:
Thank you. How are you?
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Bonjour à tous. My name is Charles King. I'm the president of the Government Relations Institute of Canada. I am also the vice-president of government relations for Shaw Communications.
With me is Jim Patrick, who is the treasurer of GRIC, chair of our legislative affairs committee, and senior vice-president at the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association. I'd also like to put on the record that Jim is the one who has been spearheading our review of this act, and I want to thank him on behalf of the association.
As you may know, GRIC directly represents some 300 government relations professionals across Canada. Our membership includes consultant lobbyists as well as corporate and organizational lobbyists. GRIC welcomes this review of the Lobbying Act, as it presents government and other stakeholders with an opportunity to clarify elements of the act and its supporting framework.
Through daily practice over the past few years we have identified several areas that have served to cause confusion, not only for lobbyists, but for public servants and parliamentarians as well. This review provides an opportunity for Parliament to ensure that the rules that apply to lobbyists and public office holders are clear, reasonably enforced, and applied equally to everyone.
We have filed a comprehensive written submission with the committee, and today we'll be highlighting GRIC's five core recommendations for bringing additional clarity to the Lobbying Act and its supporting framework, while at the same time maintaining the government's objectives and Canadians' expectations when it comes to transparency and clarity in the government relations business.
At the outset, let me stress that we're not here today asking for easier rules for lobbyists. We are asking for and seeking clearer rules for lobbyists. Lobbying is a fundamental part of the political decision-making process. As lobbyists, our focus is working with our clients and government to make sure that laws and regulations are effective and practical and support the government's economic and social objectives.
Parliamentarians, government officials, business executives, and charitable organizations each have their own distinct way of talking about public policy issues and managing them. Professional lobbyists assist those unfamiliar with government in navigating the ever-changing landscape of government rules and regulations. Put in another way, lobbyists are translators. We explain business or civil society to government, and government to business or civil society.
[Translation]
We are hired by business and charitable groups to develop and advocate specific recommendations on legislation, regulations and fiscal decisions facing government. We are frequently approached directly by government for help on complex files.
Moreover, the vast majority of lobbyists perform these functions in total compliance with the applicable acts and regulations set out by the government.
[English]
Lobbying the government is not a privilege. It is a longstanding right that stretches back through the history of constitutional government. The vast majority of lobbyists take that right very seriously, as well as our obligations to govern our activities in accordance with the rules and regulations set out by the Government of Canada.
Since the act came into force in 2008, the overwhelming majority of communications between lobbyists and public office holders have taken place in full compliance with the letter and spirit of the act.
[Translation]
In other words, the majority of lobbyists, themselves, have acted in accordance with their understanding of the standards and rules set out by the government, and will continue to do so.
[English]
At the same time, the act has been interpreted and applied by the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, the OCL, in a way that has produced a lot of confusion and uncertainly for lobbyists and public office holders.
If the objective of the act was to provide increased transparency and accountability, the way the act has been administered has in many cases had the complete opposite effect: to confuse and muddy the rules under which lobbyists conduct their professional and, in some cases, personal affairs.
This is why GRIC has presented the committee with a short list of specific recommendations we believe would increase the predictability, transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of the regulatory framework for lobbying in Canada.
Jim.
:
Specifically, we have five recommendations.
The first recommendation is that the commissioner's duty to educate public office holders should be more comprehensive. Several times it's become clear that various departments are unclear about their obligations under the Lobbying Act or about important details or definitions within the act. We recommend that OCL should have the explicit mandate to step in and request clarifications and to recommend corrective action where it's clear that a government department is offside with the spirit of the act, the same way that other officers of Parliament do.
Our second recommendation pertains to what's called the “officer responsible for filing returns”. Today the president or CEO of an organization is responsible for filing the initial registration and then all reports of meetings with public office holders. The CEO's name is the only one that appears on the monthly report, even if the CEO wasn't actually in the meeting. We're recommending that in the interest of increased transparency, the names of all lobbyists who actually participate in a meeting be listed on the monthly report—noting that there may be cases where a limited set of exemptions might be in the public interest.
Third, we're recommending that the restrictions on lobbying set out in subsection 10.11(1) of the act—this is what's called the “20% rule”—be revised, but only as they apply to former designated public office holders. There have been instances where the 20% rule has been treated as a loophole rather than a guideline. Our submission, respectfully, is that the rules should apply equally to everyone.
I want to stress that this would not impact citizens or small groups or small businesses who have cause to contact the government or their MP once or twice a year. We would limit the closing of that 20% rule specifically to former designated public office holders.
Our fourth recommendation pertains to the definitions of “oral” and “arranged” communications that are set out in the lobbyist regulations. We think those need to be clarified.
Oral communications is pretty clear: anything that's not written. There's never, however, been a formal definition of the difference between an “arranged” and an “unarranged” communication. We sought clarity on what OCL considers a reportable communication, and we were actually advised that lobbyists should be reporting “unplanned but arranged communications”.
[Translation]
That means that the best advice we have received from the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada is that we should report all unplanned but arranged communications. Quite obviously, more clarification is needed around that.
[English]
However, we do not support OCL's recommendation that the solution to this is to simply erase the word “arranged” and require all oral communications to be reported. The result would be that lobbyists and designated public office holders, including members of Parliament, would have to record and report every conversation they have with each other, whether in your office or in an airport or on the street. As designated public office holders, you already have the requirement to make a record of all reportable communications and to make those records available to the commissioner, on request, to verify the reports that lobbyists file.
So if you get rid of that word, “arranged”, you would either have to make a record of all conversations you have with anyone about the government—on the offhand chance that person was a lobbyist and reported the meeting and you were then asked to verify it—or, alternatively, you would have to ask everyone you talked to about the government whether they were a registered lobbyist. That would apply in your ridings, apply while travelling, and apply while campaigning so that you know whether you need to keep a record of that conversation. Simply put, that recommendation would micro-regulate the normal interaction between MPs and the people they represent, and should not be supported by this committee.
The underlying problem here is one of definition. What does the act mean by “arranged communications”? Rather than just erasing the troublesome words, as OCL recommends, we submit that this is something that could be solved through a straightforward consultation process run by the Governor in Council to establish a clear definition.
Our fifth recommendation is associated with rule 8 of the lobbyists' code of conduct. We believe this should be removed as written, and harmonized with the existing language found in the Conflict of Interest Act and the public service post-employment rules. There have been cases where a lobbyist has been found guilty of putting a minister in a conflict of interest after the minister has been cleared by the Ethics Commissioner of ever having been in a conflict of interest in the first place. We're saying the test for determining whether a lobbyist has put a public officer holder in a conflict of interest should be the same as the test for whether that public officer holder was in a conflict of interest in the first place. It would simply be a matter of aligning the language in the acts.
In our written submission, we explain each of these recommendations in detail. We also flag some other areas that we recommend you take a look at.
:
Thank you very much, and good morning.
My name is John Capobianco, and I'm the chair of the Public Affairs Association of Canada, or PAAC. I am joined here today by Stephen Andrews, vice-president of PAAC and chair of our advisory committee.
I want to begin our presentation by thanking the committee for inviting us here today to discuss the federal Lobbying Act and our recommendations for improving this key piece of legislation and for the public policy process.
Before addressing PAAC's specific recommendations relating to reforming the Lobbying Act, we will provide the committee with an overview of PAAC and the importance of lobbying to the Canadian policy development process.
First, PAAC is a national not-for-profit organization founded in 1984. Our principal objective is to help public affairs professionals succeed in their work by providing them forums for professional development, the exchange of new ideas, and networking. PAAC also advocates on issues that directly impact its members.
PAAC's membership represents a cross-section of many disciplines involved in public affairs, including government relations, lobbying, public relations, policy analysis, and public opinion research. Our members come from both the private and public sectors in areas such as energy, finance, small business, charities, government departments, municipalities, law and accounting firms, colleges and universities, and trade associations. At the present time we have roughly 150 members, many of whom are active in-house as organization and consultant lobbyists.
I want to make it clear from the outset that PAAC fully supports the objectives of the Lobbying Act and the need to ensure that the highest level of transparency and accountability for lobbying activity exists. We have a voluntary ethics code that complements and supplements the lobbyists' code of conduct and which directs compliance with the provisions of both the federal Lobbying Act as well as corresponding provincial statutes.
We also assist our members and lobbying regulators by holding regular educational workshops with the federal commissioner and provincial lobbying registrars. This helps to ensure that our members understand the legal and ethical requirements involved in lobbying public office holders, while providing lobbying regulators with insights into the nature of the lobbying profession.
In addition, a number of our lobbyist members have been instrumental in advocating for lobbyist registration systems, codes of conduct, and other regulatory provisions for many years at all levels of government in Canada. Our members have given testimony to the development of lobbyist registration systems at the City of Toronto as they developed the first mandatory lobbyist registration system for municipalities in Canada. Further, PAAC has a solid working relationship with the Ontario ethics commissioner and the Office of the Lobbyist Registrar and has commented on recent changes to the Ontario Lobbyist Registration Act, 1998.
Lobbying and lobbyists serve a critically important function in the development of sound public policy. At a general level, lobbying helps to build the policy and the political case for the government to act and to address an issue or opportunity that impacts a particular group--say, a region of the country, a citizen's group, a business, or an economic sector. More specifically, lobbyists provide information to government policy-makers and decision-makers that is key to the development of balanced and fair policy. For example, lobbyists routinely provide impact studies on how a proposed course of action may impact a business group, a charity, or the industrial sector.
In addition, lobbyists add value to the policy process by advising clients on how to navigate the complex decision-making process of government, including the proper timing of various communications; how to be compliant with lobbying laws, procurement processes, and codes of conduct; and advising clients and organizations on the kinds of information and policy analysis that is important in helping the government solve specific policy problems.
This list of activities is not exhaustive in the ways in which lobbyists facilitate the development of public policy, but is an often overlooked part of our job.
We believe the following recommendations will assist in improving the transparency and integrity of lobbying in Canada:
First, enable the Commissioner of Lobbying to issue advance rulings on issues covered by the Lobbying Act and lobbyists' code of conduct. Under section 10.1 the commissioner has the legal authority to issue advisory and interpretation bulletins to clarify the requirements of the act and code of conduct to ensure compliance. However, the commissioner does not have sufficient resources to issue advance rulings or advisory bulletins in a timely manner that would ensure compliance with the act and the code. While not strictly speaking an amendment to the act, we believe the commissioner should have sufficient resources to issue advance rulings to lobbyists asking for clarification on various aspects of the act and the code of conduct.
Second, reduce the five-year ban on lobbying by former designated public office holders to one year. This requires amending subsection 10.11(1) of the act. We believe the current five-year ban contained in the Lobbying Act is punitive and inconsistent with provincial lobbying law. A one-year ban is sufficient to ensure the appropriate cooling-off period and to avoid any conflicts.
Third, remove the 20% threshold for all in-house lobbying, which would involve removing the significant part test from section 7 of the act. It is clear that this subjective nature of the 20% time test for determining who is engaged in lobbying activity undermines the transparency and legitimacy of lobbying.
Fourth, expand the commissioner's duty to educate public office holders in section 4.2 of the act to say “developing and implementing educational programs to foster awareness among public office holders of the legitimacy and public policy benefits of lobbying”. We think the educational mandate of the commissioner should ensure that public office holders understand the value-added contributions that lobbying and lobbyists make to the public policy development process.
Again, we'd like to thank the committee for inviting PAAC to present our recommendations and for involving us in the Lobbying Act. As we stated at the outset, we are fully committed to improving the transparency of the regulatory system. Lobbying done well only serves to enhance the laws and policies that government develops.
We look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
:
That's a good question. Listen, from our perspective, the OCL's duty to educate I guess would be threefold.
Basically, I think it's incumbent upon the OCL. If they went and spent time with all the various independent caucuses.... For example, I think that in the past they've met with the NDP caucus. I'm not aware of them ever going in to meet with the Liberal caucus or the Conservative caucus. So basically, go and do that kind of expansion and explanation of the rules and of what the processes are.
As well, we're not aware of them having done that with various departments. Because you look around.... In my meetings with various officials, you ask them, just at cocktail parties, “What's your knowledge of the rules”, and it varies from department to department. Our view is that if they went out and did a very comprehensive program of educating, and not only DPOHs.... Let's go through all the departments and let's go to all the stakeholders and make sure that everybody is singing from the same bible.
:
Before the act came into effect, we had a senior staff person from the commissioner's office come in and meet with GRIC. We had an information session for all our members. This would have been in 2008 or 2009.
In the example given to help us understand which types of meetings we need to report, the example was which types of meetings we don't need to report. The specific example was that if you're at a conference or a cocktail party and you encounter a designated public office holder, you're not expecting to see each other, and you have a brief conversation about a file, you don't need to report that, because it's not an arranged communication; you just happened to be in the same place at the same time.
It was reported in The Hill Times last year that when the commissioner met with the New Democratic Party caucus, the specific example was the complete opposite. If a lobbyist approaches an MP at a cocktail party, that is an arranged communication.
The standard seems to have shifted without any notification or consultation. We sought clarity on that, and it only served to confuse the matter further, because the advice we got was that we should report unplanned but arranged communications.
:
The Albany Club was established in the 1800s by Sir John A. and it has been established since then. It has been, I think, a great club for those who believe in conservative values, and they can join. It's a network social club.
I think at the end of the day those of us who are lobbyists who are members of the club, if we have discussions that are pre-arranged, we record them. We do that with any other.... In any other rule, if we were to meet somebody and it's pre-arranged, we would discuss and we would record it, as lobbyists.
At the end of the day, I think the club is more used for events and public policy discussions and so forth. There isn't anything else. You can have a discussion with a public office holder at a restaurant. It doesn't have to be necessarily a club.
Lobbyists by and large always will adhere to the rules that are set forward. We just want to make sure that the rules are clear.
I'm going to go back to some of the recommendations. GRIC was very clear in some of its recommendations here. Some of them overlap actually with the recommendations that were made by the commissioner as well. We'll talk about that. We'll elaborate on that. If I have some time, I'll move over.
I'm looking at recommendation two. I'm a little bit concerned about this, because as a public office holder myself, I keep track of what I consider to be arranged meetings, which is when people call up and request a meeting in my particular office, they come over, they give me their business cards, and I keep track of that.
What I'm seeing here, though, is that I might not be able to reconcile that set of records that I keep for myself with the actual set of records that are actually filed with the ethics commissioner. Am I accurately understanding the nature of the recommendation you're making? Is the nature of your recommendation such that a cross-reference of the records that I keep of who I actually meet with—because the person who arranged the meeting might not be the person I actually met with.... If I understand that recommendation correctly, you're saying very clearly here, I think, that the circle needs to be squared. Is that right?
:
Okay. Going back to the conversation regarding “oral, arranged, not arranged”, you're right, there is confusion.
Since I've been involved here I've learned that if I call you then that doesn't need to be reported, even though we'll get into the conversation regarding X, Y, or Z.
I'm trying to tie this in to make a complete circle. What requirements are on the public office holder to report? I know we have to keep track of what we do, but there's nothing on us that we have to report to the commissioner so that someone can match things up. Should we look at closing that full circle and putting more onus on the public office holder to report to the commissioner so that he or she can do a check or balance?
In my mind, it's how we catch the ones who don't play by the rules. I think anyone coming before this committee and doing lobbying, as you've all said, is playing by the rules. It's the idea of catching the lobbyist who doesn't play by the rules.
:
I think there are three ways to look at whether you should be reporting a meeting.
You can look at it in isolation. As a stand-alone concept, having both sides reporting the same meeting would make it easier to see if somebody didn't report it. That would be a plus.
Second, though, to come back to the circle you're trying to draw around all the recommendations on the table, if you put that recommendation alongside all of the others, such as “all oral communication should be reported; you don't have to be paid to register; it doesn't matter who initiates the communication”, you get the sense that you're looking at a major bureaucratic nightmare: MPs and lobbyists making records of and reporting every conversation they have about government with everyone they meet, anywhere, no matter what the context.
The third way to look at this is from a governance point of view. Charles is right. The commissioner's office would need to be greatly expanded. You'd be looking at an exponential increase in the number of reports coming in to that office. For every report coming in now, you'd have two. And if you put those other recommendations on the table, for every report coming in now you might have ten.
There was a well-received report last week on how to reduce red tape. I don't see how that recommendation supports this.
:
It does sound to me like that may raise a challenge, because if someone is new to the industry, is not following the rules, and is under investigation, and they continue to not act according to the rules, that may actually create more hassle down the line.
Now going back to some of the things that MP Scott Andrews mentioned earlier, as well as Mr. Stephen Andrews mentioned earlier on transparency, one of the fears you have is that you create a system that does not achieve the public goal of being a transparent system so that people know the system has checks and balances. But I'm also worried about Mr. Patrick's comments about creating a bureaucracy, because we all know that red tape does end up costing more.
The Commissioner of Lobbying recommended that we broaden the scope of the Lobbying Act by removing the provisions regarding “significant part of duties”. We discussed this a little bit earlier. This would allow the government to include companies and individuals who claim that lobbying is not a significant part of their duties but is still relevant.
Do we see a possible large increase in costs as a result of this recommendation? I do know that red tape, when you add it up, does cost everyone more, especially if it doesn't add value.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I should thank Mr. Boulerice for all the free advertising he is giving to the Albany Club today, because I'm a member there too. There you go.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.
I think it's very important for this committee to hear the views of your organizations and the people you represent as to how this act has worked in its first five years. I think this is very helpful to us. We know that lobbying is a legitimate professional service. I think we all want to make sure we have some rules and some context around the Lobbying Act to make sure that it's done above board and properly and legally and fairly. So I appreciate your being here to help us in our study.
One of the areas the lobbying commissioner has perhaps recommended there be a change to--and I'd like your opinion on this--is whether she should have the authority to place a monetary penalty or some sort of an administrative penalty on someone who has breached the act, rather than having to refer it to the RCMP perhaps if it's not a criminal issue. How do you feel about that? Would it strengthen the act if she and her office could levy some sort of an administrative penalty instead of referring something to the RCMP? I think her view is that when there is a significant issue, her only recourse is to refer it to the RCMP. What's your view on that?
:
First, I would just like to endorse Mr. Jordan's comments from Tuesday that as a lobbyist, having your name placed in front of Parliament as someone who has violated the rules has a financial consequence. It affects your career prospects.
Coming back to the specific question of administrative monetary penalties, anytime you have an officer of Parliament or a tribunal of any sort with essentially unfettered quasi-judicial powers, especially powers with a Criminal Code underpinning, you want to make sure that there's a clear commitment to due process. Before we could endorse that recommendation, we'd need to see a greater commitment to due process on the part of the OCL.
As mentioned, we've seen rules applied retroactively, such as having 2009 rules applied to events that took place in 2004. We've seen lobbyists found guilty of putting a cabinet minister in a conflict of interest after the Ethics Commissioner has said that the minister was never in a conflict of interest. We've seen straightforward investigations last up to ten years. We've seen seven-year investigations without the subjects being aware that they've been accused of anything; they just get a letter one day that says congratulations, you're no longer under investigation. We've had lobbyists denied the right to have counsel make oral representations on their behalf during investigations, and we've had the Canadian Bar Association find that certain rulings and actions by the OCL have been unconstitutional. There's a legal opinion on the record to that effect.
The commissioner is asking, in effect, to be the registrar, the regulator, the investigator, the judge, and the jury. So before we could support that recommendation, we'd want to see a clear requirement within the legislation that before penalties were applied, there would be an investigation that adhered to the most basic and fundamental concepts of judicial due process.
I think that when we're talking about clarifying the rules, this isn't a red-tape-cutting exercise. I think the rules were put in place because we had a revolving door and all kinds of monkey business going on, and the Canadian people expect us to have rules people play by. So there is an Ethics Commissioner, and if a lobbyist does a big political fundraiser, say representing a cement firm for a key minister, the Commissioner of Lobbying steps in, and the Ethics Commissioner steps in. It might seem nice to have a one-stop shop, but I don't think that's in the interest of the Canadian people.
The RCMP have a role to play, but we're concerned here that the RCMP are a dead-letter shop. So it might be convenient to have the lobbying commissioner not able to follow up when it has gone to the RCMP, but we have never seen the RCMP do anything with any of these cases.
When we're talking about clarifying the rules, shouldn't we be making sure that at the end of the day this is not about burying people in nuance because the lobbying commissioner doesn't have time for that? Shouldn't we ensure that if things are not correct, we have the appropriate measures in place? We're not sure if they're all there yet. They're almost there and it's a good system. But given the fact that the RCMP don't do their follow-up, don't you think it's incumbent upon the lobbying commissioner to follow through if she's investigating something? She needs to follow through and be able to deliver that report so it clears people.
:
I'm just trying to get my head around this. If someone has been doing a seven-year investigation and you never heard of it, obviously there wasn't much of a problem. It seems every time I turn around CRA is checking on my daughter's university tuition fees. I have to send forms all the time. I don't know when they start the investigations, but they're doing them. That's the nature of government.
We're talking about an ethical standard that Canadians expect, because we saw what happened under the Liberals and the sponsorship. Canadians are holding us all to a higher standard. I haven't seen evidence that you guys are getting pushed around here, and we haven't seen the RCMP follow through.
There's a standard for us, as public office holders, with the Ethics Commissioner. If the recommendation is that the Ethics Commissioner has to raise the bar, okay. But you don't respond to the Ethics Commissioner, because you're not designated office holders; you respond to the lobbying commissioner. So those are two different functions and we have two different relationships. And then there's the RCMP.
Explain to me how it has to be transformed to make it simpler for you so we still have accountability.
:
The point is that you wouldn't want to do one without doing the other. I understand.
My own impression is that the public has a real misperception about what government relations people and lobbyists actually do. In some ways I think lobbyists are given far too much credit for how legislation and government policies are actually adopted. In other ways I don't think you're given enough credit for raising the awareness of public office holders or MPs about things that might be going on in the Canadian economy or things such as unintended consequences of legislation, which does happen. I think these things are invaluable. I will say that your profession is certainly misunderstood.
I think there was a consequence, and this is something I've witnessed over time, of the rules the way they are, but I don't know that there's a perfect way of doing it and I don't want to suggest to you that there are any changes one way or the other coming in this regard.
In any case, as we were working to become more transparent and to make sure that government was accountable to Canadians, these rules were adopted; an unintended consequence was that staffers--in our case, Conservative staffers--who were in place prior to the Federal Accountability Act were suddenly in huge demand. Everybody wanted to hire them. Some of them do very well, because they weren't covered under the act and they have no more connection in this current government than people who perhaps were working in government relations in previous governments prior to our taking power. After the last election, everybody was racing around looking for anybody who had any kind of ties into the NDP, because they were suddenly the official opposition. Government relations people were out buying orange ties and trying to see if they could get a table at Brixton's. There was all kinds of weird stuff going on.
:
That's a really good question. The reason why it is so is that in our association, specifically, more so than the GRIC, we're based in Toronto, so a lot of our members are firms that do work with Queen's Park and also with the City of Toronto. We've been lucky, in that the lobbyist registrar of the City of Toronto has been very eager to work with us, and in fact a couple of members of our board worked with her at the time to come up with the lobbying rules for Toronto, and now Lynn Morrison, the commissioner for Ontario, has also been engaging with our association.
To your question specifically, I found different levels of lobbying and lobbying activities within the three jurisdictions. I think any way or any how we can get all that to be somewhat more streamlined or focused on a lot of similarities would be helpful to our profession.
I know it's different because how you lobby Toronto City Hall is totally different from how you would lobby Queen's Park or even Parliament Hill. So some differences have to be accounted for from that perspective. I'm encouraged by the fact that all the lobbying registrars, from the City of Toronto and other municipalities across Canada as well, and certainly Ontario, are looking to our associations and other groups to try to get the common denominator of lobbying rules.
They're looking at Ottawa specifically and asking what's working best with Ottawa, what's not working best with Ottawa, and our advice was the same, which is that the five-year rule is quite a hindrance, as is the 20% rule.
I hope that answers your question.
:
There are differences, but I don't know if there's confusion.
For example, the federal system requires the filing of monthly communications reports that the lobbyists would have with designated public office holders, as do B.C. and Alberta. Manitoba has legislation; it's not in force. Ontario and Quebec do not have requirements to file monthly communications reports.
Typically, the provincial systems are more about registration processes and the federal system has a bit more of a regulatory component. Some provincial systems have lobbyist codes of conduct that have the force of law, such as Quebec. On the federal side, the code of conduct does not have the force of law, though it's enforced through reports to Parliament.
I think the issue is the role of codes of conduct. For example, the Ontario registrar has made it clear to us in various presentations and discussions that she's looking at eliminating the 20% rule but not moving forward with the introduction of any form of a code of conduct.
Provincial systems are a little worried about resources for managing codes of conduct, I think. In Quebec's case it's a little different, since it has the force of law, so if you violate the code of conduct in Quebec it could carry the same sorts of penalties as violating the act itself.
:
I would argue it's incumbent upon her to go out and educate as many people as possible, and that would be everywhere from MPs to senators to bureaucrats.
We've done a couple of information sessions on behalf of GRIC, where we've invited her to come and do some more explanation with our members. I think it's incumbent upon her also to go into the general public and spend more time educating them.
When people ask me what I do for a living, I say I'm a government relations consultant. They then kind of look at me and ask what that means. When I say I'm a lobbyist they say, “Oh...”. When I ask if they know what a lobbyist is, they say no. Then what's with the perception of it?
I think it's incumbent upon all of us to spend more time educating the public about what we do, that it's constitutionally legal and above board. We follow a set of pretty complex rules, and by and large we govern ourselves according to the act.
:
I want to start with a quick comment. I get the sense that nowhere in Canadian history has Brixton's Pub been mentioned more than here, in this parliamentary committee.
I think the work you do is entirely legitimate, useful and practical, and that it raises the level of debate and discussion. Clearly, that is not in question. But I do want to say that it is not the presence of lobbyists that bothers me, but rather the fact that some people on Parliament Hill cannot afford lobbyists. That is unfortunate. You don't have to respond to that; I just wanted to put it out there.
The 20% rule seems to be problematic. On the one hand, I appreciate having a limit. But on the other, you can tinker with percentage calculations when you want to. If you say that lobbying represents 15% of your activities, you do not have to report it.
However, 15% can have a major impact. For instance, if you call up Brian Mulroney or Jean Chrétien, and you make one lobbying call a year, the message will probably be heard loud and clear.
If we did away with the 20% threshold for former DPOHs, as you suggest, would a former minister or prime minister who made one or two phone calls a year to a current minister have to report it?
:
The concern we have with the 20% rule is how you define the 20% rule. In some cases it's 15% versus 20%, or is it 25%? It gets into that area where there's a lot of potential for miscommunication or misunderstanding of those rules, which could cause lobbyists to be, in part, in an infraction against some of the lobbying rules, which gets them into trouble.
Our view is that if you're a lobbyist you're a lobbyist. So if you're lobbying government, no matter what role you're playing and what issue you're doing, notwithstanding the five-year rule, which we're saying to reduce to one, it should be registrable. That way it gets away from any potential issues or conflicts that might come up that might cause a lobbyist to be in trouble. That's what our general sense is, what our members are telling us.
I don't know, Stephen, if you've specifically talked about it with our members.
I think a lot of that comes down to the clarification that if you're a lawyer working for a law firm and you're lobbying a firm, you are a lobbyist. If you're in communication with some government official on behalf of a client, you should be able to register if that's a registerable activity.
From your point of view, how are complaints initiated? Where are they coming from? I know you can't answer for the commissioner, but I'm sure you've got clients who perhaps explain their situation to you. If someone is doing some lobbying and they don't register, then the fact that they might have even lobbied in the first place is a bit unknown. I'm interested in knowing, from your point of view only, if this is a sort of competitor-versus-competitor type of complaint, or is there something else at play? That is one question.
The other question I have is how the average lobbyist views lobbying within the Lobbying Act. What I mean by that is, do they see it as a low-risk affair? In other words, “Oh, I see the speed limit is 80; I'm going to stay below 80 and everything should be fine.” Or do they see it as something ready to pounce on them and does it continually occupy their mind that this could backfire at any moment?
I'm wondering if you could give us a feel for their comfort level. I understand there are concerns and I understand there are some things that need to be fixed. What's the overall comfort level for the average lobbyist?
So the first thing is on the complaint and the second thing is on comfort level.
:
On the complaints, I think you're right. This is essentially a complaints-based investigation process, which is very similar to any other tribunal or officer of Parliament you can think of. Media stories sometimes bring cases to the attention of the commissioner, and I think she has mentioned that in front of the committee.
I don't see that changing, short of the commissioner putting on a disguise and staking out Brixton's on a Wednesday night. Good advertising for Brixton's today. I think it will continue to be a complaints-based process.
With respect to your second question, I think most lobbyists would err on the side of caution. If you hit an area and you're not sure.... I must have a record of fifty e-mails to the commission checking a point on something. They're very good about trying to help lobbyists understand the rules.
Sometimes the answers don't clarify things as much as we'd like—we've pointed to a couple of examples—but I have to say the staff there is typically excellent. The processes they have put in place for their computer systems have become much easier. They've heard concerns about that and they've responded.
I'd say the comfort level of how lobbyists interact with the commission on a day-to-day basis is pretty high. I don't know many people who are shy about calling up and saying they're about to go into a meeting and they don't know if they have to report it. The advice you usually get is along the lines of “err on the side of caution”, but it's better to ask for an explanation than forgiveness later. I think most people would find the day-to-day interaction between the commissioner, her staff, and the lobbying community to work very well.
:
Mr. Lemieux, I think both of your questions were bang on.
To your second point, and not to go far from what Jim was saying, I think our style of lobbying, certainly from the American style of lobbying, is totally different. I think the rules we put in place and the rules that are in place are things we support. We believe in that transparency and accountability.
I think certainly the federal commissioner and also the provincial and other ones we deal with have all opened up and they are receptive to changes. They understand that the first set of rules has to have some level of adjustment. I think they're listening to what we want to be able to do.
This process in and of itself is great. If you're getting into the lobbying profession, I think more and more folks are aware of the rules and the ramifications. They see the front page of The Globe and Mail when a lobbyist happens to be under investigation and what kind of effect that has on that person's career and reputation. Whether or not you're proven guilty or innocent at the time, it's quite profound. I think a lot of folks who want to get into the profession are starting to think about what could happen with them.
With regard to what Jim said, we're advising our lobbyists within our firm and our clients that if there's a risk, then register and be safe, and ensure they have a record of things so they don't get into trouble, not only for themselves but also for the public office holders. We're trying to do that.
:
I think we'll all have a minute to say something on this.
I think with the grandiose American style of anything that happens, the influence on us is profound in some cases, and unfortunately in most cases. But with lobbying, the money in the U.S.—the retainer amounts, the success fees, the contingency fees—is beyond the pale, and I think it allows for people to be motivated or incented to do things that otherwise....
The fact that we don't have contingency fees or success fees here is a great thing. None of us ever complain about that. We're not here to benefit. If the client gets a certain issue resolved through government, as Mr. Del Mastro said, by and large it's the government that decides, or it's the opposition that decides. We just help to facilitate that meeting more than anything else and help with the strategy, I think, from that perspective. The American style is so much more focused on money.