January 25, and in fact was this issue on the agenda of the Friday cabinet meeting of January 25?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No. While I can't get into what's on the agenda or what's not on the agenda of cabinet meetings, other than that I am talking about the specific issue of detainees, there was no discussion with the Prime Minister up to that point in time.

In fact, as I said, the further discussions with the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff clarifying the photograph and getting further information didn't start until after I returned from that cabinet retreat meeting where I did see the Prime Minister, and I didn't see him for further discussions about this matter until the cabinet on Tuesday morning, January 29.

Mr. Vic Toews: So there was no reason for you to bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister at the cabinet meeting of January 25.

Mr. Art Eggleton: No. As I said, everything had been done according to government policy. I didn't feel there was a reason to do that. As I've said subsequently, when I learned that the Prime Minister had been asked on the Monday, the following Monday, about this matter and indicated it was hypothetical, I regretted that I hadn't told him in advance so that he wouldn't have given the answer he did give.

º (1600)

Mr. Vic Toews: When were the rules of engagement finalized with respect to our forces in Afghanistan?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Each unit that goes over has a variation on rules of engagement depending upon whether they're navy, army, or air force, and depending upon the terms of reference of their mandate, so the rules of engagement are modified according to that. The basic fundamentals are the same. I'd say that about 80% to 90% of the rules of engagement are the same for all of our troops and for our missions, by and large. But there are modifications that are made for each particular unit.

In each case, the rules of engagement are finalized by the Chief of the Defence Staff in accordance with government policy and are done before the particular unit departs.

Mr. Vic Toews: And for the JTF-2, when were they finalized?

Mr. Art Eggleton: They would have been finalized before the JTF-2 went to Afghanistan.

Mr. Vic Toews: So there was no issue regarding the jurisdiction or the authority that the members of the JTF-2 had?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Right. There wasn't any.

The Chair: One minute, Vic.

Mr. Vic Toews: So the first time you had occasion to raise this with the Prime Minister was on what date?

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I said before, the first occasion that I raised it with the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet was on Tuesday, January 29, at the cabinet meeting. And I didn't go into the cabinet meeting specifically to say “We've taken detainees”. I went into the cabinet meeting to talk about the whole issue because it was just the day before that we were hearing about some differences in how the United States was treating these detainees, which caused some concern about whether the Geneva Conventions were being followed or not. So it was mainly to discuss that topic that I went into the meeting on January 29. I advised the cabinet of the taking of detainees. I regularly advise the cabinet at cabinet meetings of ongoing operations.

If there had been something out of the ordinary, something that was not in accordance with the rules, then of course I would have advised the Prime Minister at an earlier time, and, given his answer to the media on Monday, I wish I had.

The Chair: We're going to go to the next speaker.

Minister, I'm going to say this again, and I'll say it to the members again. The question of mentioning the chair is not vanity on my part, I do assure you all. One of the differences between this and a court of law is that there are hundreds of years of parliamentary experience where you mention the chair or, as we do in the House, the Speaker.

The reason is not to stop the flow. It's to keep it reasonably civilized. It is civilized now so it doesn't matter. When it becomes uncivilized, heaven forbid, it's better.

I say to you, Minister, in particular, it is normal practice in the House, it's normal practice at this committee, and it's the same for my colleagues.

Geoff Regan, Paul Macklin, Pierre Brien, Michel Guimond.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sure we'll keep it civilized here.

Mr. Chairman, through you to the minister, thank you, Minister, for coming before us today to deal with this very serious issue and the serious allegations before us.

I'd like to ask you about the take-note debate that you'll recall occurred on January 28. The motion for the debate was that this committee--the committee of the whole, of course--take note of the deployment of Canadian Forces personnel in Afghanistan.

Throughout this debate you referred to the taking of detainees in the future tense. We now know, of course, that detainees had been taken eight days before, or thereabouts, January 20 or 21. Why didn't you inform the House at that time that detainees had been taken? Why did you keep referring to the taking of detainees in the future tense when in fact it clearly wasn't the case?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, I was addressing the question of policy. I felt it was really the policy that was important, as opposed to the actual event having occurred, because, as I said earlier, that's what we sent them there to do.

This particular take-note debate was about the sending of 750 troops from Edmonton into Afghanistan. I realize the wording of the take-note debate could also cover JTF-2. Remember, there had already been 50 hours of debate on this matter previously. The JTF-2 had already been there about two months before. What really precipitated this debate was the sending of the battle group, Mr. Chairman, to Afghanistan.

In that context, there were some questions raised, as I recall, specifically by the Bloc Québécois, relevant to the matter of detainees. I talked in the context of policy because I felt that was what was most important. I was not asked specifically whether we had taken them on that occasion. I didn't consider it to be the most important part of the debate. The important part of the debate was the policy on how we were treating detainees and how our allies, the United States, were treating detainees.

º (1605)

The Chair: Geoff Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Through you to the minister, would you tell us about the circumstances on January 21 when you were briefed? You were in Mexico. Would you tell us about what you were doing that day and the circumstances of the briefing you had?

Mr. Art Eggleton: It was a very busy day. It was the first occasion when a Canadian Minister of Defence had visited Mexico. I don't know why it hadn't happened before. I don't think there's been a reciprocal visit the other way ever as well. They are our partners in NAFTA. They're an important part of North America.

With the events of September 11, we are now more focused on our continent. I think we need to be more focused not only on our continental partner to the south of us, but the one to the south of them as well.

On the Monday I had a wide array of meetings, and I wanted to get my daily briefing. It required my going to the embassy, because the embassy had a secure STU-III phone. It is encrypted and is therefore secure for the purpose of giving me a briefing. I departed from the program. I went, had the briefing, and then returned to the program. It was a very hectic day.

While it didn't leave me a lot of additional time for the phone call, I nevertheless made sure I got the fundamentals and was able to get the information I needed to make the right judgments about what had been done by our troops.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, through you again, by January 21, the issue of detainees, and the allegation that perhaps Canadian troops might be in breach of Geneva Conventions if they handed over detainees to the Americans, was in the media. It was certainly out there. In view of that, why didn't you inform the Prime Minister the week of January 21 of the fact that Canadians had taken detainees?

Mr. Art Eggleton: In retrospect I wish I had. But I felt the issue was really more the policy question. It was really more determining that the Geneva Conventions were being followed. It became a very challenging legal question with different interpretations. We saw on Monday, January 28, in particular it reach a new level with the apparent disagreements between two members of President Bush's cabinet.

So it was necessary for me to discuss this matter. Throughout the days from my return on Friday right up until Tuesday morning when I went into the cabinet meeting, I was still assessing information, getting information, asking questions of our staff, so that I would have myself in the best position to advise the Prime Minister and my cabinet colleagues about the issue. That's what I felt was really the important issue, the question of detainee policy and what was happening to them after they were turned over to our United States allies.

The Chair: Geoff Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Minister, through you, Mr. Chairman.

On January 29, you said you were informed after question period that you'd been advised of this on January 21. It was Mr. Young who had informed you of that, or who reminded you of that?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No. As I recall, I had further meetings with the departmental staff, including the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The deputy chief reminded me that I had been briefed the previous Monday on the matter and that actually the two were connected, even though I had focused on the Friday briefing, which gave me more information, and at which also the photograph was noted. But I had not initially, and certainly not when I was in the House, made that connection between the two briefings: the Monday briefing and the Friday briefing. Hence my answer in the House.

So when I got back to the department they reminded me that it was connected to the Monday briefing. That's when I returned to the House the next day, after realizing my mistake, and put the matter in correct context.

º (1610)

Mr. Geoff Regan: So it was the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff who reminded you.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Who else was present at the meeting, as you can recall?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't recall all of those who were present at that meeting. But certainly he reminded me about the briefing the previous Monday.

Mr. Geoff Regan: That was on Tuesday afternoon?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes, after question period.

Mr. Geoff Regan: So you were next in the House for question period on Wednesday.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Geoff Regan: You then gave the date, January 21.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Through you, Mr. Chairman, the real question before us of course is whether or not the minister deliberately or intentionally misled the House of Commons. We established pretty clearly last night, when we had the Clerk here, what our parameters are and what the real question before us is. It is whether the minister misled the House on Tuesday, January 29, in his statement saying January 25 was the day he learned of this.

My question, Mr. Chairman, to the minister is, did you deliberately or intentionally mislead the House when you made these statements?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, absolutely not. There is absolutely no motivation for me to do anything of that kind at all. As I indicated earlier, I've been involved in elected office for over 30 years and have served truthfully and honourably, and it is my intention to continue to do so. I have to deal with a lot of information. I have to make sure that fundamentally our troops are operating within Canadian law and government policy. I do ensure that.

The Chair: Mr. Pierre Brien, then Michel Guimond, John Harvard, David Pratt, and Yvon Godin.

Pierre.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): Mr. Chairman, let's try to shed some light on the sequence of events, starting with the end, if you don't mind.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Minister, can you see that?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Except for one head I can see.

An hon. member: Does the flash bother you?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I'm getting a shine in my eyes.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Let's start with January 29. You arrive at Cabinet and from what I understand, a bit like a jack-in-the box, in front of all your Cabinet colleagues, you tell the Prime Minister—who, the day before, had just stated there were no prisoners—that he did not tell the truth, that we had been holding prisoners since the 21st. You surprise the Prime Minister in front of all your Cabinet colleagues by telling him, “Mr. Prime Minister, you were wrong. We have been holding prisoners for over one week, and by the way, I forgot to tell you.”

Why did you speak up at that point in time in Cabinet to deliver this news to the Prime Minister in that manner?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: I didn't tell him in that manner, Mr. Chairman, I can assure you.

As I said, the purpose behind the Tuesday discussion on this issue and the lengthy presentation I made on it was to talk about the general policy of detainees and to inform the cabinet about the Geneva Conventions and how they apply and the different aspects of them. By that point in time I had been briefed a number of times by the Judge Advocate General, our chief legal adviser and expert on this issue, and I was imparting to the cabinet the matters relevant to the Geneva Conventions, the issues in dispute, and the difficulties some lawyers were having in the whole matter. I added a very brief comment at the end of about a 10- or 20-minute dissertation on the subject of detainees that we in fact had taken our first detainees directly into our possession and turned them over to the Americans, of course. That was the scenario.

º (1615)

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: So I take it that you must have taken the Prime Minister quite by surprise at that point.

Let's go back now to January 21. On January 21, you found out at around noon that we had taken prisoners. The sequence starts then. You are the only civilian who knew that we had taken prisoners of war. There is public debate about the status of those detainees. There is public debate about compliance with the Geneva Conventions. What did you do on January 21 to find out about American compliance with the Geneva Conventions? What did you do that day, January 21, after receiving the information at noon?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: It's my responsibility to get a daily briefing and to determine that government policy is being followed. I determined that government policy was being followed.

With regard to the question about the public debate, yes, there had been a simmering public debate. In fact, I recognized it when I was before the joint committee on January 17 in responding to a question.

But on Monday, January 21, the matter had not reached the peak of interest and controversy it did until subsequent comments were made in the United States that indicated a division in how the Geneva Conventions might apply, these legal questions of how status determination....

I know you're anxious, but I'm anxious to give you the answer.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: My question was: what did you do on January 21?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, in fact, the major part of the debate on the issue didn't occur until January 28 when the comments of Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld became full blown in the media.

I think it's also worth bearing in mind, in answering the question, Mr. Chairman--

The Chair: Mr. Minister, I should explain to you that it is the member's time and your answer comes out of his time, within reason. It's Pierre Brien's turn again. Go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: So I take it that on January 21, you did nothing.

Let's go now to January 22. You were still in Mexico City, and according to what I understand, you did nothing on the 22nd either.

On January 23, you were in Tampa Bay with Commodore Thiffault at the command centre. You were at the heart of the action, in the most strategic place, the control centre for troops in Afghanistan. In the United States, the controversy was still swirling, and you were the sole civilian aware that there were prisoners. Their status was unclear, and it was not clear the Geneva Conventions was being followed. What did you do on January 23, when you were in the United States with Commodore Thiffault, to clarify the situation with respect to compliance with the Geneva Conventions?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Of course, Mr. Chairman, the briefing I got on January 23 was a military briefing. They don't get caught up in political controversies. As far as they're concerned, the mandate they're operating under was being honoured, and they were advising me about the issues with respect to what was happening in Afghanistan and what was happening with the troops in the Arabian Sea and the ships and so on. Those are the kinds of things that military briefings are about.

There was nothing I saw in the media in Tampa or in Mexico City that would lead me to believe that this matter was escalating substantially, and I was only getting minimum reports at that point in time about Canadian media. I was more focused on what was actually happening and what our troops were doing, and that's the kind of advice I was getting from Commodore Thiffault.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: My colleague, Michel, will continue. So on the 23rd, once again, you did nothing.

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ): I think we will get the same kind of answer for the 24th, and for the 25th, when you spent the whole day, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., with the Prime Minister in a Cabinet planning meeting; same thing for the 26th, when you were in caucus with your party; same thing for the 27th, when you were in caucus all day; same thing for the 28th in the morning, when you were in caucus from 8 to 11 a.m.

Consequently, during Monday night's emergency debate when Mr. Robinson and Mr. Dubé asked you specific questions when detainees were being discussed—you said so earlier in response to a question that you trivialized by saying that it was just a political debate—you felt no responsibility, you did not feel compelled to disclose that prisoners had been taken.

Do you think that is acceptable? Do you think what you said earlier, is credible, Minister, when during the debate on the 28th, repeatedly, you always answered in the future tense, you answered exactly like the Prime Minister had answered on the 28th, saying that the question was hypothetical and that when we had prisoners, we would see? That is how you answered us on the 28th, during the emergency debate.

º (1620)

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, I don't agree with that characterization at all. That's wrong. I think the honourable member is missing the point. The point is, in the take-note debate, the real issue was the troops going overseas and, as a part of that, a discussion about detainee policy. I think that was the important part to address.

I think the question of having taken detainees is getting too much concern when it's really the policy that was under consideration at that time. As I said, the taking of detainees was what they were sent over there to do. What would the honourable member expect they were going to do, if not take detainees? That's what they were sent there to do.

It was all done in accordance with government policy and in accordance with the rules of engagement. So what was really important, and where I think the honourable member is missing the point, with all the X's on his map, is that it's the policy that was the real consideration.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond That is not the question. The question has to do with the treatment of prisoners under the Geneva Conventions. Although the minister had been informed, he waited until the 29th to spring the news or pull it out of the hat like a magician. He waited until the 29th to reveal it. Why did you not disclose it on one of the many occasions you had, during one of the many meetings at which you could have informed the Prime Minister, on the 25th, the 26th, the 27th or the 28th?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I indicated, what I was doing...I was away. I got the briefing. I knew there had been the taking of detainees. I was satisfied that the policy was followed.

I came back to catch up when I got back into Ottawa, to get a face-to-face briefing, to catch up on the news as it had been evolving that week while I was away, to have further meetings with the Judge Advocate General or with other officials to talk about detainee policy, the Geneva Conventions, and how they were being applied.

That, to me, was the important thing to do to prepare for the cabinet meeting on the Tuesday morning, to be able to be prepared to talk about detainees, to be able to tell my cabinet colleagues what policy was being followed. That was the important thing to do; that's what I was preparing to do.

If I had known the Prime Minister was going to be asked this question by the media on the Monday and give the answer he did, then of course I would have liked to have told him earlier. No minister wants to see their prime minister left in that situation. I would have liked to have told him earlier. I regret that. Hindsight is 20/20. I've apologized to the Prime Minister for that. But I was focused on the main issue, which was detainee policy.

The Chair: John Harvard and then David Pratt.

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood St. James--Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming today, Mr. Eggleton. I think your testimony so far today has been quite compelling.

When you explain the policy, I think I can understand why you didn't send the information about the detainees that you garnered on January 21. I can understand, from a policy point of view, why you didn't send it upstairs and, eventually, to the Prime Minister.

I am puzzled, Mr. Minister, about one thing. You're a seasoned politician. You're a veteran politician. You already pointed out your eleven years as mayor of Toronto and nine years, almost, in the federal cabinet. You're a veteran. You understand politics and political issues.

I think it's hard for some of us to understand, when it's understood that the question of detainees was a very hot political issue before this came up. How did it fail to get by you? Why didn't you recognize this as a potentially explosive political issue, immediately seize upon it, and send it up?

Yes, no policy was broken and no guidelines were flouted, but it's the politics of it. With this political antenna you have, why didn't you send it up to the Prime Minister?

º (1625)

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's a good question.

As I indicated, when I appeared before the committees on January 17, two members of the committee, two of our Liberal members, in fact did raise the question of detainees. I indicated in my testimony today my response about the matter at that time. Later that day, I did phone the Prime Minister and talk with him about this whole issue of detainees.

At that point in time, it was still not a major issue. It was an issue for some people, granted. There had already been the photographs of the shackling and hooding of some of the detainees because they had been dangerous. They'd been threatening their captors, and for their protection this action was undertaken.

The issue gained momentum in the time that I was away. Frankly, it was gaining much more momentum here in Canada than it was in the places I was visiting--Mexico and the United States. When I got home, I got a better understanding of the heightened level of the issue, but even then it hadn't reached the pinnacle, which it did on Monday, January 28, when the Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld views were being talked about on that occasion.

When I got home, of course I wanted to find out more about what the problem was with the issue, what the lawyers were saying, what the points of contention were. I went through several discussions between then and Tuesday morning, when I appeared before the cabinet.

I had to be prepared to talk about the issue, not a specific incident, which was carried out in accordance with government policy, but the rising issue of detainee status and how that was being determined. That's what I had to prepare for, and I didn't want to talk to the Prime Minister or to the cabinet before I was fully prepared on that issue. As a seasoned politician, you want to be thorough when you give a briefing and be prepared to answer questions. So I needed to have that kind of information, and it was on that basis that I acted the way I did.

I didn't know he was going to be asked the question on the Monday, obviously, or I would have at least told him that detainees had been taken.

Mr. John Harvard: It is possible, Mr. Minister, through the chair, that one of the reasons the information wasn't sent upstairs by you is that from the get-go, from the outset, you never thought the issue of detainees was a big thing; you never thought of this as a big deal. Is that why perhaps you just put it away somewhere in the dark recesses of your mind? Is that possible?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, I didn't put it in the dark recesses, but I didn't consider it to be the major issue that some people did, simply because I had the understanding through the Judge Advocate General, who had talked with counterparts in the United States, that there was a respect for the Geneva Conventions. In fact, I saw documentation from the United States that indicated they were treating people humanely in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Their exact words were “consistent with the Geneva Conventions”. They also had a visit from the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Chairman, so I didn't think....

In the minds of some people it was a major issue, and I respect that, but in my mind I didn't see it as such. I could see it was growing. It was growing from lukewarm when I left for Mexico up to something that was much hotter by Monday, January 28.

º (1630)

The Chair: David Pratt, you have about four minutes.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): Thank, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Minister, for being here today.

The issue I want to raise with you, Minister, relates to some comments Mr. Pallister made yesterday related to that meeting on January 17, the joint meeting of the defence and foreign affairs committees. In his comments--and I will read them again for the record--he states:

On January 17th, 2002, the Minister of Defence appeared before a joint meeting of the Standing Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs. He was questioned by several Liberal Members of Parliament on the issue of the handling of prisoners taken by Canadian troops in Afghanistan. In his responses, he stated that the government's policy on the handling of prisoners was “still under examination, and will be finalised shortly”.

I thought he had taken your comments at the committee completely out of context. When I looked at the comments you had in fact made in response to Mr. Patry, what you said was to clarify that it was our position that we were going to be taking prisoners and that it would be done on the basis of Canadian law and international law. That, I think, was clear to everyone around the table. But what you said to Mr. Patry was:

I've told you what would be our intent with respect to prisoners, since we will not have detention facilities, but we still have obligations under international law. With respect to any further policy issues, those matters are still under examination and will be finalized shortly.

Then you go on to talk about the mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Could you clarify for the committee what those further policy issues were? Again, this is because I think Mr. Pallister had completely taken your comments out of context.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I can't, at this point, determine what further policy issues I was referring to at that point in time. Subsequently, there did come the policy issues of dealing with detainee determination and what procedures were used on that. I can't recall whether that was a particular issue on that occasion.

I did say we intended to follow Canadian law and international law and that there is policy. I said:

Let's also remember that there is a mandate to the International Committee of the Red Cross to examine the conditions under which these people are being kept and to ask questions about all those procedures, including their status.

Subsequently, there was that concern about status determination. I can't be absolutely sure that's what I was referring to, though, on that occasion.

Mr. David Pratt: Just to finish up, could you respond to Mr. Pallister's assertion, in his responses referring to your responses, where he stated that the government's policy on the handling of prisoners was still under examination and would be finalized shortly?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No. We said, Mr. Chairman, that we were following international law, the Geneva Conventions specifically, and that we were following Canadian law. I made that abundantly clear on the 17th.

The Chair: Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie--Bathurst, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back to the January 17 meeting. According to Mr. Pallister's evidence yesterday, he referred to some Liberals. You said you had no reason to mislead the House. You told us about your 22 years in Toronto, about your years here in Ottawa, and you told us what an honest person you are.

I do not wish to question your honesty, Minister, but I am nevertheless compelled to say that there are lingering doubts, and the reason for that is quite simple. On January 17, a Liberal, Marlene Jennings, who is a very respectable person, told the committee in your presence that she would like to know:

...what position has Canada taken on the issue of anyone we capture during the six months in the theatre of operations in Kandahar? Will we be using the Geneva Convention? If we're not going to be using the Geneva Convention, in the sense of designating them prisoners of war, what legislative framework will we be using?

Then, another member of the Liberal Party, Bernard Patry, said:

...those who are taken prisoners under Canadian command will be turned over to US authorities. In your opinion, in so doing, isn't Canada setting a major policy precedent?... Canada is indirectly shirking its responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions.

Another Liberal, John Godfrey, said:

The more I hear you talk, the more alarmed I get.... At what point are we compromised in our sovereignty, in our value system, in our morality--

Those are the comments of your Liberals, the Liberals on one committee. You respect House committees. You respect the House. You respect the government. You respect Canadians.

In the January 24 Ottawa Citizen, Bonnie Brown said she was very worried about our participation in this so-called war. She said she had had enough of it, that we had bowed to pressure and that she saw no payoff for relations between Canada and the United States.

Steve Mahoney is a great defender of the Liberals in the House of Commons. He shouts from the other side the same way Yvon Godin often does. It is all well and good that his father was a steelworker. I was a steelworker too, and I do not know, but in any event, Steve Mahoney said he thought you would hear this type of comment in caucus: do not let things go so far as to compromise our independence.

Carolyn Bennett, for her part, said that the so-called issue of loss of sovereignty was of the utmost importance.

John Harvard said that Eggleton and Manley seemed to eager to please the Americans.

That was on January 17, Mr. Chairman.

Now, you say you were advised on January 21 in Mexico City. With all the problems going on here, with all the problems in the Liberal caucus, between Allan Rock and Paul Martin, or the Liberal infighting, the two camps, the battle, caucus, the problems you are experiencing and the newspapers are reporting on, as you can see, now you say you had no interest in hiding anything, and you want me to believe that.

I am going to go rather quickly because I am using up my time and I want to get some answers. I think it is important to highlight these facts for the minister.

When Mr. Duceppe asked his question, he went straight to the point:

Mr. Speaker, the honorable member who is appointed Minister of National Defence should normally be sufficiently qualified to be appointed. Since when did he know that Afghans had been captured by Canadians and handed over to Americans? Since when did he know that? And why did he not inform the Prime Minister who, as recently as Sunday, stated that there were no such prisoners? Why did he not bother to tell him during yesterday's caucus meeting, before oral Question Period? What is going on with this minister? Did he know or did he not?

Mr. Chairman, the minister's response—we are talking here about one week—is the following: “Mr. Speaker, I first became aware of the possibility on Friday.”

Do you think, Mr. Chairman, that the minister's mind went partially blank? Is that what we have for a Minister of Defence? The question was to the point. He answered: “Mr. Speaker, I first became aware...”. He did not say he had begun working on the matter and had seen the photo and so on. He said: “I first became aware...” So he should stop referring to January 21.

º (1635)

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Minister, you have about five minutes to answer those questions.

Mr. Art Eggleton: It's a very wide-ranging question. I've answered a good deal of it, Mr. Chairman.

As I've indicated, I got more details on the Friday. I got the initial briefing the previous Monday. Between Wednesday, the 17th, and the Friday, I was out of the country, except for the stop in Edmonton. Certainly, by the time I got back I could see the growing interest in the subject of detainees.

But at all times our policy has been to follow international law. I quite clearly said to the committee on the 17th that we were following the Geneva Conventions. If we captured anybody, we would treat them in accordance with prisoner-of-war status and we would transfer them to our allies, the United States.

We don't have detention facilities. We haven't had detention facilities in other cases where we've served in peace support operations. Sometimes there we have captured people and turned them over to local authorities, as may be the relevant thing to do.

This is a United States-led mission. We're there in support not only of them but also of our own values and the protection of our own Canadians, because it was our continent on which the attack of September 11 occurred.

Let us not think that these kinds of things couldn't happen to us. I don't have any reason to believe there's any imminent threat, but we must take protection. Part of the protection for Canadians is in fact to stop those terrorists overseas from ever coming to this country.

So we're part of that mission. We're working with our allies, and our allies are countries--particularly the United States, which leads the mission--that have a very solid reputation for treating people fairly and humanely and that are operating consistent with the Geneva Conventions. Those are the important things.

º (1640)

Mr. Yvon Godin: Would it be possible, Mr. Chair, for the minister to tell us if it's possible that somebody from Defence would have advised the Prime Minister's Office?

Mr. Art Eggleton: On the JTF-2?

Mr. Yvon Godin: On the JTF-2 and the prisoners. Is that possible?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Are you saying it's not possible?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, it's not in the structure. The structure that is set out in government policy involves the Chief of the Defence Staff advising me on JTF-2 and I in turn would advise the Prime Minister if there were any variances from the policy.

That does not apply to other troops. There is a regular reporting procedure going from the chain of command to the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office on matters other than JTF-2, which has this special status given the nature of the operations they perform.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chair, if that's not possible, do you have any problem with this committee calling people from the Prime Minister's Office to be witnesses to testify to that?

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's certainly not for me to decide.

I've told you quite clearly--

Mr. Yvon Godin: I just asked if you would have a problem with that.

Mr. Art Eggleton: --what the policy is, and the policy with regard to JTF-2 involves the CDS, myself, and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Yvon Godin: I'd like to ask if--

The Chair: Yvon, that's a matter for the committee itself to decide. You've made your point.

You have one minute left. Go ahead.

Mr. Yvon Godin: My question, Mr. Chair, was whether as the Minister of National Defence it would bother him if we were to do that.

The Chair: I heard his reply. My reply was that I don't care whether he says yes or no. It's for the committee to decide.

º (1645)

Mr. Yvon Godin: I'm happy to hear that, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: You have one minute.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Does he want me to say whether or not I'm bothered?

Again, it's up to you, Mr. Chair.

[Translation]

The Chair: Yvon, one minute.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Honestly, with everything you say happened on the 17th, you did not feel that people were concerned until you arrived here on January 24. That is when you discovered that things were boiling over and that people were starting to ask questions.

Does that means the meeting on the 17th made no impression on you?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Oh no. I quite clearly indicated in my opening remarks that the matter had been raised. You pointed out who had raised the matter. My remarks are quite in accordance with that. I understood that to be a concern of some people, but as I said on that occasion, we were following international and Canadian law.

The Chair: Joe Jordan, Geoff Regan, Jay Hill, and Marlene Catterall.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Through you to the minister, you mentioned that on January 17--and I'm going to repeat what I heard because this is certainly new information to me--JTF-2 had been present and part of an international force that some time prior to January 17 had been involved in an operation where prisoners were taken. Is that correct?

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's correct.

Mr. Joe Jordan: But what differentiates that from something that happened 24 hours previous to the 21st was that JTF-2 took possession of these prisoners for a certain period of time. Is that a fair characterization?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes. On the first occasion the JTF-2 did not take physical possession of the prisoners. They were involved in an operation, but they did not physically take possession of the prisoners. In the second case they did.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I don't want to get into operational details, but was there a reason for that? Or is it just the logistics? Was it their turn?

Mr. Art Eggleton: They're part of a multinational operation. Since the United States is the lead country, the United States is usually involved in these multinational operations. When I say “multinational”, it's not just the Canadians and the Americans necessarily; there could be other countries involved in that as well.

But the outcome of the second event that involved the taking of detainees was different from the first event that I described to the committees here on January 17.

Mr. Joe Jordan: How was it specifically pointed out to you in the briefings that there was a difference?

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I indicated, the photograph certainly made that very clear, as well as the further briefing I received on January 25.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you.

Again, through the chair, Mr. Minister, last night we went into excruciating detail about why we're here. We're here because you made two separate statements to the House of Commons. They were on the record. They were in Hansard. The House cannot leave that situation without it being reconciled somehow.

Why wasn't the information we're hearing today part of your response to the question of privilege in the House on January 30, or January 31, when it was brought forward by Mr. Pallister?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I feel fundamentally that it was. The detail I've given today is an elaboration on that. There's nothing new that I'm presenting today, other than an elaboration on what I said that morning in the House, the Thursday morning.

However, I really had very little notice of that particular discussion occurring in the House. I appeared without notes and just proceeded to talk about the situation. Obviously, more detail was needed, and that's why I'm here today.

Mr. Joe Jordan: If the point of privilege had not been put forward, did you feel that your two answers in the House reconciled this on their own?

Mr. Art Eggleton: On the second day, the Wednesday, when I had gone back into the House, in response to a question, I was able to put into correct context the fact that there had been a briefing and the briefing had come within 24 hours of the event. I thought that this in fact was correcting the situation, the mistake I had made.

The Chair: Geoff Regan.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, through you, Mr. Chairman, perhaps you told us already, but would you tell us again if you have, who was it who briefed you on January 21?

Mr. Art Eggleton: The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Greg Maddison. Normally it's the Chief of the Defence Staff, but he was away that particular time.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you.

It seems this chain of command is confusing, because you seem to have one chain of command, or one system, for the JTF-2 and another system for the Princess Pats, for example, and other parts of the Canadian Forces. I'd like to understand better how this chain of command works.

Also, and this is a related question, and perhaps it should be separate, what role in the JTF-2 mission in Afghanistan did the Prime Minister's Office have? What role did the Privy Council Office have? What role did the Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism have in that mission?

Sorry for the long question.

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, that's quite fine.

You're quite correct, the JTF-2 has a separate reporting procedure within the chain of command. Unlike other units, such as the Princess Pat's or the navy or the air force, which go up through a chain of command involving Commodore Thiffault, who is the commander for the operation out of MacDill base in Tampa, JTF-2 does not go to him. JTF-2 goes from the commander of JTF-2 to the Chief of the Defence Staff. It even bypasses the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, unless he takes over that role in the absence of the chief, which was the case on this particular occasion.

According to government policy, I would then get the information. If there is anything out of the ordinary, anything that is a diversion from government policy, a diversion from the rules of engagement, then I have the obligation, the responsibility, to inform the Prime Minister. That's the normal chain of command.

There was no discussion at the public security and anti-terrorism committee. I'm not even sure the committee met in the period of time between when I went away to Mexico and when the matter was first raised in the House on Tuesday, January 29. But they were not part of the loop, so to speak, in that particular matter in terms of JTF-2.

The public security and anti-terrorism committee has been largely dealing with policies and programs relevant to enhancing the security of Canadians as a result of the September 11 attack, rather than the day-to-day information flow of the operation of the troops in the field.

I hope that answers your question.

I might add one other thing, if the member would like. This is part of your question, and I'm sorry I forgot to answer. The reason for this special relationship with JTF-2 is the nature of their work. They are a counter-terrorism commando organization, they're highly skilled, and they are a unique operation in the Canadian Forces. They operate similarly to how other units, what are called special forces, do in other countries. Stealth and covert operations are an important part of their method of operation, so there needs to be an extra level of security with respect to these people. You would note that even in the photograph that appeared, their faces were covered so that they could not be identified, both for their own protection and for the protection of their families.

It is felt that this kind of level of security is necessary for their operation and for their personal security. It's not peculiar to Canada; it's also done in Britain, in Australia, and in other countries that have them. Some countries don't even want to admit they have them.

º (1650)

The Chair: Jay Hill.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for appearing today. I want to begin by stating that it's been widely reported that U.S. Special Forces were involved in the planning, training, and execution of the raid on the Chinese hospital in Kandahar. My question just needs a yes or no. Did JTF-2 participate in any way, directly or indirectly, in that operation?

The Chair: Mr. Minister, there's a question of relevance there. The member is entitled to put the question and you're entitled not to answer it.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For operational security reasons, I can't talk about operations.

My understanding, however, from the media reports on the occasion when that took place, whoever was involved in it taking place, was that a group of terrorists had taken over a wing of the hospital. It wasn't an attack on a hospital or on its patients per se. The patients had been moved to another area. My understanding is that an attack took place on that occasion.

I only know that from the media reports and from my understanding with respect to generalized information on the matter. I cannot talk about the JTF-2 and whether or not there was any involvement, not because of this matter specifically but because of the general policy.

º (1655)

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, the United States has obviously already confirmed that U.S. Special Forces were involved in the planning, training, and execution of that particular raid, yet we have to shroud our forces in secrecy. Is that correct, that we can't have that revealed?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, Mr. Chairman, that is not correct. I realize there are perceptions that some countries are more open about what their special forces do than others, but if you actually check back on the reports, you'll find that some of them do not come from government sources. Some of them are highly speculative or are media reports that are unconfirmed by those government sources.

The Chair: Jay, I hope this is relevant. We're dealing with two different versions of something in Hansard. Now, it's your time, but I'm not sure where it's leading with respect--

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, it's very relevant.

I wonder, then, if the minister has any speculation as to why the government leader in the Senate said yesterday:

...there seemed to be some question about whether the incident in question went beyond the mandate of the particular group.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I saw a version of it earlier--I don't have it in front of me--that put it into a much larger context than that, so I'm not prepared to say that this is a correct characterization of her remarks.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. Mr. Chairman, through you, would the minister perhaps care to comment on what if any aspect of JTF-2's mandate created--also a quote from the government leader in the Senate yesterday--“considerable amount of unease among a number of the ministers”. I'm assuming she's referring to a cabinet meeting.

Mr. Art Eggleton: If there was any unease, it might have been related to that overall issue I talked about earlier. I wouldn't necessarily suggest cabinet ministers were, but there were some members, as I pointed out on January 17, even in my own party who were concerned about the issue. I don't recall hearing from any of my cabinet colleagues on that matter, however. There was concern in the public domain about how the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and the detainee policy was being handled, and perhaps the reference is connected to that. I couldn't tell you. I didn't make the remarks; the government leader in the Senate did.

I can read to you what she said in total, though. I have it here now.

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, I have the quote from the Senate. Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Art Eggleton: But you've only read part of it.

» (1700)

Mr. Jay Hill: Cabinet obviously must have agreed to the rules of engagement--I think you've already said that here today--in advance of the Prime Minister deploying JTF-2 to Afghanistan. What could possibly have later changed to create unease in the cabinet about their mandate?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I didn't say there was any unease in the cabinet about the mandate. You said that.

Mr. Jay Hill: No, the government leader in the Senate said that.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I can't tell you what she was referring to. I can only speculate that it might have had something to do with a question of detainees, and that wasn't necessarily a concern of cabinet colleagues. Certainly, we have taken the position that international law and Canadian law need to be followed in this particular case.

Mr. Jay Hill: I'm following up, Mr. Chairman, on a question posed earlier by Mr. Regan or Mr. Jordan dealing with the role of the PMO in the deployment of our forces overseas. It's been reported that the active deployment of JTF-2 personnel is only made with the approval of the Prime Minister. Since this inquiry, Mr. Chairman, is all about what I referred to yesterday as the believability factor, does the minister expect Canadians to believe that the Prime Minister makes the decision to deploy Canadians into an active theatre of war but then is no longer kept informed as to what happens to them after that or what they do?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, that's not what I said at all. The Prime Minister certainly does approve. The cabinet approves the deployment of Canadian troops on all occasions, and government policy is clearly established with respect to the conduct of those troops and is reflected in the rules of engagement. If there were any variance, any diversion, from those rules that I became aware of--and I'm fully informed by the chain of command--then I would bring that to the attention of the Prime Minister. That's the protocol that exists.

Mr. Jay Hill: Through you to the minister, Mr. Chairman, would the operation that resulted in the raid on the Chinese hospital in Kandahar fall within the mandate of the JTF-2?

Mr. Art Eggleton: You're speculating that we were even involved in that kind of mission.

Mr. Jay Hill: No, I'm just asking, would it have fallen within that mandate?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I can't tell you that. I can tell you, as I said today in the House, that the JTF-2 has followed Canadian government policy, Canadian law, and the rules of engagement, and it has not diverted from that course.

Mr. Jay Hill: But my question is, Mr. Chairman, do the rules of engagement and the mandate include that type of operation?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I'm not going to talk about any specific operation. For security reasons, I cannot, Mr. Chairman, get into...I'm not prepared to call it in terms of type. I am prepared to say that the Canadian Forces, and in this case specifically the JTF-2, are following Canadian law and that they're following government policy, which is something that is my responsibility to ensure that they do. If for any reason they don't, I would certainly be bringing that to the attention of the Prime Minister. I have not had the occasion to have to bring it to the Prime Minister because it hasn't happened. They have followed Canadian law and government policy.

The Chair: I'm assuming these questions deal with chain of command...and you have two minutes.

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, through you to the minister, is it not true that during past hostage training exercises JTF-2 reported to the Privy Council Office? For training exercises, do you know what the policy was?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, I'm not aware of that being the case. The policy that is in effect now, the only policy I have operated under, is one where the advice is given to me. The reports are given to me by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Mr. Jay Hill: There's this mysterious secret memo that has surfaced, apparently in the last few days, Mr. Minister. Did that result in a policy change in the way JTF-2 reported?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't know that any memo has surfaced. There was a media report about the existence of one. It didn't say that it had surfaced; it didn't say that anybody had seen it. I'm certainly concerned about even the report of one, but there are many cabinet documents dealing with government policy. There is a cabinet document that deals with this question of the policy, one I've enunciated for you in general terms, with respect to how the reporting goes for the JTF-2.

The Chair: Jay, another comment; you have thirty seconds.

Mr. Jay Hill: Well, my comment to wrap up this round, Mr. Chairman, would be that the minister asked what possible motivation he would have to deliberately mislead the House. I would suggest, through you, Mr. Chairman, that a possible motivation might be to protect the Prime Minister if he already knew that prisoners had been taken or to buy time to sort out how the Americans were going to treat those prisoners, that is, would they adhere to the Geneva Conventions or not? Obviously, you could buy time, Mr. Minister, if you didn't reveal that at your earliest possible opportunity, which was during the take-note debate or even previous to that.

The Chair: Marlene Catterall.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West--Nepean, Lib.): Well, Mr. Chair, I will say that this has been a most interesting discussion about the operations of JTF-2, but I would like to try to get us back to the purpose of the committee's hearings, the reference from the House to this committee on the question of privilege and possible contempt.

Mr. Chair, the minister obviously wasn't here last night for the testimony of the Clerk, but I thought the Clerk laid out very clearly before us what the issues before the committee were. I'd like to review those one by one with the minister.

One, did the minister mislead the House, i.e., did he put information in front of the House that wasn't correct? Two, did he know the information was incorrect when he gave it to the House? And three, did he do it intentionally, with the purpose of misleading the House?

Let me deal with the first. I think the minister has been very clear that he did give wrong information to the House. Can I confirm that? I heard the testimony and the minister's statement in the House, and what I heard was that on January 29, during question period, he informed the House that he had been informed of the Canadian capture of people in Afghanistan on Friday, January 25. Was that your first statement to the House?

» (1705)

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I indicated previously, it's important to understand the context in which I made my answer to the question on that Tuesday afternoon, because what was clearly in my mind at that point in time was the focus on the photograph, the focus on the briefing I'd received on the Friday. The photograph was of some interest at the media scrum, and it was obviously of some interest in the House, because a question from the member from Portage--Lisgar was relevant to the photograph. This was quickly followed by a question that I answered from the leader of the Bloc Québécois, in which I again indicated the Friday. So it was in that context.

Obviously that was not complete. Obviously the omission of the briefing of Monday, January 21, was a situation that made that answer not complete.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: But to get back to my original question, the minister concedes that he put information before the House that--

Mr. Art Eggleton: That was incomplete, yes.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: So let me ask, then, did the minister believe it was true, or did he know it was not true?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, I believed it to be true.

Again, in the context in which I answered the question, I want to give correct and truthful information to the House at all times. In question period you get the cut and thrust, and you get a very short period of time to understand these questions that are about 35 seconds in length and cover a multitude of issues. You have to try to pull it into some kind of context and quickly get up on your feet and respond to it.

I was focused on the photograph a lot, and I was focused on the Friday briefing, where I got a fuller understanding. So it's in that context I gave the answer I did. I certainly did not give an answer that I thought to be incorrect. Subsequently, however, when I got to my office, I was reminded about the Monday briefing. I had not made that connection.

I made a mistake, and I have clearly said that I made a mistake. I went back the next day and corrected it in the questions I was asked on the Wednesday and Thursday.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: And that's where the problem comes, and why this reference, because you gave one piece of information on January 29 that you've admitted was wrong but did not know was wrong at the time.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes. If I was trying to hide something, I wouldn't have gone in there on January 30 and given the corrected statement in the House. I obviously wanted to make sure I got back as quickly as possible to correct the record and put it in the appropriate context.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: That's what I'm getting to. On January 30 you came into the House and answered a similar question with the correct date.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: The problem, or the problem some people are trying to make, is that you didn't then say “I'm sorry, I gave the House the wrong information yesterday, and this is the correct information”. Is there some reason you didn't do that?

Mr. Art Eggleton: It was done in the context of question period, where you get a 35-second answer. You have to get out a fair bit of information in that period of time.

I'm not an expert on House procedure. If it would have been more appropriate to put it in that context, I would have done so, but I felt that what was important was to get the correct information out.

The Chair: Marlene, you have four and a half minutes left for your side.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Okay.

I don't want to get into side issues--that is, who knew, or who the minister should have informed--because those are not really the issues before us.

The Chair: I also have David Pratt on the list.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I think the main point I've tried to make with this line of questioning is this: Did the minister say something in the House that he knew to be false? He said no, he didn't. He realizes he made a mistake. He didn't know it was not the truth at the time. The next day he gave the correct information, so that day is not a problem; that information was correct.

That's really what I wanted to get on the record here.

» (1710)

Mr. Art Eggleton: Maybe I can answer your last question.

Certainly there was no intention, as I've said many times before, to mislead the House.

To the honourable member from the Conservative Democratic Reform Party who preceded, to suggest that there might have been a motive is absolutely false. It's perhaps imaginative on his part to say that, but it's absolutely false.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: Thank you.

The Chair: David Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean--Carleton, Lib.): How much time do I have, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: You have just over three minutes.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay. I'll be very brief.

Through you, Mr. Chair, to the minister, I'd like to get a sense of the volume of briefings you get on a weekly basis. This may be a difficult question to answer off the top of your head, but presumably when Canada has troops deployed overseas--close to 3,000 troops now--you must get a tremendous volume of information from the standpoint of both hours of briefings plus pages of information. I suspect you would probably get diplomatic briefings, departmental briefings, intelligence briefings, and situation reports from the field. Can you give us a sense of how much volume there is over the course of a week?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Only in the sense of saying it's enormous. We not only have the close to 3,000 people who are involved in the Afghanistan campaign, we have another 2,000 or so involved in other operations in the world. We have involvement in some 18 missions. Not all of them are large missions, by any means. Sometimes there are only one, two, or three observers here or there. But we have a very large involvement in contributing to international peace and security.

When I say I'm briefed every day, that's just the beginning. Usually it's in the early part of the day. In the case of the Mexico one, it came at noon. But in most cases, it's in the early part of the day. It's not the only briefing I get; I do get other briefings during the day on different issues.

The Canadian Forces is a big, complex organization. It's almost like running a city, because it has everything in it--doctors, lawyers, every occupation possible, every kind of issue. We even run a whole health care system, which we are reforming right now, just as there is public discussion about reform of the national health care system. We have a separate health care system. So there's no shortage of issues.

I think it's important, though, that the Minister of Defence understand the key issues, understand what needs to be done, understand how it all relates to government policy. And I do that. I've been in this position for almost five years. When I got into the job, there had been something like six ministers of defence in seven years. I've enjoyed the confidence of the Prime Minister for almost five years now, which is the longest anybody has served in this office since the end of the Korean War. I hope that says something about the job I'm doing.

There's no doubt there's a lot of information that has to be absorbed every day. I take the absorption of that information and the following of government policy, Mr. Chairman, very seriously.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

The Chair: Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Yes.

Yesterday I asked Mr. Pallister a question. He was to provide information to the committee. I'm just wondering if he has, in fact, provided that information.

The Chair: It's not a point of order. And I mentioned at the beginning that we're requesting the material Mr. Pallister promised.

Minister, you should know now, we're going to go to the five-minute rounds.

Colleagues, I want to explain to you what I'm doing here. There's an element of time; the minister has been in question period and so on.

I have Cheryl Gallant first. These are five-minute rounds, Minister. A Liberal has given up his time to Peter Stoffer because he has to leave. Then it's Pierre Brien, Mauril Bélanger, Jay Hill, and David Pratt. So we're not in order here, but we're moving it along.

Cheryl Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Through you to the minister, on February 4, Mr. Minister, you said in the House that significant incident reports are not filed with respect to JTF-2. The reports are given entirely on an oral basis. Would you tell us how that process works?

» (1715)

Mr. Art Eggleton: I've said many times, the Chief of the Defence Staff phones the Minister of National Defence.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

I have a copy of a significant incident report on JTF-2 from 1999. The covering note stated that the enclosed was a briefing report on JTF-2 from 1999 and that there were indeed incident reports involving JTF-2. So there are such incident reports in writing. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Art Eggleton: With respect to Afghanistan, the mandate clearly calls for any reports on JTF-2 to be given to me orally. Whether or not this is on another kind of incident that involves something that happened here in Canada, I'd like to look at the information and then I can give you a more complete answer. There may be cases where the kind of procedure that I've told you about with respect to Afghanistan may not apply, but I would like to look at the information first.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: But in the House, the minister stated that JTF-2 incident reports are always oral, and here we have one that's written. Was there a change in policy? How long has the oral, or verbal, policy only with respect to JTF-2 incident reports been in existence?

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I said, this is the reporting procedure with respect to this mission in Afghanistan. In the mission in Afghanistan, or any operations, there would not be that kind of reporting mechanism.

You have to remember, though, that the mission in Afghanistan is a first for JTF-2. JTF-2 has not been involved in that kind of special operations endeavour previously. It is part of the post-September 11 counter-terrorism measures that are being taken. They've been in existence for some time, but mainly in terms of domestic protection or availability in case of a counter-terrorism problem in this country.

September 11 fundamentally changed the security environment in this country and in the world, and they've taken on a new mission. There is also the fact that, in the budget, money is being provided to expand the JTF-2 given this new mission.

So Afghanistan was something new, and there very clearly was a procedure, a protocol, put in place. That's what I've responded to, and that's what I said is involved in the oral briefing from the CDS.

The Chair: You have a minute and a half.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Mr. Chairman, the minister didn't qualify that remark in the House. He said that JTF-2 significant incident reports are always oral.

So, first of all, who initially gives that verbal report, and to whom does he give it?

Mr. Art Eggleton: It's the Chief of the Defence Staff, who gives it to me.

I would like to look at the document you're talking about. To have that kind of a document and not share it with me....

I find quite frequently that the way the Alliance does their homework, their research, is really quite faulty, and I'd like to have a look at that.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to table the incident reports.

Mr. Art Eggleton: And then I'll be subsequently happy to give a response to the document she's reading.

The Chair: Minister, I'm glad you're happy, because the committee would require it if it's tabled, so it's tabled.

Carry on, Cheryl. You have about 40 seconds.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: How would the minister report to the Prime Minister on incidents involving the JTF-2? Would he give oral reports, or would they be written? And how would one check on the accuracy of the reports if everything is verbal?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I would in fact call the Prime Minister.

You're anxious, it seems, to do something that would threaten the security of those people, and it is of utmost importance that we not do that. Why aren't we focusing on the good work our troops are doing overseas, instead of the kind of thing you're suggesting? The government is fully accountable for these troops; it's fully accountable for all our troops. We operate on policies, rules of engagement.

The Chair: Next it's Peter Stoffer, in place of a Liberal member, and then Pierre Brien.

Joe Jordan, on a point of order--as long as it is a point of order.

Mr. Joe Jordan: It's in your hands to determine that.

The Chair: I know.

Mr. Joe Jordan: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I'm not sure if we agreed that the document would be tabled, but if it's a classified document, I don't think we should be tabling it at the committee.

» (1720)

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: This came through access to information, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Colleagues, you all heard that? By the way, the bells were a quorum call.

Peter Stoffer--briefly.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville--Musquodoboit Valley--Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I'd just like to put on the record that I personally don't think the minister intentionally lied to the House of Commons or to the members of Parliament or the Canadian people. What I think the minister has done is make a major mistake in terms of communication. On that, I've already heard his apology, and on a personal note, I would accept that on behalf of our party.

But, you know, there are more changes to this story than a French figure skating judge. So I basically want to go over a couple of things once again.

JTF-2 was involved in an operation that involved detainees or prisoners of war. When that action takes place, how quickly does that information go from Afghanistan to Greg Maddison or the Chief of the Defence Staff to you?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I would have it within a day of when it occurred--within 24 hours.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You, sir, to the question from the Alliance, indicated it was an oral report.

Mr. Art Eggleton: It always is.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Is anything ever written about those briefings?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: So Mr. Maddison, for example, would give you an oral report, but he wouldn't have any written documentation on that conversation with you or on when the conversation took place.

Just for clarity's sake, you indicated to us that you had a conversation with Greg Maddison, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, on a secure line in Mexico, but there's no written documentation proving that fact; we're just taking your word for it. Is that correct?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, it is my responsibility. As I've said before, given the nature of the operations of this organization, as in the case of other special operations organizations in many other countries throughout the world, we have a security protocol. There is a reporting and accountability procedure. The JTF-2 only engage in operations that come within the parameter of government authorization, as related to government policy.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: So just to reiterate, these are just oral reports you receive, and then you orally pass them on to the Prime Minister, I assume.

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's correct.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, thank you.

Sir, I'm trying to clarify this one more time. Did JTF-2 actually capture those people, were they part of a larger engagement with other forces, or were they just escorting those detainees on behalf of the United States?

The Chair: Again, as chair I would point out the relevance of the question and your judgment on the question of security.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, yes. Obviously they were part of an event, an operation, in which there were people captured. They were clearly involved in that capture, clearly involved in the movement, as the photograph of those people indicated. They had possession of those people, again as the photograph clearly indicated.

But it was a multinational operation. I can't tell you anything more relevant to the specifics of the operation, nor can I tell you the other countries involved in the operation, although I have indicated that the United States is generally involved in mostly all of these operations, given their particular role as leader.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: You have a minute and a half.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: On my last comment and question for the minister--and I appreciate his time--JTF-2 is supposed to be a very secretive force. Generally, Canadians aren't supposed to know what they look like, what their operations are--everything else.

My one question to you, as the Minister of Defence responsible for the lives for these individuals, is how did that picture ever get in the Globe and Mail? If that picture had never appeared, do you think we'd be here today?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I don't know, but the photograph was apparently taken by an American photographer. That person breached a protocol in doing it, as I understand, and there was disciplinary action taken by the United States with respect to that matter. I think the photographer thought he was taking a photograph of the United States troops because there was a United States aircraft, but upon examination, we found they weren't.

[Translation]

The Chair: Pierre Brien, Mauril Bélanger and Jay Hill.

Mr. Pierre Brien: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to come back to the earlier sequence, the agenda from the 21st to the 29th.

According to what you have told me in your previous answers, despite the fact that you were in Tampa Bay on January 23, at the command centre with Commodore Thiffault, nothing was done from the 21st to the 24th to contact American officials to find out whether the Geneva Conventions were being followed during that time.

You say that on the 25th, the lights came on, at your briefing here in Ottawa on the 25th, and an issue began to emerge.

My question is the following. Between January 25 and 28, did you communicate with American authorities to find out whether they were acting, in their opinion, in keeping with the Geneva Conventions?

» (1725)

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Not me personally, but we always had the understanding that they were following international law; they were following the Geneva Conventions. We had no reason to believe they were not.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: When you say not personally, did anyone from you entourage contact American authorities during that period about compliance or non-compliance with the Geneva Conventions?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, there are many contacts on a day-to-day basis between Canadian and American military commanders and authorities of all kinds. The Judge Advocate General and others would be in contact with their people. This would be a frequent thing to have happen. Indeed in Tampa Bay, we have over 50 Canadian Forces personnel who are there to help provide that liaison between the United States and the other coalition partners. There are many countries. It's a mini United Nations in Tampa Bay with the many countries that are participating, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: So to recap, as of January 21, you were the only civilian who knew that prisoners had been captured. Throughout this entire period, you, personally, never saw fit to contact American authorities, knowing that debate had been raging since January 17 among your own troops, and that the status of the Americans' prisoners was being publicly debated in the United States, and that the same thing was going on here, and that Parliament was going to sit on the 28th, when Parliament resumed. Throughout this entire time, there was a debate. You were the sole civilian who knew we had taken prisoners, and you made no attempt to communicate with American authorities to find out what was going on. You informed neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs. You spoke to no one.

Is that what we are to take from your statements here today?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: No. As I said, I get regular briefings, and the departmental officials in the chain of command are in day-to-day contact with counterparts. And I certainly was getting the information at all times that the United States was following the Geneva Conventions. If there had been any variance on that, I certainly would have been advised.

It's one thing to have a political controversy, whether it's bona fide or not bona fide. People will have different views. That's one thing, versus what the reality is with respect to the law. And of course I would have been advised if there had been any variation in terms of the understanding by the chain of command and by the Judge Advocate General with respect to the policy that was being followed by the United States, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chair: One minute and twenty seconds.

Mr. Pierre Brien [Editor's Note: Inaudible]...public debate, but when two of the US President's chief advisers disagreed on the status of the prisoners, perhaps that should set off some alarm bells to the effect that it is perhaps unclear whether they are following the Geneva Conventions.

In your mind, it was clear, but not to the American authorities. You assumed the whole time that everything was being done properly, in good faith, based on what had happened before, whereas we were potentially in violation of the Geneva Conventions, and while your own members and the advisers to the US President were involved in public debate. But you did not see fit to inform the Prime Minister or to contact American authorities to clarify the situation.

You are asking us to believe that here today.

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, the division you're talking about, or the apparent division--they denied there ever was one--between two members of the Bush administration really didn't catch the news until January 28, not in the early period of time that you've just related. Again, I know your party has concerns about this matter, but I don't agree with the picture you're painting of it.

» (1730)

The Chair: Mauril Bélanger, Jay Hill, David Pratt, Garry Breitkreuz.

Mauril.

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger (Ottawa--Vanier, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask the question that my colleague, Mr. Stoffer, asked about the photo, and the fact that it was made public. Was that in fact a breach of security, a breach of procedure? That would seem to be the case, and I hope the authorities will get to the bottom of this matter, because it is indeed quite worrisome that this could happen.

Now that we have had an answer, I would like to invite my colleagues opposite to decide whether they are willing to challenge the statement of the minister, who was asked a number of times whether he had intentionally misled the House. This was repeated many times. It is the order of reference from the House to this committee. He stated categorically that he had not. Mr. Stoffer acknowledged and accepted the minister's statement.

I would like to know from my colleagues opposite whether they are prepared to challenge this statement. If so, they should do so with supporting evidence, because otherwise, we are going in circles. A whole bunch of questions are being asked that do not go to the heart of the order of reference from the House.

[English]

The Chair: That's a rhetorical question. We don't engage in questions across the yard.

Do you want to ask the witness a question, Mauril?

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I am replacing Mr. Saada here, just as you are occasionally replaced.

The Chair: Do you have a question for the minister?

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: No, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to make a comment to my colleagues.

The Chair: No. That's enough.

Mr. Jay Hill.

[English]

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have so many questions I don't know where to start.

First of all, just so I clearly understand, you stated today that sometime prior to January 17, our JTF-2 was involved in a multinational force--an operation, an action--in Afghanistan where prisoners were taken, but they themselves did not specifically take any prisoners.

Mr. Art Eggleton: They did not take control of the prisoners, no.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. Then with the briefing you received from Mexico on January 21, you were not told that they had specifically taken prisoners in a subsequent action.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I was told that they were all aware prisoners had been taken.

Mr. Jay Hill: Let me get this straight. On an action that involved a multinational force, you were informed in your regular oral briefing, presumably, that the JTF had not taken control of any prisoners themselves, and yet, when they did take control, when they had actually captured terrorists themselves, you weren't given that information.

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, I did not have all of the understanding of the details of the mission. I knew they had been involved in this mission. I knew that prisoners had been taken. The details I got more clearly when I returned to Canada on January 25.

Mr. Jay Hill: But if I understand correctly, through you, Mr. Chairman--

Mr. Art Eggleton: But I got the essentials of the mission, enough to make the judgment that it had all been done in accordance with Canadian government policy.

Mr. Jay Hill: If I understand correctly, Mr. Chairman, what the minister is saying is that when the JTF-2 did not take prisoners, he was told during a briefing that they had not taken any prisoners, but when they did take prisoners, he only found out when he looked at a photograph in the Globe and Mail. And we're supposed to believe this.

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, I said the photograph in the Globe and Mail certainly presented a very clear picture of part of the involvement, but that I got further briefing on the Friday as to the details.

The essential thing that I needed to know on the Monday, I knew. I was informed about what I needed to know--that our troops were safe, that the mission was successful, and that it had been completed in accordance with the rules of engagement and government policy.

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, through you, wouldn't an essential thing be that our troops had taken prisoners and then were either in the process or had subsequently handed them over to the Americans? Wouldn't that be an essential thing to know?

» (1735)

Mr. Art Eggleton: The details of the operation I subsequently found out.

What I found out on that occasion, on the Monday, was enough to know the nature of the mission and to know that it had been done according to the rules of engagement and government policy.

I can't go into all the details of this mission, for the reasons I've indicated previously, but I certainly got a much clearer picture when I returned home on the Friday.

Mr. Jay Hill: In a subsequent briefing, perhaps that Friday, through you, Mr. Chairman, did the minister learn specifically from the CDS that the picture, the photo, in the Globe and Mail was of the incident that you had been briefed on orally when you were in Mexico on January 21?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes.

Mr. Jay Hill: The CDS had informed you of that.

Mr. Art Eggleton: When I was in the office on the Friday afternoon, he confirmed that the photograph had involved JTF-2 and had involved the particular mission that he had informed me about the previous Monday.

Mr. Jay Hill: I just want a final point.

The Chair: Comment.

Mr. Jay Hill: Comment, Mr. Chairman.

In the interests of the policy, whether it has been changed or not in the handling of the JTF, in Mr. Pugliese's book, in the bibliography, there's a whole list of documents, “Briefing Note, JTF2 Capability...”, “JTF2 Annual Historical Reports, 1994-1999”, “JTF2 After Action Reports....” I find it incomprehensible and unbelievable that we can't get any information and that they only report orally and that is not a change in policy.

The Chair: David Pratt, then Garry Breitkreuz. Then, colleagues, I intend to try to bring it to a close.

David Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to follow up on Mr. Brien's question with respect to the concern about the detainees.

Through you, Mr. Chair, Minister, I think it's common knowledge, certainly at the defence committee, that DND has legal officers on the ground in Kandahar to ensure that the rules of international law are followed. So when the prisoners were turned over to the Americans, it seems to me--and I presume I have this information correct--their names would have been taken and they would have been identified. Our responsibility from there would be to ensure all of the customs with respect to the laws of armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions, are followed with respect to humane treatment.

So is it safe to say, Minister, that through the course of that week, if there had been any problems, you would have been notified through the chain of command with respect to violations of the Geneva Conventions or any difficulties with respect to treatment of the prisoners?

Mr. Art Eggleton: As much as those people would be able to make that kind of determination, yes.

As I've indicated previously, we have had a legal officer there who has checked the detention facilities and finds that people are being treated in a humane fashion. I think that's important to note. Not only has the Canadian officer determined that, but so did the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the British sent a team in as well. People are being treated humanely.

Mr. David Pratt: So this issue of the treatment of prisoners wouldn't have registered on your radar because there had been no reports of any problems one way or another.

Mr. Art Eggleton: That's right. The rest of the question about detainee determination is really a political, legal kind of question.

Mr. David Pratt: I have another question with respect to the trip you made to Mexico.

Now I presume as the first Minister of National Defence to go to Mexico and meet the defence minister, the foreign affairs minister, the minister responsible for the navy, and the President, that the whole issue...and there were a lot of hot issues around that time surrounding the Canada-U.S. relationship and the possibility of a joint command structure.

Can I ask, Minister, through you, Mr. Chair, if that whole issue was raised with the Mexicans in terms of the mix of issues and briefings you had to deal with at the time?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Yes, I did discuss with all of the people I met there--the President, the chief of defence, the secretary of the navy, and the foreign affairs minister--this whole question of defending the continent and the fact that the United States was moving toward a reorganization of their military to provide for a commander in chief, a CINC, as they call them, for homeland security. I felt that we, Canada, had to know about what was happening, had to make sure nothing was happening that would in any way detract from the interests we have with respect to joint operations, particularly something like NORAD, which is a very unique binational-national command entity, and certainly I made it quite clear we didn't want to have that subordinated.

But I also felt there were opportunities, and I wondered how they were considering this matter. They're part of the continent as well. They certainly are our partners as part of NAFTA. How were they dealing with this matter? What were their thoughts on this matter?

Mexico I think is now trying to get much more involved in international affairs. They have, for the first time in many years, joined the Security Council, and I indicated on behalf of our foreign affairs minister how pleased we were that they had done that. Yes, this was a very useful beginning discussion to get to know each other.

» (1740)

The Chair: Cheryl Gallant, in place of Garry Breitkreuz, and then Jay Hill for an intervention.

Then, colleagues, out of courtesy to the minister, I want to cut this off, but we have one more item of business to deal with.

Cheryl Gallant.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: If Garry Breitkreuz gets back before I'm done, he'd like to take the rest of the time.

How long has the policy of verbally reporting the JTF-2 incident reports been in place?

You inferred that as of September 11, everything changed. Did this policy of verbal versus written reporting change on September 11?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Well, as I said earlier, the policy I'm referring to is relevant to this mission in Afghanistan, and the mission in Afghanistan is the first of its kind in terms of the post-September 11 reality. So this was a new venture in terms of this kind of operation. The organization has existed for a number of years, but in all cases the security of the personnel, the security of their activities, plus the expertise they do have are kept on a confidential basis.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Was the policy change verbal? The policy change going from written incident reports to verbal, was that policy change written down or was the policy change verbal?

Mr. Art Eggleton: I cannot rely upon the comments you are making in terms of the document you have talked about until I've seen it.

There are access to information requests with respect to JTF-2, but any information relevant to the security of the organization or its people is removed from any documentation that is put out under that basis. I would have to see the kind of documentation you are talking about to be able to answer your question further, which I'm willing to do.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

JTF-2 has been our domestic hostage rescue unit and earlier in your testimony you mentioned that they are a special commando force. When did the mandate of JTF-2 change from being a domestic hostage rescue unit to being a foreign counter-terrorist force?

Mr. Art Eggleton: It hasn't changed in the sense of going from one kind of purpose to another; it has added a new kind of purpose. It still has the one that existed before September 11, but it now has additional functions post-September 11.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay. These additional functions, have they been written down? The expansion of the mandate, the change in function, has that been--

Mr. Art Eggleton: They are a part of government policy.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: And can we find that in writing?

Mr. Art Eggleton: No, it's part of cabinet confidence.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Okay, but this cabinet confidence is written down someplace, though.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Most cabinet documents and written protocols are written.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

In the cabinet meeting you had on Tuesday, January 29, did you tell your fellow ministers that you first learned of the involvement of JTF-2 in the hostage-taking? Was it the 21st, or did you tell them you first learned of it on the 25th?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Not hostages; detainees or prisoners. The purpose behind the briefing was the detainee situation overall and the relevance to the Geneva Conventions, to which I--

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: You did not tell them, Mr. Chairman, that you first learned on the 21st--

Mr. Art Eggleton: I told them about the particular mission and the fact that we had taken detainees.

» (1745)

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Mr. Chairman, in reply to Mr. Regan, the minister said he was advised by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff that he had been briefed about the taking of detainees on the 21st--not the 25th--on the afternoon of the 29th, after question period. Yet the next day, in question period, the minister answered six questions related to the prisoner issue, including questions about why it took eight days to pass this information on to the Prime Minister. In reply to any of those questions, he did not admit that he had been informed on the 21st. It was only on a direct question from Ms. Wayne as to why he had not been advised within 24 hours that he admitted he was told on the 21st.

Why did the minister not correct the record at the earliest opportunity, rather than waiting until he was pinned down by a precise question?

Mr. Art Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, I try to answer the questions I am asked in the House directly. I try to give the information people are looking for. The first opportunity I had to be able to give the information I was intent on giving, which corrected the record from the day before, was when I was asked by the member for Saint John.

The Chair: I am going to Jay Hill, briefly, then the Bloc, probably Michel Guimond.

But, colleagues, I really want to cut it off. I am being as fair as I can. So it's Jay, briefly. That was the agreement.

Mr. Jay Hill: I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that that was the agreement, and I will pose one question, briefly.

I would like to return to the issue of this mysterious memo that Ms. Gallant was talking about and I was talking about earlier, Mr. Minister.

If I understand the situation, in the House of Commons today, in reply to a question about this issue, it was stated that this secret, mysterious memo was a cabinet document and therefore protected under cabinet confidentiality.

In the meeting today you alluded to the fact, if I understood correctly, that the mandate of JTF-2 could have changed post-September 11. Can you at least tell us when the cabinet meeting was held that discussed how this new reporting structure would change, that it would move to an oral structure and you would be the only civilian contact, and was it a meeting of the full cabinet? I'm assuming it was some time in the fall, after September 11.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I can't pin it down to a date and I can't pin it down to specifically when it was before cabinet, but it is in fact a government document. It is government policy, which means the cabinet.

The Chair: Michel Guimond, as briefly as possible, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Minister, given that you are the only civilian in Canada who knew that prisoners had been taken captive, why did you do nothing, for over four days, to ensure that the Geneva Conventions would be followed?

[English]

An hon. member: He's already answered that.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I've answered that. At all times we were convinced that the United States was following international law and was treating the detainees in a humane way, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: How could you know that, given your earlier acknowledgment that you had not checked personally with the Americans? How could you assert that the Americans were following the Geneva Conventions?

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: Certainly our officials, on a day-to-day basis, continue with the flow of information between the United States and ourselves. If there was any variation in the policy that was in place, any variation in our understanding, I would have been told and I would have told the Prime Minister.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: But you, personally, as Minister of Defence, the only civilian in Canada with that information... I am not talking about senior officials, nor about “certainties” or “probabilities”, but about you personally, Minister. You refuse to answer the question. You, personally, as Minister of Defence...

The Chair: I am still here, chairing.

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton: As I previously mentioned, we have a legal officer attached to JTF-2, and that legal officer did check the facilities.

The Chair: Colleagues, I want to thank the....

There's a point of order.

» (1750)

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz (Yorkton--Melville, Canadian Alliance): Thank you. Mr. Chair, we really still have a lot of questions, and I'm wondering, with the agreement we made--

The Chair: Garry, this is a point of order.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Yes. We made an agreement that if necessary, witnesses can be called back for subsequent appearances.

The Chair: That is correct.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Because of the fact that we still have a lot of questions, I just want to make sure the committee will agree that this is not the end of it.

The Chair: The agreement we're working under is that witnesses may be recalled. Of course, the committee would have to approve that.

Minister, we want to thank you for your time. I know it's been a long time for you, particularly as it began so close to question period. Thank you very much for being here.

Colleagues, I hope you will not leave. We have one item of business.

Minister, thank you very much, and feel free to leave. Also, if you wish, you can stay and listen to us.

Mr. Art Eggleton: I trust your judgment to carry on without me.

Mr. Garry Breitkreuz: Do I have to make the motion now to bring the minister back in order for that to happen?

The Chair: Not at all. Part of the agreement is that any witness may be recalled, but the committee will have to approve it at the time. I would urge that we don't do that now, Garry, if you don't mind.

Colleagues, we have Jay Hill's motion from yesterday, which is for the tabling of a bunch of documents. The agreement was that the parties would take this list away and examine it, see what sort of material was in it, and then we would consider the motion. The motion was tabled.

Jay, would you like to speak to the motion or retable your motion, whatever we do?

Colleagues, please listen to this.

Mr. Jay Hill: Well, I just put the motion back on the table as is.

I do understand that there's some concern being expressed about being able to provide the committee with those documents in a timely manner and in both official languages. I have been informed that all--or if not all, certainly the vast majority--would already have been translated and shouldn't be a problem, but I just want to raise as sort of an addendum to my motion that obviously we need them in a timely manner. I would hope that most of them would be provided. Most of them are already in the public purview, because I had referred to a lot of them. They're in the bibliography to Mr. Pugliese's book and therefore should be able to be provided to the committee for their perusal in a timely manner.

The Chair: Colleagues, I need discussion of what the chair should do, if anything.

Marlene Catterall.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I don't mind the committee having anything it feels would be helpful. My concern is that, by and large, the discussion this afternoon has not been on the issue before us.

The Chair: Marlene, that may or may not be so. Can we address the motion?

Ms. Marlene Catterall: It's been an interesting discussion, and I know you've given people a lot of leeway....

The Chair: Can we address the motion, Marlene, please? We're dealing with this motion.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: I'm addressing the motion and whether it's relevant to our mandate or not, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Okay, carry on.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: By and large, I feel that, like the discussion this afternoon, it's very interesting and it may be of interest to the national defence committee or the foreign affairs committee, but it's not relevant to the issue before us. However, if it's going to be of any assurance to the opposition that we're willing to consider anything--and we certainly have been considering everything this afternoon--I'm not going to object to it. But it's a lot of work, it's a lot of expense, and if it's not relevant to our mandate, the member might want to reconsider.

The Chair: Jay Hill, you had a comment?

Mr. Jay Hill: Just on relevance, Mr. Chair, with all due respect, I do believe the minister himself brought up the issue of what may have motivated him to deliberately mislead the House. This deals with motivation, and I think therefore it's relevant.

If some members don't want that package of documents, why don't they indicate that? And if nobody wants them but me, then it'll require only one set of documents, one brief.

The Chair: Okay.

Mauril Bélanger.

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

Does requiring the documents tabled with the committee to be in both languages constitute an amendment to Mr. Hill's motion? If so, I would be pleased to put forward this condition as an amendment.

[English]

The Chair: We have a motion on the floor, and I understood from Jay's remarks you were amending it somewhat. Do you want to read it out with the amendment?

Mr. Jay Hill: I don't have it in front of me, but the amendment basically would state that the documents are to be provided in both official languages, in a timely manner, and if they can't be, then we would accept that, I guess.

The Chair: Okay, I'll summarize the motion then.

It's moved by Jay Hill, Prince George--Peace River, that the following documents--and we all have the list--be placed before the committee in both official languages, in a timely fashion, with reference to its examination of the question of privilege raised by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements to the House.

That is the motion before us. Is there any discussion?

Mauril Bélanger.

» (1755)

[Translation]

Mr. Mauril Bélanger: I want to make sure, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Hill's comments are properly interpreted.

The motion says the documents must be filed in both official languages in a timely fashion, but does not say that if they cannot be filed in both official languages in a timely fashion, they will be filed in just one language. If I understand correctly, they are to be filed as quickly as possible in both official languages. I want to be sure of the meaning of the resolution, and that there will be no exception to the rule that they must be filed in both languages or not at all.

Am I right to think that?

[English]

The Chair: By the way, that would be my interpretation.

Jay Hill, it's your motion. Is that a correct interpretation?

Mr. Jay Hill: No, I'm not seeking any exception to official policy of committees and providing everything in both languages.

The Chair: Absolutely. Okay.

Did I have another item of discussion?

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, I have some comments with respect to this.

With all due respect, I think what we need first of all is some clarification with respect to the security classification of these particular documents. I think that is first and foremost.

Mr. Hill has referenced Mr. Pugliese's bibliography, but the fact remains that if these documents were obtained by Mr. Pugliese, chances are there were huge omissions in the documents based on--

The Chair: In a previous discussion of this matter, it was indicated that if that were the case, we would receive them through a request for access to information and there would be blanks in them.

Mr. David Pratt: But we come back to the point, Mr. Chair, that--at least from what I've heard here today, and yesterday as well, listening to Mr. Pallister--the case has simply not been proven as far as the need for these documents is concerned. I just think this is a classic case of a fishing expedition with no apparent purpose.

The Chair: Okay, the motion is put.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: The motion is carried. The staff will proceed accordingly.

Colleagues, I'm going to adjourn this meeting, to the best of my knowledge until 11 a.m. next Tuesday, in this room. The meeting will again be televised. What I can't say is who the witness will be, but it likely will be either General Henault or Vice-Admiral Maddison.

The meeting's adjourned.