NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Friday, September 17, 1999

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[English]

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to call to order the joint meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

At this time I would ask the electronic media who are around the table to please withdraw toward the back of the room so that we can begin the meeting. Your cooperation is appreciated. Thank you.

Colleagues, welcome back to Ottawa for a special meeting of great importance. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome ministers Art Eggleton, Lloyd Axworthy, and our newly appointed minister Maria Minna. Welcome. It's a pleasure to welcome all of you this morning and to hear your comments on this tragic situation in East Timor.

I would also like to welcome Senator Stewart, who is chair of the foreign affairs committee of the Senate, as well as some other members of the Senate committee. Of course Mrs. Finestone, now Senator Finestone, needs no introduction to the topic of foreign affairs. We're pleased to have her here this morning in her new capacity.

As you can see, we have a full house, such that we could barely get enough seats for all the people who wanted to be at the table, but I think we've accommodated people.

I want to just quickly review the process for the meeting. I will first introduce Colleen Beaumier. Do you want to make an opening comment, Colleen?

The Acting Co-Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)): I'm very pleased to be here in place of Bill Graham, our chair of the foreign affairs committee. He's out of the country right now, and I am vice-chair of the committee on the government side. I'm pleased to be here. Thank you.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

So Colleen and I will co-chair the meeting. As members of the committee well know, we've been through many, many briefings. I see General Henault and other staff people who were here for briefings in the month of May and June on the subject of Kosovo. We have an established process for these two combined committees, and I would like to just briefly refresh colleagues' memories of that.

In order to try to facilitate as many members as possible having a opportunity to ask some questions, the rounds are five minutes. We start with the official opposition, Bloc, Liberal, NDP, and PC for five minutes. Now, colleagues, please, that's questions and answers. The odd time a colleague would ask four minutes and fifty seconds worth of questions. This is going to leave the minister ten minutes. At five minutes I'm going to try to let the minister speaking finish their thought, the sentence, and then I'm going to interrupt and move to the next colleague. So if we can bear that in mind, it's all simply to give as many colleagues as possible an opportunity to ask questions.

We are pleased have senators with us. As time allows, I will try to take a few questions from the senators, with your approval. This is a joint committee of two House of Commons standing committees, and we're pleased to have the senators here. Other members may be here, but obviously I have to give precedence to members of the standing committees. So we'll do our best to facilitate all the questions the members have.

With that introduction, I would turn to the ministers. Mr. Axworthy is going to lead.

Hon. Lloyd Axworthy (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to the senators and the members of the committee. We appreciate their willingness to interrupt their time away to join us for this consultation on the situation in East Timor. The two committees in the past, including committees of the Senate, have been involved in a number of consultations dealing with the Central African Republic, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. Their close involvement in such matters is very much welcome and I think will add to the public debate on these issues.

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As you know, on Wednesday the Security Council authorized a multinational peacekeeping force under chapter VII, which gives it the authority to use all necessary means to restore order in East Timor. At the time the Prime Minister said that Canada could provide up to 600 troops. My colleague Mr. Eggleton will certainly speak extensively to that question. At the same time, Ms. Minna will be able to describe the humanitarian efforts that are taking place.

I'd like to use this occasion to outline to you some of the recent events, what the Canadian role has been, and particularly what lies ahead, which is very important.

We will be distributing in a few minutes a background paper, which gives members a fairly detailed chronology of events relating to East Timor. The events in the past year were the decision in January by the Indonesian government to allow East Timor to decide its own future, followed by a negotiation that took place between Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations, which developed into a May 5 agreement that set out very specific, very clear steps and responsibilities under which a referendum would be held. Under that United Nations agreement, the ballot was held on August 30, with a fairly large international representation of observers, including members of this Parliament.

Results of the ballot were announced September 3. It was an incredible turnout of East Timorese, both inside that area as well as outside. Ninety-nine percent of eligible voters participated, and the vote was overwhelming, 78.5% for independence. I think that particular figure does highlight just how important it was to have the vote and the willingness and enormous courage of a number of the East Timorese who came forward at that time.

Following the vote itself, the wave of violence and intimidation by pro-integration militias ensued. It targeted East Timorese, UNAMET staff who were there, foreign journalists, aid workers, and perhaps most disturbingly engaged in a large-scale plan of displacement of hundreds of thousands of population.

I spoke a few days ago to Xanana Gusmao, who is one of the major East Timorese leaders, who said that if there was one area that was of great concern it was the fact that so many people had been pushed into the jungle, up to the borders, and were without any food or support. His primary plea to us at the time was to be able to respond to that matter. But it does raise serious questions relating to the crimes against humanity, whether this in fact was an enforced planned action or not.

In the face of a very strong concerted international pressure, the Indonesian government agreed to an international peacekeeping mission on September 12. Just to remind you, that was about eight days after the vote took place, so compared to what happened in Kosovo, it was a very rapid change in terms of an international presence. If you recall, for Kosovo it took us a year to get to that position before it took place. The Security Council voted to authorize the mission at 3 a.m. on September 15.

Our objective in that debate, for those of you who have followed it, was to have a clear and robust authority for the force itself to maintain order, to stop the murder from the forced displacement. We also worked successfully to ensure that the resolution addressed the needs for full and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations so assistance could be delivered under secure conditions. I can report to you today that the first air drops took place into East Timor several hours ago.

We also introduced the notion that East Timorese should be guaranteed the right of safe return and that those who committed atrocities should be brought to justice.

We are currently consulting with the United Nations and Australia, which has been given the lead role, on how best to contribute to that international effort. An interdepartmental delegation from the defence department, CIDA, and the foreign affairs department left for Australia yesterday to do their on-site reconnaissance in preparation for Canadian participation.

My colleagues will give further details about the work of their officials in this case.

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I would like to use the occasion to talk about the work that a number of Canadian civilians and police officers who were part of the UNAMET operation undertook. They were in the compound, they were throughout East Timor during most of this time, and they exposed themselves to considerable danger. On many occasions we were in contact with them and we asked them if they wanted to come out, and they preferred to stay. So I think they deserve a great deal of praise by members of this committee, this Parliament, and by the Canadian people for the work they carried out under extremely difficult and very onerous conditions.

The UN supported the May 5 agreement in which Indonesia retained responsibility.... I want to point out that there was lots of debate and discussion as to why the UN didn't go in right away. The fact of the matter, the reality, is that under the May 5 agreement responsibility for security was given to the Indonesian government. There wouldn't have been agreement if that provision hadn't been accepted. In other words, in order to move towards a vote for independence, that was one of the preconditions. When it broke down, clearly that had to be renegotiated, which it was.

I think many expressed concerns at the time. They realized there could be trouble. But insisting on an international presence would have meant there was no agreement and therefore no ballot.

Let me just spend a few minutes talking about some of the activities Canada has done. I think we have, certainly since my tenure as foreign minister, treated East Timor as a matter of some priority. We have maintained contact actively with the East Timor representatives, including Bishop Belo, Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmao, as well as a number of NGOs who I visited personally when I was in Indonesia in 1997. Canada has been the third largest aid donor in East Timor, just behind the Australians and the Japanese. This aid, however, has been channelled primarily through NGOs, as I believe CIDA reported to you, and has included support for the community reconciliation process undertaken by the Catholic bishops in East Timor.

When the Indonesian policy changed in January, we supported the right of East Timorese to determine their own future. We then convened a round table of Canadian and East Timorese NGOs and other stakeholders to discuss how Canada could help build capacity and support peace.

Let me reiterate this. When I visited Indonesia in 1997 specifically to review Canada's policy in relation to East Timor and met with people on the ground in Indonesia, their major request for us was to help build capacity, both in anticipation of taking responsibility but also in terms of developing institutions to deal with human rights matters. That's one reason why, through CIDA, we made a major contribution to the Indonesian human rights commission, which opened an office in East Timor, and supplied access on human rights issues. I think we were the only country that was able to provide that.

We have consistently pressed the Indonesian government on its human rights records, both at the United Nations Human Rights Commission and at the United Nations General Assembly, and directly on a face-to-face basis. I would meet personally with Foreign Minister Alatas sometimes three or four times a year, when this was consistently on our agenda. In fact, as late as July at the ARF meetings in Singapore, we had a long discussion about the situation, received assurances that the Indonesian government was prepared to live up to its responsibilities, but pressed furthermore that the international presence be given full access at that time. Following that meeting, I sent my ADM, Mr. Joseph Caron, to East Timor in August to get a better sense of the situation, raise our concerns, and give his advice to the government as to how we should prepare for the independence.

In the run-up to the ballot, Canada contributed to the UNAMET. As I said, we had 26 electoral experts and four civilian police officers. We ran the polling stations for the East Timorese diaspora everywhere except Australia, and we fielded an electoral observer team under the Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific, Mr. Chan. Members of this committee were in fact involved in some of that.

When the violence began to appear and it was quite clear that we would have to reorient and redirect efforts, I took the initiative to convene a meeting of foreign ministers on the margin of the APEC meetings. We undertook those discussions seven or eight days before APEC met. Through a series of phone calls, we gained agreement from a core group, including the chairman Mr. McKinnon, to this meeting, unlike at the normal APEC meeting, which is primarily economic in focus.

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Once we got there we found that there was a broad base of support, and when we held the meeting some twenty countries participated. What is important about that, I can report to the committee, is that it included six members of ASEAN who up to that time had basically taken a hands-off approach. By bringing a number of the ASEAN members into that meeting, I think we began to develop a form of international consensus, at which time the foreign ministers' statement insisted upon an international presence within Indonesia and identified the major humanitarian problems that were being faced.

Coming out of that, our representative on the Security Council, Ambassador Fowler, was the first to ask that there be contingency planning for a peacekeeping operation in East Timor. Unfortunately other members of the Security Council did not agree with our position, and it was voted down. But I can assure you that we were the first to raise that issue, because we began to anticipate the problems there.

We also worked to broaden that resolution, to provide for a strong statement on the question of human rights, and we have called publicly for those who commit atrocities to be brought to justice. We support the position taken by Mary Robinson, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, that there be an investigation. In fact I think Canada supports ultimately the creation of an ad hoc tribunal on crimes against humanity in East Timor, or an expansion of the existing tribunal to cover that kind of requirement.

Finally—and I won't deal in detail with this because I know Mrs. Minna will—at the same time as we were in APEC, we used the opportunity of the foreign ministers meeting to begin to mobilize a humanitarian program. Coming out of that meeting, on behalf of my colleagues at the foreign ministers meeting, I instructed our ambassador, Mr. Sunquist, to mobilize ambassadors in Jakarta to begin developing a humanitarian aid package, which he has done. This has now led to a United Nations program.

So on the humanitarian front and the political front, I think I can point out to you that Canada has been very active.

Finally, as for the next steps, I think we will clearly be involved in the deployment of a multinational force. We will be involved in the return of the UNAMET staff, and we'll be involved in the transition of UN administration once the Indonesian parliament has voted to release East Timor and there is a turnover to United Nations administration. I think the most difficult issue we'll have to support and we will be working on is how to develop both reconstruction and reconciliation in that very conflict-ridden area.

That, then, is the report from the political side. I think Mr. Eggleton would now like to report to you.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Axworthy.

There is some concern already being expressed by colleagues at the table who are anxious to ask questions. I didn't find that an overly long statement from Minister Axworthy. We want to hear the ministers put this in context for us so that we'll have the groundwork for those questions. But I will tell you that I've had some consternation expressed already. We'll have lots of time for questions, but I feel we need some context.

Can we go now to Minister Eggleton, please.

Hon. Arthur C. Eggleton (Minister of National Defence, Lib.): Thank you very much, Co-chairs. Members of the committee, senators, good morning, bonjour. I'll try to bear in mind your comments as I put this into context.

I'm here with the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, General Ray Henault, to discuss what the Canadian Forces are able to do with respect to responding to this very serious situation in East Timor. As Lloyd Axworthy has noted, it is important not only to promote peace, democracy and respect for human rights, but also to support these values with concrete interventions when and where necessary.

I will now lay out our thinking on the details of Canada's contribution in East Timor, at least to the extent that we know about these details at this point in time.

As you will appreciate given the nature of the situation, much still remains to be determined. The UN Security Council resolution adopted on Wednesday authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, with the following tasks: one, to restore peace and security in East Timor; two, to protect and support UNAMET, the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor, in carrying out its tasks; and third, to the extent possible, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

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Acting under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution also authorizes the nations participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate. The UN agrees that the multinational force—a coalition of the willing, if you will—should be deployed in East Timor until such time as it is replaced by a UN peacekeeping force. This would be along the lines of the UNAMET that has existed to this point in time.

At the moment, we estimate that the transition from a multinational force to a longer-term UN peacekeeping force would take a few months. While the detailed composition of the multinational force has not been determined, it has been determined that it will be led by the Australians, and we expect that it will number about 7,500 troops, the Australians comprising about 4,500 of that number.

As the lead nation, Australia is now consulting other nations, including Canada, in developing the concept of operations for this mission, the force structure and the rules of engagement. A number of other countries have stated that they either will contribute forces to this effort or are considering doing so. They include the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, France, Italy, and Portugal.

[Translation]

The Canadian government has yet to make a final decision as to the exact nature of its involvement in this mission. However, we believe our Canadian forces can make a useful, worthwhile contribution.

[English]

We are looking at air, naval and ground force components that could be deployed either alone or in some combination. If we choose to deploy all three components, our total contribution would be approximately 600 personnel, as the Prime Minister has indicated.

The first of the three components under consideration is, first of all, two Hercules transport aircraft, including about 100 personnel, which could be deployed very quickly. They could be deployed in a matter of days, within a matter of a week, following a government decision to deploy. These Hercules aircraft would work out of Australia, would help in the transport of people and of the equipment that is necessary for the operation in East Timor, and could also be involved in helping to transport humanitarian aid.

Second, a naval supply ship, the HMCS Protecteur, is on warning alert. It has about 250 personnel and integral medical, communications, helicopter and logistic capabilities. It could reach the region in about three weeks once it sails.

Third, a reinforced infantry company consisting of about 250 personnel and about 40 light vehicles could arrive in Australia in about two to three weeks' time. This third component would then require some training with Australian forces in Darwin, which could also take some two to three weeks' time. However, the surgeon general has determined that a 40-day period is needed for the appropriate inoculations because of tropical disease possibilities for these people. Those inoculations started as of yesterday, so that by the time the 40-day period has run out these troops will be in theatre; they will be in East Timor and ready to go.

As we further develop our plans, these numbers will increase slightly to incorporate essential command, support and liaison facilities, so it'll be slightly over 600. Given the pace at which events are unfolding, the Chief of the Defence Staff has already warned specific units that they might be deployed to East Timor so that they could begin preparations, and as I mentioned, the inoculations started yesterday.

The situation in East Timor is fluid and volatile. This will carry real risks for the multinational force. As with any operation, we will want to ensure that the risks facing our troops are minimized. A strategic reconnaissance team of about 15 people from the Canadian Forces is now en route to Australia. They will arrive there on Sunday. That team is responsible for providing advice on the risks on the ground in East Timor and for discussing the details of our participation with the Australians and other contributing nations.

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The information that will be supplied by the reconnaissance team will be critical in allowing the Chief of the Defence Staff to fully assess the situation, particularly the risk to our personnel. We know this could very well be a difficult mission, and General Baril's advice will be an important consideration for the government in reaching a final decision on Canada's military contribution.

Members of the committee will naturally be interested in questions of command arrangements, costs, and sustainability. I can assure you that Canada's contribution will respect our long-established practice of deploying viable military units under Canadian national command. We will also ensure that our forces are appropriately supported. Accordingly, a national command element and a national support element would also deploy to support our forces.

The incremental costs of such a contribution, if all three elements were deployed, would be approximately $33 million, based on a six-month period of time for that contribution. The costs would be considerably less, of course, if we were to deploy only one or two elements of that package or if the deployment were to last less than six months. Some are suggesting it could be a four-month deployment before it's turned over to a more permanent UN mission. As with previous international operations of this nature, I'll be seeking additional funds from the central treasury to cover the incremental costs.

Let me now take a few moments to address the concerns that some of you have raised this week about our ability to mount a new operation, given our work elsewhere and the severe personnel and financial reductions made to National Defence in recent years.

First let me note that in developing our options for East Timor we have carefully considered current and future commitments to the Canadian Forces.

[Translation]

When the Chief of Defence Staff presents options to the government, he must ensure that these options are viable. The mission to East Timor is no exception to this rule.

[English]

The nature of the mission, the number of troops already deployed, other foreseeable operations, the risk, the geographic location, and health and quality of life considerations are all factors that must be carefully examined when determining the level and nature of our contribution. In the present case, we have concluded that we could participate in this mission without adversely affecting our operations or our ongoing contingency preparations for meeting the Y2K challenge.

Some elements of the Canadian Forces have certainly experienced a very high operational tempo in recent years, but others have not. It is with that in mind that we have been shaping military options for East Timor. We recognize, however, that frequent deployments overseas have implications for quality of life of our people and their families. This is why in March we introduced a comprehensive quality of life package to address the issues that were raised by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs in its very thorough examination of the matter in its quality of life report.

The measures contained in that package are all aimed at improving the quality of life of military personnel and their families, because we recognize the unique nature of the military profession and the challenges it imposes. For example, the Military Family Resource Centre will provide emergency child care for the families of personnel deployed on this mission. The 1-800 mission information line will provide family members with helpful information about the mission as it progresses.

Once again, we are asking the men and women of the Canadian Forces to be the instrument of our resolve in restoring peace and stability in a troubled region of the world. As I said earlier, much remains to be determined, but I ask you and all Canadians to give your full support to the men and women of the Canadian Forces who carry out our collective will.

Thank you. Merci.

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The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister Axworthy.

It's a pleasure to welcome Minister Minna for the first time in her new capacity. Colleen and I are pleased to welcome you to our committees—and all members are seconding that—and to hear your comments before we have some questions.

Minister.

Hon. Maria Minna (Minister for International Cooperation, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Co-chair.

Fellow members, dear colleagues, as the Minister for International Cooperation, I am pleased to provide you with information on how my department, the Canadian International Development Agency, is working with relief organizations to coordinate Canada's humanitarian aid to the people of East Timor.

My purpose in coming before you today is, first, to give you more details on the assistance we are already providing to some of the people displaced in this crisis; second, to go over some of the latest developments that will allow Canada and the international community to provide much-needed relief in the most appropriate way; third, based on our current understanding of the humanitarian situation, to outline some of the next steps we may be taking; and finally, to provide you with information you can pass on to your constituents. We all know Canadians have shown tremendous support for victims of conflict and other disasters in the past and we want to make sure their generous assistance is directed in the most efficient way.

[Translation]

I would like to take a few minutes to pay tribute to the courage of the men and women whom we are seeking to help today. According to the latest reports, half of the 800,000 residents of East Timor, or 400,000 people, have been forced to flee. This figure represents more or less the entire population of a city the size of Kitchener, or slightly more than half of the population of New Brunswick. Overnight, these people's lives have been endangered and they have likely lost virtually everything they have. Whether they have become refugees within East Timor or have fled to West Timor, they are in need of assistance.

Canada was providing assistance to East Timor well before the events of recent weeks began to unfold. Canada continues to maintain close ties with community organizations in this region. It contributed two ways to the referendum conducted under the auspices of the United Nations: first, it provided assistance in the form of civilian police officers at a cost of $1 million, and second, it provided assistance in the form of election experts, also at a cost of $1 million. Furthermore, Canada lent its support to local conflict resolution initiatives, at a cost of $850,000 and also supported the Monsignor Belo Nobel Prize. Naturally, these and other initiatives undertaken in East Timor have been put on hold, but these can be revived and adapted to meet current needs.

[English]

The events in East Timor have fractured the human security of the Timorese people and set back their development progress. Apart from providing emergency assistance to meet the urgent basic needs, my department's main job is to help them act on root causes of their instability and insecurity. This is a longer-term effort.

As in other cases where violent internal conflict has erupted, the root causes can be traced to social and economic inequality and a political structure that does not encourage broad participation or that favours one group of people over another. We therefore contribute to human security when we work on access to sustainable employment opportunities, essential infrastructure, health and social services—in other words, when we help remove the barriers of human development and social progress. We also contribute to human security when we work on key governance issues, promote respect for human rights, and strengthen equal access to justice. At the present moment, however, we have to work with our colleagues from Foreign Affairs and National Defence on ensuring the safety and basic needs of the East Timorese people.

[Translation]

With respect to humanitarian aid, as you know, I have directed CARE Canada workers on site to provide assistance to displaced persons. This Canadian organization has already proven itself in times of crisis. You will recall its recent involvement in humanitarian relief efforts in Kosovo. This organization was already well positioned in this region to provide rapid assistance to victims. Last week, it received $420,000 from CIDA and rest assured that it lost no time springing into action.

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[English]

CIDA announced its $420,000 contribution to CARE Canada last week. By then CARE Canada had pulled out of East Timor for safety reasons. They already had ongoing projects in West Timor, and they immediately took the necessary steps to assess current needs and organize support for internally displaced persons who fled from East Timor to the western part of the island. CARE Canada has targeted one camp in West Timor where between 10,000 and 13,000 internally displaced people have settled. They have already assembled some 3,000 out of the 5,000 survival kits they will be providing. In the end, they should be able to help some 25,000 people.

At this time I can tell you that they have already started to hand out the clothing, bedding, mosquito nets, basic cooking utensils, and other basic material that will allow these people to feed their children, to rest, and to create their own space even in these most chaotic and precarious circumstances.

We are using various flexible alternatives in order to provide a quick response, while making the best use of resources already committed in Indonesia or East Timor. For example, $300,000 of food aid was recently redirected to meet the needs of displaced Timorese. My department, together with CARE Canada, arranged for an initial 400 metric tonnes of rice to be reallocated to both East and West Timor from a project in East Kalimantan. Canada's fund for local initiatives in East Timor is another resource available to us in the region. There is currently $300,000 that can go to support displaced people and to meet other humanitarian and reconstruction needs.

Taken together, these three channels add up to a bit more than $1 million directed to helping the people affected by the violence in East Timor.

Whatever else we do from now on must be carefully planned so that our help reaches the greatest possible number of people in the most effective way. This is the spirit in which the United Nations, through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, sent an assessment mission to East Timor this past Wednesday. The results of this mission will set the overall parameters that will guide the humanitarian efforts of the international community. We will be working in close collaboration with OCHA in determining Canada's contribution.

As you know, an interdepartmental mission is leaving Canada shortly for strategic talks in Australia. I am dispatching a food aid specialist along with representatives of the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs to provide expertise on humanitarian assistance and logistical concerns. This person will also ensure an eventual smooth transition between the first stages of assistance and the next—that is, rehabilitation or reconstruction.

I am also dispatching a humanitarian assistance specialist to Indonesia and, as the situation permits, to West and East Timor to liaise with our partners in the field and assess how CIDA and Canadian relief organizations can best contribute to the next steps of the overall humanitarian effort.

As far as future steps are concerned, we already know a certain number of things. Food stocks are currently available for three to four months in the region, but there will likely be a need for food aid, possibly through the World Food Programme. We can also expect there to be needs in shelter, water, and sanitation.

Apart from CARE Canada and UN agencies such as OCHA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, my department will be consulting closely with such partners as the Red Cross movement and World Vision Canada, both of which have been able to gain access to East Timor, as well as with Médecins sans frontières and USC Canada. Some of these organizations are already well known to your constituents and mine.

Your offices may already be receiving calls from generous Canadians eager to help in whatever way they can. Again, as you know, it is important to stress that cash donations are what is most needed and most efficient. The circulated copies of my remarks include a list of these relief organizations, including their toll-free numbers.

Thank you again for your interest. I look forward to answering your questions. Merci.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Ms. Minna, and all three ministers, for providing that context.

Before we go to questions, I want to welcome back the clerk of the defence committee, Mr. Eugene Morawski, who fell ill in the spring and was absent from us for some period of time. Gene, we're glad to have you back and looking so fit.

We'll now go to questions, reminding colleagues there will be five minutes for question and answer. Please cooperate in that so that we can get as many members in the action as possible. We will start with the official opposition, Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and ministers, we believe the situation in East Timor is certainly appalling, and it does require some intervention to ease the suffering of the people there. But we also have another problem with the way the government has been handling this situation, and I think that is just as appalling, and that is dealing with our armed forces. Ultimately, from what I can see, the Minister of National Defence should be accused of inaction and lack of preparation in dealing with the matter of our armed forces. They have suffered dramatically over the past several years from cutbacks that the minister and the government have imposed upon them.

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In a situation here, where an emergency arises, there is a requirement now to have a robust force—and those are the words of the external affairs minister—a robust force enter East Timor to quell the problem there, the conflict. Yet our forces will require at least 40 days between now and the time they actually enter that ground.

The other problem I see arising and which I would like the minister to address is over the issue of the use of the only supply ship on the west coast, sending that particular ship, as well as its personnel, with the light vehicles that are required to go and operate on the other side of the globe. It's the only supply ship. In other words, there will be no supply ship for the frigates, the destroyers, and the coastal defence vessels. And if you take one from the east coast to counteract that, then that side will be void of any sort of support.

I would like the minister to address those particular concerns. And before he does, I have one specific question. The Prime Minister committed the 600 troops, or 600 personnel, to East Timor. Did he consult with you and the external affairs minister prior to making that commitment? And what was your advice?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Minister, Mr. Hanger has left you half the time to answer. You have two and a half minutes.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Okay. He talks about the situation with respect to the budget. Yes, there have been a lot of cuts in the budget in order to get our financial house in order in this country. But as recently as February 1998, Reform's alternate budget plan called for holding the line in government spending. They didn't want to spend a single nickel more on defence. In fact, the year before they were calling for another billion-dollar reduction. So people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones, I would think.

As for the robust nature, yes, you bet; they'll be robust when they get there. Our people are top professional, well-trained people, and they will be able to perform quite well with their colleagues from the other nations.

The 40 days is simply to protect them from a very deadly disease. Japanese encephalitis is one that can kill a great number of people. It's a problem in the tropical jungles. This is a vaccination that the surgeon general feels is absolutely necessary. It requires three vaccinations—the first one was given yesterday—so that these people will be properly protected when they get there. Surely the honourable member isn't suggesting, for the sake of being robust earlier, that we should leave our people unprotected, is he?

So we are attempting to have our people put there in the quickest possible time. And I can tell you the coalition partners, including the Australians, want us to be there and fully understand that requirement.

Now, the supply ship in fact is for purposes of using when cases such as this arise, as has been done before. General Henault can certainly comment further on that if there's sufficient time to do so. We will be properly protected in terms of our west coast operations.

On the question of the 600 troops, the 600 number the Prime Minister used came from us. It came from me. Yes, we were consulted. We gave them the number. That's why he used it. I've given you the number again today: 250 on the infantry company, 250 approximately on the ship, and 100 on the Hercules. That's 600, which is the approximate number.

The Prime Minister made it quite clear that it could be less than that. There's no commitment at this point in time. There's no commitment as of right here and today either. We are still in the process of collecting information. We've got a reconnaissance team out there now. As soon as we have that information back, we'll be in a position then to make a commitment, to make a decision.

• 1050

But I should also point out that a part of getting to there is consultation, and consultation with this joint committee and the senators is a valuable part of that input before the decision is made.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

[Translation]

I will now turn the floor over to the Bloc Quebecois member, Ms. Lalonde. You have five minutes.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What strikes me about all of this is the Canadian government's slowness to react to the crisis unfolding in East Timor. Our government was slow to take a stand when it came to imposing financial sanctions on Indonesia, whereas most every European and North American country had already opted to impose sanctions. We are also critical of the time it has taken the government to prepare our soldiers. Why did it wait until now to inoculate them? The day after the referendum, it was obvious that the situation was going to deteriorate. Why was the government so slow to react?

What does the government plan to do to help the refugees who have fled to West Timor? José Ramos-Horta is pleading with us to help East Timorese refugees who for the most part are women and children. According to the reports we have received, the refugees are being targeted by militia members now fleeing East Timor.

Why has the government been so slow to respond to the situation?

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: First let me point out to the honourable member that before the vote was held, I asked our assistant deputy minister, Mr. Caron, to go to East Timor to evaluate the situation. I also met with a group sponsored by the CLC that reported that they had concerns about outbreaks of violence. Based upon that, I asked our representative at the United Nations Security Council, Mr. Fowler, specifically to introduce a resolution asking the United Nations Security Council to authorize a contingent looking at peacekeeping. That was voted down. It wasn't our slowness; we simply couldn't get the political support for the action that was required.

Based upon that development, I then began to call a number of the other foreign ministers in the following days, recognizing that we would be in Auckland together, and suggesting that we in fact meet at that time to begin developing political support for action in East Timor, which took place. I think the honourable member would have to acknowledge that it's a very unusual occurrence to have a purely political security question raised at the APEC meetings. Out of that particular session arose a consensus statement demanding that Indonesia accept an international force. That was then turned over to the leaders at Auckland. On that front itself, I think we were ahead of the curve of other nations in responding to it.

Secondly, at the same time, Canada took the lead in organizing the humanitarian response. Coming out of those meetings in Auckland, my colleague Madame Minna had already allocated money. I was authorized to use our ambassador in Jakarta as the catalyst, the organizer for a humanitarian initiative. He brought together a number of the aid agencies in seven other countries, who made a commitment to begin moving it. I spoke to Mr. Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister, to gain security agreements that a team could go to West Timor, on the border, and start opening up operations immediately. That was before the Security Council even passed it. So again we tried to take the lead in getting international action and international cooperation. I don't believe we were slow. In fact I think we were trying to provide as much leadership as the capacity of Canada could provide.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Madame Lalonde, I think Minister Minna wanted to comment. One minute.

Ms. Maria Minna: I'll be very quick. I just wanted to refer to Madame Lalonde's concern with respect to assistance and the quickness of that.

The CARE Canada program was dispatched quickly. We met shortly thereafter and the money was allocated. We have now up to $1 million to use. The work is being done in West Timor, where in one of the camps survival kits have already been handed out. So the people for aid are on the ground already. The problem to date has been getting into East Timor, because all of the offices of the Red Cross and CARE Canada have been destroyed in East Timor. It was not safe to go into East Timor until now. I know that the UN has been in, and the Red Cross today, I believe, and the World Food Organization has gone in. So as we are able to safely expand our aid, the money is there and we will very quickly start dealing with it.

• 1055

As I said before, we have a three- to four-month supply of food, but that probably will become an issue. Our aid was on the ground very quickly, and to some degree to great danger to the people giving it in West Timor. But it was not possible to go into East Timor at that point.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

Now to this side for one speaker and then back to the other side. First is Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to ask a question to Minister Minna to start with respect to the best estimates at this point as to the number of people who have been killed, wounded, or are missing. Are there are any figures whatsoever circulating in terms of those numbers?

I'd also like to ask the minister: obviously the situation in East Timor is critical and it's a humanitarian crisis that begs for a response, but there are other places in the world as well that have pressing needs. I just want to be assured that some of those places, in particular perhaps Sierra Leone, have not fallen off the table as far as the consideration of her department goes.

To Minister Axworthy, I would like to ask a very quick question with respect to the ad hoc human rights or the international criminal tribunal that he mentioned and whether or not there has been any preliminary feedback from some of the major UN players with respect to whether we'll actually see war crimes prosecutions at some point in the future. Do you have any reasonable level of optimism that this will actually occur?

Ms. Maria Minna: Firstly, as for the number of people who may be dead or missing, we don't have exact figures on that except for the fact that our ambassador has gone into West Timor and has reported that he saw very few men there. We don't know whether it's because the men fled to the hills or are hiding or because they're elsewhere or some other horrible thing. We don't know at this point. So we don't have that number.

In terms of the displaced, we're looking at about 50% of the population of East Timor who have been displaced. Some 200,000 of them are in West Timor and 175,000 dispersed in the hills of East Timor somewhere. So that's a pretty dire situation.

As I say, at this point we don't have reports as to the number of dead and what have you until we get actually into Timor and do that kind of assessment.

With respect to aid to the other parts of the world, I know the honourable member's interest in Sierra Leone. I can assure him that is very high on my agenda. I hope to meet with Minister Axworthy after this meeting and come to a conclusion on that with respect to aid to Sierra Leone.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: David, on your question, as you know, in the resolution passed on Wednesday there was a clause pertaining to the need to bring those responsible to justice. That was the operative clause.

Yesterday at the United Nations Security Council, Mary Robinson, a high commissioner, speaking on the Canadian initiative on protection of civilians, indicated that she would like to see an inquiry established. That could take several forms: it could take a form that she could establish in her own office, or it could be authorized by the council itself. So probably the preliminary step would be some form of investigation and inquiry authorized by the UN High Commission on Human Rights.

At Geneva right now it takes 24 votes to get an approval. I think we're one short, and we're working on that one country to get them to come around to actually approve such an initiative. If that's the case, then the UN Human Rights Commission could authorize its own inquiry. As I said in my opening remarks, I think that would be their lead to an ad hoc tribunal or an extension of the tribunals that are presently working on Rwanda and in the Balkans.

Mr. David Pratt: Any time left?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Yes, one minute.

Mr. David Pratt: To Minister Eggleton, could you provide any specific information on what you expect the strategic reconnaissance team to produce after they've had an opportunity to meet with the Australians and to examine the situation?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'll ask General Henault to describe that situation.

Lieutenant-General Raymond R. Henault (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you.

The strategic reconnaissance team is en route, and in fact should be in Australia now. They will be proceeding to both Canberra and Darwin to discuss the concept of operations and the overall integration of the potential Canadian force into the overall coalition, if you like.

• 1100

Their primary function over this particular weekend will be to determine what the composition of the actual force itself will be, what contributing nations will be providing, how they best fit into the overall plan, and to come back to us with recommendations on not only that concept of operations, but potentially on the security, medical, and other arrangements we might have to consider as we do the tactical reconnaissance, which will follow this particular reconnaissance to Australia. The tactical reconnaissance will be into East Timor itself.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, to correct the record, I said 24. Actually, the number is 27. I stand corrected.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

Now to Mr. Robinson—five minutes, questions and answers.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to first join with the ministers in acknowledging and commending the role that Canadians have played, both within UNAMET and in NGOs, including the International Federation for East Timor, a number of Canadians who played a very courageous and important role in East Timor. I think I'm the only member of the joint committees who was actually in East Timor last month, and I had the opportunity to meet with many of those Canadians. I know that in at least one instance a young Canadian, Aaron Goodman, actually saved the life of a person who was being attacked by militias in the town of Same.

I also want to acknowledge that in the last two weeks Minister Axworthy has played a significant leadership role at the United Nations, as has our ambassador in Indonesia. But I think we have to put this in context, as well. Canada's overall record on East Timor over the last 24 years has been one largely of complicity and of silence. We saw that at the United Nations General Assembly in vote after vote there. All Canadians witnessed it at APEC, when we rolled out the red carpet for Suharto, the author of the genocide in East Timor, and attacked students who were peacefully protesting his policies.

I met with Timorese who pleaded and begged us, as Canadians, to get the message to our government that they should be calling for a strong international peacekeeping force to avert a bloodbath. This was not unpredictable. Yet it was only after the vote took place that Canada acted at the Security Council to call for peacekeepers.

I want to ask three very specific questions. First of all, why didn't Canada call for UN peacekeepers earlier? At the very least, why didn't Canada send a clear message to Indonesia, along with other nations, to live up to the commitments and promises that Indonesia made in the May 5 accord or their credits from the World Bank and the IMF would be cut off? Those aren't just my words; they're the words of David Malone, a former foreign affairs official, who the minister knows. Why didn't Canada show that leadership, and why isn't Canada showing that leadership today? Bishop Belo pleaded before the vote with the community of nations to make it clear to Indonesia that they wouldn't receive military assistance or loans unless the army ended its campaign of violence. Canada ignored that plea. Why did we do that?

Question two: military sales. The minister said in an interview with The Globe and Mail that there will be no new military export permits issued. I want to ask, what about the authorization of over $300 million in military sales from 1993? Many of those sales haven't yet taken place. Those are sales of things like military aircraft, helicopters, transport aircraft, navigation equipment. Will the minister make a very clear undertaking that there will be no military sales whatsoever, including permits that have already been issued?

Finally, what will the role of the Indonesian military be when the multinational force moves in? Under the United Nations resolution there is an acknowledgement of the Government of Indonesia's continuing responsibility. Will all Indonesian troops be out, particularly given their direct complicity with the violence and the militias?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Ministers, Mr. Robinson has left you a minute and a half for those questions.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: What else is new?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I'm trying to focus this discussion.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Quickly, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, in 1997 two things happened in terms of our policy that applied to East Timor.

First, I went there with a specific purpose: to reassess the Canadian policy as it relates to Indonesia and East Timor. As a result of that, we initiated a number of new programs dealing with human rights and dealing with support for East Timor, setting up a consultative system on human rights with Indonesia. At the same time, we instituted a very specific new regime dealing with military exports where in a case-by-case basis every application would be assessed according to its potential impact on human rights on the civilian population. As a result of that, there was a very substantial reduction in all military permits given to any country that had any kind of prospect or potential, including Indonesia, to the point where last year the actual sales to Indonesia were $5,000. Everything has been put on hold.

• 1105

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you.

We're going to have trouble getting the answers to the questions already posed. Mr. Axworthy, we have about half a minute here.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Let me just say that I think it's very important in this case that the difficult context in East Timor was based upon a UN arrangement negotiated with Portugal and Indonesia itself. As I said in my opening remarks, under that agreement the Indonesian government had taken on responsibility for security, which in fact had been enforced during the vote: there was no violence. However, we were still very uneasy. That's the reason I sent Mr. Caron, our ADM, to also go to East Timor to also make the assessment. He came back with some of the same kinds of concerns Mr. Robinson expressed, which is the reason I asked Mr. Fowler to raise the matter in the United Nations.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Eggleton, do you want to wait until the next round, or do you want to answer it now very quickly?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I would just attempt to answer the third question, about the Indonesian army. It's our expectation that they would in fact pull back, withdraw. However, our reconnaissance team has to assess that situation further to make sure that in fact the central command of the Indonesian army is strong enough to be able to ensure that.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much.

Mrs. Wayne, for five minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much.

Firstly, I have to say to the Minister of Defence, and this won't surprise him, that I really don't agree with him that it's all right to cut your budget. I have to tell you, I'm a very strong supporter of defence. Art, if you want to get on board with me, I think we can put more money into the defence budget. Every one of us around this table should make sure that happens. I have to say, we are going to fight for you on that one.

I have a couple of concerns. Mr. Minister, I'm glad to hear that our men are being inoculated, because we went through this once before, dear, when they were sending them over for Saddam Hussein and they weren't inoculated.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that the Department of Foreign Affairs anticipated problems and that they were unable to get Security Council support for their proposals in May. I'm wondering why the Department of National Defence wouldn't, working with the two ministers together, see that this problem was coming and our men would be inoculated and they'd be ready to go right now. Certainly I think you know, and we all know, that this has been ongoing for quite some time.

Also, I'd like to know, when our men and women go over there, we talk about 250 personnel going over who will be on the ground and the rest are in supply ships and aircraft. For the ones on the ground, I would like to know if we are going under the Australian command structure when they go there. They're going to have 4,500 troops, and we're going to have 250 troops on ground. The rest will be.... I can understand how you've come up with the 600 figure, but we won't discuss that. Are we going to be under the Canadian flag and under our command? That's what we would like to know. Are we going to have control of our troops or is Australia going to have control of our troops when they go over?

Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I agree that the budget certainly has been cut enough. We need to get on with making the money we have serve us in the best way possible. We have great dedicated men and women who make up our Canadian Forces. However, as you know, the budget cuts, not only in the military but in all departments and all aspects of government, were to get our financial house in order. I would suggest that it wouldn't have been quite so severe to go through those budget cuts if it weren't for the budget cuts the Tories were already inflicting on the military for some four years before we even took office.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Minister, you and I should have stayed at the other level of government.

• 1110

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Regardless of that, Mr. Chairman, let me say that in terms of international operations such as East Timor, the Canadian Forces are an instrument of our foreign policy. And yes, our two departments do work very closely together.

You know, to be able to predict very far in advance, months in advance, about what our requirements might be in a “what if” condition is not easy to do. Even today, knowing what we know, we still are not sure about the exact composition of what is going to be necessary to help the people of East Timor. If we were to put all of our troops through every kind of inoculation conceivably possible for any part of the world, their arms would become pincushions, but this is not a practical reality. As soon as we can determine, in concert with Foreign Affairs, where we are likely to be deployed, in what way we're likely to be deployed, what troops we're likely to need, and with what occupational capacity, then we'll take action very quickly.

So even though at this point in time every detail is still not worked out, even though there's still not a Canadian decision made, we've already started the inoculations as a preparation.

Now, I said earlier with respect to the 250 reinforced infantry company that they would of course have an appropriate Canadian command structure. But we would be operating with the Australians, more so than perhaps we have in the past, where we've operated, say, with the British in the Balkans, because then we had more resources, logistic support, medical support, and other things that we are really quite stretched on and can't provide in this case. The Australians will provide that.

But to give you the picture of how that's all going to work in command and control structure, I'll ask General Henault for further comment.

LGen Raymond Henault: As the minister has already said, we still do not have a clear concept of operations from the Australians, who are now working out those details. They are working quite diligently in cooperation not only with us but with other militaries—the U.S., the New Zealanders and so on—to develop the concept of operations, the rules of engagement, all of the concepts that are required to actually deploy into East Timor. As part of that, we have been in constant consultation with the Australian defence force through our attaché and liaison officers, who are on the ground in Canberra now and who will be augmented by our reconnaissance team, which is en route, as the minister has said.

Our expectation is that we will be under Australian control or other allied control as part of a battalion or as part of a multinational battalion. I would point out that that's operational control, and that in multinational operations we always deploy a national command element. So the Canadian Forces that are deployed to East Timor, whether air, land, or sea, whatever is determined by government, will be under Australian command but reassigned under operational control for actual operations themselves. So we do retain that command responsibility in a deployed context.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, General. Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

We'll start a second round now, and the cooperation is pretty good. Perhaps we can keep it to two or three focused questions and allow the ministers some time to respond, hopefully to your satisfaction or at least as fully as they can.

So we'll start again with Reform and Mr. Mills, for five minutes.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly the official opposition is concerned about man's inhumanity to man, what we've seen on television. We think Canada should be involved in supporting the diplomatic and financial aid and of course upholding the democratic process as it occurred in East Timor.

Having said that, however, I think we have to look at what the real facts are. This is not a new issue; this is something that's been going on for 20-plus years. The government has known about it, the minister has known about it, and the minister has visited a number of times.

In actual fact, what has happened is that Team Canada found that Indonesia was a great place to do business, that they were wonderful to work with. The Prime Minister even suggested that we involve a CANDU project with this wonderful country of Indonesia, meanwhile totally ignoring East Timor. We also of course welcomed them to APEC, welcomed their leadership, and said how wonderful it was to have them as part of this.

In 1998 we sent $250 million in export credits, another $20 million, another $16.4 million, and so the list goes on, most of it government-to-government aid, not through NGOs but to government. What did they use it for?

• 1115

Now we come to the CNN factor, bringing this to international highlights, and suddenly of course we must have action. Why do you think the UN wouldn't respond when we asked to send peacekeepers? Because they knew it was just talk and we couldn't really provide them.

While it sounds as if we're all so wonderful and so on, I think the real question we need to ask as Canadians is what influence does the foreign affairs minister really have? What influence does he really have at the UN, with Indonesia, or with the neighbours of Indonesia? I think the record obviously speaks for itself.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to examine what our Prime Minister has said. He said that we are boy scouts, that we will go anywhere. Of course I then asked if that means we will go to Sudan when that place explodes soon. We know it's coming; it's been coming for a long time. The list could go on.

But, Mr. Chairman, let Mr. Axworthy answer these questions.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Minister Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I'm very pleased to see that Mr. Mills has gone through a conversion in position. I noticed in his statement of a day or so ago that he was totally opposed to any Canadian involvement in East Timor. I'm glad to see that wiser heads have prevailed somewhere and the Reform Party has now changed its position.

Mr. Bob Mills: Military.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: If one wants to talk about consistency, I think one certainly has to applaud the fact that the Reform Party is prepared to recognize when it is wrong and change its position. So we welcome his endorsement of what we've done.

Secondly, to suggest that we've simply come to this in the last two weeks is wrong. In answer to Mr. Robinson, I pointed out that in 1997 I went to Indonesia with the specific purpose of assessing our broad approach to the human rights situation in Indonesia in relation to the government and to East Timor specifically, and I spent some time meeting with everyone from government authorities, to NGOs, to those involved in the East Timor movement. I concluded that we could make changes, and we did make changes, such as supporting the Indonesian human rights commission's movement into East Timor itself, setting up a human rights dialogue with Indonesians in which these matters could be raised through the support of CIDA, and providing much stronger support for the reconciliation commission that Bishop Belo started. We set up a round table on East Timor that brought people together in an attempt to find some solutions.

So we did begin an active effort to try to provide a peaceful solution to the matter, in the meantime using every opportunity we had in meetings with the Indonesian authorities to press them on the suppression of rights in East Timor and the suppression of rights in fact in Indonesia itself.

Let me point out something that's very important, Mr. Chairman. Indonesia itself is going through a change. It had democratic elections last spring. It is now moving towards a new form of responsibility. It is certainly not perfect, but at least it is a major change.

For all those who simply want to provide punitive actions against Indonesia, we are recognizing two things. One, it is a fledgling democracy. It is going to take some support to get to the point where it can have responsible government. Secondly, the issue of East Timor is not over with. Under the UN agreement, the Indonesian parliament has to ratify the East Timor independence. We hope that comes very soon. We hope it can come as early as late October or early November. Therefore it is very important to continue to work towards that end.

We don't want the elements within Indonesia.... You can see already the backlash that is taking place, with people on the streets protesting the fact that there is an international force, protesting the decision of the Habibie government to give it its independence. There are lots of elements in Indonesia that are not in favour of independence for East Timor, and it's very important that we provide whatever support we can to those who are supporting independence and supporting democratic rights, and therefore not come at it—as in your comments, I would have to say, Mr. Mills—in a pretty simplistic way of dealing with it.

Indonesia is a very major country in the Asian region. It has 200 million people. I only have to recall to you the horrendous history back in the 1950s when half a million people were killed in violent conflict when civil war disrupted that country itself. Therefore I think it is important that while we pursue actively the independence of East Timor, we also actively support the establishment of responsible democratic government in Indonesia and try to offset the kinds of control by the military and others that have been such a negative influence over the past many years.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mr. Mills.

• 1120

[Translation]

You have five minutes, Ms. Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good morning, sirs. Minister Eggleton, earlier you mentioned that you would be deploying 600 soldiers to the region. Of which battalion are these soldiers members and will more than one regiment be involved in this mission?

My second question concerns Canada's weapons sales to Indonesia. It is no secret that Canada has been selling weapons to Indonesia for a number of years and we've learned that such sales were recently halted or that an embargo has been imposed. When exactly was this embargo ordered? Prior to the embargo, what types of weapons or arms were sold or military aid provided to Indonesia in 1997-98? How much did these weapons sales generate in revenues?

I believe Mr. Rocheleau has a brief question that will use up the time I have left.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Rocheleau.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): Mr. Axworthy, as you know, Timor proclaimed its independence in 1975. Indonesia proceeded to invade the territory of Timor and the government subsequently annexed East Timor, which became its 27th province. The United Nations rejected the annexation of East Timor and called for a referendum on independence. The UN General Assembly subsequently passed several resolutions proclaiming East Timor's inalienable right to self-determination. In light of the outcome of the August 30 popular consultation, does Canada recognize the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, as endorsed by 78.5 per cent of the residents of this territory in the referendum?

[English]

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Eggleton, please.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Very quickly, in response to the source of the 600 troops that we are examining as a possibility, the Hercules aircraft and the 100 personnel would come from 8 Wing in Trenton, Ontario. Approximately 250 personnel on the HMCS Protecteur, the supply ship, would sail out of Esquimalt on the west coast. The approximately 250 in the reinforced infantry company would come from the third battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment, the Vandoos, in Valcartier, Quebec.

This of course has not been finalized. These are the parts of the organization that have been given what we call warning orders, and in fact the inoculation was carried out with respect to the Royal 22nd Regiment infantry company. The first inoculation was carried out yesterday. We don't anticipate, I might add on the inoculations, that this would be a difficulty with respect to the Hercules staff, because they would be going between Australia and an airport. They would not be exposed to the conditions that could lead to that problem. Therefore they could be deployed a lot faster. Similarly, those on the ship could be inoculated while en route if, again, any of them could potentially come in contact with a disease. But then again, if they're off the shore, this may not be a problem for most of them.

But the infantry company from Valcartier definitely will require the 40-day inoculation period.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: On the question of exporting military goods, we introduced in 1997—and I think many members were in the House of Commons when I tabled the report—a new system for examining exports that was to be applied against the criteria of human rights, impact upon civilian population, etc. That means we do a case-by-case scrutiny, where it's assessed by a variety of sources to determine what the impact may be. The result I can give you is that in 1996 we sold $1.65 million dollars' worth of so-called military goods, which were aviation-related equipment parts. In 1997 there was $189,000 in aircraft ground equipment parts, aircraft parts, and navigation system parts. In the last two years we sold $5,000 worth, mainly navigation parts.

• 1125

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you very much. Merci beaucoup. That was exactly five minutes, and I appreciate it.

We'll come to this side now. With colleagues' cooperation, I'm going to invite Senator Stewart, who's chair of the Senate foreign affairs committee, to take five minutes, if he would like.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. As I understand it, this is a joint meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): That's right.

Mr. Svend Robinson: These are committees of the House of Commons, of elected representatives of the House.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Yes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Our colleagues from the Senate will have an opportunity, should they wish to convene a meeting to do so.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Yes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: There are still many members of the House committees who do have questions, and it is quite improper for a guest of the committee from the Senate to be taking the time that should be allotted to those elected members of the House who are convened to this meeting.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I take your point, Mr. Robinson. I indicated that it is now the turn of the majority side, and there's five minutes allotted to the majority side. If the members on the majority side wish to defer to the senator who is chair of the foreign affairs committee, I intend to rule that he will be invited to speak.

Are there objections from this side of the table to the senator being next speaker? Senator Stewart, you have the floor.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I've made my ruling, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, that ruling is quite inappropriate. Under the rules of the House, senators are welcome to sit in at meetings of House of Commons committees, and if no member of the House wishes to pursue a line of questioning, then they are free to ask a question. There are a number of members on this side of the House, perhaps not on the government side but on this side of the House, who do have questions.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I take your point. As a matter of fact, I have four members on the government side who wish to speak to this issue. They wish at this time to show the courtesy to this senator, and I'm ruling he has the floor.

Senator Stewart, please.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Senator Stewart, please.

Senator Stewart has the floor, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: It is out of order for a senator to be taking the time of the House members—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Senator Stewart has the floor.

Senator Stewart, please. Thank you, sir.

Senator John B. Stewart (Antigonish—Guysborough, Lib.): Chairman, I appreciate the invitation that was given to individual members of the Senate foreign affairs committee to be here and to ask some questions. I have a question for Mr. Eggleton and one for Mr. Axworthy. I'll be brief.

The number of militias in East Timor has been estimated at 30,000, and the head of the Australian defence force, Admiral Chris Barrie, has stated that the task force mandate does not authorize the disarming of the militias in East Timor. Now, assuming that the minister takes seriously the view of General Wiranto, the Indonesian minister of defence, expressed to the Security Council mission at Jakarta, that “the situation would only deteriorate further if United Nations were brought in at the present stage”, does he believe that a force of about 7,500 persons will be adequate to restore peace and order in East Timor?

Before he answers, may I read a comment: “If they”—that is, the militias—“decide to fight it out, outright war could break out between the UN force and the Indonesian military”. My question: if a war such as that which is anticipated in that statement does take place, is the Government of Canada making adequate preparations?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): I welcome the minister's responses. We have about three minutes, please.

Senator John Stewart: I have a second question.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Well, I think we'd better let him address these, Senator—

Senator John Stewart: Yes, all right.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): —and we'll see how our time goes.

We have three minutes. Is Minister Eggleton going to take that one?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We'll both take that one, but I'll start off.

Of course this is the very reason we haven't made decisions yet, the very reason we've sent a reconnaissance squadron over there to check out this situation, to see whether or not it is a realistic scenario, so that we understand fully what the level of risk is before we make any commitments.

The thought to this point in time is that if we do in fact get the Indonesian military to withdraw, the militias will not stand up for very long. One of the problems has been that while perhaps it has been the militias throwing the grenades in some cases, it's the military that's been handing it to them to do so. In going into East Timor with a coalition force, it is very important to understand fully what the Indonesian military is going to do.

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Certainly our effort is not to get into any kind of battle with the militias, but to restore peace and order in the most expeditious way possible, in the quickest time. But that is an ongoing assessment that is being made by the UN, by the coalition headed by the Australians, and by our own 15-member reconnaissance team that has gone over.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind Senator Stewart that this is a United Nations chapter VII activity, which means that in fact it has been fully mandated by the United Nations Security Council. Therefore they are instructed to use all means necessary to achieve the objectives, which in this case was to return order and to allow the displaced persons to return.

Do I think there will be major combat? No, I think there will be problems. But the fact of the matter is, as Mr. Eggleton just said, the militia has been basically supported by the elements of the Indonesian military that were in East Timor. They are now back in their barracks and going back. That is the reason it was so important to get the agreement of the Indonesian government for the intervention of an international force, which we now have.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): A brief question, a very brief answer.

Senator John Stewart: President Habibie warned the Security Council mission earlier this month that to allow chapter VII forces into East Timor might very well lead to the balkanization of Indonesia. Only yesterday the leaders of another province asked for a referendum on self-determination. Is it true that Habibie agreed to the referendum and to the admission of the UN force only under pressure, and indeed pressure from the World Bank and the IMF?

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Axworthy.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: There's no question, Mr. Chairman, that they gave in to a lot of pressure. It wasn't just the bank; it was a combined international consensus, as I said, where we met in Auckland, in the APEC setting.

One thing that I think was very crucial in turning things around was the inclusion of a number of the ASEAN countries, close neighbours of Indonesia, who also supported the need for an international presence. It was also important for the United States, which has very major military connections with the Indonesian army, to apply its particular pressure, which after the meetings they agreed to do. Third, there was the recognition that they had lost control. I think Mr. Habibie and Mr. Alatas, in the discussions we had with them, said they would try to do what their responsibilities were set out to do, but if they couldn't, they would then be prepared to renegotiate their position, which is ultimately what they had to do, which is what they eventually decided to do.

I think, Senator Stewart, you're taking Mr. Habibie's words out of context. When he said that earlier this month, he was referring to the intervention of the UN force without the agreement of Indonesia. It now is going in with the agreement of Indonesia.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Senator.

We'll go to the NDP. Mr. Earle, for five minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I would say, as others have said, that I certainly support Canada trying to assist in this most serious situation, and I commend the fine men and women of our military for the excellent job they are doing.

We do note, however, that there have been a lot of military cuts. I note in particular, in the small town of Greenwood, the potential loss of 225 jobs, a complete squadron there. I think we have to look seriously at the impact that has, not only upon the military itself but also upon the communities that house these military units.

With that in mind and the cuts that are being made, my first question is what kinds of guidelines do we have for our military in terms of how and when we become involved in these international crises? We see them happening more and more every day. I think we have to have a vision for our military as to what kind of military we want and when we're going to get involved. We note, as has been indicated, that there was very little involvement with Sierra Leone, where lots of atrocities took place.

So what are our guidelines? What is our vision for our military?

Second, it has been mentioned that the decision has not been made yet and that this will depend upon information from the reconnaissance committee and other consultation, particularly with this committee. Will this matter be brought back to Parliament for a vote before a final decision on our involvement is made?

Third, mention was made about getting at the root causes of the problem. Will there be a very serious look at the causes that help these situations to develop, such as economic trade, arms trade, and so forth, with these countries? Are we going to take a serious look at that, so we don't find ourselves facing the same situation further down the road where Canada has in fact participated by allowing trade and arms to these countries that then commit atrocities on other people?

Thank you.

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The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Ministers, about three minutes.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, in three minutes I couldn't begin to cover the subject called “vision of the military of the future”.

There is a policy paper called the 1994 white paper that talks about what our purposes are. We have gone through and are going through various visionary exercises. For example, our Strategy 2020 in five-year segments deals with both long-term and short-term applications. I'd be very happy to provide more information on that.

Certainly when it comes to our basic fundamentals, it's the sovereignty of Canada working with the United States and the protection of our continent and contributing to international peace and security. In regard to international peace and security, we are involved in some 22 missions around the world, but there's no doubt that we are getting stretched to the limit. We've been able, fortunately, to find some troops that can go and be a part of helping to bring security and peace into East Timor without further aggravating that situation. But there are limits on what we are able to do.

I'd be happy to have more money to be able to do more, to help in terms of the implementation of our foreign policy, but I'm not waiting, holding my breath. I'm proceeding to make sure that our organization is the most cost-efficient and effective it can be, investing in people, investing in the tools they need to do the job in the most effective way possible. We'll continue to operate in that way and we hope to have additional money and resources if we can get it.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to provide a brief answer to Mr. Earle's last question.

As he knows, in the last year or so we have been putting forward the basic policy framework of human security, which is to take into account the fact that civilians are now the major risk-takers and victims of a wide variety of international activities. When you say how do we address it, I can give you a specific example. Yesterday, at the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary General tabled a report based on the Canadian initiative on how to protect civilians in conflict. In that report were 40 recommendations dealing with everything from dealing with poverty issues to conflict prevention to rapid response to the small arms trade. There is a series of 40 recommendations that are now on the table of the United Nations.

I can tell you, Mr. Earle, that beginning Monday, when we start the United Nations General Assembly sessions, we will be making the implementation of that report a primary focus and priority for Canada, along with a number of allies. So I think we are trying to deal with the root causes. We took that initiative last February.

I would recommend to all members that they get a copy of the Secretary General's report. It's one of the best documents that I think the Secretary General has provided in terms of looking at the contemporary scene internationally. And I am pleased to say that it was as a result of the initiative we took at the council last February.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mr. Earle, all done? Thank you.

Thank you, ministers. Oh, I'm sorry, Minister Minna.

Ms. Maria Minna: I just wanted to address the comment the honourable member made with respect to the root causes and addressing them.

The Government of Canada has been one of the most active players in East Timor for the last while. We've been in East Timor since 1979, but in the last number of years we've increased our commitment to approximately $4.4 million per year in East Timor. A great deal of that has had to do with dealing with the tensions and community reconciliation and increasing the capacity of human rights within that area prior to the vote and working with the United Nations as well long before that. So we've been working very much at the grassroot level together with the East Timorese and the churches and other organizations with respect to strengthening and working together through conflict resolution as well as working in Indonesia.

Earlier Mr. Mills was talking about moneys going directly to the Indonesian government. There's no cash ever given directly to the Government of Indonesia, but there is work that is done, for instance, with respect to the human rights commission, trying to strengthen that in Indonesia. The expertise of the human rights members of Canada is there, working with them. So the assistance is given through Canadian executing agencies, not directly to the Government of Indonesia.

So we've been working on both sides, both within Indonesia to reinforce the structures of democracy as well as within East Timor. Ours is one of the largest programs in East Timor at the moment, specifically addressing the root causes of conflict.

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The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

You're out of time now, Mr. Earle. Thanks very much. I'll give you an opportunity on the next round, because Mr. Bachand is waiting for his five-minute time slot.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. André Bachand (Richmond—Arthabaska, PC): Good morning and welcome. It's been a while, or at least it seems so. It's a pleasure to see you again today.

I have a first question for you. Some countries, for example, former East Bloc nations, are often recognized quickly by others following a vote or referendum on independence. Has Canada formally recognized the newly independent nation of East Timor?

Earlier, mention was made of planning problems, following a question from Ms. Wayne. It is now clear that Canada is likely embarking on a lengthy mission. Whether or not it has been formally recognized by Canada, this country must set the wheels of democracy in motion. What actions is Canada planning to take to support the establishment of a democratically elected government in East Timor? What role will it play when peace has been restored? Will people receive the vaccinations they need in time to help out the Timorese people?

Finally, after Canada has formally recognized East Timor, if it hasn't already done so, what role does Canada intend to play in Indonesia to ensure the security of other provinces in this region? If East Timor does in fact gain its independence, it's possible that tens of thousands of Indonesian soldiers will be deployed to other regions. From a planning and monitoring standpoint, what role does Canada foresee for itself in other parts of Timor and in Indonesia?

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I can start.

First, in terms of the history, when the Portuguese pulled out in 1975 the international community did not recognize East Timor at the time because they didn't have time; the Indonesians moved in too fast. It then became a matter before the United Nations, with a series of resolutions, but it was never recognized by the United Nations or by anybody as being an integral part of Indonesia at that point in time.

What we have done at this point in time is to recognize the right of the East Timorese to have a say in determining the outcome of their future. With the outcome of the vote, where you had—and I think it's important to emphasize—a very clear question, with a very high majority for independence, it seems to me to establish pretty fair criteria to recognize. However, that has to be mandated by the Indonesian parliament, which, as I said, will take place in November, when they will accept the results of that vote. As I say, there was a very clear question with a very clear majority, and I think that's a very important recognition to make.

As to what happens afterwards, under the United Nations arrangement, in the third phase they will become an administrative unit in East Timor, responsible for both security and for civic administration, helping the East Timorese to build up the capacity to govern over that period of time. I expect Canada will play a very active role. As Mrs. Minna has said, we have been very actively involved up until now on the human rights commission and Bishop Belo's reconciliation commission.

We've had a number of discussions with East Timorese leaders about support. When I met with Mr. Horta here last year, he said the most important assistance we could provide is to train people in civil administration, train people on how to run a government. So the governance issue is very important, and that's where I think we would be particularly interested in supporting, in giving the East Timorese the capacity to govern themselves and to set up their own administrations.

We would also, I would think, have to determine at that point in time what form of UN security force would be there. My own expectation would be that at that time it would probably be more regionally supported than the force of the willing that we now have. At that point in time I think it would be an authorized peacekeeping mission of the Security Council.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

Minister Minna.

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Ms. Maria Minna: With respect to the long-term assistance, I think it's important for the committee to know that the Canadian aid program has a very good reputation among civil society organizations in that part of the world, because we have been very busy, as Minister Axworthy has said, with respect to reconciliation and trying to build up the NGO organizations and the infrastructure at the community level as well as the human rights end and what have you.

With respect to East Timor, it's obvious that in the long term we will be active and we will have to be involved with programs that will be required to fill the void that is left by the departing Indonesians, who up until now occupied most of the professional positions, including the bureaucracy, schools, and hospitals. That type of training and assistance will be required and expanded by us. Of course CIDA will be looking at that together with our partners in the international community.

We already have a very extensive program in place, which was suspended as a result of the violence, and which can restart as soon as things are calm. We can begin to work with the various NGOs and infrastructure that's already there.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

Now we start another round.

I want to inquire first of all if the ministers have any flexibility. The meeting is officially scheduled to end at twelve. Is there a possibility you could stay with us another fifteen minutes to half an hour?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Fifteen minutes would be our maximum flexibility.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): All right. We appreciate whatever extra time you're able to stay.

I want to start another round now with the Reform Party. Mr. Hanger, for five minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Minister Eggleton, you have gone on record saying that the Canadian Forces are already overstretched. That was prior to a complete commitment to the Kosovo crisis. Now, since that time of course there have been some small commitments, and now this situation with East Timor.

I guess the point of my question is since you brought up quality of life issues in your statement to the Canadian public, is there going to come a time when you're going to be able to say no to support the men and women in our Canadian Armed Forces? Are you aware that some of the Canadian Forces, the troops, are serving back-to-back deployments?

I've had conversations with several of the families in different bases across this country. Some of their husbands have come back from Bosnia, they have barely hit the ground for a short stay to be reacquainted with their families after six, seven, eight months of deployment, and they are off to training, sometimes in Arkansas, sometimes to Gagetown, sometimes out in the field in the areas their bases are on just to be prepared for redeployment. Some have gone to Turkey without even having any period of time apart from three or four months in Canada, and back into the field, or back into another tour somewhere.

I listen to their comments. They're married to military men and women, and they enjoy the military. But they're asking when they are going to see their husbands and when they are going to be back and be part of their family. It takes several weeks, if not months, to resettle into a living style that would be considered reasonable for any family.

Mr. Minister, I appeal to you, when you talk about quality of life for military personnel, I want to ask you, does it bother you to know that this is happening? Should you be more concerned about what is going on here with our personnel, and the fact that they're overtasked? There are all kinds of reasons why they're overtasked. I'm going to again ask you, will there come a time when you might say no, you're going to look after and support those here in our country so that their quality of life will indeed be what one might consider reasonable?

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Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I think there may well come a time when we have to say no. I originally thought we might not be able to participate in this particular mission because there are certain elements of the Canadian Forces that are stretched to the limit. What the chief of defence staff and the deputy chief have been able to come up with are units that do not—I repeat do not—contribute further to that situation where they are overstretched.

The peacekeeping missions we have are by and large based on the army. They have certain elements—medical, food, transportation, and various logistical elements such as communications—that are particularly overstretched. In the composition that we've suggested is possible for this mission we have stayed away from those particular elements that are stretched to the limit.

The concern about quality of life, yes, is a paramount concern of mine. You know the policy is that people who serve overseas go overseas for six months. Yes, that is a fair period of time to be away from your family. It's part of the life of being a soldier. But remember that those people do get an opportunity, through rest and recreation time, to get back with their families, even within that six-month period; they do get other opportunities for rest.

When they come back, the policy requires that they be in Canada for a year before they can be redeployed. There are circumstances however where people volunteer. I've talked with some of these volunteers—if Mr. Hanger would like to listen. Some of them are very happy to go back. They understand that life. They want to be a part of it. But you're quite right in saying that there are stresses and strains on the family. We have more family people today, more married people with children, than we've ever had before. At one time a lot of these people in the rank and file were single individuals, but that's not the case today. The demographics have changed.

I am concerned about that kinds of stress on family life. We're looking at this situation very carefully, because if it comes to a point where we have to say no, we may have to say no unless we can get additional resources to be able to provide for additional troops.

We want to be able to contribute to international peace and security. It's the nature of Canadians to do that. It's part of our value system. It's part of our direct interest, because we're a trading nation, to be able to have peace and security in the world. It's part of what Lloyd Axworthy has frequently described as human security, the need to respect people's human rights. We want to be a part of that. Our people are very good at that. However, we also owe them a good quality of life—for them and their families—and that is of paramount importance.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

[Translation]

You have five minutes, Mr. Mercier.

Mr. Paul Mercier (Terrebonne—Blainville, BQ): Mr. Eggleton, I believe our party was the first to call for military intervention in Timor. Therefore, we are obviously pleased with Canada's decision to participate in this mission.

However, we deplore the time it is taking to make the arrangements to organize an operational, efficient mission. We can appreciate that these delays are due to the fact that soldiers must be inoculated, but there's one thing we can't understand. Violence erupted on September 3, after the results of the balloting were known. I realize that a decision had not been made at the time to deploy troops because the government was awaiting the go-ahead from Jakarta. However, it appeared more than likely that at some point in the not too distant future, Canada would be deploying soldiers to the region. Why weren't steps taken then and there to inoculate the soldiers who would eventually be deployed to East Timor, even if they never received the order to move out? No such decision was made. Is there a problem inoculating soldiers against diseases to which they might never be exposed? If not, why weren't steps taken as early as September 3 to prepare a unit for possible deployment to Timor?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Quite simply, we had no idea what kind of team would be required or who would be required. We have 60,000 regular personnel and 30,000 reservists. We can't inoculate all of them against the possibility of going into this operation in East Timor. We had no idea what the nature of the operation would be.

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As Lloyd Axworthy has clearly said, Canada attempted to draw the international community's attention to the potential problems in East Timor. We can't act alone. If they ignore our requests to take preventive action or to take earlier action, that definitely is a problem for all of us. We certainly have very responsibly tried to ensure that the international community is seized of this matter, and we have moved at the earliest opportunity.

We have not, contrary to what you've said, made a decision at this point. We're still in consultation with the Australians and others as to what the composition should be and how we would fit into it. There are a number of unanswered questions. The rules of engagement haven't been drafted yet. But even on the basis of what we know today, we have taken some action. We started the inoculations yesterday of those 250 infantry company personnel in Valcartier.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

There are two and a half minutes left for the Bloc, Mr. Rocheleau, if you wish....

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I'd like to come back to a question I asked earlier. Every time the UN General Assembly has held a vote on the right to self-determination, Canada has voted against this action. In light of the outcome of the August 30 referendum, where does the Canadian government stand today on the right of the Timorese people to self-determination?

[English]

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, as I answered Mr. Bachand—and I take it Mr. Rocheleau was listening—in January we recognized the right of the East Timorese to have a say in determining their future as a non self-governing territory. It was never recognized as being part of Indonesia; they were a non self-governing territory, and we recognized their right to have a say in that determination. There has not yet been a recognition of full independence for East Timor. The Indonesian Parliament will have to ratify that when they assemble in early November.

I think it is important to point out—and in particular, Mr. Rocheleau, you should underline—that in this case there was a very clear question and a very large majority for independence.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): There's still a minute of Bloc Québécois time...unless that's not clear enough.

Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: The plight of the Timorese is desperate. Many are now living in camps, while many more have fled into the forests. Still others have taken refuge in West Timor. There are countless hungry and frightened people. Compared to the efforts deployed in Kosovo, where the number of displaced persons wasn't much higher, don't you think our efforts in this case fall somewhat short? Granted, the decision to provide assistance to East Timor was made much more quickly, but according to figures compiled by the UN High Commission for Refugees, the situation has taken on truly tragic proportions.

My question is directed to Ms. Minna.

[English]

Ms. Maria Minna: Thank you.

With respect to Kosovo, I think all of us know that we were looking at the scale of an emergency that was quite enormous: a million people were displaced. Canada has been part of an action long before that.

With respect to East Timor, the million dollars I mentioned earlier is only the start. This is simply to deal with the immediate emergency of the East Timorese that we can reach. We can only reach the ones in West Timor at the moment where CARE Canada is. We will be looking at further aid as we get into East Timor and as we're able to see what kind of assistance can in fact be given, with security. As I said before, OCHA has gone into East Timor; so has the Red Cross and the World Food Bank. They will be able to assess. We are dispatching a member of CIDA to work on the ground with our partners there to be able to see what additional assistance is needed.

The most important thing to remember is that at the moment in West Timor there are about 200,000 people, and the CARE program has been delivered under a great deal of risk to the people for whom we're trying to provide this care. They've done a tremendous job, given the situation, in assisting those people.

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As soon as we have an assessment of what's happening and we are able to get into East Timor, we'll certainly be looking at the situation again. This is an initial response. We wanted to assist as immediately as we could, given the security situation, and CARE Canada was very helpful in telling us exactly what personnel they had on the ground and what they could deliver, given the situation. Obviously, as things change daily and as soon as we hear more, we will be able to adjust our response.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mr. Mercier.

Madame Lalonde.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Let me just add one comment. In fact when CIDA announced its original contribution, our ambassador in Jakarta, Mr. Sunquist, was unable to use that to lever donations from seven other countries. So in fact we were able to use it really as the first ante in an aid package, and that took place last week before anybody else was there.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

The ministers have indicated they can stay for 15 minutes longer than was scheduled, so we'll continue.

[Translation]

You have five minutes, Mr. Patry.

Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): My question is for Mr. Eggleton.

I would like you to expound on some of the answers you provided earlier.

You stated that the Indonesian army would likely pull out of the region once peacekeepers arrived on the scene. According to certain reports received this morning, the Indonesian government has ordered even more troops into East Timor, and they seem prepared to stay a while. The report also says that peacekeepers could come under fire from the army and the militias. The role played by the army and the militias in the slaughter that took place in the aftermath of the referendum is no secret. Since this will be a peacekeeping mission, how will our Canadian and other UN peacekeepers respond if they come under fire? In short, what is their mandate going to be? Will they be able to defend themselves if they come under attack?

As for my second question, should the Indonesian army not pull out, what will Canada's position be then on deploying our soldiers, mindful that Indonesia has not guaranteed or more importantly, has been unwilling to guarantee the safety of the Timorese or of UN personnel in East Timor in the wake of the referendum?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: That's an excellent question. The reconnaissance team over there is very key for us at this point in time in helping to access the information.

I think you're quite right, there is conflicting information. The information we have is that the Indonesian military commander in East Timor has promised that he would begin withdrawing his troops from the devastated province next week. That would certainly pave the way for our peacekeeping force to come in. As long as they stay to that, I think that situation is of far less risk to us. There is the further piece of intelligence that suggests the militias would not survive beyond that. We have to check all of that out and understand that fully to assess the risk before we go in.

I might add one other thing. You mentioned blue helmets. This is a UN-authorized force under chapter VII, but they won't be blue-helmeted. This is a coalition of the willing, as they call it. It's mandated by the UN Security Council, but it's not a blue beret, blue helmet type of force. Ultimately, the blue beret, blue-helmeted force would be back after this coalition force creates the conditions for them to return.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

There's time left on the Liberal side, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the ministers for coming.

The questions that are coming into my constituency office deal entirely with wanting reassurance. Canadians want reassurance that what we're doing is as safe as it can be, both for CIDA personnel and in particular for Canadian troops, not only in East Timor but in that we're on the ground right now—CIDA is anyway—in West Timor. That's the first question that's asked.

The second question, of course, is who's going to run the mission? The logistics of the mission are important as far as who's in command of Canadian troops in the event that we do take part in this. I believe you answered it earlier. Is it a UN mission? Is it a Canadian stand-alone mission? These are the questions I've been asked.

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I'll deflect the rest of my time to Hector.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can begin the answer and the others can follow.

On the question of security for aid personnel, in discussions last week with Mr. Alatas, when we organized this humanitarian group, they said they could provide security in West Timor and allow that to be established as a bridgehead over which other forms of aid could be delivered, particularly to the people who had been pushed into the border areas. So there is a security arrangement there. Our ambassador visited there two days ago and reported again that they are satisfied that there is sufficient security to allow aid workers.

I also say that aid workers are probably some of the most courageous people in the world. They take on risks that I think the rest of us would be very reluctant to do. They really are the front line in many cases in these kinds of operations.

As for the nature of the force itself, as Mr. Eggleton said, it is in chapter VII that the force is authorized to use force or all means necessary, but it is not under the command of the United Nations. Australia has been designated as the command centre. The Thai army would be the deputy area. They can go into the explanations of that.

However, there will be a transition. After phase two, after the ratification of the vote, which I expect will take place in early November, if the Indonesian parliament does—and that's why I think it is important to keep the pressure on in Indonesia, to get the vote on independence—then the United Nations would be taking over under a fully integrated UN peacekeeping activity with UN commanders and so on. That's the plan that goes back to May 5.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): A real quick question, Mr. Clouthier.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Could I further respond to that?

First of all, hot off the wire comes this information from Indonesian military headquarters that some 8,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor have left or are on their way out of the territory and into the border town of Atambua.

With respect to John's question about the command, our Canadian troops would initially be commanded by Canadian officers. The actual orders are given by Canadian officers to Canadian troops. However, they're under the operational control of the Australians. This is not dissimilar to what already exists in Bosnia and in Kosovo, where we are there in the sectors that the British are controlling. We are there under their operational control. But the day-to-day command and control of Canadian troops is done by Canadian officers.

Ms. Maria Minna: Just to finish up on the issue of security with respect to our aid personnel, I think it might be interesting for you to know that there are more aid workers killed in these situations than military personnel nowadays. This is why when in answering my question to Madame Lalonde I stated that CARE Canada was giving aid in an area where there was some assistance given by the Indonesians, some safety. This is why we have not been able to go into East Timor: we cannot put people at risk. So we have to wait until at least the force in the area is secured somewhat so that we can go in and see what the situation is and make sure that our aid workers are in fact protected.

I must tell you that as my colleague said, they are some of the bravest people I know, the ones I met in my office. I'm not sure how many of us would go into that arena and provide aid in this kind of environment.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

It is the NDP's time slot. Mr. Robinson, five minutes.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just before my questions, my colleague had a brief follow-up question.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): It's five minutes total, gentlemen, questions and answers.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

When the final decision and assessment has been made regarding Canadian involvement, will this matter be brought back before Parliament for a vote so that the Canadian people can have a say through their elected representatives as to sanctioning Canada's involvement in this matter?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Chairman, as I think we pointed out, the practice we follow is to consult with Parliament. That's exactly what we're doing this morning.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, consultation with parliamentary committees is certainly not consultation with full Parliament. That was my colleague's question.

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I want to follow up on a couple of issues. One is on the issue of arms sales. For the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, over $400 million in export permits for arms to Indonesia were authorized. I want to ask the minister, when he said that effectively everything has been put on hold, does that mean that sales that may have been pending, pursuant to those previously issued export permits, sales to the Indonesian military—and those included things like military aircraft, helicopters, other military-related equipment—that none of those sales will proceed?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Mr. Robinson, right now there are I think only three permits outstanding, all for simulators and aircraft parts. There are no airplanes, no guns, no ammunition, no what you call pointy-end equipment. The actual sales in the past two years have been $5,000.

There are still three permits. We don't have a capacity for retroactivity, but we have put any new applications on hold. The only permits that are there I think are for matters that are non-combat-related, that would not be used in a civilian context. Judged by the criteria set out in 1997, they're not being used in any kind of enforcement action. That is the present state of affairs.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So there will be no sales pursuant to existing export permits to the Indonesian military?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: What I'm saying is that there are permits that authorize those sales. Whether they will be activated or not.... We put everything since then on hold, but we can't be retroactive on those permits that are in existence.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Well that's what I'm asking.

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well I just told you.

Mr. Svend Robinson: So the minister is then saying that he is prepared, if permits were issued in 1995, 1996, 1997—

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: No, no, no. The permits have to be renewed consistently. Those permits have a six-month shelf life. All that is in there right now are three permits that in fact have standing.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And none of them will be acted on?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: I don't know. It's up to the individual companies. What I'm saying is that we put everything else on hold. As I understand, none of those have any kind of active combat role, and would have no impact on any activity in East Timor.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I have one other question, Mr. Chairman.

Of course there are serious human rights concerns in East Timor. There are also very serious concerns about human rights violations in Aceh, Indonesia, and in Irian Jaya as well. The Canadian Labour Congress has shown leadership in issuing a hot edict on trade in any products that are going to Indonesia, in light of the direct complicity of the Indonesian government in the massive human rights violations and murders in East Timor.

I want to ask the minister again, is he prepared to use economic leverage, particularly within the context of the World Bank and the IMF, on Indonesia now to make it very clear that we are appalled by their conduct in East Timor and also to make it very clear to them that unless they fully cooperate in withdrawing all of their troops from East Timor and in bringing to justice those responsible for crimes against humanity, there will be economic consequences?

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy: Let me put this very clearly. We are continually raising with the Indonesian government actions we don't agree with. We've been doing it since I've been minister, on every occasion, including the latest discussions with Mr. Alatas. At the same time, we are very anxious that East Timor be given its independence and that the vote be ratified by the Indonesian parliament and that the Indonesians fulfil their commitment to pull out, which is under their agreement, and to turn over East Timor for independence.

I think, frankly, that some of the things you're recommending are counterproductive. It seems to me you're almost recommending a course of action that would go against the independence of East Timor, because it would set up a backlash in Indonesia itself. I think it's very important that we try to support those elements in the Indonesian government that have been working toward the independence and the protection of rights. They are not all there. There are very strong elements, both in the army and in some of the political elements, against the independence of East Timor and who want to prosecute and continue to prosecute the Indonesian intervention. But as we demonstrated last week, the application of strong international pressure did bring about a very substantial change in their position. We're continuing that pressure.

Frankly, to cut off food aid to Indonesia, to cut off support for NGOs, to cut off support for the development of capacity.... Well, that's what the CLC is talking about. They're going to stop any shipment that goes, including food, including aid to NGOs. Those are the kinds of things they're talking about. I think that would be frankly counterproductive in terms of the objective that I think you have and I have, which is to see a proper process toward independence in East Timor.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Minister.

The last time slot is for Mrs. Wayne. And dare we say that Senator Andreychuk had hoped to ask a question. I'll let Mrs. Wayne judge that. Anyway, there's five minutes to go.

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Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chairman, the Prime Minister referred to our troops as boy scouts, and I think we are all aware that the motto for boy scouts is to be prepared. I'm not quite sure that we are prepared.

My question is for the Minister of Defence. We were concerned about our men going in and the role they were going to play when they were there, whether it is just peacekeeping, in view of the Indonesian troops.... You've stated, I believe, that 7,000 or 8,000 of them have pulled out, Mr. Minister. How many more are still there?

The general mentioned or you mentioned that a delegation has now gone from the military to look at the whole role and just what we're going to be doing when we're there. How long will that take? When will we be informed exactly of what is going to happen when we send our people there, or if we are going to continue to go in this direction?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We expect the reconnaissance team would return within a week. We'll look at each of the elements. It's possible that we could decide on the Hercules aircraft going sooner because of their role. The most complicated role would be the ground troops. That's where we need most of the information from the reconnaissance team, and we would have that within a week.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: If what happens this afternoon, with the rumours that are going around, this committee will not be meeting to find out just exactly.... We'll have to hear about that through the papers?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We're doing the same kind of consultation at a similar stage to what we've done on all previous missions, in the Balkans and everywhere else. We're at a stage where no decision has been made. I think it's important to have the consultation before that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: But obviously the situation is still fluid. It's still forming. We're still getting an idea of what's involved here. If we waited until all the i's were dotted and the t's were crossed it wouldn't be much of a consultation. We obviously want to do it at the earliest possible stage. And we don't have all the answers.

So we're doing that at this stage. Then ultimately the government makes a decision. That's exactly the way it's been done before.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Do you wish to allow Senator Andreychuk to finish your time?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I want to make this statement so that everybody around this table knows. I'm going to say yes, and the reason is this. My understanding is that the reason we are here today is because Senator Andreychuk was up in the Senate every day asking that this committee come together, along with the senators—and jointly come together. We're not going to fight about whether we're a senator or an elected person, because we're talking about the lives of the people in East Timor, and all of our people over there.

The reason we're here is because of this lady here, and I don't think my colleague to my right knew this because this committee was not looking at meeting until they agreed. They sat down and they worked and negotiated this agreement for today. I don't think my other colleagues on this side of the House knew it either. So yes, I certainly will turn it over to Senator Andreychuk.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Let me invite Senator Andreychuk to pose a question.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, under the provisions of the Standing Orders of the House, Standing Order 119 states:

119. Any Member of the House

—not any member of Parliament, but any member of the House—

who is not a member of a standing special or legislative committee may, unless the House or the committee concerned otherwise orders, take part in the public proceedings of the committee, but may not vote or move any motion, nor be part of any quorum.

It says any member of the House, not a member of the Senate, Mr. Chairman. That's under the standing orders.

Under Beauchesne's there is provision for joint meetings of a committee. Certainly Mrs. Wayne is quite correct, if the members of the Senate wish to engage in a joint meeting—-

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's what it is.

Mr. Svend Robinson: This is not a joint meeting of the committee.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's what was asked for.

Mr. Svend Robinson: Mr. Chairman, this is not a joint meeting. Under Beauchesne's citation 869 there is provision for joint meetings of the committee. This is not a joint meeting. There may very well be provision for joint meetings in the future. That's not what this committee is.

Mr. Chairman, finally, under Beauchesne's citation 766, the order with respect to members only participating with the agreement of the committee is reiterated. Unless there is agreement of all members of the committee, senators shall not participate under the rules of this House.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, very quickly—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): Mrs. Wayne, no, sorry, I want to respond to this point of order. He's raised a point of order to the chair, Mrs. Wayne.

First of all, I want to thank and excuse the ministers. If they wish to avoid this part of it, I think they have some other work to do.

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I have conferred with both clerks. The consensus is that there is nothing that would prevent this committee from inviting senators. We extended the courtesy to the chair of the Senate foreign relations committee and we are attempting to extend that courtesy to the vice-chair of that committee. I'm under the guidance of both clerks, and I have references, Mr. Robinson—I can cite them if you want—that this is in the hands of the committee. I ruled as a chair that it was acceptable. The time slot I allotted was to the Liberal side when I called on Senator Stewart, and no member on that side objected.

My previous ruling stands. I intend to invite Senator Andreychuk to end the meeting with a couple of questions. You have the right to challenge the chair, of course.

Mr. Svend Robinson: And that's my—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): You do challenge the chair. All right.

So in challenging the ruling of the chair, the process is that we vote as two separate committees, the foreign affairs and defence committees. My ruling is that the senators have been properly invited, with the agreement of members, to ask questions at this meeting.

Let's go with the defence committee first. That ruling has been challenged by Mr. Robinson. Those who support the challenge to the chair made by Mr. Robinson, please indicate support for Mr. Robinson.

Ms. Marlene Catterall (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): Mr. Chair, I don't think we understand what the vote is. The motion is that the chair be now sustained—

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): That's right.

Ms. Marlene Catterall: —and those who want to support your ruling vote yes.

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): If I might, the motion is from Mr. Robinson to challenge the ruling of the chair and not support it. I think that's pretty clear, and I have begun to call the vote on that.

(Motion negatived: nays 7; yeas 3)

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): So that is lost.

Now we'll call the vote on the same motion—we may have a tie here—with the foreign affairs committee.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 5; nays 4)

The Co-Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien): We have an interesting ruling. The defence committee upholds the chair and the foreign affairs committee does not uphold the chair.

Thanks for the meeting. We're adjourned.