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37th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 28, 2002

1110

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.))

Mr. Jim Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1115

1120

The Chair

Mr. Toews

1125

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

1130

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Toews

The Chair

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Toews

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

1135

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Jim Wright

1140

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ)

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

1145

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

1150

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard--La Prairie, Lib.)

Mr. Jim Wright

1155

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jacques Saada

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie--Bathurst, NDP)

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

1200

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

1205

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.)

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR)

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

1210

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

1215

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

1220

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Guimond

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

The Chair

1225

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Ms. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Mrs. Gallant

Mr. Jim Wright

Mrs. Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Michel Guimond

1230

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Michel Guimond

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Guimond

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

1235

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Joe Jordan

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jacques Saada

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Joe Jordan

The Chair

Mr. Jordan

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

Mr. Jim Wright

1240

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Jim Wright

1245

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Benoit

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

1250

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

Mr. Jim Wright

Mr. Pierre Brien

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

1255

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

1300

The Chair

Mr. Yvon Godin

The Chair

Mr. Jim Wright

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

NUMBER 052

1st SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 28, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á (1110)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Peter Adams (Peterborough, Lib.)): I would ask the cameras to leave. These meetings will be fully televised but regular cameras should leave now, please. I'd be grateful if you would.

Colleagues, for your information I'm beginning before Yvon Godin gets here. He was in New Brunswick or wherever this morning, got stuck in Montreal, drove from Montreal, and I understand he's just getting off the Queensway. But he will be here, and I hope that if he's particularly late we can simply fit him into the order of questions when the time comes.

Colleagues, we're here today pursuant to the order of reference from the House of Thursday, February 7, 2002, consideration of the question of privilege raised on January 31, 2002, by the member for Portage--Lisgar concerning the charge against the Minister of National Defence of making misleading statements in the House.

Our witness, who I will introduce formally in a moment, is Jim Wright, assistant deputy minister, global and security policy, Department of Foreign Affairs.

I would remind you that at our meeting this afternoon, at 3:30 in this room, our witness is Joseph Maingot.

Also, I will note that we received all the information that we requested from previous witnesses--the Clerk of the House, Brian Pallister, Minister Eggleton, and from Commodore Thiffault--and all of that has been circulated. We're still waiting for replies from Mr. Judd, General Henault, and Mr. Cappe, who of course was our witness last evening.

With respect to Jay Hill's requisition of documents, as I described last evening, we've had some discussions about that, and apparently it's proceeding and they will be here as soon as some of them have been translated.

Colleagues, I would now welcome on your behalf Jim Wright, from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jim, we appreciate your being here. We understand that you have very recently returned from Russia, so if you fall asleep during the proceedings, we'll know why. As a result, I know you have not been able to follow the proceedings the way some of our previous witnesses have. We appreciate your being here.

I apologize to you for the fire alarm or whatever it was that delayed this meeting. I know you realize that's out of our control.

Colleagues, we all have a copy of Mr. Wright's preliminary statement.

Mr. Wright, we're in your hands.

Mr. Jim Wright (Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to reassure committee members that the Department of Foreign Affairs had nothing to do with the fire alarm that just took place.

I welcome the invitation to appear before this committee. With your permission, I'd like to make a brief opening statement that I hope will put my responses to your questions in a useful context.

I've been assistant deputy minister for global and security policy in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade since September of 2000. I'm a career foreign service officer and have served in Moscow, Washington, D.C., and London, as well as at Foreign Affairs headquarters and in the Prime Minister's Office.

Before assuming my present responsibilities I was director general for central, east, and southern Europe at the Department of Foreign Affairs.

My current responsibilities mean that I must provide advice and answer to the deputy minister and minister on all issues that relate to security, multilateral and global affairs. In many countries the position I occupy is referred to as the political director. In particular, with respect to the work of the G-8, I work with my political director colleagues to prepare the political agenda for summit leaders meetings.

Among the files I deal with are the following: security concerns such as peacekeeping and regional security; terrorism; defence relations with the United States and NATO; arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation; and intelligence and security issues. I also am responsible for multilateral institutions or groupings such as the G-8 political agenda, the UN, Commonwealth, and la Francophonie. I also look after global concerns such as human security, international human issues, and human rights.

[Translation]

I am not directly responsible for any geographic area. However, given the horizontal policy nature of my duties, my staff and I work very closely with those in the department managing our bilateral relationships.

Finally, while the legal bureau of the department does not report directly to me, we work very closely together and I often call upon the department's legal team for legal advice.

[English]

In the context of the committee's work, as ADM for global and security policy, I am the senior foreign affairs policy and operational interface with the Department of National Defence. There is close and constant contact between the two departments to ensure that our foreign and defence policies are coordinated and consistent.

Let me turn now to the role that Foreign Affairs plays in Canadian Forces deployments abroad. I'll then specifically describe the role that Foreign Affairs has played in Operation APOLLO, Canada's military contribution to the U.S. coalition currently fielding forces in the Afghanistan theatre.

Requests for military deployments abroad can come from various sources. Sometimes they're generated by the UN, sometimes by NATO, and sometimes by a bilateral partner, such as the United States, which is seeking to build a military coalition.

My department must determine from a foreign policy perspective whether participation is consistent with Canadian foreign policy as defined in our 1995 white paper, whether it is in Canada's interest, what the political considerations and implications are in terms of our multilateral responsibilities and bilateral relationships, how other countries are managing the issue, and whether an appropriate legal basis and mandate exists for Canadian military participation in a given operation.

These considerations are then discussed with National Defence, which must determine if a deployment is consistent with defence policy and is operationally feasible and sound in terms of resources and logistical support.

Recommendations on a deployment need carry the approval of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence.

The Privy Council Office is obviously part of the overall consultative process. The Prime Minister would need to give his approval, with appropriate cabinet consultations.

My department is often involved in the logistics aspects of a deployment. Moving Canadian Forces and resupplying them requires overflight clearances and sometimes basing rights with suitable legal arrangements such as status of force agreements to ensure immunities for Canadian personnel. Canadian diplomatic missions play a very active role in the negotiation of such arrangements. These missions also play an important liaison role for the Canadian Forces personnel who are posted overseas.

Á (1115)

[Translation]

The collaboration between DFAIT and DND was in evidence from the outset of Operation Apollo. In fact, immediately after the events at September 11, members at both Departments representing policy, operational and legal offices, began to meet on an almost daily basis.

The members of this informal task force shared information and developed options for Canada's military contribution to the fight against terrorism. This group continues to meet for the purposes of sharing information and coordinating the position of the Canadian government regarding our military deployment in Afghanistan.

[English]

Two basic principles informed the foreign policy advice given by the foreign affairs department concerning Operation Apollo. The first was the passage by the United Nations Security Council of two resolutions--Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1368--condemning the attacks and reaffirming the right of self-defence under the UN Charter. The second was the historic invocation by NATO of article 5, the collective defence provision of the Washington Treaty.

Under article 5, an attack against one NATO member is an attack against all NATO members. The treaty envisages the use of various forms of response, up to and including the use of armed force in self-defence. Self-defence is fully justified under article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 5 recognizes the UN Charter's importance, both in regulating the use of self-defence and through the role of the UN Security Council in restoring and maintaining international peace and security.

All of our actions were taken within the context of Canada's comprehensive response to September 11 and our commitment to stand together with the United States in the fight against terrorism. Canada's decision to provide military forces, along with other friends and allies, was taken in this spirit. The U.S. military effort--Operation Enduring Freedom--is run out of the U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, located in Tampa, Florida.

In determining Canada's military contribution, very careful consideration was given to the operational framework for Canada's participation. We gave particular attention to setting out arrangements for government approval if the mission were to change significantly--for example, if the original scope, mandate, or commitment was to be altered. These guidelines essentially state that the Minister of National Defence must be informed by the Chief of Defence Staff of any proposed significant change. It would then be up to the Minister of National Defence to determine whether to consult with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the Prime Minister before making any decisions.

As the coalition developed, Foreign Affairs fulfilled another important foreign policy function. It provided the policy military link, not only with the United States but also with the growing number of coalition partners, in both multilateral settings, such as our mission at NATO in Brussels and our mission at the UN in New York, and the bilateral context. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and foreign affairs officials worked to build international contacts and partnerships that we considered essential for maintaining the cohesion of the coalition.

In addition to the foreign affairs and defence contacts in Ottawa, Foreign Affairs has also provided a political adviser to the task force commander at central command in Tampa, Florida. This foreign affairs officer provided political advice to the commander and has built a network of contacts with the U.S. policy advisers in Tampa, as well as other coalition partners, to ensure that we have the broadest possible set of facts and information analysis upon which to develop our policy advice for the government.

Our missions abroad, particularly in key settings such as London, Washington, Brussels NATO, southwest Asia, and the United Nations in New York, also provide us with essential insight and analysis that both departments draw upon in formulating policy.

Á (1120)

[Translation]

In summary, DFAIT and DND have worked in collaboration since the earliest days of Operation APOLLO. Foreign Affairs has provided the foreign policy framework in which National Defence carries out its operational tasks. We have also used our diplomatic instruments to assist and support the Department of National Defence in carrying out these tasks overseas when appropriate and in ensuring that the Government of Canada gets the very best strategic policy advice in dealing with these issues.

[English]

I hope this information has been of assistance, and I'll be happy to answer your questions now, to the very best of my ability.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Wright.

Colleagues, before we proceed I would point out that we have cookies today. The clerk assures me he baked them himself, and he thought it would sweeten the occasion. I say this quite seriously. When we normally meet in our cave, in 112 North, we don't have such things. People who are here should feel free to help themselves.

Mr. Wright, I suspect you wouldn't want to eat a cookie while you're here, but you could take one to Foreign Affairs with you.

The way we proceed, Mr. Wright, is that for the first round of questions the parties have ten minutes each, and we rotate among the parties. They may decide to let one person question you for ten minutes, or more than one person. I will try to give you an idea of what is happening.

When we finish that round, we go to five-minute questions and we still rotate. Your answers come out of the member's time. So again, without being discourteous, if I see a member getting restless I may interrupt your answer and go to the member. Essentially, in my mind as chair, it's the member's time.

I have Vic Toews, Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Joe Jordan, then either Yvon Godin or Jay Hill, and then Jacques Saada.

Mr. Toews.

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Wright.

I'm going to assume, for the purposes of these proceedings, that you're generally familiar with some of the testimony that's been provided here, the photograph, the questions of the photograph, and relevant dates.

You indicated in your testimony at page two that there was collaboration between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence from the onset of Operation Apollo. I assume that's a continuing relationship.

Á (1125)

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes.

Mr. Vic Toews: Does that in fact involve members of the PCO or the PMO?

Mr. Jim Wright: It certainly involves the Privy Council Office, and it's the responsibility of the Privy Council Office to keep the Prime Minister's Office informed.

Mr. Vic Toews: All right. So no direct person from the PMO attends these meetings, if there are meetings.

Mr. Jim Wright: Not to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Vic Toews: Have you had any direct conversations with any of the prior witnesses regarding this particular issue--the prisoner issue and the events between January 21 and January 29?

Mr. Jim Wright: I have working relations with a number of the individuals who have appeared before the committee. I have not sat down with the individuals in question regarding this committee's proceedings at all.

Mr. Vic Toews: I'm just wondering about that, not with respect to the proceedings as much as the substantive issues we're discussing here. For example, have you had any conversations with Mr. Cappe on the issue of the prisoners, or with Mr. Fadden on the issue of prisoners prior to January 29?

Mr. Jim Wright: We were very much involved with the detainee issue. I had consultations with the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office on this issue, starting on or about January 17 on.

Mr. Vic Toews: So from January 17 on, were you in discussion with somebody in the PCO about the issue of detainees and the actual detainees?

Jim Wright: It was on the issue of detainees, generally--the principle of detainees. The issue came up, in fact, when I appeared before a joint session of SCFAIT and SCONDVA . I think it was the afternoon of January 17.

The Chair: Could you tell us what those are--SCFAIT and SCONDVA?

Mr. Jim Wright: Sorry. They are the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. But it was in general terms, not with respect to the specific action relating to the detention by Canadian forces of Afghanis to be turned over to the U.S. authorities.

Mr. Vic Toews: Right.

We sent some questions to Commodore Thiffault. At question 18, from the questions of Mr. Jay Hill--one of the members of the committee here--Commodore Thiffault is asked whether his staff in Florida has representatives from Foreign Affairs, CSIS, the RCMP, or the Privy Council Office, and if so, whether they have their own reporting lines to their own departments in Ottawa. He was asked, “If these representatives are present in Florida, when did you pass to them the information regarding the taking of prisoners in Afghanistan?”

His reply was “Yes, I have one representative from Foreign Affairs who reports directly to Foreign Affairs.”

Do you know who that representative is?

Mr. Jim Wright: I do. Her name is Wendy Gilmour.

Mr. Vic Toews: Wendy Gilmour. And he continues with his answer--this is the commodore--“To the best of my knowledge, my Foreign Affairs representative became aware of the circumstances surrounding the said detainees when my Public Affairs Officer presented me with the news articles on or about January 25.”

Are you familiar with that answer?

Mr. Jim Wright: I am. Even though the answer was given to your committee yesterday afternoon, when I flew in from Moscow yesterday late afternoon I was given a copy of Commander Thiffault's testimony, and I have seen that.

Mr. Vic Toews: And are you aware of the circumstances by which the Foreign Affairs representative became aware of the detainees as early as January 25?

Mr. Jim Wright: When I saw the written testimony from Commander Thiffault with respect to the Foreign Affairs officer in Tampa, I asked my staff immediately to contact the individual in question, because this was the first I had heard of it. We did contact Ms. Gilmour yesterday late afternoon, and it is my very clear understanding--and it was confirmed by her to my office--that the news articles in question that Commander Thiffault refers to were only drawn to her attention on January 29 or thereafter, after Mr. Eggleton had spoken to the Canadian media.

Á (1130)

Mr. Vic Toews: So are you saying the date here is wrong--January 25?

Mr. Jim Wright: I am saying we have spoken directly to the foreign affairs officer in question whom Commander Thiffault is referring to. She has confirmed to us that she only became aware of the specific transfer of detainees that is the subject of your hearing here either on January 29 or shortly thereafter, after Minister Eggleton had made his public comments here.

Mr. Vic Toews: Mr. Chair, I think this raises an issue for us. We have written evidence before this committee giving us a specific date, and now we're hearing something else. I have no reason to doubt what this witness has told us about this date, but it certainly does cause me some concern. I want to reserve any right we may have to call another witness in respect to this clarification.

As you know, Mr. Chair, this is a very important time that is quoted here. Certainly it's a significant difference if it's on January 25 that the officer found out about this, as opposed to January 29. I think the whole world knew about it by January 29.

The Chair: These hearings are being conducted on the basis that we can recall witnesses, and that was agreed from the beginning. Please carry on.

Mr. Vic Toews: I thank the witness here for bringing that to our attention.

Are you aware of any other investigations that would have been launched in the Department of Foreign Affairs before January 29 in respect of the specific detainees?

Mr. Jim Wright: The understanding the department had reached with the Department of National Defence with respect to JTF-2 was very clear. The decision-making process--the consultative mechanism--was spelled out very carefully to the two ministers in question in advance, approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and approved by the Minister of National Defence.

Our involvement at the outset was to give advice to ministers, and through ministers to the Prime Minister, about the appropriateness of the overall Canadian deployment to Afghanistan. We were fully supportive, for very strong foreign policy reasons, of the full deployment of Canadian forces to Afghanistan, including the deployment of JTF-2.

However, with respect to the day-to-day operational aspects of JTF-2, this was--and it was clear right from the outset--the responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Chief of the Defence Staff directly to the Minister of National Defence. It was up to the Minister of National Defence to determine if and when he advised others.

The Chair: You have one minute.

Mr. Vic Toews: My time is running out, but you just touched on an issue that I wanted to raise.

In your testimony you indicated that article 5 of the NATO agreement talks about the collective defence provision. Just for my knowledge, does article 5 specify what kinds of attacks justify a military response on the part of NATO? I'm specifically thinking, does the attack have to come from an identifiable state, or can the attack come from a source other than a state?

Mr. Jim Wright: Perhaps the briefest way to answer this is to agree to give to the committee the text of article 5. It does not specify a state.

The Chair: It's Geoff Regan, Pierre Brien, Jacques Saada, Yvon Godin, Joe Jordan, and Jay Hill.

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wright, thank you for coming before us today.

My first question is about the rules of engagement. What involvement, if any, did you have in the development of the rules of engagement for the Joint Task Force 2, the commandos, and/or for the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry?

Á (1135)

Mr. Jim Wright: The responsibility for drafting the rules of engagement for Canadian Forces overseas rests with the Chief of Defence Staff.

The Chair: I would be grateful if you'd mention the chair from time to time.

Mr. Jim Wright: Excuse me.

The Chair: That's okay, just from time to time.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Mr. Chairman, I should tell Mr. Wright that he shouldn't feel left out. It happens to all of us frequently. So he's not to worry too much. It's obviously serious.

Tell me what you know about the JTF-2's reporting structure.

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the JTF-2 reporting arrangement is that it reports directly to the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Defence Staff. It's up to them to decide whether they wish to bring the information to the attention of the defence minister.

It is then up to the defence minister whether or not he wishes to share this information beyond to the Prime Minister, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. And my understanding, Mr. Chair, is that this reporting relationship was understood by all concerned at the time of the Afghanistan deployment decision by the Canadian government.

Mr. Geoff Regan: Are you in the reporting loop in terms of JTF-2? To what degree are you in that loop, or have you been?

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, the Department of Foreign Affairs is in the loop with respect to the initial deployment of JTF-2 overseas. We would very much have a role to play in terms of giving advice to the Canadian government in terms of the appropriateness of such a deployment from a foreign policy perspective, which we did do.

In terms of the day-to-day operations of JTF-2, no, we are not in the loop. We are not supposed to be in the loop, and it's appropriate that we're not in the loop. This is for reasons of operational secrecy. In terms of the day-to-day management of the armed forces, that's the responsibility of the defence department, and they do it extremely well.

Mr. Geoff Regan: How would you delineate or how do you set out the line between when your department reports to the Privy Council Office or the Prime Minister's Office on events that have happened within the department, or that relate to the department's activities? When do you pass it on and when do you not pass it on?

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, the first role of the department is in respect to the actual initial deployment of any forces overseas. We provide advice and counsel that goes to our foreign minister. We discuss such deployments with the Department of National Defence and also with the Privy Council Office. Formal advice is given to our minister. Our minister then provides his views directly to the Minister of National Defence and to the Prime Minister on any overseas deployments.

In terms of the day-to-day running of a combat operation in which our troops are engaged, as I say, we do not get involved in how our forces are deployed within a given campaign. But if there were a decision taken to significantly change a mandate, to significantly increase the number of troops that we send overseas on a given operation, if there were a decision to go ahead and redeploy some of those troops to another country, we would become very much involved in that process.

I would also say that to the extent that these issues sometimes are discussed in the United Nations, United Nations Security Council, at NATO, discussed in Afghanistan, our Canadian missions overseas very much become a part of the process. So we give advice and counsel to our missions overseas to engage other partners in terms of how they are dealing with the Afghanistan deployment issue, reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Therefore, our role is multi-faceted but it does not pertain to the day-to-day operational aspects of how our forces are used on the ground in Afghanistan. And that's not something that relates only to JTF-2, it relates to the forces generally. I mean, that is quite properly the responsibility of the Chief of Defence Staff, and he makes his minister aware, as appropriate.

Á (1140)

Mr. Geoff Regan: I guess what I'm really looking for is in terms of not so much giving policy advice but in terms of incidents that occur within the department or within the department's realm. When is it reported? What gets reported to the PMO and PCO and what doesn't get reported to the PMO and PCO?

We've heard, for example, from the people in the defence department, military and civilian, that the taking of prisoners in this case wasn't the kind of thing they would pass on to PCO; it was part of their mission, part of the rules of engagement. Give me an idea, if you would, in general terms, in your department what gets passed on and what doesn't in that sense, in terms of incidents or events that occur out in the field.

Mr. Jim Wright: I guess a good example to point to was the issue of treatment of detainees and status of detainees. That was a very clear example of a policy issue that did engage the foreign affairs department. It related to the Geneva Conventions, an issue that my department is also responsible for. So on that policy issue, we very much engaged not only our colleagues at the defence department but our colleagues in the Privy Council Office as well. So there are policy issues that can arise where we need very much to speak to the Privy Council Office.

In terms of future deployments of Canadian forces, that would be an issue, Mr. Chair, that we would need to discuss thoroughly with the Privy Council Office.

Mr. Geoff Regan: When activities of the department are carrying on in a normal fashion, whether it's related to this Afghanistan matter or other matters, when actions are taken according to policy, when do you and when do you not report such actions up the line?

The Chair: Perhaps this could be quite a brief answer, Mr. Wright, please.

Mr. Jim Wright: I think we would report it up the line if there was a sense that we were deviating from existing policy, or whether there was a significant change in original mandates that had previously been agreed to by ministers.

[Translation]

The Chair: Pierre Brien, Jacques Saada and Yvon Godin.

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Wright. I would like to come back to Ms. Gilmour's work in Tampa. Could you tell us who Ms. Gilmour reports to here, in Ottawa?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Absolutely. Ms. Gilmour reports to the foreign affairs department, but all of her reporting is shared with the defence department and with the Privy Council Office as well.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: But who exactly does she report to here? I imagine that there is someone she talks to.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: The direct reporting relationship, I believe, is to the division called the defence relations division at the Department of Foreign Affairs. That is a division that works under my supervision.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Therefore, her role is to report things that go on in Tampa Bay and that, because of her presence there, she is able to observe at Central Command.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, with a particular focus on providing foreign policy advice, both to Commander Thiffault and to the Canadian government more generally in Ottawa, but her role is to work closely within the Canadian team, to provide advice to Commander Thiffault, to consult with other countries that also have representatives on the ground in Tampa, Florida, and to synthesize that information and provide not just informational updates but policy advice to the Canadian government as well.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Mr. Thiffault tells us that he learned of the circumstances surrounding the capture of prisoners on the 25th of January. As soon as Mr. Thiffault gained this knowledge with Ms. Gilmour present, it would have been perfectly normal that she be aware.

Á (1145)

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: As I reported earlier, we spoke very directly to Ms. Gilmour yesterday to get clarification on Commander Thiffault's written testimony to the committee. Ms. Gilmour has confirmed to us that the first knowledge she had of the detention and transfer of the Afghan detainees in question was either on or very shortly after January 29, when it was a public issue in Canada after Minister Eggleton had spoken to the Canadian media.

So my understanding is that the first Ms. Gilmour became aware of this action was at the same time that I became aware of this action: January 29. In fact, for the record, Mr. Chairman, I was travelling in London. I was there with Minister Graham at the time. We were there on Commonwealth business. We were attending two ministerial meetings, one on terrorism and one of the Commonwealth ministerial action group dealing with the question of Zimbabwe.

The Chair: I think we should go back to Pierre Brien.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Yes, that is interesting, but I would like to come back to Ms. Gilmour because, once again, there are people who are confused as to the dates. This brings us back to the beginning. People are confused. Now it is between the 25th and the 29th, and no longer between the 21st and the 25th, but this time, it is Commodore Thiffault who... According to our interpretation of what you are saying today, Commodore Thiffault is confused as to his recollection of the events.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I will not comment on Commander Thiffault. He has provided written testimony to you. I think it's up to Commander Thiffault and the defence department to address this issue.

I will tell you there is absolutely no confusion on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There is no confusion on my part. There is no confusion on the part of Ms. Gilmour.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Very well. At the Department of Foreign Affairs, is the capture of prisoners by a Canadian operational force on foreign soil classified as an ordinary operation or an extraordinary operation?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: That was their job. That's what JTF-2 was sent to Afghanistan to do. I believe that point has been made.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: But is this something ordinary, this type of operation, for Foreign Affairs? I am not asking if that was their mandate. I am asking if for you the capture of prisoners by Canada is an event. You deal with foreign affairs, with diplomatic relations. Is this an event that one might qualify as being ordinary?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chair, the best way I can answer this question is to say that the deployment of JTF-2 to participate in an operational military action in Afghanistan was unusual. To the best of my knowledge--and I think this was confirmed the other day by senior defence department representatives--this is the first such operational assignment for military action by JTF-2 overseas.

That was an unusual step, yes, but it was their job to go ahead and detain Afghanis; that's what they were sent to do. In that respect, the actual detention was not unusual at all; it's why we sent them there. The policy debate on whether to send them there was an issue that the Department of Foreign Affairs, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was fully involved with and on which it provided advice.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: You must certainly be very familiar with the Geneva Convention, clause 12 of which stipulates that a country that takes prisoners must ensure that the power it hands them over to has the ability and the will to respect the Geneva Convention.

We have seen articles in American papers, for example an article that appeared on the 26th of January in The Washington Times that I will quote you the beginning of:

[English]

“Secretary of State Colin Powell has asked President Bush to reverse the president's position on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees and declare them prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.”

Á (1150)

[Translation]

In essence, Mr. Powell is asking President Bush to change his position and to respect the Geneva Convention. How do you reconcile that with the fact that you must obtain assurances from the Americans that they will respect the Geneva Convention, at the very time Colin Powell is reminding the American President that he should respect it? You transfer prisoners and you say that you are certain they will respect the Convention, whereas Colin Powell believes they will not respect it. You must explain this to me because I am having tremendous difficulty understanding.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: The best answer I can give is that it's no secret that there were divisions within the U.S. administration on the whole issue of the treatment of detainees. The Canadian government paid very careful attention to the different statements coming out from senior representatives of the administration. In fact, this was a leading subject of discussion when Mr. Eggleton appeared before the two House standing committees on January 17, and when I appeared before them on January 17. It's one of the reasons that senior representatives from the government, from Mr. Eggleton to Mr. Graham to myself to Mr. Laverdure in the Privy Council Office, actively engaged U.S. authorities on the issue of detainees, trying to ensure that we could get clarification not only as to how the detainees were going to be treated but also how their status was going to be determined.

I was in Washington, I believe on January 24, for the very purpose of doing this. In fact, on January 15 I also had an opportunity to host a lunch on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, so we were--

The Chair: Mr. Brien, you have one minute, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: I do not want all of the details about the cocktail party. I want to know how it is that on the 24th of January, despite the fact that you are in the United States to discuss the detainee issue, Canada transfers detainees to the Americans in an ambiguous context with regard to respect of the Geneva Convention. Do you find it normal that at that time you did not possess information about Canada having taken prisoners? The people you were having discussions with were probably aware that Canada had taken prisoners and had handed them over to the Americans. You, coming from Foreign Affairs, are holding talks with them and you are not even aware of this.

Everyone here in the government is telling us that this is an operation that was carried out normally and that everything went well. Would you have liked to have known, on January 24, when you were holding talks with the Americans, that Canadians had taken prisoners?

[English]

The Chair: Please make a short reply, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: Number one, Mr. Chairman, I object to the reference to a cocktail party. Foreign affairs is a serious operation, and it was a serious discussion with the International Committee of the Red Cross on the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. That's point number one.

Point number two is the Canadian government was not happy with the U.S. government concerning the ambiguity on this issue, and we were not alone in that respect. Other governments--France, Germany, the U.K.--were similarly making high-level representations to the U.S. government to get their position straight.

Number three, the President of the United States on February 7 issued a very clear statement of their commitment to abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention. The Canadian government, as the Prime Minister has said before, has accepted it.

And number four, I was not aware of the detention in question until January 29, when Mr. Eggleton went ahead and made his statement to Canadian media. I hope that's short and simple.

[Translation]

The Chair: Jacques Saada, Yvon Godin, Joe Jordan and Jay Hill.

Mr. Jacques Saada (Brossard--La Prairie, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you as well to you, Mr. Wright.

I in fact have a relatively simple two-part question. Firstly, the expression used was “not in the loop”. You stated that as far as you are concerned, your work was political and not operational, that JTF-2 was not supposed to be reporting to you on its operations. Is that correct?

Therefore, is it logical to think that Ms. Gilmour was not required to be informed of the operations of JTF-2 in Tampa?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: You're absolutely right. She was not required to know this information, and I would be surprised if operational details surrounding JTF-2 would have been made known to her. I think Commander Thiffault in fact was not himself directly in the chain of command with respect to the operations of JTF-2. So your assumption is absolutely correct.

Á (1155)

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Saada: Here is a sub-question. Since your work is essentially political and deals with the political context in which the intervention was to be carried out, was it logical to think that the major portion of your work had preceded the deployment of the troops compared with the work you had to do once the troops had indeed been sent off?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Excuse me, Mr. Chair, I don't quite follow the question.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Saada: Is it logical to believe that the major portion of your contribution, in the context of this operation, took place before the troops were sent off rather than afterwards?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, I would say that is absolutely correct. That is the traditional role of the foreign affairs department. Once the operation begins, unless there is a significant change in the scope and mandate of the mission, unless there is a change in terms of countries of destination where our troops will be deployed, if it is standard operating procedure, we are not directly involved in the process.

[Translation]

Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, since the purpose of this committee's hearings is essentially to determine whether or not the minister of Defence deliberately mislead the House, I have a final, very simple, question to ask our witness. Was he surprised to be called before our committee?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, no. The foreign affairs department is very much involved in the deployment of our forces overseas. We're very proud to participate in helping to contribute to international peace and security, so I was not surprised, and I'm delighted to try to help the committee in its deliberations.

The Chair: Yvon Godin, then Joe Jordan, then Jay Hill.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie--Bathurst, NDP): Let us come back to the answer given by Commodore Thiffault. To my mind, it is not clear and I believe such is the case for everyone here. It is the credibility of one person versus the credibility of the other that is at play. It is the credibility of the minister versus the credibility of the General. And now, it is your credibility versus that of Commodore Thiffault. Here, we read that Mr. Thiffault answered thus:

Yes, my staff includes a representative of Foreign Affairs that reports directly to Foreign Affairs.

At the present time, is that within your department?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, the officer in question, Ms. Gilmour, does respond to the area in which I work in the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was our initiative to send Ms. Gilmour to Tampa, Florida, to assist Commander Thiffault in his operations. Yes, she reports directly to Foreign Affairs and to my branch in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to know if the representative of Foreign Affairs who gained knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the taking of prisoners in question is Ms. Wendy Gilmour.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I have not spoken to Commander Thiffault with respect to his written testimony. As the chair acknowledged, I flew in last evening from Moscow. I read his testimony.

We have only one representative working in Tampa, Florida, with the Canadian commander. It is Wendy Gilmour. I am inferring that this is the individual he must be referring to.

As I say, we spoke with that individual yesterday to clarify her own understanding of the events surrounding the detention and transfer of the Afghan detainees. She indicated directly to us that the first time she became aware of the detention and transfer was at exactly the same time as I became aware, as Minister Graham became aware, as all Canadians became aware: when Minister Eggleton gave a press briefing following cabinet on January 29.

Â (1200)

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Let us continue reading Mr. Thiffault's answer:

...when my public affairs officer presented me with the articles in question around January 25.

He alludes to Ms. Gilmour. That is where the date of January 25 comes up, Mr. Chairman, and it no longer fits with the date of January 29.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, again, I don't want to interpret Commander Thiffault's written testimony to you on his behalf, but when he refers to a public affairs officer, I don't believe he is referring to Ms. Gilmour.

Mr. Yvon Godin: He is referring to Ms. Gilmour?

Mr. Jim Wright: He is not. I do not believe he is referring to--

[Translation]

To my knowledge, the Foreign Affairs representative was made aware of the circumstances surrounding the capture of the detainees in question when my public affairs officer presented me with the articles in question around January 25.

He is no longer talking about the 29th; he says that the Foreign Affairs representative was made aware of the circumstances on the 25th. This is what Mr. Thiffault's statement says, and you are saying that she only learned of this on the 29th.

Now, Mr. Chairman, does Ms. Gilmour read the papers in the United States and does she follow the news? Did she at least say that she had seen the photo around the 21st or the 22nd of January?

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Wright, do you want to--

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, my question...

[English]

The Chair: Yes, that's fine.

Mr. Wright, you understand your own limitations and you should feel free, whatever you wish, to indicate if you don't want to answer something.

Otherwise, Yvon, please continue.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Very well. My question is the following: Did Ms. Gilmour, in her discussions with Mr. Wright, at least recognize having seen the photograph? Perhaps she heard the events reported on the 29th of January, but...

[English]

The Chair: Yvon, you are allowed to question.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Yes, okay. Thanks.

The Chair: It's up to Mr. Wright whether he replies.

Mr. Jim Wright: I don't want to be put in a position, Mr. Chairman, of trying to read too much into what Commander Thiffault was saying. I think it's up to Commander Thiffault and the defence department to do that.

What I will say is that I am sure Ms. Gilmour.... I did not ask her if she reads newspapers. I have every confidence that as any good foreign service officer does, she reads a lot of newspapers. But there was no indication in the photo in question--which I think was published on January 22, was it--or the accompanying caption that these were Canadian special forces. I did not draw that inference. I don't want to speak on behalf of Ms. Gilmour, but my department did not draw that inference. I don't believe the staff at the Department of National Defence, who were aware of the JTF-2 deployment, drew that inference. So I don't want to speculate here, but I certainly didn't draw any inference from that photo. I saw it in the newspaper, but it didn't make a connection for me.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: When did you see the photograph for the first time?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I can't give a specific answer, but I try to read newspapers every day. I think I probably would have seen it the day it was published and I think it was published on January 22.

The Chair: That's correct, Yvon. Please continue.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: You were aware, at the January 17 meeting, of the concerns of Parliament and of a good many Liberal MPs with regard to the prisoners. We now know that prisoners were taken on January 20 and that the report was handed to the minister on the 21st of January. We also know that, even in the United States, people were wondering if the Geneva Convention was going to be respected or not. There were contradictions in this regard and if I understood correctly we were only given assurances on February 7. Do you find it normal that things such as that happened within the government machinery, while here in Parliament we were of the belief that there would be no transfer of prisoners to the United States unless we had assurances that the Geneva Convention would be respected? And you are now telling us that we did not have these assurances before February 7.

Is there something hidden somewhere that might explain why we were not aware of the situation? Is that the reason the minister did not report on this before January 29? Had there not been this photograph, perhaps we would never have learned about it.

Â (1205)

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chair, I understand the question very clearly. Was the Canadian government pleased with the ambiguity, with the mixed messages that were coming out of Washington on the treatment of detainees and on the status of those detainees? No. Did we engage the U.S. authorities at a very high level for an extended period of time? Yes. Did our representations and the representations of other governments have a bearing on the final decision by the United States to respect the principles that underpin the Geneva Convention and to ensure that the detainees in question were being treated humanely? Absolutely.

Were we pleased with the ambiguity? No. Did we do everything in our power to try to correct that ambiguity? Yes. It was an American decision. It was clear from the outset that the Canadian government, that the Canadian Forces, would not be detaining Afghans on their own. That was very clear. Were we happy with this uncertainty? No, not at all. Did we do everything in our power to correct it? I think we did, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: You therefore recognize, as I do, that the prisoners were transferred to the Americans while they were still undecided, while we had no assurances that all of the rules of the United Nations or of NATO would be followed.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: What I would say is yes. We were working very hard with U.S. authorities to get a clear statement as to their commitment to the principles that underpin the Geneva Convention.

I would add that on the issue of the treatment of the detainees, we were very confident that the detainees were being treated properly right from the outset. As I was trying to indicate earlier, it was important that we speak to the International Committee of the Red Cross. In fact, the team that was here in Ottawa was the team that went down to Guantanamo Bay to visit the facilities there, and it was for this reason that we wanted to get some assurance as to what was their perception of this issue. Were they discussing the issue with American authorities? Were they being reassured on the issue of treatment? So on treatment, we were comfortable.

The Chair: Joe Jordan and then Jay Hill.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds--Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Wright, I certainly will forgive you if you failed to deduce why you're here based on the questions you're being given today.

The Speaker, without finding a prima facie breach of privilege, although confronted with two conflicting statements, has referenced this committee to determine the circumstances. The issue before us, the critical issue, is whether the Minister of National Defence, who made two conflicting statements, did so deliberately.

Are you in possession of any information that you feel is at all relevant to whether those statements were made deliberately?

Mr. Jim Wright: I don't believe I am.

Mr. Joe Jordan: I want to thank you, and I want to apologize for putting you through this, sir.

The Chair: Jay Hill, then Marlene Catterall.

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George--Peace River, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to return to the issue of Ms. Wendy Gilmour and when she did or didn't find out. You were out of the country until this morning, is that right?

Mr. Jim Wright: Yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Jay Hill: Yesterday afternoon. You said that someone spoke with her directly yesterday. I'm assuming that it wasn't you, because you were on an airplane. Is that so?

Mr. Jim Wright: When I returned late yesterday afternoon I was given a copy of the written testimony of Commander Thiffault. I saw the reference in answer 18 to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I did not speak to her directly; I asked my team to speak with her right away. They did. I got the answer that I have delivered to the committee this morning.

Â (1210)

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if you wouldn't mind.... Obviously, for all of us time is of the essence; we only have a certain amount of time to ask our questions. I would ask that you direct the witness to please, as much as possible, just to answer yes or no. I asked a direct question--did he speak directly--and I'd appreciate, to speed things up--

The Chair: I can ask him to be short, but I can't ask him to say yes or no; that's not appropriate. However, Jay, if you look at me and you're frustrated, I will look at Mr. Wright and indicate that you're frustrated. Is that okay?

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

To the best of your knowledge, since you admit you didn't talk to her directly, was she asked by whoever in your department who spoke directly with her to explain the contradiction between her memory and Commander Thiffault's?

Mr. Jim Wright: The question that was put to Ms. Gilmour was whether this is an accurate statement on the part of Commander Thiffault--was she in the know on January 25? The answer that was given was “No”.

Mr. Jay Hill: Was she asked to explain the contradiction, yes or no? Was she asked that, or do you know?

Mr. Jim Wright: I'm afraid I don't know, but my suspicion is she was not.

Mr. Jay Hill: All right, thank you.

I think if I heard you right in response to an earlier question, you said--and I'm quoting, but obviously I don't have the transcript in front of me--that Ms. Gilmour said she was first aware of the transfer of detainees on January 29.

Mr. Jim Wright: I think I said on or after January 29.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay, but the key there is transfer of detainees. Does that mean she was first aware of the capture of suspected terrorists or al Qaeda on January 29? They're not one and the same, you understand.

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes. My understanding is that she became aware of the capture and transfer of the detainees in question on or after January 29.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

Last night I asked Mr. Cappe who the acting or alternate minister of defence was while Minister Eggleton was in Mexico between January 20 and 25. He didn't know. Do you know? Was it your minister?

Mr. Jim Wright: I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that question.

Mr. Jay Hill: No, that's fine, I just thought I'd clear it up right now.

It's my understanding from what transpired during our involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo that the taking of prisoners is a serious matter, because prisoners taken could indeed well be war criminals. Would you agree with that, that it's serious when we take prisoners because of that possibility, especially when we're dealing with a civil war type of situation?

Mr. Jim Wright: It is, it's an extremely serious issue

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

Mr. Jim Wright: War is a serious issue.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

We seem to have had some conflicting statements made before this committee. Some people say it's serious, some people say it's just normal, it fell within the mandate, therefore nobody seemed to need to know. That's been puzzling some of us. You said earlier--and again, I might be quoting you slightly out of context--“Were we pleased with the ambiguity coming out of Washington surrounding the treatment of prisoners? No.” I think that's a fair recollection of what you said just a few minutes ago.

Then I posed the question, wasn't it viewed sufficiently serious enough that DFAIT, the PCO, and the PMO, and by extension the Prime Minister, should know immediately when our forces took prisoners and were about to hand them over to Americans at the same time that there was all this ambiguity coming out of Washington that you, yourself, admit was a serious issue and that you were concerned about?

Mr. Jim Wright: As I said earlier to the committee, there was a clear chain of command that was approved by both ministers, the ministers of foreign affairs and of defence, with respect to the deployment and the operational security pertaining to JTF-2 specifically. In a sense, it was clear once the deployment had been approved what the job of JTF-2 was going to be. It was also clear that it was the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence, once apprised, to then decide who else needed to know about aspects of the work of JTF-2. That decision rests with him.

Â (1215)

Mr. Jay Hill: I'm still trying to get at the fact that it would appear to the uninformed, like me, that on one hand you say it's a serious issue--certainly in the past it's been an extremely serious issue in places like Bosnia, or Kosovo--where prisoners are taken and there are questions raised whether they are serious war criminals. Therefore, by extension, I would assume with DFAIT especially this is a serious issue.

At the same time that you're viewing this, we have forces over there--JTF-2--in a position where they may be conducting combat operations and capturing prisoners. And at the same time as that, we have this ambiguity coming out of Washington about how the Americans, when they take prisoners or when prisoners are turned over to them by the Afghanis or any of the other forces that are over in Afghanistan, may or may not treat them.

All of that's surrounding you. Is it not serious enough that you think DFAIT and the PCO and the PMO should find out about it before a week goes by? That's what we're led to believe: that a week went by, and no one knew about it except the Chief of Defence Staff and the minister.

Mr. Jim Wright: As I say, I think the Minister of National Defence, in his discussions with your committee, in his appearances before the House of Commons, has spoken to this issue. I don't want to put words in the mouth of the Minister of National Defence. He is at the top of the chain of command with respect to all JTF-2 operations--

Mr. Jay Hill: But you don't view it as a serious enough issue that you should have found out before a week goes by? That's the crux of my question, I guess.

Mr. Jim Wright: I guess, Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure it's my place before this committee to be passing judgment on the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, I wasn't asking him to pass judgment, just for an opinion.

I want to move on.

The Chair: The witness is entitled to respond or not respond.

Jay, please continue. You have about two and a half minutes.

Mr. Jay Hill: We know now that DFAIT has this officer attached to CENTCOM in Tampa. Does DFAIT have someone attached to JTF-2 in Afghanistan?

Mr. Jim Wright: No.

Mr. Jay Hill: Okay. We know that on any given day, cables--and I'm assuming in this modern world of telecommunications, e-mails--are flying around the world back and forth between embassies and various foreign affairs people around the world. Did nothing come across your desk or, to your knowledge, to DFAIT prior to January 29 about taking of prisoners?

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, we receive lots of traffic; no, we did not receive any traffic on that particular transfer of detainees that we only became aware of on January 29.

The Chair: Fifty seconds.

Mr. Jay Hill: I'll have to have another round, then.

When did we reach an agreement with the United States regarding the treatment of prisoners? Or did we, indeed, have an agreement prior to our JTF-2 being deployed? When and how did that come about?

Mr. Jim Wright: Just as a clarification here, when you say “agreement”, are you alluding to a written agreement?

Mr. Jay Hill: Yes, an agreement between our country and theirs as to how they would treat prisoners--any prisoners taken or turned over to them.

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chair, again I think that might be a question better put to the defence department, the Chief of Defence Staff. I think it relates directly to the issue of the rules of engagement for our troops, including JTF-2 in Afghanistan.

On the specific questions of the ambiguity, it was resolved when the President of the United States made his pronouncement on February 7. That policy statement by the president was accepted by the Canadian government.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Wright.

That ends the ten-minute rounds. In a moment I'm going to begin the five-minute rounds, and we'll essentially go through the parties in a similar fashion.

Colleagues, I'm going to ask the clerk to circulate an e-mail we've just received from Commodore Thiffault. I think this is the time to do it. I will read the English version of this when you've received the copies. I note there is what appears to be a typo in it. I will refer to that when I get to it. Then, when I get to that typo, I'll will refer you to the French text.

Colleagues, do most of you have it? It's coming. Mr. Wright, you should have a copy. Okay, colleagues, you have it before you.

I'll read the English version. It's dated February 28 and says:

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have reviewed my written statement provided to your Committee on 26 February 2002 and noted that the date upon which I became aware of information regarding the taking of prisoners in Afghanistan required more accuracy. As such, I reviewed the media articles that I would have been shown, conferred with my Public Affairs Officer and realize that the date I was informed was on or about 30 January 2002...”

Then it says “vice” or “visa”, which would be something like “versus”, I think, in Latin--in other words, not 25 January 2002.

I will read the last sentence, and then I'll go to Michel:

“I hope that this information helps to resolve any uncertainty that the answer to this question may have created. Please find enclosed a copy of my revised statement.”

I want to say that in the French, where I read that word “vice” or “visa”, or whatever it is, which I think is something like versus, it says:

Â (1220)

[Translation]

«...j'ai été informé le 30 janvier ou vers cette date, et non le 25 janvier».

[English]

Now, colleagues, I have Michel Guimond and then Leon Benoit.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond (Beauport--Montmorency--Côte-de-Beaupré--Île-d'Orléans, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In order for the people who are listening to us to understand the full meaning of this masquerade Commodore Thiffault is putting on... It is really worrisome to know that he holds an important position in Tampa.

[English]

The Chair: I want to explain to Cheryl Gallant that this is not our regular turn now. We're discussing this issue.

A point of order.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Chair, through you to the honourable member, if he thinks on national television, in the middle of a campaign, he is going to call into question the credibility and honesty of the gentleman commanding that operation in this room, in front of me, he is sadly mistaken.

The Chair: Michel.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Chairman, in order for us to grasp the meaning of this retraction, could you indicate how much time Commodore Thiffault had to give written answers to the questions we put to him in writing? How much time did he have to think?

[English]

The Chair: Exactly one week.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was my only question.

[English]

The Chair: Leon Benoit is next.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

We have an e-mail here from the commodore. He's busy running a war, and I can understand completely how he could make a mistake like this. We should accept the mistake as corrected and get on with business.

The Chair: Pierre Brien, on this point.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: I would like to know from the clerk when he received this e-mail. I see here that Commodore Thiffault's entire statement has been corrected. When did you receive this e-mail?

The Chair: Five minutes ago. Yes, indeed. It just arrived.

[English]

On this issue, we'll now continue. Colleagues, I'm going back to the regular rotation.

Mr. Wright, you understand we're proceeding now with the questioning, and I have Cheryl Gallant first, then Michel Guimond, then Yvon Godin and then Jay Hill.

Cheryl Gallant.

Â (1225)

Ms. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew--Nipissing--Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to preface my questions by saying that the Canadian Alliance, as the loyal official opposition, fully support Operation Apollo and the operations carried out by JFT-2 and we wish them Godspeed.

Through the chair to the witness, between January 21 and January 29, were you ever present at any meeting, conference call, etc., where JTF-2 operations were discussed?

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chair, to the best of my knowledge, no. That would have been inconsistent with the policy with respect to JTF-2, which is operational secrecy, which means that we are not involved in the day-to-day work of JTF-2 in Afghanistan.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

To the best of your knowledge, did anyone in your department have any conversations with anyone in the Department of National Defence on the prisoners issue prior to January 29?

Mr. Jim Wright: I take it when you refer to the “prisoners issue”, you are not referring to the general policy discussion but to the specific capture and transfer.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: That is correct.

Mr. Jim Wright: Then the answer to that is, to the best of my knowledge, no.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Were any investigations launched in DFAIT after January 29 to confirm that no one knew about this issue?

Mr. Jim Wright: The answer is no, and the reason the answer is no is because I work extremely closely with all of my staff on this issue and I am very confident of the answers I'm giving the committee here today.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

How many officials in your department deal regularly with the war in Afghanistan? Roughly? Do you know?

Mr. Jim Wright: My guess is probably in the hundreds. It would be in the hundreds, and that includes headquarters and our missions overseas.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

What is the nature of their involvement with respect to Canadian military operations in Afghanistan?

Mr. Jim Wright: I think I tried to go ahead and address some of those issues in my testimony this morning. It relates to everything from the work of international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the Commonwealth, the OAS, la Francophonie, all these institutions that are looking at the overall counter-terrorism campaign and the issue in Afghanistan.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Are you or other officials in your department part of any interdepartmental task force or committee on the war in Afghanistan?

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes. Again, I'd refer to my testimony indicating that there are informal committees that are in place that meet on a regular basis to discuss Afghanistan.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Can you describe the mandate of these groups?

Mr. Jim Wright: The mandate of the group is to ensure that we share information as appropriate, that we discuss policy implications of developments, and that we give the best advice possible to ministers and to the Government of Canada.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Does the Deputy Minister of DFAIT routinely consult with the Deputy Minister of National Defence?

Mr. Jim Wright: To the best of my knowledge, the two have a very good working relationship.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Can you say with total certainty that the Deputy Minister of DFAIT did not speak to the Deputy Minister of National Defence between January 21 and January 29 on the issue of the JTF-2?

Mr. Jim Wright: I have not specifically asked that question of my deputy minister, so I cannot give an answer, but I would be surprised, because had the issue been discussed, had we been aware, I would have been aware. So I draw the inference that no, this issue was not discussed, but I have not asked the question of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant: Those are all my questions. Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: We will now hear Michel Guimond, followed by Yvon Godin, Jay Hill and Leon Benoit.

Mr. Michel Guimond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wright, in answer to a question from Mr. Brien, you recognized earlier that on the 24th of January, the international community had concerns with regard to the treatment prisoners handed over to the Americans would receive. Is that correct?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: You spoke of high level representations, am I correct?

Â (1230)

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: You mentioned there was controversy as early as the 24th of January and perhaps even before. Indeed, you stated that you appeared before the joint national defence and foreign affairs committee on January 17 and that you realized that within the Liberal caucus there were concerns in this area. Is that the case?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I would answer by saying that my engagement was only with the joint committees. And yes, there were expressions of concern around that table when I met with them.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: That being said, Mr. Wright, I would ask you to explain to committee members how you feel after having participated in a meeting on the detention of prisoners in the context of the Geneva Convention. How do you feel, having participated in the January 24 meeting in Washington, when it is clear today that you did not have all of the relevant information? What were your feelings? And how do you feel today?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: The best way I can answer that is by saying I had participated fully and actively in the discussions interdepartmentally on the decision-making process--the consultative mechanism that was to be followed regarding all aspects of our deployment to Afghanistan. And on the issue of JTF-2, there was a clear understanding as to what the chain was going to be, who needed to be in the know. And I understood from the outset that the Department of Foreign Affairs did not need to be aware of all of the operational aspects of what JTF-2 had been engaged in.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Today, you recognized that on January 24 you did not have all of the relevant information. Do you continue to believe that you were a credible participant in that meeting?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I would answer that by saying I think I was a very credible representative for the Canadian government in engaging the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the State Department at a very senior level on the issue of the treatment of detainees and the status of detainees. And I can assure you that the U.S. government took the representations by the Canadian government on this issue extremely seriously.

[Translation]

Mr. Michel Guimond: Mr. Wright, do you believe that the Americans could take you seriously during these discussions when they knew all along that they were holding prisoners? They knew that they had information that you clearly did not possess. Do you believe you could be a credible participant? The Americans knew they had prisoners.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I would make a distinction between the policy issues that were under debate and the actual transfer of the detainees in question. My suspicion is that the American colleagues I was talking to probably had no awareness of the transfer of detainees--on January 21, I think--by JTF-2 to American forces in Afghanistan. What our American colleagues knew was that we had Canadian fighting forces on the ground working shoulder to shoulder with the United States to go ahead and bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. And they were and continue to be enormously grateful for our efforts. That's what they were aware of.

The Chair: Yvon Godin and then Jay Hill.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You arrived here yesterday by plane. Who was the person who spoke with Ms. Gilmour and who represented you?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Mr. Chairman, I can't give the committee a specific name because I'm not sure who it was. It was one of my staff in the defence relations division of the Department of Foreign Affairs--which individual, I'm afraid I don't know.

Â (1235)

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman... [Editor's Note:Inaudible]

[English]

The Chair: If you could at a later date, we'd be grateful, Mr. Wright.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Do you know if since last night someone from your department has spoken with Mr. Thiffault and if there were discussions with regard to the dates of January 25 and January 30, the latter date having been communicated to us but some 15 minutes ago? Was there discussion with regard to the fact that the dates did not fit?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: To the best of my knowledge, no.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: So Mr. Thiffault is following our committee proceedings on television, in the United States.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I think it's important here to make sure committee members understand what Mr. Thiffault is referring to when he talks about the foreign affairs representative and the public affairs officer.

Again, I don't want to be putting words in Mr. Thiffault's mouth, and I think you would be better addressing this question to the defence department. But my assumption is that the public affairs officer he is referring to is in fact a defence department representative in Tampa, Florida, who saw the written testimony given by Commander Thiffault to the effect that there was an internal discussion within the defence department. The clarification you received is a result of that. To the best of my knowledge, it is not as a result of any engagement from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: This came very quickly. We read the document in its entirety and it says the following:

As far as I know, the Foreign Affairs representative was made aware of the circumstances surrounding the capture of the detainees in question when my public affairs officer presented me with the articles in question around January 30.

The dates have changed, Mr. Chairman, just as everything has changed since we began our discussions.

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dennis Mills stated the following:

[English]

“They should have backed up their minister. If my employees tried to hang me out to dry on the national stage, I would just say, 'Look, you're working for the wrong company'.”

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I fail to see the relevance of that. I should add that his own member at this committee said he believed the minister did not mislead the House. If we're going to quote members, let's quote members.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, that is what this says; the Liberals are saying that if someone had not supported the minister, then he or she was working in the wrong place. Is this some style that is becoming entrenched, with everyone having to support the minister?

Mr. Jacques Saada: Mr. Chairman, I would like you to shed some light on this. I fail to see how the credibility of the various persons who confirm or do not confirm things related to this issue has any impact on the work of this committee. Our work consists in verifying if the minister's intention was or was not to deliberately mislead the House.

I see no relationship between the two.

[English]

The Chair: Also on a point of order, Yvon Godin.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, in response to the point of order with regard to credibility, we are the ones examining that of the Prime Minister or rather of the minister.

We are simply not buying the story we have been told. Things are going from bad to worse, with Liberal MPs saying that if these people worked in their department they would tell them that they are in the wrong place. This is most relevant, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Mr. Joe Jordan: On a point of order.

The Chair: Mr. Jordan, on a point of order; go ahead.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Chair, I'm not getting the translation. I think he might be speaking too quickly, or screaming.

The Chair: You'll have about forty seconds, Yvon.

A voice: This microphone is not functioning.

The Chair: That's enough.

Mr. Yvon Godin: I don't think it's fair, on my time. He went on a point of order three times.

The Chair: I have given you the additional 40 seconds. I've given you additional time, Yvon.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thus, you learned at the same time we did, a few moments ago, that the date in Mr. Thiffault's text was changed.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I took it upon myself to verify with the foreign affairs officer in question who was named in the written testimony that you received, I think yesterday, from Commander Thiffault, whether our officer was knowledgeable on or about January 25. I got the answer that, no, it was only after Minister Eggleton had gone ahead and spoken publicly of this issue, on January 29, that she became aware of this. That is the information I brought to this committee.

I had not seen a copy of the message from Commander Thiffault today, clarifying his testimony, until it was presented in front of me a few minutes ago.

Â (1240)

[Translation]

The Chair: Is that all?

[English]

Just so the record doesn't get more confused, Mr. Wright, we received that information on Tuesday, but I understood the way you put it. He said we received the replies from Commander Thiffault yesterday, and I was simply correcting that before we got more confused.

Mr. Yvon Godin: On a point of order, it was the first reply, not the one that has been adjusted through the--

The Chair: Yvon, I was listening to his reply to your answer. He said “We received Commander Thiffault's replies yesterday”. I was simply saying we received them Tuesday.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Jay Hill.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wright, I want to return to this issue of whether we have a written agreement with the United States concerning the status and treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan. Do we have any written agreement with the United States on the status of prisoners?

Mr. Jim Wright: To the best of my knowledge, there is no bilateral agreement between the two countries on the question of the treatment and status of the detainees. My understanding is we are governed by the rules of engagement for our Canadian Forces that are drawn up and issued by the Chief of Defence Staff, and we are guided by the President's statement of February 7, where he made very clear to the international community, following serious, high-level representations by many governments, including Canada, that they were prepared to go ahead and treat the prisoners in question humanely and in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Jay Hill: So other than the verbal statement, the commitment made by President Bush, to your knowledge there's no written agreement between our country and the United States, either bilaterally or multilaterally, dealing with the status of prisoners or the treatment of prisoners.

Mr. Jim Wright: The answer is yes, Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Jay Hill: Is it true that on this particular issue, because of the controversy--I'll phrase it that way--that was swirling around the ambiguity from Washington on how these prisoners, once taken and incarcerated, may or may not be treated, because of that, there was a trip planned to Australia on or about January 29, about the same time this information came out? In other words, the minister made it public that we had, indeed, taken prisoners. There was a trip planned either for someone from DFAIT or from the Department of National Defence to go to Australia and try to work this out with our Commonwealth partners. Are you aware of anything like that?

Mr. Jim Wright: I am not aware of any planned trip by officials from the foreign affairs department to go to Australia to deal with this issue, no.

Mr. Jay Hill: At what level were the negotiations with our Commonwealth partners? Because obviously Canada wasn't the only country that was concerned about these contradictory statements coming out of Washington as to how they may or may not treat prisoners.

Mr. Jim Wright: We had a dialogue, in particular, with the British government. As I indicated at the outset, when I became aware of Mr. Eggleton's public pronouncement on this, I was in London with Minister Graham. That morning--I believe it was the morning of January 29--we sat down with the U.K. Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, and one of the subjects we discussed at some length was this very issue and the representations that we had under way in Washington to try to remedy the situation. Mr. Straw indicated to us the kinds of representations they were making on Washington as well.

Â (1245)

Mr. Jay Hill: Yesterday afternoon when Mr. Fadden was before the committee, then again last night when the Clerk of the Privy Council, Mr. Cappe, was before the committee, they both spoke about.... Once Mr. Cappe learned of the fact that JTF-2 had indeed taken prisoners, once he learned about that at the cabinet meeting of the morning of January 29, he returned to his office and instructed that an inquiry be conducted to see if anyone in the PCO had prior knowledge of that fact, the fact that our troops, our special forces, had indeed taken prisoners a week before. Was there any type of inquiry like that made of personnel in DFAIT?

The Chair: This should be a fairly short reply.

Mr. Jim Wright: In answer to that, when I returned from London, in informal discussions with staff I indicated that Mr. Eggleton's announcement certainly was news to me. None of my staff indicated to me they were aware of this issue, in advance of Mr. Eggleton's pronouncement on January 29.

So was there a formal inquiry launched? No. Were there informal discussions? Yes. Was I reassured that we were not aware? Yes.

The Chair: Mr. Leon Benoit is next, very briefly, and then Pierre Brien.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to start by saying that I and the Canadian Alliance fully support and supported the JTF-2 and our other troops taking prisoners in Afghanistan. That's what they're there to do. And I fully support the turning over of these prisoners to the Americans. I respect and fully believe the Americans will treat them as they are to be treated under international law, as you have said in your presentation this morning. I just want to make that clear, because some of the other opposition parties are giving another view, and I want to separate myself and my party from those views.

In your statement, Mr. Wright, you referred on two occasions to the people who were captured by our JTF-2 as Afghanis, and I'd like you to clarify if that's what you meant.

Mr. Jim Wright: That's a very good question. In fact, I am not aware of the nationalities of the individuals in question. I more properly should have referred to them as detainees only. I am not aware of their nationality.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You understand my point. Many of the al Qaeda are not Afghanis.

Mr. Jim Wright: Point taken.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, I just wanted to check that out. Thank you.

The Chair: That's a very useful point.

Pierre Brien.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Mr. Chairman, I am impressed to see how quickly information can circulate between Foreign Affairs and National Defence. Around 4:30 p.m. yesterday, I asked Mr. Fadden, from Privy Council, a question here, and he seemed surprised to learn that someone from Foreign Affairs could have been aware on January 25. Mr. Wright returns and, 24 hours later, we receive a correction from Tampa that states that in the end, the first... [Editor's Note: Inaudible]. It seems that the information was circulated very quickly, but in the case of the capture of prisoners, it took eight or nine days for the information to be relayed. I must admit that I am quite surprised.

My question for our witness, Mr. Wright, is the following. You stated earlier that the person you spoke with in the United States on January 24 was probably not aware that Canadian soldiers had taken prisoners on January 20. Could you guarantee us that your counterpart was not aware of that?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: Of course I can't guarantee that. I wasn't aware at the time, and certainly in the discussions I had in Washington there was no evidence to suggest they were aware that Canadian Forces had turned over detainees earlier.

Â (1250)

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Earlier, I asked a question regarding the Geneva Convention and I noticed that you looked through your papers. Do you have section 12 of the Geneva Convention with you?

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: I don't think I do, and I'm not a lawyer.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: I will read you a paragraph taken from section 12 of the Geneva Convention:

Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention.

What this says, in summary, is that the prisoners of war taken by Canada can only be handed over to the United States once Canada has received assurances that the United States are willing and able to apply the Convention.

You talked of the status of the prisoners with the Americans on January 24. The Geneva Convention requires of Canada that it obtain assurances as to the treatment or the status that will be given to the prisoners by the Americans. Canada took prisoners four days earlier. You were talking with the Americans and you are guaranteeing us here that the Geneva Convention applied. You are certain that the Americans are applying it whereas this whole debate is going on, and you are certain that Canada is applying the Convention. You are certain that that paragraph is being respected while Colin Powell finds that they are not applying the Geneva Convention. Explain that to me once more.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wright: There was some ambiguity on the part of the U.S. government. We were always confident, from the outset, that the Americans would treat the prisoners humanely, according to international law. There were some conflicting statements coming out of the U.S. administration.

As I indicated earlier to the committee, the government worked diligently to engage appropriate U.S. authorities to ensure we were fully reassured that they would be treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention. In the final analysis, we were.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Mr. Chairman, at clause 12, the Geneva Convention does not ask you to be confident that those you are handing the prisoners over to will respect it. It states that Canada must ensure that the United States are willing and able to apply the Convention. You are telling us that you are confident that they would apply it. There is to my mind a major difference between being confident that they will apply it and having satisfied oneself that they will do so.

Do you not find that there is a difference?

[English]

The Chair: This will be a short reply, Mr. Wright.

Mr. Jim Wright: I understand the nature of the question. I don't think I can change the answer I gave you.

We were fully confident that the United States government would respect the principles of the Geneva Convention. We worked hard to get the U.S. government to clarify their position. The president did. The Canadian government and other governments were reassured accordingly.

The Chair: Jay Hill.

Then I hope to wind this thing up, please.

Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, in response to Mr. Benoit's patriot statement, I'm going to go out on a limb here and assume all the MPs on this committee are proud Canadians. We're all proud of the work, the sacrifice, and the conduct of our armed forces. It would include the JTF-2. I don't think it should be necessary to go around the room with each one of us making some type of a statement of commitment and acknowledgment of the role our armed forces plays.

We are trying to get at this huge issue of whether the conflicting and contradictory statements made in the House of Commons and indeed maybe even at this committee by the Minister of National Defence were made intentionally or deliberately. It's the purpose of our work here. I think all of us recognize it, or should recognize it.

I want to return to the whole issue, Mr. Chairman, of the taking of prisoners in this particular type of situation. I think all of us view it as a situation of war. We've heard it constantly. We're in a war against global terrorism. We have our young men and women committed to this fight, putting their lives on the line to preserve the freedoms that all too often we tend to take for granted.

Recognizing that, and going back to what I'd said about earlier conflicts, whether it's the most recent in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Gulf War, or wherever, I think most people would agree the taking of prisoners is an extremely serious international event in today's world. Obviously, at the same time this story was unfolding there was tremendous controversy raging about how the prisoners may or may not be treated.

Given that, is our witness not concerned that he and the Department of Foreign Affairs, and by extension the PCO and the PMO, were isolated from the fact that our forces did their job, took prisoners, and turned them over to the Americans, at a time when all this controversy was raging? Did the entities, DFAIT, PCO, PMO, and the Prime Minister, by extension, not know about it for a week? Is it not serious?

Sir, with all due respect, you have a lifetime of commitment as a diplomat. We know that. Don't you view it as a serious issue that all of them, including our department, would be kept in the dark for a week about it happening?

Â (1255)

Mr. Jim Wright: I think that from our perspective we were comfortable and confident with the consultative mechanisms that had been agreed to at the time of the deployment of all Canadian Forces, including JTF-2, to Afghanistan.

And I get back to what I said earlier, that it was the responsibility of the Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence to inform others, as deemed appropriate. The timing as to when he decided to inform others is the responsibility, the judgment call, of the Minister of National Defence. He has to decide for reasons of operational security when and when not to.

We're very confident also of the exceptionally good work that our forces are doing. They are contributing to international peace and security. I'm not sure I have much more to add in terms of whether or not Foreign Affairs feels as though we should have been informed earlier. It was not our call. It was the call of the Minister of National Defence.

The Chair: We have Yvon Godin, but I understand just a very brief something.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Godin: Mr. Chairman, it is very important for me.

On January 17, Mr. Bernard Party of the Liberal Party stated the following:

As you said, those who will be taken prisoner under Canadian authority will be automatically handed over to the American authorities. Do you not believe that Canada is thus creating a very important precedent in its policy? In fact, in handing the prisoners over to the Americans when it knows that those prisoners will not be prisoners of war, Canada is indirectly removing itself from under the Geneva Convention.

I want it to be stated, Mr. Chairman, that we too respect our soldiers, but that we have values and morals that we wish to respect. That is our job here.

Is the fact that you are confident whereas Mr. Powell is not and is seeking clarification mean that it should be good enough for us? Why does Canada trust the United States so much when the American Army Chief does not trust them?

[English]

The Chair: Okay, Yvon.

Would you care to respond to that, Mr. Wright?

Mr. Jim Wright: The application of the Geneva Convention is exceptionally important to the Government of Canada, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to the Department of National Defence. We pursued this issue with vigour with U.S. authorities. There was some ambiguity. That was not of our making. It was of the making of U.S. authorities. We engaged them as appropriate. As expected, the Government of the United States confirmed to the international community their support for the principles that underpin the Geneva Convention.

· (1300)

The Chair: Mr. Wright, I want, on behalf of all my colleagues, to thank you for taking the time, particularly in the circumstances of your arriving here yesterday. I know it was difficult.

We have one point of order. Just a moment.

Mr. Yvon Godin: Yes, Mr. Chair. The point of order is that the witness has said that he will give us the name, and I'd appreciate it if we could get it before this afternoon.

The Chair: I'm not sure we can do that. I'm going to refer to that now.

Mr. Wright, there are two or three items that we asked for. I assume you will provide those to the committee. You heard Mr. Godin. He wanted one of them a little earlier, but the sooner the better. But they come to the committee, not to the people who asked you for them.

Mr. Jim Wright: Understood.

The Chair: We're grateful for that.

I would also like to repeat what my colleagues have said, that we do appreciate what the armed forces are doing, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. We also appreciate all of those who give them very important support. Thank you very much, and please feel free to leave.

I'd like to take the liberty of welcoming to our audience this morning Chief Greg Cowie of the Hiawatha-Anishnabe First Nation. He has been listening to our proceedings today.

Chief Cowie, it's a pleasure to have you here. Would you stand, Chief Cowie, please? Thank you very much.

Our next meeting is at 3:30 today in this room. The witness then is Joseph Maingot, the author of Parliamentary Privilege in Canada.

The meeting is adjourned until 3:30.